ML20076A987

Forwards Proposed Revision to Tech Specs to Allow Unlimited Containment Purges.Revisions Deal W/Containment Isolation Valves

ML20076A987
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	04/27/1979
From:	Counsil W NORTHEAST UTILITIES
To:	Reid R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
TAC-11348, TAC-11561, TAC-12505, TAC-42588, TAC-42846, TAC-8162, NUDOCS 7905070359
Download: ML20076A987 (17)

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HART ORD. CONNECTICUT 06101 (203) 666-6911 k k j

• April 27, 1979 Docket No. 36 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: Mr. R. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #4 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

References:

(1) R. Reid letter to W. G. Counsil dated November 29, 1978.

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v (2) W. G. Counsil letter to R. Reid dated January 3,1979.

Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2 Proposed Revisions to Technical Specifications In Reference (1), the NRC Staff requested action of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) regarding containment purging during normal operation. In Reference (2), NNECO identified its intent to pursue Option 3 of Reference (1),

namely to justify unlimited purging. Subsequently, NNECO has determined that the existing containment isolation valves are not sufficiently qualified to justify the undimited purging option.

Therefore, pursuant to 10CFR50.90, NNECO hereby proposes to amend its operating O license, DPR-65, by incorporating the revisions identified in Attachment 1 into O the Millstone Unit No. 2 Technical Specifications.

As indicated on attached Page 3/4 6-lla, NNECO is conservatively proposing to maintain the containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves in a locked closed position in Modes 1 through 4. For this reason, the attached Technical Specifications delete all reference to Functional Unit 7 of the Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System, the Containment Purge Valves Isolation function.

These changes reflect the fact that there is no longer any automatic action re-quired of these valves in Modes 1 through 4. Accordingly, Table 3.3-6 has also been modified to reflect the fact that the Process Monitors no longer cause any automatic action in Modes 1 through 4.

The operability requirements for the containment airborne radioactivity monitors and the containment purge valve isolation system are fully contained on revised Pages 3/4 9-9 and 3/4 9-10. These specifications are conservative, in that the isolation system must be demonstrated operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the start of core alterations. The isolation time originally specified in Table 3.6-2 is now provided in Surveillance Requirement 4.9.10. The revised maximum isolation time of one minute is adequate to ensure that the radiological consequences of a postulated fuel handling accident remain a small fraction of 10CFR Part 100 limits.

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. The revised specifications and bases are consistent with the model specifica-tions provided in Reference (1).

The above proposed changes have been reviewed pursuant to 10CFR50.59 and have not been found to constitute an unreviewed safety question.

The Millstone Unit No. 2 Nuclear Review Board has reviewed and approvec the above proposed changes and concurred in the above determination.

NNECO has reviewed the above proposed changes pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR170, and has determined that the proposal constitutes a class III amendment.

Accordingly, enclosed herewith is payment in the amount of $4,000 (four thousand dollars). The basis for this determination is that the proposal involves a single safety issue, responding to a written request of the Commission, and does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

Please be advised that in the event the NRC Staff does not disposition this request prior to the start of Cycle 3 operation, the isolation valves will be maintained in the locked closed position in Modes 1 through 4 as indicated in Attachment 1.

Very truly yours, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY r a W. GC/Counsil Vice President By:

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W. F. Fee Vice President Attachment i

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STATE OF CONNECTICUT )

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COUNTY OF HARTFORD )

Then personally appeared before me W. F. Fee, who being duly sworn, did state that he is Vice President of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, a Licensee herein, that he is authorized to execute and file the forecoing information in the name and on behalf of the Licensees herein and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

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W Notary Public My Commission Expkes Much 31,1931 O

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DOCKET NO. 50-336 ATTACIMENT 1 MILLS 1DNE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2 PROPOSED REVISIONS TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONTAINMENT PURGING O

i APRIL, 1979

Mar"ch 1, 1979 l

l INSTRUMENTATION

't SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) '

4.3.2.1.3 The ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each ESF function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific ESF function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-3.

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TABLE 3.3-3 h! ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION G

j MINIMUM

1. 1 TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE

, FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

!! 1. SAFETY INJECTION (SIAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 6

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b. Containment Pressure -

High 4 2 3 1,2,3 7

c. Pressurizer Pressure -

Low 4 2 3 1,2(d),3(a) 7

2. CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CSAS)

a. Manual (Trip Buttons) 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 6 M

b. Containment Pressure --

ja High - High 4 2(b) 3 1,2,3 7 0

3. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (CIAS)

a. Manual CIAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 6

b. Manual SIAS (Trip Buttons) 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 6

c. Containment Pressure - E High 4 2 3 1,2,3 7 5 r+

d. Pressurizer Pressure -  !" .

Low. 4 2 3 1,2(a),3(a) 7  ;

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) h ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION G

d 2 MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE

, FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION E

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7. LOSS OF POWER >l I E

a. 4.16ky Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Under- k v61tage relays) - level 4/ Bus 2/ Bus 3/ Bus 1, 2, 3 7 ,8 one

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b. 4.16kv Emergency Bus 5 Undervoltage (Under- 13 voltage relays) - level two 4/ Bus 2/ Bus 3/ Bus 1, 2, 3 7

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August 1, 1975 -

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION (a) Trip function may be bypassed when pressurizer pressure is <

1750 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed when pressurizer pressure is > 1750 psia.

(b) An SIAS signal is first necessary to enable CSAS logic.

(c) Trip function may be bypassed below 600 psia; bypass shall be automatically removed at or above GOO psia. '

O (d) Trip may be bypassed during testing pursuant to Special Test Exception 3.10.3.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 6 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the -

Total Number of Channels, restore the inoperable channel I to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 7 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels and with the pressurizer pressure:

a. < 1750 psia; innediately place the inoperable O channel in the bypassed condition; restore the in-operable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increa-sing the pressurizer pressure above 1750 psia.

b. > 1750 psia, operation may continue with the in-operable channel in the bypassed condition, provided the following conditions are satisfied:

1. All functinnal units receiving an input from the bypassed channel are also placed in the bypassed condition.

2. The Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional channel may be removed from service for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for i surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1 l

provided one of the inoperable channels is

! placed in the tripped condition.

i MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 3-16

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March 1, 1979 5

(( TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

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ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES e

-d ALLOWABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT TRIP YALUE VALUES ro

5. ENCLOSURE BUILDING FILTRATION (EBFAS)

a. Manual EBFAS (Trip Buttons) Not Applicable Not Applicable

b. Manual SI AS (Trip Buttons) Not Applicable Not Applicable

c. Containment Pressure - High < 5 psig < 5 psig

d. Pressurizer Pressure - Low > 1600 psia > 1600 psia

6. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (SRAS)

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a. Manual SRAS (Trip Buttons) Not Applicable Not Applicable.

i* b. Refueling Water Storage Tank - Low 48 + 18 inches above 48 + 18 inches above G; tank bottom tank bottom o

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August 30, 1976 1

TABLE 3.3-4 (Continued)

% ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM liiSTRUMENTATION TRIP VALUES U

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' ' ALLOWABLE 7 FUNCTIONAL UNE . , <

TRIP iALUE ~ VALUES ,-

E 7 LOSS.0Fr?0WER - t a ~ ,

m a. 4.16 kv Emergency,Eus Undervoltage:

(Undervoltagetelays',1 ic? vel one

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> 2912 volts > 2912 volts

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b. 4.15kE.&srgency. Bus L'nder' voltage > 3700 volts with > 3700 volts with (Undervalteae relays) - le' vel two

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' an 8.0 + 2.0 second an 8.0 + 2.0 second

, time deTay . time deTay 1

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J TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued) vi ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS o

$ CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST c REQUIRED 5 6. CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION (3 RAS) 0"

a. Manual SRAS (Trip Buttons) N.A. N.A. R N.A.

b. Refueling Water Storage .'

Tank - Low '

S R M 1,2,3

c. Automatic Actuation Logic. N.A. N.A. M(1) 1, 2, 3 R

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1 LOSS OF POWER T+

a.4.16 kv Emergency Bus l w I.

Undervoltage (Undervoltage relays) - level one -

b. 4.16 kv Emergency Bus S R M 1,2,3 13 0 Undervoltage(Undervoltage relays) - level two S R M 1,2, 3 12

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March 1, 1979 3r .

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@ TliBLE 3.3-6 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Q MINIMUM m CHANNELS APPLICABLE ALARM / TRIP MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT, OPERABLE MODES SETPOINT RANGE ACTION

1. AREA MONITORS

.. a. Spent Fuel Storage Criticality Monitor 2

• and Ventilation -< 100 mR/hr 10-I - 10+4 nR/hr 13 and lS System Isolation w

1 2. -FROLESS MONITORS

/o a. Containment Atmosphere-Particulate 1 MODE 6 < the value 10 - 10 #6 cpm 14 and (a) 38 determined in accordance with specification 4.9.9.3 l

b Containment Atmosphere-Gaseous 1 MODE 6 < the value

_ 10 - 10+6 cpm 14 and (a) detemined in accordance with Specification 4.9.9.3 With fuel in storage building.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.7 The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be locked closed.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one containment purge supply and/or one exhaust isolation valve open, close the open valve (s) within one hour or be in at least HOT

() STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

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SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS l i

4.6.1.7 The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves shall be determined locked closed at least once per 31 days.

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g o TABLE 3.6-2 (Continued) 5 I CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

[E TESTABLE DURING y VALVE NUMBER MAXIMUM FUNCTION PLANT OPERATION ISOLATION TIME A. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES 2-AC-12 Containment Air Sample 2-AC-15 Yes 5 seconds Containment Air Sample Yes 2-AC-20 Containment Air Sample 5 seconds 2-AC-47 Yes 5 seconds Containment Air Sample Yes HV-8150 Containment Air Sample 5 seconds HV-8151 Yes 5 seconds Containment Air Sample Yes 5 seconds

• 2-MS-191A Steam Generator Sample 2-MS-1918 Yes 5 seconds Steam Generator Sample Yes 5 seconds

$ 2-EB-91 Hydrogen Purge Yes

. 2-EB-92 Hydrogen Purge 5 seconds 1 2-EB-99 Yes 5 seconds m Hydrogen Purge Yes 2-EB-100 Hydrogen Purge 5 seconds Yes 5 seconds

8. CONTAINMENT PURGE g 2-AC-4 Purge Air y 2-AC-5 No "

Purge Air N/A ~

2-AC-6 .

Purge Air No N/A -

2-AC-7 Purge Air No N/A -

C.

No N/A 0 u,

MANUAL 2-SI-709* Shutdown Cooling Yes Not Applicable 2-SI-463* Safety Injection Tank Test Line Yes Not Applicable 2-SA-19* Station Air 2-RW-21*

Yes Not Applicable Refueling Water Purification 2-RW-63* Refueling Water Purification Yes Not Applicable 2-RW-154* Refueling Water Purification Yes Not Applicable 2-RW-232* Refueling Water Purification Yes Not Applicable Yes Not Applicable

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- . August 1, 1975 REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTAINMENT RADIATION MONITORING ,

I LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.9 The containment airborne radioactivity monitors l which initiate containment purge valve isolation shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTION:

With less than the above required instrumentation systems OPERABLE, r- either suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS and novement of

(_g) fuel within the containment building or close all penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere, then CORE ALTERATIONS and/or fuel movement within the containment building may proceed for up to 7 days subject to ACTION requirements of Specifi-cation 3.3.3.1, as applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.9.1 The specified instrumentation shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by fs performance of the surveillance requirements of Specification 4.3.3.1.

(_)

4.9.9.2 All penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be verified closed at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during CORE ALTERATIONS or fuel movement within the containment building when less than the above required instrumentation systems are OPERABLE.

4.9.9.3 The trip value shall be such that the containment purge effluent shall not result in calculated concentrations of radioactivity offsite in excess of 10CFR Part 20, Appendix B, Table Fog the purposes of calculating this trip value, a x/Q = 5.8 x 10 gl.sec/m3 shall be used when the system is a igned to purge through the building vent and a i X/Q = 7.5 x 10-8 sec/m shall be used when the system is aligned to i purge through the Unit 1 stack; the gaseous and particulate (Half Lives greater than 8 days) radioactivity shall be assumed to be xenon-133 and cesiumgl37, respectively. However, the setpoints shall be no greater than MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-9 l l

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August 1,1975 l

REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTAINMENT PURGE VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM ,

i LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.10 The containment purge valve isolation system shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTION:

("") With the containment purge valve isolation system inoperable, either s- close each of the penetrations providing direct access from the contain-ment abnosphere to the outside atmosphere or suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or fuel movement within the containment building. a SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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4.9.10 The containment purge valve isolation system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of CORE ALTERATIONS by veri-fying that containment building isolation occurs on a high radiation signal from each of the containment radiation monitoring instrumentation channels required OPERABLE by Specification 3.9.9. The maximum isolation '

time of the containment purge isolation valves is one minute.

MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-10 1

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March 23, 1977 .

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that the containment peak pressure does not exceed the design pressure of 54 psig during LOCA conditions.

The maximum peak pressure obtained from a LOCA event is 51.2 psig.

The limit of 2.1 psig for initial positive containment pressure will limit the total pressure to less than the design pressure and is consistent with the accident analyses.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitation on containment air temperature ensures that the containment peak air temperature does not exceed the design temperature of 288*F during LOCA conditions. The containment temperature limit is consistent with the accident analyses.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY This limitation ensures that the structural integrity of the con-tainment vessel will be maintained comparable to the original design standards for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required l20 to ensure that the vessel will withstand the maximum pressure of 51.2 psig in the event of a LOCA. The measurement of containment tendon lift off force, the visual and metallurgical examination of tendons, anchor-O~ ages and liner and the Type A leakage tests are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the containment's strucutral integrity are in compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.35 " Inservice Surveillance of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containment Strucutres".

3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM The containment purge supply and exhaust isolation valves are required to be closed during plant operation since these valves have not been denonstrated capable of closing during a (LOCA or steam line break accident). Maintaining these valves closed during plant operations ,

ensures that excessive quantities of radioactive materials will not be l released via the containment purge system.

l MILLSTONE - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-2