IR 05000312/1987024

Insp Rept 50-312/87-24 on 870711-0911.No Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint, Surveillance,Followup Items & Listed Insp Procedures

ML20236E871
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	10/15/1987
From:	Dangelo A, Miller L, Myers C, Perez G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236E853	List: IR 05000312/1987024 ML20236E850
References
50-312-87-24, NUDOCS 8710300044
Download: ML20236E871 (10)

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, .U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY, COMMISSION-REGION V-t

. Report'No: .50-312/87-24-

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Docket No. '50-312 ,

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License No. OPR-54 Licensee! Sacramento.Mun'icipal Utility District- ,

P.'O. Box.15830 ,

Sacramento; California. 95813 Facility-Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1

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H Inspection at: Herald,JCalifornia (Rancho Seco Site)

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. J. D'A elo,.Senlogesident: Inspector .

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m , fu Off 7 b r ayers, Resident Inspecto Date Signed

" ._ he /Q-/ 7-27 G. . P Perez side'nt Inspector Date Signed

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'4 Approved By:

L.UF.. Miller, Chief, Reactor ProjectsSection II

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Date Signed

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Summary:

. Inspection between July 11, 1987 and September 11, 1987 (Report 50-312/87-24)

Areas Inspected: .This. routine inspection by the Resident Inspectors involved the areas of operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, and  !

followup items. -During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 25575,'37700, 37701, 42700, 61726, 62700, 62702, 62703, 71707, 71710, 72701, 92700,-92701',

92702,-92703, and 93702.were use Results:

.In the areas inspected, no violations were identifie ,-

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DETAIL .1L Persons ~Contac'ted G. C. Andognini, Chief' Executive Officer, Nuclear

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J. Firlit' Assistant General Manager (AGM), Nuclear Power Production-

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j J G.-Coward, Assistant General Manager (AGM), Technical ~and Administrative = Services D. Keuter, DirectoriNuclear_ Operations 'and Maintenance ,

• J. McColligan, Director, Plant Support 'c

.D.: Brock, Acting Nuclear Maintenance Manager /

• B. Croley, Director, Technical Service '

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G. Cranston,: Nuclear Engineering Manager W. Kemper,-Nuclear Operations Manager

• J. Shetler, Director, System Review and Test Program T. Tecker, Nuclear Operations' Superintendent J.-Grimes, Nuclear Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent ,

L. Focsom, Deputy Implementation Manager ',

• R. Colombo, Supervisor, Operations Support and Inspection '

J. Field, Plant Support Engineering Manager

• K. Meyer, Manager,; Nuclear Licensing L~.-Conklin, Technical Assistant, AGM S. Crunk, Technical Assistant, AGM F. Kellie, Radiation Protection Superintendent J. Vinquist,-Quality Assurance Manager R.'Cherba, Quality Engineering Supervisor D. Ross,' Security

• D. Tipton, Nuclear Operations

• Koepke, Supervisor, Quality Control

• D. Falconer, Licensing Engineer Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security and office personne * Attended the Exit Meeting on September 11, 198 . Operational Safety Verification ,

The inspectors reviewed control room operations which included access  !

control, staffing, observation of decay heat removal system alignment, and review of control room logs. Discussions with the shift supervisors and operators indicated understanding by these personnel of the reasons for annunciator indications, abnormal plant conditions and maintenance 1 work _in progres l During the period, the reactor coolant system was drained and {

depressurized with reactor core cooling provided by the decay heat I removal system (DHR). The inspectors also verified, by observation of valve and switch position indications, that DHR and the emergency power l

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. supply systems were properly aligned for the cold shutdown condition o the facilit Tours of.the auxiliary, reactor, and turbine buildings, including exterior areas, were made to assess equipment conditions and plant conditions. Also the tours were made to assess the effectiveness of

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radiological . controls and adherence to regulatory requirements. Th l inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness, looked for potential fire and safety hazards, and observed security and safeguards

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practice !

Throughout this report period..the plant remained in cold. shutdown while j the licensee continued their efforts to restart the plant. .During this period the licensee made four 10 CFR 50.72 notifications and declared one-Unusual Event. Two'of the four 10 CFR 50.72 notifications involved 'out of specification flow rates for the decay heat system coolers;'one notification was made 'due to the closure of the decay heat system suction j

, valve which interrupted flow to the decay heat system; the fourth notification involved the'inoperability of both emergency diesel ,

generators-(discussed in detail in' paragraph 7). The Unusual Event wa declared on July 29, 1987 when the only operable train of emergency power was declared out'of service due to excessive diesel jacket water coolant

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The inspector participated in a Regulatory Effectiveness Review (RER)

team in the security area which is documented in an unnumbered Inspection Report dated September 3, 198 l At various times regional management was involved in meetings with the licensee, including two on-site meetings attended by the Regional Administrator on the status of the restart program and the progress of the engineering review progra Diesel Generator Water Coolant Pump Procurement  !

On July 29, 1987, while the licensee was performing a surveillance test on the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (Bruce GM) excessive coolant leakage was discovered on the bearing of the jacket coolant water pum The licensee had available a spare pump, however, sufficient o documentation was not available to accept tag the pump for installation -

in a safety grade system. The licensee wrote a Nonconformance Report

(NCR) #6899, which allowed for a conditional release of the replacement pump into the EDG, but which prevented the declaration of operability of the EDG until the'NCR was dispositione To resolve the NCR, the licensee used their existing program for purchasing items as commercial grade, and then upgraded the item to

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safety grade status by the use of a Receipt Inspection Data Report (RIDR). The inspector's review of this process found that the RIDR lacked any inspection requirements except for inspection of visible physical damage and identification of the component's part number. The inspector discussed with the licensee's Quality Assurance (QA) Manager that the process to install the existing spare jacket coolant water pump for the "A" EDG appeared to be insufficient. This included the apparent

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lack of engineering involvement in the qualification process, including the minimal inspection of the pump prior to installation. The QA manager agreed to review the activities surrounding this wor The licensee reviewed the process and found that the. work surrounding the  !

replacement of the jacket coolant water' pump was inadequate. In addition, the licensee later identified that they did not have available documentation for the seismic qualification of the jacket coolant water pump. On August 26, 1987, the licensee notified the NRC of this situation' based.on the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7 By the end of this report period the licensee was reviewing the  ;

following: Dedication of commercial grade items program, increased inspection activities for RIDRs, engineering involvement in this event, and a root cause analysis of this event plus two other incidents that were related to failures in the work control process. .The.other two events were incidents identified by the inspector (a filter replacement s and spent fuel pool liner inspection) which were discussed in Inspection '

Report 87-13. Therefore, the inspector will followup on the licensee's '

actions ~to prevent the recurrence of this type of event. (0penItem 50-312/87-24-01)

No violations or deviations from regulatory requirements were identifie . ESF System Walkdown Decay Heat Removal During Mid-Loop Operations The inspector reviewed the licensee's reactor vessel level indication (RVLI) used to monitor the water level in the reactor vessel. The licensee monitored the RVLI to insure that an adequate water level was maintained to prevent a loss of DHR flow due to vortexing in the suction  !

line to the OHR pump The inspector determined that the licensee used a QA class 2 RVLI system {

allowing the use of three separate elements for monitoring water level: j a differential pressure transmitter, a sight glass, or a tygon tube. The i inspector discussed the operation of the RVLI with licensed operators to l determine their awareness of proper measures to prevent DHR vortexin l The inspector found all operators to be knowledgeable as to the required l use of the RVLI but some uncertainty was evident as to the actual system '

configuration. For example, some operators thought that there were three sight glasses installed rather than just one; others were unaware whether the tygon tubing was left valved in during use of the system or whether it was used only for calibration checks of the differential pressure transmitte The inspector noted that the licensee monitored reactor vessel water level through the use of the permanently installed differential pressure transmitter display in the control room. Licensee management stated that RVLI was being accomplished by use of the differential pressure transmitter. The licensee also reviewed the configurations for RVLI

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usir.g the sight glass and tygon tubing with the operations. staff. The inspector concluded that the licensee's methods for RVLI were adequat No violations or deviations from regulatory requirements were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation / System Review and Test Program >

Inspection Technical. Specification (TS) required surveillance tests were observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted-in accordance with these requirement The following items were considered during this review: Testing was in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; removal and restoration of ,

the affected components were accomplished; test results conformed with TS '

and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; the reactor operator, technician or engineer performing the test recorded the data and the data were in agreement with observations made by the inspector, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and j resolved by appropriate management personne ' During this inspection period the licensee was involved in testing and flow balancing the decay heat removal system (DHR), the nuclear service cooling water system (NSCW), and the nuclear service raw water system (NSRW). Throughout the testing, the licensee experienced various problems with the special tests as discussed below. The licensee used an ultrasonic transit time flow meter for this testin The licensee identified that a procedure to use the flow meter had not been developed. However, a licensee approved vendor's manual had been used by the technicians performing the measurement The inspector expressed concern that the vendor manual did not state prerequisites, require documentation of input values, or record measured output values. The inspector also noted that minimal training had been given to the technicians who were to use the {

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/ train of DHR was declared inoperable due to high nuclear service cooling water flow through the decay heat coolers and low flow '

through the reactor building coolers. Flow control appeared to be difficult due to manual flow control valves that could not be set in a position that was repeatabl The licensee took corrective actions to the inspector's concern including: Licensee stopped work on flow measurement until an approved procedure had been issued, increased training on the flow instrument, and successfully retested the NSCW, NSRW, and DHR system In addition, the quality assurance department increased their participation in

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the testing program by requiring quality control hold points in tests performed for the system test and review program (SRTP).

The inspector concluded that the licensee's flow measurements were adequat b. The inspector reviewed the licensee's system functional testing program. The criteria used for this inspection was that of Regulatory Guide 1.68, " Initial Test Programs for-Water Cooled l Nuclear Power Plants" Rev. 2. The review consisted of discussions I with the licensee and review of various written and approved test i procedure l Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.68 describes an acceptable nuclear I facility preoperational test program. Although Rancho Seco is not a preoperational plant, completion of the tests outlined in the j p Regulatory Guide should demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will operate in accordance with design in all modes of plant operation. The Regulatory Guide was not used as a checklist i for what was required to be in the licensee's test program, but as a ,

guide to identify potential weaknesses in the licensee's test i program for further revie The inspector found that in all but one of the tests of Appendix A of the Regulatory Guide, the licensee had proposed similar test However, the inspector found one system where the licensee's test program did not appear comparable to the Regulatory Guide's guidanc The licensee's test program did not have any proposed integrated test to demonstrate remote shutdown capability from outside the control room. The licensee stated testing had been performed on the remote shutdown panel which functionally checked the individual circuits on the remote shutdown panel. The licensee committed to review the adequacy of testing previously performed on the remote shutdown panel in meeting the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.68.2, Revision 2, titled, " Initial Startup Test Program to Demonstrate Remote Shutdown Capability for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants".

This item will remain open pending review of the licensee's assessment of the adequacy of previous testing performed on the remote shutdown pane (0 pen Item 50-312/87-24-02).

The inspection also included reviews of selected Special Test Procedures and Test Outlines. Observations were conducted on procedures that were being performed and maintenance work that was in progres c. The inspector observed portions of STP.10098, "New Diesel Generator Engine Integrated System Phase II Testing," which was performed on TDI Diesel "B" and STP.975D, "120 VAC Vital 'D' Power System Functional Test" which was performed on the 120V AC vital inverte Both procedures were conducted correctly, although the inspector was concerned about the adequacy of the test logs that were being maintaine ______-_-__-___A

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During the performance of'one step of STP.975D an output breaker was observed to not operate correctly, but no test log entry was made to identify it for future repair. The abnormal breaker position was, however, noted in the test procedure itself. Upon questioning about-the breaker, the licensee stated said they were aware of the breaker problem and therefore didn't feel a test log entry was required. No q other documentation could be identified to show that the problem was T being tracked for repair. A test log entry was subsequently made by the licensee. The licensee subsequently conducted training to ensure deficiencies, identified during the conduct of testing, were documented in the test log. The inspector considered this action to satisfactorily resolve this issu STP.666 Emergency feedwater Isolation and Contori (EFIC) Cold Functional Test '

The inspector conducted observations of pre-test work activities, ,

test briefings, and test prerequisite performance. During the performance of pre-test Work Request 01357660-0, which was identified as a " Testing Only" work request, the licensee input a test signal ~to the EFIC logic that was large enough to cause the '

Atmospheric Dump-Valves (ADVs) on one steam header to open. This erroneous opening of the ADVs resulted in water being discharged from the steam header to the tank farm area and subsequently to the storm drain system. The licensee stated that approximately 2000 gallons of water was released before the ADVs were close Inspector followup of this occurrence indicated that a work request had been used to perform this system testing. In doing so, the normal review process that test procedures received was not initiated and, consequently, prerequisites, cautions and system lineups for the test were not identified. This, in conjunction with an inadequate clearance boundary identified by the licensee, resulted in a system configuration for testing and testing parameter inputs that resulted in a release of slightly radioactive water (5.0 x 10E-8 uC1/ml Cesium 137) to the storm drain syste The licensee committed to review the extent of testing being performed on work requests and to enhance formality of clearance requests by test engineers. The licensee stated that their intent was to not perform startup testing on a work request. The inspector concluded that the licensee's review and corrective action for this occurrence was adequat No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Maintenance Observation

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Maintenance activities for the systems and components listed below were observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and the Technical Specification The following items were considered during this review: The limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were i

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removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were ;

inspected as applicable; functional testing or calibration was performed prior to returning components or systems to service; activities were 4 accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Motor Operated Valves (M0Vs)

l The inspector observed portions of the maintenance activities involved in 1 the refurbishment and testing of motor operated valves (M0Vs).. During l the period, the licensee had experienced a failure of decay heat system I cross tie valve (HV-26046) to operate from the control room. _ The valve j had been refurbished under the licensee's program, tested and_ returned to- l service; however, when operated remotely from the control room, it had failed to change position as required. Investigation by the licensee found the operator to be electrically operable but jammed in manual ,

handwheel drive alignment preventing electrical motor driven operation, jl The MOV operator is designed to automatically engage the electric motor j drive when energized, even from a manual handwheel drive alignment. _ !

However, the licensee's procedures required the valve to be. electrically stroked subsequent to manual operation to ensure that the valve operator was left in its motor-driven alignment, rather than manua In discussions with licensee representatives, the inspector found that both maintenance and operations personnel were aware of the procedural requirement to electrically stroke each MOV after manual operation. The inspector noted, however, that the requirement appeared to be perceived ,

to be a redundant post-maintenance functional check rather than a l required condition of the operator to insure its electrical operabilit For example, licensee personnel stated that manual checking to ensure a valve was closed was common practice during system leakage investigation, as stated by licensee personnel, if restricted by the existing system ,

operational alignment. However, subsequent electrical stroking i of the valve would not be performed. This would leave the M0V operator in its handwheel drive alignment requiring automatic mechanical re-alignment to its electrical motor drive alignment during a future actuation of the valve. This realignment potentially might extend the cycle time for the valve beyond its specification, and would introduce an additional potentially unanalyzed failure mode for the operator, similar to the one seen in this instanc The inspector was concerned that the required condition of the M0V ]

operators did not appear to be adequately controlled. The inspector also i noted that although operations procedures required that the operator be in automatic and not in manual, it was not possible to determine this condition based on visual observation without attempting to operate the handwhee In light of the failure of HV-26046, the inspector brought his concerns to the attention of licensee management who acknowledged the potential weakness in their control of the equipment status of M0V operators. The licensee planned subsequent disassembly of HV-26046 to determine the cause of the failure and additional review of their current procedures l l

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l and training to control the_ manual positioning of M0Vs. The inspector considered these commitments to adequately-address this concer '

Diesel Generator Installation The inspector observed portions of the Transamerica Deval Industries-(TDI)DieselBuildingMissleShieldPlacement. Concrete placement was .

observed to have been performed in accordance with applicable licensee !

procedure During the initial inspection, of fabrication and installation of the permanent turbocharger vibration support the inspector noted what appeared to be insufficient cleanliness controls being utilized for this activity. Welding and grinding activities were performed without licensee inspectors in the diesel room. However, the licensee committed to and had implemented increased QC coverage of the. turbocharger installation, including cleanliness requirements, by the end of this inspection. . The inspector concluded that the licensee's corrective action was adequate in this instanc No violations or deviations were identifie . Followup of NRC Open Items Licensee Event Reports LER 85-25, Rev. 2 (Closed), " Reactor Trip Following Loss of ICS, Power" The above LER was submitted to the NRC following the December 26, 1985 event and subsequently revised. The licensee, to date, has been in a cold shutdown condition since the event. The NRC has performed many inspections related to the event which have been documented in inspection reports and NUREG 119 Because the licensee has undertaken an extensive restart program following the event, the LER only included the description of the even The corrective actions have been documented in various correspondence to the NRC which included the Action Plan for Performance Improvemen Therefore, the inspection involved in the followup of this event has been completed and documented and the NRC continues to monitor the licensee's actions to restart the plant. This item, LER 85-25, Rev. 2 is considered close (LER 85-25, Rev. 2 CLOSED).

Special Reports Special Report 83-07-X0 (Closed), " Heat Tracing for the Hydrogen Monitoring System Was Found De-energized."

The licensee reported that they had discovered the heat tracing of the hydrogen monitoring system to be deenergized on August 18, 1983. This was reported to the NRC in the above special report. Most recently this item was inspected in an NRC inspection report 87-08 where the item was left open for future inspection of the deportability of the event and the identification of the root caus . __-

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.:The) inspector-reviewed the licensee's pa'ckage. for. this item. At the time

'of the occurrence no. Technical Specification requirement to. verify the

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. heat. tracing each'. shift existed. .Therefore the 10 CFR 50.73: reporting'-

. requirements. did not apply. Finally, the licensee was unable to identify

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7 , the; root cause:of the. heat tracing being'deenergized approximately four.

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>- years ago. Finally . it appeared that the licensce's corrective actions

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which included'a verification of the energized heat tracing each_ shift

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closed. (Special; Report 83-07-X0 CLOSED).. .:

Exit Meeting-e ..

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The inspector met ~with licensee representatives (noted.in Paragraph 1) '

-at various times during the. report period and formally on September 11,:1987. The scope and. findings.of the inspection activities described in .this report were summarized at the. meeting.' Licensee -i representativestacknowledged the' inspector's finding ;

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