IR 05000285/1986003
| ML20205N763 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 03/20/1986 |
| From: | Harrell P, Hunnicutt D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205N757 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-285-86-03, 50-285-86-3, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, NUDOCS 8605020287 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20205N763 (17) | |
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APPENDIX B U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COPMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
50-285/86-03 License:
DPR-40 Docket: 50-285 Licensee:
Omaha Public Power District 1623 Harney Street Omaha, Nebraska 68102 Facility Name:
Fort Calhoun Station Inspection At:
Fort Calhoun Station, Blair, Nebraska Inspection Conducted:
February 1-28, 1986 hl b _i #
10/84.
Inspector:[J P. H. Harrell, Senior Resident Reactor thte /
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Inspector i
Approved:
h)bw M
.8[f,O/8'd D. M. Hunnicutt, Chief, Project Section B, Cate'
j Reactor Projects Branch
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Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted February 1-28, 1986 (Report 50-285/86-03)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection including operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, plant tours, safety-related system walkdowns, followup on previously identified items, followup on licensee event reports, followup on an IE Bulletin, followup on an NRC headquarter's request on the maintenance outage team inspection, and followup on an NRR order for modification of license.
The inspection involved 107 inspector-hours (including 14 backshift hours)
onsite by one NRC inspector.
Results: Within the ten areas inspected, two violations (failure to check nonfunctional fire barriers hourly, paragraph 2; and modification of a safety-related system without an approved procedure, paragraph 2) were identifled.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
"W. Gates, Plant Manager C. Brunnert, Operations Quality Assurance Supervisor M. Core, Maintenance Supervisor D. Dale, Quality Control Inspector J. Fisicaro, Nuclear Regulatory and Industry Affairs Supervisor J. Foley, I&C and Electrical Field Maintenance Supervisor M. Kallman, Security Supervisor L. Kusek, Operations Supervisor J._Lechner, Engineer T. McIvor, Technical Supervisor R. Mueller, Plant Engineer G. Roach, Chemical and Radiation Protection Supervisor J. Tesarek, Reactor Engineer S. Willrett, Administration Services and Security Supervisor
- Denotes attendance at the monthly exit interview.
The inspector also contacted other plant personnel, including operators, e
technicians, and administrative personnel.
2.
Followup on Previously Identified Items (Closed) Violation 285/8003-05:
No supporting evidence of mask fit.
The licensee has established an automated system for monitoring the records for fit testing of respirators.
The data for each individual has been entered into a computer and the computer highlights on the weekly printout whenever mask fit testing is due for an individual in less than a month.
The individual must then qualify for respirator use or the licensee will revoke the authorization for the individual to use a respirator.
The licensee also uses the same computer system to track the qualification status for security badge and radiation training.
The NRC inspector performed a spot check of individuals currently qualified for respirator use to verify their qualifications are current.
No problems were noted.
(Closed) Unresolved Item 285/8008-01:
Data for verification of the adequacy of fire barrier penetration seals.
The licensee supplied, in a letter dated October 18, 1978, the data for the fire barrier penetration seals to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) for technical evaluation.
NRR evaluated the data and subsequently issued a safety evaluation report (SER) in a letter dated November 17, 1980, detailing
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the results of the data review.
In the SER, NRR found that the penetration seal material used by the licensee was acceptable.
-(Closed) Severity Level IV Violation 285/8203-01: Failure to provide adequate instructions.
l-The licensee has reviewed the circumstances that led up to an unplanned offsite release. Based on the evaluation performed by
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the licensee, actions have been taken to ensure that an
unplanned release will not reoccur. Actions taken include a l
change to the appropriate procedures to include a precaution to l
ensure the vent header is not drained while a volume control
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tank sample is being drawn, installation of caution tags to warn l-personnel of opening header drain valves when a volume control l
tank sample is being drawn, and a written requirement that i
chemistry personnel notify the shift supervisor before l
performing any sampling activities.
The NRC inspector has reviewed the actions taken by the licensee to verify the items listed above have been completed.
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appears that the actions taken by the licensee will preclude l
another unplanned offsite release due to the same circumstances.
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The.NRC inspector also noted during discussions with plant
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personnel that the sampling evolution has been performed, since the above actions were taken, without problems.
l (Closed) Severity Level V Violation 285/8315-03:
Improper storage of
critical quality equipment (CQE) items.
The NRC inspector toured the onsite warehouse and outside storage areas to verify that CQE items were stored in accordance with procedure requirements. No problems were noted during the tour. The NRC inspector also verified that a program has been i
l established for periodic inspection of warehouse storage j
activities by the quality control department.
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l (Closed) Unresolved Item 285/8425-02:
Safety classification of the j
feedwater regulating valve (FRV) bypass valve.
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l NRR has reviewed the safety classification of the FRV bypass l
valve for adequacy.
The review performed by NRR used Regulatory Guides (RG) 1.26 and 1.29 as a basis for the evaluation.
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NRR concluded that the feedwater system meets the guidance in RG
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1.26 with respect to the quality group classification of l
components and is acceptable. NRR also concluded that the l
feedwater system meets the guidance provided in RG 1.29 for seismic classification of the system component. - _
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' (Closed) Unresolved Item 285/8527-04:
Installation of a valve in the emergency diesel generator fuel oil system.
During a walkdown performed in December 1985, the NRC inspector noted that a valve had been added to the fuel oil system for the emergency diesel generator. At that time, the NRC inspector requested that the licensee provide documentation to indicate
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the valve was installed in a controlled manner.
The licensee has performed a documentation search and has not been able to locate any evidence that the installation of the valve was performed in accordance with approved procedures.
The licensee has alsa interviewed plant personnel and has not I
been able to locate anyone who installed the valve.
Based on the review performed by the licensee, it appears that no evidence exists to verify that the valve was installed per documented and approved instructions, procedures, or drawings.
I This is an apparent violation.
(285/8603-01)
(Closed) Unresolved Item 8527-05:
Establishment of an hourly fire watc:..
i The licensee was previously unable to provide documentation to
indicate that an hourly fire patrol was checking nonfunctional fire barriers.
However, the licensee did state that security j
guards toured all portions of the auxiliary building on an i
hourly basis.
This hourly tour by the guards is intended to i
satisfy the Technical Specification requirement for checking nonfunctional fire barriers.
I The NRC inspector reviewed Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 105 on February 11, 1986, to verify that security guards were entering the auxiliary building to nake fire barrier checks.
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security guard is required to sign in on RWP 105 for each entry.
During the RWP review, the NRC inspector noted that the security
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guards had not signed in on the RWP for three hourly tours on
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i February 11, 1986.
In discussions with the licensee and the l
security guards, it was noted that the guards were not making
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I all of the required hourly tours of the auxiliary building to check on two nonfunctional fire barriers (a fire door and a ventilation port).
The failure to establish an hourly fire
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patrol in safety-related areas with nonfunctional fire barriers
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is an apparent violation of Technical Specification 2.19(7).
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(285/8603-02)
Upon notification to the licensee by the NRC inspector, the licensee took measures to ensure that an hourly fire watch
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l patrol was established in safety-related areas in the auxiliary
building for the nonfunctional penetration fire barriers.
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3.
Licensee' Event Report (LER) Followup Through direct observation, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine (
that reportability-requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence has been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.
The LERs listed below are closed:
l 83-004 84-019 83-013 84-022 l
84-010 85-006 84-017 85-008 LERs83-004 and 83-013 reported that pressure switches A/PC-742-1 and l
A/PC-742-2 were found to be out of calibration. These switches monitor
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containment pressure and were reported as having drifted above the Technical Specification limit of 5 psig. The drifting problem was noted during routine surveillance performed by the licensee. The licensee increased the surveillance for these pressure switches from every refueling outage to a 6-month interval. Based on continuing drif ting problems with these pressure switches, the licensee decided to replace tnem with a different type. During the refueling outage in the fall of 1985, the pressure switches were replaced. No additional drifting problems have been noted since the outage.
LERs84-010 and 84-017 reported initiation of the ventilation isolation l
actuation system (VIAS) due to the discriminator setting for the radiation monitors not being readjusted. The rachation monitors can sample either the containment or the ventilation discharge stack. When the monitor is switched from one sampling point to another, a meter adjustment must be
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made.
In these two cases of VIAS initiation, the technician failed to
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adjust the discriminator setting and thus caused an actuation signal. The l
licensee has changed the appropriate procedures to ensure the adjustment is made when operating the system. The licensee has not experienced l
additional VIAS initiations due to this problem.
LER 84-019 reported actuation of the VIAS due to a technician
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inadvertently pressing the wrong reset button during switching of the monitoring location of the detector from the ventilation stack to the containment. The technician pressed the reset button for RM-062 instead of RM-061, causing a VIAS actuation. Discussions were held with the t
technician involved to stress the importance of verifying that correct actions are taken during surveillance testing activities.
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LER 84-022 reported discrepancies noted during upgrading of temporary penetration fire barriers to a permanent status. During performance of this work, the licensee noted that some of the penetrations contained voids and/or breaches. Upon discovery, the licensee took inrnediate
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-6-action to correct the situation by verifying detectors were operable and the fire suppression systems were functional for the affected areas.
The licensee has repaired the identified discrepancies.
In addition, the licensee inspected all other penetration barriers and corrected the noted problems.
Procedure changes have been made, as necessary, to ensure the barriers are properly installed and to establish a surveillance program to verify the barriers are maintained in satisfactory condition.
LER 85-006 provided information regarding the lift settings of the main steam safety valves (MSSV).
The licensee discovered, during testing of the MSSVs, that three of the ten valves were not within 1 percent of their nameplate rating.
The licensee performed an analysis and determined that the out-of-tolerance settings of the MSSVs did not adversely affect the loss of-load analysis previously performed for the plant.
The MSSVs were adjusted and subsequently reinstalled.
The licensee has reviewed the past data from this and other reports associated with MSSV drift and has not been able to determine the exact cause of the proble.n.
Review will continue as additional data becomes available.
LER 85-008 reported a VIAS actuation due to torn filter paper in radiation monitor RM-061.
The filter paper was repaired and the radiation monitor returned to service.
No radioactive release occurred.
RM-061 performance was normal after repair of the torn paper.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Followup on an NRC Headquarter's Request During the fall of 1985, a special pilot inspection was performed at the Fort Calhoun Station by a team from NRC headquarters.
The team was designated as the maintenance outage team (MOT).
The M0T inspected the maintenance and modification activities occurring during the recent refueling outage.
The MOT inspection was performed to verify that maintenance and modification activities conformed to the applicable regulations, codes, standards, and Technical Specification requirements.
The results of the M0T inspections are provided in NRC Inspection Reports 50-285/85-22 and 50-285/85-29 (to be issued).
NRC Inspection Report 50-285/85-22 discusses the design phase of the M0T inspection and NRC Inspection Report 50-285/85-29 discusses the installation and testing phases of the M0T inspection.
During the performance of the installation and testing phase, the M0T identified ten items that the licensee agreed to followup on prior to plant startup.
This portion of this inspection was performed to verify that the ten items identified by the M0T were completed by the licensee prior to startup.
The ten items and the results of the review to verify completion are provided below:
a.
A fire barrier penetration was installed without a design change being issue '
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-7-The M0T noted that a small tubing fitting had been installed through a fire barrier and a design change had not been performed to verify the fitting did not affect the integrity of the fire barrier.
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M0T requested that the licensee perform an analysis to provide
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assurance that the fire barrier is adequate.
The licensee has performed an analysis and the results indicate that the fire barrier provides adequate protection with the fitting
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installed.
The basis for this conclusion is that the fitting is a stainless-steel fitting capped on both ends that is judged to provide l
a fire resistance rating-at least equal to that of the barrier
itself.
The NRC inspector inspected the installation of this fitting and verified that it is capped on both ends.
There does not appear to be any degradation of the fire barrier caused by the installation of the fitting.
l b.
No documentation existed for verification that 0-rings had been
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installed in the Foxboro transmitters.
l The M0T noted that the licensee could not provide objective, documented evidence that new 0-rings were installed in the Foxboro transmitters after the transmitters were opened for calibration.
The MOT requested the licensee provide documented evidence of changeout
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l of the transmitter 0-rings.
The licensee issued Maintenance Order (MO) 857693 for replacement of the 0-rings in all Foxboro transmitters.
The M0 provided a list of the individual transmitters and a signature verifying 0-ring replacement for each transmitter had been completed.
The NRC resident inspector performed a spot check to verify that all Foxboro transmitters were included on the completed M0.
No problems were noted.
c.
Inadequate welds on a component cooling water flow element.
The MOT identified problems with the installation of flow element FE-498 on the component cooling water system.
During a documentation review, the M0T noted that the licensee performed a I
liquid penetrant inspection at a temperature less than the minimum l
required by the procedure.
The M0T requested the licensee reinspect
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the welds at the correct temperature. When the welds were
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reinspected, linear indications were noted.
The M0T requested the
licensee remove the linear indications and then reinspect the weld joints.
i The licensee issued MO 857862 to provide instructions for removing the indications on the two weld joints.
The joints were reinspected at the proper temperature and no additional problems were noted.
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-8-The NRC inspector reviewed the M0 and the record of the liquid penetrant inspection to verify the final weld inspection was performed at the correct temperature.
No problems were noted.
d.
Improper installation of valve MS-100.
The M0T noted that valve MS-100 was improperly installed in that the welding used for installation appeared to be unacceptable.
After grind out and rewelding of the joints for MS-100, the M0T noted that the grind out appeared to have violated the requirements for minimum wall thickness.
The M0T requested the licensee perform a liquid penetrant inspection on the new welds and to verify that the minimum wall requirements have been met af ter weld grind out.
The licensee insoected the new welds for MS-100 and found the welds to be satisfac* cry.
During the ground out, excessive material was removed and r.inimum wall thickness was apparently violated.
An analysis was performed by the licensee to determine the affect of the excessive grind out.
The results of the analysis indicate that the pipe is capable of performing its intended function in its present condition.
Documentation of the analysis and weld inspection are contained in maintenance record FC-85-42.
The NRC inspector reviewed the liquid penetrant ir.spection records for the welds. The inspector also reviewed the analysis performed to verify system adequacy.
No problems were noted with the documentation, e.
Design inconsistencies for installation of air accumulators for valves YCV-1042A and YCV-10428.
The M0T noted inconsistencies between the design description and testing procedure for installation of air accumulators for the auxiliary feedwater steam-driven pump steam supply valves, YCV-1042A and YCV-10428.
It was noted that the design description required the air accumulators hold the valves shut for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, whoreas the test procedure required the accumulators hold the valves shi.t for 1/2 hour.
The M0T also noted that the as-built spacing for the supports for the accumulator tubing did not meet the requirements stated in the design document.
The MOT requested the licensee perform an analysis to indicate the tubing supports are adequate and that the length of time used to test valves YCV-1042A and YCV-1042B was appropriate.
The licensee has reviewed the requirement for the air accumulators to hold valves YCV-1042A and YCV-10428 shut for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> versus 1/2 hour.
Based on the review performed by the licensee, it was decided that holding the valve shut for 1/2 hour would provide sufficient time for an operator to manually close the valve.
Plant operations personnel reviewed the 1/2-hour requirement and concurred that the amount of time was adequate.
The appropriate documentation was changed to
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reflect the change in system requirements.
The licensee also reviewed the as-built spacing of the accumulator tubing supports.
A calculation was performed to verify that the supports, as installed, were auequate.
The results indicate that the supports are adequate and no changes are required.
The NRC inspector reviewed the documentation related to the above i
items.
No problems were noted.
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No evidence was available to indicate that the battery charger test
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met the acceptance criteria.
The M0T reviewed the completed acceptance test performed for the newly installed battery chargers.
During this review, the M0T noted that there was no evidence that the performance of the battery chargers would meet the acceptance criteria stated in_the test procedure.
The M0T requested the licensee provide evidence that the acceptance criteria was met.
The licensee reviewed the completed test procedure and has discussed the performance of the acceptance test with the field engineer that directed the test.
Based on these inputs, the licensee has determined that the performance of the battery chargers adequately meets the acceptance criteria established by the charger manufacturer.
In addition, the licensee has utilized the battery chargers during routine surveillance tests af ter installation and has noted no problems.
Based on these items, the licensee has concluded that the battery chargers are capable of performing their intended function.
The NRC inspector reviewed the documentation associated with the battery charger testing.
No problems were noted.
g.
Welding for installation of seismic supports not performed per installation instructions.
During a review of installation of seismic supports for safety-related conduits, the MOT noted that three supports were not installed in accordance with the installation instructions.
The instructions required a fillet weld be used and a skip weld was used instead.
The MOT requested that the licensee evaluate the use of the skip weld and if unacceptable, reweld the support per the installation instructions.
The licensee has performed an analysis of the as-built welds and seismic support installations.
The results of the analysis indicates that the as-built installations are acceptable and no changes need to be performed.
The licensee has updated the appropriate documentation to reflect the as-built condition _
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-10-The NRC inspector reviewed the documentation and inspected the support installations. No problems were noted.
h.
The procedure for testing valve circuits did not include testing of the fuse protection.
During a review nf the procedure used for testing of solenoid-operated valves, the M0T identified that the test procedure did not include all the appropriate instructions. The test procedure did not include a check for ground and short-circuit protection for the valve.
The M0T requested the licensee include the circuit test in the instructions and then reperform the test.
The licensee issued MO 857847 to require testing of the circuits for the solenoid-operated valves. Attached to the M0 was a Plant Review Comittee approved procedure for functionally testing the protective fuses for the valves. The licensee completed the testing and found all the valve circuits to operate satisfactorily.
The NRC inspectos reviewed the completed NO and attached test procedure. No problems were identified.
1.
A weld for installation of a union below valve 51-217 was pitted.
During field observation activities, the NOT identified what appeared to be an inadequate weld. The weld used for installation of a union below valve SI-217, the relief valve for one of the safety-injection tanks, contained a pit.
The M0T also noted a mark approximately 3/8 by 3/4 inch on the valve piping. The tiOT requested the licensee reinspect the weld and also evaluate the mark to verify minimum wall thickness requirements were not violated.
The licensee has reinspected the weld that was questioned by the 110T.
The liquid penetrant inspection indicated that the weld was satisfactory and therefore acceptable.
The licensee also evaluated the mark on the piping.
The evaluation concluded that the mark does not affect the integrity of the piping.
The NRC.aspector reviewed the documentation associated with this item.
No problems were noted.
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The packing gland retainer and packing gland bolts for valve HCV-1042C were installed improperly.
The M0T noted that the packing gland retainer for valve HCV-1042C was installed upside down and the bolts for the packing gland were bent when installed. The MOT requested that the licensee install the packing gland correctly and replace the bolt _ _ _ - _ - _ - _
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-11-The licensee issued MO 857168 with a Plant Safety Corrtittee approved procedure attached to provide instructions for inverting the packing gland retainer and replacenent of the bolts.
The M0 has been completed and the valve stroke tested. The licensee considers the valve acceptable for continued service.
The NRC inspector reviewed the completed M0 and attached procedure for completeness and acceptability. The inspector also visually inspected valve HCV-1042C to verify the packing gland retainer and t olts were installed properly.
No problems were noted.
The review of the ten items listed above was performed to verify the licensee had taken corrective action as committed. During review of the items, no effort was rude to review the generic and/or programmatic aspects of the identified discrepancies.
The generic e.nd/or programmatic aspects of these ten items will be reviewed during a future inspection.
In conclusion, it appears that the licensee has taken the appropriate action to correct these specific discrepancies.
5.
Followup on an IE Bulletin IE Bulletin 84-02, " Failure of General Electric Type HFA Relays In Use In Class 1E Safety Systems," dated March 12, 1984, was issued by the NRC to alert all licensees about failures in General Electric relays.
The bulletin requested each licensee respond with informatior about relay replacement, plans for surveillance of the relays prior to replacenent, and a basis for continued operation.
The licensee replied to the NRC request in a letter dated February 26, 1985.
In this letter, the licensee provided a description of the actions it intended to perform in response to the problem identified in the bulletin.
The NRC inspector reviewed the licensee'< response and performed a verification that the licensee had corp, teJ he actions, as connitted. A discussion of each of the items is list ed '+10w:
The licensee conaitted, in the responte to the bulletin, to replace
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all HFA relays or rel*y coils prior to liarch 1986.
The NRC inspector reviewed the maintena..ce request (MR) issued for relay or coil replacement. MR-FC-84-96 provided instructions and established a record of coil / relay replacements.
The licensee completed MR-FC-84-96 in December 1985.
The NRC inspector reviewed MR-FC-b4-96 for completeness and conformance with the applicable requirements.
No problems were noted during the review.
The licensee established a plan to perform surveillance on each
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relay. The plan included on initial inspection and a subsequert monthly inspection. The inspections noted no relay or coil problems.
The relays were inspected monthly f rcm July 1984, until coll / relay replacement.
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-12-The NRC inspector reviewed the results of the inspections performed.
Based on the documentation review, it appears the inspections were performed in accordance with the commitments made by the licensee.
The licensee committed to stocking only qualified parts for HFA
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relays.
By stocking only qualified parts for use in safety-and nonsafety-related applications, the licensee will preclude the possibility of nonqualified parts being used in safety-related applications.
The NRC inspector discussed the stocking of HFA relay parts with stores personnel.
The personnel confirmed that only qualified parts were in stock for HFA relays.
The licensee's response to this bulletin also included a commitment
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te investigate 86 lockout relays.
The investigation will determine the affect of the general concern expressed in the bulletin on the 86 lockout relays.
The licensee's engineering staff has performed an investigation which was concluded in June 1985.
The investigation suggested that the 86 lockout relays be inspected each refueling outage.
Plant personnel reviewed the results of the investigation and disagreed with the suggested inspection program.
Plant and engineering personnel are in the process of establishing an effective inspection program. When established, the licensee will take the necessary action to verify that 86 lockout relays are maintained in an acceptable state.
This itefr. is open pending the completion of the investigation and e:,tablishment of a program.
(285/8603-03)
Based on the reviews performed by the NRC inspector, it appears the licensee has met the commitments made with respect to IE Bulletin 84-02.
This bulletin is considered closed.
No violations or deviations were identified.
6.
Followup on an NRR Order for Modification of License On April 20, 1981, NRR issued an order for modification of license concerning primary coolant system pressure isolation valves.
This order dealt with a scenario where check valves between the high-and low pressure system piping could fail.
The failure of the check valves would cause the pressurization of the low pressure piping, which would result in an intersystem loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
To minimize the possibility of the intersystem LOCA, NRR issued an order requiring the periodic testing of the check valves installed between the injection system low pressure piping and the reactor coolant system (RCS)
high pressure piping.
The NRC inspector reviewed the actions taken by the licensee to verify that the licensee has complied with the requirements stated in the order for modification of license.
The following is a discussion of the revie, _.
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-13-I The check valves for the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) and the
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high pressure safety injection (HPSI) systems flow to the RCS are
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located directly downstream of motor-operated control valves.
These eight check valves represent possible intersystem LOCA paths from the l
RCS to both injection systems.
To minimize the possibfity of an intersystem LOCA, the licensee maintains the motor-operated valves immediately upstre n of the check valves in the shut position during normal operation.
During nonroutine operations, the motor-operated valves are opened after the discharge pressure of the injection pumps
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is high enough to prevent potential backflow through the check (
valves.
In addition, the licensee also performs routine surveillance on the check valves in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
This surveillance verifies that the back leakage through the valves is less than a specified amount.
, The four check valves for combined injection flow into the RCS are
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monitored for leakage.
The combined injection flow through the check valves includes LPSI, HPSI, and flow from the safety injection tanks.
The leakage backflow through the check valves is monitored using an installed system.
The leakage monitoring-system contains a flow meter and the necessary valves to determine the amount and source of leakage from any one of the four check valves.
The licensee continually monitors this system in the control room for any abnormal conditions.
Based on the above review performed by the NRC inspector, it appears that the licensee has established a program to meet the requirements of the order for modification of license.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7.
Operational Safety Verification The NRC inspector conducted the reviews and observations described below to verify that facility operations were performed in conformance with the requirements established under 10 CFR, administrative procedures, and the Technical Specifications.
The NRC inspector made several control room observations to verify:
Proper shift manning
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Operator adherence to approved procedures and Technitil
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Specifications Operability of reactor protective system and engineered safeguards
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equipment
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Logs, records, recorder traces, annunciators, panel indications, and
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switch positions complied with the appropriate requirements Proper return to service of components
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-14-Maintenance orders had been initiated for equipment in need of
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maintenance Appropriate conduct of control room and other licensed operators
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During walkdowns recently performed by the licensee for procedure verifications, a problem was noted regarding a recently issued abnormal operating procedure (A0P).
AOP-6, " Emergency Fire Procedure," provides instructions for actions to be taken in the event the control room has to be evacuated.
A walkdown of the actions required by AOP-6 revealed that a modification made during the recent refueling outage affects the availability of the 'nstrumentation on the alternate shutdown panel (ASP).
The ASP is supplied by inverters C and D which also supply power to instruments in the control room.
The ASP supply connections tap off between the inverter and the inver' tr output breaker located in the control room.
If the control roca tiad to be abandoned due to fire, the possibility exists that the portion of the inverter cables in the control room could be damaged, causing a short and a subsequent loss of power to the inverters.
Loss of the inverters would cause a loss of instrument power to the ASP.
The licensee has provided corrective action by staging the necessary tools in the switchgear room adjacent to the inverters to cut the inverter output cable.
The cut will be made downstream of the ASP instrument supply tapoff.
Cutting the cable in the switchgear room will prevent any damage to the cable in the control room from affecting inverter operation.
The licensee has made the necessary procedure changes and has briefed the operating crews on the use of the new method for securing inverter output power.
The licensee currently plans to change the power supply for the ASP instrumentation during the next refueling outage.
No violations or deviations were noted.
8.
Plant Tours The NRC inspector conducted plant tours at various times to assess plant and equipment conditions.
The following items were observed during the
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tours:
General plant conditions
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Equipment conditions, including fluid leaks and excessive vibration
.
Plant housekeeping and cleanliness practices including fire hazards
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and control of combustible material The physical security plan was being implemented in accordance with
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the station security plan Adherence to the requirements of radiation work permits
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y Work activities being performed in accordance with approved
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procedures No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Safety-Related System Walkdowns The NRC inspector walked down accessible portions of the following safety related systems to verify system operability. Operability was determined by verification of valve and switch positions.
The systems were walked down using the procedures noted:
Reactor startup locked valves (01-RC-28, Revision 45)
.
Engineered safeguards features controls (01-ES-1, Revision 18)
.
During the walkdowns, the NRC inspector noted minor discrepancies of an editorial nature between the procedures and plant as-built conditions.
None of the conditions noted affected the operability or safe operation of l
tne system.
Licensee personnel stated that the noted minor discrepancies l
would be corrected.
No violations or deviations were identified.
10. Monthly Maintenance Observation i
The NRC inspector observed station maintenance activities of safety-related systems and components to verify the mainfenance was
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conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory requirements, and the Technical Specifications.
The following items were considered during the observations:
The limiting conditions for operation were met while systems or
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components were removed from service Approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work
.
Activities were accomplished using approved M0s and were inspected, as
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applicable
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Functional testing end/or cal *brations were performed prior to
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returning components or systems to service
,
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l Quality control records were maintained
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l Activities were accomplished by qualified personnel
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i Parts and materials used were properly certified
.
Radiological and fire prevention controls were implemented
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-16-The NRC inspector observed the following maintenance activities:
Removal of raw water pump for overhaul (M0 860245)
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Installation of fire barrier for auxiliary feedwater pump
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(SROC0 86-01)
Installation of 1-hour fire barrier wrap (M0 860691)
.
No violations or deviations were noted.
11. Monthly Surveillance Observation The NRC inspector observed the Technical Specification-required surveillance testing on safety related systems and components.
The NRC inspector verified the following items during the testing:
Testing was performed using approved procedures
.
Test instrumentation was calibrated
.
Limiting conditions for operation were met
.
Removal and restoration of the affected system and/or component were
.
accomplished Test results conformed with Technical Specification and procedure
.
requirements Test results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual
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directing the test
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Deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
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resolved by appropriate management personnel
.
The NRC inspector witnessed the following surveillance test activities.
The procedures used for the test activities are noted.
Weekly test of the electric-and diesel-driven fire water pumps
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(01-FP-6)
Monthly test of emergency diesel generator D-2 (ST-ESF-6-F.2,
.
Appendix B)
Annual inspection of emergency diesel generator 0-2 (ST-ESF-6-F.5)
.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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-17-12.
Exit Interview The NRC inspector met with Mr. W. G. Gates (Plant Manager) at the end of this inspection.
At this meeting, the inspector summarized the scope of the inspection and the findings.
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