IR 05000312/1987027

Insp Rept 50-312/87-27 on 871102-06.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness Exercise, Associated Critique & Followup Items

ML20234C063
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	12/21/1987
From:	Fish R, Good G, Norderhaug L, Perotti D, Prendergast K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20234C043	List: IR 05000312/1987027 ML20234C040
References
50-312-87-27, NUDOCS 8801060091
Download: ML20234C063 (8)

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,-

REGION V

r Report No.' 50-312/87-27 Docket No. 50-312 License No. DPR-54 Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District

'P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name: Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Inspection at: Clay Station, California-Inspection Conducted: November 2-6, 1987 Inspectors: hkb,.__ .=. m _ hMm Kent _M.-Prender"gast Date S gned E gency P paredness Analys G

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Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Analyst

1. Mukw D. Perotti Emer y Preparedness An lyst ni Date'eSi ned L

. Norderhaug

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=x /A//fr/fr1 ~ l Date Signe'd Approved By:

R. Fish, ChTef

/Rb/O Date' Signe'd

Emergency Preparedness Section l

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Summarv: '

Jnsoection on NovgmbMQJ,237 (ReagttJo, 50-31U87-27)

Arnas Inspected:

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Unannounced inspection of the licensee's emergency preparedness exercise, associated critique, and followup on open item l Inspection procedures 82301 and 92701 were covere !

gegylty,: No violations of NRC requirements were identifie l

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7 8801060091 871221 PDR ADOCK 05000312 0 DCD

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DETAILS I Persons Contacted l l

l D. Martin, Manager, Environmental Protection l J. Price, Emergency Preparedness Specialist l S. Manofsky, Chemistry Supervisor j R. Croley, Director, Technical Services '

J. Delezenski, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing i 1 Action on Previous Inspection Findings (CLOSED) Open Item No. 86-32-0 Corrective actions.on assembly and accountabilit Corrective actions have been completed by the license Four card readers are currently installed in each Operational Support Center (OSC), the Training and Records Building and Warehouse Implementing Procedure EPIP-5310 was revised to streamline the assembly card-in process, to further define accountability responsibilities, and to clarify instructions in the accountability procedur During the exercise held on November 4, 1987, a complete assembly and accountability was performed. There were about 440 individuals involved in the assembly and response as emergency response personnel. Overall, it took about 48-minutes to complete the accountability. The printout of onsite personnel was delivered from Security to the OSC Coordinator at 0914 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.47777e-4 months <br />, about 33 minutes after the initiation of the accountabilit However, the next 15 minutes were spent trying to identify personnel who had previously been exempted from responding to exercise evolutions (e.g. , early dismissal) because of the priority nature of their wor According to the licensee, the exemption list had been changed a few times recently, l with the latest change the day of the exercise. The Security personnel in the OSC who were to identify the missing personnel from the printout apparently were not aware of the last-minute change to the exempt lis Based on the above, this item is considered closed. The matter of the administrative problem regarding late changes to the exempt list was discussed with the licensee at the exit meeting. This item is close (0 pen) Open Item 86-32-06. Inadequate Training of Dose Assessment Personnel During the 1986 Exercise. An examination of the licensee's dose assessment program was performed and the following information was obtained. Discussions with the licensee's dose assessment personnel indicate that all of the dose assessment procedures have been rewritten and reviewed. New methods and procedures have been written for control room (CR) dose assessment and the manual procedures for the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) have been revised. The primary dose assessment method for both the TSC and EOF is now MIDA Modifications to the program are essentially complet A new computerized backup dose assessment method has been created for the TSC and EOF. The program is called FASTCALC and is a menu driven, user friendly program that runs on an IBM PC. The program uses X/Q values from MEAS and a simplified calculational algorithm. The program is designed to be easily modified and new calculational modules can be added as needed. The program is intended not only as a backup calculational

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method but as a' flexible tool. capable of performing assessment calculations that MIDAS is not designed to handle. Following the

. November annual exercise, an extensive validation and verification of all dose assessment methods is to begin. At'this point almost all dose I assessment methodology development has been completed and the licensee expressed hope that by early 1988 (March) the entire dose assessment program would be ready to enter a' routine maintenance phase, i It was also noted that dose assessment training is conducted by the Emergency Preparedness Departmen The. program is governed by a new

. procedure EPIP-5600, " Training". Data base software is being developed onsite to maintain training records and assist with schedulin Dose assessment training is described in lesson modules EP 4, " Control Room Dose Assessment," and EP 5, "TSC/ EOF Dose Assessment". The lesson module (plan) EP 5 was approved on 8/27/87, while EP 4 is in draft form and has not yet been approved. Discussions indicate that training on EP 5 has been completed and some training for onshift CR dose assessment has been conducte This area will be examined again during the next routine ,

emergency preparedness inspectio J Exercise Planning The licensee's Emergency Preparedness (EP) staff has the overall responsibility for developing, conducting and evaluating the annual emergency preparedness exercise. The EP staff developed the scenario package with the assistance of licensee staff possessing appropriate expertise (e.g., reactor operations, health physics, maintenance, etc.)

Individuals who were involved in the scenario preparation were not !

The EP staff established the exercise

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participants in the exercis objectives with the assistance of participating offsite agencies. The NRC Regional EP staff, who were evaluating the exercise, ware also .

provided an opportunity to comment on the exercise objectives and scenario. The exercise document was tightly controlled before the exercise. This exercise was intended to meet the requirements of IV. of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 5 . Exercise Scenario The exercise scenario started with an event classified as an unusual event and ultimately escalated to a general emergency classification. The following events were included in the scenari j Classification Event Unusual Event High coolant activity Alert Security Compromise Site Area Emergency Fire defeating a redundant safety system function General Emergency Loss of two fission product barriers with a threat to the third

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5. Federal Evaluators i

Five NRC inspectors evaluated the licensee's responses during the  !

exercise. Inspectors were stationed in the CR, TSC, OSC, Security Central Alarm Center (CAS) and in the E0F. The NRC inspectors in the CR and the CAS also accompanied response and monitoring teams to evaluate j their performanc ;

I 6. Control Room The following aspects of CR' operations were observed during the exercise:

detection and classification of emergency events, notification, use of emergency procedures, and innovative attempts to mitigate the acciden The following NRC observations of the CR activities, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the progra (a) The CR staff was well managed by the Shift Supervisor (SS). The classification and associated notifications from the CR appeared timely and accurate. The CR staff did a good job responding to the unusual challenges presented by the scenario and in their efforts to mitigate the acciden (b) The transfer of the responsibilities from the CR to the TSC went smoothl (c) The dispatch time for the fire brigade from the CR was a little slo The team could have been in the process of donning their gear in preparation for departure, while the location and extent of the fire were being determine . Technical Support Center The following aspects of TSC operations were observed: activation, accident assessment / classification, dose assessment, notification, and support of the C The following NRC observations of the TSC activities, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving the progra The open item is of sufficient importance to warrant further NRC examinatio (a) The TSC staff operated as a team and were well managed. The individual functional areas kept the Site Emergency Coordinator I (SEC) well informed on the status in their respective areas. A positive aggressive attitude was demonstrated by players toward their dutie (b) Excellent attention and detail was devoted to personnel safety throughout the exercise (c) Checklists were completed and logs were maintaine (d) Appropriate and timely classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendations (PARS) were observed during the exercise, except for the official offsite notification for the General Emergency, which was a little slow (20 minutes). However,

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' state and local agencies were apprised of the classification and associated PARS during an official briefing in the EOF at 12:37 pm

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(within 15 minutes). As a recommendation for improvement, the l licensee may want to examine this subject and determine if the l 1 implementation of PARS may be expedited having the official notification, including-PARS, come from the EOF, when the EOF is fully' manned and operational. This action would also remove this burden from the Emergency Coordinator (EC) in the TSC and allow the TSC staff to focus more attention onl mitigating the acciden l (e) The frisking station at the entrance to the TSC was poorly set up at the beginning of the exercise. The set up.was later changed to a j more' useable configuratio Radiation Protection should examine :

this station, establish the most effective method for setting up

, this station-and assure its implementation.

t (f) The use.of a contingency message to' initiate the declaration of a site area'was-necessary to keep the exercise on track. The licensee may want to examine.their_ exercise responses and related procedures to. determine if the TSC crew should have declared a site area emergency at an earlier point in.the exercise.- This will be i followed as'0 pen Item 87-27-0 l l

(g) Two observations were noted.regarding the interim data acquisition system (IDADS) data and status-board I There were a few instances where individuals were observed to use data shown on IDADs that would have been incorrect due to ;

the location of the sensor or the condition of the system in- !

which the sensor was-located. The beron concentration shown in IDADs provided the EC's staff with data on the shut'down margin and was' accepted as valid. However, during this scenario and !

possibly during a real problem, the sensor, which is located in the let down line, would probably be isolated from the reactor coolant system. Consequently, the sensor =would still present data to IDADs, but the data would be incorrec . When the IDADs was declared inoperable due to invalidation of the data, the status boards showing operational data were not '

well maintaine . Operations Support Center The following aspects of OSC operations were observed: activation of the

~ facility, functional capabilities, and the disposition of various

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in plant / monitoring team The following NRC observations of the OSC l activities, as appropriate, are intended to be suggestions for improving

.the program.

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(a) The OSC was activated and operational in approximately 15 minute l

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(b) The licensee's OSC functioned well to provide a place to assemble, organize, and dispense teams into to the plant to mitigate the accident. However, the licensee might want to examine the operation

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of the OSC and determine if some improvements in the layout, use of status boards, coordination, and management of the the OSC may effect a smoother and more efficient utilization of resource (c) No prioritization of tasks was apparent. Teams appeared to be dispatched as jobs arose. A posting of prioritized jobs - to be updated as conditions changed or as jobs were completed - might be helpfu !

(d) A few personnel were observed using poor techniques for conducting I contamination surveys. Some wipes were put directly on the probe and some personnel placed the frisker probe in direct contact with their clothing while performing their survey. Both procedures lead

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l to the possibility of spreading contamination and/or contaminating the probe. In addition, poor contamination control of the used air sample media was exhibited by the stack sample team because of the 3

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l lack of tweezers. Also, a clean replacement air filter was damaged '

while installing it in the sample holder. The observation did not -l identify whether this was a drill problem or a training proble (e) Security, or whoever makes the announcement in the OSC, shoul inform personnel to use all four card readers. This may improve the time frame for accountabilit . Emergency Operations Facility The following EOF operaticos were observed: Activation of the facility, functional capabilities, accident assessment, notification, and the interface with offsite official The following NRC observations of E0F i activities,'as appropriate, are suggestions for improving the progra (a) There was an excellent interface between the Emergency Manager and State, local, and federal agencie (b) The EOF did a good job making arrangements to bring in two diesel  !

generators in support of the TS ]

(c) The information flow within the EOF could be improved. The layout of the EOF is comprised of numerous individual functional areas ( UDAC, Engineering, offsite agencies, NRC, plant technical information, etc.,) each with their own sources of informatio It appears that the information collected in each area is not expeditiously disseminated to the other areas. This resulted in the EM expending a large portion of his time gathering data, rather than managing licensee resources or supporting the TS . Security Operations The following aspects of Security Operations were observed: Planning, i communication, and the implementation of the Security Contingency Plan as I it related to the exercis The following NRC observations of Security operations, as appropriate, are suggestions for improving the progra The open item is of sufficient importance to warrant further NRC examinatio _ - _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . ___ . _ _ _ _ _ ____ _ __ __ __

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l, (a) _ The initial event was properly handled as a simulated credible threa (b) The Security nerve center and tactical command location was j established at the CAS where it operated effectively throughout th '

exercise. As'a suggestion'for improvement some human factoring l

regarding the location of status. boards:and the alarm consoles-should be evaluated to possibly~ improve security operation (c) Good use of radio. discipline and hard-line use in the field was i'

observed. In addition,' the use of security. tape to define areas .

l already searched expedited the. bomb searc All' planted surrogate.

l devices.were discovered and retrieved ahead of the timeline planned L in the scenari i

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l (d) Communications between the CAS and the TSC were quite difficult. A-  ;

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"ringidown" line .perhaps with a communicator, is suggested as 'a  ;

method of improving the flow of information. A similar operation ma j also be beneficial for the_ E0F to help them function more

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( effectively..as.the SMUD contact to Security support agencies. (e) Communications between in plant officers and the CAS.were hampered

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by the need to limit' local radio transmission. Consequently, delays  !

in the transfer of information and progress by the team were

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incurred while'trying to.get through to the CAS. An additional j multi-line phone might eliminate this problem.

I (f) The Security implemented elimination of mobile radio transmissions to preclude an inadvertent detonation of bomb (s) on site was inconsistent throughout the plant. The OSC and onsite NRC staff were told not to transmit, while the SS, fire brigade and onsite l monitoring teams continued to transmit message This will be tracked as Open Item 87-27-0 ,

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!. 1 Exit Interview l/ An exit : interview to discuss the preliminary NRC findings was held on November 6, 1987. The attachment to this report identifies some of the l licensee personnel who were present at this meeting. The NRC was represented by members of the observing team and Ray Fish, Chief, l Emergency Preparedness Section, Region V. The licensee was informed that

'no. violations of NRC requirements were identified during the inspectio The exit interview also addressed the findings in Section 2 and the observations described in Sections 6-10, abov '

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Exit Interview Attendees SMUD Personne G. Coward, AGM, Technical and Administrative Services R. Croley, Director, Technical Services S. Crunk, Supervisor, Region V Coordination B. Kemper, Manager, Nuclear Operations Department D. Martin, Manager, Environmental Protection P. Lavely, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness Program J. Vinquist, Director, Nuclear Quality J. Gilfor, Supervisor, Emergency Preparedness J. Price, Emergency Preparedness Specialist F. Hauck, Emergency Preparedness Advisor M. Hammons, Emergency Preparedness Specialist R. Door, Emergency Preparedness Specialist D. Finley, Emergency Preparedness Specialist G. Stansfield, Security J. Langer, Security B. Spencer, Nuclear Engineering Assistant S. Locke, Emergency Preparedness Specialist Contractor Personnel E. Carnes, Emergency Preparedness W. Knox, Emergency Preparedness J. Toresdahl, Emergency Preparedness G. Legner, NRC Liaison, Licensing l

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