IR 05000245/1987026

Emergency Preparedness Insp Repts 50-245/87-26,50-336/87-22 & 50-423/87-20 on 871007-09.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Observation of 871008 Annual Emergency Excercise. Emergency Response Actions Adequate

ML20236C435
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	10/15/1987
From:	Lazarus W, Schumacher J, Thomas W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236C431	List: IR 05000245/1987026 ML20236C429
References
50-245-87-26, 50-336-87-22, 50-423-87-20, NUDOCS 8710270179
Download: ML20236C435 (6)

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'U.S. NUCLEAR' REGULATORY COMMISSION-

REGION I

Report 2No.- c50-245/87-26, 50-336/87-22,and 50-423/87-20-Docket.N , 50-336 and.50-423 I

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License No.: .DPR-21, DPR-65 and NPF-49 Priority Category B Licensee: . Northeast Nuclear Energy Company '

P.O. Box 270  ;

Hartford, Connecticut, 06141-0270

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Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear-Power Station Inspection At:-Waterford. Connecticut

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Inspection-Conduct d:- r 1987

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Inspectors: /m , nn .-. - A/AVMf l W. Thomas ~, Team lehd6f, EPS, /date  :

EP&RPB ,DRSS'  !

JobV O ' .;

.-Schumacher, Senior EP ' ' 1 Specialist,'EPS, EP&RPB, DRSS date-

- C. Conklin, EP Specialist, EPS, EP&RPB, DRS ,

T. Tuccinardi, EP Specialist, EPS, EP&RPB,' DRSS i W. Raymond, SRI 'l S ' Barber, RI e Section Chief, DRP Approved By: ,M /v i P7

- W. 64.izqr'yt, Chief, EPS, date EP&RPB, DR5S Inspection-Summary: Inspection on October 7-9, 1987 (Report No l

.50-245/87-26,.50-336/87-22 and 50-423/87-20)

Areas Inspected: Routine announced emergency preparedness inspection and j observation of the licensee's annual emergency exercise performed on October 1 8, 1987. The inspection was performed by a team of seven NRC Region I

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Results: No violations were identified. Emergency response actions were adequate to provide protective measures for the health and safety of the publi I B710270179 871020 PDR ADOCK 05000245 G PDR.

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DETAILS 1.. Persons Contacted i

The followingilibensee representatives attended the exit meeting held on October 9, 198 E. Mroczka, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Engineering and c

Operations

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.E. Molloy, Supervisor of Emergency Preparedness, NUSCO D. Aloi, Emergency Preparedness, NUSCO

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W. Romberg, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

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C. Borea, Radiological Assessment Branch, NUSCO W. Buch, Millstone Emergency Preparedness Coordinator R. Rodgers, Manager, Radiological Assessment, NVSCO J.'Kangley, Senior Engineer 1 S. Scace, Station Superintendent t

C. Hill, NUSCO L J. Stetz,' Unit 1 Superintendent The team observed and interviewed several licensee emergency. response personnel, controllers and observers as they performed their assigned functions during the exercis . Emergency Exercise .

The Millstone Station Partial-participation exercise was conducted on October 8, 1987 from 8:00 AM to 2:00 P .1 Pre-exercise Activities Prior to the emergency exercise, NRC Region I representatives held meetings and had telephone discussions with licensee represent-atives to discuss objectives, scope and content of the exercise scenario. As a result, changes were made.in order to clarify certain objectives, revise certain portions of the scenario and ensure that the scenario provided the opportunity for the licensee  !

to demonstrate those areas previously identified by NRC as in need of corrective actio NRC observers attended a licensee briefing on October 7, 1987, and participated in the discussion of emergency response actions expected during the various phases of the scenario. The licensee stated that controllers would intercede in exercise activities to prevent scenario deviation or disruption of normal plant operation l

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i The exercise scenario included the following events:.

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'- Loss ^of one barrier due to an RCS leak;. ]

- Failure off the Hydrogen Purge containment isolation valves; .

- LossLof coolant accident wit'h minor fuel damage;

- An offsite release;

-Declaration of Alert and-. General Emergency Classifications; Calculation.of offsite dose consequences;. and .,.

'. Recommendation of protective actions to state official .2.LActivities Observed :I d

During the conduct of the licensee's exercise, seven NRC team -]

members made. detailed observations of the activation and. augment- ,

ation ef'the emergency-organization, activation.of emergency-  !

response fac'ilities, and actions of emergency response personnel during the operation of the' emergency response. facilities. The j

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following activities were observed:- Detection, classification and assessment of scenario events; ' Direction and coordination of the emergency response; 1 i . Augmentation of the emergency organization and response facility activation;

Notification of licensee personnel and offsite agencies of pertinent plant status information; Communications /information flow, and recordkeeping; I Assessment and projection of offsite radiological dose and consideration of protective actions; j Provisions for inplant radiation protection; Performance of offsite and inplant radiological surveys; Maintenance of site security and access control; 1 Performance of technical support, repair and corrective actions; )

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11. . Assembly, accountability and. evacuation of personnel; and 12. Management of recovery operation !

3.0 Exercise Observations

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The NRC . team noted that the licensee's activation and. augmentation of  !

the ' emergency. organization, activation of the emergency response facil-ities,land use of the facilities were generally consistent with their .

emergency response plan and implementing procedures. The team also I noted the following actions that were indicative of their ability-to

' cope with abnormal plant conditions:

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-Positive command and control of all emergency response facilities-was demonstrated by the respective managers; i

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Classifications made by the Control Room and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF)' staff were prompt.and correct, and subsequent notifications were timely;

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Offsite d m projections were performed often and differences  ;

between corporate and site calculations were quickly resolved;

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The Offsite Based Information System (0FIS) was an invaluable tool in providing plant information and data to the various staff members;

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The use of the laptop computer based parameter display was an  ;

effective method of data presentation and enhanced exercise real-ism; and

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Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) equipment and procedures were adequately demonstrated. Personnel operating PASS and analyzing PASS samples were very knowledgeabl >

3.1 Areas Requiring Follow-up o

The NRC team identified the following areas which could have degraded.the response and need to be evaluated by the licensee for corrective action. These items are tracked as Inspector Follow-up Items (IFI).

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50-245/87-26-01, 50-336/87-22-01 and 50-423/87-20-01; The Shift Supervisor Staff Assistant (SSSA) reported the wind direction incorrectly during offsite notifications (winds

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. blowing'"to". rather than "from"). lAlthough 1ater corrected,

< 'this could.have resulted.in incorrect protective action decision makin .i '4 0' Licensee! Actions on Previously Identified. Items,

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. The following? items were identified during the previous.wxercise -

(Inspection Report Nos.- 50-245/86-23, 50-336/86-29 and b0-423/86-36).

. Based upon' observations made by the NRC team during the exercise the-

-following Open Items were.not' repeated and are' closed:.

(CLOSED)' 50-245/86-23-02,150-336/86-29-02 and 50-423/86-36-02: Station-accountability.was not demonstrated during'this exercise due to a k security system hardware failur .(CLOSED) 50-245/86-23-04, 50-336/86-29-04.and 50-423/86-36-04: . The CE0 (was not fully. aware of. the location of offsite teams in' relation to the

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.(CLOSED) 50-245/86-23-06, 50-336/86-29-06.and 50-423/86-36-05: The NESS j did not operate properly throughout the exercise; and-(CLOSED) 50-245/86-23-07, 50-336/86-29-07 and 50-423/86-36-07: No announcements were made.over the plant 'page concerning plant condition .In' addition,'the PA didlnot work in the TSC throughout the exercis .0 Licensee _ Critique The NRC team attended the licensee's post-exercise critique on October 9, 1987, during which the key licensee controllers discussed observa-tions of the exercise. The licensee indicated these observations would be evaluated and appropriate corrective actions taken, i

6.0 Exit' Meeting and NRC Critique The NRC team met with the licensee representatives listed in Section 1

'of this report at the end of the inspection ~. The team-leader summarized

the observations made during the exercis .The licensee was informed that previously identified items were adequately addressed and no violations were observed. Although there-were areas identified for corrective action, the NRC team determined that within the scope and limitations of the scenario, the licensee's

. performance demonstrated that they could implement their Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures in a manner which would

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-adequately provide ~ protective measures for the health.and safety of.the-publi Licensee. management acknowledged the findings and indicated that appro-priate action would be.taken regarding the identified open ite At no time during this inspection did.the inspectors provide any written information to the license .. ;

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