ML20093M720

Informs of Schedular Changes Per IE Insp Rept 50-219/81-10 for Condensate Transfer Bldg Sump Alarm & Replacement of Splices W/Continuous Wire,Originally Proposed for Completion During Current (Cycle 10) Refueling Outage

ML20093M720
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	10/05/1984
From:	Fiedler P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 8410230182
Download: ML20093M720 (2)

Text

____ -____ _ _____

't

. g GPU Nuclear Corporation gggf Post Office Box 388 Route 9 South Forked River, New Jersey 08731-o388 609 971-4000 Writer's Direct Dial Number:

October 5, 1984 Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406

Subject:

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Cycle 10 Refueling Outage Commitments The purpose of this letter is to inform you of schedular changes for two (2) items which were originally proposed for completion during our current (Cycle 10) refueling outage. Additionally, the scope of work for one (1) of these items has been modified. The items and their applicable references are discussed below:

1. Condensate Transfer Building Sump Alarm In response to a Notice of Violation (N0Y) forwarded by letter dated August 2,1981 with Inspection Report No. 81-10, proposed corrective actions were provided to Region I to minimize the probability of future leakage fron sources within the Condensate Transfer Building (CTB) to the environs. The response was forwarded to Region I by letter dated September 22, 1981. Ona of the corrective actions outlined was the design of a water detection alnrm in the CTB with an associated alarm in the control room. The NOV and associated corrective actions were in response to several building outleakage events occurring between August 9,1980 and April 21, 1981.

A subsequent event occurred on June 16, 1982 when it was suspected that approximately three hundred (300) gallons of condensate water was released to the sofi outside the building. This event was reported in Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 50-219/82-34. In that report, installation of the CTB sump level alarm was indicated for completion during the current refueling outage. Due to outage workload and redirection in workscope this modification will not be accomplished during the current outage, It has been decided to delete the control room alann. The installation of a local visual and/or audible alarm will be completed no later than 8410230182 841005 PDR ADOCK 05000219 l

G PDR GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the General Public Utilities Corporation ] g

^ . ~

rQr; Thomas E. Murley, Adninistration Region I i

. Page 2 I

startup from the next refueling outage (Cycle 11). Action has already been taken to correct various root causes of past leakage events in the CTB l including the repair and/or replacement of leaking valves, better guidance

-on system operation to preclude valve-induced piping vibration and the balancing of pump rotating assemblies to minimize piping vibration. In addition, the earthen floor areas were covered with asphalt sloped to a metal . drum sump. A more permanent concrete floor will replace the asphalt floor-and a polyethylene drum will replace the metal drum sump. This work will be performed on a schedule consistent with the installation of the sump alarm.-

2. Replacement of Splices With Continuous Wire Licensee Event Report 50-219/82-25 contained a commitment to replace all

- splices, in safety-related installations similar to the one described in the LER, with continuous wire during the current refueling outage. A total of

- seventeen (17) splices in pressure switch circuits were identified for replacement with continuous wire. Six (6) of the splices will be replaced during the current outage. The eleven (11) remaining splices will be replaced during the next (Cycle 11) refueling outage as they require extensive conduit relocation and addition of terminal blocks. ~ The logic of the associated devices has been reviewed and thel failure mechanism is in the

" fail safe" mode, i.e., failure of continuity in the splices wruld be-identified by actuation of their respective devices. All devices are accessible for maintenance during power operation.

Very truly yours, M ' $ by P e . 1edler -

ice President and Director Oyster Creek PBF/PFC/ dam cc: Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission r Washington, DC 20555.

lL NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731 t

L t

l l

-n, - -- n,-,~-.,-n...,.---,--,,-n- -

.~e--w---- - - ,