IR 05000423/1987026

Insp Rept 50-423/87-26 on 871116-20.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action to Improve Reactor Trip Reliability,Surveillance Testing of ECCS Sys & Cold Weather Protection

ML20149D377
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	12/17/1987
From:	Blumberg N, Finkel A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20149D368	List: IR 05000423/1987026 ML20149D363
References
50-423-87-26, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8801120301
Download: ML20149D377 (8)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /87-26 Docket N License N NPF-49 Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company _

PO Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 __

Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Inspection Conducted: November 16-20, 1987 Inspector: /M ~ / 7' 7 A. Finkel, Senyor Reactor Engineer date Approved by:

N. Blumbevg Chief date Operational [ProgramsSection Operations Branch, DRS ,

Inspection Summary: Routine, unannounced inspection on November 16-20, 1987 (Report No. 50-423/87-26)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspe. tion by one region based inspector of licensee's action to improve reactor trip breaker reliability, surveillance testing of ECCS systems and their cold weather protection, and testing emergency diesel generator logic system Results: No violations were identified.

a 8801120301 871228 PDR ADOCK 05000423 0 DCD ._

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted Northeast Nuclear Ene_rjy Company

• Clement, Unit 3 Supervisor K. Covin, Unit 3 Operations Engineer

• R. Enoch, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor

"M. Gentry, Unit 3 Engineering Supervisor

• J. Harris, Unit 3 Operations Supervisor N. Hulme, Unit 3 Engineer G. Olson, Unit 3 Operations Engineer G. Patterson, Production Test Engineer P. Privizzine, Unit 3 Maintenance Engineer

• R. Rothgeb, Unit 3 Maintenance Supervisor United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

• Raymond, Scnior Resident Inspector The inspector also held discussions with "Ser licensee personnel during the course of the inspection including opeiations, maintenance, instrumen-tation and controls, and administrative personne * Denotes those present at the exit meeting on November 20, 1987.

2.0 NRC Generic letter 83-28, Item 4.1 Reactor Trip Breaker Reliability The NRC Generic letter 83-28 discusses action to be taken by licensees and applicants as a result of the Salem anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) events. Item 4.1 of Generic Letter 83-28 discusses the subject of reactor trip system reliability improvements. The following subjects of item 4.1 were to be discussed and implemented by the licensee:

• Develop a system to assure that vendor recommended reactor trip breaker modifications are reviewed and incorporated into maintenance procedures as require * Establish a comprehensive program of preventive maintenance and surveillance testing for the reactor trip breaker * Develop test procedures to assure that the shunt trip attachment activates automatically in all PWR's that use circuit breakers in their reactor trip syste *

Establish a test program to ensure that on-line functional testing of the reactor trip system is performe The licensee's maintenance program for their Westinghouse DS-416 Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers has been developed from the Westinghouse Maintenance Program Manual for DS-416 Reactor Trip Circuit Breakers, Revision 0 docu-ment. This document was prepared for the Westinghouse Owners Group and is

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-3-the breaker manufacturer's recommended maintenance program for the DS-416 breaker. It provides specific directicn with regard to schedule, inspec-tion and testing, cleaning, lubrication, corrective maintenance and record keeping. The licensee has issued the following two procedures which comply with the recommendation of the Westinghouse Maintenance Program

Manual for the 0S-416 Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker (1) Station Procedure (SP) No. 3786AH-1, Revision 1, Change No. 1, March 31, 1987, "PM Reactor Trip Breakers Record Sheets," and, (2) Station Procedure (SP) No. MP 3786AH, Revision 1, Change No. 3, March 31,1987, "PM Procedure, Reactor Trip Breakers." __

The 05-416 Reactor Trip Breakers were serviced and tested on November 7,198 The inspector reviewed the work orders (No. M 38602376 and M38602378)

that were issued for this task to verify that the SPs reflected the re-quirements of the Westinghouse Maintenance Program Manual for PS-416 Reactor Trip Breakers and that the test results were within the acceptance criteria of their procedure In addition to the above, the inspector also reviewed the trending program that the licensee has developed for these breakers. An evaluation by the inspector of the test results and the trending data indicated that the 05-416 Reactor Trip Breakers are well

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within their procedure criteri The inspector also verified that the spring release latch assembly S/N No. 795-A855-G01 (Item.that had poten- !

tial part cracking problem) was inspected as part of the November 1987 .

inspection and maintenance program. The inspection of the potential cracking problem of the spring release latch assembly by the licensee indicated that their system of updating their maintenance procedures with industry information is operating as stated in their procedure The inspectors review of the licensee's maintenance procedures, comparison ,

of their maintenance procedures with the Westinghnuse Maintenance Program i Manual for DS-416 Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker, their updating of proce-i dures with industry problems and the trending of their data results on these breakers indicate that they have complied with the requirements of i

NRC Generic Letter 83-28.

I Actions required by NRC Generic Letter 83-28, Item 4.1 is considered completed for Millstone Unit .0 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Cold Weather Protection The inspector performed a walkdowr inspection on selected portions of the ECCS system components and the cold weather protection associated !

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with this system. The ECCS automatically initiates safety injection

conlant delivery into the reactor core on receipt of a safety injection signal (SIS). Surveillance procedure reviews and component inspections

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-4-l performed by the inspector consisted of the following ECCS components and logic systems that are associated with the receipt of an SIS:

• Safety Injection Accumulator Level Instruments

• Auto Logic / Master Relay Operation's Test (Train B)

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Actuation Logic Test of Emergency Generator Loading Sequencer f Autotest, Units A and B

• Solid State Protection System

Charging Pumps l

• Safety Injection Pumps l

Residual Heat Removal Pumps

• Containment Recirculation Pumps l

a Safety Injection Accumulators

• Selected Heat Tracing Since a minimum of one charging pump, one safety injection pump and one residual heat removal pump is required for an ESF operation, the inspector selected a component surveillance or logic test for inspection. The work orders and procedure evaluated by the inspector during this inspection are listed in attachment 1 of this repor The inspector verified that the following subjects were documented in the surveillance procedures and that the data recorded and witnessed by the inspector met the Technical Speci-fication (TS) requirements for this sit The surveillance review of procedures and test data consisted of the verification of the following criteria:

The surveillance procedures reflected the TS requirement *

The surveillance work orders were signed by the operators before the work began and at the completion of the tas *

The surveillance procedure has specific precautions that were required to be followed by the persennel performing the procedur *

Test data work sheets required the "as found" and "as left" setting to be recorded and signed by the testing personne *

Surveillance procedures specified quality co trol hold points when required by the procedure ste . . .

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• Out of tolerance conditions were noted with a review and signature of the supervisor reviewing the data sheet * A system established to assure that only the latest procedures were available to the test personne * The data of surveillance procedures are trended with results and recommendations sent to management for action when require * Cold weather protection was installed, where require During the witnessing of the Safety Injection Accumulator Level Instruments __

surveillance testing, Tank A and D, the inspector verified that the above listed subjects were complied with by the Instrumentatiun and Control (I&C)

personnel and that the instruments were left within the TS tolerance requirement During the walk down of the Auxiliary Building, elevation 4'6", the inspector verified that the heat tracing control panels were operating and that the components were within the procedure requirements. Discussions with the Plant Equipment Operators (PE0s) verified they were inspecting and documenting the heat tracing panels' status as part of their "rounds" procedures that they perform on a once per shift basi The heat tracing program as defined in Operating Procedure (0P) 3352, Revision 2, April 17, 1986, "Heat Tracing" was active during this inspection period. The PEOs verify the system operation and document their results in Operating Pro-cedure No. 3670.3, Revision 0. September 3, 1936, "Plant Equipment Operators Rounds" data sheet The heat tracing lines verified by the inspector are identified on Drawing No. 12179-EM-115A-6, "Piping and Instrumentation Diagram, Quench Spray and H Recombiner."

No violations or deviations were identifie .0 Bypass Of Nonessential Diesel Generator Trips h order for either of the Emergency Diesel Generators to trip, the shutdown relay must be energize Under non-emergency conditions, such as during the monthly surveillance, eight conditions will cause the emergency diesel generator to trip as listed below:

(1). Both emergency stop push buttons depressed (remote or local as I selected). )

(2). Low lube oil pressur (3). Engine over spee (4). Generator Primary protective relay actio ,

l (5). Low Jacket Water Pressure, i (6). High Crankcase Pressur l (7). High Jacket Water Temperatur (8), High Lube Oil Temperature, i l

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-6-Of these~eight, the last four are bypassed in accident' conditions. . Trips  :

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5-8 are in service only when the diesel has been started from either the- .

"maintenance" or."test l start" position. The accident conditions that by- '

pass these trip signals are Loss of, Power (LOP), Safety Injection Actuation (SIAs), or Containment Depressurization (CDA) signals. Any one of thase conditions will, by design, prevent the shutdown relay from being energized. -To assure that the diesel logic design complies with the requirements of Technical Specification paragraphs 4.8.1.1.2.F.12 and 4.8.1.1.2.F.13, the inspector reviewed Station Procedures (SPs) 3646A.17,  :

Revision 1, March 31, 1987, "Train A ESF with LOP Test" and SP 3448E51, Revision 0, March 11, 1987, "Diesel Sequences Actuation Time Test."

Station Procedure 3646A.17 is performed when the reactor is shutdown in- *

Mode 5 with the rector trip breakers open. Paragraph 7.15 is where i'

verification that when an SIS, LOP or COA signal is received, the non--

emergency signals (Items 5-8 listed above) are locked out of-the system and caneot override the three ESF signals. Station Procedure 3448E51 sis used to verify that each ESF signal, singularly,and in combination, will trip the lockout rela This SP tests the following ESF signals:

(1). SIS onl (2). CDA onl l (3). LOP onl ;

(4). SIS and LO l (5). CDA and LO (6). SIS Recirculation then LO .

(7). CDA Recirculation then LO *

The inspector reviewed the above referenced SPs and the data sheets I associated with these station procedures and verified that the recorded ,

data was within the TS requirements and that the operation of the ESF_  :

signals above were verifie No violations or deviations were identifie I 5.0 Quality Assurance There were no quality assurance activities associated with the areas that were evaluated by the inspector during this inspection perio i

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6.0 Exit Interview ,

l Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the '

inspection at the entrance i t.erview on November 16, 1987. The findings of the inspections were discussed with licensee representatives during the <

course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the ,

November 20, 1987,-exit interview (see Paragraph 1.0 for attendees).

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At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspectors. The licensee indicated that no proprietary information was involved within the scape of this inspectio i i

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ATTACHMENT 1 1.0 Station Procedures (SPs)

SP 3448E51, Revision 0, March 11, 1986, "Diesel Scquencer Actuation Timer Test."

SP 3448E41, Revision 0, October 14, 1986, "Train B Diesel Sequencer Actuation Logic Test."

SP 3646A.17, Revision 1, March 31, 1987, "Train A ESF with LOP Test."

SP 3646A.12, Revision 0, Change 1, August 8, 1986, "A EDG Lockout Test -

18 Months."

SP 3448E11, Revision 0, February 1, 1985, "EGLS Au.totest Test."

SP 3447001, Revision 3, August 3, 1987, "Channel Calibration of the Safety Injection Accumulator Level Instruments."

SP 36108.4, Revision 0, November 12, 1987, "Accumulator Check Valve Part Stroke Test."

SP 3448E41, Revision 0, October 14, 1986, "Train B Diesel Sequencer Actuation Logic Test."

SP 3447E01, Revision 1, March 31, 1987, "Channel Calibration of the Safety Injection Tank Pressure Instruments."

SP 3447001, Revision 3, March 31, 1987, "Channel Calibration of the Safety Injection Accumulator Level Instruments."

SP 3646A.21, Revision 0, October 5, .387, "DG Auto Start on ESF Signals."

SP 3646A.16, Revision 1, September 29,1987, "Train B Loss of Power Test."

SP 3646A.18, Revision 1, October 14,1987, "Train B ESF w/ LOP Test."

SP 3646A.8, Revision 3, October 17, 1987, "Slave Relay Testing Train A."

2.0 Operating Procedures (ops) OP3352, Revision 2, April 17,1986, Heat Tracin OP 3670.3, Revision 0, September 3, 1986, "Plant Equipment Operators (PE0) Rounds."

3.0 Maintenance Procedures (MPsj MP 3786AH, Revision 1, March 31, 1987, "PM Procedure, Reactor Trip Breakers."

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Attachment 1 -2-MP 3786 AH-1, Revision 1, March 31,1987, "PM Reactor Trip Breakers Record Sheets."

4.0 Work Orders (W0s)

WO M3-87-08247, September 21, 1987, Station Procedure 3448E11, "EGLS Autotest Test," Revision 0, Change 2, January 27, 198 WO M3-87-12640, (Train 'j, October 17, 1987, Station Procedure 3443E31,

"Tra'. A Diesel Sequencer Actuation Logic Test," Revision 1, September 15, 198 ~

WO M3-87-10301, (Train A), September 30, 1987, Station Procedure 3446B11,

"Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Operational Test,"

Revision 2, March 13, 198 i

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WO M3-86-16617, November 6, 1987, "Emergency Diesel Generator Shutdown Instrumentation," Revision 1, August 26, 198 WO M3-87-11347, (Tra.n B), November 6, 1987, "Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Operational Test," Revision 0, March 13, 198 WO M3-87-11347, (Train B) November 6, 1987, "Solid State Protection System (SSFS) Auto Logic / Master Relay Operational Test."

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