IR 05000312/1987008

Insp Rept 50-312/87-08 on 870209-0306.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Program for Environ Qualified Electrical splices,follow-up of Insp Open Items,Ie Bulletins & Info Notices,Unresolved Items & LERs

ML20206P020
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	04/01/1987
From:	Jim Melfi, Miller L, Willett D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20206P000	List: IR 05000312/1987008 ML20206N995
References
50-312-87-08, 50-312-87-8, IEB-82-02, IEB-82-2, IEB-86-003, IEB-86-073, IEB-86-3, IEB-86-73, NUDOCS 8704210078
Download: ML20206P020 (13)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

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Report No.'50-312/87-08 Docket No. 50-312

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License No.-DPR-54 Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name: Rancho Seco Nuclear GeneratinJ Station Inspection at: Clay Station, California Inspection Conducted: February 9 - March 6, 1987 Inspeetors: M .

3-8/-87 y Willett, Reac r Inspecto Date Signed WW

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J. F fi, Re r1 l ector 3 - 11- 6 7 IJate Signed Approved by: 8/

L. y'ldr, Reactor Pfojects Section 2 D~ ate Signe'd Sumary:

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Inspection on February 6 - March 9, 1987 (Report No. 50-312/87-08)

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Areas Inspected: Routine, announced safety inspection of_the licensee's

, program for environmentally qualified electrical splices, follow-up'of:

inspection open items, I&E bulletins, Information Notices, unresolved items, licensee event reports, and 10 CFR Part 21 reports.- Inspection procedures TI-2500/17, 92701, 92719, 93702, and 36100 were covere Results: Of the seven areas inspected no violations or deviations 'were i identifie .

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8704210078 870401 PDR ADOCK 05000312 O PDR

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. Details Personnel Contacted

• R. Colombo, Supervisor Regulatory Compliance ,

1. B.. Day, Deputy Plant Manager B. Kumar, Environmental Qualification Engineer

1. J. Robertson, Licensing Enoineer P. Bausekauski, Nuclear Engineer D. Army, Maintenance Manager

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T. Holkum, Nuclear Engineer R. Wolf, Licensed Operator J. Field, System Review and Test Group Supervisor R. Little, Licensing Analyst R. Daniels Electrical Engineering Supervisor

1. T. Shewski, Quality Engineer

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J. Janus, Representative for the Plant Mg S. Knight,-QA Manager J. Witters, Electrical Maintenance

1. • F. Hauck, Regulatory Compliance R. Nelson, Electrical Maintenance foreman R. Lucero, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor S. Stinson, Electrical Technician

1. R. Wise, Electrical Engineer

1. W. Fargo, Electrical Engineer

1. C. Stephenson, Regulatory Compliance

1. T. Carver, Licensing B. Stiver, Maintenance Engineer -

D. Jones, Electrical Technician M. Price, Maintenance Snperintendent The-inspector also held discussions with other licensee and contract personnel during the inspection. This included plant staff engineers, technicians, administrative and clerical assistant * Denotes those personnel attending the exit interview on 2-13-8 # Denotes those personnel attending the exit interview on 3-6-8 . Raychem and Qualified Electrical Splices The inspector had several discussions with personnel responsible for the implementation of the Environmental Qualification Program (EQ) for electrical eouipment. These discussions centered around the following concerns identified in a previous inspection (Rpt # 50-312/87-04)

regarding qualification of Okonite' tape splices: The licensee has subsequently balanced the qualification test data against the accident profile and determined that there,is sufficient margin between the 54 psig. test peak and the 52 psig analysis pea Based on these results, unresolved item 87-04-02 is resolved and close . . .

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'The' licensee is revising the qualification file' by removing test _ report

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NORN-3 as supporting documentation for pressure. qualification, and-F including revision.4 of EM-137, which has!been_ revised to provide for '

F - inspection and removal of burrs and sharp' edges in_ splices. The licensee

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is still awaiting data to resolve any possible synergistic effects F between. Scotch 27 and Okonite T-95 tapes. This concern remains, pending' further. resolution'of the synergism.

', - The licensee utilizes weep' holes in junction boxes inside of containment

- but the-licensee'doesn't utilize weep holes in junction boxes outside of b containment because they are not exposed to pressure differentials as-large'as those expected during postulated pipe breaks. The licensee stated that since the spray pump junction box; is not required to be~

' sealed the use of RTV as a seal doesn't make any difference. The

. licensee ' stated that since the spray pump motor is not subject'to -

steam or high humidity. conditions,' the absence of-a break-out-boot in

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the Raychem splice does not matter. 'The lice ~nsee stated that the~

Raychem splice- to a braided fabric in the -spray pump motorjfeeder

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i leads was acceptable for the same_ reason as :the missing I break-out-boot. The licensee's. evaluation of thesetissues, appears

. ' appropriate. This closes <open item 87,-04-03. * ;

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Thelicenseeis'developinggeneralinstrucktonsforistallationof

~ Raychem splices (M115 and M116). The licensee has agreed to review

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their records to determine the . level of inspection, completed by a j person certified in Raychem installation for the 407 inspections -

F - performed under- project instruction 0790-273-01. This concern

remains, pending verification of an appropriate sample ~ size selection by the licensee.

!. . The licensee will' remove the cable' pull rope that wasf l eft in a conduit-

!- in the' spray. pump room _ overhead. Since this is a reoccurring problem, the ,

i licensee is considering identifying this. item in the housekeeping

. procedures. -The licensee's effectiveness ~in this area will be

! evaluated further in subsequent: routine . inspection '

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j At the end of these discussions the inspector ' identified that when changes

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are made to procedures which affect environmental qualified equipment, the-

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i qualification package should be reviewed to assure that these changes do i not void the equipment qualification. The licensee said that they would evaluate this issue.

[ Follow-up of Inspection Report Open Items

, RV-E-13 (0 )en) This item concerns the observed discrepancy between'the ,

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SPDS and tle Strip Chart Recorders for OTSG " Operate Level" indication and . '

j - was previously, discussed in IE report #50-312/86-07. The two remaining- 'I open issues regarding this item are:

' Resolution of the observed discrepancies vs. the smaller simulated and calculated discrepancy.

i The determination of the extent of incorrect infomation contained in'

{ the SPDS manua '

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The inspector held discussions with licensee: personnel responsible for

evaluating and resolving these issues.1 The inspector expressed-the-l

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concern.that, since this discrepancy had not been totally resolved. it-would appear prudent to_ ass'une that the operator's observations were correct and work backwards'through the system to identify what unique set ^

of circumstances / inputs-could generate these observations. Additionally,

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the. inspector commented that, since the systemLtest of the system algorithm was verified only up to 95% level, maybe.the algorithm diverges above -100% and generates erroneous 1information. This. possibility should- 3 j- be resolved since generator . level did exceed 100% operating level during  ;

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[ the event. The licensee agreed with these concerns and resolved these two possibilities during the. inspection by verifying the ' algorithm up to i 110%. Working . backward, . from the observations, proved fruitless because,-- ,

without a pressure history, the results were meaningless. This issu '

appears to have been thoroughly evaluated.and is closed.~

The licensee is holding discussions with B&W to resol've the reliability o information contained in the ~SPDS manual. This item will_ remain.open

pending resolution of administrative control for the SPDS manual.

RV-MA-1 (0 pen) This item concerns-implementation of a preventative

- maintenance program for all valves (not restricted to safety related or manual). The licensee has revised the previous PM program in an attempt

to integrate the different maintenance disciplines (I&C, Electrical and

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Mechanical) into a comprehensive PM program in which everyone is doing

, business the same way. This represents a new direction, aided by more.

modern management and computer techniques, which have yet to be fully defined or implemented. AP-650, rev. 5, while issued 9-24-86, is being reviewed / evaluated by the discipline supervisors which are pointing out ,

implementation discrepancies. The new computer system is in its

adolescence and many of the programs are yet to,be instituted.

The licensee has ganerated criteria for inclusion of valves into the PM program-(0M M. Price to D. Army 2/10/87) which are to amend AP-650.

Approximately 85% of the manual operated valves.. selected, because of their safety role, have been refurbished along with 100% of the motor operated safety valves. Over the long range, the PM program will. include check

< valves, relief valves, pneumatic valves, etc. but this = program has yet to be definitively described or scheduled for implementation. This=1 tem

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remains open pending more specific program details.

h RY-0-15 (Closed) This item-concerned a finding (report.86-07) that

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operators did not use the. appropriate annunciator response procedures and the licensee agreed to reexamine these procedures. The licensee has i reviewed the 568 annunciator response procedures and determined that the.

i format was difficult to follow and that many steps were out of order.

l Currently the licensee is in the process.of revising approximately 272 i alarm response procedures to clarify them, make them more accurate, and-

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account for Engineering Changes (ECN's) that have been generated during

this outage. During this rewriting, the licensee has committed'to make-

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these procedures more specific prior to restart by identifying, in

. addition to the. source of the alarm, how to check alanns locally and what instrumentation to us '

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- These revised procedures will identify what casualty procedure'to go to~

for an alarming condition. . In the future, the licensee intends to change -

the format for these procedures along the-lines of a fault tree with

- subsequent actions. At the time of this inspection, the licensee'has~

-completed approximately 45%.of the 272 procedures they are rewriting.

- This item 'is clo' sed based on the licensee's conunittment to complete procedure upgrading prior to restart (not including format change).

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RV-E-1(Closed) For this item, the licensee' performed a walkdown of the o secondary system to determine what secondary branch lines have a potential for contributing to an overcooling event, and for those lines which valves do'not isolate on a loss of ICS, ensure that these valve..

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motor operatornare capable of control from the control room._. independent -

of the IC ,

Eight branch lines over two inches in size were determined to have' valves

which.did not close on loss of ICS and are not fitted with remotel operated isolation valves independent of the ICS.- These lines were the two

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main turbine bypass-valve headers and the steam' lines to the six

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Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADV). Class I motor operated valves FindependentL of the ICS, powered by vital power, and remotely operated from the control room, are being installed on the TBV headers and will be completed prior i

to restar Clas's I remote motor operators are being fitted to the existing isolation valves located upstream of the two inservice ADV's (the remaining four ADV's are to remain with manual isolation valves which are shut during normal operation). This issue is closed.

I RE-0-4 (Closed) This item identified the'need for additional event-related procedures (casualty) procedures which are a necessary complement to the symptom based Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's). To

meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.33 the following six' additional event-related procedures were identified to'be.necessary: -

1. Loss of ICS ,

4. Loss of flux ;indicatien

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2. Pgstoration after SFAS 5. A. cts' of nature

3. Loss of electrical-power 6. Irradiated fuel damage-

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The licensee has committed to complete the above procedures prior to restart. This item is' closed based on this consnitment (NOM 87-29, Redeker to R. Crowley 2-9-87).1 f RE-0-7 (Closed) This item ' involved providing clearer guidance to the operators regarding Pressurized Thermal . Shock -(PTS) concerns. The licensee

, has rewritten their Emergency Operating Procedures -(E0P's) using a new format. E0P 4 & 5 have been revised to put guidance for PTS within the body of the procedure instead of as a general rule which was the previous method.- These revised procedures have been through the review t'

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cycle and have completed a verification and validation cycle which ~

includes trial use by the operating crews at the plant simulator and a review by Human Factors. E0P 4 & 5 were implemented effective-February 9, 198 The licensee has determined that existing. guidelines and cooldown curves 4 contained in the current Technical Specifications are adequate (conservative)'and do not plan an amendment. This item is close RV-E-12 (Closed) For this issue the licensee was to investigate the Main

. Teedwater block valve operations in the. main; steam logic.as shown by the Interim Data Aquisition and Display System (IDADS). Procedure 8.2-20

" Reactor coolant system Heatup to Hot Shutdown" (Rev 38 effective September 5,1986 and B.4-11 " Plant Cooldown" (Rev 40 effective September 5, 1986) have been revised to incorporate the changes to main steam line failure logic, reset of actuation logic and inhibit. This item is close : RY-E-20 (closed) For this item the licensee was to evaluate the acceptability of closing maintenance valves during a transient. The

, licensee has completed an evaluation of the acceptability of. closing maintenance valves during transients (NOM 86-252, D. Whitney to Distribution,4-10-86). The licensee concluded that, programmatically, improved training of operators on emergency procedures and systems emphasizing procedural adherence was needed as well as an operator review of emergency and casualty procedures, to assure that operators are aware of " tools" at their disposal during emergencies. The licensee's position

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was that it is inappropriate to operate maintenance valves unless so directed by an appropriate procedur The licensee requires operator retraining in "Comand and Control Training for Decision Makers" on a annual basis. This training will reemphasize the importance of procedural adherence. The licensee operating crews will trained on the new E0P's by March 1, 1987. Based on these licensee comitments this item is close RV-MA-2 (Closed) For this item the licensee was to implement a program to assure integrity of plant electrical cerminations. There were three issues associated with this item, loose electrical lugs, unterminated shield wire and uncalibrated crimping tools. The issue addressed here deals only with the loose electrical lugs. The other two issues are being followed-up and tracked under separate open item numbers 86-07-10 & 11 respectivel The licensee decided that the results of a reinspection and rework of the circuits in the control room would decide whether or not to inspect the

terminations cutside of the control room. Reinspection of all the critical

. terminations in the control room did not identify any supporting data for programatic problems with Amp connectors and crimping. Therefore RV-MA-2

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is close A new issue arose, during the licensee's inspection, with " Fat Lugs" which had been shaved dcwn to make them fit the terminal. This issue only affected cabinet power leads which were put on with a hydraulic crimpe This new issue is being further researched by

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N 4 linspections and rework outside of the control room via work requests

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1281511through 128236. Procedure QAIP-15 has been revised to require inspection for this _new issue any time electrical equipment is inspected.

! The results of the control room reinspection are detailed in a: licensee

.. document due February 13, 1987. This " Fat Lug"' issue is a new open item (87.-08- 01) . '

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! 86-30-02(Closed)Thisissueconcerns[asteelwedge'whichwasfound

restricting a pipe support in the Decay Heat Removal System. The licensee

!' has completed a root cause analysis of this occurrence.and has finished a

sample review of 91 additional ' supports to ascertain the programatic

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implications of this occurrence. The' licensee concluded that the results of

this review confirm that the original program was' acceptable,1and that

[ the wedge was an isolated case. ThisLissue.is closed..

)' 86-30-04 (Closed) For this item the licensee'had connitted to submit an

explanation of corrective actions justifying interim functional status of the DHR system. Letters

J.. Ward.SMUD to J.' Martin'NRC 9-9-86 and i 10-15-86,. JEW 86-412 & 647 respectively, detail corrective actions and'

} status of the DHR system per the licensee's commitment. .This issue is F . closed.

i 86-17-01 (Closed) For this issue, the licensee was to' establish a formal

program to implement Technical Specification amendments. ; Inspection

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report 50-312/86-17, identified that: "the licensee'does not.have a formal

! procedure to ensure that Technical Specifications amendments received by

the Regulatory Compliance Department are transmitted to the Technical

Support Department, which generates appropriate procedural revisions.".

j This report also ider tified that .a recent Technical -Specification .

amendment concerning Inservice Inspection of Ungrouted Tendons was not yet incorporated into a specific Surveillance Procedure (SP). No violation i- was issued since the surveillance wa's not due until 1987. .This report i noted that the Once Through' Steam Generator. (OTSG) Auxiliary Feedwater

[ (AFW) header Surveillance Procedure (SP 210.06) and the-required Technical Specification (4.17.6) were not- in the cross index' of Technical Specificationsandsurveillanceprocedures(SG.104). .

j In response to this item, the' licensee.has implemented s and changed

procedures'. A new Administrative' Procedure (AP.72),'" Technical l Specifications Amendment Procedure",~is the licensees'3 response to assure ,

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that Technical-Specification amendments will have the appropriate surveillance

! revisions. A new procedure, AP.303.05, " Technical Specifications to ~

j Surveillance Procedure Cross' Reference Data Base Update Guideline"  ; ~

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establishes a formal method to implement amendments and appears adequate to assure that the cross reference data base will-be updated.- The cros ~

I reference data base is now incorporated in administrative procedure.

p AP.303.04. The OTSG AFW header surveillance'is now referenced to the +

l appropriate Technical Specification. The licensee also revised SP.205.03 j to include the surveillance of the ungrouted tendons in 1987. Based on-4 the licensee's actions, this item is closed.

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82-22-01 (Closed) This is an. unresolved item. The-licensee ordered an environmentally qualified transformer designed for an ambient tenperature of 130 degrees F. The transformer that the licensee received and accepte was rated at 104 degrees F ambient. The licensee reviewed this issue and determined that the maximum temperature that this transformer would~see would be 122 degrees The licensee contacted the manufacturer and was told that the transformer '

which was supplied was a 1500 KVA transformer with 150 degree C ris This means that the transformer insulation is good for a1 continuous

' temperature of' 220 degrees C. Therefore, considering a 50 degree C (122 degrees F) ambient tenperature and a 150 degree' C rise the max 1 temperature would be 200 degrees C, which is.we11'below the 220 degree C insulation thermal rating. This~ issue is close . Follow-up of Licensee Special Reports and 10CFR Part 21 Reports 83-07-X0 (0 pen? Heat tracing for the Hydrogen monitoring system was found deenergized. This heat tracing is necessary to meet post THI sampling

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requirement ,

The licensee did not identify the cause or causes of'this occurrence, or the measures taken to preclude reoccurrence. The licensee is reviewing the '

! circumstances surrounding this occurrence and has agreed to provide the additional -information necessary to close this issue.

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The inspector asked the licensee why this August 1983 occurrence was not reported under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50.73, effective July 198 The licensee responded that the rule was not implemented until January 1, 1984. The inspector will review the pre amendment 63 Technical

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Specifications and address the reportability aspects in the follow-up of the cause and corrective action information that the licensee is to

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provide. This issue remains ope . 83-09-X0 (0 pen) This issue involves 45 pipe supports, in the Hydrogen Monitoring System, which had standard fiberglass insulation installed instead of thermal hangar shields as specified (this system is heat traced).

The licensee concluded that a lack of sufficient' detail on the drawings and a lack of communication during construction caused this deficienc The pipe shields have been installed on the Hydrogen Monitoring System as of March 29, 1984. No mention of a follow-up of other similar installations to verify that this was not a programmatic problem was made.

, The licensee is following-up on the inspector's concern. This item will remain open pending licensee follow-u j

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83-05-X1 (Closed) This issue was in regard to plugging of tubes in the "B" '

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OSTG. One tube was found to have a thru-wall indication of 45%. The .

Technical Specification limit is 40% for thru-wall. This tube (75-13) was plugged. This item is close .

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E 83-01-X0 (Closed) The reactor coolant purp motor fire detectors (which are inaccessible during operation) were-not tested (demonstrated operable)

with the required frequency and/or plant shutdown. The licensee concluded that this omission wardue to a misinterpretation of the _ -

Technical Specifications. The licensee has taken appropriate corrective action by issuing direction to clarify this issue (RWC-83-165, R Colombo to Files 4-15-1983). This issue is close ~#022081 dated 2-20-1981 (Closed) This item is a licensee Special Report using the old numbering system. This. report identified that the motor driven fire pump P-440 initiation logic was defeated as part of planned maintenance. The diesel-driven fire pump was available and the motor driven could have been manually placed in service. The licensee had neglected to process a special order. identifying specific instructions-for manually placing the system in service prior to the start of the maintenance. Special orders (S0 2-81, 2-20-1981) were generated to cover this operating mode. This item is close P (Closed) This item is a 10 CFR Part 21 report. The licensee determined that the Woodward governor, for the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), cover plate interfered with the dial indicator which caused the diesel to operate at less than indicated speed. The licensee machined 1/16 inch from the disc diameter to remove the interference. The licensee alerted other facilities via INP0 Notepad, the manufacturer, and the Commission via a 10 CFR Part 21 report. This item is close P (Closed) This part 21 report concerns Wilmar Electronics Underpower Monitor relay circuit boards. When investigating the cause of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) underpower relay monitor chatter which caused voltage fluctuations on the 120 volt bus, several components of the relay circuit board appeared to be overheated. The board was replaced, and the chatter stopped. .Further investigation by the licensee noted several other discrepancies with the Wilmar Relays such as damaged circuit boards, bad solder co~nnections, and circuit boards that did not match vendor supplied schematic drawing It was also determined that the relays had failed 19 times since-1977. The licensee investigated Wilmar Electronics and in their ,

opinion, Wilmar Electronics did not have an adequate Quality Assurance (QA) program for Nuclear Power Plant To resolve the concern, the licensee decided to replace the Wilmar Electronics circuit boards with Brown Boveri circuit boards. The change involves a component with inputs into the Reactor Protection System (RPS)

and Integrated Control System (ICS). . The previous relays were 16 h underpower and 16 electrical phase balance relays. The re will be 16 Brown Boveri undercurrent relays (Model ITE-37)Theplacements .

licensee contracted Babcock and Wilcox to perform an engineering study on the proposed change (Document 51-1164378-00) and it was determined that the Wilmar relays were unique to Rancho Seco. The 16 phase balance relays were determined to be redundan !

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. 9 It was also determined that the Brown Boveri relays will meet the functional requirements of the 32 W11 mar relays. The licensee changed the relays under ECN R-0889. The licensee also has submitted the proposed t Technical Specification changes (Letter JEW 86-358, dated 9/22/86). Based on the licensee's actions, this Part 21 report is close Follow-up of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)

~ LER 84-18-LO & L1 (Closed) This Licensee Event Report was the result of a June 1, 1984 trip from RCS high pressure. This condition was the result of a closure of the "B" startup and main feed block valves, which resulted from an intermittent short in 2 of 4 pressure switches in the main steam line break (MSLB) Logic. -This short was caused by Bourdon tube leaks which caused water to accumulate in the pressure switches. These

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tubes and switches have been replaced.~

LER 84-20-LO, which was closed in report 50-312/86-61 and designated to be followed-up under LER 84-18-10, identified that the MSLB Logic had been inhibited during a July 3, 1984 transient because these pressure switch setpoints had drifted high (above 500'psig) which caused the ICS to control and demand high feed flow. These switches have been recalibrate This LER 84-18-L0 and L1 is close LER 86-12-LO (Closed) This LER identified that, while the plant was in cold shutdown, two snubbers were removed from the c'perating train of the decay heat removal system. This item was addressed in inspection report 50-312/86-21. This LER number was also previously identified in inspection report 50-312/86-33 in error as 86-12-0 and should have read 86-13-L0 in report 86-3 (Closed) LER 83-07-L1, " Replacement of Wilmar Electronic Relays" The original of this LER and LER 83-17 concern problems with WITmar Electronic relays. Revisions to this LER and LER 83-17 were both l included in revision 1 to LER 83-17. The original to this LER was closed out in inspection report 50-312/86-17. Revision 1 to the LER was closed out in inspection report 51-312/86-42. Based on the minimal changes to the LER and the changeout to Brown Boveri relays noted in_the closure of 10CFR Part 21 report 86-22P, this LER is close . Follow-up of IAE Bulletins (IEB's), Informatien Notices and Temporary Instructions IN 86-73 (Closed) This Information Notice identifies vibration induced fuel line wear and a deficiency in the design of the field flash circuitry. These issues were reviewed by the licensee and determined not to be applicable to the GM or TDI diesel generators (Ltr. GVC 87-112 Engineering Mgr. to Licensing Mgr., 1-21-1987). This item is close , - . - .._ . .

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IEB 86-03,(Closed) This Bu11etinladdressed a design deficiency found in the

} minimum flow recirculation paths-for ECCS pumps-at Westinghouse-designed ,

i reactors. Similar design deficiencies could exist .in other systems and at b other typesfof. reactors. This. deficiency has both' recirculation lines discharging to a common header, then to a single line with 2 valves in series. Thus, with one valve-failin

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path for both Safety Injection (SI) pumps g,(single failure),

would.be lost. Ifthe the minimum pump flow i operates with no flow, the pump will' overheat,.and cause damage to the 1 pump. In,a Sma11' Break Loss.0f Coolant Accident (SBLOCA), the Reactor

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' Coolant System (RCS) pressure decreases slowl This could cause both

!- . pumps- t o opera t e_ without flow into the RCS until the RCS; pressure decayed t

'below the SI pump shutoff head. This could result in pump damage and -

l -failure within minute ,

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i - This-bulletin requires the licensea.to evaluate for this specific type of l single failure ' vulnerability and' report to the NRC within 30 days. If

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the licensee has this design. deficiency. they must provide.short term and long term corrective actions to mitigate this deficiency and report on

. their actions to the comissio ,

I The response of the licensee was timely and acceptable In the licensee l response to IEB 86-03 (JEW 86-809, Ward to Martin, (dated November 7, . _

1986), the. licensee stated that neither their Decay Heat System-(DHS) nor ,

their High Pressure Injection (HPI) system were vulnerabl_e to the single '

failure or sir.ilar problems described in the bulleti The inspector determined, by a review of the licensee's response, that the DHS pumps are provided with a locked open' recirculation line from the- .

discharge _of the DHS cooler to the suction of the pump. The lines do not j discharge into a common header (P&ID M-522, sheet 1). There are separate j lines from the sump and from the' Borated Water-Storage Tank (BWST), which

! assure separate suction for the pumps. The HPI pumps are not vulnerable-

! to single failure from this mechanism. They also have separate, locked i open lines from the BWST. The recirculation of the HPI pumps is directed to the Makeup Tank. The recirculation valves will close on'the Safety features Actuation System signal, which also opens the HPI pump discharge headers into the reactor. The design operating pressure for the_~ reactor .

l is 2150 psig. The shutoff head of the HPI pumps ~is 2900 psig and the

!- pressurizer code safety setpoint is 2500 psig. . The design setpoint of the HPI pumps ~(USAR, chapter 6) is at 2500 psig. At the design setpoint, the

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l pumps will lift the code safeties,' discharging into the relief tank.

] Therefore, no single failure could prevent the HPI_ pumps from ru'nning deadheaded against RCS pressure. This~ Bulletin is close ' ,

} TI-15-71 (open)' Reactor Pressure Boundary Threaded Fastener Inspection ,

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This inspection is due to an MRC Temporary Instruction (TI-15-71),j j which is a special followup'to IEB 82-02. Bulletin-82-02 concerns'the ' failure of-connections in the Reactor Coolant' f Pressure Boundary (RCPB)

4 due to chemical corrosion of metal fasteners by . lubricants

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and/or j sealant ,

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y This Bulletin was closed for Rancho Seco in previous inspection: report 50-312/84-07. The requirements for this additional-inspection for- -

Rancho Seco were to take a sample of component connections in the Reactor'

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Coalant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) and evaluate if the lubricant in use was 1 specified by the equipment manufacturer. . Also to be determined wasl1f-

. maintenance procedures specify torque values and/or if the bolt tensioning i procedures were consistent with manufacturer recommendations. The second *

. part of the inspection was to evaluate the purchasing procedures for these ,

compounds from a QA standpoint. Emphasis was~to be on the components-i examined in the RCPB.and the review of the certifications for chemical

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contaminant ,

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!' The' bulletin identified that failure mode of these. fasteners is stress -

l corrosioncracking(SCC). This is of particular concern on high.-

strength, low alloy steels, and also austenitic and martensitic steels.

This failure mode is enhanced with compounds containing significant

amounts of halogens or. sulfur. Therefore, the control,of. compounds

! containing these elements is. vital for these and other. stainless steels.

i The licensee determined that the two compounds that this coul_d apply to'

4 for Rancho Seco in the RCPB would be Furmanite (with varying amounts of j- halogens) and Molycote G (essentially MoS2 )*

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In this inspection, the inspector reviewed the:11censee's documentation a but standards for the chemistry of lubricants .in the RCS'were not found.

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The site lubrication Manual (M.102) does not specify the chemistry. The i cleanliness specification for the RCS was found in Babcock and Wilcox

{ (B&W) Technical Document 10-1395-04, " Cleanness of B&W Manufactured - i

{ Nuclear Equipment & Components". This specification appeared to-take ,

! precedence over the lubrication ' specification. This* document specified l that com l

million) pounds of sulfur,orchloride materials shall havelless or fluoride'when .in contactthan-250 ppm with' (parts.pe stainless

steel or high nickel alloy In appendix D.of this. specification,

! Molycote G was not allowed to be used on-high n.ickel alloys'and,was on_1y 1- allowed to be used on external RCS surface '

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) .1 The components examined included the Once Through Steam 1 Generator (OTSG)

i manways, the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP)' bonnet, and several) valves -in the

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Reactor Coolant System (RCS). . The vendor documents for theJ0TSG manways

and the RCP bonnet specify Molycote G. These components;and, fasteners 4 are high' carbon steel, which .is not a significant concern- for SCC. The licensee procedures are consistent with the vendor recommendations of-lubrication and torquing for these two components. Also, no concerns were.

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identified with respect to torquing of valves. The procurement control

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for work on the RCP and 0TSG seemed adequate.

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! A new concern was identified with several of the valves in the RCS. Most l of the valves in the RCS are made of stainless steel. In the licensee

! response to IEB^82-02 (Mattimoe to Engelken,' dated' July 28,:1982),the

! licensee stated that Molycote G was used on several valves in the RCS.

l These valves include HV-20001,'HV-20002, DHS-015 DHS-016,-RCS-001, l RCS-002, CFS-001, and CFS-002. The' valves ~HV-20001:andHV-20002(RHR drop line) are Velan manufactured valves made of stainless steel. The

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i j Velan vendor manual does not allow the use of Molycote ,

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, The concern here is to assure that Molycote G was not used on the

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sta'nless steel fasteners for the RHR' drop line valves or the other valves

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mentioned above. .The use of the Molycote G on the fasteners could-lead to a dejradation in the RCPB. This item (50-312/87-08-02) will be fdlltwed-up in a subsequent inspection of this Temporary Instruction (TI'

15-71).

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The licensee also stated to thc inspector, that Furmanite had been used to

seal these valves. A Furmanite chemical analysis was noted in the above j letter, and specified the chloride, . fluoride. and sulfur concentrations ,

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- as 'less than the B&W cleanness specification, though the fluoride concentration was clore to the limit. . Therefore, no concern appears to exist for SCC-from Furmanit <

, Unresolved Item

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Unresolved items are matters which more information is rec,uired in order i to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviation Unresolved-items disclosed.during the inspection ar'e discussed in-paragraphs 2, and ,

l Exit Interview

i The inspector met with licensee representatives '(denoted in paragraph 1)-

l at the conclusion of the inspection on February 9, and March 6. The scope

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and findings of the inspection, which were discussed during the exits and

telephone interviews, are set forth in' paragraphs 2 through 6 of this-report. The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' findings.

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