IR 05000423/1987009

Insp Rept 50-423/87-09 on 870330-0403.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Maint Areas,Including Organization,Program Implementation,Activities in Progress, Transformer Program,Trending & Qa/Qc Interfaces

ML20215L930
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	04/24/1987
From:	Bissett P, Blumberg N, Petrone C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20215L924	List: IR 05000423/1987009 ML20215L921
References
50-423-87-09, 50-423-87-9, NUDOCS 8705130012
Download: ML20215L930 (10)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report N /87-09 Docket N License No. NPF-49 Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270 Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear power Station, Unit 3 Inspection At: Waterford, Connecticut Inspection Conducted: March 30 - April 3, 1987 m

,f Inspectors: 2/10 }/fif ( ssett,

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Reactor Engineer _ 7123/ Y7

/ dge d' M C. Petrone, Lead Reactor Engineer 7 U date Approved by: # }

N. Blumberg, Acting Chief, pperational date Programs Section, Operations Branch, DRS Inspection Summary: Routine, unannounced inspection on March 30 - April 3, 1957 (Report No. 50-4YDliF09).

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee maintenance organization, maintenance program, maintenance program implementation, major maintenance activities in progress, transformer maintenance program, maintenance trending, and QA/QC interface Results: No violations were identifie PDR ADOCK 05000423 0 PDR

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

• C, Clement, Millstone Unit 3 Superintendent G. Clossius, QA Supervisor

• R. Enoch, Instrument and Control Supervisor

"R. Rothgeb, Maintenance Supervisor

• S. Scace, Millstone Station Superintendent USNRC J. Shediosky, Senior Resident Inspector F. Casella, Resident Inspector The inspector also held discussions with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection, including operations, maintenance, quality assurance and administrative personne * Denotes those present at the exit meeting on April 3, 1987.

2.0 Maintenance Organization Maintenance activities are controlled and conducted by the Maintenance and Instrument and Control (!&C) departments at Millstone, Unit The mechanical and electrical groups make up the Maintenance Department with

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the I&C Department constituting a separate entit Both departments report to the Millstone, Unit 3 Superintendent, who in turn reports to the Station Superintenden .0 Maintenance Program 3.1 Scope and Criteria Administrative controls were reviewed to evaluate the licensee's program for implementing requirements associated with preventive and corrective maintenance activities. The objectives were to ensure that the licensee's maintenance program conformed to the following requirement CFR 50, Appendix B

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Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program (Operation)

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ANSI N18.7-1976, Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance j for the Operational phase of Nuclear Power Plants i

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Millstone Point, Unit 3, Final Safety Analysis Report

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3.2 Program Review / Implementation Plant maintenance programs were reviewed to determine their effect on the safe operation of the plant. In addition to a program review,

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NRC inspectors witnessed ongoing maintenance activities, and l

discussed maintenace-related activities and administrative controls '

with appropriate personnel including maintenance and I&C department ;

i supervision, technicians, tradesmen and interfacing departments such '

as Operation The backlog of scheduled m.intenance was also i -

reviewed to determine the impact, if any, on safety-related equipment -

operability. Also reviewed were present staffing levels, maintenance backlog, and management involvement in the maintenance area. In addition quality assurance / quality control (QA/QC) involvement with ,

i maintenance activities was evaluate :

Interviews were held with maintenance and I&C personnel to evaluate i those controls in place used to identi fy, schedule, track and j

document maintenance activities, including both preventive and corrective maintenance. All maintenance is controlled via an autorrated work order (AWO), which is part of the Production

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Maintenance Management System (PMMS). The PMMS is a computerized maintenance management information system which provides a mechanism for organizing and controlling maintenance activities, including such information as:

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Equipment nameplate data, TS schedules and maintenance status;

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On-line inquiry of Work Order status by component, work center l or system;

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Storage of maintenance and I&C history by task, component and -

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Identification of maintenance backlog, priorities and approval ;

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Scheduling of preventive and corrective maintenance tasks and

. TS surveillances; and ,

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On-line updating on a per-shift basi ! Both the maintenance and I&C departments have a designated individual l l (PMMS Planner), who routinely works with this system to plan and

schedule daily and future maintenance task ! The scheduling and subsequent initiation of any particular work l activity is accomplished 1) directly through the initiation of an i AWO, or 2) indirectly through a trouble report, which in turn, i

generates an AW The trouble report system enables all plant l

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, 4 personnel to identify maintenance problem On a daily basis, the respective PMMS Planner reviews the PMMS for newly generated Trouble Reports, and subsequently initiates an AWO or rejects the Trouble Report if it is a duplicatio One, two, or three page work orders, dependent upon the scope and type of work, are generated to control the conduct of maintenanc Quality Control (QC) inspection reports, procedures, procurement documents, etc. along with the appropriate AWO constitute the work package. The inspectors reviewed the records of both random and selected maintenance tasks performed on safety-related equipment to verify the followin Required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initiation of work activities

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Approved procedures and/or instructions were used

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Appropriate post-maintenance testing was completed prior to declaring a system or equipment operable

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Hold points were appropriately identified and completed

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Qualified test equipment and tools were identified

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Procedures and appropriate data sheets were properly completed

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Acceptance criteria were met

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Appropriate reviews were completed as required

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Records were assembled, stored and retrievable as part of the maintenance history The inspectors determined that the attributes Itsted above were accomplished as require No violations were identifie .3 Witnessing of Ongoing Maintenance Activities 3. !D' Steam Generator _(S/G)_Handhole Covers The inspectors observed the reinstallation of 'O' Steam Generator handhole covers, which had to be repaired as a result of gasket failure. The entire repair of these two covers were performed under AWO M387-03352, 03401, and 0376 These three work orders covered the removal and reinstallation (03352) of the damaged handhole covers; the verification that the other S/G handhole covers were set at preselected torque valves and showed no evidence of

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. 5 prior leakage (03401); and the weld repair of the covers and the 'O' S/G handhole gasket seating surfaces (03766).

During the reinstallation of the covers, the mechanics noted that the upper handhole cover was not seating up parallel to the S/G handhole seating surfac They felt that this was a result of procedural inadequac The procedure called for an alternate torquing sequence of the cover bolts. This alternate torquing sequence displays good engineering prutice; however, the mechanics felt that the initial increase in torque increments was too larg This resulted in the cover being somewhat tilted after the

1. 1 bolt was eventually torqued to its design specificatio This tilt was lessened as the remaining seven bolts were tightened; however feeler gauge measurements of the clearance between the S/G shell and the handhole cover indicated that an unevenness persisted (minimal clearance was noted at the #1 bolt). This would indicate an unevenness on the crush of the flexitallic gasket, which could possibly result in eventual gasket failure and S/G leakag The mechanics brought this concern to the attention of their supervisor and cognizant enginee After careful evaluation, a non-intent change was made to the procedure which corrected the problem and both covers were reinstalled. Followup measurements indicated that the covers were seated evenl The observation of this activity, including a review of the work packages and discussions with involved personnel verified the followin Personnel were aware of the scope of the maintenance activities

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Personnel were qualified

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Supervisors maintained adequate oversight of the work activity

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QC coverage was provided where specified in the inspection plan

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Adequate corrective action was being taken

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Approved, up-to-date procedures were utilized

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Administrative approvals were obtained prior to commencing work

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Measuring and test equipment used were calibrated e

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Parts and materials were adequately identified

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Adequate controls were in place to assure that '

applicable post maintenance testing requirements were '

accomplishe .3.2 Main Steam Isolation Valve Maintenance  !

The four main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) Sulzer, Model i ISF-IC, 30 inch globe valves, had developed steam leaks during operation. Steam leaks had developed between the solenoid manifold block and the valve body. These blocks are bolted to the valve body and sealed with flexitallic gaskets. During this shutdown, the two blocks on each of the four valves were removed and inspected. The steam leaks had caused some steam cutting (erosion) of the gasket seating surface In addition, the blocks had warped slightly. These blocks are steel, approximately 24" x 6" x :

6", and are machined with parts to accept the four !

solenoids which operate the MISVs. To repair the warpage '

these blocks were re-machined ( 007 inch maximum) to achieve flatness. The gasket seating surfaces on the valve bodies were machined approximately .090 inch deeper and the :

original .187 inch thick flexitallic gaskets replaced with l

.250 inch gaskets. These modifications were recommended by the vendor (Sulzer) technical representatives and approved by the licensee's 50R !

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The inspector reviewed related documentation, witnessed the repair activities, and held discussions with licensee '

personnel to veri fy that those attributes listed in

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paragraph 3.3.1 were accomplishe .

The inspector witnessed solenoid and manifold block reassembly, and machining of the MSIV valve bodies. The inspector also examined the completed installation on the right side of valve 27C, and the left side of 278, and verified that the four solenoids and eight electrical cables had been installed in the correct location on eac i The release for work had been signed by a Senior Reactor Operator. QC inspections were signed off satisfactorily for the work complete Review of calibration records for the three torque wrenches being used verified they were in calibratio The inspector also witnessed stroke testing of MISV-27 i t

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Following reassembly, the licensee experienced difficulty stroking several of the MSIVs due to sticking of the solenoid valves. Two of the solenoids were replaced with on hand spares. The other six solenoids were disassembled and inspected. Some lapping was performed on the valve intervals to allow freer movement of the valve pisto These solenoids were reinstalled satisfactorily on April 2, 1987. The inspector reviewed the results of surveillance test 3616A.1-3, performed on April 3, and noted that all four MSIVs met the 5 second maximum closing time requirement During a tour of the MSIV valve room the inspector noted that the glass faces on two local air pre:;sure gauges were broke These pressure gages locally monitor the air supply to the MSIV bypass valve actuators. The inspector reported these to the licensee's I&C supervisor who stated that he would have them repaired.

l Based on the inspectors reviews, observations, and discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector did not identify any concerns with the licensee's msintenance of these valves. However, one week subsequent to the restart of the reactor, the licensee experienced more problems with l

the MSIV solenoids and decided to shutdown the plant to investigat The resident inspector is performing a followup inspectio .3.3 Maintenance of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator The licensee had issued work orders MS-8704160, MS- 8704244 and MS-8704245 to troubleshoot and repair a slow starting problem on the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG). This included inspection and cleaning of air start system filters, replacement of air start solenoids, and recalibration of the engine tachomete The inspector witnessed recalibration and re-installation of one air start solenoid valv A calibrated portable stroboscope (Type 4912) was used to calibrate the tachomete The licensee's QC inspectors witnessed these activities and verified proper crimping of a terminal lug i

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on a solenoid hea During a tour of the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator Room, the inspector noted that the jacket water temperature gage to the oil cooler (3EGS-T!260) and the jacket water temperature gage to the engine (3EGS-TI250) had expired calibration stickers (due date 2/87) on them. The inspector reviewed the licensee's calibration program and

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noted that these gages are designated to be calibrated "as needed." The I&C supervisor stated that these gages had been incorrectly labeled with a 2/87 due date. The labels were corrected prior to the exit meetin The licensee completed these repairs, re performed the startup surveillance tests, and verified both diesels met the start time requirement of 10 second . Transformer Inspection Mflistone Unit 3 has six large power transformers, which include two main generator transformers, two normal station service transformers (NSST), and, two reserve station transformers (RST). During normal operation the emergency busses are supplied by the main generator through the "A" NSS On a trip of the main generator, the emergency busses are supplied from the grid through the "A" RSS The inspector reviewed the licensee's program for the maintenance and surveillance of these transformers. Review of the OPS Form 3670.3-3 checklist used by plant operations .

personnel on their outside rounds indicated that the following areas were checked at least dail Fire Protection Deluge Valve Pit

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Abnormal Alarms

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011 level

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Winding Temperature

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Oil Temperature

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Nitrogen Pressure The inspector reviewed a two week sample (Feb. 1-14,1987)

of completed checkoff sheets (OPS Form 3670.3-3) and verified they had been signed off satisfactoril The inspector also reviewed the licensee's plans for periodic testing of large transformers and noted they plan major tests for their first refueling outage (scheduled for November, 1987) and each subsequent refueling outage. A review of procedure PT1411A/21411A/3411A, "Large Power Transformers Test Procedure," Revision 1. dated June 29, 1983, revealed that the following would be performed each refueling outag Doble tests of the transformer windings

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High and low side bushings, and lighting arrestors

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Ratio test of the in-service transformer tap

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Doble, hypot or megger tests of buswork or cables

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011 sample analysis

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. 9 The procedure also contained appropriate precautions, prerequisites, and restoration step The inspector examined each transformer and verified that the oil temperature, winding (copper) temperature (s), and oil level gages were reading normally. The cooling fans on the energized transformers were operating satis-factoril No oil leaks or physical damage were eviden The inspector examined the nameplate data on the transformers, compared it to the data contained in the design specification (NU-015), and verified it to be Correc Based on these reviews, discussions and visual examinations the inspector concluded that the licensee had established a comprehensive program for the surveillance and preventive maintenance of large transformer No violations were observed during the conduct of the above observed activitie Personnel were found to be well-trained, conscientious individual Supervisory awareness and involvement was adequat .4 Maintenance Trending The maintenance and I&C supervisors, informally monitor equipment trends through their reviews of AW0s, LERs, etc. They are also periodically provided with a " Hit List" which denotes those components which experienced the largest percentage of failures or problems during a specified time frame. These identified components and their associated failures are then further reviewed to determine if any degraded trend in performance is developing. Appropriate '

corrective measures following this review might include component replacement, an increase in the frequency to which preventive L maintenance measures occur, or any variety of measures necessary to insure continued operabilit Both Supervisors stated that the forthcoming revision of the Preventive Maintenance Management System software should provide a better means for tracking and readily identifying repetitive equipment failures and maintenance trends for both primary and secondary equipmen The inspectors had no further question .0 Quality Assurance / Quality Control (QA/QC) Interface

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Discussions with QA/QC Supervisors and QC inspectors and a review of completed work packages provided sufficient evidence of QA/QC involvement with site activities. In addition to routine inspection hold points, the ,

NUSCO QA and NNECO QA/QC groups perform audits, surveillances and activity '

observations. Management is kept apprised of associated findings and resolution of these findings appeared adequat P

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', 10 Discussions with the onsite NNECO QA Supervisor revealed that reorganiza-tional changes would be taking place in July,1987. Presently, as noted above, there exists organizationally a Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO) QA group and a Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) QA/QC group. Quality Assurance representation is found both at the Millstone site and at the corporate level, located in Berlin, Connecticu Presently, both corporate and onsite QA groups are totally separate from each other, in that they fall organizationally under different Vice Presidents. Onsite QA activities fall under the control of the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), whereas corporate QA is part of the Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO). Both NNECO and NUSCO Vice Presidents report to the same Senior Vice President. It is at this level where disagreements between NUSCO QA (corporate) and the Millstone station are ultimately resolved if resolution is unattainable at the lower level Disagreements between NNECO QA (onsite) and the Millstone station are resolved at the Station Superintendent level if resolution is unattainable at the lower level Under the new reorganization all quality functions will fall under the cognizance of NUSCO. These changes are designed to avoid the duplication of effort that, in the past, has occurred in various areas while fulfilling the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix 8. Also this change will clearly create a distinct separation between QA and site operation The inspectors stated that a review of these changes will be subject to future NRC inspection :

The inspectors also reviewed selected QA surveillances and QC inspection plans that were performed of maintenance activities conducted during this mid-cycle outage. Activities reviewed included 1) Reactor Coolant pump seal removal and replacement, 2) Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) seat leakage repair, 3) 480 volt load center PMS, 4) 'O' S/G handhole cover repair, and 5) snubber inspection Any concerns identified were adequately resolved in a timely fashio The inspectors had no further question .0 Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee management representatives (see section 1.0 for attendees) at an exit meeting on April 3,1987. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection at that tim At no time during this inspection was written material provided to the licensee by the inspector.

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