IR 05000245/1987004

Insp Repts 50-245/87-04 & 50-336/87-05 on 870310-0413.No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Facility Activities, Operational Safety,Fuel Reconstitution,Actuation of ESF, Reactor Scram & Surveillance

ML20210A046
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	04/21/1987
From:	Mccabe E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20210A027	List: IR 05000245/1987004 ML20210A022
References
50-245-87-04, 50-245-87-4, 50-336-87-05, 50-336-87-5, NUDOCS 8705040333
Download: ML20210A046 (13)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report: 50-245/87-04; 50-336/87-05 Docket Nos: 50-245/50-336 License Nos: DPR-21; DPR-65 Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Enerqy Company Facility: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Waterford, Connecticut Inspection at: Millstone Units 1 & 2 Dates: March 10, 1987 through April 13, 1987 Inspectors: Theodore A. Rebelowski, Senior Resident Inspector Geoffrey E. Grant, Resident Inspector Approved: b 4/2i/p7 E. C. McCabe, Chief, Reactor Projects Section 3B Date Summary: Report No. 50-245/87-04; 50-336/87-05 (March 10 through April 13, 1987)

Areas Inspected: This inspection included routine NRC resident inspection (233 hours0.0027 days <br />0.0647 hours <br />3.852513e-4 weeks <br />8.86565e-5 months <br />) of Facility Activities, Operational Safety, Fuel Reconstitution (Unit 2),

Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (Unit 1), Reactor Scram (Unit 1), Reac-tor Building Closed Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Flow (Unit 2), Implementation of a new Radioactive Waste Treatment System (Unit 1), Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Supply Review, Surveillance, On-Site Plant Operations Review Committee Review, and Periodic and Special Report Results: No inadequacies were identified. However, the Unit 1 Reactor Scram was found to be in need of additional management review (Detail 6). Also, the practice of eating on duty within the red-lined area in the Unit 2 control room was identi-fled as having a potential for distracting operators and detracting from the pro-fessional atmosphere in the control room (Detail 3).

8705040333 870424 PDR ADOCK 05000245 G PDR

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Persons Contacted.................................................... 1 S umma ry o f Fac i l i ty Acti v i ti e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 & 2)........................ 1 Fuel Reconstitution (Unit 2)......................................... 2 Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) (Unit 1)............. 2 Reactor Scram (Unit 1)............................................... 3 RBCCW Heat Exchanger Service Water Flow Deficiency (Unit 2).......... 4 Implementation of a New Radioactive Waste Treatment System (Unit 1).. 5 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Supply Inspection (Units 1 & 2)...... 5 10. Observation of Surveillance (Units 1 & 2)............................ 8

1 On-Site Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) (Units 1 & 2)....... 9

.1 Review of Periodic and Special Reports (Units 1 & 2)................. 10 1 Management Meetings.................................................. 11

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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted Mr. S. Scace, Station Superintendent Mr. J. Stetz, Unit 1 Superintendent Mr. J. Keenan, Unit 2 Superintendent The inspector also contacted members of the Operations, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Instrument and Control, Maintenance, Reactor Engineering, and Security Department .0 Summary of Facility Activities Unit 1: The unit operated at full power until March 22 at which time the unit tripped. (See Paragraph 6 of this report.) The unit returned to power and except for routine power reductions to conduct main steam and turbine stop valve testing remained at 100% power through the end of the report perio Unit 2: The unit operated at full power during this report perio .0 Operational Safety Verification (Units 1 & 2)

The inspector observed plant operations during regular and off-hour tours of the following plant areas:

Control Room Fence Line (Protected Area)

Auxiliary Building Yard Areas Diesel Generator Rooms Turbine Building (Unit 2)

Security North Entrance Control Point Condenser Area (Unit 2) Spent Fuel Pool (Unit 2)

Fuel Storage (Unit 1) Intake Structures In control rooms, instruments were observed for review of conformance to Technical Specification requirements. The inspector observed annunciator responses and found no discrepancies. Operators were knowledgeable of the activated annunciator windows. Control room and shift manning were compared to regulatory requirements and found acceptable. A practice of eating within the red-lined area of the Unit 2 Control Room was observed on several occa-sions. This item was communicated to the Unit Superintendent and the Opera-tions Supervisor for evaluation because it appears to have the potential to detract from control room professionalism and operator alertness. During this report period, however, no operator inattentiveness to plant conditions was observe Posting and control of radiation and high radiation areas were inspecte Compliance with Radiation Work Permits and use of appropriate personnel moni-toring devices were checked. Plant housekeeping controls were observed, in-cluding control and storage of flammable material and other potential safety hazards. During plant tours, logs and records were reviewed to determine if

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entries were properly made and communicated equipment status / deficiencie These records included operating logs, turnover sheets, tagout and jumper logs, and Plant Information Reports. The inspector observed selected aspects of plant security including access control, physical barriers, and personnel monitoring. No unacceptable conditions were identifie .0 Fuel Reconstitution (Unit 2)

The licensee is presently reconstituting 16 fuel assemblies. The reconstitu-tion is performed using an inversion technique which locks an assembly in an inversion strongback which is rotated 180 degrees for bottom nozzle remova The strongback fixes the top and bottom nozzles with pins that extend into the bottom nozzle legs and top nozzle extension ports. On removal of the bottom nozzle, the fuel assembly is rotated 90 degrees to a horizontal posi-tion. Failed fuel pins are then removed, eddy current tested, and placed in a storage tube. A dummy solid stainless steel rod is used to replace removed fuel pin A licensee safety analysis was performed on the work activity. Radiological controls have been evaluated by the licensee and are addressed in procedure 665-6010-0 The inspectors witnessed the inspection of two assemblies per procedure 665-6010-01. The licensee observed the specific precautions and limitations and addressed all prerequisites. The material handling log was maintained. Fuel rod accountability was maintained per procedure EN21001, SNM Inventory Contro Observation of assembly H50 noted the eddy current results on pin J8. Three pin defects were noted. Storage of the rod was accomplished satisfactoril Rod removal was noted on a video screen. Pool clarity was satisfactor As of the end of this report period, 14 of the 16 assemblies had been recon-stituted successfully. This project has been well planned and supervised, and has involved quality assurance and control review. No deficiencies were identifie .0 Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) (Unit 1)

On March 10 the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System auto-initiated on a signal from the Reactor Building Ventilation System radiation monitor. The signal was caused by an I&C technician conducting troubleshooting without first placing the channel in bypass. The SGT system is designed to initiate and the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolates in a one-out-of-two logic on a ventilation system radiation level of 11 mrem /hr or greater. The same actions will also occur if both radiation monitor channels fail downscal The technician was investigating an apparent downscale failure of one of the monitor channels when his actions caused the channel to exceed the trip set-point, initiating the SGT system. After determining normal system response and conditions, operators returned the SGT system to standby statu .. .

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The licensee investigated the SGT initiation and is studying the need for developing a basic equipment troubleshooting guide. The. resident inspector had no further questions concerning.the SGT system initiation but, during routine inspections, will review the licensee's actions to~ prevent recurrenc .0 Reactor Scram (Unit 1)

On March 22, during a planned power reduction to repair a valve steam leak, the reactor scrammed from 50% power due to closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs). The MSIVs closed automatically on a Group 1' Primary Contain-ment Isolation Signal (PCIS) when reactor pressure dropped to approximately 790 psig while shifting pressure control from.the Mechanical Pressure Regula-tor (MPR) to the Electrical Pressure Regulator (EPR). The Group.1 PCIS closes the inboard and outboard MSIVs and main steam line drain valves (MS-5&6),.re-circulation loop sample valves, and isolation condenser vents. When the MSIVs closed to the 90% open position, the reactor automatically scrammed. With the MSIVs closed, control room operators manually initiated the Isolation Condenser (IC) in anticipation of required post-scram reactor pressure contro All systems associated with the scram, Group 1 isolation, and initiation of the IC' operated normall Although post-scram actions taken were normal and successful, operators ex-perienced difficulty in resetting the Group 1 isolation signal. The signal needed to be reset to open MS-5&6 to bypass / equalize around and open the MSIV This would regain use of the turbine bypass valves for pressure control and the main condenser as a heat sink. The difficulty in resetting the signal was caused by the normally closed MS-6 being de energized. With MS-6 de-energized, .the Group 1 isolation reset logic could not sense the valve's

" closed" condition, thus preventing signal reset. An operator was dispatched to the Reactor Building to energize MS-6, allowing the subsequent resetting of the isolation signal and return of the main condenser to operation. MS-6 had been intentionally de-energized, in response to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R cri-teria, pending modifications to correct potential " hot short" concerns. This is a less than optimum plant condition requiring eventual correction. The Unit 1 Probabilistic Safety Study (a probabilistic risk assessment) indicates that the prompt recovery of the main condenser should take about 10 minutes under normal conditions. For this event, it took approximately 20 minutes to bypass around and open the MSIVs. Although the licensee has not finalized the required modification, corrective action is scheduled for the June 1987 refueling outag Shifting reactor pressure control between regulators is a normal but infre-quently conducted operation. Other than transferring from the MPR to the EPR during a reactor startup (and the reverse on a shutdown), most operators have limited experience exercising the transfer function. In this instance, a relatively new licensed operator conducted the transfer and apparently did not allow adequate time for the control system to respond to his action By too rapid an adjustment of the MPR to meet the EPR setpoint, artificial error signals were produced, causing a momentary loss of positive pressure control and the subsequent low pressure condition. System testing indicated

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that the-.EPR and MPR were operating satisfactorily. The Plant Operations Re-

',. view Committee (PORC) post-event causal analysis tended-to focus on the age i of the control system design and the lack of simulator fidelity to accurately recreate control system response. These appear to be contributing factors to a root cause of operator error. The sensitivity and behavior of the~ system

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are known and require appropriate review and factoring into operator action The inspector subsequently observed successful EPR and MPR testing and trans-fers conducted at approximately 97% power. The licensee is attempting to up-grade operation through-improved proceduralizaticn of a standard technique-for EPR/MPR operations. Also being considered are training improvements an possible. system changes. The r,esident inspector will review further licensee corrective actions during routine inspection activitie h 7.0/8CCWHeatExchangerServiceWaterFlowDeficiency(Unit 2)

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-The Reactor dependent Building headers, eachClosed having aCooling Water pump, heat (RBCCW)

exchanger, and System associatedconsists piping, of tu in valves, instrumentation and controls. : 4The headers are redundant withieach a having-100%: heat removal capacity.following a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).

A third RBCCW pump and heat exchanger serve as idle system spares. Components cooled by RECCW include: CAR. units, CS pumps, HPSI pumps, LPSI pumps, RC pumps, shutdown cooling heat exchangers, and CEDM coolers. The Service Water systemitupplies cooling water flow to the RBCCW heat exchangers and is auto-matically controlled by RBCCW temperature. These Temperature Control, Valves (TCVs) are over, ridden and go full open upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). The SIAS also isolates non-vital Service Water system loads so that maximum flow and cooling potential is available to RBCCW,

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g Under LOCA conditions, the Millstone Unit 2 Final-Safety Analysis Report

- (FSAR) Table 14.16-5 indicates an assumed minimum Service Water flow to one RBCCW heat exchanger of 3.15 x 10 E+6 lbm/hr (approximately 6200 gpm). Con-seqyectly, duririg original construction Phase II testing in June 1975, throttle valves on the Service Water outlet of each RBCCV heat exchanger were set and marked to allow a maximum ott 6300 1 100 gpm. ' Limiting the maximum flow through<the RBCCW heat exchangers was deemed necessary in order to pre-vent potential Service Water pump runout conditions (approximately 15,000 gpm)

which could result in thelloss of the pum ,

Recent licensee review of post-LOCA RBCCW heat balance calculations shows that the current FSAR value of approximately 6200 gpm is in error and that the cor-rect Service Water flow to the RBCCW heat exchangers should be approximately -

11,000 gp The error has been verified by the original Architect-Engineer (AE). The current throttle valve settings for 6300 i 100 gpm flow are ade-quate for Service Water temperatures less than 50 degrees Fahrenheit. Current Service Water temperatures are in the 40-44 degree Fahrenheit range and typi-cally increase 1-2 degrees per week during this time of year. The licensee <

will reset the throttle valves to the 11,000 gpm mark prior to Service Water

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', temperaturesexceeding50degreesFahrenheit-andafterproceduEechangeshav .been reviewed and implemente The licensee is currently developing.an FSAR-change to correct.the Table 14.16-5 error. The resident inspector will review licensee corrective actions during routine inspection y 8.0 Implementation of a New Radioactive Waste Treatment System- (Unit 1)

JIn the liquid radwaste system, low purity,'high conductivity wastes frcs floor-drains are collected in two Radwaste BeiTding floor. drain sumps; two Reactor

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Building floor sumps; the Turbine Building floor drain sump;; and the drywell floor drain sump.~ These wastes, along with drains from the, cooling water side of heat exchangers and chemical waste' effluent'from radwast'e' operations, aro!

pumped and collected in floor drain collector tanks. From these tanks, the?

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. aste is processed through-the floor drain filter to sample tanfs;Wher;e, the effluent can be discharged to the circulating water discharg6 pystem Ware-cycled through the radwaste system. An alternate flow from the collector tanks is to one of two concentrators where the high purity distillate is comm bined with other high purity waste for processing'and return to the Condensate Storage Tank or discharge. The concentrate from thistoperation is-either solidified for disposal or, if the activity is low enough, discharge \

ThetwoconcentratorsatUnit1areinbdegradedconditionwithonenolonger-serviceable and the other having a limited useful life. Accordingly, the licensee has installed a new skid mounted. waste treatment s>itm to replace the ' concentrators 'and provide effluent at quality and activity ' levels suitable for discharge. The unit uses ion selective media, general ictexchange resin and filters to accomplish these objectives. .It consists of a< booster pump,

. resin pressure vessels, effluent mechanical filter, resin media tansfer unit-and supporting hardwar The waste generated W the system will be' spent filter cartriages and resin media. The spent filters will be stored and ,

eventually shipped'off-site for disposal. The resin will be transferred to

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the solid radwaste system, decanted and eventually shipped oftysite for dis-posa "

.. U q The resident inspector reviewed system operation, the Plant Design Change Request (PDCR) associated with installation, s2Jety evaluation, Radidlogical s Environmental Review (RER), and operating procefores.' The RER indicated that #)

concentrators, resulting in an increase in the' radioactivity of liquid j ent Analysis of this increase showed that the resultant doses from the 't . 1 3 effluent pathway were still well below the 10 C R 50, Appendix I limit The inspector had no further questions in tnis area b

9. 0 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Supply Inspection (Units 1 & Q .

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The resident inspector reviewed the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fuel Supply systems at both units. Inspection emph nis was placed on system de-signs, licensee programs and actions that ensure availability and reliability

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' ~ e ., oftheEDGs.'<TYomajorfunctionalareas.wereinvNtigated: engineering design and mainteiance'of the fuel supply systems; and, fuel oil supply quality assurance. (The engineering design revww traced the fuel oil supply path from the bulk storage tanks to the engine mounted fuel pump. The maintenance re-view examined procedural preventive maintenance actions that ensure free flow of fuel oil to tne FDG. The fuel oil supply review covered licensee controls and analyses intended.to assure required quality. Documents reviewed included:

surveillance, operation and maintenance procedures; piping and instrumentation diarams; the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR); system descriptions; Tech-nical' Specifications; the licensee's Production Maintenance Management System (PMtts); and, applicable Regulatory Ghides; The intent of the inspection was

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to ascertain what programs and controls the licensee had implemented that assured high quality fuel oil reached the EDGs in a reliable manner. Inspec-

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w i The Unit 1 EDG Fuel Oil Supply system consists of parallel redundant supply headers running from the Fuel, 011 Day 3 Tank to the suction of the engine mounted fuel pump. Two independeN N.nd redundant fuel oil transfer pumps draw off: of a buried 25,000 gallonJdlk 'stbrage tank and discharge through a common

' header to the day tank. The transfer' pumps automatically respond to day tank level switch commands to maintiin day tank contents between 1360 and 1610 gallon *

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During the design review, the inspector questioned the maintenance activities relating to three "Y" type strainers located in the supply piping (one in the rtbrage tank to day tank nipe and one in each of the day tank to engine pipes).

Blockage of these straineFs would cause engine fuel starvation and shutdow The strainers had nd planned preventive maintenance actions associated with them.and the lic w de Isd no de'.wmentation or knowledge of the strainers ever having been disassembled; inspected and cleaned. The main strainer between the storage and day . tank is bloWdma by procedure during EDG operation when the transfer pump t.akes up fuel to the day tank. This is a relatively low pressure flush and may not-adequately remove tenacious debris from the strainer elements. The other two' strainers are not routinely flushe Al-though these strainers have not experienced blockage problems, the' licensee has addressed the potential by including the strainers in PMMS and requiring

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routine cleaning. A Plant Design Change Request (PDCR) is under development for a piping modification that will facilitate cleaning the two strainers in the day tank to engine lines. Routine blowdown of these strainers will also o

beaddedtotheEDGopegtingprocedur Also during the design review, the inspector questioned the purpose and re-liability of thermally fused fuel shutoff check valves in each of the supply lines from the day tank to the engine. These commercial grade valves actuate when an integral fuseable link melts at 165 degrees Fahrenheit. Actuation of these valves stops fuel flow to the ED .

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Reliability 6f the valves under seismic conditions was questioned. The lic-ensee's investigation determined that the valves were not needed from a fire safety standpoint and were not seismically qualified. Consequently, the lic-ensee has initiated a jumper bypass and lockwired the valves open. Further, as permanent corrective action, the licensee intends to remove the valves or their internals during the next refueling outag The inspector noted that the scope of the licensee's fuel sampling and analy-sis program was limited. Bulk fuel deliveries have not been sampled and an-alyzed prior to transfer to the storage tank nor have the storage tank con-tents been routinely sampled. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.137 recommends these actions to ensure fuel oil quality. (The licensee is not committed to RG 1.137 for Unit 1 or Unit '2.) Fuel oil sampling does occur on a monthly basis during EDG operation. The sample is drawn from the storage to day tank strainer tailpiece during operation of the fuel oil transfer pump. RG 1.137 recommends that the sample be taken from the day tank. Parallel to the in-spector's investigation, the licensee was independently conducting a review of the fuel oil sampling program in response to Information Notice 87-0 The results of their review confirmed program deficiencies. Corrective ac-tions completed or in progress address each of these concern Ancillary to the sampling program is maintenance of the fuel oil supply tank RG 1.137 recommends that the tanks be emptied and cleaned every ten year Although the storage tank has been cleaned once, the requirement has not been incorporated in PMMS. Because the day tank has no access opening, it has never been cleaned. The licensee is incorporating a ten year cycle storage tank cleaning requirement into PMM Although several deficiencies were identified during the inspection, none of them render the EDG inoperable. Throughout the inspection the licensee took aggressive action to independently perform appropriate reviews and formulate corrective actions. An effective program of :nformation Notice analysis re-sulted in licensee identification of some of these deficiencies. Implementa-tion of corrective actions will be monitored by the resident inspector during routine inspectio Unit 2 The Unit 2 EDG Fuel Oil Supply system consists of a buried storage tank which feeds two 13,850 gallon Supply Tanks. Each Supply Tank contains the Technical

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Specification 3.8.1.1 required minimum of 12,000 gallons of fuel and indepen-dently supplies its associated ED The design review determined that the "Y" type strainers located between the storage tank and each Supply Tank and between each Supply Tank and its asso-ciated EDG are routinely cleaned on an annual basis. The thermally fused fuel supply shutoff check valves between each Supply Tank and EDG are of a differ-ent design than those in Unit 1 and have been seismically qualified. No de-ficiencies were identified during this revie r

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Although the licensee is not committed to RG 1.137. the fuel oil sampling and analysis program was found to follow RG 1.137 recommendations with one excep-tion. When fuel is delivered, a sample is drawn from the truck and sent off-site for laboratory analysis. Results are not available for approximately two weeks after delivery. RG 1.137 recommends that testing for specific gravity, water and sediment, and viscosity be performed prior to transferring fuel from the truck to the storage tank and the balance of the analyses be completed within two weeks. Analysis equipment is onsite for performing these pre-delivery tests and is currently used at Unit Knowing the results of pre-delivery tests to determine fuel acceptability would be an improvement to the fuel oil quality assurance progra The in-spector had no further questions in this are .0 Observation of Surveillance (Units 1 & 2)

The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance tests to' determine whether properly approved procedures were in use, test instrumentation was properly calibrated and used, technical specifications were satisfied, testing was performed by qualified personnel, procedure details were adequate and test results satisfied acceptance criteria. The following activities were observe Unit 1 On March 25 and April 7, the inspector observed several surveillances con-ducted by licensee Instrument & Controls (I&C) technicians. Special attention was given to review of the surveillance procedures, observation of test con-trol and review of completed documentation. Additionally, the inspector ob-served the actions of the licensee On-the-Job Training (0JT) evaluator. Sur-veillances observed included:

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SP 410C, Rod Block Monitor Calibration Test

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SP 4108, Rod Block Monitor Functional Test

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SP 408G, Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Functional and Calibration Test The surveillances were well coordinated, executed and evaluated. Communica-tions between test locations were adequately conducted on a dedicated circui I&C personnel were adequately prepared and knowledgeable of test requirement The inspector noted one minor error in procedure SP 410C. The licensee stated that will be corrected. The inspector had no further questions in this are Unit 2 The inspector observed the following surveillances:

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Procedure 2612A, Facility 1 Service Water Pump Operability Test

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Procedure 2612A, Facility 2 Service Water Pump Operability Test

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Procedure 21121, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump A

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Procedure 21122, Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump B In addition, observations of valves that monitor the Spent Fuel Pool Liner Leakage found satisfactory lineu Boron buildup from leaking flanges on Spent Fuel Pool piping was observe Leakage at pump vents was identified. The licensee addressed these concerns with a cleanup of piping, retorquing of flanges, and repairing leaking pump vent No inadequacies were identified in the instrumentation, pressure, or pump floors. All acceptance criteria were met. The inspector had no further question .0 On-Site Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) (Units 1 & 2)

Unit 1 The resident inspector attended meetings on March 10, 13, 18 and April 9 of the Unit 1 PORC. Technical Specification 6.5.1 requirements for committee composition were met. PORC reviews included the following:

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Results of a special test of fire dampers under flow condition Procedures for sampling diesel and gas turbine fuel on delivery prior to transfer to bulk storage tank Results of a special test of APRM relay sequenc Procedures to perform functional and calibration surveillances of various radiation monitors previously performed by Health Physics personne Plant Design Change Request (PDCR) to provide input to the Unit 2 process computer from the plant stack gas Kaman high range radiation monito PDCR to modify the south scram discharge volume header vent line to minimize splashing of the effluent and attendal.t surface contaminatio Changes to valve maintenance procedure MP 719.1 to require internal de-bris constraining dams when performing grinding / machining operations to prevent dispersion of undesired material into syste Technical presentation in support of a PDCR explaining / justifying the rationale for not monitoring potential ventilation system release paths based on low probabilities and low activity level .

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PDCR to install a safety grade drywell bulk temperature monitoring syste PDCR to install alternate diesel fire pump cooling water discharge pipe

'(corrects deficiency identified during Hurricane Gloria).

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Review of Nuclear Review Board minute Various Plant Incident Reports (PIR).

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Minor operations, I & C and maintenance procedure change Unit 2 The resident inspector attended a meeting on March 20, 1987 of the Unit 2 POR Technical Specification 6.5.1 requirements for committee composition were me PORC review included the following:

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Various Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) changes to incorporate the flexibility of the new Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) to perform-Safety Function status check The status of acceptance testing of the new SPD PORC examined test discrepancies and corrective action plan A procedure change to accommodate minor equipment problems experienced during fuel reconstitution activitie Proposed Appendix R modifications exemption For both units, adequate review and analysis of the issues were conducted by PORC members prior to the meetings as shown by several of the items being resubmittals upgrading previously rejected items. Review of previously PORC-approved special test results appears to be an effective feedback mechanism contributing to an overall assurance of quality operations. No deficiencies in PORC performance were observe .0 Review of Periodic and Special Reports (Units 1 & 2)

Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 6.9.1.6 and 6.9.1.3 were reviewed. This review verified that the reported information was valid and included the NRC required data; that test results and supporting information were consistent with design predic-tions and performance specifications; and that planned corrective actions were adequate for resolution of the problem. The inspector also ascertained whether any reported information should be classified as an abnormal occur-rence. The following periodic reports were reviewed:

Unit 1 -- Monthly Operating Report, plant operations from March 1-31, 198 *

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' Unit 2 -- Monthly Operating Report, plant operations from March 1-31, 198 Units 1 & 2~--' Annual Radioactive Effluents Dose Report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.4(b)(1).

No deficiencies were identifie .0 Management' Meetings At periodic intervals during this inspection, meetings were held with senior plant management to discuss the findings. - No proprietary information was

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identified as being in the inspection coverage. No written material was pro-vided to the licensee by the inspector.