05000311/LER-1982-024, Supplemental LER 82-024/03X-1:on 820328,sample Results from Boric Acid Storage Tank 21 & Boron Injection Tank 22 Indicated Concentrations Below Tech Spec Limit.Cause Unknown.Boric Acid Added

Supplemental LER 82-024/03X-1:on 820328,sample Results from Boric Acid Storage Tank 21 & Boron Injection Tank 22 Indicated Concentrations Below Tech Spec Limit.Cause Unknown.Boric Acid Added

ML20076M601
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/29/1983
From:	Frahm R, Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Allan J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
LER-82-024-03X, LER-82-24-3X, NUDOCS 8307210009
Download: ML20076M601 (5)

LER-2082-024, Supplemental LER 82-024/03X-1:on 820328,sample Results from Boric Acid Storage Tank 21 & Boron Injection Tank 22 Indicated Concentrations Below Tech Spec Limit.Cause Unknown.Boric Acid Added

Event date:
Report date:
3112082024R00 - NRC Website

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• NAME OF PREPARER

. ab PHONE (609) 935-6000 Ext. 4309j

C PSIEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station July 7, 1983 Mr. J. Allan Acting Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Allan:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-24/03X-1 SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9b, we are submitting supplemental Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-24/03X-1.

Sincerely yours,

.')fl.17 J. M. Zupko, Jr.

General Manager -

3 Salem Operations RF:ks l

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Report Number: 82-24/03X-1 Report Date: 06-29-83 Occurrence Date: 03-28-82 Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Reactivity Control / Emergency Core Cooling Systems -

Boric Acid Storage Tanks and Boron Injection Tank -

Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports82-064 and 82-065.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 85% - Unit Load 980 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 1500 hours0.0174 days <br />0.417 hours <br />0.00248 weeks <br />5.7075e-4 months <br /> and 1620 hours0.0188 days <br />0.45 hours <br />0.00268 weeks <br />6.1641e-4 months <br />, March 28, 1982, sample results from Nos. 21 and 22 Boric Acid Storage Tanks (BATS) and the Boron Injection Tank (BIT) respectively, indicated the boric acid concentrations were below the specification limit of 20,000 ppm boron. Nos. 21 and 22 BATS were declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.1.2.6.a was entered. The BIT was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.5.4.1 was entered.

The Refueling Water Storage Tank remained operable as a borated water source throughout the occurrence. No transient initiating Reactor Coolant System (RCS) cooldown occurred during the period in concern and immediate measures were taken to restore the required negative reactivity control during plant operation.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

No apparent reason for the decrease in boric acid concentration could be determined. The BAT and BIT results were consistent making it unlikely that the analyses were incorrect. Investi-gation of previous tank sample results showed no downward trend.

All previous batches were accounted for in the logs, and had been sampled with satisfactory results prior to addition. Sample results of subsequent batches were realistic, indicating no problem with reagents or method. There was no safety injection flow into Unit 2 RCS during this period. All other major water sources adjacent to the boron injection system were borated to greater than 20,000 ppm.

LER 82-24/03X-1 .

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

A subsequent detailed review of the procedures for boric acid solution preparation and transfer (as well as BIT operations -

see Unit 1 LER 83-018/03L) revealed that it would be appropriate to provide additional operator guidance to ensure proper completion of these evolutions.

AN_ALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

' The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include: 1) borated water sources,

2) charging pumps, 3) separate flow paths, 4) boric acid transfer pumps, 5) associated heat tracing systems, and 6) an emergency power supply from ope 5able diesel generat rs. With the RCS average temperature above 200 F, and a minimum of two boron injection flow paths are required to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the flow paths inoperable.

The boration capability of either flow path is sufficient to provide a shutdown margin from expected operating g conditions of 1.6% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200 F.

The operability of the boron injection system as part of the ECCS 1

ensures that sufficient negative reactivity is injected into the core to counteract any positive increase in reactivity caused by

. RCS system cooldown. RCS cooldown can be caused by inadvertent depressurization, a loss-of-coolant accident or a steam line rupture.

The limits on injection tank minimum contained volume and boron concentration ensure that the assumptions used in the steam line break analysis are met. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

i Technical Specification 3.1.2.6.a requires:

l With the boric acid storage system inoperable and being used as one of the required borated water sources, re-store the storage system to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and borated to a shutdown margin equivalent to at least 1%

i delta k/k at 200 F.

f Technical Specification 3.5.4.1 requires:

With the BIT inoperable, restore the tank to an operable status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, or be in hot standby and boraged to a shutdown margin equivalent to 1% delta k/k at 200 F

!. within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

i In either case, the Technical Specifications require if the inoperable component (s) are not restored to an operable status within the next 7 days, be in hot shutdown within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

l i

LER 82-24/03X-1 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Since, as noted, the redundant injection system was operable, and the appropriate measures were taken to ensure reactivity control of the plant, no undue risk to the health and safety of the public was involved. The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9b.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Boric acid was added and recirculated. At 1720 hours0.0199 days <br />0.478 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.5446e-4 months <br />, March 28, 1982, a sample of the BIT showed 19,950 ppm. Power reduction and preparation for entering Mode 3 were commenced in compliance with Action Statement 3.5.4.1. At 1910 hours0.0221 days <br />0.531 hours <br />0.00316 weeks <br />7.26755e-4 months <br />, sample results showed the BIT boric acid concentration was within specification.

The BIT was declared operable, and Action Statement 3.5.4.1 was terminated. Sample results indicated that the BAT boric acid concentrations were within specification limits at 0043 hours4.976852e-4 days <br />0.0119 hours <br />7.109788e-5 weeks <br />1.63615e-5 months <br />, March 29, 1982. Nos. 21 and 22 BATS were declared operable, and Action Statement 3.1.2.6.1 was terminated.

Operating Instruction 01 II-3.3.5 " Boric Acid Solution Preparation and Transfer" was revised to provide greater detail and ensure the BATS are not diluted. Operating Instruction OI II-4.3.5 " Flushing, Draining and Filling the BIT" was also revised to provide detailed guidance for restoring the BIT to recirculation following either dilution or draining.

FAILURE DATA:

Not applicable Prepared By R. Frahm . . Y f General Manager -

Salem Operations SORC Meeting No.83-086 1

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