IR 05000312/1988019

Enhanced Operational Insp Rept 50-312/88-19 on 880613-17. No Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operation & Operational Support Activities

ML20151K676
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	07/13/1988
From:	Crews J, Andrea Johnson, Kosloff D, Lois L, Miller L, Myers C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151K668	List: IR 05000312/1988019 ML20151K665
References
50-312-88-19, IEB-79-14, NUDOCS 8808030247
Download: ML20151K676 (11)

Text

,

.

. .

,.

.

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-312/88-19 Docket No. 50-312 Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District P.O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1 Inspection _at: Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)

Inspection Conducta -

_-J 'l 17, 988 Inspectors: . b -b'

M Crews F 4eactor Engineer Date Signed dTa e der

.

A 7 Johns 'n E for ment Officer, Region V D' ate Signed 4.D%s *ers,

. 7-is-h Date Signed CU djtInspector,RanchoSeco

'l %

Inspector, Davis-Besse 7-IP 2Y Q/ . Koslo f Resi e Date Signed nf l$ $

tylois,ReactoMys~temsEngineer,NRR Date Signed Accompanying Personnel: B. F. Gore, Consultant Batt 1 Paci i orthwest Laboratories Approved by: / _

/.Y'

il,/F. Miller,(f41ef, Reactor ProjectsSection II Date Signed M. mary:

p spection on June 13-17, '.988 (Report 50-312/88-19)

Areas Inspected: This was a special Enhanced Operational Inspection, Phase II, during power ascension test *ng, at the 40 percent power plateau, following an extended period of plant shutdow The inspection was conducted by Regional and Resident Inspectors from Region V and Region III, a Reactor

'

Systems Engineer from NRC Headquarters, and a consultant from the Battelle-Pacific Northwest Laboratories, and included the areas of plant

~

8808030247 880713 PDR ADOCK 05000312 O PNU -,

. . - . . - . ., , .. - . - .

? ,

.

-

.

.

operation and operational support activitie During the. inspection, Inspection Procedure 71715 was use Results: No violations with NRC requirements were identified within the areas examine Strengths were observed in the knowledge and performance of plant operators; a generally strong discipline in adherence to written procedures by essentially all plant personnel; and the coordination between operations, maintenance, QC, and test personnel during the conduct of trouble shooting and

"fine tuning" of plant control systems. A weakness was observed in computerized scheduling of the calibration of plant, instrumentation.

_

- w -g - - W-- w - = . - - se.g- --+-w,-y -- - g, ay -

e

.

'

.

.

i

'

DETAILS Persons Contacted G. C. Andognini,. Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear J. F. Firlit, Assistant General Manager, Nuclear Power Production

• R. Croley, Assistant General Manager, Technical and Administrative Services

• 0. Keuter, Director, Nuclear. Operations and Maintenance

• D. Brock, Manager, Nuclear Maintenance

• W. Kemper, Manager, Nuclear Operations S. L-. Crunk, Manager, Nuclear Licensing

• J.' Shetler, Director, Plant Support

• V. Cranston, Manager, Nuclear Engineering D. Compton, Licensing Engineer J. Walkin, Lead Design Engineer

• Q. L. Coleman, Quality Engineering Sugarvisor R. McAndrew, Plant Performance Engineer Other licensee and licensee contractor employees were contacted including plant operators, technicians, engineers and supervisory personne * Attended the exit meeting on June 17, 1988. Scope and Purpose of Inspection This inspection was a part of Phase II of the NRC's Enhanced Operational Inspection (E01) to evaluate the overall performance of the plant operating crews and those organizations which support operations. Phase I of HRC's E0I involved 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> coverage by an NRC inspection team for a period of approximately three weeks commencing prior to plant startup, through low power testing and the start of the power ascension program to the 25% power plateau. (See Inspection Report 50-312/88-10).

The current inspection (Phase II) involved approximately five days by an NRC inspection team, including three days of 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> coverage at the 40%

power level platea . Performance of the Operrting Crews The overall performance of the plant operators was assessed through direct observations of activit'es involving licensed operators in the control room and non-licensed operators in areas outside the control roo The inspection team observed continuing evidence of operations being in control and command of plant activitie Pre-shift briefings and shift turnover were observed to be thoroug The plant operators demonstrated, as in Phase I, an overall strong discipline in terms of adherence to procedure An exception in this

.

.

.

regard was observed during the conduct of a surveillance test, and is discussed in paragraph 5. of this repor In essentially all instances observed by the NRC inspectors plant operators appeared to perform work tasks with appropriate attention to detai An example of continuing need for improvement in this area, as well'as pre-task briefings, occurred when non-licensed operators were restoring a portion of the starting air system of an emergency diesel generator (TDI-A2) to servic This task involved use of the

' system operating procedure for proper system alignment, while at the same time removing a work clearance (electrical tag-outs) which had been hung

-

on the system to allow prior work to be performe During the conduct of the task an air compressor in the system started unexpectedl Although no particular safety significance was associated with this event, the NRC inspection team examined circumstances associated with the event in detail, including discussions with the plant operators and supervision involved. These discussions revealed that a pre-task briefing had been held between the Assistant Shift Supervisor and the operator In accordance with the plant administrative procedures, the Assistant Shift Supervisor directed (by use of a hand written listing)

the sequence in which clearance tags were to be removed. He verbally discussed the need to coordinate removal of the clearance tags with steps in the system operating procedure. The Assistant Shift Superviscr stated to the NRC inspectors that he felt the plant operators had a complete understanding of the task to be performed following the pre-task briefin While performing the task, however, the plant operators removed a clearance tag and closed the electrical breaker to the system's air compressor, prior to completing a step in the system operating procedure which required that the local awitch for the compressor be verified to be in the "off" position. When the air compressor was observed to start at this point unexpectedly, the plant operators promptly shut the compressor down, discontinued the work task, and notified the control roo The circumstances in this instance demonstrated a need for more thorough pre-task briefings as well as increased attention to detail on the part of plant operator . Work Planning / Work Control As in Phase I, this area was evaluated by the NRC team with particular attention to maintenance and testing activitie The NRC inspectors observed good cooperation and coordination between operations, maintenance, QC, and test personnel in the conduct of trouble shooting and testing activities. Extensive attention was given to the activities involving fine tuning of the plant's integrated control and (

! main feedwater system The NRC team concluded that these activities, which were in progress throughout the entire period of the current inspection, were conducted in a controlled and systematic manne In general, work planning in terms of the accuracy and completeness of work packages was improved over that observed during Phase I. An

,

_ ___ _ ________

.

.

.

regard was observed during the conduct of a surveillance test, and is discussed in paragraph 5. of this repor In essentially all instances observed by the NRC inspectors plant operators appeared to perform work tasks with appropriate attention to detai An example of continuing need for improvement in this area, as-well as pre-task briefings, occurred when non-licensed operators were

, restoring a portion of the starting air system of an emergency diesel generatnr (TDI-A2) to servic This task involved use of the system operating procedure for proper system alignment, while at the same time . removing a work clearance (electrical tag-outs) which had been hung on the system to allow prior work to be performe During the conduct of the task an air compressor in the system started unexpectedl Although no particular safety significance was associated with this event, the NRC inspection team examined circumstances associated with the event in detail, including discussions with the plant operators and supervision' involved. These discussions revealed that a pre-task briefing had been held between the Assistant Shift Supervisor and the

"

operator In accordance with the plant administrative procedures, the Assistant Shift Supervisor directed (by use of a hand written listing)

the sequence in which clearance tags were to be removed. He verbally discussed the need to coordinate removal of the clearance tags with steps in the system operating procedure. The Assistant Shift Supervisor stated to the NRC inspectors that he felt the plant operators had a complete understanding of the task to be performed following the pre-task briefin While performing the task, however, the plant operators removed a clearance tag and closed the electrical breaker to the system's air compressor, prior to completing a step in the system operating procedure which required that the local switch for the compressor be verified to be in the "off" position. When the air compressor was observed to start at this point unexpectedly, the plant operators promptly shut the compressor down, discontinued the work task, and notified the control roo The circumstances in this instance demonstrated a need for more thorough pre-task briefings as well as increased attention to detail on the part of plant operator . Work Planning / Work Control As in Phase I, this area was evaluated by the NRC team with particular attention to maintenance and testing activitie The NRC inspectors observed good cooperation and coordination between operations, maintenance, QC, and test personnel in the conduct of trouble shooting and testing activitie E> tensive attention was given to the activities involving fine tuning of '.he plant's integrated control and main feedwater systems. The NRC tean concluded that these activities, which were in progress throughout the entire period of the current inspection, were conducted in a controlled and systematic manne In general, work planning in terms of the accuracy and completeness of work packages was improved over that observed during Phase I. An

-_

.

. 3 instance was observed, however, where unusual circumstances associated with a work task led to an error in applying the proper torque value to a bolted connector on an emergency diesel generator support bracket. The error was recognized by the maintenance technician involved, and the condition was corrected by removal and replacement of the overtorqued bol The task in this case called for the maintenance. technician to back off on a previously torqued connection, observe'any cold spring associated

-

with the connection, insert necessary shims to reduce the cold spring, and retorque the bolt. The bolt in this instance was installed in a

"blind hole" ma;:ing visual examination of the threaded bolt section impossible without removal of the bol Upon backing off.of the installed bolt no cold spring was observe Therefore, rather than removing the bolt for the installation of a shim, the bolt needed only to be re-torqued to the proper value. The error occurred when the maintenance technician, together with a QC inspector who was present, erroneously determined the torque value to be applied. The procedute required the torque valve to be determined using tables-provided by the vendor. While making this determination a table was entered using the bold head size, measured by the maintenance technicia This dimension was "called out" by the maintenance technician, and not direct verified by the QC inspector. Due to an apparent mental lapse, the bolt head dimension was used as the threader bold diameter, leading to a torque valve of 180 foot-pounds vs a correct valve of 30 foot-pounds. An additional unusual circumstance in this case was the finding that the bolt in question was a nonstandard, large head bolt for which the vendor table used was not applicable. Using the table

'"properly" in this instance would have resulted in an inappropriately

-

high torque valve for the bol The NRC inspectors concluded that the circumstance of this task were unusual and non-typical. In essentially all tasks involving bolting on the diesel-generator supports, new higher strength bolts are being replaced or installed where the actual bolt diameter can be used directly in determining the proper torque valve. It was observed, however, that walking down of work packages during the work planning phase should reveal unusual circumstances such as existed in this instance, and lead to the inclusion of precautions and/or special work instructions for such unusual circumstance In conclusion, the NRC team observed that work planning has improved since Phase I, although needs for continuing improvement exis . Procedure Adequacy and Adherence The NRC inspection team observed, as during Phase I, a continuing strong discipline on the part of essentially all plant personnel toward adherence to written procedure Whereas during Phase I, the NRC inspection team observed numerous interim and/or temporary changes to plant procedures, this condition was much i

'

less evident during the current inspection. This observation suggests J

. . -

,

4~

.

that the actions taken by the licensee to incorporate temporary changes into permanent revisions to plant procedures have.had positive result The NRC team did observe an instance during the conduct of a monthly surveillance test on the Nuclear Service Electrical Building (NSEB)

Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system which raised a question regarding strict adherence to written procedures. In this instance the Shift Supervisor authorized continuation of the test when a prerequisite step in the procedure was indicated as "... not satisfied as it is presently worded." The prerequisite step requires that calibration data on selected system instrumentation be recorded, and that it be within the current calibration perio In fact, the due dates for four instruments were two days overdue for annual calibration. The Shift Supervisor indicated that he thought there was a 25% tolerance applicable to the schedule for instrumentation calibration, similar to the tolerance applicable to the schedule for the conduct of surveillance test Upon pursuing this question it was determined that no such tolerance does exist regarding calibration schedule Licensee management's review of the completed test procedure for this-test resulted in a determination that the test had not been properly conducted, and the test was required to be repeated, after the instrumentation in question had been calibrate The licensee initiated several actions in response to concerns expressed by the NRC inspectors regarding the action by the Shift Supervisor described above. These actions included instructions to be provided to all Shift Supervisors to not bypass prerequisite steps for surveillance tests unless justified by plant conditions solel This is intended to clarify guidelines in the plant administrative procedures (AP-23, in particular) which allow performing procedures prior to meeting all initial condition In addition, a practice is to be initiated whereby all plant instrumentation utilized to record data in surveillance procedures will be calibrated prior to performance of the procedur Consideration is also to be given to including a grace or tolerance period in determining the calibration interval for plant instrumentatio The NRC inspectors expressed particular concern to licensee management that the action authorized by the Shift Supervisor set a poor example for other plant personnel in terms of management's expectations of strict adherence to procedures by all plant personne . Control of Plant Instrumentation Calibrations During a walkdown of the B-2 emergency diesel generator room an NRC inspector observed ten instruments with calibration stickers affixed to them showing calibration due dates which were overdue. This observation was brought to the attention of licensoe management for investigation and explanatio After a rather substantial effort by the Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) department it was determined that none of the instruments were actually overdue for calibratio This conclusion was based upon a review of the individual calibration data sheets for the instruments in l

-_-_-..- J'q

,

'

question. -The records showed that the' calibration interval for the instruments had initially been established,.on an arbitrary and-conservative basis according to licensee-representatives, at 12 month This calibration interval was input into the NUCLEIS computer software program utilized to produce the calibration schedule. Subsequently, in January 1988, the calibration interval for the instruments was revised to 18 months. However, this change was not revised as input into the NUCLEIS software-program. This appears to be'a potentially generic problem for several instruments . associated with the TDI Emergency Diesel Generator An additional discrepancy was identified in reviewing the input provided into the NUCLEIS software program which could introduce nonconservative due dates for instrumentation calibration. This discrepancy involved the date input into the NUCLEIS program to initiate the next calibration due date. The practice followed by the licensee has been to use the date the last instrument in a group of instruments covered by a given work request was calibrated, even though several days may elapse between initiation and completion of calibrations of several instruments in a given grou Licensee management acknowledged that a significant effort was necessary to identify ano correct software discrepancies in the NUCLEIS computer program to provide an acceptable level of confidence in the computer generated schedules for instrumentation calibrations. They indicated that an Action Plan is to be developed to scope and implement this tas . Evaluation of Technical Work Two areas were selected to evaluate the capability and quality of technical work by the license One area involved the technical basis, including calculations to support the sizing, of the backup control air bottle banks for the TDI Emergency Diesel Generators (EDS). A review of NRC Inspection Report N /87-29 provided the basis for NRC's concern which led to the design and installation of the backup control air bottle banks for the TDI EDG's. The resolution of this concern was documented in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-312/87-40. During the current inspection an NRC inspector reviewed the calculations which support the capacity of the bottle banks for each EDG. The calculations (three in total) were reviewed to (a)

determine that reasonable and conservative assumptions were used, (b)

technically adequate and reasonable methods were followed, and (c) assure numerical correctness of the calculations. The inspector found the calculations to be conservative, accurate, and acceptable. Specifically, the calculations justify the minimum of 7 days capacity of control air in the bottle banks specified by plant operations at 2150 psig in one (6 bottle) bank or two bottle banks at 1100 psig per EDG. The calculations also demonstrated that under worse case conditions (five attempted starts per each normal air received tank, and without makeup air compressors available) the plant operators have at least 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> to valve the backup bottle banks into servic The inspectors also discussed with responsible Licensee personnel the difference between the actual and predicted criticality in terms of reactivity during the current (Cycle 7) operating cycle. The observed

,.my. w..r -e..--- y . . . + + - +p ,----3 --ve ,-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

. -

.

-

.

reactivity differences at initial criticality for Cycle 7 and two subsequent startups were approximately -0.24, -0.36 and -0.40% AK/K, respectivel These differences from predicted criticality are well within the technical specification limit of 1.0% AK/K and the licensee established limit requiring investigation (0.8% AK/K). Discussions with licensee representatives revealed that they are highly dependent upon the NSSS contractor for core reload analysis and calculation It was established, however, that apparently effective communications between licensee representatives and their counterpart representatives within the NSSS contractor's organization do exis No inconsistencies between the licensee's practice and NRC requirements were identified in this are Discussions with licensee representatives revealed that the actual effective full power days (EFPD) achieved during Cycle 6 was 345.7 EFPD compared to a predicted value of 345 EFPD by the NSSS contracto . Housekeeping and Material Conditions Frequent tours of the plant by the NRC inspection team revealed generally good housekeeping condition Several questionable material conditions observed during plant tours-were brought to the licensee's attention for explanation and/or actio Items in this category are discussed below, with their status at the conclusion of the inspection indicate A) Water Was Observed to be in Valve Pit NRW-041 - This is a repeat item from Phase I. A Potential Deviation from Quality (PDQ) was initiated covering the conditio The valve pit was pumped down and valves (NRW-41 and 42) were cycled to ensure free operatio Inspection of valve NRW-41 revealed evidence the valve had been repaired previously by use of furmanite, and current flange leakage was observed to be "minimal". This and similar valve pits are to be added to the operator round sheets to inspect the valve pits on a routine basis. A memorandum, dated June 14, 1988, was sent to all Shift Supervisors informing them that valve pits containing water are to be pumped down prior to inspection of valves within the valve pi This item was resolve B) Observation of Boron Crystals on a Tubing Connector in HPI/ Makeup Pump Room Facility records showed that this condition had been previously identified by the license A photograph had been taken of the condition and a Work Request (WR 01460280-0) had been initiated to evaluate and repair the conditio It was observed that the WR included a requirement to check all carbon steel potentially contaminated with boron for eviden e of corrosion or pitting, and contact maintenance or system engineering for evaluation and resolutio This item was resolve fi1L

l

- 7

-

<

t I-C) A Yellow Tag was Observed on an Air Start check valve in the

'TDI - 82 Room - The tag, dated December 26, 1985, indicated that the check valve was "... released for construction only." Discussion with licensee representatives revealed that a nonconformance report associated with this tag had been previously resolved, without the tag being removed. The tag was removed and the licensee is to continue to be alert during plant walkdowns for similar out-of-date l tag This item was resolve D) A Manual' Outside Air Damper in the TDI - B2 Room May have Improper Position Indication - Licensee representatives provided evidence of proper position indication on the dampe This item was resolve E) Three Electrical Junction Boxes in the Auxiliary Feedwater Area were Observed to have several (more than half) the Screws Missing on their Cover All screws were replaced during the course of the inspectio None of the junction boxes were on the EQ lis This item was resolve F) Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps P-318 and P-319 were Observed to have Water Leakage from Inboard and Outboard Shaft Seals Licensee representatives stated that the extent of leakage, ranging from 70-130 drops per minute on pump P-318 to a small steady stream on pump P-319, was considered acceptable when the pumps were not runnin This item was resolve G) Two Pipe Supports on Auxiliary Feedwater Piping were observed to have Gaps between Holddown Nuts and Base Plate Washer Nuclear Engineering Department representations stated that these conditions, including evidence of corrosion on a shim associated with one baseplate, were in accordance with design, which is intended to provide for horizontal' movement of the supports. They further stated that these conditions were verified during system walkdowns in accordance with NRC Bulletin 79-1 This item was resolve <

,, . , , , . . .

.. . - _ _ .

, , , . . . ,

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.

e . 8

.

t H) Plugs were Observed to be Removed from the Bottom of the Electrica1 Covers on two Limitorque Valve Operators

_

in the Auxiliary Feedwater System Licensee representatives stated that the plugs are required to be removed to maintain conditions consistent with the environmental qualification (EQ) of the valve This item was resolve I) The Cover for the Temperature Sensing Instrument (TE-31802)

on Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-318 Outboard Bearing was Observed to be Removed The cover, which was laying nearby, was replaced by a licensee representativ This item was resolve J) Water Leakage of Approximately Four Drops per Minute was Observed in the Vicinity of the Steam Trip / Throttle Valve for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-318 The licensee committed to investigate the source of this leakage, which will require the removal of insulation from the valve and/or associated pipin This item remains ope K) A Small Amount of Steam was Observed Leaking Through the Turbine for Auxiliary Feedwater Pump P-31 Licensee representatives committed to evaluate this' cor.dition, including discussion with personnel at the Davis-Besse plant where similar conditions may have led to difficulties in the operation of the turbine governor valv This item remains ope L) Apparent Spacers were Observed in the Piping Associated with Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps P-318 and P-319,and Do Not Appear on the Isometric Drawing for the System Representatives of the Nuclear Engineering Department verified that the spacers had been installed to replace startup strainers in the piping system. Although the location of startup strainers are not normally shown on piping drawings, the spacers are to be added to

,

the piping isometric drawings, according to a representative of the t

Nuclear Engineering Department.

l l This item was resolved.

\ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

..

'

. -

,.

4 o

. 9

.

,

, Membership of Plant Rev'iew Committee (PRC)

Facility records indicated tnat effective June 1,'1988 membership on the PRC was revised to include-the Director, Nuclear Operations and Maintenance as Chairma Other members of the Committee include managers of the departments of Operations, Maintenance, Radiation Protection and Plant Performanc Also included as members are supervisors of the Incident Analysis Group and Quality Engineerin '

fD11s action by the licensee resolves a concern identified by the Enhanced Operational Inspection Team during Phase I (see Inspection Report 50-312/88-10, paragraph 6.)

1 Exit Meeting The findings of_the inspection were discussed with those licensee representatives indicated in paragraph 1. on June 17, 1988.