IR 05000312/1988012

Insp Rept 50-312/88-12 on 880330-0502.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Maint, Surveillance & Followup Items

ML20155A681
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	05/23/1988
From:	Dangelo A, Miller L, Myers C, Qualls P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20155A670	List: IR 05000312/1988012 ML20155A667 ML20155A672
References
50-312-88-12, NUDOCS 8806100189
Download: ML20155A681 (6)

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'k U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMfilSSI0tl

REGION V

Report No: 50-312/88-12'

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Docket N License No. OPR-54 Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District F. O.' Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813 Facility Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1 Inspection at: Herald, California (Rancho Seco Site)

Inspection conducted-Inspectors: . , h ~U~N A. V. D' clo, S Rosi nt Inspector Date Signed bbh D b L.$~N8 C. rs, Resi nspe or ' ' d Date Signed

, ( d 'h 7 P. y 1s, Res'd pector Date Signed Approved By: / f-2 3d Date Signed L.VV. ' Miller, Chief @ actor ProjectsSection II Summary:

Inspection between March 30 and May 2, 1988 (Report 50-312/88-12)

Areas Inspected: This routine inspection by the Resident Inspectors, invclved the areas of operational safety verification, maintenance, surveillance, and followup item During this inspection, Inspection Procedures 71707, 71709, 71881, 71710, 62703, 62702, 61726, 25565, 72700, 30702, 30703, 92701, 92700 and 93702 were use Results: Of the areas inspected, one violation was identified. (See Paragraph 7). No major programmatic strengths or weaknesses were observed during this inspection perio ;

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8806100189 880523 PDR ADOCK 05000312 o DCD

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c41 DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted Licensee Personnel

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G. C. Andognini, Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear J. Firlit, Assistant General Manager (AGli), Nuclear Power Production

• D. Keuter, Director, Nuclear Operations and Maintenance D. Brock, Acting Nuclear Maintenance Manager

• B. Croley, AGM, Technical and Administrative Services G. Cranston, Nuclear Engineering Manager W. Kemper, Nuclear Operations Manager J. Shetler, Director, System Review and Test Program T. Tucker, Nuclear Operations Superintendent P. Kagel, Nuclear Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent I.. Fossom, Manager, Scheduling and Outage Management J. Field, Plant Support Group Supervisor L. Conklin, Manager of Management Controls S. Crur.F, Manager, Nuclear Licensing J. Vinquist, Director, Nuclear Quality T. Fetterman, Electrical Engineering Manager J. Irwin, Supervisor, I&C Maintenance

• Q. Coleman, Quality Engineering Supervisor T. Shewski, Quality Engineer V. Lewis, Supervising Civil Engineer J. Robertson, Licensing Engineer P. Bosakowski, Supervisor of Licensing, Technical Support J. Delezinsky, Supervisor, NRR Coordination, Licensing G. Legner, Licensing Engineer

• S. Rutter, Supervisor, Incident Investigation Review Group (IIRG), Licensing

• D Schuman, Incident Analyst, Licensing /IIRG H. J. Sefick, Jr. , Nuclear Security Manager Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics, security and office personne * Attended the Exit Meeting on May 2, 198 . Operational Safety Verification (71707, 71709, 71881)

The inspectors reviewed control room operations which included access control, staffing, and observation of and review of control room log Discussions with the shift supervisors and operators indicated understanding by these personnel of the reasons for annunciator indications, abnormal plant conditions and maintenance work in progres The inspect. ors also verified, by observation of valve and switch position indications, that emergency systems were properly a'ligned as required by technical specifications for the plant condition __ . _ . _ _ _ - - __ __ . . -

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During this inspection period, the licensee changed reacter modes from hot-shutdown to reactor criticality on March 30, 1988 and operated the plant at power levels up to 30% reactor power. The inspectors verified the technical' specification requirements for operation in these mode Tours of the auxiliary, reactor, and turbine buildings, including exterior areas, were made to assess equipment conditions and plant

. conditions. Also, tours were made to assess the effectiveness of radiological controls and adherence to regulatory requirements. The inspectors also observed plant housekeeping and cleanliness, looked for potential fire and safety hazards, and observed security and safeguards practice l The inspectors walked down 30% of the protected area boundary and 100% of the vital area boundaries to ensure that they were complete and that guards were properly posted where known deficiencies existe The inspectors also observed protected area access control, personnel screening, badge issuance and maintenance on access control equipmen No violations or deviations were identifie . ESF System Walkdown (71710)

l During plant Operations with the reactor critical, the inspectors walked down and verified the operability of the emergency diesel generator

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system,theauxiliaryfeedsystemandthehighpressureinjectionsyste While the reactor coolant system temperature was above 280 , the inspectors: 1) verified the capability to remove heat by use of two steam generators, 2) verified that one atmospheric dump valve (ADV) per R generator was operable, 3) verified that the licensee had the minimum

250,000 gallons of water in the condensate storage tank, 4) walked down '

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the ADV isolations, 5) verified the operability of the steam safety

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valves, and 6) walked down the backup instrument air bottle supply l systems for the ADVs and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system valves.

t l No violations or deviations were identifie , Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Maintenance activities for the systems and components listed below were  ;

observed and reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and the Technical Specifications.

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The following items were considered during this review: The limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were

removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the

work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing or calibration was performed

! prior to returning components or systems to service; activities were

, accomplished by qualified personnel; radiological controls were

implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente !

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o 3 1) The inspectors observed maintenance on the A2 Transamerica DeLaval Industries (TDI) diesel which included piping support modifications and bolt replacement ) Maintenance activities on the auxiliary boilers were observed. The licensee needed to repair these boilers due to the need to operate the boilers if the plant were to be shutdow Maintenance activities were limited during this inspection period due to plant operation No violations or deviations were identifie . Monthly Surveillance Observation and Review of System Review and Test Program (SRTP) Testing (61726)

System testing was observed and reviewed to ascertain that the testing was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the approved special test procedure STP 66 The licensee conducted various activities to properly tune the integrated control system (ICS) for proper response to plant behavior. No significant problems were identified during this testin The licensee had scheduled a turbine trip, a reactor / turbine trip and a test of the remote shutdown system on April 25, 198 This test was delayed until the next inspection period due to tube leaks in the auxiliary boile No violations or deviations were identifie . Enhanced Observation Team Inspection (62702, 72700, 30702, 30703, 92701)

During this period an Enhanced Observation Team inspection was conducted on-sit The purpose of the team was to provide additional inspection coverage of the licensee's operational activities following the 2 year plant sbatdown. The inspection included 3 weeks of around-the-clock coverag The exit for Phase 1 of this inspection was conducted on April 13, 198 One of the resident inspectors participated in this audit. The majority of issues resulting from this inspection will be addressed in the report to be issued concerning that inspectio The resident inspt-tors are addressing the following issue Shift Supervis ar Emergency Maintenance (SSEM)

This issue was addressed in inspection report 88-05 and is inspector followup item 88-05-01. This issue remains open pending review of the licensee's SSEM criteria, Procedure Change for UV Device Testing The licensee's root cause investigation of the breaker failure discussed in paragraph (a) above determined that the cause of the failure was improper contact between the undervoltage (UV) device

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trip lever and the breaker tripping ba The licensee issued Revision 6 to EM 175, CRD Breaker Preventive Maintenance, to cbc.,

,i proper undervoltage device operation and contact with this breaker tripping shaf This item is closed.

'l i c. UV Device Procurement The licensee is reviewing the procurement practices and

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documentation for the UV devices. This issue will be reviewed further upon completion of the licensee revie (50-312/88-12-01).

d. "B" Letdown Cooler Leak The licensee identified problems in the operation of the letdown system coolers which were addressed in report 50-312/88-0 Licensee personnel stated that the "B" letdown cooler had a leak and

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that it was not in servic No documentation of this leak was identified to the NRC. The licensee is reviewing records to find the leak documentation. This item is open pending record review of these records (50-312/88-12-02).

e. Letdown System Quality Class The inspector noted that 10 CFR 50.2 defines "reactor coolant pressure boundary" as piping connected to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) up to and including the outermost containment isolation valve which penetrates the containment or the second of two valves normally closed during normal operations which does not penetrate the containment.

, Furthermore, 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, Criterion 30 requires that the reactor coolant pressure boundary components be fabricated to the highest quality standards practica However, portions of the licensee's letdown system inside containment apparently fall within the reactor coolant pressure boundary as defined above, but are not considered Quality Class 1 components by the licensee. The licensee was reviewing the approved design criteria for this portion of the system at the end of this inspectio This item is open (50-312/88-12-03).

f. Procedure Updating The inspection team identified a variety of procedures which were difficult or confusing to interpret due to frequent, recent change pages interleaved with previous versions cf +he same page of the

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procedur The licensee promptly instituted a major effort to update the time critical procedures (e.g., off-normal procedures, ect.) to prevent confusion by the operators. At the conclusion of this inspection period, most of these changes were incorporated and were in various stages of management review and approval. This item is close .- . . . - . _. _ _ _ _ _

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5 TDI Diesel Vibration The licensee committed to do vibration monitoring of the TDI diesels in the diesel safety evaluation report (SER). These activities will be followed up by the inspectors as they are performe No violations or deviations were identifie . Control Room HVAC Spurious Actuations (92700, 93703)

On April 11, 1988 at 2:38 p.m., the control room heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) system actuated, isolating the control room (CR)

and switching on the essential HVAC unit The inspectors, upon finding out about_the occurrence, questioned the licensee as to why a non-emergency 4-hour red phone report to the NRC was not made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii) for the actuation of an engineered safety features (ESF) syste The licensee subsequently reported the event on April 14, 1988 at noon. In LER 86-09, the licensee stated that the CR HVAC system was to be in a testing status and that due to the work, no further reporting was going to be done. On February 27, 1988 the-Performance Analysis Group (PAG) signed that the system was ready for normal operation. The first unreported spurious actuation occurred on March 16, 1988. The licensee determined that between March 16 and April 11, 1988, a number of unreported actuations had occurred. The failure to report the ESF actuations is an apparent violation of

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10 CFR 50.7 (50-312/88-12-04).

t Although no complete listing of engineered safety feature systems was '

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available, the licensee had previously stated in the Control Room [

Habitability Report, Revision 5, submitted to the NRC on July 22, 1987, and in LERs 86-09 and 86-13, that this system was considered an engineerea safety feature (ESF). At the time of the event the licensee '

was nevertheless uncertain that the control room Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) was an ESF system. The licensee was reviewing this issue furthe One violation was identifie . Exit Meetina (30703)

The inspector met with licensee representatives (noted in Paragraph 1) at various times during the report period and formally on May 2, 1988. The scope and findings of the inspection activities described in this report were summarized at the meetin Licensee representatives acknowledged the inspector's findings and violation identified.

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