ML20207F152

Notice of Violation from Investigation Rept 1-94-021 on 940506-960329.Violation Noted:Between 740831-910407,licensee Made Changes to Facility Described in Safety Analysis Rept for Refueling Core Offloads Without Performing Evaluation

ML20207F152
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	05/25/1999
From:	NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:
Shared Package
ML20207F108	List: ML20207F104 ML20207F145 ML20207F152
References
EA-96-151, NUDOCS 9906080081
Download: ML20207F152 (4)

Text

]q t1AY-25-1999L 08:02T _ USNRC RI/OFC OF, REG ADt1 blu m x41 e. u viu -

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' s ENCLOSURE 1 NOTICE OF VIOLATION.

-  ; Northeast Nudear Energy Company Docket No. 50-245 Licenae No. DPR-21

- Millstone 1

- EA 96-151

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During an investigation conduded by the NRC Office of Investigations from May 6,1994 to March 29,1996, violations of NRC requirements were identified.' In accordance with~ the " General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violations are listed below- .

~A.- ;10' CFR 50.59(a) allows licensees to make changes to the facility or procedures as

-desenbod in the safety analysis report, without prior Commission approval unless the I change involves an unreviewed safety qesstion (USQ).

10 CFR 50.59(b) requires, in part, that the licensee maintain written safety evaluations that

- provide the bases for the determination that the change does not involve a USQ.

' Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Section 9, stated that the normal heat load for the spent fuel pool (SFP) during a refueling outage (RFO) was based on a partial cora offload decayed for 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br />, and the emergency (abnormal) heat load was based on a full core omend decayed for 250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br />. T' c UFSAR also stated that the SFP cooling heat exchangers were designed to remove the maximum normal heat load from the fuel pool, and that the SFP cooling system and the shutdown cooling (SDC) system, working together, could remove the emergency heat load. l Contrary to the above, between August 31,1974 and April 7,1991, the licensee made changes to the facility descnbed in the safety analysis report for refueling core offloads

' without performing an evaluation to provide the basis that the changes did not itivolve a

USQ. The licensee routinely performed core offloads without assuring that the specified i

decay times in the UFSAR had been met, and the licensee did not perform an analysis to assure that the design SFP heat loads were not exceeded. Specifically,

• Full core offloads were commenced less than 250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br /> after shutdown during RFOs 2 -4 and 7 - 13. In all but three of these RFOs, fuel transfer began before the reactor had been shutdown for 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br />.

• A partial core offload was commenced less than 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> after shutdown during RFO 5. (01013)

.B. - 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be

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' accomplished in accordance with documented instructions or procedures.

' Contrary to the above, between 1980 and 1991, the licensee provided augmented cooling to the SFP, an activity affecting quality, without documented instructions or procedures.

Spec;rically, the rcensee used the SDC system to augment the SFP cooling system during

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?Enclosure1 2 refueling operations with flow through the SFP cooling and SDC discharge intertie valves.

No procedure existed for operation of the SFP cooling and SDC- systems in this

configuration. (01023); , .

C. 10 CFR 50.9(a) requires, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee be complete and accurate in all material respects.

Contrary to the above, in the. submitted request for License Amendment 40 dated June 24, 1988, the licensee failed to provide the NRC complete and accurate information conceming the performance of core offloads. In an analysis submitted to the NRC to support the license amendment to increase the fuel storage capacity of the SFP, the licensee stated that l

it analyzed two scenarios for fuel offload.to the SFP. However, the licensee failed to j indicate, in that analysis, that its offload practices were different than the stated analyzed scenarios. Specifically, the licensee stated that the analysis performed to obtain the decay heat load and the bulk temperature profile for the SFP was based on conservative assumptions. These assumptions included: (1) a normal discharge, described as one third of the core discharged after 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br /> of decay in the reaMor; and (2) an abnormal condition, described as the full core discharged with fuel transfer beginning 250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown. This description implies that those scenarios represented the actual ,

methods used by the licensee to discharge fuel from the reactor core. As such, this I information was not complete and accurate because it did not reflect that full core offloads were routinely performed with fuel transfer beginning before the reactor had been shutdown for 250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br /> as described above. The actual conditions for the majority of the fuel offloads performed by the licensee were less conservative with respect to SFP heat load than the j conditions described in the analyzed scenarios. This information was material in that the time the fuel transfer begins is integral to the assessment of SFP heat removal capabilities.

It was assumed that the supporting analysis bounded the actual conditions that would exist in the SFP during a core offload. (01033)

D. 10 CFR 50.9(a) requires,in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee be complete and accuratein all material respects.

10 CFR 50.73(b)(2)(ii)(C) requires that the narrative required to be included in a Licensee Event Report shall contain the dates and approximate times of occurrences of the events ,

being reported.

Contrary to the above, on October 18,1993, in a Ucensee Event Report (LER) (No.93-011) l submitted to the NRC to report a condition outside of the design basis of the plant, the licensee failed to provide complete information conceming the performance of core offloads.

The licensee reported that conditions may have existed where the SFP cooling system may have been ir,c.psNe of rnaintaining the SFP temperature below the 150 *F design limit when I performing full core offloads and described a scenario in which fuel transfer began 150 l hours after reactor shut down. However, the information provided was not complete in that it did not report tne dates of occurrences of at least seven refueling outages (RFOs 2 -4 and i 8 - 11), prior to the submittal of the LER, when full core offloads we e actually commenced before the reactor had been shutdown for 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br />. This information was material in that the NRC relies on LERs to assess the significance of events, assess licensee performance, 9

MAY-25 _1999 08:03_ UbNNC Rl/DFC u_ NcG ADM 61035/:>d41 P.09/10

7 Enclosure 1 3 and to identify issues that may impact the health and safety of the publ'm. In this case, the

' NRC could not accurately assess the' safety significance or licensee perfonnance without the specific information that was omitted. (01043) .

T.us is a Severity Level 111 problem (Supplement 1).

.The NRC has concluded' that you have already addressed the broad, programmatic problems that leid to the violations cited in the enclosed Notice in your response to the 52,100,000 civil penalty.

However, if you choose to respond, clearly markyour response as a " Reply to a Notice of Velation," l and send it to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC -

Resident inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice).

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

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' if you choose to respond, your response will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).

Therefore, to the extent possible, the response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be placed in the PDR without redaction.

Dated at King of Prussia, PA this 25th day of May 1999 -

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f lMAY-25-1999 t 08:03.- USNRC RI/OFC OF REG ADM 6103375241 P.10/10

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- - ENCLOSURE 2-i . SYNOPSIS-lThis investigation was-initiated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of-Investigations (01) Region I-(RI), on May 60 1994, to determine whether-Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) wrformed nuclear fuel offloads at Millstone Nuclear Power Station. Unit 1.(M)1), in conformance with its NRC license: prcperly. evaluated employee concerns relative to this

~ activity; and. reported any identified noncompliance to the NRC in a timely.-

complete and accurate manner. This investigation was later expanded-to ascertain'whether officials at NNECO/MP1 have knowingly and intentionally provided the NRC with incdeplete and inaccurate information in a license amendment application and utilized unapproved and.unanalyzed s'ystems' configurations in the cooling of the MP1 spent fuel pool (SFP).

- Based on the' evidence developed during this investigation it is concluded

-that.

1)' In many instances MP1 staff, without the appropriate engineering analyses, willfully performed reactor fuel. offloads in a manner' not consistent with MP1's FSAR. FSAR updates._and License Amendments:

'2) NNECO willfully submitted incomplete 'and inaccurate information to the NRC'

-in its request for License Amendment 40: l

- 3) A former Supervisor, .N; clear Licensing Department, and a Senior Engineer, Nuclear Licensing Department, deliberately caused MP1 management not to report E the REF 92-73 issues in a timely manner. MP1 management willfully failed to

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' ensure timely reporting of the issues associated with the REF;

. 4) A former MF1 Supervisor of Reactor Engineering, deliberately pre >ared an- a incomplete and inaccurate LER (No. 93 011), which was submitted to t1e NRC on October 18. 1993. NNECO management willfully failed to ensure the submittal.

.of complete and accurate information in the LER: .and

5) . An Operations Shift Manager, MP1, deliberately utilized unapproved and unanalyzed systems' configurations,.to augment MP1 SFP cooling during RFOs

.from about 1980 to 1991..without procedures to govern those activities. MP1 management willfully utilized unapproved and unanalyzed systems' configurations to augment SFP cooling during RFOs. .

l JCase No. 1 94 021- 1.

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