ML20153E508

Insp Rept 50-312/88-24 on 880719-22.Violation Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Actions on Previous Insp Findings & Lers,External Exposure Control & Internal Exposure Control

ML20153E508
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	08/16/1988
From:	Hooker C, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20153E393	List: ML20153E389 ML20153E466 ML20153E508
References
50-312-88-24, NUDOCS 8809060336
Download: ML20153E508 (11)

See also: IR 05000312/1988024

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s U. S. NOCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION

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[ REGEON V

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4 Report 6. 50-312/88-24

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Docket No. 50-312

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License No. OPR-54

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Licensee: Sar.ramer.+. Municipal Utility District

14440 Twin Cities Road .:

9 Herald, California 95638-9799

4 Facility Name: Rt'choSecoNuclearGeneratingStktion

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Inspection at: Clay Station, California

Inspection Conducted. July 19-22, 1988, and subsequent telsphnna

con ~versation on July 25, 19P8.

Inspector: N' " _

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r. A. Hooker, Radhtion Specialist Date $igned

, Approved by: b.h Ot *d// 6/W .

G. P. uh s. Chief Date Signed

Emerge Preparedness and Radiological

Protection Branch

Summary:

Inspection on July 19-22. 1988 and telephone conversation un July 25. 198S  !

(Recort No. 50-312/88-24)

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Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection of licensee act?on on

prestous inspection findings and Licensee Event Reports (LERs), external

exposure control, ano internal exposure contro'. Inspect!on Procedures 30703, t

92700, 92701, 92702, 83724 and 83775 were addiessed.

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Results: In the areas inspected the licensee's program appearet', adequate to

accomplish its sh t ety objectives. The licensee replaced thier contract

Radiation Protectin M Pger with a District employee with qualifications t

equivalent to those out ' eri in Regulatory Guide 1.8 (paragraph 3). l

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One apparent violatio.; was ntifiec nne area: TS 6.11., failure to l

! follow procedures (para .- ) .

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1. Persons Contacted

Licensee

• B. G. Croley, Ass?stant General Manager (AGM), Technical Services

D. Keuter, AGM, Nuclear Power Production

• J. Vinquist, Director, Nuclear Quality i

c *M. Bua, Manager, Radiation Protection (RPM) at:

• R. Harris, Assistant RPM

• W. . Keeper, Manager, Nuclear Operations (MNO) i

• S. Crunk, Manager, Licensing

! *L. Houghtby, Manager, Nuclear Security

l *P. -Turner, Manager, Plant Performanca

• P. Lavely, Manager Environmental Monitoring and Emergency

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Preparedness (EM&EP)

• G. Cranston, Manager, Nuclear Engineering

• J. Reese, Superintendent, Radiological Health (SRH)

L *G. Legner, licensing Engineer

• G.~Podgursk), Supervisor, Respiratory Frotection/ Instruments (SRP&I)

D. Gardiner, Superintendent, Radwaste (SRW)

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NRC Resident 2nspectors

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• A. D'Angelo, Senior Resident Inspector

• P. Qualls, Resident Inspector i

• Denotes individuals attending the exit interview on July 22, 1988.

In addition to the individuals noted abovo, the inspector met and held

discussions with ott.e members of the licensee's and contractor's staffs. j

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2. Licensee Action on krevious Inspection Findings and LERs (92700. 92701 *

and 92702 .

l ,(Closed) Violation (50-312/88-13-01): This violation involved the

licensee's failure to maintain documentation attesting that a shipping

container was a Department of Transportat'on 7A package as required by 49 -[

CfR 173.415(a). Based on a discussion with the SRW and review of revised ,

procedure PP.309.I.1, Determination of the Requirements for l

Shipinent of Radluactive (Nonwaste', Material Of f site, th~. inspector

determined tb effective corrective actions had been is.iemented to

prevent recurrence as stated in the licensee's timely le v er dated June

6, 1988. The inspector had no further questions regarding the licensee's i

corrective act.ons.  ;

(Closed)f Violation (50-312/88-13-02): This violation involved the

licensee s failure to obtain wr4tten certification that a recipient was I

authorized to receive the byproduct material transferred to them by the

licensee. Bared on a discussion with the SPW and review of revised

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procedure RP.309.I.1, the inspector determined that effective corrective

. actions had been implemented to prevent recurrence as stated in the licensee's l

letter dated June 6, 1988. The inspector had no further questions

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regarding this matter. l

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(Clo gd) Follow-up (50-312/87-22-04): This item involved the need to

revie.e the licensee's evaluation tr accurately measure beta radiation

with their Panasonic Thermoluminescent Dosimeters (TLD). The SRH

informed the inspector that the Panosonic TLDs, when used, are only used

to backup their pocket ion chamber (PIC) results under certain

conditions. The SRH also informed the inspector that if and when it was J

determined that a need to use the Panasonic TLD for measuring beta

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exposures existed, they would ensure calibration data results met

industry standards. The licensee utilizes a contract vendor supplied TLD

service that is certified under ti.o National Voluntary Laboratory

Accreditation Program (NVLAP) for their legal record and compliance with

the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. The inspector had no further .

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questions regarding this matter.

(Closed) r-llow-up (50-312/87-26-01): This item involved the need to '

review the licensee's evaluation of changes in the A and B Regenerate

Holdup Tank's cleanup system. Based on review of the licensec's letter

No. GCA 87-916, Radioactive liquid Effluent Systems D_escription

S_upplement, dated January 7, 1988, and administrative controls

(splashguards for flanges and valves) added to procedure A-29

Waste Water Disposal System the inspector censiders this matter closed.

(Closeo) Follow-up (50-312/85-28-08): Inspection Report Nos,

a 50-312/85-28, 86-11 and 88-01 document previous inspection efforts

regarding problems and licensee actions associated with a containment

building purge flow rete measuring device. Based on discuctions with

licensee representatives and review of Preliminary Change Description No.

4264, for relocating this device during the licenska's 1989 refueling

outage, the inspector considered this matter closed.

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, (C'losed) LER (50-312/88-04-201: The inspector determined that corrective

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actions as stated in the licensee's timely LER No.88-004,

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Incperative Radiation Moisitors Due to an Inadequate Surveillance

Procedure . dated March 29, 1988, had been effectively implementcd to

prevent scurrence. The inspector also noted ttie.t as a result of the

licensee's corrective actions, they identified deficiencies in other

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surveillance procedures and were taking appropriate action to resolve

these findings. The inspector had ne further questions regarding this

matter.

3. External Exposure Control

The inspector examined the licensee's external exposure control program

to determine :he licensee's compliance with 10 CFR Fart 20, Technical

j $pecifications (TS), licensee procedures, and recommendations outlined in

- various industry standards.

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Audits

Quality Assurance (QA) audits and Health Physics / Chemistry Services 1

(HP/CS) surveillances of this area were discussed in Inspection Report l

No. 50-312/88-17, paragraph 3. j

Coanges

Changes in the licensee's program due to implementation of the Hot

Particle Control Program and new equipment were described in Inspection

Report No. 50-312/88-17.

During this inspection (50-312/88-24), the licentee had appointed a new

permanent RPM effective July 22, 1988. Technical Specification, Section 6.3, Facility Staff Qualifications, states in part, that the RPM shall

meet or exceed the qualifications of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.8, September

1975 Based on an interview with the new RPM, the inspector determined

that this individual's qualifications were equ!voient to those outline in

RG 1.8, Personnel Selection and Training, dated September 1975. This

individual has a BA in Chemistry approximately five years of nuclear

power supervisory experience in chemistry and radiation protection

training, about seven years of experience as an instructor in chemistry

and radiation protection, and about eight years at the technician level.

However, the inspector also noted that this individual had very little

experience in management of day to day inplant RP activities.

Program Implementation

Inspection findings associated with the licensee's failure to control

licensed material to ensure workers were not exposed in excess of

regulatory limits were described in Inspection Feport Nos. 50-312/88-07,

08 and 20. This inspection (50-312/88-24) did nat include a review of

those matters.

The inspector reviewed the following licensee procedures:

• RP.305, Radiation Protection Plan

RSAP-1104, Hot Particle Control Program

AP.305-1, Restricted and Controlled Area Access Requirements

including Maximum Permissible Exposures, TLD Issue,

Multiple Badging and Exposure Record.

• RP.305.4, Radiation Work Permits

• RP.305.10. Initial Reactor Building Entry Guivalines

• RP.305.37, Noble Gas Clouds Dsse Determination

• AP.311, Portable Health Physics Instrumentation

• EPIP-5550, Emergency Facilitits, Equipment and Supplies

• Selected Procedures in the licensee's Dosimetry Manual.

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Based on review of the above procedures and facility tours the inspector

made the following observations:

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On July 20, 1988, the inspector, accompanied by the SRH and SRP&I ,

inspected the contents of the licensee's onsite emergency radiation

protection equipment lockers:

RP1 - Control Room /TSC Hallway

RP2 - Warehouse "A" Locker Room

RP3 - Auxiliary Buildina Hallway (orace level)

The inspector noted that tl.e lockers were equipped with the quantity

and type of radiation survey instruments and PICS as specified in

procedure EPIP-5660. The inspector also noted that the survey '

instruments and PICS had current calibration dates. Problems

associated with survey instrument calibrations in offsite response ,

kits were discussed in Inspection Report No. 50-312/88-25. Status

of equipment associated with internal exposure control is discussed

in paragraph 4 below.

The inspector also observeo that the alternate Operations Support

Center (OSC), in the "A" warehouse, contained unlocked lockers

filled with a large number of uncalibrated portable battery operated

air samplers and portable radiation survey instruments. The

inspector was informed that the instruments and samplers were

maintained by the Emergency Preparedness Department and, when -

needed, were calibrated and used as replacements for those in

offsite locations when their calibration had expired. The inspector ,

also noted that the was no posting or other controls to indicate '

that the uncalibrated air samplers and survey instruments in the OSC

should not be used. The inspector expressed a concern to the

licensee that there were r.o controls to prevent the inadvertent use

of this equipment if the OSC was manned during an emergency. At the

exit reeting on July 22, 1988, the EM & EP manager informed the

inspector that the uncalibrated enuipment would be removed from the  ;

OSC and administratively controlled, for non use, in another l

location.

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On July 20, 1988, during a tour of the auxiliary buildir.g

radiologically controlled areas (RCAs), accompanied by the SRP&I,

the inspector observed an individual who had just exited a

contaminated work area in the grade level decon room. The inspector

also noted that the individual, dressed in swimming trunks, did not

have any personnel monitoring devices or security badge on his

person. The inspec(or questioned the individual concerning the  ;

whereabouts of his dosimetry devices and security badge.

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individuul presente( a PIC he had placed at the step off pad when

exiting the contaminated work area; however, he could not present a

TLD or security badge. The individual informed the inspector that

he had apparently left his TLD and security badge in the change room

locker (prade level), along with his street clothes, when changing

icAc pt rtretive clothing PCs. The individual also informed the

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inspectoe that he had been in the contaminated work area for about

20 minuteT to take airflow measurements of the air supply for the

decon room.

The inspector, along with the SRP&I, informed a RP Technician who

was stationed outside of the decon room of this matter. The RP

Technician escorted the individual to a nearby whole body personnel

contamination monitor (PCM) for a body frisk, change room to get his

TLD and security badge, and subsequently to the RCA access control

point on the 40 ft, level. During further questioning of this

individual, prior to his exit from the RCA, he informed the

inspector that he was aware that the radiation work permit (RWP) No.

88-021A, he had signed in on, required him to wear his TLD at all

times when in the RCA. The individual also stated that he was also

aware of the requirements for wearing his TLD and security badge '

through General Employee Training (GET) when he started to work

Rancho Seco in January 1988.

As a result of this incident the licensee immediately performed a

survey of the contaminated area in the decon room. The licensee's

survey results indicated that the radiation levels were 25 1.0 mR/hr

and the maximum contamination level was 1000 dpm/100 cm . The

individual's PIC indicated that no measurable radiation was received

and no personnel contamination was detected when the individual used

the PCMs on the grade and +40 ft exit area. The licensee also

initiated an Abnormal Dorimetry Report and investigation of this

incident.

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The licensee's Radiation Control Manual procedure RP.305 Article 2,

Responsibilities of Workers, states, in part, "An example of

responsibilities of all radiation workers follows: .. 3. Wear

TLD/ film badges where required by procedure, RWP or Radiation

Protection Personnel...."

Procedure RP 305.4 Section 6.6.2 states "It is the responsibility of ,

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all porsonnel using an RWP to familiarize themselves with the '

radiological conditions listed, protective clothing, dosimetry  !

required, and any special instructions. Each ?WP use will complete [

Enclosure 8.2 with their Printed Name, Signature, Date, and Badge l

No. Once per work period, and read the RWP upon each entry. An f

individual's completion of these items constitutes acknowledgement

of the conditions and requirements as listed on the RWP.

The inspector noted that on July 20, 1988, this individual had

signed Enclosure 8.2 for RWP No. 88-021A, prior to entering the RCA.

The inspector also noted that RWP No. 88-021A required a TLD badge

l, for all workers entering the RCA under this RWP. The failure of

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this individual to wear his TLD badge while working in the der <

room was identified as ar apparent violation of TS 6.11

(50-312/88-24-01).

The inspector examired records associated with containment entries at

reactor power on May 4, 1988, for maintenance and inspection, and June '

22, 1988, for neutron energy spectrum studies performed by the contract I

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vendor who supplies the licensee's TLDs. The records examined indicated

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that the licensee corducted adequate preplanning prior to the entries,

and ALARA considerations and RWPs were appropriately scoped.

Determination of air activity and air quality, use of respiratory

protection equipment, surveys, use of personnel dosimetry, and safety

i precautions taken were performed in accordance with licensee procedures.

The inspector identified no problems during this examination.

With respect to the Itcensee's short maintenance and inspection outage

, scheduled in August 1988, the inspector noted that the RP Department was

in the process of contracting for additional RP and Dosimetry Technicians

to augment their current staff. The inspector toured an area where th1

licensee had been conducting training with a newly built reactor coolant

pump (RCP) mockup for expected RCP work during the outage. The inspector

noted that the licensee had taken extra measures to simulate working

conditions, including heating the area to evaluate heat stress on

workers.

Personnel monitoring was based on monthly vendor processed TLDs and

!' updated licensee PIC data. The licensee inputs the monthly TLD data into

a computer based system to keep track of each workers accumulated

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exposure. In addition to normal badging, supplementary TL0s and PICS

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were used to monitor whole body exposures in non uniform radiation fields

and extremity monitoring as required. Neutron exposures were determined

by survey data and stay time. On June 22, 1988, neutron energy

! evaluations were performed by the licensee's TLD vendor for possible

j future use in neutron dosimetry. Licensee processed Panasonic TLDs were

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used in special cases to backup PICS. Weekly exposure updates from TLD

1 and accumulated PIC data showing exposure used for the week, quarter to

date, and year to date were sent to department supervisors, and the OSC

and TSC.

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Exposure records for selected individuals were examined. The inspector

verified that forms NRC-4 and NRC-5 or equivalent were maintained as

required by 10 CFR Part 20. The inspector noted that personnel folders

) also contained a computer listing of dates of workers last GET, medical

examinations, respiratory test, whole body count (WBC) and date of

termination. With respect to termination reports, the inspector made the

following observations:

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On July 21, 1988, the inspector noted that the licensee had stored,

in a cabinet, personnel files for 11 workers who terminated in May

, 1988. Notes in the files indicated that they had be m reviewed by

the t'osimetry office during the July 11-13, 1988 period, and were being

i held for the SHS's review and resolution of minor administrative

! discrepancies before they could be processed.

The vendor TLD report for these terminated workers was dated June 9,

1988. According to the Dosimetry Supervisor (05) the reports were

normally received at the SRH's office within two weeks of the report

date. The SRH reviews the reports before they are sent Y.o the

dosimetry office. Since the licensee did not have an administrative

system such as logging in or stamping the reports, the licensee

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could not provide evidence of the exact date of receipt while the

inspector was on site.

On July 22, 1988, prior to the exit interview, the inspector

discussed the 30 day reporting requirements outlined in 10 CFR

20.408(b) with the 05 and RPM. The inspector also informed the DS

and RPM that the NRC normally perceived that a workers exposure was

determined when the TLD results were received by the licensee. The

RPM informed the inspector that the subject termination reports

would be processed by July 23, 1988.

The apparent lack of administrative controls to ensure that

termination reports were processed in a timely manner, and the 30

day reporting requisements of 10 CFR 20.408(b) were also discussed

at the exit interview on July 22, 1988. The inspector's concerns

were acknowledged by the ifcensee.

During a telephone conversation with the SRH on July 25, 1988, the

inspector was informed that the licensee had received the vendor TLD

results on June 20, 1988, and computer inputs, to determine the

workers exposures, were not corpleted until a few days later. The

SRH also informed the inspector that their procedures would be

revised to include administrative controls to ensure that

termination reports were processed in a more timely manner. The

inspector will examine the licensee's actions regarding this matter

in a subsequent inspection (50-312/88-24-02).

The inspector noted that exposures from evaluations due to personnel

contaminations or lost dosimetry devices were appropriately added to an

individual's exposure record, No individual, excluding the individual

described in Inspection Report Nos. 50-312/88-07, 08 and 20, had exceeded

the 10 CFR 20.101(a) or 20.101(b) limits.

The inspector reviewed the circumstances involving an incident that

occurred on July 12, 1988, at about 0228 hours0.00264 days <br />0.0633 hours <br />3.769841e-4 weeks <br />8.6754e-5 months <br />, which resulted in five

workers being contaminated with radioactive noble gases. The incident

was due to the flushing of raw reactor coolant (RC) from the letdown

system to a floor drain on the minus 20 ft. level, which emptied into a

sump on the minus 40 ft. level. The RC degassed when it entered the sump

and created a noble gas cloud that contaminated workers on both levels.

The licensen determined that the causes of the incident was the failure

to recognize that the letdown system contained raw RC due to their long

, shutdown time, little experience in flushing RC systems during reactor

operations, no established procedures, and several other weaknesses that

contributed to the incident. The licensee calculated that the effluent

release that resulted from the noble gases released was about 2.4% of the

j TS 3.18.1 limit. The maximum personnel exposure due to noble gas was 30

mrem. The WBCs of the five workers indicated no detectable radionuclides

other than noble gases. The inspector outermined that the licensee had

1 properly evaluated this incident, determined root causes, and were taking

appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence. At the exit

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meeting on July 22, 198R, the MNO informed the inspector that detailed

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procedures were being developed for flushing operations.

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During facility tours, the inspector made independent radiation

measurements using an NRC PO-2 portable ion chamber, S/N 2694, due for

calibration on August 10, 1988. The inspector noted that radiation and

high radiation areas were posted as required by 10 CFR Part 20. Licensee

access controls for high radiation areas were observed to be consistent

with TS, Section 6.13, and licensee procedures.

The licensee appeared to be maintaining their previous level of

performance in this area and appeared capable of accomplishing their

safety goals. However, it appeared that the licensee naads to improve on

worker awareness of the requirements for working in RCAs, and provide

more management oversight and attention to detail for processing

termination reports and flushing of systems containing RC water. One

apparent violation was identified in this area which appeared to be an

isolated occurrence.

4. Internal Exposure Control

The inspector examined the licensee's internal exposure control program

to determine compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 TS, licensee procedures, and

recommendations outlined in various industry standards.

Audits

QA audits and HP/CS surveillances of this area were discussed in

Inspection Report No. 50-312/88-17, paragraph 3.

Chances

The appointment of a new RPM was discussed in paragraph 3 above. With

respect to other changes, during the fourth quarter of 1987, the licensee

replaced their old bed WBC with a new ilelgeson "Quicky" and bed counter.

Both of these units were located in a portable trailer near the dosimetry

office, at the new location, outside of the Plant protected area.

Quality control checks and calibrations of the WBCs were performed in

accordance with licensee's procedures.

Program Implementation

Based on review of air sample data for containment entries during reactor

power operation on May 4 and June 22, 1988, selected RWPs and discussions

with the SRH, the inspector determined that there were nu airborne

exposures to workers that exceeded the 40 MPC-hour control measure that

would require an evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 20.103(b)(2). Examination

of WBCs of selected workers indicated no intakes of radioactive materials

that would require internal dose evaluations. Action points for the

"Quicky" counter were established and, if exceeded, required a count in

the bed counter for a more detailed assessment of internal exposures.

The following procedures in the licensee's Respir.irory Protection Manual

were reviewed:

RP.314 Article 1, Radiological Respiratory Protection Program

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AP.114 I-1, Use of MSA Ultra Filter Full Facepiece Respirator

AP.314 II-2, Use of MSA Custom 4500 Air Mask SCBA

AP.314-2, MSA Constant Flow Air Line Respirator

AP.314 IV-1, Respirator Inspections. Maintenance. Cleaning and

Storage

AP.314 V-I, Training For Use and Maintenance of Respiratory

Protection Equipment

Based on review of the above procedures, discussions with licensee

representatives, and observations during the inspection, the inspector

determined that the licensee's program was consistent with,10 CFR

20.103, RG 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protcetion, and

NUREG 0041, Manual of Respiratory Protection Against Airborne

Radioactive Materials.

The inspector noted that personnel who performed tests and repairs on

respiratory protection equipment, had been trained and certified by the

vendor who supplies the licensee's equipment.

Records of quarterly breathing air system radioactivity and air quality

checks examined, indicated no problems with the licensee's breathing air

system. The licensee also performed the same analysis prior to each use

of the breathing air system which was supported by the service air

system. The licensee maintained a separate system for filling SCBA air

tanks. The inspector toured areas where the licensee maintained

respiratory equipment for normal and emergency use. The following

observations were made: ,

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On July 20, 1988, the inspector noted two SCBA Units in the MAKO air

compressor shed that had yellow sticky note paper denoting that

their pressure gauges were broken. The note papers had been

attached to the faces of the gauges on these two units that were

stored in a borizontal position with several filled units. Due to

the heat in this area, the glue on the note paper had become '

ineffective and were just resting on the face of the gauges. The

inspector expressed a concern to the licensee that note paper was

being used instead of a more permanent type of tag This was also

discussed at the exit meeting on July 21, 1988. The inspector's

observations were acknowledged by the licensee.

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On July 20, 1988, the inspector noted that the low volume portable ,

air samplers in Emergency Lockers RPI, RP2 and RP3 were due for

calibration on July 18, 1988, as indicated on attached calibration

tags. In addition, locker RPI also contained a "HI-Vol" portable

air sampler that indicated that calibration was due July 1, 1988. j

As indicated on the calibration tags and according to the SRH, these

samplers were calibrated quarterly.

Lased on review of procetures in the licensee's Radiation Detection

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i Instrutsonts Manual, the inspector noted that no reference was n.ade

J to the calibration frequency for portable air samplers. The

inspector Tiso noted that the licensee's computer listing, of .

1 instruments due for calibration by July 30, 1988, listed the * '

"HI-Vol" sampler as being due on July 1,1988; however, the low

volume samplers were not on the list presented to the inspector. "

The licensee took immediate steps to have the samplers calibrated on {

July 20, 1988.

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i The inspector discussed the apparent weakness in the licensee's  ;

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program regarding the failure to specify the policy for tt.e

calibration frequencies of portable air samplers, and the failure to r

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list the low volume sampler in the emergency lockers with the SRH. ,

These matters were also discussed at the exit meeting on ,1uly 22,  !

1988. The inspectors observations were acknowledged by tne  ;

licensee. The inspector was informed by the SRH that the licensee's .

procedures were beir,g revised to clarify the policy with respect to l

3 instrument calibration frequencies, and a review to ensure all 1

i instruments were on the licensee's listing of instruments due for *

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calibration.  !

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The inspectcr noted that respiratory equipment, availaH e for  !

emergency use, appeared to be well maintained and in the quantities

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specifled in the licensees procedures. l

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l Problems associated with responsibilities for inventories of  !

emergency equipment were described in Inspection Report No.  !

j 50-312/88-25. ,l

j The licensee seemed to be maintaining their previous letol of performance

in this area and their program appea.ed adequate to accomplish its safety l

l

objectives. No violations or deviations were identified. [

l 5. Exit Interview [

'

The inspector met with the licensee representatives, denoted in paragraph

1, at the conclusion of the inspection on July 22, 1988. The scope and  ;

] findings of the inspection were summarized. During the interview, the i

l RPM reviewed the actions taken to assure that the workers terminatioli i

j reports would be immediately processed.

~! The licensee was informed of the appar nt violation discussed in i

paragraph 3 above. The inspector also informed the licensee that the [

j matter regarding timeliness of processing tertaination reports would be  !

,

given further in office review, and the licensee needed to established a  !

4

firm date as to when the TLD results had been received onsite. The SRH t

stated that he would investigate the matter and inform the inspecter of  :

a

his findings by telephone (paragraph 3). '

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