IR 05000336/1987011

Insp Rept 50-336/87-11 on 870519-0629.No Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Daily Operations,Backshift & Weekend Operations,App R Electrical Mod & Control Board Enchancement

ML20235Y327
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	07/17/1987
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20235Y307	List: IR 05000336/1987011 ML20235Y305
References
50-336-87-11, NUDOCS 8707250202
Download: ML20235Y327 (13)

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REGION I

Report: 50-336/87-11-Docket Nos: .50-336' License No: =DpR-65 Licensee: No_rtheast Nuclear Energy Company-Facility: Millstone Nuclear Power Station Waterford, Connecticut l :. .

l Inspection at: Millstone Unit 2 Dates: May 19, 1987 through June 29, 1987

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Inspecto'r: Theodore A. Rebelowski, Senior Resident: Inspector 6L e &GdL . :h - 7/ ole 7-Approved: E.C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date l Summary: Report No. 50-336/87-11 (May 19,- 1987 - June 29,1987)

Areas Inspected This was a routine safsty inspection (122 hours0.00141 days <br />0.0339 hours <br />2.017196e-4 weeks <br />4.6421e-5 months <br />) by the resident inspecto Areas inspected: included daily operations, backshift and weekend operations, an Appendix R electrical modification, control board enhancement, radioactive waste shipment preparations, allegation response, management changes,. refueling

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outage planning, steam generator value impact analysis review, surveillance of i seismic monitors, surveillance of-charging and service water pumps, and status of boric acid treatment programs for Steam Generators. The dedication of the licensee's training center was attende Results:

No. unacceptable conditions were identified. Preparation for the January 1988 outage has condensed the schedule to ten weeks. The preparation and transfer of: radioactive waste (21,200 curies) was completed in a safe and controlled

- manner, with excellent cooperation between health physics, operations, and engineering staff *

8707250202 870717 PDR G ADOCK 05000336 PDR

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Persons Contacted.................. ........ ............. 1 Summary of Facility Activities........ ............... . 1 Review of Previously Identified Items...................... 1 Daily Operational Safety Verification......... ........... 2 Backshift and Weekend Inspection.......................... 2 Appendix R Bockfeed Installation.................. ....... 3 . Human Factors - Control Board Enhancement Program......... 4 Radioactive Waste Shipment................................ 4 Allegation 87-A-0051, Electrical Connector Qualificatio . QA Management Changes................................ ..... 7 1 Unit 2 Refuel Outage Meeting.............................. 7 1 Steam Generator Value Impact Analysis...... .............. 8 13. Appendix R Self Audit of Licensee's Practices. . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1 Spectral Posponse Seismic Monitor Calibration............. 9 1 Surveillance Testing.......... ........................... 10 1 Boric Acid Treatment of Steam Generators.................. 11 17. Dedication of Nuclear Training Center..................... 11 1 Exit Interview............................................. 11

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DETAILS Persons Contacted Mr. S. Scace, Station Superintendent Mr. J. Stetz, Unit 1 Superintendent Mr. J. Keenan, Unit 2 Superintendent Mr. H. Haynes, Station Services Superintendent The inspector also contacted other licensee employees including members of the Operations, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Instrument and Control, Maintenance, Reactor Engineering, and Security Department . Summary of Facility Activities The plant remained at 100% power throughout the report period. During this period the licensee had numerous electrical ground indications on the Main Generator rect 1fiers. The grounds are presently under licensee review to determine if additional measures for correcting faults are to be pursue Due to the demand for power in New England, additional licensee attention was placed on high risk surveillance (Rod Checks, etc.) Planning meetings for the January 1987 refueling outage were conducted. The inspector did not identify any areas of concer . Review of Previously Identified Items (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-336/85-03-02) Radiation Survey Instrument Response to Physically Small Sources (Chips, etc.)

The licensee's report of February 5,1985 describes pitfalls in surveying small, radioactive metal chips. The report addressed the routine surveillance of highly radioactive chips and those with minimum activit Point source and possible false averaging considerations were identified, as was the potential for small chips not to be detected during routine surveys. Licensee reviews of incidents involving activated chips were performe A number of corrective actions were instituted including:

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Additional surveys of radioactive waste cutting activities which generate chip Additional visual inspection The potential for " chip" presence is to be noted on Radiation Work Permits (RWPs).

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Training sessions have been conducted for: Unit 1, 2 and 3 health physics

_ Technicians on recognition of activated chips by the Health Physics and Radwaste. Protection Supervisors. During this report period, the inspector observed continuing health physics program attention to the ability to detect activated chips. Representative samples of laundry jump suits.and head covers'were surveyed for chip retention after laundering. No abnormalities were identified. This item is close . Daily Operational Safety Verification The inspector routinely observed plant operation during daily regular and .

off-hour tours of the following plant areas:

Control Room Intake Structure Auxiliary Building Vital Switchgear Room Spent Fuel Buildin Site Fence Turbine Building Yard Areas Railroad Access (SFB)

Operator response to various alarm conditions was observed in the Control Room.- No discrepancies were identified. Control room and shift manning were-found to meet regulatory requirements. There were only a few annunciator window-displayed alarm conditions, and these were due to known out-of-service components'.

Posting and control of _ radiation and high radiation areas were inspecte The charging pump stations were in need of additional housekeeping due to observation of. slight boron encrustation on the relief valve of the No. 1 Charging Pump. This item was identified to the licensee and will be re-examined during routine inspectio The preparation for shipment of in-core assembly cut-up elements in a liner / cask for burial was witnessed during several stages. No discrepancies were identified (see paragraph 8).

The 480v switchgear rooms were clean and free of extraneous materia Areas near the containment entry were in need of housekeeping and were discussed with licensee management, and will be routinely reinspecte Control Room backpanel inspection for extraneous material identified no deficiencies. A major effort to clean and paint condenser bays and the turbine building reflected the licensee's commitment to maintain a clean

. working environmen . Backshift and Weekend Inspection Inspections of Millstone 2 were performed on June 13 (Saturday) between 7:30 pm and 10:30 pm and on June 22 (Monday) between 4:00 am and 7:00 a Activities observed included waste transfers, rotation of operating

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l l pumps, and normal watch surveillance. Ground alarms on the main I generator rectifiers were noted. The licensee completed the cleaning of i the four rectifiers and is renewing the cooling lines to the rectifiers.

l The operators and shift supervisors were alert and attentive, with no signs of fatigue, and responded appropriately to plant annunciator Control room log books, plant incident books and plant operator daily logs were reviewed. In addition, the inspector observed the control room l back panels and control room communication No unacceptable conditions were identifie . Millstone 1 & 2 Appendix R Backfeed Installation The Millstone Unit I and 2- electrical interconnection modification for meeting the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R requirement to provide an alternative shutdown capability is in progress. Plant Design Change Request 1-98-86 replaces existing 4KV bus 24F. The previous design was initiated in 1983 to allow interconnection of the Unit 1 and 2 emergency generator supplies for storm-caused blackouts. In 1984, the design basis was extended to provide for vacuum breaker switchgear control of the interconnection.

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PDCR review found that backfeed capabilities are to be demonstrated by testing equipment to feed the following circuits:

Source of Power Load to b' Tested 1) Unit 1 Reserve Station Service Unit 2 Charging Pump Transformer (RSST) "B" and/or "C" 2) Unit 1 RSST Unit 2 Charging Pump

"A" and/or "B" 3) Unit 1 Gas Turbine Generator (GTG) Unit 2 Charging Pump

"B" and/or "C" 4) Unit 1 GTG Unit 2 Charging Pump

"A" and/or "B" 5) Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Unit 2 Charging Pump

"B" and/or "C" 6) Unit 1 EDG Unit 2 Charging Pump

"A" and/or "B" 7) Unit 2 Normal Station Service Unit 1 Control Rod Drive Transformer (NSST) (CRD) Pump "A" 8) Unit 2 RSST Unit 1 CRD Pump "A" 9) Unit 2 EDG "A" Unit 1 CRD Pump "A"

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10) Unit 2 EDG "B" Unit 1 CRD Pump "A" The inspector observed construction of new breaker panels, switchgear (presently incomplete), and cabling. No deficiencies were observe PDCR review included Fire Protection Review, drawings, and safety and )

environmental impact reviews. No discrepancies were identifie The test procedures were not yet available and will be reviewed during a subsequent inspectio . Human Factors-Control Board Enhancement Program The licensee's Control Room Design Review (CRDR) has identified a number of physical changes. These include controls and switches required for i operation and during refueling / outage periods. NRR hr reviewed these I items during on-site visits and meetings. On site, the resident has attended two licensee meetings that stressed the need for detailed planning prior to commencing changes. Changes to operating panels C01, C07, and C08 scheduled prior to and during the January 1988 outage include:

-- Relocation of components

-- Control switch modification

-- Revision of meter and recorder scales

-- Switch replacement

-- Addition of main steam indicating lights

-- Adding service water flow and differential pressure computer inputs

-- Relabeling the main board

-- Replacement of indicators with digital / analog meter Sequencing of work and the need for a detailed review by the operations department to ensure no adverse impact on safety was discussed during the meetings. Work tasks have been assigned and review of work packages is underway. The inspector noted that a careful, well-reviewed plan has been formulated to implement the CRDR enhancements. The inspector will follow this activity during the operating cycle and the January 1988 outag No deficiencies were identifie . Radioactive Waste Shipment Licensee preparation for shipment of 21,200 curies of solid waste was observed by the resident inspecto Shipping Cask Air Test The licensee cleaned the spent fuel pool of activated non-fuel material, including the replaced In-Core Instrumentatio This

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Waste'was placed in a steel encased,, lead-shielded cask with crushable impact limiters. Total weight' of cask plus liner was 35 i, tons.

l Inspector' review of vendor procedure TR-0P-019-492,' Handling Procedure'for. Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc. (CNSI)~ Transport. Cask CNS-3-55, identified no discrepancie Inspections were conducted in the spent fuel building (SFB) of lift

out and draining of the cask at the spent. fuel pool. In addition,

! a radiological survey of the cask in the SFB._ railroad access _ was witnessed. In order to ensure cask integrity, a licensee leak test of the transport cask was performe The inspector witnessed pressurization of the: cask to 4 psig,.the-hold for 15 minutes, and the 30 minute drop test. .These tests were completed successfull Licensee-Quality Assurance witnessed the above tests and surveillance of the: shipping. cask. The QA inspector was-knowledge-able 'of the procedures and testing he witnessed. In addition, a Unit 2 engineer monitored complete shipping preparations and testing of the cask, p

No_ discrepancies were identified. The inspector had no further questions..in this are Radioactive Waste Shipment

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-The licensee packaged and shipped the irradiated non-fuel-bearing waste on June 1. The items shipped were identified as a Class "C" waste classification. The waste was contained in an L-3-55 Steel Cask and Liner. lThe total curie content was 21,200 curies, consisting of 7 batches of wast Documents reviewed by the inspector were:

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Bill of Lading (Chem-Nuclear Systems)

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Radioactive Shipment Manifest Forms

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Detention Worksheet

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South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control ttadioactive Waste Shipment Certification Form

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Verification of Quality Assurance Certificate for Transportation Cask

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User Checkoff Sheet

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State of Connecticut Radioactive Permit

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Instructions to Driver of Exclusive Use Vehicles No discrepancies were identified in the shipping documents.

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1 In addition, the inspector checked:

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Levels of activity at the rear of truck cab (0.1 mR/ hour)

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That the driver held a valid truck licens That the cask was properly secured to the trailer bod Also, the inspector monitored the licensee's survey of the cask, cask cover and tool box. No discrepancies were identified. The licensee stated that the shipping cask was received and accepted at Barnwell, South Carolina and was buried without incident. The inspector had no further questions in this are . ALLEGATION RI-87-A-0051, Electrical Connector Qualificatio This two part allegation concerns the environmental qualification adequacy of cable connectors in the Core Exit Thermocouple (CET) and Reactor Vessel Level Monitoring (RVLM) system Specifically, the allegation stated that, although represented as environmentally qualified by the NSSS vendor, Litton/VEAM cable connectors used in the CET system were susceptible to moisture intrusio The effect of moisture ingress in a connector would be to increase the associated CET reading uncertaint The allegation further stated that similar connectors used in the RVLM system, although retrofitted to alleviate this problem, were still potentially susceptible to moisture intrusion due to gasket and/or con-nector mating surface dimensional inaccuracies. Litton/VEAM connectors are used in the Unit 2 CET and RVLM system The inspector reviewed the technical basis, applicability, and safety significance of the allegatio Both systems provide post-accident supporting information to control room operators. Neither system inputs to a safety system nor are they relied upon for automatic safety signi-ficant action. The CETs input to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) sub-cooled margin monitor, which is required by Technical Specification 3.3.3.8 to be operable during Modes 1,2 and 3. The Action Statement for an inoperable subcooled margin monitor is to hand calculate subcooling margin every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. (This information is not normally needed at power.)

The RVLM system is used to determine reactor vessel water level during accident conditions. Redundant strings provide level step change indi-cations to control room operators. While RVLM inoperability in the post-accident mode represents a loss of important information, examination of temperature and pressure data provides a means of determining whether core voiding may have occurred, and radiation measurements provide a means of assessing fuel integrity. lne RVLM system is not essential to determining the action needed to minimize the danger to public health and s&fety. Although this system was installed in response to TMI concerns, operability is not specified in Technical Specification Therefore, connector failure does not invalidate the ability to assure safe operatio J

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1 The alleger. stated to' the' inspector that he had informed the licensee.of his concerns. The inspector found that licensee follow-up of the concern has been initiated. It was also determined that the connectors in

. question are identified as qualified in the licensee's environmental e, qualification program for electrical equipmen 'Because the technical issues raised in the allegation have potential generic implications, further NRC evaluation is anticipated. The resident inspector will~ follow licensee evaluation of this matter at Millston . QA Managemer.t Chu:gg Effective July 1, a change in the management-structure of the Quality Assurance.and. Control Department is to occur. The.new management organization will be. established as the Quality Services Department. The change is from'an operation / construction organization-to one which will better support, by site presence, operating units. Technical ll ,

specifications are to be revised the revised organization charts for all four nuclear plants. The Quality Services Department will have the following organizatio DIRECTOR QUALITY SERVICES I I I I I I I I I l i I I Manager Supervisor Supervisor Manager Procurement Assessment Assessment & Plant Quality Services Services Staff Services Quality Services The topical QA report is to be revised to address the new organization

. and job descriptions during the annual update. _The performance of the new organization and submission of revised Technical Specifications will be examined during routine inspectio . Unit 2 Refueling Outage Meeting On June 16, the licensee conducted its monthly outage meeting. The outage is' presently scheduled for commencement in January 198 The inspector's evaluation of this meeting was positive in that all attending department heads were involved in the review of all areas of responsibilities including the following.

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Schedule Reviews Project Management Assignments and statu I Generation Construction and Planning: Service Water header work scop Extraction Steam Piping replacement progra Steam Generator Sleeving & Pluggin Operations Department Addressed support personnel during outag Engineering Department Addressed a number of issue Examples are:

l Environmental Qualification (EQ) inspection program, l Steam Generator detailed work scop Maintenance Addressed the snubber program and EQ and Motor-operated valve testin In addition, schedule status was reviewed by the Instrumen: 5 & Controls (I&C) department, health physics, production test, and pur..iasin The licensee added local leak rate testing (LLRT) to the program schedul All of the above work tasks have working groups for advice in their particular areas of expertis The inspector found that the r;mmunications between the departments was excellent, in that comments were meaningful and enhanced safety aspect addressal for the outage. The inspector did not identify any areas of concern. Subsequent meetings will be monitored incident to routine inspectio . Steam Generator Value Impact Analysis The licensee has conducted a Value-Impact Study for the potential Unit 2 steam generator replacement. The fleeving and chemical cleaning that was implemented in 1985 reduced the steam generator repairs and sleeving from i 3000 tubes to 250 tubes during ths last outag _- I

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G; n- , 9 f-Items considered in the report were the total man-rems expended, the cost, and the.st'atus'o.f. sleeving and plugging of' tubes. Also considered were additional steam-generator degradations in the batwing area and the recent circumferential cracking of one tube at top of tubesheet. Tube support (eggcrate) damage is an additional concern.

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Interim Lfcensee analysis and program status aspects include: {

4 Replacement steam generator tube sheet purchase specifications are completed.and out for bid . Based on current estimates of degradation rates, .the existing repair strategy is recommended to be-retaine . Risks associated with the repair strategy are considered to justif the purchase-of replacement steam generator . A 10-day period of mobilization for sleeving operations should be pursue . A higher-through wall pitting allowance for tube dafects should be permitted. A Technical Specification change is to be submitted to NRR to allow up to.50% pitting, 6. . Replacement of the Steam Generators is tentatively planned by the

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licensee in the early 1990' The-above items will be reviewed during subsequent inspection . Appendix R~- pre-Audit of Licensee Practices On June 19 and 22, a licensee consultant conducted an Appendix R audit of contingency fire procedure and practice Identified strengths include (1) the operators' enthusiasm and knowledge of _ procedures, (2). housekeeping, (3) all fire doors were closed, and (4)

contingency fire procedure acceptabilit Areas identified as needing additional attention were communications,-

access and egress pathways, the need for additional operator aids, and review of the maintenance repair procedure The licensee indicated that the pre-audit did identify minor weaknpsses that will be corrected prior to the NRC Appendix R Audit scheduled for July 1987. The inspector had no further' questions at this tim . Spectral Response Seismic Monitor Calibration The licensee surveils the frequency response of the Seismic Event Spectral Monitoring instruments to assure maintance of the ability to

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promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of components important to safet There are three sets of seismic recorders - Vertical, Long'itudinal and Horizontal. Each recorder has three sets of four reeds with attached styli that record movement on surface plates (12 per unit). Four reeds are checked for natural frequency in each recorder each surveillance. All 12 reeds of each reccrder are tested cver three calibration period The surface plates (record plates) were examined by the inspector for abnormalities since the last calibration. No abnormalities were observed. The records of the reed stylus movements matched the markings of the record plates as shown in the surveillance procedure. In addition, an inspection of the damping data collection for two reeds was observed and all the results met the established criteri The inspector has no further questions on the celebration procedure or the results of the spectral response seismic monitor calibratio . Surveillance Testing During this report period, the following operational readiness tests were witnessed:

SP21102 Service Water Pump A Operational Readiness Test SP21118 Charging Pump A Operational Readiness Test SP21119 Charging Pump B Operational Readiness Test SP21120 Charging Pump C Operational Readiness Test Observation .

l All valve manipulations were done in a deliberate manner and the valves were restored to normal lineup upon completion of testing. The observed I suction and discharge pressures were within test criteri Vibration !

analysis identified no abnormal operating pump parameters. All test and in line instruments were properly calibrate One area in the charging pump cubicle A exhibited boron encrustation on piping near the system relief valve. This item was brought to licensee management attention and was cleaned, and will be periodically re-inspecte It should be noted that areas in the charging pump cubicle have radiation fields of 40 to 50 mR/hr. due to letdown lines in the area. The inspector's total dosage was less than 10 mR/hr. The inspector had no further questions on this surveillance tes _a

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l .' il . Boric Acid Treatment of Steam Generators The licensee is reviewing'a boric acid qualification program for possible implementation at Unit 2. Boric acid treatment (BAT) of secondary side feedwater has been used at a number of PWRs to reduce the denting phenomenon. A presentation by Northeast Nuclear Materials and Chemistry was made to the Unit 2 staff cn the technical bases for boric acid treatment, the effects on Balance of Plant (80P) components, and the i

effect on the turbine. Discussions included the effect of boric acid l carry over on secondary equipment. The major concern appears to be a mandated reduction in the inspection interval of .nain turbine, with accompanying high cost and possible critical path effects during over-hauls. Erosion / corrosion rates of carbon steel extraction lines were presented, with no material or chemistry problems being identifie The licensee's operating staff requested time to further review the material presented prior to a decision to commit to the BAT program. The inspector will follow this item during routine inspectio . Dedication of L. F. Sillin Jr. Nuclear Training Center The licensee's Nuclear Training Center was dedicated on June 26, 198 The Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Lando W. Zeck, Jr. and the Region I Administrator, William T. Russell, spoke to the audience on

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the need for professionalism and dedication to serving the public. The Regional Administrator, in a later ceremony, presented Senior Reactor Operator and Reactor Operator Certificates to operators for Haddam Neck and Millstone 1, 2 and The training facility was toured by Chairman Zech and attending members of his staff prior to his departur . Exit Interview During the inspection, meetings were held with plant management to discuss findings. No proprietary information related to this inspection was identified.

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