Text

Forwards Amend 1 to Probabilistic Safety Study
	ML20077M495
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	09/06/1983
From:	Counsil W; NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO., NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To:	Youngblood B; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	B10887, NUDOCS 8309120352
	Download: ML20077M495 (160)
	v • d • e

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gg General Offices

Seldon Street Berlin Connecticut j j,,*,((QQ,",,"7] P.O. BOX 270

.c., .. ... %. co,,.- HARTFORD. CONNECTICUT 061414270 L t ; ",';a'TylJO,g , (203) 666-69M September 6,1983 Docket No. 50-423 B10887 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations Attn: Mr. B. 3. Youngblood, Chief Licensing Branch No. I Division of Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Transmittal of Amendment I to the l Submittal of Probabilistic Safety Study (PSS) l l On behalf of the participants in the Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit No. 3, five (5) copies of Amendment No. I to the Probabilistic Safety Study (PSS) are herein submitted.

Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY et.al.

BY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY Their Agent j, ?

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/ / # 2422 W. G. Counsil Senior Vice President i i k

B309120352 830906 PDR ADOCK 05000423 A PDR

STATE OF CONNECTICUT)

) ss. Berlin COUNTY OF HARTFORD )

Then personally appeared before me W. G. Counsll, who being duly sworn, did state that he is Senior Vice President of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, Applicants herein, that he is authorized to execute and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Applicants herein and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

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I INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS FOR AMENDMENT 3 J

Remme old pages and insert Amendment 1 pages as instructed below (amendment pages bear the amendment number and date at the foot of the page).

Vertical bars (change bars) have been placed in the outside margins of revised text pages and tables to show the location of any technical changes originating with this amendment. A few unrevised pages have been reprinted because they fall within a run of closely spaced revised pages. No change bars are used on '

figures or on new sections, appendices, questions and responses, etc.

Transmittal letters along with these insertion instructions should either be filed or entered in Volume I of Part I, in front of any existing letters, instructions, distribution lists, etc.

Remove Insert Location V-7 (Table V-1) V-7 (Table V-1) Vol.1, Intro. & Summary Figure V-1 Figure V-1 Vol.1, Intro. & Summary Figure V-2 Figure V-2 Vol.1, Intro. & Summary Figure V-3 Figure V-3 Vol.1, Intro. & Summary Figure V4 Figure V4 Vol.1, Intro. & Summary 1.1-34 1.1-34 Vol. 2, Section 1.1 1.1-37 1.1-37 Vol. 2, Section 1.1 1.140 1.140 Vol. 2, Section 1.1 4.1-12 4.1-12 Vol. 3, Section 4.1 4.4-52 4.4-52 Vol. 8, Section 4.4 5.1-12 5.1-12 Vol.10, Section 5.1 vi vi Vol.11, Section 6.0 vil vii Vol.11, Section 6.0 6.1-9 6.1-9 Vol.11, Section 6.1 '

6.1-11 6.1-11 Vol.11, Section 6.1 6.1-12 6.1-12 Vol. I1, Section 6.1 6.1-13 6.1-13 Vol. I1, Section 6.1

! 6.1-15 6.1-15 Vol.11, Section 6.1 l 6.1-16 6.1-16 Vol. I1, Section 6.1 6.1-17 6.1-17 Vol.11, Section 6.1 6.1-20 6.1-20 Vol. I1, Section 6.1 6.1-23 6.1-23 Vol. I1, Section 6.1 Figure 6.1-3 Figure 6.1-3 Vol.11, Section 6.1 Figure 6.14 Figure 6.14 Vol.11, Section 6.1

! Figure 6.1-5 Figure 6.1-5 Vol.11, Section 6.1

Figure 6.1-6 Figure 6.1-6 Vol.11, Section 6.1 Figure 6.1-7 Figure 6.1-7 Vol.11, Section 6.1 Figure 6.1-8 Figure 6.1-8 Vol.11, Section 6.1 Figure 6.1-9 Figure 6.1-9 Vol.11, Section 6.1

Figure 6.1-10 Figure 6.1-10 Vol. I1, Section 6.1 l Figure 6.1-11 Figure 6.1-11 Vol.11, Section 6.1 l Figure 6.1-12 Figure 6.1-12 Vol.11, Section 6.1 Figure 6.1-13 Figure 6.1-13 Vol.11, Section 6.1 i

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Rernove Insert Location 7.2-8 7.2-8 Vol.12, Section 7.2 7.2-9 7.2-9 Vol.12, Section 7.2 7.2-10 7.2-10 Vol.12, Section 7.2 7.2-11 7.2-11 Vol.12, Section 7.2 7.2-12 7.2-12 Vol.12, Section 7.2 7.2-13 7.2-13 Vol.12, Section 7.2 7.2-14 7.2-14 Vol.12, Section 7.2 7.2-15 7.2-15 Vol.12, Section 7.2 7.2-16 7.2-16 Vol.12, Section 7.2 7.2-17 7.2-17 Vol.12, Section 7.2 7.2-18 7.2-18 Vol.12, Section 7.2 Figure 7.2.2-1 A Figure 7.2.2-1 A Vol.12, Section 7.2 Figure 7.2.2-1B Figure 7.2.2-1B Vol.12, Section 7.2 Figure 7.2.2-IC Figure 7.2.2-lC Vol.12, Section 7.2 Figure 7.2.2-1D Figure 7.2.2-ID Vol.12, Section 7.2 Figure 7.2.2-lE Figure 7.2.2-lE Vol.12, Section 7.2 Figure 7.3-1 A Figure 7.3-1 A Vol.12, Section 7.3 Figure 7.3-1B Figure 7.3-1B Vol.12, Section 7.3 Figure 7.3-1C Figure 7.3-1C Vol.12, Section 7.3 Figure 7.3-ID Figure 7.3-ID Vol.12, Section 7.3 Figure 7.3-lE Figure 7.3-lE Vol.12, Section 7.3 7.4-3 7.4-3 Vol.12, Section 7.4 7.4-5 7.4-5 Vol.12, Section 7.4 Figure 7.4.3-1 Figure 7.4.3-1 Vol.12, Section 7.4 Figure 7.5.1-1 A Figure 7.5.1. l A Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.1-1B Figure 7.5.1-1B Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.1-lC Figure 7.5.1-IC Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.1-ID Figure 7.5.1-ID Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.1-lE Figure 7.5.1-1E Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.2-1 A Figure 7.5.2-1 A Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.2-1B Figure 7.5.2-1B Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.2-IC Figure 7.5.2-IC Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.2-ID Figure 7.5.2-ID Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.2-1E Figure 7.5.2-lE Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.3-1 A Figure 7.5.3-1 A Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.3-1B Figure 7.5.3-1B Voi.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.3-1C Figure 7.5.3-1C Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.3-ID Figure 7.5.3-ID Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.5.3-lE Figure 7.5.3-lE Vol.12, Section 7.5 Figure 7.6-1 Figure 7.6-1 Vo!.12, Section 7.6 Figure 7.6-2 Figure 7.6-2 Vol.12, Section 7.6

e- _ _ .

TABLE V-1 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES CONTRIBUTING TO CORE ELT, EARLV FATALITIES, AND LATENT FATALITIES (INTERNAL EVENTS)

Pen ent Percent Contribution Contribution Penent to Early to Latent Contribution Fatalitics Fatalities Plant to (at >100 (at >1000 Rank With fatalities Respect To Sequence Damage Mean Annual Core Melt fatalities Core Melt Designation Sequence Description State Frequenct Fregtency level) level) 1 E2 (1)/R-2 Medfue LOCA: Failure of High Pressure Recirculation ALC 3.8 E-6 8.5 <0.1 <u.1 .

Loss of Vital DC Bus 1 or 2: Failure of Ausf1tary TEC 2. 20E-6 4.9 <0.1 <0.1 2 E18( 2) /Ar-1/04-7 Feedwater, Failure of Bleed and Feed Cooling r

Loss of Vita' AC Bus I or 2: Failure of Auxiliary SLC I .9E -6 4.4 <0.1 <0.1 3 Epo( 2)/AF-1/R-2 Feedwater, Failure of High Pressure Recinulation Loss of Vital AC Bus 3 or 4: Failure of Auxfilary SLC 1.9E -6 4.4 <0.1 <0.1

.c 4 E21( 2) /AF-1/R-2 24 Feedwater Failure of High Pressure Recinulation Interfacing Systems LOCA: Failure of RHR inlet Valves V 1.90E-6 4.2 99.8 27.9 5 E16 TE 1.65E-6 3.6 <0.1 18.4 6 E3 s(71/E60/E120/ Loss of Offsite Power: Failure of Both Diesel E6H/QS Generators, Failure to Pecover Power in 6 Hours.

Failure of Quench Spray Recovery Loss of Offsite Power: Failure of One ESF Bus, TEC 1. 63E -6 3.6 <0.1 <0.1 7 E14(6)SBl/AF-2/

OA-3 Steam Line Break Inside Containment, Failure of Auxiliary Fr.edwater, Failure of Primary Bleed through PORV's Steam Line Break Outside Containment: Failure to TEC 1. 55E-6 3.4 <0.1 <0.1 8 E6(1)/MS-2/0A-3 Isolate Main Steam Lir:e, Failure of Frimary Bleed through PORV's Small LOCA: Failure to Control Primary Depressurf ra- SLC 1.39E -6 3.1 <0.1 <0.1 9 E3 (1)/0A-2/R.2 tion. Failure of High Pressure Recin ulation Large LOCA: Failure of Low Pressure Recirculation ALC 1. 37E -6 3.0 <0.1 <0.1

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20 E9 (4)/AF-1/ Primary to Secondary Power Mismatch: Failure of TE 6.15E -7 1.4 <u.1 6.9

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These scenarios have been identified through a review of containment penetra-tions that was conducted in order to insure that all interfacing systems have been considered. Table 1.1-12 provides a list of the M111 stone-3 containment penetrations, along with associated system and piping information. As shown in the table, the only other penetrations for which an interfacing system LOCA might be postulated are those involving the charging and high pressure injec-tion lines. These paths are not considered in detail for several reasons.

First, the piping in these lines upstream of the RCS pressure boundary are qualified to relatively high presssres (2375 psig and 1750 psig, respectively) so that there is a probability that such piping will not rupture if exposed to existing RCS pressure. Indeed, insofar as the charging lines are concerned, rupture is judged extremely urMkely to occur based on system piping qualifi-cations. Second, these piping runs range from 2 to 4 inches in diameter, so s that the consequences of an interfacing system LOCA via one of these paths would be less severe than the other scenarios under analysis. Third, tbse paths are virtually identical in valve configuration to the low pressure injection paths analyzed below. It is demonstrated later in this section that the low pressure injection paths contribute negligibly to the overall Event V frequency. The less frequent and less severe paths associated with the charging and high pressure injection systems are, therefore, also judged to be insignificant contributors to plant risk and are not considered further in this analysis.

1. Event V - Cold Leo Injection Lines s

J Figure 1.1-3 depicts the cold leg injection arrangement for the low pres-sure injection and recirculation systems at Millstone Unit 3. As shown in the figure, there are four cold leg injection lines, each of which con-tains three series check valves. There are also two normally open motor-operated valves (one for each pair of lines) located upstream of the check val ve s. An interfacing systems LOCA via this path would involve failure of three series check valves and subsequent failure to close the appro-priate motor-operated valve. The present analysis takes no credit for the possibility of manually closing these valves (MV 8809A and MV 88098).

Timely closure of these valves, once the safeguards signal has cleared (approximately 3 minutes), would terminate the V sequence with no resulting core degradation.

1.1-33

It has be:n d2tgrained, based en consid3 ration of possible check valve failure modes, that disc failing open of the valves in the cold leg injection lines is not a credible failure mode. These check valves are tested for leakage after RLS depressurization to ensure proper disc seating. This leak testing occurs after system use (RHR mode) and prior to reactor startup. The valve operator motors are sized by design to preclude opening at pressures exceeding 600 psia.

Disc rupture, therefore, is the sole failure mode applicable to the check valves in the cold leg injection lines. An interfacing systems LOCA via I this path would involve disc rupture of the three valves in one of the four lines. Because disc rupture is more reasonably postulated for valves exposed to relatively high (e.g., RCS) pressures, the accident progression as modeled here involves failure of the last series check valve (i.e., the one farthest downstream) and the sequential failure of the two valves upstream of the initial valve failure.

The frequency of an interfacing systems LOCA via the cold leg injection path can thus be expressed in tenns of the following equation:

F(Vc ) = 4[F(VI) x P(V2 l VI) x P(V3 l VI, V2)] ( E q. 1.1. 3. 6.1-1 ) <

l where:

F(Vc ) = frequency of cold leg V sequence F(Y1) = frequency of initial valve failure P(V2lVI) = conditional probability of second valve failure l

P(V3 l V1, V2) = conditional probability of third valve failure The failure rate distribution associated with check valve disc rupture /

catastrophic leakage is taken from NUREG/CR-2815 and is of the truncated l logunifonn type with the following characteristics:

l 1.1-34 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

through a nonna11y closed containment isolation motor-operated valve (MV 8840). Such an accident sequence would expose the low pressure piping upstream of valve MV 8840 to the existing RCS pressure.

Given the subsystem configuration as shown, there exist six different sequential failure combinations (or cutsets) that would cause an inter-facing systems LOCA via the hot leg injection path. Specifically, there are two cutsets involving the sequential ruptures of two series check valves and the motor-operated valve. Four other cutsets involve two series check valve disc rupturcs and transfer open/ excessive leakage through the motor-operated valve. Because it is highly unlikely that the motor-operated valve could transfer open against RCS pressure, the cutsets that include this failure mode require that the failure occur prior to the rupture of both series check valves. Thus, the total frequency of an interfacing systems LOCA occurring via the hot leg injection path is expressed by the following equation:

F(VH ) = 2[F(VI) P(V2 l VI) P(MV l VI, V2)] + ( E q. 1.1. 3. 6.1-3 )

l 2[F(MV) P(V1 l MV) P(Y2 l MV, Y1)]

2[F(V1) P(MV l V1) P(V2 i V1, MV)]

i The first term in the right-hand side of the above expression accounts for the cutsets involving three successive valve disc ruptures. The second term represents those cutsets in which two series check valve ruptures occur following the MV transfer open failure. The third term accounts for those sequences in which the initial check valve rupture occurs, followed by the MV transfer open failure and, finally, rupture of the second series l check valve.

l The failure rate distributions for both motor-operated valve failure modes ,

j -- i.e., disc rupture and valve transfer open -- are also taken from NUREG/CR-2815 and are identical to that for the check valve disc rupture mode. That is, 1

Mean - 7.9 x 10-8/ hour 2

Variance = 1.9 x 10-4/ hour l

t 1.1-37 Amendment 1 September 7,1983

The check valves in the hot leg injection lines, as those in the cold leg lines, are subject to quarterly testing. The position of the nomally closed motor-operated valve is indicated in the control room, so that failure by transferring open would be detected within a normal 8-hour shift. For purposes of this analysis, a detection interval of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is assumed.

Given the above infomation, the expression for VH is quantified, using DPD arithnetic, to obtain the probability distribution of the total frequency of an interfacing systems LOCA occurring via the hot leg injection path:

Mean = 2.0 x 10-II/ year Variance - 4.9 x 10-217y,,r 2

3. Event V - RHR Suction Lines Figure 1.1-5 depicts the RHR suction arrangement at Millstone Unit 3.

Referring to the figure, an interfacing systems LOCA would be caused by the sequential failure of two series motor-operated valves in either of the two RHR suction lines. Such a sequence would expose the low pressure piping downstream of the failed valves to the existing RCS pressure.

Failure combinations (for cutsets) involving disc rupture of two series motor-operated valves are included in the analysis. Other valve failure modes are judged inapplicable based on system characteristics. Disc failing open is defined as failure of a valve disc to return to the closed position after use. The RHR lines are used during plant shutdown condi-tions when the RHR system is in operation. If both valves in either line had discs which failed open, this condition would become apparent during the subsequent RCS startup, and corrective action taken. For this reason, the cutsets involving disc failing open in two series MVs are excluded from further consideration. Combinations involving disc failing open of the first MV and subsequent rupture of the second MV downstream of the first valve are also eliminated from consideration because the positions 1.1-38

_ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - ----------.---------------u

l of these valves are indicated in the control room. Therefore, failure to close the initial valve in either line would be detected during a nonnal s hif t. More important, during the assumed 24-hour detection interval, the second valve would not be exposed to pressures that could reasonably be postulated to induce disc rupture.

Each line contains a nomally closed valve (MV 8701C and 8702C) as well as a verified and locked closed valve downstream of the first valve. Thus, the potential transferring open failure would exist for only one of the l two MVs in each line. These valves, however, would have to transfer open against existing RCS pressure given the connand (spurious signal or operator error) to do so. There is an extremely low probability, given the valve motor capabilities, that such valves could change position under such a large pressure differential. On this basis, then, transfer open is l

considered a negligible failure mode for the MVs in the RHR suction lines.

i Based on the infomation and assumptions given above, the following expression is developed for the frequency of an interfacing systems LOCA occurring via the RHR suction path:

1 F(Vr ) = 2[F(VI) P(V2 I V1)] (Eq. 1.1.3.6.1-3) l where: F(VI) = frequency of first valve disc rupture l

i P(V2 l VI) = conditional probability of second valve disc rupture These valves are not tested during the year. As noted in the discussion of the hot leg injection path, the MY disc rupture frequency distribution 1s identical to that for check valves; that is, l

Mean = 7.9 x 10-8/ hour Variance - 1.9 x 10-14/ hour2 Quantification, using DPD arithnetic, of the above expression then yields the following probability distribution of the frequency of an interfacing systems LOCA occurring via the RHR suction path:

1.1-39

t

Mean a 1.9 x 10-6/ year Variance = 2.6 x 10-II/ year2 This result is obtained from a series of analytic steps that are outlined in the following paragraphs. Fint, the MV disc rupture frequency, taken from NUREG/CR-2815, is specified as a truncated logunifom distribution. l A discretization is, therefore, perfomed in order to translate this continuous distribution into appropriate DPD fom. In this case, the discretization is accomplished by dhiding the loguniform density function into a series of twelve intervals. Eight of the intervals have individual probabilities of 0.1 and occupy the center of the density function. Two l

intervals, each with 0.05 probability, specify either tail of the density function. The probability associated with each interval is then assigned to the middle percentile of that interval. By examining the sensitivity to various discretization schemes, it has been detemined that this i specification provides a reasonably accurate characterization of the distribution. The DPD for the hourly MV disc rupture frequency is given below:

Probability Failure Rate (per hour) 0.05 1.28 x 10-10 0.05 1.98 x 10-10 4 0.1 3.84 x 10-10 0.1 9.26 x 10-10 O.1 2.23 x 10-9 0.1 5.38 x 10-9 0.1 1.30 x 10-8 1

0.1 3.13 x 10-8 0.1 7.54 x 10-8 0.1 1.82 x 10-7 0.05 3.52 x 10-7 0.05 5.46 x 10-7 1.1-40 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

Table 4.1-1 (Continued)

VI. CONTAINMENT FLOOR PARAMETERS

a. Sump volume (up to containment floor) 115 ft 3 Volume including RSS pumps and suction piping 338 ft 3

b. Water volume before spillover into 1.266 x 106 gallons

Tower reactor cavity area + 73000 gallons

c. Volume of lower reactor cavity 6700 ft 3 to bottom of vessel

d. Volume of incore instrument tunnel 1300 ft 3

Sp111over occurs into the incore instrument tunnel and then flows into the lower reactor cavity. Refer to containment layout drawings for this area.

t l

l i

4.1-12 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

TABLE 4.4.2-1 Amendment 1 BEST ESTimTE ACCIDENT CHRONOLOGY September 7,1983 Time in Seconds Flausnability

- H ant Core Vessel Ca vity Spray Spillover Debris Quench Cavity Damage ECCS Core -

Uncovery Melt Failure Dryout On to Cavity Quench Spray Off Dryout Start End State off 1690 --

--- 4970 ---

210 820 '1380 --- --- ---

f AE' O 20660 17420 1370 ---

I 0 210 810 '1360- 1710 50 17160 ---

AEC 810 1360 1710 50 17080 20580 17420 64420 -1370 22100 AEC' 0 210 1690 290 --- --- --- 3300 ---

AEC" 0 210 820 1380 ---

19980 11280 --- --- --- 20500 ---

AL .6670 8320 % 70 --- ---

7500 7960 50 11550 16270 11800 --- 7500 ---

ALC 3880 5260 6520 7500 7960 50 11470 16190 11800 55407 7500 16600 ALC' 3880 5260 6520 9670 10980 11280 290 ---- --- --- --- 109*0 ---

ALC" 6670 8320 1460 2310 2760 4270 --- --- ---

.* SE O 2750 4540 880 18040 21040 18300 --- 5780 --.

0 1450 2290 t [~ SEC 58035 6700 23400 2290 2750. 4540 880 17960 20960 18300 ;

SEC' 0 1450 ^

2760 4270 1120 --- --- --- --- 7700 ---

l SEC" 0 1460 2310 '

'53670 53780 --- --- --- --- 61000 ---

l SL 45480 '49180 52370 ---

S't 48510 57520 60020 '61460 90660- --- --- ---

16370 16440 950 17460 20700 17720 --- 17510 ---

SLC 11750 13400 15460 16370 16440 950 17380 20620 17720 >86400 17600 ---

SL C

11790 13400 15460 52370 53670 53780 1190 --- --- --- --- 53640 ---

SL C" 454P0 49180 TE O 17640 18800 20070 21680 --- --- --- ---

20070 21680 15500 32610 34710 32870 --- 24400 ---

TEC 0 17640 18000 21680 15500 32530 34630 32870 >86400 24400 38000 TEC' O 17640 18800 20070 20070 21680 15800 --- --- --- 23750 ---

TEC" 0 17640 18800 ---

l l

l i

Category Description M-4 This release category is used for core-melt sequences with failure of containment isolation function.

M-5 These release categories are usad for core-melt accident sequen-M-6 ces which could lead to intermediate containment failure times without containment sprays operational. Release category M-5 accounts for late melt sequences and M-6 for early melt sequences.

M-7 This release category is used for core-melt accident sequences which could lead to late containment failure times without containment sprays operational.

M-8 This release category is used for core-melt accident sequences which could lead to intennediate containment failure times with functional containment sprays.

M-9 This release category is used for core melt accident sequences which could lead to late contair.aent failure times with func-tional containment sprays.

M-10 These release categories are used for core-melt accident sequen-M-11 ces which could lead to basemat melt through. Release category M-10 is used for the case of containment sprays nonoperational l

and M-11 for operational sprays in the time frame following core melt and vessel failure.

M-12 This release category is used for core-melt accident sequences where containment remains intact. All sequences in this release category have continuous spray operation.

5.1-11

5.1.3 SOURE TERM UNCERTAINTIES Prior estimates of the magnitude of release of fission products from the reactor system following postulated core melt accidents were based on small scale experiments and are reported in the Reactor Safety Study. The approach adopted by the authors of the RSS was detemined by the information available to them at that time. For those areas where data and models were inadequate or nonexistent ali upper bound or conservative approach was taken. For example the assumption was made that fission products released from the core where released, unatenuated from the primary coolant system.

Several major reviews of the transport of fission products have been under-taken in the two years, these include:

ND-R-610(5) "PWR Degraded Core Analysis", UKAEA issued 1982.

NUREG-0772 " Technical Basis for Estimating Fission Product Behavior During LWR Accidents" NUS-3808 " Source Tems Investigations of Uncertainties, Magnitudes and Recommendations for Research."

The general conclusion reached by the authors of these documents is that while there is considerable weight of evidence that the release of fission products from the' primary coolant-reactor vessel system would be lower than those released given in the RSS, quantitative justification based on experimental data was not presently available.

In order to address uncertainty in the source tem, and provide more realistic estimates of fission product release for the various release categcries, a method of Discrete Probability Distributions was utilized for this present report. l To provide rationale for the Development of Discrete Probability Distributions for the Millstone-3 release categories, a British report, SRD R 256, "The l l

5.1-12 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

Figure $o. Title 6.1-27 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M2

--ACUTE INJURIES 6.1-28 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M2

--TDTAL LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING THYROID 6.1-29 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M2

--POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE 6.1-30 .RESULTS OF DPD RLNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M2

--TOTAL 1HYR0f D NODULES 6.1-31 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS- FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M3

--ACUTE FATALITIES 6.1-32 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M3

--ACUTE INJURIES 6.1-33 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M3

--TOTAL LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING EYROID 6.1-34 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M3

--POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE 6.1-35 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M3

--TOTAL THYROID EDULES 6.1-36 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M4

--ACUTE FATALITIES 6.1-37 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M4

--ACUTE INJURIES 6.1-38 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M4

--TOTAL LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING DiYROID 6.1-39 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M4

--POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE 6.1-40 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M4

--TOTAL THYROID WDULES 6.1-41 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M5

--ACUTE FATALITIES G.1-42 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M5

--ACUTE INJURIES vi Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

l LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

Figure 40. Title 6.1-43 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M5

--TOTAL LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING THYROID 6.1-44 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY MS

--POPULATION WHOLE B3DY DOSE 6.1-45 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M5

--TOTAL THYROID PODULES 6.1-46 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M6

--ACUTE FATALITIES 6.1-47 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M6

--ACUTE INJURIES 6.1-48 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M6

--TOTAL LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING THYROID 6.1-49 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M6

--POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE 6.1-50 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M6

--TOTAL THYROID 10DULES 6.1-51 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M7

--ACUTE FATALITIES 6.1-52 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M7

--ACUTE INJURIES 6.1-53 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M7

--TOTAL LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING THYROID 6.1-54 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M7

--POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE 6.1-55 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M7

--TOTAL THYROID EDULES vii Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

SECTION 6 0FFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 6.0 OVERVIEW & St99tARY The offsite consequence analysis may be broadly classified into three sections. The " airborne pathways consequence analysis" (Section 6.1) estimates the effects on population due to exposure from fission products released through the air pathway and deposited on the ground (cloud, ground, inhalation and ingestion doses). The " airborne rainout to fish flesh pathways consequence analysis" (Section 6.2) accounts for rainout of the airborne fission products into water bodies, contamination of fish and finally, consumption of the contaminated fish by man. The " liquid pathways consequence analysis" (Section 6.3) treats the consequences resulting from fission products released directly into liquid pathways.

6.0.1 AIRBORNE PATHWAYS Airborne pathways consequence analysis is carried out for estimating the population health effects resulting from the release of fission products from the containment into the environment subsequent to a postulated coremelt accident. The methodology utilized in this study is consistent with other major safety studies on nuclear power plants such as the Reactor Safety Study and the Zion and Indian Point Probabilistic Safety Studies. A modified version of the CRAC computer code (CRAC2) was used here to estimate the consequences.

. Base case calculations were performed using the CRAC2 computer code for each release category. The output from this analysis is a conditional cumulative probability distribution for each of the damage indices for each release category. This set of conditional probability distributions constitutes the S Matrix.

In addition to these base case calculations that define the S Matrix, other computations were made for uncertainty and sensivity evaluations.

6.0-1 1

F The uncertainty calculations consisted of cases where release magnitudes were modified by various amounts and their effects on consequences determined. The sensitivity calculations were performed for projected population growth and weekend population. An analysis was also performed i to estimate the effects of special evacuation conditions following a seismically induced release.

6.0.2 OTHER PATHWAYS Two additional dose pathways were investigated in order to determine their importance in determining the consequences of severe accidents at M111 stone-3. These were the rainout to fish flesh pathways and liquid pathways. Rainout to fish flesh pathways involves deposition of airborne fission products into an isolated water body wherein fi sh are contaminated and subsequently eaten by man.

For water bodies other than Long Island Sound at large, a scoping study was conducted. A survey of the coastline within 50 miles of the site revealed that the bays and lagoons in this area are shallow. Flushing from tidal currents should prevent any long term accumulation or retention of fission products in these bodies of water and hence radiological consequences would be small. The only bodies of concern then were nearby ponds, lakes and reservoirs. Probability of wind directions and probability of coincident rain and wind direction were determined from the Millstone site meteorological data. Based on this probabilistic analysis two representative water bcdies (Pachaug Pond and Groton Reservoir) were selected for further evaluation. The probability of contamination of these two lakes was estimated. Volumetric turnover rates of water in these lakes were determined in order to estimate flushing rates. From the flushing rates it was judged that the consequences of potential Pachaug Pond contamination are minor. Due to the lower turnover rate (and hence lower depletion rate) of Groton Reservoir, economic consequences from its potential contamination may be significant due to the potential need for long-term pathway inte' v'ction (i.e., prohibition of use of Groton Reservoir for drinking wate. )

6.0-2

r For assessing the consequences of fission product rainout to Long Island Sound, a model was developed to estimate the magnitude of doses to an average individual and to the population due to the consumption of contaminated fish. It was assumed that fission products excluding noble gases released from the containment to the air-pathway would be rained out into Long Island Sound and would mix unifonnly in the water body.

Depletion of radioactivity from the water body as a function of time after deposition was by radioactive decay, by tidal interchange and by fresh water inflow into the Sound. The population dose estimates were based on fish harvest data for Long Island Sound. Doses to the organ of an individual who consumed the contaminated fish over a two year period, and to the population, were computed and found to be small. The dose estimates were also found to be in reasonable agreement with those published in earlier studies.

Liquid pathways involve the release of fission products into the ground below containment via mel t-through of the containment basemat. The mechanisms for such releases were investigated and the one of most concern was found to be the release of highly contaminated sump water into ground water systems. However, it is most likely that basemat melt-through would be followed by the release of only a small volume of sumpwater due to filling of a local system of interconnected cracks; contaminated water would then be trapped in the rock and would not migrate. If the sumpwater should eventually infiltrate a flow system, the rate of movement will he very low and groundwater flow will be into containment for a long period of time following depressurization.

Adequate time would be available to remove a large fraction of the contaminated water from containment and to erect effective barriers to prevent the outward spreading of radionuclides. It was therefore concluded that the potential for radionuclide release to the liquid pathways is low, that such a release (should it occu-l would be delayed for years, and that the quantity of radioactivity released would be small.

6.0-3 l

l

With the possible exception of the economic consequences of pathway interdiction of Groton Reservoir, the public consequeaces of the rainout to fish flesh and of the liquid pathways were found to be sufficiently small enough (in comparison to consequences from airborne pathways) to be neglected without affecting the validity and usefulness of the risk study.

6.0-4

6.1 AIRBORNE PATHWAYS CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 6.1.1 AIRBORNE PATHWAYS CONSEQUENCE IODEL This section briefly describes the methodology employed for estimating the consequences of airborne releases of fission products subsequent to a postulated coremelt accident. The CRAC2 computer code (Reference 1) was utilized for this purpose and was executed on the CRAY-1 computer.

This code is an updated version of the CRAC code that was employed in the Reactor Safety Study.

The CRAC code is developed, supported and continually improved by Sandia National Laboratories. All the modifications recommended by Sandia up through July 1, 1982 (Change 29.83/06/23) have been implemented in this version. Conversion of the code for use on the CRAY-1 computer was carried out. The code has been properly verified using the sample problems provided by Sandia and is under configuration control which assures traceability and documentation. The physical phenomena modeled in the code have been described elsewhere, (References 1 and 3).

Therefore, no attempt is made to describe the details of the code in this report. A very brief overview is provided below.

Transport of the fission products released from the containment due to the prevailing wind is modeled. Vertical rise of the plume depends on the release energy associated with the particular release (category).

Time dependent motion of the plume is simulated making use of the meteorological data - wind speed, turbulence, etc. Radioactive decay of the nuclides and their daughter buildup are accounted for.

One of the improvements of this code over the original CRAC model is the provision for " bin sampling" of the meteorological data. The meteorolog-ical data file contains pertinent information for each of the 8760 hours0.101 days 2.433 hours 0.0145 weeks 0.00333 months in a year. Performing plume dispersion calculations for each set of this data would be prohibitively expensive. What is normally done therefore is to pick approximately 100 samples and to perform a calculation for each of those start times. The sampling can be random, at regular 6.1-1

intervals or by bin sampling. In the latter method, all of the hourly data are first classified into groups or bins (there are 29 bins defined in CRAC2) on the basis of similarity of weather sequences. Then samples are picked from each bin. This insures against exclusion of some weather scauences or inappropriate weighting of them. Bin sampling is utilized in the current study using four samples from each bin. As discussed later in Section 6.1.4.4, more samples were selected from certain bins for release categories M1 and M4.

As the plume travels through the atmosphere, deposition of the particu-late radioactive material takes place. When rain or snow occurs, the deposition rate is enhanced, depending on the rate of precipitation. The deposition affects both airborne and ground concentrations of the radioactive material. Both dry deposition and wet deposition are modeled by the code. Noble gases are not removed by deposition.

The radiation doses received by individuals are from the passing radioactive cloud (plume) and the material deposited on the ground. The cloud doses could be due to direct radiation and due to inhalation of the radioactive material suspended in the air. These processes will last only during the passage of the cloud over the affected population. Doses from the deposited radioactive material are via three paths: direct radiation from the radionuclides, inhalation of resuspended material and ingestion of contaminated food and water. The CRAC2 code simulates all these dose paths.

In order to assess the effect on the entire population, the individual doses are combined with the population distribution. The area within a 350 mile radius around the reactor is modeled on a circular grid that has finer radial divisions closer to the plant for better resolution.

The entire grid consists of 33 rings (or circular intervals) and 16 sectors (radially around the rings) forming a total of 528 discrete areas. The population in each area is modeled based on the 1980 census

. data as described in Section 6.1.3. The radionuclides remaining in the plume beyond 350 miles is depleted by incident rain in an interval with a radius of 2000 miles.

6.1-2

Several protective action measures to reduce the radiation doses are modeled. These include evacuation of the nearby population to prevent or limit the cloud dose and early ground dose, and sheltering of the non-evacuees to limit the doses they receive. The evacuation model is typically comprised of two evacuation schemes and is described in Section 6.1.4. Long term relocation of people, interdiction and decontamination of land in the contaminated area are the other steps that could limit the radiation doses and are modeled in CRACE.

The population health effects are determined from individual radiation doses and dose response characteristics. The health effects that are focused upon in this stucty are acute fatalities, acute injuries, latent cancer fatalities, benign and cancerous thyroid nodules and total population whole body dose. Early fatalities are dominated by bone marrow dose. The latent cancers occur over a period of several decades.

CRAC2 also calculates specific economic consequences of radioactive release.

In addition to the base case consequence calculations for each of the release categories, several sensitivity calculations were performed as discussed in Sections 6.1.6, through 6.1.8. In addition, several runs were made by adjusting the fission product release fractions (except noble gases) to estimate the impact of uncertainties in the S matrix.

These are discussed in Section 6.1.9.

6.1.1.1 SOURCE TERMS The radioactive source terms used in the consequence analysis was obtained from Table 5.1-2 of Section 5. The airborne radioactive releases were classified into thirteen release categories - M1A, M18, and M2 through M12. For each release category, the source terms were listed as fractions of core inventory of fission products released from the containment to the atmosphere. In addition to the magnitude of the release the following parameters were also defined: release start time (hr), warning time (hr), release duration (hr) and release energy 6.1-3

(Btu /hr). These parameters also formed part of the input to the CRAC2 l

evaluation of consequences.

As discussed earlier, several CRAC2 runs were made by adjusting the fission product release fractions for uncertainty analysis. The magnitude of the source terms (except noble gases) for release category M1B was a factor of 10 smaller than that of M1A whereas all the other parameters were the same for M1A and M18. Hence M1B was identical to one of the uncertainty evaluation runs identified for M1A and hence its consequences were not evaluated separately during the base case evaluation; but they were properly accounted for in the final risk assembly discussed in Section 7. Thus twelve release categories (M1A and M2 through M12) formed the base case evaluation matrix. In the following discussions in Section 6, release category M1 refers to M1A and M18.

6.1.2 MILLSTONE SITE CHARACTERISTICS 6.1.2.1 GE0 GRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS The Millstone site is located in the town of Waterford, New London County, Connecticut, on Long Island Sound. The 500 acre site occupies the tip of Millstone Point between Niantic Bay on the west and Jordon Cove on the east. The geographical coordinates of the centerline of the Millstone-3 reactor are N 410 18' 41" by W 720 10' 06".

The topography around Millstone is characterized by low rolling hills rising inland from the coast. The maximum height of the surrounding terrain within 5 miles of the site is about 250 feet above mean sea level. To the ::outh of the site is open water.

For the purpose of site consequence analysis, the habitable land fraction around the Millstone site was estimated from the " Millstone Nuclear Power Station Emergency Planning Zone Map." The general site location is shown in Figure 6.1-1.

I 6.1-4

6.1.2.2 METEOROLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS The Millstone site is characterized by a continental climate, modified by the maritime influence of Long Island Sound and the Atlantic Ocean.

The general eastward movement of air at the middle latitudes transports large air masses into the region. These prevailing westerly winds provide for day-to-day weather changes. The annual frequency of calm winds (less than 2 mph) is less than 3 percent. Precipitation around the

' Millstone site is well distributed throughout the year with an average annual precipitation of 39 inches. Table 6.1-1 lists the monthly, seasonal and annual frequency distribution of wind direction near the Millstone site.

The meteorological data used in this study was prepared from on-site meteorological measurer.ents with the exception of precipitation measurements which were obtained from the National Weather Service Station at Bridgeport, Connecticut. The measurements consisted of wind speed, wind direction, wind direction variance, and temperature lapse rates taken every 15 minutes for the years 1977 and 1978. A computer program, METDATA, was written to convert the 15 minute readings to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months average and in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.23, convert the temperature lapse rates to stability classes. The MET 0ATA program produces as output a meteorological data file in the format required by the CRAC2 code.

6.1.3 MILLSTONE OFFSITE POPULATION DISTRIBUTIONS The population distributions used for the consequence analysis were prepared from 1980 census data as presented in Appendix 6-A. The base case analysis was performed using the actual 1980 population distribution around the Millstone site out to 350 miles. Additional sensitivity analyses were performed for the 1990 projected population distribution and estimated weekend beach popul ati on. These sensitivities are described in Sections 6.1.7 and 6.1.8 of this report.

The actual population distributions used are given in Appendix 6-A of this report.

6.1-5

In general, the immediate area around the Millstone site has been an area of slow growth for the 1 cst 20 years and is expected to continue

slow growth for the next 20 years (

Reference:

Millstone-3 FSAR Section 2.1.3.1).

Seasonal population variations resulting from an influx of sumer l residents is minimal since most homes in the area have been winterized and are now used as year-round residences. In addition, many of the beaches and recreation facilities in the area are used by residents, and therefore, do not represent any increase in population but instead a slight shift in population (

Reference:

M111 stone-3 FSAR Section 2.1.3.3).

The closest population center to the Millstone site is the city of New London which contained a 1980 population of 28,842 people. The distance between the Millstone site and the nearest boundary of New London is 3.3 miles. The population centers of 25,000 or more within 80 km of the site are shown in Figure 6.1-2 and the population of each center is given in Table 6.1-2.

6.1.4 MILLSTONE EVACUATION CHARACTERISTICS 6.1.4.1 EVACUATION PODEL The general evacuation model used in this study consists of three evacuation schemes. These are intended for non-seismic initiating events with normal weather conditions, non-seismic initiating events with adverse weather conditions and seismic initiated events irrespective of weather conditions. For release categories that are especially sensitive to evacuation scheme (M1A & M4), special treatment was required, as discussed later in Section 6.1.4.4.

The first two evacuation schemes mentioned above were used for all non-seismic events. Their probability of occurrence was determined on the basis of weather data. The probability of inclement weather used as the 6.1-6

basis was calculated from the data obtained from M111 stone-3 FSAR and reproduced here as Table 6.1-3. The third evacuation scheme mentioned above was used for all seismic initiated events, irrespective of weather conditions.

In practice, the direction of evacuation is determined by the location and distribution of population and the wind direction at the time of evacuation. The mathematical model in CRAC2 assumes that the population will always evacuate in the downwind direction, radially away from the plant. The direction of wind affects the evacuation zone from where people evacuate when instructed. The evacuation zone consists of the entire area within five miles from the plant and the area enclosed by a 0

90 sector in the downwind direction up to ten miles from the plant.

These parameters remain the same for all evacuation schemes. The important parameters that vary between evacuation schemes are evacuation speed and delay time. These are discussed below.

6.1.4.2 EVACUATION SPEED The speed at which the evacuees move radially away from the plant is called the evacuation speed. True value of this parameter will depend on several factors such as the time of day, weather condition, the density of population, the local road network, etc. A detailed analysis conducted by Storch Engineers (see Appendix 6-B) using extremely conservative assumptions estimated the evacuation speed to be of the order of 2 mph. It assumed that only the major highways would be used for evacuation. Values based on such conservative assumptions will provide unrealistic resul ts. Hence realistic values based on more reasonable assumptions should be used in a probabilistic study.

An evacuation speed of 10 mph was used in this study for the first evacuation scheme (non-seismic event, nonnal weather condition). This is believed to be a realistic value for Millstone. It is also the representative value quoted in Table E-3 of Reference 3. Adverse weather conditions will slow down the evacuation. The Storch study estimates a reduction in speed of 20 te 30%. For the second evacuation scheme (non-6.1-7

seismic event, adverse weather condition) an evacuation speed of 7.5 mph was used.

To properly assess the consequences of hypothetical severe earthquakes, alternate assumpCons on evacuation speed are necessitated. This is because of the fact that certain major highways may become unavailable for evacuation due to bridge collapse, buckling of roadbed sections (in certain areas), and the effects of local dam failures which could potentially washout portions of the roadways. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to predict evacuation speeds with the degree of confidence that exists for non-seismic events. Clearly there will be an appreciable number of secondary roads available for evacuation. For the purpose of this report, calculations were performed assuming an evacuation speed of 2 mph for the third evacuation scheme (seismic initiated events).

6.1.4.3 DELAY TIMES BEFORE EVACUATION INITIATION 6.1.4.3.1 DELAY TIME FOR h0N-SEISMIC EVENTS Given a requirement for evacuation, it is necessary to inform the population and proper authorities and make decisions about which of several evacuation schemes to implement. This duration may be termed notification time. Sirens will be used to notify and alert the surrounding population affected by the evacuation. Under these circumstances the notification time will be less than 15 minutes. Even after being notified, additional time will be used by people as they get ready to evacuate. This duration is tenned preparation time and has been determined in the evacuation study performed by Storch Engineers as 40 minutes. Thus the total delay time, comprised of notification time and preparation time, used in 'this study for normal evacuation is 55 minutes.

6.1-8

l I

6.1.4.3.2 DELAY TIME FOR SEISMIC EVENTS For seismic initiated events it is likely that the sirens normally used for notification of the population may be incapacitated. Under these conditions mobile notification will be required. Police and fire protection personnel will drive their vehicles to various neighborhoods and directly notify the public. Such notification measures require additional time for execution. The notification time will be short for nearby population, but increases with distance from the site. The Storch Report estimated the notification time to be 163 minutes for a distance of 10 miles. The preparation time needed by people after nctification will be the same as for the non-seismic case, namely 40 minutes. Thus the total delay time for evacuation subsequent to a seismic event is estimated to be 203 minutes (3.38 hr).

6.1.4.4 SPECIAL TREATMENT OF M1 AND M4 In the course of evaluating the results of the consequence analyses, an extreme sensitivity to evacuation scheme input data was noted for release categories M1 through M4 for non-seismic events. For example, at 10 mph and 7.5 mph, no fatalities were calculated to occur as a result of release category M1A, while at 2 mph with an extended delay time, a large number of fatalities was indicated. The primary causes of this sensitivity are the short warning time and the low release energy for M1 through M4 which makes the people living in the evacuation areas more likely to be affected by the plume. Conversely, in the other release categories, the long warning time and the lofted plume make the analysis results relatively insensitive to evacuation scheme parameters. Based on the release category frequencies, it was further determined that release categories M2 and M3 would have an insignificant impact on risk. This eliminated any need for addressing evacuation scheme sensitivity for release categories M2 and M3.

In order to take into account the extreme sensitivity to evacuation scheme parameters, a special treatment for evacuation speed and delay time was incorporated for release categories M1 and M4. All 6.1-9 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

calculations involving categories M1 and M4 were redone using this

> special treatment such that the uncertainties associated with M1 and M4 were crought into line with the uncertainties associated with the other release categories. In order to further minimize uncertainties in these cases, the number of meteorological samples wcs also increased. Twelve (12) samples were used from each of.the seven rain bins and four samples each from the other bins.

The special treatment for release categories M1 and M4 involves the use of six probability weighted evacuation schemes with varying evacuation speeds and delay times. The parameters for the six schemes were selected by consensus of a team of eight risk assessment experts (two from NUSCO and six from Westinghouse). The same team members, using engineering judgment, individually assigned their estimate of probability that each scheme would result in the "true" consequences. The sum of the six probabilities must always equal 1.0. The mean of the individual estimates were calculated and assigned for each scheme. The six schemes selected are uniquely represented by their associated evacuation speed (mph), and delay time (hours) and probability. The parameters for each scheme are presented in the following section.

6.1.4.5 EVACUATION SCHEME SUNIARY

, As discussed earlier, of the three general evacuation schemes used in this study, schemes 1 and 2 were used for non-seismic initiated events.

Scheme 3 was used for releases resulting from seismic initiated events.

A special treatment of evacuation speed and delay time was incorporated for release categories M1 and M4. Table 6.1-4 lists the values of some important parameters for these evacuation schemes.

6.1.5 POPULATION HEALTH EFFECTS (NON-SEISMIC)

The site consequence analysis performed using the CRAC2 code provides conditional probability distributions for various damage indices. The consequence analysis was performed for each release category defined in Section 5.1.2.3. Appendix 6-C shows a listing of the CRAC2 input data 6.1-10

deck used for a typical calculation. The results presented in this section do not account for the frequency of (attaining) each release category, but rather the consequences assuming the occurrence of each release category.

Figure 6.1-3 shows the conditional cumulative probability distributions for acute fatalities. For each release category, the corresponding curve shows on the ordinate the conditional probability of exceeding the magnitude of damage (acute fatality) represented by the abscissa. Since these plots do not take into account the frequency of each release category, they do not reflect risk. These distributions constitute part of the input (the S Matrix) utilized to assemble the final results discussed in Section 7. No acute fatality is predicted for release categories M7 through M12. Therefore, conditional probability curves are not shown for these release categories.

Referring to Figure 6.1-3, it may be noticed that for the range of 1 to 1,000 fatalities, M1A has the highest conditional probability distribu- l tion. The primary reason for this is that among the major releases (M1 through M7), M1A has the lowest release energy. Hence the plume would not be lofted, leading to larger radionuclide deposition closer to the site. Further, M1 has a short warning time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months thereby limiting the benefits from evacuation. In combination, these factors result in higher doses to the nearby population and hence higher conditional probability of few acute fatalities.

When the release energy is high, the plume is lof ted into the wind field. When this occurs, the fission products are likely to be carried farther from the plant before significant deposition takes place. They could then be distributed over larger areas, exposing more people to the radionuclides than if the release energy is low. Release categories MS, M6 and M7 have very high release energies. M7 has a long warning time and has much smaller values Of radionuclide release to the environment.

Of the remaining (M5 and M6), M6 is more severe on several counts: it has larger release fractions of all fission products and has earlier time of release (4.3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months vs 8.3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months for M5) and hence less decay.

6.1-11 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

The decay time is particularly important for the short lived iodine isotopes 1 132' I 133 and I 134 Therefore, among the major release categories with long warning times and high release energies, M6 has the highest conditional probability of acute fatalities.

Figures 6.1-4 through 6.1-7 show similar conditional cumulative probability distribution curves for other damage indices - acute injury, latent cancer fatalities excluding thyroid, thyroid nodules (both cancerous and benign) and population whole body dose. In general, absence of a curve for a release category indicates that the particular damage index is not expected to occur for that release category.

6.1.6 POPULATION HEALTH EFFECTS (SEISMIC)

It may be postulated that under certain accident conditions such as seismic induced coremelt, evacuation of the population will not be very effective. A study was conducted to determine the impact of slow evacuation on health effects.

In order to properly model this scenario, the evacuation speed is reduced to 2 miles per hour and the delay time increased to 3.38 hours4.398148e-4 days 0.0106 hours 6.283069e-5 weeks 1.4459e-5 months .

Estimation of these evacuation parameters is discussed in Section 6.1.4.

Release categories M1 through M7 were selected for this evaluation since these are the significant release categories in terms of risk. CRAC2 runs were made to evaluate the consequences.

The results indicate that there will be no change in latent health effects - the effects will be the same as those for the base case (which models evacuation with higher speeds and lower delay times). However, the deviation on acute health effects is significant.

Figures 6.1-8 through 6.1-13 compare the conditional probability distributions of acute fatalities for the slow evacuation case with those for the base case. Figure 6.1-8 shows this comparison for release category M1A. It may be seen that the conditional probability distribution for the seismic case is higher than that for the base case 6.1-12 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

i by approximately one order of magnitude. It indicates that when evacuation is sl ow, the conditional probability of acute fatalities increases, signifying the impact of evacuation for release category M1A.

For this _ release category, due to the low release energy, the plume would not be lofted very high and therefore the impact on nearby population would be high. The slow evacuation thus increases the population acute doses and hence the conditional probability of acute fatalities.

Figure 6.1-9 displays the comparison in acute fatalities between post-seismic evacuation and the base case for release category M2. The conditional probability curve moves upward and to the right for the slower (seismic) evacuation. M2 has a short warning time (0.2 hrs).

Therefore, the nearby population would receive a higher dose if the evacuation is delayed (3.38 vs 0.92 hr delay time) and slow (2 mph vs 10 mph). The higher dose increases the conditional probability of acute fatality. The conditional probability of a small number of fatalities (1 to 20) increase by an order of magnitude and that for a large number of fatalities (20 to 1000) ir. creases from near zero to a finite fraction of the order of 0.01.

For release category M3, the comparison is shown in Figure 6.1-10. The variation in the conditional probability of acute fatalities for M3 is very large. Conditional probability of a few (1 to 3) acute fatalities increases by about two orders of magnitude. For a larger number of fatalities (in the range of 5 to 700) the conditional probability increases from near zero to a finite fraction (of the order of 0.01) as a result of slow evacuation.

Figure 6.1-11 illustrates the comparison for release category M4. The impact on acute fatalities are very similar to M1A - the conditional probability distribution curve shifts upward for the seismic case when the evacuation is slower and delayed.

Figures 6.1-12 and 6.1-13 show the comparison for release categories M5 and M6. It may be noted that only one curve is shown in each of these 6.1-13 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

figures. That is because the two sets of data (acute fatalities for seismic and non-seismic evacuation) are identical and the curves are superimposed. Release categories M5 and M6 have large release energies associated with them so that the plume is lofted high into the atmosphare. In addition they have i warning time of over four hours. Due to the 1crger warning time, evacuation is more effective for these l

release categories since the evacuating population receives a head start before the release from containment takes place. Even under post-seismic conditions, the evacuation is very effective. Doses received by lagging evacuees are not high enough to cause fatality. Under both evacuation schemes all fatalities would occur outside the evacuation zone; hence the results for seismic conditions are identical to the base case for release categories M5 and M6.

There are no acute fatalities for release category M7 either for the base case or for the seismic case.

Figures 6.1-14 through 6.1-20 provide similar comparisons for acute inj uries. The highest variation in conditional probability of acute injuries occurs for release categories M2 and M3. See Figures 6.1-15 and

16. At the low consequence (1 to 1000 injuries) end of the curve, the increase in conditional probability over the base case is approximately one order of magnitude. Thereafter the two curves tend a converge.

Following is the reason for the large variation at the low consequence end. Io' terms of evacuation effectiveness these two release categories are quite similar. They have low warning times (.2 to .5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months ) and nearly same release energies. Due to the low warning time, the evacuation would not be as effective as for release categories with large warning times. In the seismic evacuation scheme, the delay time is 3.38 hours4.398148e-4 days 0.0106 hours 6.283069e-5 weeks 1.4459e-5 months and the speed is only 2 mph. Hence the adjacent population will receive higher radiation doses for a few hours, significantly increasing the conditional probability of acute injuries. For people in the non-evacuating zone there will be no difference in radiation exposure between the two evacuation schemes. Hence the two curves tend to converge at the high consequence end.

6.1-14 (

It may be noted from Figures 6.1-8, -11 and -17, that for release ,

categories M1A and M4 conditional probability of acute fatalities and injuries within certain ranges is greater for the non-seismic case than for the seismic evacuation case. This may appear odd and unexpected.

However, it is explainable: for all release categories, the seismic evacuation scheme had an evacuation speed of 2 miles per hour and a delay time of 3.38 hours4.398148e-4 days 0.0106 hours 6.283069e-5 weeks 1.4459e-5 months . For release categories M1 and M4 only, the non-seismic evacuation model consisted of six evacuation schemes as discussed in Section 6.1.4.4. Two of these had evacuation speeds of only 1.2 miles per hour. Although the probability associated with these ,

i evacuation schemes were low (.05 and .07), they do model the entire i population within the designated zone as evacuating at this slow rate.

This results in a large number of people calculated as receiving higher acute doses. Thus the non-seismic evacuation model for M1 and M4 would be overpredicting the acute effects, thereby causing this curve to cross -

the corresponding curve for seismic evacuation.

i ,

Release categories M5 and M6 have relatively large warning times (4.1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ). Therefore the base case evacuation is quite effective in l protecting the population within the evacuation zone. In the post-seismic evacuation scheme also, most people in the evacuation zone would escape from the cloud shine before being severely exposed. However, a l small number of lagging evacuees could receive sufficient doses to cause acute injuries. This increases the conditional probability of acute injuries at the low consequence (1 to 100) end over the base case. This

! is seen in Figures 6.1-18 and 19. At the high consequence end of the curve, the conditional probabilities of acute injuries are approximately the same under the seismic and non-seismic evacuation schemes.

j For release category M7, the warning time is very large--16 hours. With so much time available, both the seismic and non-seismic evacuation l schemes are very effective. The evacuating population is protected in l both cases. Further, people outside the evacuation zone are assumed to be exposed the same amounts in both cases. Therefore, the consequence curves are identical. This is evident from Figure 6.1-20, where the only ,

curve shown represents the results for both evacuation schemes.

6.1-15 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

In conclusion, the effect of slow and delayed evacuation is dependent on the release categories. Of particular interest is the warning time. For release categories with large warning times, evacuation would be completed before exposure of the population, somewhat independent of evacuation speed and delay time. Thus, no appreciable variation in l health effects between the two cases would be expected. For release categories with very short warning times, the cumulative conditional probability curves for the seismic case are expected to be higher than

, the base case, particularly at the low consequence end.

1 6.1.7 SENSITIVITY TO PROJECTED POPULATION GROWTH As discussed earlier, the base case analysis was conducted using the 1980 census data. A sensitivity analysis was performed to estimate the effect of population change on consequences. A projected 1990 population distribution based on the 1980 census data was used for this evaluation.

From the base case evaluation and knowing the preliminary frequency estimates for each release category, it was determined that M1 through M7 would dominate the risk. Therefore, the sensitivity analysis was performed for these seven release categories.

The results indicate that for the 1990 projected population the health effects will be approximately 8% greater than for the 1980 population.

This observation is appropriate for both the acute and the latent effects and is consistent with expectations since the projected 1990 population reflects an increase of approximately 8% over the base case.

Table 6.1-5 shows the percentage increase in mean health effects for the projected 1990 population over the 1980 population (base case) for each of the seven release categories. The increases in acute fatalities are in the range of 3 to 12%, those in acute injuries 6 to 11% and those in latent effects 8%.

j

(

6.1-16 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

6.1.8 SENSITIVITY TO TRANSIENT (StM4ER WEEKEND) POPULATION A sensitivity analysis was conducted to detennine the effect of the shift in population during summer weekends. As discussed in Section 6.1.3, a shift in population from the inland to the beaches ar.d shores is expected during the summer weekends. The beach population was raised by an amount equal to the expected inflow f om the in-land areas while the populations in the in-land sectors were conservatively assumed to remain unchanged. Using the same rationale as in Section 6.1.7, CRAC2 ,

e runs were made for release categories M1 through M7.

The results indicated that the influence of weekend population on latent health effects is negligible (less than 11). The acute effects on the other hand, may change significantly. Table 6.1-6 lists the percentage increase in the mean acute fatalities and injuries over the base case results. For release categories M1A and M4, the increases in mean values 4

of fatalities were 40%. M1A and M4 have low release energies associated l with them and their warning time is 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months or less. Due to the low release energy the plume height would be small and hence the radionu-clide deposition closer to the site would be greater. Consequently, the l increase in nearby beach population leads to higher acute effects. For the other release categories the increases in mean fatalities range from

( 0 to 6 percent over the base case. The increases in mean acute injuries

.are in the range of 7 to 26 percent over the base case.

! 6.1.9 UNCERTAINTY ANALYSIS l

The. consequence analysis is performed using CRAC2, a complex computer model which treats a large number of diverse factors. These include site meterology, radionuclide depositon parameters, population

distribution (within 350 miles), plume dispersion, site evacuation characteristics, shielding factors, radionuclide dose pathways, and dose conversion factors to calculate population health effects. Point estimate values (as opposed to a distribution of values) are used for most of the CRAC2 inputs. Although the intent was to use best estimate values for inputs, there is a tendency to select conservative estimates 6.1-17 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

when values are uncertain. The input values used in the consequence calculations would thus tend to be conservative.

A rigorous treatment of uncertainties associated with the CRAC2 calculations would require the identification of the uncertainties for all of the inputs as a minimum, and propagation of these uncertainties through the CRAC2 calculations. Such a detailed treatment would be both unwieldy, if not impossible, and very expensive. In the current study, a subjective discrete probability distribution (DPD) was applied. The distribution is based on engineering judgment regarding the magnitude of the uncertainties in the calculations.

The models describing atmospheric processes are based on substantial observational data. Variability in weather is treated by statistical sampling of a .large body of weather data and performing consequence calculations for each sample. Thus uncertainties in the weather data are relatively small. The processes of atmospheric dispersion and of radionuclide deposition on the other hand are treated by models based on experimental data. For atmospheric dispersion processes, the model represent a fit to data which has a significant degree of variability, and hence uncertainties. The large sampling base employed in CRAC2 tends to reduce overall uncertainty in dispersion calculations to a relatively low level. Deposition processes on the other hand depend on particle size of the material being treated. Particle sizes for radionur.lides once they reach the atmosphere are not clearly known; hence there is sign'ificant uncertainty in calculations of the rate of desposition. Of particular concern are weather conditions which produce high early fatality estimates. These scenarios are a result of rain washing out radioactive material and depositing it in a local area; principal dose effects result from ground shine from the deposited radioactivity.

Estimates of concentration associated with ground deposition are probably skewed to the high side since the variability in rainfall in a storm is not accounted for in the model (deposition over a larger area than calculated is likely).

6.1-18

1 l

Also critical is modeling of evacuation. There is appreciable uncertainty associated with such modeling. One problem with modeling of evacuation processes is the lack of data regarding the way an evacuation would proceed under the variety of possible dose exposure regimes. For rain scenarios this is particularly critical. For example, no credit is taken for the potential for avoidance of rain areas in the evacuation path based on either dose surveys and/or directions to the evacuating population. Dose effects would be smaller for some scenarios if people are sheltered in place rather than evacuated. Such distinctions are not accounted for in the evacuation and dose models.

The biological transport models and dose models employed were developed from a substantial data base and represent the state-of-the-art. They have relatively low levels of uncertainty associated with them.

Considerations of the above factors and engineering judgment were employed in estimating a probability distribution for the uncertainties associated with the CRAC2 calculations. Such estimates were initially made in conjunction with the Indian Point and Zion Risk Assessment Studies. Discussion among personnel performing the source term and consequence calculations for Millstone did not identify any basis for altering those earlier DPD estimates (Westinghouse personnel participated in the initial estimation for Indian Point and Zion). The primary reason for this is that there have not been significant advances in the state-of-the-art for propagation of the consequence uncertainties since the Zion and Indian Point DPD estimates were made.

After considering the effect of uncertainties in radionuclide deposition, population evacuation, and other aspects of the dose calculations, it was judged that there is a small chance that doses are underestimated by a factor greater than 2, a reasonable chance that the doses computed are correct, a slightly higher chance that the doses are overestimates by about a factor of 2, and a small chance that the doses are overestimated by a factor larger than 10. The specific DPD values are 0.35 for the point estimat:, 0.45 for a reduction by a factor of 2, and 0.1 each for an increase by a factor of 2 or a decrease by a factor 6.1-19

l of 10 relative to the point estimate. These are probabilities which add up to 1.0. An inherent assumption is made that this representation of the uncertainty in the dose also reflects the uncertainty in the consequences.

The skewed nature of the distribution will be reflected in the risk curves presented in Section 7 where the point estimate values are nearer to the .90 percentile values than the .50 percentile values (see Section 7). As discussed earlier, a rigorous treatment of all the uncertainties in the consequence analysis was not performed and would have been costly. Expert judgment was therefore employed to evaluate the impact of model uncertainties and conservatisms in the input variables and to produce the discrete probability distribution values used in the study.

Table 6.1-7 lists the discrete probability distributions. They are used in the final risk assembly discussed in Section 7.

6.1.10 UNCERTAINTY PROPAGATION As discussed in Section 6.1.9, the uncertainty analysis is performed using the DPD (Discrete Probability Distribution) technique. The DPDs associated with various source term multipliers, to account for the uncertairties in the consequence model, were also discussed in that section. The source term uncertainty analysis was also perfomed using the DPD technique as discussed --

Section 5.1.3. These DPDs were combined with those from the consequence analysis.

It was necessary to evaluate the consequences resulting from modifying the source terms using the multipliers.. This was performed via several DPD runs using the CRAC2 code. The DPD runs to be made were first identified on thc basis of the risk significance of various release categories. These are tabulated in Table 6.1-8. The results of these runs were then incorporated into the final risk assembly as conditional cumulative probability distributions.

These conditional probability distributions are shown in Figures 6.1-21 through 6.1-55. For er. ample, Figure 6.1-21 shows the conditional l 6.1-20 Amendment 1 ,

September 7, 1983

probability distributions of acute fatalities for each of the DPD runs made for release category M1A. Each curve is identified by the source tern multiplier from which it resulted.

6.1.11 REFERENCES

1. Ritchie, L.T., J.D. Johnson and R.M. Blond, " Calculations of Reactor Accident Consequences Version 2 - CRAC2 - Computer Code Users Guide," NUREG/CR-2326, SAND 81-1994, Sandia National Laboratories.

2. Lemaster, R.D., "CRAC2 Meteorological Data Sampling,"

Telecon with Mr. J.D. Johnson, E-NLE-200, December 10, 1982.

3. "PRA Procedures Guide," NUREG/CR-2300, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, January 1983.

l 6.1-21

- -,m.-__v_ _ . ~ , , , ,,#--- m. _ .. , _ _ _ - . _ _ _ ,

TABLE 6.1-1 ftDNTHLY, SEASONAL, Aff0 ANNUAL FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS OF WIND DIRECTION ON LONG ISLAND SOUND NEAR MILLSTONE SITE (1949-1978)

FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION (%) 0F WINO O!RECTION TOTAL N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE SSE S SSW SW WSW W WNW NW NNW Calm Total -HOURS 8.8 5.5 9.6 5.9 2.4 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.8 4.0 5.3 11.7 14.7 12.6 8.9 3.1 100.0 10,120 December l January 8.3 5.2 9.7 5.7 3.3 1.4 1.0 0.9 1.6 2.0 4.9 7.9 12.5 12.3 11.9 8.6 3.0 100.0 10,630 February 8.9 5.0 8.0 6.3 4.8 1.9 1.6 1.1 2.0 2.4 4.9 7.6 9.4 11.0 13.1 9.2 2.9 100.0 9,684 Winter 8.7 5.2 9.1 6.0 3.5 1.7 1.3 1.1 1.7 2.1 4.6 6.9 11.2 12.7 12.5 8.9 3.0 100.0 30.434 8.6 5.0 6.9 6.7 7.6 3.8 2.1 1.6 2.8 3.5 6.4 5.9 7.4 8.4 11.1 9.6 2.9 100.0 10,149 March April 7.0 4.1 5.5 5.3 7.1 3.2 2.4 2.5 4.7 5.3 8.3 9.0 7.9 7.8 9.1 S.5 2.7 100.0 9,824

{

May 5.5 4.3 5.6 5. 8 10.5 5.5 3.4 3.0 5.6 6.4 9.0 9.1 6.7 5.0 5.6 5.9 3.1 100.0 10.150 (

l Spring 7. 0 4.5 6.0 5. 9 8.4 4.2 2.6 2.4 4.4 5.1 7.9 8.0 7.3 7.1 8.6 8.0 2.9 100.0 30.123 ;

cn 3.6 3.8 6.5 3.6 3.3 7.0 7.4 14.0 12.9 7.2 4.1 4.9 4.3 2.8 100.0 9,813 June 5.3 4. 5 4. 8 b July 3.9 4.8 2.7 4.3 3.6 3.4 3.6 7.2 8.1 14.7 13.3 7.9 4.8 4.6 4.2 3.2 100.0 10,148 5.6 fu 5.4 5.1 3.5 100.0 August 7.3 5. 3 6.7 3.1 4.1 3.3 3.1 3.4 6.9 7. 9 13.4 10.6 6.4 4.8 10.148 Sumer 6.1 4.3 5.3 3.2 5.0 3.9 3.4 3.4 7.1 7.8 14.0 12.3 7.2 4.6 5.0 4.5 3.2 100.0 30.109 September 8.3 7.4 11.3 4.9 4.0 3.7 2.9 2.8 4.4 5. 2 9.9 7.1 6.5 6.0 7. 0 5.9 2.9 100.0 9.811 October 9.0 6.6 11.2 4.7 3.4 2.5 2.4 2.2 3.3 3.7 8.4 8.2 8.8 8.3 8.0 7.0 2.4 100.0 10.149 3.5 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.5 3.0 6.1 7.0 9.7 11.5 10.9 9.1 2.4 100.0 9,811 November 8.8 6.1 9.5 4.1 fall 8. 7 6.7 10.7 4.6 3.6 2.7 2.4 2.3 3.4 3.9 8.1 7.5 8.4 8.6 8.6 7.3 2.6 100.0 29.771 Annual 7.6 5.2 7. 8 4.9 5.1 3.1 2.4 2.3 4.1 4.7 8.7 8.7 8.5 8.2 8.7 7.2 2.9 100.0 120.437

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TABLE 6.1-2 1980 POPULATION IN POPULATION CENTERS

WITrlIN 80 km**

Name 1980 Population Bristol 57,370 Hartford 136,392 New Britain 73,840 Milford 49,101 Middletown 39,040 Meridan 57,118 New Haven 126,109 Waterbury 103,266 West Haven 53,184 New London 28,842 Norwich City 38,074 Naugatuck 26,456 Shelton 31,314 Warwick (RI) 87,123 Newport (RI) 29,259

! Cranston (RI) 71,992 Providence (RI) 50,980

Cities with over 25,000 people in 1980

- Entire city population is given even though some cities are only partially within 80 km. (See Figure 6.1-2 locations).

6.1-23 l

TABLE 6.1-3 AVERAGE ENTHLY, SEASONAL, AND ANNUAL FREQUENCIES OF VARIOUS F0G CONDITIONS ON LONG ISLAND SOUND NEAR MILLSTONE SITE (1949-1978)

FREQUENCIES OF VARIOUS F0G CONDITIONS (%)

TOTAL NINBER F0G GROUND FOG HEAVY FOG 0F HOURS December 14.6 1.6 2.2 10,168 January 15.0 2.0 2.1 10,664 February 13.3 1.1 2.0 9,707 Winter 14.3 1.6 2.1 30,539 March 14.2 1.5 2.0 10,168

, April 12.7 1.2 1.5 9,840 May 16.1 1.8 3.2 10,168 Spring 14.4 1.5 2.2 30,176 June 14.5 3.1 2.1 9,840 l July 11.5 2.9 0.9 10,168

! August 12.7 3.3 0.4 10,168 t.

( Summer 12.9 3.1 1.1 30,176 i

September 11.2 3.2 0.3 9,840 October 8.8 3.5 1.0 10,168 l

l November 11.6 2.1 0.5 9,840

Fall 10.5 2.9 0.6 29,848 Annual 13.0 2.3 1.5 120,739 l

l l 6.1-24 l

l l

TABLE 6.1-3 (CONTINUED)

ENTHLY SEASONAL AND ANNUAL AVERAGES AND EXTREMES OF SNOWFALL ON LONG ISLAND SOUND NEAR MILLSTONE SITE (1921-1973)

SNOW, ICE PELLETS (INCHES)

MEAN NIEBER OF DAYS MEAN MAXIMlM MAXIMUM IN WITH 1.0 INCH OR mRE TOTAL ENTHLY 24 HOURS SNOW AND SNOW PELLETS Length of Record * ** *

December 5.2 25.3 7.3 2 January 7.8 30.3 16.7 2 February 8.4 47.0 16.7 2 Winter 21.4 47.0 16.7 6 March 5.4 21.8 11.1 1 April 0.4 8.1 3.7 +

May T T T 0 Spring 5.8 21.8 11.1 1 June 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 4

July 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 August 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 Summer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 September 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 October T T T 0 November 0.5 14.1 5.4 +

l Fall 0.5 14.1 5.4 +

Annual 27.7 47.0 16.7 7 l

NOTES: T = trace

+ Less than i day every 2 years j

1949 through 1978 (30 years) (NOAA 1970, 1974, 1975, 1978)

- 1921 through 1978 (58 years) (NOAA 1970,.1974, 1975, 1978) l 1

l 6.1-25 I

TABLE 6.1-3 (CONTINUED)

AVERAGE P0NTHLY SEASONAL AND ANNUAL HOURS OF FREEZING RAIN AND DRIZZLE ON 00NG ISLAND SOUND NEAR MILLSTONE SITE FREEZING RAIN (HR) FREEZING DRIZZLE (HR)

LIGHT

MODERATE ** LIGHT

December 5.7 0.1 3.1 January 3.0 0.0 2.3 February 3.3 0.0 1.6 Winter 17.0 0.1 7.5 March 2.1 0.0 1.3 April 0.1 0.0 0.0 May 0.0 0.0 0.0 Spring 2.2 0.0 1.3 June 0.0 0.0 0.0 July 0.0 0.0 0.0 August 0.0 0.0 0.0 Summer 0.0 0.0 0.0 September 0.0 0.0 0.0 October 0.0 0.0 0.0 November 0.1 0.0 0.1 Fall 0.1 0.0 0.1 Annual 19.3 0.1 8.9 NOTES:

Less than 0.1 iph

- 0.1 to 0.3 iph 6.1-26

TABLE 6.1-3 (CONTINUED)

MEAN NtNBER OF DAYS OF THUNDERSTORM OCCURRENCE ON LONG ISLAND SOUND NEAR MILLSTONE SITE (1949-1978)

NINBER OF DAYS Dacember

January

February

Winter

March 1 April 2 May 3 Spring 6 June 4 July 5 August 4 Sunder 13 September 2 October 1 November

Fall 3 I

Annual 22 l

l l

l NOTE:

Less than 1 day every 2 years l

l l

l 6.1-27 I.. _ _ _ - _ _ _ - . . _ . _ _ . _ . ._ _ . _ . _ . - - - _ - _ - - -. .

TABLE 6.1-4 StfmARY OF EVACUATION SCHEMES AND THEIR PROBABILITIES ANALYSIS CATEG)RY GENERAL SEISMIC SPECIAL TREATMENT F1)R M1 AND M4 2 3 51 52 S3 54 SS 56 Evacuation Scheme 1 Non-Seismic Non-Seismic Seismic Non-Seismic Non-Seismic Non-Seismic Non-Seismic Non-Seise!c Non-Selsmic Initiating Event Adverse Any Any Any Any Any Any Any Neather Condition Normal Radius of Evacuation 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 Sector (MI) 10 Radius of Evacuation 5 5 5 5 5 5 Circle (Mt) 5 5 5 Distance traveled 15 15 by evacuees (M1) 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 Evacuation Speed (Mph) 10 7.5 2 1.2 3.0 10 1.2 3.0 10 7

ro C Delay Time 0.92 0.92 3.38 0.92 0.92 0.92 2.0 2.0 2.0 before evacuation (Hr)

Probabillty 0.88 0.12 1.0* 0.'.)7 0.19 0.39 0.05 0.14 0.16

Probabilley is 1.0 for Evacuation Scheme 3 if the release is from a seismic induced event. Otherwise it is zero.

Also, the probability of Evacuation Schemes 1 and 2 and 51 through 56 will be zero for seismic initiated releates.

o o

T

1 TABLE 6.1-5 Sensitivity of Health Effects to 1990 Projected Population l Percentage increase in health effects for the 1990 Projected population over the base case Latent Release Acute Acute Cancer Population Category Fatalities Injuries Fatalities Whole Body Dose M1A 5% 6% 8% 8%

M2 3% 10% 8% 8%

M3 4% 10% 8% 8%

M4 5% 7% 8% 8%

MS 12% 11% 8% 8%

M6 12% 11% 8% 8%

M7 N.A. 11% 8% 8%

l

, s.

6.1-29

TABLE 6.1-6 Sensitivity of Health Effects to Weekend Population Percentage Increase Over Base Case Release Category Acute Fatalities Acute Injuries M1A 40% 26%

M2 0% 9%

M3 0% 7%

M4 40% 21%

M5 6% 8%

~

M6 6% 7%

M7 N.A. 7%

Influence of weekend populaticn on latent health effects is negligible.

l l

i

(

l l

I l 6.1-30 l

l

TABLE 6.1-7 SUBJECTIVE DISCRETE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR SITE CONSEQUENCE UNCERTAINTY EVALUATION RELEASE FRACTION DISCRETE ADJUSTMENT FACTOR

PROBABILITY 2 0.10 1 0.35 0.5 0.45 0.1 0.10

Adjustment Factor of 1 is always used for noble gas releases.

i l

l l

6.1-31

TABLE 6.1-8 LIST OF DPD RUNS PERFORMED Source Term Multiplier

2 1 1/2 1/4 1/10 1/30 1/100 Release Category M1A X X X X X X X M2 X X X M3 X X M4 X X X X M5 X X M6 X X X X X M7 X X X X X X X M8 X M9 X M10 X M11 X M12 X

Multiplier for noble gases remains 1.0 for all runs.

6.1-32

5

- I$

~g ay e-

. I & '1 g=: = i '. ! WI i .- j

@((l

.u

. 1 3

D -- k 1' ,

.m_ ni S

j (- e,

~ /V ,o;T

\q i i

\

\I

) \.

, y, . .

"a

+Oe4 \;

1 ,

,', - kF i 'N , t

\d -

s 11 ,

4 d -i. j. ;

l I

I l

l l

4 n 5 EI lh,!3 I; i Ob r, l5 9 a- 9

!.,D, t --=

a ,r l lj ;a: gr o e

![

lill!lg$$[ 5 f!! ! e.

8' E h

g$$

i!!1: lilli j! ! .. ! E si jeeeeeeessee s -

g -

u . o eli g- ..

is

.s:it 5 +

... _t Y

,1 y

y%_ ,

e ., A

,, , j- 'r o

3 7 t} l 9---. ',o %

o

c. A .

1

Ansunemos ! _

l ,

... ),,i.

I j ,k "o,

14 :.

\n ..

l km( 'u)

=

L b q;; .

4

- o m

. : ~- e {/-)

i c'

\/

o u

ti s

%- ,e ,9f x y, g_

n.

n- u..O?Rish - w /e e,.. ,l,g v 6/

e* :

, t

PROBABILITY IS ZERO FOR

l .-a. OTHER RELEASE CATEGORIES

. 5 M2 i a : _ _

~ .. ;

4 :::

I I M5 g4. M3 M4 MA w, , 5 ., ., . .,., ..,

AEnffE FMIIIES FIGURE N0. 6.1-3 POINT ESTIMATE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR ACUTE FATALITIES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 1 must be multiplied by the fre-

quency of release in order to obtain risk.

l

\

L.M "

= = ~

i Mfg i

M2

.Ik- -g-PROBA8ILITY IS ZERO FOR 0THER RELEASE CATEGORIES N5 .

! V M3 5

E n'- = = = = = = -

h M7 2

I g ...

'M6 l M7 g

h M2, M5 Ib M1A M4 io c "ve - 74 - y,. y+

. - .a.

i FIGURE N0. 6.1-4 POINT ESTIMATE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR ACUTE INJURIES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 '

must be multiplied by the fre-

, quency of release in order to obtain risk. _ _ - _ - _ - - _ _ - - - - _ _ -

4 N~M -

PROBABILITY IS ZERO FOR RELEASE CATEGORIES Mll AND M12 lw o e

5 l M5 M3 M4 I '

g E M2 g wt i

M9 3 M10 MY HM1A, M6 soy .. . . . . .. . .. ..

ser amenose.

i FIGURE N0. 6.1-5 POINT ESTIMATE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR TOTAL LATENT FATALITIES OTHER THAN THYROID NCTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

vg PROBABILITY IS ZER0 FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M12 V

a M2

! , 3, M6

[ ,M10 M5 2w 4 I'-

i 1A E M b M M/

g $8 M11 w;, - ;,, ;7, ;- g : ,:, 4 ;.4

= , .

FIGURE NO. 6.1-6 POINT ESTIMATE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR TOTAL THYROID N0DULES (BENIGN AND CANCEROUS)

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

~'tt!(*t?****:{*

4 1

,g L

-MS, M6 Y

E 1 '** bM2, M3

i J L g f M10 M4 M8 M "

g ,,... M1A E

I .,

M12

,c.

M11

.. g . . 7,, g. =,:, . _g. .:4 g. .g a

TOTAL WHOLE B0DY DOSE, 100 MAN REM FIGURE NO. 6.1-7 POINT ESTIMATE CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FOR TOTAL POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

.a

.. . . . ~

gg l',

o ,e ..

g O SEISMIC

? O NON-SEISMIC d ge-s.

, I g .

E

,e...

g se-a i

,, .....,.,, ...,. ...,. . . ;. . . .j i

acess moeterns i

FIGURE NO. 6.1-8 COMPARIS0N OF ACUTE FATALITIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M1A: SEISMIC VS. NON-SEISMIC EVACUATION NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

e, l ?

_ 4 - -

4

y 0 SEISMIC O NON-SEISMIC a

E d wt i I.

f E

i -

]

l

! w ',, ...,.,, .j .., . .g

== w ien.

FIGURE NO. 6.1-9 COMPARISON OF ACUTE FATALITIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M2: SEISMIC VS. NON-SEISMIC 4

EVACUATION NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

.j i

y

[] SEISMIC

,0 #

l

() NON-SEISMIC h

b I

i

=

80'3-w',, -,. i ' Ves

.,a r.=i r m.

FIGURE 6.1-10 C0f1 PARIS 0N OF ACUTE FATALITIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M3: SEISMIC VS. NON-SEISMIC EVACUATION NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendnent 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

dr '

I is-8, C SEISMIC E O NON-SEISMIC ai Ia i

g ie o

.., .,.,, . ;., .,., . , ., --y acwsresmitus FIGURE NO. 6.1-11 COMPARIS0N OF ACUTE FATALITIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M4: SEISMIC VS. NON-SEISMIC EVACUATION NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

I.

i V

I

- SEISMIC AND NON-SEISMIC (IDENTICAL CURVES) 4 d is d'

I I

1 i

l l '% ,,, a

< FIGURE N0. 6.1-12 COMPARIS0N OF ACUTE FATALITIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY I45: SEISMIC VS. NON-SEISMIC EVACUATION NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983

) must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

l

s) f '

f

, SEISMIC AND NON-SEISMIC '

I (IDENTICAL CURVES)

_I m

i E 4 so a.

I t

E i l i

i i

w ',, -..,.,,

ou n.,e.ir:n l

FIGURE NO. 6.1-13 COMPARIS0N OF ACUTE FATALITIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M6: SEISMIC VS. NON-SEISMIC j EVACUATION NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

i

i.-...--.+= ==

j ::::: :

4 I

i. i.

J O SEISMIC g O NON-SEISMIC s

!i..+

e i

i i I 4 E

I

i. <-

l 5 I

i. * ..., ..

i ..

FIGURE N0. 6.1-14 COMPARIS0N OF ACUTE INJURIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M1A: SEISMIC VS. NON-SEISMIC-EVACUATION NOTE: This figure shows conditiona'l Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983

, must be multiplied by the fre-l quency of release in order to obtain risk.

i _ : : _

l l O SEISMIC O NON-SEISMIC

i. -t U

i h

] 2 is L i

, t I

b b

j is a ....,

== i u.

i FIGURE N0. 6.1-15 COMPARIS0N OF ACUTE INJURIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M2: SEISMIC VS. NON-SEISMIC EVACUATION I

l i

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

n e.

W===- '

I O SEISMIC I

O NON-SEISMIC

i. o V

s i

4 a

2 i It i

E 4

I ie o 4

aan eenmus l FIGURE NO. 6.1-16 COMPARISON OF ACUTE INJURIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M3: SEISMIC VS. NON-SEISMIC

EVACUATION NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1

! probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 1

must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

'#e 9 9 9 9 - --

I

.e O SEISMIC O NON-SEISMIC V

.i l ... n m

2 I

g ....

E I

gg 4.

4 ie ',, . . .g, . - ,- . , . ;., . . ;., . . ;.,

.swa .a l FIGURE N0. 6.1-17 COMPARIS0N OF ACUTE INJURIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M4: SEISMIC VS. NON-SEISMIC I EVACUATION

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-

quency of release in order to 1

obtain risk. -

e8 ;

I O SEISMIC i

O NON-SEISMIC V

l

== -

a 2 ..-t i

i E

i I

I

}

-,, ..., ..., ..., 5 ..

I

== . .

FIGURE NO. 6.1-18 COMPARIS0N OF ACUTE INJURIES FOR RELEASE i

CATEGORY M5: SEISMIC VS. N0h-SEISMIC EVACUATION NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1

probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

e i

i gL,

[3 SEISMIC f: C) NON-SEISMIC 1

?

=

d .e J.

I t

I amm twens FIGURE N0. 6.1-19 COMPARISON OF ACUTE INJURIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M6: SEISMIC VS. NON-SEISMIC

! EVACUATION NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

r) = = = = =

} SEISMIC AND NON-SEISMIC (IDENTICAL CURVES) e I

m d so-a. ,

I g .'

I .-

}

e

'*L y.i y., y, --y ,

owa .. -

4

! FIGURE NO. 6.1-20 COMPARIS0N OF ACUTE INJURIES FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M7: SEIS~MIC VS. NON-SEISMIC l EVACUATION NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-qiisEcy of release in order to l

obtain risk.

i

l I.

} ===;;

i. -

I I i .-t 5

a 2 .+

i i

E

,,3 2X I ,

.5X is t

.1X .25X

.03X 1X

..g, 4 ;;g ..-,. - -, . , .y

=ws <=un.

FIGURE NO. 6.1-21 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M1A -- ACUTE FATALITIES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

e3 e- : :: - _ _ _

j 5 5 f *%

3 I

U l .+

l 2X 89- E :

I i

=

g<.

4

.01 X 1X

.03X .1X

.25X

.. -i.

4b

.5X

i. ,, . ._g . . ;., . . ;., . ,:, . . ;.,

= = ..

FIGURE N0. 6.1-22 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M1A -- ACUTE INJURIES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7. 1983 i must be multiplied by the fre-

quency of release in order to obtain risk.

.p - -- ,- _ _

j ~'

i l .....

m I

i '

'725X g

ig-J, 2X

,L .03X

. 01 X .1X 3,,)y

.5X

, . . ;., . . ;., .j sov aarnese.

FIGURE NO. 6.1-23 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M1A -- TOTAL LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING THYR 0ID NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values. September 7, 1983 i must be multiplied by the fre-i quency of release in order to l obtain risk.

I

I 4

d.

I 9

5 2

g i o r '

i g

i o gw a.

-- ' 25X l -

'. 5 X 4

'ex

,,.03X L l .01X .1X a

1X wg . 5, . :g . : .=,) . =,:,. xg. 4 zg m n o. i. is.

j FIGURE NO. 6.1-24 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M1A -- POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE i

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to

, obtain risk.

a c e- . . = - - - --

%_g c -._ _

N i

i l .. . ..

s t

5 I

j .0lX .1X ,,

I ..-i ,L 1X

.25X .

4 a

.03X 2X

c,

.5X

, 4,, =,=, .,, ._, =7, . 4, ews. = uses

FIGURE NO. 6.1-25 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY i

M1A -- TOTAL THYR 0ID N0DULES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 i probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

.+

h y

a _

~

3

?

5

.5X

.t I

1X "1, c..

c,e awarmaerns FIGURE N0. 6.1-26 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M2 -- ACUTE FATALITIES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 i probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 i must be multiplied by the fre- ,

! quency of release in order to obtain risk. '

'l

g

+

1

,g * ,,

I.

a

, 2 la. ,

s E

I is-a. .25X 1X

.. . 5X_

-y

,, ..,., . . ., ..,., . *g, I

== - .

FIGURE NO. 6.1-27 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M2 -- ACUTE INJURIES l NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

1 1

6 i

p = ::: :: -- _ _ _ _ _

.... i g j l

.2sx 1x ;

2 ira

{

l r s

E l-4.SX i

i

?

l so ' . . . ..

. -, , . q., 1,:p FIGURE 6.1-28 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M2 -- TOTAL LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING l-TiiVROID j.

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values Septer.her 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain riek.

1

.e=============_ -

i I

l 9 .. ...

m E

d i

g f75X

=

g i. a. a 1X a

.25X

, . ,. 4, . 4, . ::4, . =,. ;q, . q,,

1 , i. .

i FIGURE 6.1-29 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M2 -- POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE 4

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983

, must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to j

obtain risk.

. p .-. . . .

- wm, t

.. s.

V 2 .a. 4

.5X i

E I

.25X

.., g,, 4 4 % ,, ,e FIGURE NO. 6.1-30 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M2 -- TOTAL THYROID N0DULES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

3 %

f ,

t .

< i i s 1 Y l 5 3 i

' s

! E a .

I

\

i

. N IX i

- =nn.

j I

! i-IGURE 6.1-31 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE i

CATEGORY M3 -- ACTUTE FATALITIES l NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 i

probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

J

e.

i :

i l i. i.

a 2

I

(

I i j . . . ..

4 i

I IX 1

lSX

i. ;, ..,., ..,., -..,., .,

= =.

FIGURE 6.1- 2 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M3 -- ACUTE INJURIES NOTE This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 I probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983

'} must be multiplied by the fre-

1 quency of release in order to obtain risk.

.\ ._ __.

6 i

+ =. = = = _ _

i s

\

6 '

\

.\

h : \

=

s .,

\\'\\

t

~

\

i ,\

.25X 1X

- - , -- - - - - - - = --

i FIGURE 6.1-33 RESULTS OF D?D RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M3 -- TOTAL LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING THYR 0ID NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1

probabilities,.and the values .

September 7, 1983 l must be multiplied by the fre-quency of relea'se in crder to obtain risk.

i i

i 4

e: ::::: :: ::: :: - _ _ _ ,

i r

,g- 8,

. .i 5 -

, I -

I

=

l ie '- jXLd 1X l

,, . : q, . ; _g - =g . 7, - =g- :-j, - = = , , ,

i. .

, FIGURE 6.1-34 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M3 -- POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

sa . eg 4

1 l

1 e

5 E

h '

2 to L. .

I i

e A IX ~

.25X

>, g .g -,, g :: ,

m i-= =

l FIGURE 6.1-35 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M3 -- TOTAL THYROID N0DULES l

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to

' obtain risk.

-a .

Ief l .d <

s.

m

~

so-a.

I f

.25X is...

.5X is t i 1X 2X i.=,, , y - ;, -j = i, GERIIE FSMLtf189 FIGURE 6.1-36 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M4 -- ACUTE FATALITIES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-

! quency of release in order to i obtain risk.

i

, - .=.

{:: N i

.. i V . a.

li 2X

=.e.

ai I

i:

g i.-s s

, i.-i.

IX

.5X

.25X

) =,, ..

. . ;., . . ;., .., .j acwis samus FICURE 6.1-37 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M4 -- ACUTE INJURIES s

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to

~

obtain risk.

'N - O C 2Z k

ws.

I 2X i

.2sx ,

1x 2 is J.

) i 1

s I

, we.

.5X w ;, ..., ..,., ..,

19f Utf#UDfEL FIGURE 6.1-38 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M4 -- TOTAL LATENT FA1ALITIES EXCLUDING THYROID NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to .

obtain risk.

l es ,===== _ = = = - - = = = = - _ _ _ _:

e

i. d i

75X l .25X

! .. t N ,

a IX E

a I

, ..s I

i. a. ,,

2X i .. ], . .:f,, . 4 ::7, . :9-

, 4 : -; g . :g I

FIGURE 6.1-39 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE

! CATEGORY M4 -- POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-

quency of release in order to obtain risk.

e: ::::=::::

-- -_ 2 t

l .. i.

s b

i d

I f

=

g ..+

.25Xt L

.sx 4 2X 3

1X

i. - a

,, . . j,, :7, . ;., ::p ;;j,- --j, FIGURE 6.1-40 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M4 -- TOTAL THYROID N0DULES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 1 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to j obtain risk.

..z b

T f .

I y

5 I

m E _

} d es-si

I iE I

1 IX

.i 4

l asma esaurus FIGURE 6.1-41 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY MS -- ACUTE FATALITIES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk. 1

si i

gg-J,

.I.

m E

d i

lw e.

1 IX

.t25X

===i.mn.

FIGURE 6.1-42 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M5 -- ACUTE INJURIES 1

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to i

obtain risk.

4

A m .__ _

h - -

V I

?

5 ... ..

I t:

IX 1 25X

.., .y y 4

see amenos=.

FIGURE 6.1-43 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY MS -- TOTAL LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING THYROID l

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

..p', 3 : : ; _ : :: := = = % _ _ _

I y ... ..

, I 4

h

E 1X a

i I

s g .....

i 1

. .25X

-g- ' "g m is FIGURE 6.1-44 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE

CATEGORY M5 -- POPULATION WHOLE

BODY DOSE NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to 1

obtain risk.

T 1

V

.I m

2 ge s, Ir b '

I a 1X

. NX wy 3 ., ., =, . . , ..,

seen. smeses 4

FIGURE 6.1-45 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY MS -- TOTAL THYROID N0DULES l NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-

, quency of release in order to obtain risk.

.w

, ..4..-

i ;

i i

g 5

s b

E se a ,

, I 2X g

I j IX l

}

w;, . . ;., . . . _3., . ,. ,

FIGURE 6.1-46 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M6 -- ACUTE FATALITIES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

e:

I I

bs

\

.. + % >

, ==-

9 f 1

b a

l .. a. --

E

$ '\

s.... -

T )g

\s iD.

.25X

.5X 2X

, . . . . , ..,, =j -.,, =1, 1 som sumiss FIGURE 6.1-47 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY MS -- ACUTE INJURIES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

.v: : - __ __

i Y

is a, 9

.h.

s E .25X a is a.

1

'I

. 2X g

E j .5X 3 IX gg-8.

a

.1X

is ;, - 7,. ;,, - 7, - ;, = p, ser sarsvere.

t FIGURE 6.1-48 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M6 -- TOTAL-LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING THYR 0ID NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

i

.e y.____ _____ _

a 1

I i

g t , L m IX

_0 m

a ...a.

l .,

{

=

2X o

I- .5X

, a

.25X

.1X 1

I s.- . ;

,. :.g . .:g ::g . : __ .

4 : .g FIGURE 5.1-49 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M6 -- POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE i

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 ,

probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

t i

.. - t.

V i* k a

.25X 1X ,

2 so-a.

I 4

.5X X

. . .. 3

.1X 2X

i. ;, . ;.,, .,., -,., . .;j .,, ...,

sorse, wweero FIGURE 6.1-50 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE i

CATEGORY M6 -- TOTAL THYR 0ID N0DULES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-

quency of release in order to obtain risk.

, i 1

V s

'l h i

b

! : ~

t 2 i I.C J

i i E

I 2X

'* ",e i.* is j

ensu rossests FIGURE 6.1-51 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M7 -- ACUTE FATALITIES i

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

l e,

4 Iw5 : : :::

I b

5 i<

.t so n.

.5X 1X 2X w' . . , . .,.

g ..

ans sensus

FIGURE 6.1-52 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M7 -- ACUTE INJURIES i

l j

NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

' ' ' - - 4~- _; ___ _ _

4 1 .. i.

V E

H m .5 E

d ,e J.

.03X

.25X 4 2X I f 1X t>

i

.01X .1X i.;,. ..,, .., _ =,:, . . ;., . . ;.,

ror v. norse.

FIGURE 6.1-53 RESULTS OF CPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M7 - TOTAL LATENT FATALITIES EXCLUDING THYROID NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency cf release in order to obtain risk. .

.+_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

t i

?

ied.

b 5

e 1

. 25) f ..+ , i

/

' I

- '. 5X 4

= a l 1Xa2X so o .03X l .01X ,'lX ic ',, . . 24,. ug. ng. xg . . =g ng . x:

w seesemessa se iss.

FIGURE 6.1-54 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE CATEGORY M7 -- POPULATION WHOLE BODY DOSE NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-quency of release in order to obtain risk.

l

e a p :----

4 l 5 i

.. - t V

i h

~ ,

$ o 2X 2 ..a. 5X i

i E

l 4 .25X

.03X

'*~'

,, , o

.01X .1X IX i

4 i

zg . xj, .; , ==, -,, -;p

i.es i====

FIGURE 6.1-55 RESULTS OF DPD RUNS FOR RELEASE

CATEGORY M7 -- TOTAL THYR 0ID N0DULES NOTE: This figure shows conditional Amendment 1 probabilities, and the values September 7, 1983 must be multiplied by the fre-i quency of release in order to obtain risk.

1 i

h i

PU-241 8 6.06 E+06 5.333E+03 1.000E-02 1.000E-04 -

j AM-241 8 PU-241 3.52 E+03 1.581F+05 1.000E-02 1.000E-04 CM-242 8 1.42 E+06 1.630E +02 1.000E-02 1.000E-04 CM-244 8 1.16 E + 05 6.611 E +0 3 1.000E-02 1.000E-04 LEAKAGE 12 A0 P WR = M 1 1.0 2.5 1.0 1.0 1.4 E 06 0.

9.0E-01 7.0E-03 5.0E-01 5.0E-01 3.0E-01 6. 0 E-0 2 2.0E-02 4.0E-03 PWR = M2 1. 0 0.75 2.0 0.2 10.5 E 06 12.6 4 6.9E-01 4.8E-03 5. 9 E- 01 5.9E-01 2.4E-01 6.9E-02 2.3E-02 2.6E-03 PWR = M3 1.0 6.0 2.0 0.5 13.3 F 06 12.6 7.6E-01 5.3E-03 6. 3E-01 6. 3E -01 1.7E-01 7.7E-02 2.6E-02 2.9E-03 PWR = M4 1.0 0.2 2.0 0.0 4.9 E 06 12.6

8. 6E- 01 6. 0E-03 6. 3E-01 6.3E-01 5.3E-01 7.1E-02 4.5E-02 7.1E-03 4 PWR = MS 1. 0 8.3 0.5 4.1 31.5 E 06 12.6

9. 0 E-01 6. 3 E- 03 4.5E-01 4.5E-01 4.6E-01 4.9E-02 3. 7 E-0 2 6.1E-03 PhR = M6 1.0 4.3 0.5 4.1 30.8 E 06 12.6 9.1E-01 6. 4E- 03 4.8E-01 4.8E-01 5.0E-01 5.3E-02 4.0E-02 6.5E-03 1

PWR = M7 1.0 20.1 9.5 16.0 37.8 E 06 12.6

9. 0 E- 01 6.3E-03 2.7E-01 2.7F-01 2.8E-01 3.0E-02 2.2E-02 3.6E-03 PWR = M8 1.0 4.5 0.5 4.0 1.54 E 06 12.6 9.4E-01 6.6E-03 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 1.4E-05 1.1E-06 1.0E-06 1.8E-07 PWR = M9 1.0 21. 0.5 20. 1.54 E 06 12.6

9. 0 E- 01 6.3E-03 1.5E-06 1.5E-06 9.5E-07 1.6E-07 8.9E-08 1.3E-08 E PWR =M10 1.0 95. 10. 80. O. O.

8 3.0E-01 2.0E-03 8.0E-04 0.0E-04 1.0E-03 9.0E-05 7.0E-05 1.0E-05 PWR =M11 1.0 95. 10. 80. O. O.

6.0E-03 2.CE-05 1.0E-05 1.0E-05 2.0E-05 1.0E-06 1.0E-06 2. 0 E-0 7 PWR =M12 1. 0 0.5 5.0 0. O. O.

. 1.3E-03 9.1E-06 1.4E-06 1.4E-06 8.8E-07 1.6E-07 8.3E-08 1.2E-08 i

DISPERSION 47.0 49.0 0 34 0

' EV ACU AT E 6 NO NO O.05 2.00 0.536 14.0 24135. 19.0 2. 1.

0.07 0.92 0.S36 14.0 24135. 19.0 2. 1.

0.14 2.00 1.34 14.0 24135. 19.0 2. 1.

0.19 0.92 1.34 14.0 24135. 19.0 2. 1.

1 0.16 2.00 4.47 14.0 24135. 19.0 2. 1.

i 0.39 0.92 4.47 14.0 24135. 19.0 2. 1.

.75 1. .5 .75 .33 .5 .08 .33 2.66E-4 2.66E-4 1.33E-4 2.66E-4

8045. 90. 165. 3. 1 l ACUTE 7 i

m T MARROW 320. 400. 510. 615. .03 .5 1.

LL1 WALL 2000. 5000. 5000. 5000. 1. 1. 1.

i 3s LUNG 5000. 14800. 22400. 24000. .24 .73 1.

ma Sg W BODY 55. 150. 280. 370. .30 .8 0.

l LUNG 3000. 3000.1 6000. 6000. .05 1.0 0.

i os LLI WALL 1000. 1000.1 2500. 2500. .05 1.0 0.

' '" THYR 010 1.E10 1.E10 1.E10 1.E10 1.0 1.0 0.0 a

w l

I INITIAL OTHER INITIAL W BCDY TOTAL LEUKEMIA TOTAL LUNG TOTAL BREAST t TOTAL BCNF TOTAL GI TRK TOTAL THYROID TOTAL CTHER TOTAL W BC0Y

' INTERO POP INTERD COST 1.0E+06 INTERD AREA INTERD DIST NTERD RSK-INT 14 1.0E-06 (NTERD I R SK-IN T20 1.0E-06 INTERD RSK-IN124 1.0E-06 DECON POP DECON COST 1.0E+06

DECCN AREA DECON DIST

$' DECON RISK-INT 14 1.0E-06 4

DECON RISK-INT 24 1.0E-06 C DECON RISK-INT 30 1.0E-06 INT CROP COST 1.OE+06 INT CROP AREA INT CROP CIST INT CRPRSK-INT 14 1.0E-06 INT CRPRSK-INT 24 1.0E-06 INT CRPRSK-INT 30 1.uE-06 INT CRPRSK-INT 32 1.0E-06 INT MILK COST 1.0E+06 INT MILK AREA INT MILK DISI ,

INT MLKRSK-INT 14 1.0E-06 INT MLKRSK-INT 24 1.0E-06 INT MLKRSK-INT 30 1.0E-06 INT MLKRSK-INT 32 1.0E-06 RELOC ATION COST 1.0E+06 EVACUATICN COST 1.0E+06 TOT COST h/U DEC 1.0E+06 i

mg TOT COST w/CECCN OPTIONS NO 1.0E+06 I

Id o n :s 1

%a trN END i 45 a

w I

MCC191: MILLSTONE CRAC2 RUN, SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR M1A AND M4 LEAKAGE 2 NO PWR = M1 1.0 2.5 1.0 1.0 1.4 E 06 0.

9.0E-01 7. 0E- 03 5.0E-01 5.0E-01 3.0E-01 6.0E-02 2.0E-02 4.0E-03 P WR = M4 1.0 0.2 2.0 0.0 4.9 E 06 12.6 8.6E-01 6. 0 E-0 3 6.3E-01 6.3E-01 5.3E-01 7.1 E-02 4.5E 'i2 7.1E-03 SITE 1 MILLSTONE MET O AT A 5 000 1 29 12 10 12 12 12 12 12 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 END I

C)

.L i

i 4

I

'l s'f.

II

u y-

. 5 3

- - - e e e . -

O O O O O, O O O O e O. O. i e i e e e O. e w w w w w w w w w w w w 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 b 0 0 e . - - -

0 0 O O O, O O O O e e i O. e e i e a O. O.

w w w w w w w and w w w w 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 =

O O O O O O O. e e i e O. O. O. O. e i O.

" w w w w w w w w w w

'EW p 8 8 5 8 8 E. 8 8 8 8 8 8

$ E O O O O O O O O O O O O 8

m e n e m m m m m m m m z O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.

8 w w w w w w w w w w w w

= - O O . m . . m n - O E * .

8 * ". * .

a .

E e , m n . N N N - - - -

a e m m m m , m n m , , ,

=

0, O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O.

W W W W W W W W . W W W W

e e w e e o O O O m e w j - - - - - - - O O - g &

$ - - J E E - E J E e g ,

Q

> N N N N N N N N N N N N g

$, $, g O.

naJ O.

w O.

naJ O,

w O,

w O.

i.J O.

w O.

naJ O.

w O.

w e e m e

. w , e o e N O O N m m a n N w m a m a N e & c O E

U I e' N ." d 4 M N N $ $ E -

w w 468 *n , . . - -

m Q $ 0 O O O O O O O O O O O

" g a e a a a a a a a a

E m

8 8 8 8 E. E.' 8 8 E' .

8 8 3 I N O O O O O O O O O O O m

w m m. m g=3 .- m, n. m .- . - - -. - . -

x OO 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e ee s e inJ w ww nee naJ i.J w ww ww ww w aad ww

N-N 2.8 2.8 28 28 wE N. . 28 w

4. 5 . saJ w8.88.8 88 88 88 E EE TO 90 90 no no MO -O 00 00 00 00 00 w

- m. .- m. m- n- m. ,. .. .. -- --

"m O, O. O. O. 0. C. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. O. e O. O. O. O.

4AJ 4ej O. O. O. O. O. O.

GAJ IdJ GAJ &&J 44J 4eJ 44J lad LAJ SAJ GAJ lAJ LeJ &&J GdJ She laJ IdA Lhl led 663 LAJ S

m .-

28 38 ?.8 38 38 5.8 38 28 88 88 88 88 O II 40 mO MO NO -O -O MC -O mo mo 00 00 in x .. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- N. N. N. N.

$ 00 00 00 00 00 00 0, 0, 00 00 0, 0, 00

- O. O.

ww w Jw ww ww w .J Jw m .J w w, w

<O 88 38 28 ;8 .

38 08 t8 .

38 28 28 08 E8 .

EE NO -O =0 == O -O -0 -O -O e0 WO WO no

.- - N N 8 8 8 8 8 O. O. O. O. O. O.

O LeJ IdA 443 .d4 LAJ 46J GdJ 443 laJ L&J &AJ RaJ 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8

- W m W W a W m s W - W (030333x3) S3I111V1VJ A1BV3 7.2-8 Amendment 1 l .- - _

September 7, 1983 _ _ . .

TA!LE 7.2.1-4A (CONTINUED)

RELEASE CATEGORY MtA M1B M2 M3 M4 MS M6 M7 M8 M9 MIO Mit M12 3.OOE+02 2.72E-02 0.OOE-Og O.OOE-01 0.OOE-Ot 7.87E-03 1.09E-04 1.03E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOf-Ot O.OOE-Ot O.OOE-Of 5.OOE+02 1.50E-02 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot 5.19E-03 0.OOE-Of 1.03E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot

. 7.OOE+02 8.28E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-Of 3.32E-03 0.OOE-Of 9.16E-04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot o O.OOE-Ot O.OOE-Ot O.OOE-Ot o

w

" 1.OOE+03 2.36E-03 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Ot O.OOE-Of 1.95E-03 0.OOE-01 9.16E-04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

,. ,x 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of.0.OOE-Of temsp y 2.OOE*03 2.96E-04 0.OOE-Of O.OOF-Of 0.OOE-Of 2.52E-04 0.OOE-Ot 4.75E-04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

. C. O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01

?e U

a 0.OOE-01

$ 3.OOE+03 1.28E-04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 7.10E-05 0.OOE-Ol 2.34E-04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of i < 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of u.

g 5.OOE+03 2.66E-05 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 2.94E-05 O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

= 0.OOE-Ol O.COE-Of 0.OOE-Of w

7.OOE+03 5.04E-06 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 2.5tE-05 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ol O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of j O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 1.OOE+04 2. TOE-06 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot O.OOE-Of 5.04E-06 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-Ot O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of Ln > 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

' (D B 2.OOE+04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-OS 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-01 O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot

3. @a.

hk to :s 7 rt ya

THE VALUES IN THIS TABLE REPRESENT THE CONDITIDNAL PROBA81LITY OF A GIVEN RELEASE CATEGORY EXCEEDING A PARTICULAR NUMBER OF EARLY FATALITIES. TO GET THE RISK PERSPECTIVE, THIS NATRIX

, 8 MUST BE MULTIPLIED BY THE VECTOR OF FREQUENCIES OF EACH RELEASE CATEGORY.

4

. . . . .=

0 0 0 0 C O O O O O O O e e a e e e e i e e e e W W W W W W W W lad W W W 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 m O E O O O O O O O O O O O

. e .

O O O O O O O O O O O O e e e a e e e e e e e e W W W W W W W 8 8 E. E. E. 8 E. 8 8 8 E. 8

. O O E O O O O O O O O O O E* N N N N N N e M n 4") M

^ O O O O O O O O O O O O s e e e e e e e e e a e M w w has w w w w w w w w w

n n n n - - m e - e -

2 - - - .- o n - n a.

w > . . . . . . .

I - - - - - - e e e 5 m 3 ,=

i n n n n n n n n n n n n 4 O O O O O O O - O O O O O 2 . e e e e e e e e e e e e 2 w w w w w w w w w w w w w e e e a w o a e - c w e

w w w e. os E O. O. e. a. e. e. . . . n. .

E n n n n n n n n n -

n n n n n n n n n n n n W

~ O O O O O O O O O O O O e e e e e e a e e e e e E w w w w w w las w w w w w O e n O ~ m > n e @ w n Q w & w 2 e . n. n. n. n. . O. G. e. W. .

E N a a n n N n n = .= * -

J m - - - - . . . .

M E O O O O O O O O O O O O O w 4 W

o e e e e e e e e e e e e I laJ &&J W ltJ GAJ SAJ $$J GdJ led laJ leJ GAJ GAJ

"" > 0 v e n n e e a e O e n

- # 4 - > w 6 - 9 N O u , . e. . . e. n. O. . e. .

b I e b & M > > > W W e w w

W W X 4 N N N n N N N N N N N n

=8 *" w Q O O O O O O O O O O O r4 E J e e a e e a e e e e a e 4

w w w w laJ w w w w w w w w

> 4 m w > e o a e a e e - m o I w e e n n e.

n . a. . e. e. n. .

m I n a n . . * = = = * - m x n . n n . . . n n n n n OO OO OO OO CO OO OO OO OO OO OO OO E ee ea ee ee e e ee e e ee ee e e ee e e

- ww ww ww ww ww ww ww ww I

n-n 8 E.E. 28 w.w. ". 8 28 88 "8 .

w5

8. . ww*8 38

'8 .

28 W EE 00 90 wO wo no no NO no -0 -O *O -O 3 .. -- -- -- n. n- n. n. -- n.

OO n.

CO 1 OO OO OO OO OO OO OO DO

O e e ee ae ee ee ee ee O. O e e a e e ea e e i

naJ ww ww ww ww laj w ww ww ww ww ww laJ w w ees

8 sk .. .

8 .

28 "8 .

88 38 38 8.8 28 28 38 38 38 j EE ~O -O -O -O mo 60 00 no NO -O =O no e

a .. . . . . . .

OO 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 CO 00 ee ee ee e e ee ee e e ee ee ee ae e e S&J GdJ HJ ldJ IdJ l&J GAJ &&J laJ lad l&J lad 44J led liJ s&J &&J SaJ GdJ OdJ haJ had l&J &&J l

<O 8

"8 .

88 88 28 38 88 ?.8 8

. . 3.8 "8 .

8 . .

1 E Tn no DO. 00 00 90 wo so wO wo no no nO

- - . n n 8 8 8 8 8 O. O. O. O. O. O. O.

nsJ W EdJ edJ &ad laJ laJ laJ SaJ W laJ W 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8

- a e a n - n n e n - n l

l (030333X3) $3180PNI A1MV3 1

7.2-10 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 l

TAILE 7.2.1-43 (CONTINUED)

RELEASE CATEGORY MtA MtB M2 M3 M4 MS M6

M7 Ma Mg MIO M11 M12 3.OOE*02 2.76E-Ot 7.48E-04 1.2tE-02 7.99E-03 3.63E-Ot 1.26E-02 1.59E-02 5.37E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 4

5.OOE*02 2.07E-Of 1.90E-04 9.25E-03 6.07E-03 2.69E-Of 1. TOE-02 1.35E-02 3.59E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01

! O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-01 7.OOE+02 9.47E-Of 6.54E-05 8.02E-03 5.53E-03 f.99E-Of 9.50E-03 9.19E-02 2.87E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of l

' 3 in 1.OOE+03 8.78E-02 O.OOE-Of 3.41E-05 6.37E-03 4.79E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 1.4tE-Of 7.65E-03 f.OtE-02 2.22E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of S

w M 2.OOE+03 4.35E-02 0.OOE-Of 4.06E-03 2.69E-03 7.53E-02 4.7tE-03 6.70E-03 8.27E-04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of w 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of en

." " 3.OOE+03 f.76E-02 0.OOE-Of 2.69E-03 1.62E-03 5.05E-02 3.19E-03 4.79E-03 4.75E-04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of y g O.OOE-01 0.OOE-01 0.002-01 0 2 5.OOE+03 7.39E-03 0.OOE-Ot 1.62E-03 7.09E-04 3.66E-02 1.51E-03 2.13E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

> 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot i N 7.OOE+03 9.64E-04 0.OOE-01 8.27E-04 3.53E-04 1.66E-02 8.27E-04 1.40E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 1.OOE+04 5.17E-05 0.OOE-Of 3.53E-04 1.09E-04 6.29E-03 2.34E-04 5.87E-04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 2.OOE+04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 1.47E-05 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of my 3.OOE*04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 mm O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of c+ s a C3.

hM m3

'1 r+

N =.a THE VALUES IN THIS TABLE REPRESENT THE COPE)ITIONAL PROBABILITY OF A GIVEN RELEASE CATEGORY EXCEEDING A PARTICULAR NUMBER OF EARLY INJURIES. TO GET THE RISM PERSPECTIVE. THIS MATRIX y MUST BE MULTIPLIED BY THE VECTOR OF FREQUENCIES OF EACH RELEASE CATEGORY.

m

TESLE 7.2.1-4C TRANSPCSED SITE MA1RIX (5 MATRIX) FOR THYROID N3OULES (INTERNAL EVENTS)

RELEASE CATEGORY i

M4 MS M6 M7 M8 M9 MfA MtB M2 M3 M10 Mit Mt2 1.OOE+00 1.OOE+00 9.99E-Of 9.99E-Of 9.97E-OI 1.OOE+00 9.99E-Of 1.00E+00 1.OOE+00 1.OOE+00 1.OOE+00 9.90E-Of 5.86E-02 0.OOE-Of f.OOE+00 f.OOE+OO 9.91E-Of 9.98E-01 9.93E-Of 9.99E-OS 9.99E-Of 2.OOE+00 f.OOE+00 1.OOE+00 1.OOE+00 9.OtE-Of 2.48E-04 0.OOE-Of a

1.OOE*00 9.93E-Ot 9.94E-01 9.85E-Of 9.92E-01 9.77E-Of 3.OOE+00 f.OOE+00 1.OOE+00 9.98E-OI 9.97E-Ot l 8.67E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 1.OOE+00 9.80E-Ot 9.83E-Of 9.56E-Of 8.61E-Of 8 OtE-Of 5.OOE+00 1.OOE+00 9.98E-01 9.94E-Of 9.93E-Of I 8.10E-Ot 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-01 1

9.92E-Of 9.99E-01 9.6tE-01 9.69E-Of 9.4tE-Of 7.88E-01 6.79E-Of a 7.OOE+00 9.98E-Of 9.95E-Of 9.92E-Of

, S 7.76E-Of 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-Of 8 4.5tE-Of 9.84E-Of 9.99E-Of 9.47E-Ot 9.54E-Of 9.23E-Ot 7.09E-Of U 1.OOE+01 9.98E-Of 9.87E-OI 9.90E-01 U 7.29E-Of 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-Of y -

9.20E-Ot 8.93E-Of 3.76E-Of 1.48E-Ot Y U 2.OOE+01 9.95E-Of 9.36E-Of 9.7tE-Of 9.64E-01 9.98E-01 9.15E-01

[ $ 5.66E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ol O

@ 9.59E-01 9.51E-Of 9.97E-Of 8.99E-Of 9.03E-01 8.73E-01 1.87E-01 7.45E-02 i 3.OOE+01 9.9tE-Of 9.14E-Of O 3.06E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of o

E 7.63E-02 2.72E-02 I 5.OOE+01 9.76E-Of 8.97E-Of 9.37E-OI 9.ISE-Of 9.95E-Of 8.78E-01 8.82E-Ot 8.60E-OI

" 1.05E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-OI e 7.OOE+09 9.55E-01 8.87E-Of 9.19E-01 8.99E-OI 9.fs4E-01 8.66E-Ot 8.75E-Of 8.45E-Ot 3.22E-02 1.04E-02 4.ISE-02 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot i

3.62E-Of 8.92E-Of 8.83E-Ot 9.9tE-01 8.55E-Ot 8.62E-Of 8.32E-Of 1.35E-02 1.69E-03

.m dw 1.OOE+02 9.34E-Of 0.OOE-Of 1.45E-02 0.OOE-01

,0Q

. a.

BB 9,60E-Of 8.24E-Of 8.35E-Of 7.3tE-Ot 0.COE-Of 0.OOE-Of 8.14E-Of 8.69E-Of 8.65E-Of

[y 2.OOE+02 9.09E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

,n m-*

3.OOE+02 8.96E-01 7.70E-Ot 8.54E-Of 8.37E-Of 9.39E-Of 8.09E-Of 8.14E-Ot 7.62E-Of 0.OOE-Ot O.OOE-01 l g O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-Of m

ta 7.37E-Ot 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 5.OOE+02 8.86E-Ot 7.30E-Of 8.20E-01 8.ISE-Of 9.09E-Of 7.74E-Ot 7.76E-Ot O.OOE-Ot O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

?.

T A*2 LE 7. 2.1 -4C (CONTINUED) 4 RELEASE CATEGORY I

MIA M18 M2 M3 M4 MS M6 M7 MS M9

MSO Mtt M12 7.OOE+02 8.67E-01 7.07E-Of 8.05E-Of 7.90E-Of 8.97E-Ot 7.52E-Os 7.58E-Ol 7.26E-Of 0.OOE-01 0 OOE-Of l

0.OOE-Ol O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of l 1.OOE*03 8.46E-Of 6.54E-Ot 7.82E-Of 7.7tE-Og 8.8tE-OI 7.32E-Og 7.41E-Of 6.9tE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 1 0.OOE-Ot O.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of I

i 2.OOE+03 7.90E-Og 3.89E-Ot 7.25E-Of 7.ISE-Of 8.36E-Of 6.94E-Og 7.C?E-Of 5.60E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 4

0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 1

! 3.OOE*03 7.43E-Of 1.92E-Of 7.10E-Of 6.99E-Of 8.lOE-Og 6.33E-Of 6.51E-Of 4.35E-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-OS 0.OOE-Of 0.O(4-01 0. ODE-Of 1

, 5.OOE+03 7.tGE-Of 8.05E-02 6.70E-Ot 6.4GE-Of 7.70E-01 4.83E-Of 5.22E-Of 2.88E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot t - O.OOE-Of O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of i S o

w 7.OOE*03 6.70E-Ot 3.87E-02 6.32E-Of 5.95E-Of 7.36E-Of 3.89E-Og 4.26E-Of 1.90E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0. ODE-Of l U O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of i 5

~

! ." 1.OOE+04 5.75E-Of 2.05E-02 5.58E-Ot 4.85E-Of 7.05E-OI 2.70E-Of 3.12E-01 1.08E-Ot 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of f N $ O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of b W o

j i g 2.OOE+04 2.58E-OS O.OOE-Of 2.90E-Of 2.25E-Of 5.20E-01 1.06E-Of 1.33E-Ol 5.49E-02 0. ODE-Of 0. DOE-Of i O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of i

O 3.OOE*04 1.20E-01 0.OOE-Of 1.66E-Ot 1.24E-01 3.26E-Of 7.20E-02 8.2tE-02 4.66E-02 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of i E O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-01 1 >

I 5.OOE+04 6.39E-02 0.OOE-Of 8.74E-02 7.89E-02 1.35E-Of 5.16E-02 5.49E-02 1.15E-02 0. ODE-Of 0.OOE-Of

! O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of f 7.OOE*04 2.65E-02 0.OOE-Of 6.75E-02 5.49E-02 8.07E-02 3.28E-02 4.OtE-02 f.74E-04 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-Of 0 OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of j in 3=

ma f N$ m o.

1.OOE+05 1.07E-02 0.OOE-Of O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 4.15E-02 2.70E-02 3.92E-02 8.53E-03 0.OOE-Ot 1.68E-02 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01

' mh1 :k et s

2.OOE+05 0.OOE-OI O.OOE-Of 6.16E-04 0.OOE-Ot 2.58E-03 0.OOE-Of 0. ODE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

}

__, O.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-OS 0.OOE-Of 4 $ 3.OOE+05 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Og O.OOE-Of '

co O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-01 '

. W THE VALUES IN THIS TABLE REPRESENT THE COPEDITIONAL PROBA8ILITY OF A GIVEN RELE ASE CATEGORY EXCEEDING A PARTICULAR NUMBER OF THYROID NOOULES. TO GET THE RISK PERSPECTIVE, THIS MATRIX

MUST BE MULTIPLIED BY THE VECTOR DF FREQUENCIES OF EACH RELEASE CATEGORY.

l

TABLE 7.2.1-C3 TZANSPISED SITE MATRIX (5 MATHIX) FOR LATENT CANCE3 FATALITIES (INTER

AL EVENTS) i RELEASE CATEGORY MS M6 M7 M8 M9 l MIA MtB M2 M3 M4 M10 Mit M12 1.OOE+00 9.99E-Of 9.96E-Ot 9.96E-Ot 1.OOE+00 9.88E-Of 9.90E-Of 9.74E-Of 8.39E-Of 7.82E-Of 1.OOE+00 9.09E-Ot 2.18E-04 0.OOE-01 2.OOE+00 9.98E-Of 9.87E-Of 9.90E-Of 9.90E-01 9.99E-Ot 9.55E-Of 9.6tE-Of 9.41E-Of 7.06E-Of 4.3tE-Of 8.44E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of +

1 8 9.75E-Of 9.67E-01 9.99E-Of 9.3tE-Of 9.35E-Of 9.27E-01 5.35E-Ot 2.23E-Of 3.OOE+00 9.92E-Of 9.45E-Of 8.12E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of S 9:04E-01 2.66E-Of 8.85E-02

' O 5.OOE+00 9.47E-OI 9.20E-Of 9.48E-Of 9.47E-01 9.94E-Of 9.12E-01 9.13E-Of U 7.88E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of l'

aa 1

7.OOE+00 9.30E-01 9.14E-01 9.27E-01 9.20E-Of 9.S2E-Of 9.06E-Of 9.07E-Of 8.97E-Of 1.43E-Of 4.54E-02 I en 7.5tE-Ol O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of I U t-N **

1.OOE+01 9.19E-Of 9.00E-Of 9.11E-Of 9.14E-Of 9.67E-Of 8.96E-Of 8.97E-Of 8.89E-Of 7.72E-02 2.47E-02

b N G.63E-Of 0.OOE-Ot O.OOE-Of 1 .e . <

) #

2.OOE+0i 9.09E-Ot 8.62E-01 8.9tE-Of 8.9tE-Of 9.39E-01 8.65E-Of 8.66E-01 8.63E-01 1.35E-02 1.69E-03

, ~E 2.90E-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-01 l !d

o 3.OOE+01 8.75E-Ol 8.40E-01 8.66E-Ot 8.67E-Of 9.27E-OI 8.StE-OI 8.53E-Of 8.44E-Of I.94E-03 0.OOE-Of l > 1.06E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

3 1

4 5.OOE*01 8.59E-Of 7.9tE-01 8.48E-Ot 8.45E-r i 8.79E-Of 8.15E-Of 8.16E-01 8.14E-Of 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-Of i

1.76E-02 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot 1

7.OOE+01 8.30E-01 7.50E-Of 8.19E-01 8.*!.E-Of 8.67E-Of 7.99E-Of 8.OOE-Of 7.86E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0:OOE-Of

, 2.79E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

! (A 33 f.OOE+02 8.03E-Of 7.4tE-01 7.93E-OI 7.93E-Of 8.46E-Of 7.82E-Of 7.82E-Of 7.72E-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of j O.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of Ig <o CD 3

{

7 r+ 2.OOE+02 7.StE-Of 7.03E-Of 7.56E-Of 7.65E-Ot 0.11E-Of 7.67E-Ot 7.7tE-Of 7.47E-01 0.OOE-Of 0.00E-01 O.OOE-Ot O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 7.47E-Of 7.5tE-01 7.25E-Of 0.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-Of co 3.OOE+02 7.45E-Ot O.OOE-Of 6.33E-Of 0.OOE-Of 7.48E-Of 0.OOE-01 7.52E-Of 7.83E-Ot i

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TABLE 7.2.1-4E (CONTINUED) 5.48E-Of 5.40E-Ot 5.42E-Of 3.95E-01 4.03E-Of 2.78E-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of 3.OOE+05 3.62E-Of 6.25E-02 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ol 3.48E-Of 3.02E-01 2.OOE-Ot 2.10E-01 1.22E-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of j - 5.OOE*05 1.96E-Of 2.20E-02 3.39E-Of

o 0.OOE-Of 0.00E-01 O.OOE-Of

. o i na 2.17E-01 2.16E-Of 2.06E-Of 9.92E-02 1.03E-Ot 7,66E-02 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of U 7.OOE*05 1.06E-Ol 1.14E-02 0.OOE-01 x 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of U

3 t.15E-Of t.14E-Of 1.13E-Of 8.72E-02 8.73E-02 6.67E-02 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Ot 1.OOE*06 7.56E-02 2.66E-03 y

O.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

3 8.33E-02 7.42E-02 6.31E-02 6.32E-02 4.33E-02 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of i

X 2.OOE+06 6.44E-02 0.OOE-Ot 8.13E-02 u O.OOE-Of 0.OOE-OS 0.OOE-Of O

7.25E-02 6.90E-02 2.93E-02 3.2tE-02 2.22E-03 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of N o 3.OOE+06 2.72E-02 0.OOE-Of 7.32E-02 j '

E O.00E-Ot 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of y

1 1 9 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of

' W k 5.OOE+06 1.72E-03 0.OOE-Of 1 11E-02 1.14E-02 5.42E-03 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Ot O.OOE-Of j

0.OOE-Ot C.OOE-Ot 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-OI 7.OOE*06 0.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 l

O.OOE-01 0.OOE-Of 0.OOE-01 THE VALUES IN THIS TABLE REPRESENT THE COM)lTIONAL PRO 8 ABILITY OF A GIVEN RELEASE CATEGORY EXCEEDING A PARTICULAR NUMBER OF MAN-REN. TO GET THE RISK PERSPECTIVE. THIS NATRIX MUST BE MULTIPLIED BY THE VECTOR OF FREQUENCIES OF EACH RELEASE CATEGORY.

mN

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l Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 ,

FIGURE 7 2 2-1A POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR EARLY FATALITIES INTERNAL RISK ONLY i.0-. , , . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 2.2-18 POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR EARLY INJURIES INTERNAL RISK ONLY

(

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 2 2-10 POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR THYROID NODULES INTERNAL RISK ONLY

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 l FIGURE 7 2.2-1D l POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR LATENT CANCER FATALITIE:

INTERNAL RISK ONLY i.o-s ,

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 2.2-1E POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR MAN-REM INTERNAL RISK ONLY t.o-4 . , .

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t Amendment 1 Septerrber 7,1983 '

FIGURE 7.3-1A RISK DIAGRAM FOR EARLY FATALITIES DUE TO INTERNAL EVENTS 1 0-6 _

1 1 i - -

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 3-1B RISK DIAGRAM FOR EARLY INJURIES DUE TO INTERNAL EVENTS 1 0-5 ..-

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7.3-10 RISK DIAGRAM FOR THYROID NODULES DUE TO INTERNAL EVENTS t.o-4 . . . . .....

i 1 0-5 , ,

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l l

1 0-4 . . . .

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l Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 i

t FIGURE 7.3-1D RISK DIAGRAM FOR LATENT CANCER FATALITIES DUE TO INTERNAL EVENTS g e a a a a a a a an a a a a a a aan a a a a aaaan a a a a a a a as a a a aaaaa l . , . .

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 3-1E RISK DIAGRAM FOR MAN-REM DUE TO INTERNAL EVENTS i,o.4 . . . . ..

. D

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MAN-RENS e ---- - , - , , - - - - + ,,- ,, --, - , . ,,,.,.n- - - - , , . , . - , _ - - , - - . . . . - - . , , - - . - , , . , - - , - - - - , , - , . . , , - - , - - - - - , - - - - , - . - - - -

7.4.3 DOMINANT CONTRIBUTORS TO RISK FROM INTERNAL INITIATORS In this section, the major contributors to point estimate risk from internal initiators are identified. The early fatalities and latent cancer fatalities indices are used as the basis for identification.

The major contributors to the point estimate risk can be identified by con-sidering the matrix products which uniquely identify the contribution of a state (initiating event, plant damage, or release states) to the final damage index. Evaluation of the matrix products for early fatalities shows that Categories MIA and M4 are the dominant release states. As shown in Figure 7.4.3-1, Category M1A releases account for approximately 99 percent of the risk at the greater than 100 carly fatalities level, while Category M4 releases contribute about 1 percent.

As shown in Figure 7.4.3-2, the interfacing systems LOCA, which bypasses the containment, makes up 100 percent of release Category M1A. Transients with early melt and containment cooling dominate Category M4.

Categories M1B, M7, M8, M9, M10, and M11 do not contribute to the early fatalities index. Since 61 percent of core melt sequences which lead to con-tainment failure are in these release categories, the majority of core melt sequences do not contribute to the point estimate risk of early fatalities.

In summary, a majority of the core melt sequences do not result in containment failure and do not contribute to the risk of early fatalities. The inter--

facing system loss of coolant accident resulting in containment bypass and a Category M1A release dominates the early fatalities risk from internal events.

Table 7.4-1 provides a list of dominant sequences on a system level with respect to core melt fregeency and risk in tenns of early fatalities and latent cancers. The dominant sequences with respect to core melt frequency are not as important in tenns of risk, and vice versa.

7.4-3 Amendment 1 September 7, 1983

Figure 7.4.3-3 shows the dominant release categories contributing to latent cancer fatalities. Category M7 makes up 71 pement of the risk at the greater than 1000 latent fatalities level, while Category M1A releases contribute 28 pement.

As shown in Figure 7.4.3-4, transient sequences with early melt and no containment cooling make up 84 percent of release Category M7. The remaining 16 percent is contributed by small LOCA's with late malt and failure of recirculation cooling, and transients with early melt and failure of recirculation cooling.

1 As described above, the V-sequence makes up 100 pement of Category M1A.

With respect to core melt frequency, no single sequence accounts for more than 10 pement of the core melt frequency. The sequences with highest frequency are medium LOCA's with failure of high pressure recimulation (8.5 pement) and transients with failure of auxiliary feedwater and bleed and feed cooling (4.9 pement).

Table 7.4-2 provides a list of the dominant accident sequences for each release category for internal events. Each accident sequence is defined by an i event tree number, a support state number, and a sequence notation showing the

! failed nodes in the event tree. Infonnation related to the containment response can be obtained from the definition of the release categories l themsel ves. For example, release Category M1A represents containment bypass, l while M7 represents a late containment failure with no sprays, and M12 no

! containment failure.

7.4-4 '

TABLE 7.4-1 DOMINANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES CONTRIBUTING TO CORE ELT, EARLV FATALITIES, AND LATENT FATALITIES (INTERNAL EVENTS)

Percent Pertent Contribution Contribution Percent to Early to Latent Contribution Fatalities Fata11tles Rank With Plant to (at >100 at >1000 Respect To Sequence Core helt fatalities Core Melt Designation Sequence Description Damage Mean Annual fatalities S_ tate Frequency Frequency level) level) 1 E2 (1)/R-2 Medium LOCA: Failure of High Pressure Recirculation ALC 3. 87E -6 8.5 <0.1 <0.1

2 E18(2)/AF-1/0A-7 Loss of Vital DC Bus 1 or 2: Failure of Auxiliary TEC 2.20E-5 4.9 <0.1 <0.1 Feedwater, Failure of Bleed and Feed Cooling 3 E20(2)/AF-1/R-2 Loss of Vital AC Bus 1 or 2: Failure of Auxiliary SLC 1.98E -6 4.4 <0.1 <0.1 Feedwater, Failure of High Pressure Recirculation 4 E21(2)/AF-1/R-2 Loss of Vital AC Bus 3 or 4: Failure of Auxiliary SLC 1.9E -6 4.4 <0.1 <0.1 y Feedwater, Failure of High Pressure Recirculation

[ 5 Egg Interfacing Systems LOCA: Failure of RHR Inlet Valves V 1.90E-6 4.2 99.8 27.9 6 E14( 7)/E60/E120/ Loss of Offsite Power: Failure of Both Diesel 1. 6SE -6 3.6 TE <0.1 18.4 E6H/QS Generators, Failure to Recover Power in 6 Hours.

Failure of Quench Spray Recovery 7 Ei g(6)SBI/AF-2/ Loss of Offsite Power: Failure of One ESF Bus, TEC 1.61-6 3.6 <0.1 <0.1 OA-3 S'eam Line Break Inside Containment Failure of Aux 111ary Feedwater, Failure of Primary Bieed through PORV's 8 E6(11/MS-2/0A-3 Steam Line Break Outside Containment: Failure to TEC 1.55E -6 3.4 <0.1 <0.1 Isolate Main Steam Line, Failure of Primary Bleed through PORV's 9 E3 (1)/0A-2/R-2 Small LOCA: Failure to Control Primary Depressuriza- SLC 1.39E-6 3.1 <0.1 <0.1 tion, Failure of High Pressure Recirculation 10 E g(1)/R-1 Large LOCA: Failure of Low Pressure Recirculation ALC 1. 37E -6 3.0 <0.1 <0.1 vi z.

$! 19 E20(4)/AF-1/ Loss of Vital AC Bus 1 or 2: Failure of Opposite TE 7.23E 7 1.6 <0.1 8.0 gg gg OA-7/QS Train ESF Cabinet, Failure of Auxfilary Feedwater, Failure of Bleed and Feed Cooling Failure of Quench

'* Spray w

, 20 Eg(4)/AF-1/ Primary to Secondary Power Mismatch: Failure of TE 6.15E -7 1.4 <0.1 6.9 g OA-7/QS Both ESF Labinets, Failure of Auxiliary Feedwater, w Failure of Bleed and Feed Cooling, Failure of Quench Spray

Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7.4.3-1 MedOR RELEASE CATEGORIES CONTRIBUTING TO EARLY FATALITIES (GREATER THAN 100 FATALITIES)

INTERNAL EVENT 5 tes.ses ,, , , , , ,

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RELEASE CATECORY

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 l

FIGURE 7 5 1-1A POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR EARLY FATALITIES

' SEISMIC RISK ONLY 1 0-5 - -

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7.5.1-18 POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR EARLY INJURIES SEISMIC RISK ONLY 3.o 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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o o o o o o o o o

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u nr INJURIES

Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7.5.1-10 POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR THYROID NODULES SEISMIC RISK ONLY i.0 4 . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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- o o o e o o e THfROID NODULES " S

Amendment 1 Sc;ptember 7,1983 FIGURE 7 5.1-1D POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR LATENT CANCER FATALITIES SEISMIC RISK ONLY i.4 < . . . ......

81 .

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g . . . . . . . . . - . . . ..... . . . . . . . . .

S 8 8 8 8

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LATENT CANCER FATALITIES 3

Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7.5.1-1E POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR MAN-REM SEISMIC RISK ONLY -

1.o-< - - - -

.W 4D 4m E

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MAN-REMS

Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 5.2-1A POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR EARLY FATALITIES FIRE RISK ONLY 1.0-10 : : : : : : : :: : : ; : ::::: : : : : : : ::

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== O O e O

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EARLY FATALITIES l

l

Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 5 2-1B l POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR EARLY INJURIES FIRE RISK ONLY

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EARLY INJURIES

Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7.5 2-10 POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR THYROID NODULES FIRE RISK ONLY

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 5.2-1D POINT ESTIMATE RISK CURVE FOR LATENT CANCER FATALITIES FIRE RISK ONLY 1.o-s .

1 0-4 . . ::

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I 8 O

O LATENT CANCER FATALITIES

~

3

Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 5 2-1E POINT ESTIMATE RISK C!)RVE FOR MAN-REM FIRE RISK ONLY 1.0-s , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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95 MAN-REMS l

1

Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 5.3-1A RISK DIAGRAM FOR EARLY FATALITIES DUE TO EXTERNAL. EVEETS 1.o-s + - + - . . . ...

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a I EARLY FATALITIES l

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7.5.3-1B RISK DIAGRAM FOR EARLY INJURIES DUE TO EXTERNAL EVENTS i.0-4 - . . . . . . . . . .

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Amendment 1 4

September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7.5 3-1C ,

RISK DIAGRAM FOR THYROID NODULES ,

DUE TO EXTERNAL EVENTS i

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Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 5 3-10 RISK DIAGRAM FOR LATENT CANCER FATALITIES DUE TO EXTERNAL EVENTS

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Amendment 1 September 7. 1983 FIGURE 7 5.3-1E CISK DIAGRAM FOR MAN-REM I DUE TO EXTERNAL EVENTS :

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S Se MAN-REMS

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l Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 FIGURE 7 6-1 COMPARISON OF RISK CURVES FOR EARLY FATALITIES WASH-1400 VS. MILLSTONE 3 i i.0-. _ .

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EARLY FATALITIES

l Amendment 1 September 7, 1983 I

FIGURE 7.6-2 COMPARISON OF RISK CURVES FOR LATENT FATALITIES WASH-1400 VS. MILLSTONE 3 1 0-4 : . : : : : ::::: : : : :::::: : : : : :::: : : : :: ;. ,

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. . - . -_ . - . . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

B10887, Forwards Amend 1 to Probabilistic Safety Study

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B10887, Forwards Amend 1 to Probabilistic Safety Study

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