ML20058N670

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Advises of Final Disposition of 1992 Lake County Commissioner Petition Re Proposed low-level Radwaste Processing & Storage Facility for Plant
ML20058N670
Person / Time
Site: Perry FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/01/1993
From: Selin I, The Chairman
NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To: Glenn J
SENATE, GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
References
CCS, DD-93-15, DD-93-5, NUDOCS 9312220203
Download: ML20058N670 (2)


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[ December 1, 1993 CHAIRMAN The Honorable John Glenn, Chairman Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate l Washington, D.C. 20510-6250

Dear Mr. Chairman:

l By letters dated November 25, 1992, and August 12, 1993, the Commission informed you of the status of our activities with respect to a proposal by the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company to build a low-level radioactive waste processing and storage facility for its Perry Nuclear Power Plant. I am now writing to advise you of our final disposition of the 1992 Lake County Commissioners' Petition with respect to the proposed .

1 facility.

On September 29, 1992, the Lake County Commissioners filed a petition pursuant to Section 2.206 of Part 2, Title 10, of the l Code of Federal Reculations concerning the proposed facility. l NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) issued  !

Director's Decision 93-05 (DD-93-05) on March 28, 1993, denying J the petition. On September 21, 1993, NRR issued a supplement (DD-93-15) to the original Director's Decision to clarify several points. The supplemental decision confirmed the previous denial of the petition and did not change any of the bases for that denial. I am enclosing a copy of DD-93-15 for your information.

We forwarded a copy of DD-93-05 with our August 12, 1993 letter.

The reasoning behind that decision is as follows: The licensee for the Perry plant performed a safety evaluation for the proposed facility in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. The staff reviewed the licensee's evaluation and confirmed that, with limited exceptions, the construction and operation of the interim facility do not involve changes in the handling and storage of low-level radioactive wastes as described in the licensee's Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR). The few exceptions where there are changes to the FSAR description do not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59; therefore, the i licensee may construct and operate the facility without prior NRC review and approval. Thus, no Federal action is involved, and the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act do not apply to this activity. The staff, based on its review, also concluded that the licensee has acceptably addressed all relevant safety issues posed by the construction and operation of the 9312220203 931201 PDR COMMS NRCC COnnE5busbEtwE'rvu 1' 7 0 0 x"

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, '2 interim facility. The supplemental decision contains a more detailed discussion of the basis for the staff's determination that the potential radiological effects of the facility are acceptable.

As noted in DD-93-05, the NRC sponsored a public meeting on October 1, 1992, at Lakeland Community College to hear public concerns about the proposed facility. In reviewing this issue, the staff considered the concerns expressed at that meeting. The  !

original decision, as supplemented, constitutes the final action >

of the Commission regarding this petition.

t We will be pleased to brief you on this matter at your convenience. If I can be of further assistance, please let me know.

Sincerely, [

Ivan Selin

Enclosure:

DD-93-15 i P

cc w/ enclosure:

Senator William V. Roth, Jr.

l i

i

. ENCLOSURE P

p DD-93-15 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (Thomas E. Hurley, Director)

In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-440 CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING ) License No. NPF-58 COMPANY, ET AL. ) (10 CFR 2.206)

)

(Perry Nuclear Power Plant ) .

Unit 1) )

SUPPLEMENTAL DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206  :

1. INTRODUCTION On September 29, 1992, Mr. Steven C. LaTourette submitted a petition on behalf of the Lake County Board of County Commissioners (the petitioners),

requesting that the Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, take certain actions with respect to the proposed construction of an onsite, low-level radioactive waste storage facility at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (Perry). The petition specifically requested that (1) a public hearing be held before the licensee constructs such a facility and (2) the construction of the facility be suspended until (a) either the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or the licensee (the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, et al.) produces an environmental impact statement assessing the risks of onsite storage of low-level waste and (b) the NRC promulgates regulations for storing low-level radioactive waste at nuclear power plant sites. On March 28, 1993 (DD-93-05), I denied the petitioners' request on the bases that  ;

the petitioners raised no substantial health and safety issues and that the Q 12 ~} O c 0f N

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. 3 licensee had complied with the applicable NRC regulations and guidance.

In a letter of April 21, 1993, the patitioners requested that the Commission review and reverse DD-93-05. In that letter, the petitioners contended that DD-93-05 and 10 CFR 50.59 " fall far short of demonstrating the l

safety of the facility itself," as they claim that the discussion in the director's decision only addresses the effect the facility could have on -

existing equipment in the plant. Although 10 CFR 2.206fc)(2) provides that  :

the Commission will not entertain any petition or other request for review of a director's decision under that section, I am issuing this supplemental decision to clarify the bases for my earlier. decision, in response to the-  ;

petitioners' letter of April 21, 1993. ,

II. BACKGROUND  :

Part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Reaulations, " Domestic l

.. q Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," includes regulations  !

l governing the licensing and operation of commercial nuclear power plants in I J

the United States. Section 50.59 addresses the disposition of changes,-tests, l i

and experinents at these facilities, as follows: '

(a)(1) The holder of a license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility may (1) make changes in the facility. _,

as described in the safety analysis report, (11) make changes in the  !

procedures as described in the safety analysis report, and (iii) conduct ,

tests or. experiments not described-in the safety analysis _ report, . {

without prior Commission approval, unless the proposed change, test, or experiment involves a change in'the techr.ical specifications incorporated in the license or an unreviewed safety question. 1 (2) A proposed change, test, or experiment shall be deemed to j involve an unreviewed safety question (i) if the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the. safety 1

l

analysis report may be increased; or (ii) if a possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report may be created; or (iii) if the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification is reduced.

(b)(1) The licensee tha11 maintain records of changes in the facility and of changes in procedures made pursuant to this section, to the extent that these changes constitute changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report or to the extent that they constitute changes in procedures as described in the safety analysis report. The licensee shall also maintain records of tests and experiments carried out pursuant to paragraph (a) of.this section. ,

These records must include a written safety evaluation which provides the bases for the determination that the change, test, or experiment' does not involve an unreviewed safety question. 9 (2) The licensee shall submit, as specified in i 50.4, a report containing a brief description of any changes, tests, and experiments, including a summary of the safety evaluation of each. The report may be submitted annually or along with the FSAR updates as required by f 50.71(e), or at such shorter intervals as may be specified in the license.

(3) The records of changes in the facility shall be maintained until i the date of termination of the license, and records of changes in procedures and records of tests and experiments shall be maintained for ,

a period of five years.

(c) The holder of a license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility who desires (1) a change in technical specifications or (2) to make a change in the facility or procedures described in the safety analysis --n " or to conduct tests or experiments not described in thi <.cfee _nalysis report, which involve an unreviewed safety question on ch! ge in the technical specifications, shall submit an 10 ation for amendment of his license pursuant to 6 50.90. '

In August 1992, The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company announced plans to construct an interim onsite low-level radioactive waste (LLW) storage and processing facility, in anticipation of the possible loss of access to the

-three disposal sites currently operating in the United States. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and NRC staff guidance in NRC Generic Letter (GL) 81-38,

' Storage of Low-Level Radioactive Wastes at Power Reactor Sites," dated November 10, 1981, the licensee performed and documented a safety evaluation i

,e .

i for the proposed facility. In the safety evaluation, the 'censee concluded that the construction and operation of the interim LLW facilisj do not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2) and that no changes in license conditions or technical specifications are necessary. Therefore, the licensee further concluded that the facility could be built and operated without prior NRC approval, as stated in 10 CFR 50.59(a)(1). The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's safety evaluation and supporting documentation for the interim onsite LLW storage and processing facility. As discussed in DD-93-05, the staff concluded that the licensee '

correctly determined that the interim LLW storage and processing facility does not constitute an unreviewed safety question and that the design and operation of the facility will conform with the safety analyses in the Perry Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR).

III. DISCUSSION In accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(b)(1), the licensee evaluated the interim LLW facility in a written safety evaluation, which provided the bases for the conclusion that the interim onsite LLW storage and processing facility does not involve an unreviewed safety question. The bases for the licensee's conclusion and the staff's agreement with that conclusion are described below in greater detail, to address the petitioners' assertions of April 21, 1993, that DD-93-05 and 10 CFR 50.59 fall far short of demonstrating the safety of .

the facility itself and only address the effect the facility could have on existing equipment in the plant. '

1: .  ;

. i The licensee analyzed the processing and storage of solid radioactive r

waste in Section 11.4 and a spectrum of potential accidents and events in Chapter 15 of the Perry FSAR, to demonstrate the ability of the plant to operate within regulatory guidelines without undue risk to the public health and safety. This spectrum was selected to represent the types of accidents and events postulated to occur at Perry and to bound the potential consequences of less significant teridents and events. Th.,e NRC staff evaluated and accepted this spectrum of accidents and events as part of the licensing basis for the plant. Wh?le this spectrum of accidents and events if ,

primarily focused on reactor safety and the equipment and systems directly affecting reactor safety, the licensee also evaluated other types of acciaents not affecting reactor safety, including fuel handling accidents and liquid radioactive waste tank failures, both of which could result in the release of radioactive material offsite.

The licensee addressed the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2) to determine if a change, test, or experiment involves an unreviewed safety question, as part of its safety evaluation of the construction and operatior, of the interim onsite LLW storage and processing facility. The licensee divided the three criteria into seven separate items in performing its analysis. Although the licensee's seven-point analysis did not explicitly address certain of the matters discussed below, the licensee's safety analysis and its attachments, and the FSAR, provide sufficient information for the staff to confirm that the construction and operation of the interim LLW facility do not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Effect on the Reactor Facility The licensee's analysis clearly demonstrates that there are no interactions between the interim onsite LLW storage and processing facility and the operation of the reactor facility. The licensee has analyzed the potential catastrophic failure of the interim LLW facility and determined that the facility is located far enough away from other plant structures to prevent a postulated complete failure of the building from damaging any plant systems or equipment important to reactor safety. The interim LLW facility is not interconnected with any system relied on to mitigate any accident or event previously evaluated in the FSAR. The only significant system connected to the interi:n LLW storage and processing facility is the fire protection water system (FPWS), which is controlled in accordance with facility-approved guidance (i.e., licensee procedures and training provide that the FPWS is to be available when and where it is needed and also provide that it can be isolated from the interim LLW facility, if necessary to ensure integrity of the FPWS). The licensee determined that a failure of the FPWS branch piping to the interim LLW facility will not reduce the fire suppression capability in the plant.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's evaluation and agrees that, with respect to the safe operation of the reactor facility, the construction and operation of the interim LLW storage and processing facflity will not (1) increase the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated, (2) create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated, or (3) reduce the margin of safety.

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Ooeration of the Interim LLW Facility (1) Dry Solid Radwaste Currently, processing of dry solid radioactive wastes is carried out mainly in the radwaste building, but some activities are carried out in other locations of the plant in accordance with the FSAR description. Many of these activities will continue to be performed in the same locations. The processing of low-level dry radwaste material with average, contact radiation levels less than 5 millirem per hour (mrem /hr) will be carried out in the interim LLW storage and processing facility. Dry solid radwaste with

  • radiation levels in excess of 5 mrem /hr will continue to be processed in the radwaste building. In addition, the plant will retain the p.svious capability I

to process dry solid radwaste in the radwaste building.

Dry solid radwaste will be stored in the interim LLW storage building.

The operating license for Perry contains no restriction on the storage of dry radwaste and the FSAR addresses the storage of dry radwaste at any location at the site, provided such interim storage locations are evaluated for compliance with NRC GL 81-38. GL 81-38 provides guidance on a number of aspects of the design of onsite, temporary low-level radwaste storage facilities, including limits on the amount of radwaste to be stored, the potential consequences of design-basis accid (nts, shielding and dose limits from normal activities, I

container selection ano inspection, physical security, monitoring of potential release pathways, and the control of liquid drainage. The licensee's evaluation demonstrates that storage of dry radwaste in the interim LLW facility complies with the provisions of GL 81-38. Thus, the storage of dry radwaste at the interim LLW facility does not involve a change to the Perry FSAR.

The only change to the FSAR description for the processing of dry radwaste is the location of the compactor used for processing low-level dry radwaste with average contact radiation levels less than 5 mrem /hr. This material will be processed in the interim LLW building rather than in the radwaste building. Although the interim LLW facility will use an improved compactor and a shredder, neither the plant's operating license nor the FSAR specify details of the compactor. Further, the licensee indicates and the staff agrees that this equipment is similar to that currently used and does not represent a handling process different from that described in the Perry FSAR.

Thus, the storage of dry radwaste has been evaluated against the guidance of GL 81-38 as set forth in the FSAR, and the changed location for the processing of dry radwaste with radiation levels below 5 mrem /hr has been evaluated against the standards of 10 CFR 50.59.

The licensee designed the interim LLW facility and has established administrative controls to ensure that (1) the volume and activity of the stored radwaste will be limited, (2) sufficient radiation shielding will be provided, (3) periodic monitoring and inspections will be performed, and (4) the other applicable provisions of GL 81-38 are satisfied.

The interim LLW facility will incorporate safety features similar to those existing in the radwaste building processing and storage area, including foot-thick concrete walls for shielding, a fire suppression sprinkler system, and a ventilation system incorporating high-efficiency particulate air filters and radiation monitors. The facility ventilation system is designed to maintain a negative pressure in the building so that all effluents will be discharged through the filtered, monitored pathway. Although NRC regulations f

w

.g. -

l do not require such facilities to be designed to specific seismic criteria, the basic structure of the facility is designed to withstand the effects of the maximum predicted earthquake. However, the licenso did not take credit for this design feature in conservatively postulating a complete failure of the building (due to unspecified causes) for the purpose of performing an accident analysis, as discussed later. In addition, the licensee sited the building so that the probable maximum flood from Lake Erie _.would still be 15 feet below the level of the curb surrounding the building.

The licensee has aralyzed the consequences of- various potential '

accidents involving the interim LLW facility, including a catastrophic failure of the building itself, which the licensee does not consider a credible event.

For such a failure, the licensee assumed that 10 percent of the radioactivity of the entire 5-year volume of LLW would bc released, a reasonable assumption based on the design of the storage containers, the nature of the waste, and the design features of the facility described above. The maximum calculated i radiation dose to an individual at the nearest offsite point (the shoreline of l Lake Erie, north of the plant) is approximately 5 millirem for this accident.

This accident dose is several hundred times smaller than the NRC staff guidance of GL 81-38 for accidents involving onsite storage of radwaste, 2.5 i

rem (i.e.,10 percent of the 10 CFR Part 100 limits of 25 rem radiation dose to the whole body). l The consequences of accidents involving dry radwaste processing or storage were not specifically calculated in the Perry FSAR; rather, the FSAR computes the consequences of a category of accidents involving " radioactive release from subsystems and components." This category encompasses releases from radioactive waste systems. The radiological consequences of accidents in

l this category were bounded by the consequences of the fuel handling accident, for which the calculated consequences result in a radiation exposure of approximately 1000 millirem at the exclusion area boundary.

The potential radiological consequences from the storage and processing of dry radwaste at the interim LLW facility were calculated to be a maximum of 5 millirem, far below the value specified in the guidance of GL 81-38. Thus, the storage of dry radwaste conforms to the provisions of the FSAR, and the consequences associated with the processing of dry radwaste with contact n

radiation levels less than 5 mrem /hr are far below the consequences of the category of radwaste accidents previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The NRC staff concludes that the storage of dry radwaste in the interim LLW facility is consistent with the requirements of the FSAR and that the processing of dry solid radwaste at the interim LLW facility will not increase the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated, nor will it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type from that previously evaluated. The dry solid radwaste processing and handling activities are essentially unchanged, except for the fact that .some of these activities will be performed in the interim LLW facility. The equipment and processes to be employed in the interim LLW facility are similar to the equipment and handling processes currently used in the radwaste building. There are no margins of safety associated with the handling of dry solid wastes as defined in the basis for any technical specification.

(2) Resin Processing The processing, dewatering, and handling of radioactive resins is unchanged and will continue to be carried out in the radwaste building. The

.. - l l

I l

. i dewatered or solidified liners resulting from these activities will continue to be packaged into high integrity containers (HICs) in the radwaste building.

The only change in resin handling is that the HICs containing spent resin will be placed in individual Onsite Storage Containers (OSSCs). The OSSCs are cylindrical concrete and steel-reinforced vessels designed to provide additional shielding and structural protection for the HICs containing spent resin material. .

Again, the Perry operating license contains no restriction on the s'

storage of HICs, and as indicated above, the FSAR permits the storage of radwaste, including dewatered resins, at any location at the site, provided such interim storage locations are evaluated for compliance with NRC GL 81-38.

The licensee's evaluation demor strates that storage of dewatered resins in the OSSCs complies with the provisians of GL 81-38. Thus, the storage of HICs in the OSSCs does not involve a change to the Perry FSAR.

The licensee has analyzed the effects of tornadoes, floods, and seismic events on the OSSCs and concluded that these events will not result in the failure of the OSSCs, nor in the release of any radioactive material contained in the HICs inside the OSSCs. Further, the OSSCs will be kept on a concrete pad away from any potential sources of combustible material and are not themselves subject to combustion. Therefore, the licensee does not consider a  ;

potential fire in the vicinity of the OSSCs to be a credible event.

The specific consequences of accidents involving spent resin radwaste processing or storage were not explicitly calculated in the FSAR for the Perry facility, but are encompassed by the category of accidents involving )

radioactive releases from subsystems and components. This category of accidents is bounded by the consequences of the fuel handling accident.

l 1

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l In connection with the design of the interim LLW storage and processing facility and the OSSCs, the licensee calculated the consequences of an accident involving the failure of a HIC as-a result of dropping a HIC during placement into an OSSC. The calculation assumes that 10 percent of the contents of a HIC are released for dispersal into the atmosphere. This is a very conservative estimate since the radioactive material is chemically and physically bound to the resin material and would not be readily dispersed. In addition, the HIC is designed and tested to withstand a drop of 25 feet, and the licensee has established administrative controls to limit the lifting of /

HIC to a maximum height of 15 feet. The maximum calculated dose at the nearest offsite point (Lake Erie, north of the plant) is approximately 80 millirem for this accident. This is about 3 percent of the limit recommended in the NRC staff guidance in GL 81-38 for accidents involving the onsite storage and handling of radwaste. It is also substantially lower than the >

offsite dose consequences calculated for the bounding fuel drop accident in the FSAR (approx:nately 1000 millirem).

In summary, storage of the HICs in the OSSCs conforms to the guidance of '

GL 81-38 and thus conforms to the requirements of the FSAR.

Although the consequences of an accident involving the failure of a HIC '

were not explicitly calculated in the FSAR, the FSAR indicated that such '

storage containers would be used for offsite transport of spent resin  ;

material. The failure of a HIC as a result of dropping the container while loading it into an OSSC would be similar to a potential failure during the  !

existing processes for the temporary storage or loading of HICs for transport offsite. The dropping of a HIC while loading it into an OSSC would not be more likely than a handling accident during the temporary storage or loading i

s .- - -. . . .

l 1

1 of a HIC for transport offsite.

4 The NRC staff has concluded that the licensee's evaluation of the three criteria of 10 CFR 50.59(a)(2) is sufficient and that the construction and i operation of the interim onsite LLW storage and processing facility and the associated OSSCs at Perry do not involve an unreviewed safety question.

Environmental Imoact Statement Issue  : ,

4 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), as amended, o

requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement for a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.

The Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 51.20 also specify criteria for licensing and regulatory actions requiring environmental impact ~ statements.

Since the licensee can construct and operate the LLW storage facility on the i

Perry site without prior NRC approval, no Federal action is involved and neither NEPA nor the provisions of 10 CFR 51.20 apply. Therefore, neither a hearing nor an environmental impact statement is required.

IV. CONCLUSION l l

In DD-93-05, I determined that the petitioners' requests concerning the temporary onsite low-level radioactive waste storage and processing facility at the Perry Nuclear Power Plant did not present any substantial health and safety issues and did not provide a basis for the NRC to require a public hearing for the construction and operation of the facility, or for the NRC to write (or require the licensee to produce) an environmental impact statement for the use of the facility. The staff concluded that the interim l

1

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)

LLW facility does not require an amendment to the plant's operating license; therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(a)(1), prior NRC approval is not required for the licensee to construct and operate the facility. In this  :

supplemental decision, I have clarified the bases for the staff's previous finding that the construction and use of the facility does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. I am issuing this supplemental decision to address the petitioners' contentions raised in their letter of April 21, 1993, to the Secretary of the Commission. I find that those contentions also fail to raise any substantial health and safety issues.

Therefore, I confirm my previous conclusion in DD-93-05, that the petitioners have not submitted a sufficient basis for the NRC to require the preparation of an environmental impact statement or to hold a hearing ,

regarding the facility. I have not changed my previous finding from that discussed in DD-93-05 concerning the petitioners' request for rulemaking.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this supplemental decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, for the Commission's review.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

$5 Thomas E. Murley, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 21st day of Septe:nber 1993 i

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