Text

Insp Rept 50-285/86-03 During Feb 1986.Violations Noted: Hourly Check of Nonfunctional Fire Barriers Not Performed & safety-related Fuel Oil Sys Modified W/O Approved Procedure
	ML20205N763
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	03/20/1986
From:	Harrell P, Hunnicutt D; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20205N757	List: ML20205N753; ML20205N758; ML20205N763;
References
	50-285-86-03, 50-285-86-3, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, NUDOCS 8605020287
	Download: ML20205N763 (17)
	v • d • e

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APPENDIX B

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-285/86-03 License: DPR-40

Docket: 50-285

Licensee: Omaha Public Power District

1623 Harney Street

Omaha, Nebraska 68102

Facility Name: Fort Calhoun Station

Inspection At: Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska

Inspection Conducted: February 1-28, 1986

Inspector:[J hl b _i # 10/84.

P. H. Harrell, Senior Resident Reactor thte /

) Inspector i

Approved: h)bw M

D. M. Hunnicutt, Chief, Project Section B,

.8[f,O/8'd

Cate' j

Reactor Projects Branch 1

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted February 1-28, 1986 (Report 50-285/86-03)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety

verification, maintenance, surveillance, plant tours, safety-related system

walkdowns, followup on previously identified items, followup on licensee event

reports, followup on an IE Bulletin, followup on an NRC headquarter's request

on the maintenance outage team inspection, and followup on an NRR order for

modification of license.

The inspection involved 107 inspector-hours (including 14 backshift hours)

onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: Within the ten areas inspected, two violations (failure to check

nonfunctional fire barriers hourly, paragraph 2; and modification of a

safety-related system without an approved procedure, paragraph 2) were

identifled.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

"W. Gates, Plant Manager

C. Brunnert, Operations Quality Assurance Supervisor

M. Core, Maintenance Supervisor

D. Dale, Quality Control Inspector

J. Fisicaro, Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affairs Supervisor

J. Foley, I&C and Electrical Field Maintenance Supervisor

M. Kallman, Security Supervisor

L. Kusek, Operations Supervisor

J._Lechner, Engineer

T. McIvor, Technical Supervisor

R. Mueller, Plant Engineer

G. Roach, Chemical and Radiation Protection Supervisor

J. Tesarek, Reactor Engineer

S. Willrett, Administration Services and Security Supervisor

Denotes attendance at the monthly exit interview.

The inspector also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, e

technicians, and administrative personnel.

2. Followup on Previously Identified Items

(Closed) Violation 285/8003-05: No supporting evidence of mask fit.

The licensee has established an automated system for monitoring

the records for fit testing of respirators. The data for each

individual has been entered into a computer and the computer

highlights on the weekly printout whenever mask fit testing is

due for an individual in less than a month. The individual must

then qualify for respirator use or the licensee will revoke the

authorization for the individual to use a respirator. The

licensee also uses the same computer system to track the

qualification status for security badge and radiation training.

The NRC inspector performed a spot check of individuals

currently qualified for respirator use to verify their

qualifications are current. No problems were noted.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 285/8008-01: Data for verification of the

adequacy of fire barrier penetration seals.

The licensee supplied, in a letter dated October 18, 1978, the

data for the fire barrier penetration seals to the NRC Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for technical evaluation. NRR

evaluated the data and subsequently issued a safety evaluation

report (SER) in a letter dated November 17, 1980, detailing

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the results of the data review. In the SER, NRR found that the

penetration seal material used by the licensee was acceptable.

-(Closed) Severity Level IV Violation 285/8203-01: Failure to provide

adequate instructions.

l- The licensee has reviewed the circumstances that led up to an

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unplanned offsite release. Based on the evaluation performed by

the licensee, actions have been taken to ensure that an

unplanned release will not reoccur. Actions taken include a

l change to the appropriate procedures to include a precaution to

l ensure the vent header is not drained while a volume control

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tank sample is being drawn, installation of caution tags to warn

l- personnel of opening header drain valves when a volume control

l tank sample is being drawn, and a written requirement that

i chemistry personnel notify the shift supervisor before

l performing any sampling activities.

The NRC inspector has reviewed the actions taken by the licensee

, to verify the items listed above have been completed. It

! appears that the actions taken by the licensee will preclude

l another unplanned offsite release due to the same circumstances.

! The.NRC inspector also noted during discussions with plant

! personnel that the sampling evolution has been performed, since

the above actions were taken, without problems.

l (Closed) Severity Level V Violation 285/8315-03: Improper storage of

critical quality equipment (CQE) items.

The NRC inspector toured the onsite warehouse and outside

storage areas to verify that CQE items were stored in accordance

with procedure requirements. No problems were noted during the

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tour. The NRC inspector also verified that a program has been

l established for periodic inspection of warehouse storage

j activities by the quality control department.

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l (Closed) Unresolved Item 285/8425-02: Safety classification of the

j feedwater regulating valve (FRV) bypass valve.

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l NRR has reviewed the safety classification of the FRV bypass

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valve for adequacy. The review performed by NRR used Regulatory

Guides (RG) 1.26 and 1.29 as a basis for the evaluation.

NRR concluded that the feedwater system meets the guidance in RG

[' 1.26 with respect to the quality group classification of

l components and is acceptable. NRR also concluded that the

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feedwater system meets the guidance provided in RG 1.29 for

seismic classification of the system components.

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' (Closed) Unresolved Item 285/8527-04: Installation of a valve in the

emergency diesel generator fuel oil system.

During a walkdown performed in December 1985, the NRC inspector

noted that a valve had been added to the fuel oil system for the

emergency diesel generator. At that time, the NRC inspector

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requested that the licensee provide documentation to indicate

', the valve was installed in a controlled manner.

The licensee has performed a documentation search and has not

been able to locate any evidence that the installation of the

valve was performed in accordance with approved procedures.

The licensee has alsa interviewed plant personnel and has not

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been able to locate anyone who installed the valve. Based on

the review performed by the licensee, it appears that no

evidence exists to verify that the valve was installed per

documented and approved instructions, procedures, or drawings.

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This is an apparent violation. (285/8603-01)

(Closed) Unresolved Item 8527-05: Establishment of an hourly fire

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The licensee was previously unable to provide documentation to

indicate that an hourly fire patrol was checking nonfunctional

fire barriers. However, the licensee did state that security

j guards toured all portions of the auxiliary building on an

i hourly basis. This hourly tour by the guards is intended to

i satisfy the Technical Specification requirement for checking

nonfunctional fire barriers.

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The NRC inspector reviewed Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 105 on

February 11, 1986, to verify that security guards were entering

the auxiliary building to nake fire barrier checks. Each

security guard is required to sign in on RWP 105 for each entry.

During the RWP review, the NRC inspector noted that the security '

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guards had not signed in on the RWP for three hourly tours on

i February 11, 1986. In discussions with the licensee and the

l security guards, it was noted that the guards were not making ,

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all of the required hourly tours of the auxiliary building to

check on two nonfunctional fire barriers (a fire door and a

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ventilation port). The failure to establish an hourly fire

, patrol in safety-related areas with nonfunctional fire barriers

, is an apparent violation of Technical Specification 2.19(7).

1 (285/8603-02)

Upon notification to the licensee by the NRC inspector, the

, licensee took measures to ensure that an hourly fire watch

l patrol was established in safety-related areas in the auxiliary

building for the nonfunctional penetration fire barriers.

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3. Licensee' Event Report (LER) Followup

Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and

review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine

( that reportability- requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective

action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has

been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.

The LERs listed below are closed:

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LERs83-004 and 83-013 reported that pressure switches A/PC-742-1 and

l A/PC-742-2 were found to be out of calibration. These switches monitor

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containment pressure and were reported as having drifted above the

Technical Specification limit of 5 psig. The drifting problem was noted

during routine surveillance performed by the licensee. The licensee

increased the surveillance for these pressure switches from every

refueling outage to a 6-month interval. Based on continuing drif ting

problems with these pressure switches, the licensee decided to replace

tnem with a different type. During the refueling outage in the fall of

1985, the pressure switches were replaced. No additional drifting

problems have been noted since the outage.

LERs84-010 and 84-017 reported initiation of the ventilation isolation

l actuation system (VIAS) due to the discriminator setting for the radiation

monitors not being readjusted. The rachation monitors can sample either

the containment or the ventilation discharge stack. When the monitor is

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switched from one sampling point to another, a meter adjustment must be

! made. In these two cases of VIAS initiation, the technician failed to

adjust the discriminator setting and thus caused an actuation signal. The

l licensee has changed the appropriate procedures to ensure the adjustment

is made when operating the system. The licensee has not experienced

l additional VIAS initiations due to this problem.

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LER 84-019 reported actuation of the VIAS due to a technician

inadvertently pressing the wrong reset button during switching of the

monitoring location of the detector from the ventilation stack to the

containment. The technician pressed the reset button for RM-062 instead

t of RM-061, causing a VIAS actuation. Discussions were held with the

technician involved to stress the importance of verifying that correct

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actions are taken during surveillance testing activities.

LER 84-022 reported discrepancies noted during upgrading of temporary

penetration fire barriers to a permanent status. During performance of

this work, the licensee noted that some of the penetrations contained

voids and/or breaches. Upon discovery, the licensee took inrnediate

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action to correct the situation by verifying detectors were operable and

the fire suppression systems were functional for the affected areas. The

licensee has repaired the identified discrepancies. In addition, the

licensee inspected all other penetration barriers and corrected the noted

problems. Procedure changes have been made, as necessary, to ensure the

barriers are properly installed and to establish a surveillance program to

verify the barriers are maintained in satisfactory condition.

LER 85-006 provided information regarding the lift settings of the main

steam safety valves (MSSV). The licensee discovered, during testing of

the MSSVs, that three of the ten valves were not within 1 percent of their

nameplate rating. The licensee performed an analysis and determined that

the out-of-tolerance settings of the MSSVs did not adversely affect the

loss of-load analysis previously performed for the plant. The MSSVs were

adjusted and subsequently reinstalled. The licensee has reviewed the past

data from this and other reports associated with MSSV drift and has not

been able to determine the exact cause of the proble.n. Review will

continue as additional data becomes available.

LER 85-008 reported a VIAS actuation due to torn filter paper in radiation

monitor RM-061. The filter paper was repaired and the radiation monitor

returned to service. No radioactive release occurred. RM-061 performance

was normal after repair of the torn paper.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Followup on an NRC Headquarter's Request

During the fall of 1985, a special pilot inspection was performed at the

Fort Calhoun Station by a team from NRC headquarters. The team was

designated as the maintenance outage team (MOT). The M0T inspected the

maintenance and modification activities occurring during the recent

refueling outage. The MOT inspection was performed to verify that

maintenance and modification activities conformed to the applicable

regulations, codes, standards, and Technical Specification requirements.

The results of the M0T inspections are provided in NRC Inspection Reports

50-285/85-22 and 50-285/85-29 (to be issued). NRC Inspection

Report 50-285/85-22 discusses the design phase of the M0T inspection and

NRC Inspection Report 50-285/85-29 discusses the installation and testing

phases of the M0T inspection.

During the performance of the installation and testing phase, the M0T

identified ten items that the licensee agreed to followup on prior to

plant startup. This portion of this inspection was performed to verify

that the ten items identified by the M0T were completed by the licensee

prior to startup. The ten items and the results of the review to verify

completion are provided below:

a. A fire barrier penetration was installed without a design change

being issued.

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The M0T noted that a small tubing fitting had been installed through

a fire barrier and a design change had not been performed to verify

the fitting did not affect the integrity of the fire barrier. The

. M0T requested that the licensee perform an analysis to provide

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assurance that the fire barrier is adequate.

The licensee has performed an analysis and the results indicate that

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the fire barrier provides adequate protection with the fitting

installed. The basis for this conclusion is that the fitting is a

stainless-steel fitting capped on both ends that is judged to provide

l a fire resistance rating-at least equal to that of the barrier

itself.

The NRC inspector inspected the installation of this fitting and

verified that it is capped on both ends. There does not appear to be

any degradation of the fire barrier caused by the installation of the

fitting.

l b. No documentation existed for verification that 0-rings had been

! installed in the Foxboro transmitters.

l The M0T noted that the licensee could not provide objective,

documented evidence that new 0-rings were installed in the Foxboro

transmitters after the transmitters were opened for calibration. The

, MOT requested the licensee provide documented evidence of changeout

l of the transmitter 0-rings.

The licensee issued Maintenance Order (MO) 857693 for replacement of

the 0-rings in all Foxboro transmitters. The M0 provided a list of

the individual transmitters and a signature verifying 0-ring

replacement for each transmitter had been completed.

The NRC resident inspector performed a spot check to verify that all

Foxboro transmitters were included on the completed M0. No problems

were noted.

c. Inadequate welds on a component cooling water flow element.

The MOT identified problems with the installation of flow

element FE-498 on the component cooling water system. During a

documentation review, the M0T noted that the licensee performed a

I liquid penetrant inspection at a temperature less than the minimum

l required by the procedure. The M0T requested the licensee reinspect

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the welds at the correct temperature. When the welds were

! reinspected, linear indications were noted. The M0T requested the

licensee remove the linear indications and then reinspect the weld

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joints.

The licensee issued MO 857862 to provide instructions for removing

the indications on the two weld joints. The joints were reinspected

at the proper temperature and no additional problems were noted.

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The NRC inspector reviewed the M0 and the record of the liquid

penetrant inspection to verify the final weld inspection was

performed at the correct temperature. No problems were noted.

d. Improper installation of valve MS-100.

The M0T noted that valve MS-100 was improperly installed in that the

welding used for installation appeared to be unacceptable. After

grind out and rewelding of the joints for MS-100, the M0T noted that

the grind out appeared to have violated the requirements for minimum

wall thickness. The M0T requested the licensee perform a liquid

penetrant inspection on the new welds and to verify that the minimum

wall requirements have been met af ter weld grind out.

The licensee insoected the new welds for MS-100 and found the welds

to be satisfac* cry. During the ground out, excessive material was

removed and r.inimum wall thickness was apparently violated. An

analysis was performed by the licensee to determine the affect of the

excessive grind out. The results of the analysis indicate that the

pipe is capable of performing its intended function in its present

condition. Documentation of the analysis and weld inspection are

contained in maintenance record FC-85-42.

The NRC inspector reviewed the liquid penetrant ir.spection records

for the welds. The inspector also reviewed the analysis performed to

verify system adequacy. No problems were noted with the

documentation,

e. Design inconsistencies for installation of air accumulators for

valves YCV-1042A and YCV-10428.

The M0T noted inconsistencies between the design description and

testing procedure for installation of air accumulators for the

auxiliary feedwater steam-driven pump steam supply valves, YCV-1042A

and YCV-10428. It was noted that the design description required the

air accumulators hold the valves shut for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , whoreas the test

procedure required the accumulators hold the valves shi.t for

1/2 hour. The M0T also noted that the as-built spacing for the

supports for the accumulator tubing did not meet the requirements

stated in the design document. The MOT requested the licensee

perform an analysis to indicate the tubing supports are adequate and

that the length of time used to test valves YCV-1042A and YCV-1042B

was appropriate.

The licensee has reviewed the requirement for the air accumulators to

hold valves YCV-1042A and YCV-10428 shut for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months versus 1/2 hour.

Based on the review performed by the licensee, it was decided that

holding the valve shut for 1/2 hour would provide sufficient time for

an operator to manually close the valve. Plant operations personnel

reviewed the 1/2-hour requirement and concurred that the amount of

time was adequate. The appropriate documentation was changed to

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reflect the change in system requirements. The licensee also

reviewed the as-built spacing of the accumulator tubing supports. A

calculation was performed to verify that the supports, as installed,

were auequate. The results indicate that the supports are adequate

and no changes are required.

The NRC inspector reviewed the documentation related to the above i

items. No problems were noted. !

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f. No evidence was available to indicate that the battery charger test !

met the acceptance criteria.

The M0T reviewed the completed acceptance test performed for the

newly installed battery chargers. During this review, the M0T noted

that there was no evidence that the performance of the battery

chargers would meet the acceptance criteria stated in_the test

procedure. The M0T requested the licensee provide evidence that the

acceptance criteria was met.

The licensee reviewed the completed test procedure and has discussed

the performance of the acceptance test with the field engineer that

directed the test. Based on these inputs, the licensee has

determined that the performance of the battery chargers adequately

meets the acceptance criteria established by

the charger manufacturer. In addition, the licensee has utilized the

battery chargers during routine surveillance tests af ter installation

and has noted no problems. Based on these items, the licensee has

concluded that the battery chargers are capable of performing their

intended function.

The NRC inspector reviewed the documentation associated with the

battery charger testing. No problems were noted.

g. Welding for installation of seismic supports not performed per

installation instructions.

During a review of installation of seismic supports for

safety-related conduits, the MOT noted that three supports were not

installed in accordance with the installation instructions. The

instructions required a fillet weld be used and a skip weld was used

instead. The MOT requested that the licensee evaluate the use of the

skip weld and if unacceptable, reweld the support per the

installation instructions.

The licensee has performed an analysis of the as-built welds and

seismic support installations. The results of the analysis indicates

that the as-built installations are acceptable and no changes need to

be performed. The licensee has updated the appropriate documentation

to reflect the as-built conditions.

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The NRC inspector reviewed the documentation and inspected the

support installations. No problems were noted.

h. The procedure for testing valve circuits did not include testing of

the fuse protection.

During a review nf the procedure used for testing of solenoid-

operated valves, the M0T identified that the test procedure did not

include all the appropriate instructions. The test procedure did not

include a check for ground and short-circuit protection for the

valve. The M0T requested the licensee include the circuit test in

the instructions and then reperform the test.

The licensee issued MO 857847 to require testing of the circuits for

the solenoid-operated valves. Attached to the M0 was a Plant Review

Comittee approved procedure for functionally testing the protective

fuses for the valves. The licensee completed the testing and found

all the valve circuits to operate satisfactorily.

The NRC inspectos reviewed the completed NO and attached test

procedure. No problems were identified.

1. A weld for installation of a union below valve 51-217 was pitted.

During field observation activities, the NOT identified what appeared

to be an inadequate weld. The weld used for installation of a union

below valve SI-217, the relief valve for one of the safety-injection

tanks, contained a pit. The M0T also noted a mark approximately 3/8

by 3/4 inch on the valve piping. The tiOT requested the licensee

reinspect the weld and also evaluate the mark to verify minimum wall

thickness requirements were not violated.

The licensee has reinspected the weld that was questioned by the 110T.

The liquid penetrant inspection indicated that the weld was

satisfactory and therefore acceptable. The licensee also evaluated

the mark on the piping. The evaluation concluded that the mark does

not affect the integrity of the piping.

The NRC .aspector reviewed the documentation associated with this

item. No problems were noted.

J. The packing gland retainer and packing gland bolts for valve

HCV-1042C were installed improperly.

The M0T noted that the packing gland retainer for valve HCV-1042C was

installed upside down and the bolts for the packing gland were bent

when installed. The MOT requested that the licensee install the

packing gland correctly and replace the bolts.

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The licensee issued MO 857168 with a Plant Safety Corrtittee approved

procedure attached to provide instructions for inverting the packing

gland retainer and replacenent of the bolts. The M0

has been completed and the valve stroke tested. The licensee

considers the valve acceptable for continued service.

The NRC inspector reviewed the completed M0 and attached procedure

for completeness and acceptability. The inspector also visually

inspected valve HCV-1042C to verify the packing gland retainer and

t olts were installed properly. No problems were noted.

The review of the ten items listed above was performed to verify the

licensee had taken corrective action as committed. During review of the

items, no effort was rude to review the generic and/or programmatic

aspects of the identified discrepancies. The generic e.nd/or programmatic

aspects of these ten items will be reviewed during a future inspection.

In conclusion, it appears that the licensee has taken the appropriate

action to correct these specific discrepancies.

5. Followup on an IE Bulletin

IE Bulletin 84-02, " Failure of General Electric Type HFA Relays In Use In

Class 1E Safety Systems," dated March 12, 1984, was issued by the NRC to

alert all licensees about failures in General Electric relays. The

bulletin requested each licensee respond with informatior about relay

replacement, plans for surveillance of the relays prior to replacenent,

and a basis for continued operation. The licensee replied to the NRC

request in a letter dated February 26, 1985. In this letter, the licensee

provided a description of the actions it intended to perform in response

to the problem identified in the bulletin.

The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee'< response and performed a

verification that the licensee had corp, teJ he actions, as connitted. A

discussion of each of the items is list ed '+10w:

. The licensee conaitted, in the responte to the bulletin, to replace

all HFA relays or rel*y coils prior to liarch 1986. The NRC inspector

reviewed the maintena..ce request (MR) issued for relay or coil

replacement. MR-FC-84-96 provided instructions and established a

record of coil / relay replacements. The licensee completed

MR-FC-84-96 in December 1985. The NRC inspector reviewed MR-FC-b4-96

for completeness and conformance with the applicable requirements.

No problems were noted during the review.

. The licensee established a plan to perform surveillance on each

relay. The plan included on initial inspection and a subsequert

monthly inspection. The inspections noted no relay or coil problems.

The relays were inspected monthly f rcm July 1984, until coll / relay

replacement.

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The NRC inspector reviewed the results of the inspections performed.

Based on the documentation review, it appears the inspections were

performed in accordance with the commitments made by the licensee.

. The licensee committed to stocking only qualified parts for HFA

relays. By stocking only qualified parts for use in safety- and

nonsafety-related applications, the licensee will preclude the

possibility of nonqualified parts being used in safety-related

applications.

The NRC inspector discussed the stocking of HFA relay parts with

stores personnel. The personnel confirmed that only qualified parts

were in stock for HFA relays.

. The licensee's response to this bulletin also included a commitment

te investigate 86 lockout relays. The investigation will determine

the affect of the general concern expressed in the bulletin on the

86 lockout relays. The licensee's engineering staff has performed an

investigation which was concluded in June 1985. The investigation

suggested that the 86 lockout relays be inspected each refueling

outage. Plant personnel reviewed the results of the investigation

and disagreed with the suggested inspection program. Plant and

engineering personnel are in the process of establishing an effective

inspection program. When established, the licensee will take the

necessary action to verify that 86 lockout relays are maintained in

an acceptable state. This itefr. is open pending the completion of the

investigation and e:,tablishment of a program. (285/8603-03)

Based on the reviews performed by the NRC inspector, it appears the

licensee has met the commitments made with respect to IE Bulletin 84-02.

This bulletin is considered closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Followup on an NRR Order for Modification of License

On April 20, 1981, NRR issued an order for modification of license

concerning primary coolant system pressure isolation valves. This order

dealt with a scenario where check valves between the high- and

low pressure system piping could fail. The failure of the check valves

would cause the pressurization of the low pressure piping, which would

result in an intersystem loss of coolant accident (LOCA). To minimize the

possibility of the intersystem LOCA, NRR issued an order requiring the

periodic testing of the check valves installed between the injection

system low pressure piping and the reactor coolant system (RCS)

high pressure piping.

The NRC inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee to verify

that the licensee has complied with the requirements stated in the order

for modification of license. The following is a discussion of the review.

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I . The check valves for the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) and the

! high pressure safety injection (HPSI) systems flow to the RCS are

located directly downstream of motor-operated control valves. These

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eight check valves represent possible intersystem LOCA paths from the

l RCS to both injection systems. To minimize the possibfity of an

intersystem LOCA, the licensee maintains the motor-operated valves

immediately upstre n of the check valves in the shut position during

normal operation. During nonroutine operations, the motor-operated

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valves are opened after the discharge pressure of the injection pumps

! is high enough to prevent potential backflow through the check

( valves. In addition, the licensee also performs routine surveillance

on the check valves in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

This surveillance verifies that the back leakage through the valves

is less than a specified amount.

. , The four check valves for combined injection flow into the RCS are

monitored for leakage. The combined injection flow through the check

valves includes LPSI, HPSI, and flow from the safety injection tanks.

The leakage backflow through the check valves is monitored using an

installed system. The leakage monitoring-system contains a flow

meter and the necessary valves to determine the

amount and source of leakage from any one of the four check valves.

The licensee continually monitors this system in the control room for

any abnormal conditions.

Based on the above review performed by the NRC inspector, it appears that

the licensee has established a program to meet the requirements of the

order for modification of license.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Operational Safety Verification

The NRC inspector conducted the reviews and observations described below

to verify that facility operations were performed in conformance with the

requirements established under 10 CFR, administrative procedures, and the

Technical Specifications. The NRC inspector made several control room

observations to verify:

. Proper shift manning

. Operator adherence to approved procedures and Technitil

Specifications

. Operability of reactor protective system and engineered safeguards

equipment ;

.

. Logs, records, recorder traces, annunciators, panel indications, and ,

switch positions complied with the appropriate requirements

. Proper return to service of components

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. Maintenance orders had been initiated for equipment in need of

maintenance

. Appropriate conduct of control room and other licensed operators

During walkdowns recently performed by the licensee for procedure

verifications, a problem was noted regarding a recently issued abnormal

operating procedure (A0P). AOP-6, " Emergency Fire Procedure," provides

instructions for actions to be taken in the event the control room has to

be evacuated. A walkdown of the actions required by AOP-6 revealed that a

modification made during the recent refueling outage affects the

availability of the 'nstrumentation on the alternate shutdown panel (ASP).

The ASP is supplied by inverters C and D which also supply power to

instruments in the control room. The ASP supply connections tap off

between the inverter and the inver' tr output breaker located in the

control room. If the control roca tiad to be abandoned due to fire, the

possibility exists that the portion of the inverter cables in the control

room could be damaged, causing a short and a subsequent loss of power to

the inverters. Loss of the inverters would cause a loss of instrument

power to the ASP. The licensee has provided corrective action by staging

the necessary tools in the switchgear room adjacent to the inverters to

cut the inverter output cable. The cut will be made downstream of the ASP

instrument supply tapoff. Cutting the cable in the switchgear room will

prevent any damage to the cable in the control room from affecting

inverter operation. The licensee has made the necessary procedure changes

and has briefed the operating crews on the use of the new method for

securing inverter output power. The licensee currently plans to change

the power supply for the ASP instrumentation during the next refueling

outage.

No violations or deviations were noted.

8. Plant Tours

The NRC inspector conducted plant tours at various times to assess plant

and equipment conditions. The following items were observed during the -

tours:

. General plant conditions

. Equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibration

. Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices including fire hazards

and control of combustible material

. The physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with

the station security plan

. Adherence to the requirements of radiation work permits

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y . Work activities being performed in accordance with approved

procedures

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Safety-Related System Walkdowns

The NRC inspector walked down accessible portions of the following

safety related systems to verify system operability. Operability was

determined by verification of valve and switch positions. The systems

were walked down using the procedures noted:

. Reactor startup locked valves (01-RC-28, Revision 45)

. Engineered safeguards features controls (01-ES-1, Revision 18)

During the walkdowns, the NRC inspector noted minor discrepancies of an

editorial nature between the procedures and plant as-built conditions.

None of the conditions noted affected the operability or safe operation of

l tne system. Licensee personnel stated that the noted minor discrepancies

l would be corrected.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10. Monthly Maintenance Observation

i The NRC inspector observed station maintenance activities of

'

safety-related systems and components to verify the mainfenance was

conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory requirements,

and the Technical Specifications. The following items were considered

during the observations:

. The limiting conditions for operation were met while systems or

components were removed from service

. Approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work

. Activities were accomplished using approved M0s and were inspected, as

applicable

+

. Functional testing end/or cal *brations were performed prior to

returning components or systems to service ,

.

l . Quality control records were maintained !

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l . Activities were accomplished by qualified personnel ;

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. Parts and materials used were properly certified

. Radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented :

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-16-

The NRC inspector observed the following maintenance activities:

. Removal of raw water pump for overhaul (M0 860245)

. Installation of fire barrier for auxiliary feedwater pump

(SROC0 86-01)

. Installation of 1-hour fire barrier wrap (M0 860691)

No violations or deviations were noted.

11. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification-required

surveillance testing on safety related systems and components. The NRC

inspector verified the following items during the testing:

. Testing was performed using approved procedures

. Test instrumentation was calibrated

. Limiting conditions for operation were met

. Removal and restoration of the affected system and/or component were

accomplished

. Test results conformed with Technical Specification and procedure

requirements

. Test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual

, directing the test

. Deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and

. resolved by appropriate management personnel

The NRC inspector witnessed the following surveillance test activities.

The procedures used for the test activities are noted.

. Weekly test of the electric- and diesel-driven fire water pumps

(01-FP-6)

. Monthly test of emergency diesel generator D-2 (ST-ESF-6-F.2,

Appendix B)

. Annual inspection of emergency diesel generator 0-2 (ST-ESF-6-F.5)

No violations or deviations were identified.

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12. Exit Interview

The NRC inspector met with Mr. W. G. Gates (Plant Manager) at the end of

this inspection. At this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of

the inspection and the findings.

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ML20205N763

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