IR 05000312/1988008

Insp Rept 50-312/88-08 on 880307-22.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Capabilities for Mgt & Implementation of Effective Liquid & Gaseous Effluents Program After Restart

ML20153C796
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	04/21/1988
From:	Cillis M, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20153C789	List: IR 05000312/1988008 ML20153C785
References
50-312-88-08, 50-312-88-8, NUDOCS 8805060321
Download: ML20153C796 (15)

Text

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-312/88-08 Docket No. 50-312 License No. DPR-54 Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District 14440 Twin Cities Road Herald, California 95638-9799 Facility Name: Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Inspection at: Clay Station and Sacramento, California Inspection Conducted: March 7-11, 1988, March 16, 1988 and Marci 22, 1988 Inspectors: l' //

M. Cillis, Senior Radiation Specialist Date' Signed Approved by: . _ 'M21/KY G. P.(TDM , Chief Date Signed Faciltt(ies Radiological Protection Section Summary:

Inspection on March 7-11, March 16 and March 22, 1988 (Report No. 50-312/88-08)

Areas Inspected: Special unannounced inspection by a regionally based inspector to review the licensee's capabilities for the management and implementation of an effectiva liquid and gaseous effluents program after restart; review the status of unresolved item 88-07-01 related to a potential overexposure reported by the licensee on February 4,1988; review the licensee's Radiation Protection, Chemistry and Radwaste organization; including a review of the Radiation Protection, Chemistry and Radwaste staff qualification and training program, review of followup items, and a tour of the facilit Inspection procedures 30703, 83722, 83723, 92701 and 92702 were addresse In addition a management meeting was held on March 16, 1988, to discuss the apparent skin exposure incident described in LER 88-03 and Inspection Report 50-312/88-0 Results: Of the six areas inspected, two apparent violations related to unresolved item 88-07-01 were identified involvin0 failure to achere to radiation protection procedures, Technical Specifications 6.11, paragraph S(d)

and failure to provide instructions to workers, 10 CFR Part 19.12, paragraph 5(d), were identifie The licensee's performance in the remair.ing areas that were examined met the regulatory requirements. As a result of the inspection findings and the management meeting Region V found that the radiation protection program was adequate to support restar PDR ADOCK 05000312 Q DCD

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i DETAILS l

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1. Persons Contacted  :

(a). Licensee G. Carl Andognini, Chief Executive Officer, Nuclear

• + Croley, Assistant General Manager, Technical and Administrative i-Services

+J. Fir 11t, Assistant General Manager, Nuclear Power Production I

+J. Vinquist, Director, Nuclear Quality ,

• J. McColligan, Director, Plant Services

+D. Keuter, Director, Operations and Maintenance

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• + Turner, Manager, Nuclear Training

• + Crunk, Manager, Licensing

• + Lavely, Manager, Environmental Protection

• + Kellie, Plant Services Technical Assistant

• +J..Reese, Radiation Health Superintendent

• E. Yochhein, Manager, Chemistry

• D. LeGare, Quality Assurance Engineer  ;

.R. Bowser, Radiation Protection /ALARA Technical Support r Superintendent >

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• +S. Nicolls, Radiation Protection Superintendent c+P. Howard, Radiation Protection Supervisor

+W. Tearney, Radiation Protection Supervisor H. Story, Health Physics Services / Environmental Services Superintendent

, (b) Contractor Personnel  ;

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(1) United Energy Services I i

• '9. Hinsley, Acting Radiation Protection Manager R. Baron, Health Physics Supervisor ,

• +0. Compton, Licensing Engineer W. Wadman, Acting Environmental Programs Supervisor J. Robertson, Licensing Engineer A. Kamrowski, Health Physics / Chemistry Services Engineer (2) IMPELL

• +R. Jones, Licensing Engineer (3) Others ,

• +A. Bonino, Hot Particle Program Manager  !

+ Harris, Acting Radiation Protection Manager

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(c) U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

+Ross A. Scarano, Director, Radiation Safety and Safeguards  ;

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+ A. Wenslawski, Chief. Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch

+A. Johnson, Enforcement Officer

• T. D'Angelo, Senior Resident Inspector

+G. P. Yuhas, Chief, Facilities Radiological Protection Section

• Denotes attendance at the exit interview held on March 11, 198 + Denotes attendance at the management meeting held on March 16, 1988.

l The inspector also met and held discussions with other members of the licensee's and contractor staf . Liquid and Gaseous Effluent Program An examination of the licensee's radiological effluent program established to support restart was conducte Discussions were held with 4 Health Physics / Environmental Services Superintendent (HP/ESS), having l responsibility for implementation and maintenance of the effluent  !

program In addition, the following documents / procedures were reviewed: l i

Document / Procedure Subject / Title ,

l Radiological Environmental Various-Health Physics Implementing I Monitoring Program Manual Procedures Contained in the Manual Environmental Monitoring Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM),

Manual Revision 5, dated 12/27/87 Radiological Effluent Proposed Amendment (PA)-155, Revision 2 Technical Specifications dated 12/23/87 (RETS)

SMUD Nemorandum, GCA, Radioactive Liquid Effluent System 87-810, dated 1/13/88 Evaluation SMUD Memorandum, GCA,87-916 Radioactive Liquid Effluent System dated 1/7/88 Description Supplement SMUD Memorandum, GCA,88-068 Radiological Effluents Action Plan dated 2/3/88 SMUD Memorandum, GCA,88-074 Radiological Effluent Control Manual dated 2/19/88 SMUD Memorandum, GCA,88-087 Response to two Action Items resulting from the November 13, 1987 Meeting of SMUD and tr.e NRC on Radiological Effluents SMUD Memorandum, GCA,88-096 Proposed Amendment (PA) - 155, Revision 2, dated 2/11/88 Supplement 1 SMUD Memorandum, GCA,88-124 Response to one action item resulting from dated 3/11/88 the November 13, 1987 meeting of SMUD and

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I the NRC on Radiological Effluents Effluent Procedures Effluent Overview, EP 88801 Training - Lesson Plan Effluent Procedures Liquid Releases, ED 88802 Training - Lesson Plan NRC Inspection Report Enforcement Items: 86-15-01, 86-15-03, 50-312/86-15, dated 86-15-05 and 86-15-09 June 6, 1986 SMUD Memorandum, RJR86-135, Special Inspection Report 86-15 dated 4/17/86 SMUD Memorandum, JEW 86-169, NRC Inspection Report 86-15 dated 7/3/86 SMUD Memorandum, GCA 87-483, Revised response to Apparent Violations dated 10/8/87 Identified in NRC Inspection Report N The examination also included a review of the licensee's organization assigned the responsibility for implementing the liquid and gaseous effluent program The examination disclosed the following:

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a). The corrective actions, related to enforcement items 86-15-01, 86-15-03, 86-15-05 and 86-15-09 were verified to be compitste as discussed in the licensee's responses dated July 5, 1986 and October 8, 198 b). Procedures for control and management of effluent releares had been revised for the purpose of assuring compliance with 10 0FR Part 50, Appendix I and with Proposed Amendment-155 of the Technical Specification Personnel responsible for the implemeatation of l these procedures were in the process of being trained during the i inspection period.

p c). The radioactive liquid effluent treatment system nodifications, ODCM l changes and the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) l were verified to be consistent with the information orovided in 1 Section 4.3 of the Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER), )

NUREG-128 d). The licensee had developed a comprehensive radioloriical effluents ;

action plan to ensure the plant will operate within the 10 CFR Part i 50, Appendix I guidelines. The three phase plan is geared to I evaluate and implement additional hardware /operat'.onal enhancements such as:

Reducing the Lower Level of Detection (LLDs) to 10% of 10 CFR 50, Appendix ! values l

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Improving capability of processing equipment

Increase Cesium primary side filtration capability e). The licensee's Environmental Protection (EP) group staff had assumed responsibility for the verification and validation of all liquid and gaseous effluent release This task was previously a responsibility shared by the Chemistry and Radiation Protection grou f). The licensee's new Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program Manual includes a commitment of the SMUD Board and Rancho Seco management to comply with the Technical Specifications and to'other applicable regulations and-codes by implementing an effective environmental sampling program. Controlling procedures for assuring compliance with the regulations are provided in the REMP manua g). -The Environmental Programs Manager (EPM' , has been tasked with providing a trained staff to support the liquid and gaseous effluent programs upon restar The EPH has also been tasked to certify that all previous commitments and inspection findings in the effluent programs conducted by the site Quality Assurance group, INPO, NRC and other independent groups, have been resolved prior to criticality, h). The HP/ESS informed the inspector that the licensee was prepared to implement the new radiological effluents program as soon as NRC had approved the TS amendment PA-15 The inspector determined that the SMUD board and plant management has made a strong commitment to ensure that effluent releases will be maintained within the guidelines established by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I. The inspector concluded that the licensee's liquid and gaseous effluent program was acceptable to support restar No violations or deviations were identifie . Radiation Protection. Plant Chemistry and Radwaste Organization and Management Controls: Organization The licensee's radiation protection, plant chemistry and radwaste organization has not changed from what is described in Inspection Report 50-312/86-11, paragraph 2. The inspector found that the organization was consistent with the licensee's commitments made to support restar No violations or deviations were identifie Staffing Discussi9ns with the licensee's staff disclosed that radiation protection, plant chemistry and radwaste staffing are reviewed annually by SMUD managemen Staffing needs for outages are

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reviewed well in advance of an outage. Normally, the permanent plant staff is augmented with contractor personnel during maintenance or refueling outage period A review of the current radiation protection, chemistry and radwaste organization disclosed the following:

The previous Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) was recently assigned as a Technical Adviser to the Director of Plant Service The RPM was replaced with a contractor RP *

Sixty-one of the sixty-nine positions approved in radiation protection were fille *

The Chemistry Superintendent, two Assistant Chemistry Superintendents, Chemical Control Superintendent, and Chemistry Support Superintendent's positions were filled with contractar personne *

The radiation protection technician group was augmented with a contractor staff of nineteen radiation protection technician The above observations were discussed with the licensee's staff during the exit intervie The inspector was informed that the licensee's Human Resources group was in the process of recruiting personnel to fill the vacant and contractor slots that currently exis The inspector concluded that the licensee's staffing was adequate to support restar No violations or deviations were identifie C. Radiation Protection Manager (RPM)/ Chemistry Manager (CM)

An examination was conducted to determine if the RPM and CM had adequate responsibility, authority and management support to ensure adequate control of their areas of responsibilit The inspector determined through discussions, observations and review of Rancho Seco Administrative Procedure (RSAP)-1,

"Responsibilities and Authority" that both the RPM and CM had adequate management support to implement an effective radiation protection and chemistry program. Both the RPM and CM appear to receive the full support of upper management in most decisions they mak No violations or deviations were identifie D. Audits and Appraisals See paragraph 4, herei No violations or deviations were identifie .

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. Training and Qualifications, General Employee Training (GET), Radiation Safety, Plant Chemistry, Radwaste and Transportation j Training i

An examination was performed for the purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of training programs for non-licensed plant staff such '

as radiation protection and chemistry technicians, and staff members who have responsibilities in the areas of radwaste and transportatio :

The examination included the review of Licensee Event Reports (LERs), non-reportable licensee events and discussions with plant personnel for training related matter The examination also included a review of the licensee's GET program and of audits conducted pursuant to TS, Section 6.5.2.8(b). TS, Section 6.5.2.8(b)

requires that the performance, training and qualifications of the .

entire facility staff be examined at least once per yea '

Discussions related to this subject area were held with the RPM, Chemistry Manager and Training Manage Paragraph 2(c) of Region V Inspection Report 50-312/88-01 discusses

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the licensee's training program for workers involved in radwaste and transportation activities. This training program was found to be adequat .

The inspector was informed that INPO had just recentiv completed a review of the licensee's accreditation training program for non-licensed plant staff such as radiation protection and chemistry technicians. The staff reported that an INPO board will be convened i on or about April 19, 1988 to consider Rancho Seco accreditatio .

Licensee audit report, number 87-A-138, dated February 25, 1988, [

evaluated the performance, training and qualifications of the Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Nuclear Engineering, Nuclear Operations, Security, Nuclear Training and maintenance group pursuant to TS, Section 6.5.2.8(b) requirement The audit team <

concluded that the Rancho Seco training and qualification programs  ;

were in compliance with the regulatory requirement t A review of training aspects of LER 88-03 involving a potential r overexposure (skin) due to a hot Cobalt-60 particle is discussed in paragraph 5(d) of this repor Additional information related to LER 88-03 is discussed in Region V Inspection Report 50-312/88-0 Qualifications e The inspector verified through discussions and a review of  !

appropriate records that the new RPM met the qualifications l recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG)-1.8, "Qualification and '

Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants." The qualifications of Rancho Seco and contractor radiation protection and chemistry ,

technicians were also verified to be consistent with TS, Section 6.3, "Facility Staff Qualifications." TS, Section 6.3 requires each

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member of the unit staff shall meet or exceed the minimum l qualifications of ANSI N18.1-1971, "Selection and Training of .i Nuclear Power Plant Personnel."

No violations or violations were identifie l Followup Items

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l The status of NRC enforcement items, unresolved items and inspector  ;

identified items from previous inspections were examined. The inspection .;

disclosed the followin > Enforcement Items

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(Closed) Enforcement Items 50-312/86-15-01, 50-312/86-15-0 l 50-312/86-15-05 and 86-15-09: These items are addressed in i paragraph This matter is close i

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(Closed) Enforcement Items 50-312/86-06-05: This enforcement item t is identified as items 0.2 and 0.3 in the Notice of Violation in the i NRC letter dated October 22, 1986. The violation identified that l the licensee's staff had failed to implement procedure AP.305-28, i

"MPC Determination at Site Boundary from Radioactive Releases" and annunciator response procedure H2PSA-7 during the December 26, 1985 plant transient. With the exception of training, Inspection Report

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50-317/86-37 verified that all of the licensee's corrective actions :

reported in their response to the NOV had been complete The j inspector verified that the training had been completed during this ;

inspection period. This matter is close ( Followup Items f

(Closed) Followup Item 50-312/87-05-01 identified that Quality Assurance findings had not been resolved in a timely manner. A {

review of this item during this inspection disclosed that all of the i audit findings had been adequately resolve This matter is close ! Licensee Event Reports (LER) ,

(Closed) LER 88-01-LO: This LER identified that an air sample taken I during a reactor building purge on December 26, 1987 was lost before ;

an analysis for gross alpha activity could be accomplishe The i analysis results for gross gamma activity which had been completed j before the sample was lost were less than the Lower Limit of .

Detection (LLD). The failure to perform a gross alpha analysis of E the air sample is a violation of TS, Table 4.22-1. A review of this i event was conducted. The inspector verified that the corrective  !

actions specified in the LER had been complated. The corrective  !

actions appeared to be adequate for preventing a recurrence of this !

even This matter is closed, Unresolved Item j

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. 8 (_0cen) Unresolved Item 50-312/88-07-01: On March 8, 1988, Licensee Event Report (LER) 88-03, was submitted to Region V pursuant to 10 i CFR Part 20.405 (a)(1)(iv). The LER reported that a "hot particle" of Cobalt-60 was found on the pant leg of a maintenance worker. The skin dose estimate to the worker was determined to be 523 rem to a 1 cm2 area behind the left kne A review of the LER was conducted by the inspector and Region V staf It should be noted it was initially assumed by the licensee's staff that all radiation protection technicians assigned to provide coverage for the repair of the Decay Heat Cooler Pump had read and

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understood procedures for establishing and maintaining a "Hot Particle Zones". However, during this inspection it was determined that at least one Radiation Protection Technician had not attended training related to the licensee's "Hot Particle Program" and had not reviewed related procedures for establishing and controlling

"Hot Particle Zones".

The description of the event and probable cause of the event described in the LER was consistent with the information documented in Inspection Report 50-312/88-07. LER 88-03 states in part:

"Cause of the Event

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In September 1987, Rancho Seco's Health Physics and Chemistry

, Services division developed a proposed hot particle program, in accordance with IE Notice 87-39. Radiation Protection had begun to

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implement the program in a phased manner. Training for the program had not been completed, nor were all proposed program components in plac The following specific causes led to the overexposure:

1) Radiation Protection personnel failed to adhere to approved

, radiation protection procedures regarding radiological precautions for hot particle zone The work area was not conspicuously posted as a hot particle zone, Radiation Protection did not provide continucus coverage throughout the

job, and the workers left the work area without being frisked.

2) Due to inadequate communication between Radiation /rotection

] personnel, the RWP was not revised to reflect that a hot

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particle zone had been established. Had the RWP been revised, !

{ there may have been a higher level of awareness regarding the

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potential radiation exposure problems associated with the work

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j 3) Inadequate communications between Radiation Protection l Technicians resulted in poor job turnove ) Due to inadequate training of RPTs and radiation workers regarding hot particle precautions, the individuals involved

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I ;did not have a full understanding of the required radiological precautions nor did they appreciate the radiological .

implications of the work being performe ,

l 5) The attitude exhibited by many of the individuals involved was casual.and inappropriate when compared to the potential radiation exposure problems associated with the work being performed.

! 6) The workers did not comply with specific instructions provided l l by the Radiation Protection Program. This included the welder !

i not performing a proper frisk before changing into his street clothe !

i 7) Radiation Protection Supervisors did not inspect the work area to ensure the adequacy of the hot particle precautions." '

It should be noted:

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Technical Specifications Section 6.11 requires that procedures for l personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the !

requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, maintained, i and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation !

exposur Requirements established in the licensee's Radiation Control Manual I for controlling personnel exposure are as follows:  :

(1) Licensee Radiation Protection procedure (RP) 305-7, "Ares i Definitions and Posting', Section 6.7 requires: (1) Hot Particle Zones (HPZ) to be conspicuously posted as a Contaminated Area per 6.6 with a Hot Particle Zone Sign (b)

entry into HPZ requires continuous radiation protection ,

coverage, and (c) personnel exiting from HPZs are required to (

be surveyed to ensure they are free of hot particle Contrary to these procedural requirements: l L

(a) A HPZ established for the repair of "A" Decay Heat Cooler Pump drain line, on February 3-4, 1988, had not been conspicuously posted with an HPZ sig (b) Continuous radiation protection coverage had not been provided for work performed in an established HPZ for the period between 1130 p.m. PST on February 3, 1988 through 0700 a.m. on February 4, 198 (c) Personnel exiting from a HPZ established in the "A" Decay Heat Cooler Pump room had not been surveyed to ensure they were free of hot particle (2). RP.305-98, paragraph 6.2.1, requires that all personnel who have been in a posted contaminated area to conduct a whole oody frisk as close as possible to the exit point, but, in any case t

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. prior to donning additional clothing or leaving a Controlled Are Paragraphs 6.3.1.3 and 6.3.1.7 of_RP.305-98 require that a Radiation Protectior. Technician (RPT) be notified ( contacted) whenever contamination is discovered during the performance of a whole body frisk. RP.305, Article 2,.

"Responsibilities of Workers", regt' ires that worker use proper frisking techniques when exiting contaminated areas and to notify a Radiation Protection Technician or supervisor or Control Room of any skin or clothing contaminatio Contrary to these procedural requirements, at approximately 0630 am (PST) nn February 4,1988, a worker exiting from the

"A" Decay Heat Cooler Pump room which was a posted contaminated area, failed to perform a whole body frisk prior to donning his clothing and failed to notify a RPT, supervisor or the Control Room that he was potentially contaminate Failure to adhere to procedures as described in (1) and (2)

above is considered an apparent violation of TS, Section 6.11 (88-08-01).

(3). 10 CFR Part 19.12, "Instructions to workers, requires in part, that all .ndividuals working in or frequenting any portion of a restricted area shall be kept informed of the storage, transfer, or use of radioactive materials or of radiation in such portions of the restricted area; shall be instructed in the health protection problems associated with exposure to such radioactive materials or radiation,_and in precautions or procedures to minimize exposure. The extent of these instructions shall be commensurate with potential radiological health protection problems in the restricted are Contrary to the above, on February 3-4, 1988 at least two workers were permitted to work on the "A" Decay Heat Cooler Pump without being instructed on the precautions and procedures to minimize their exposure to highly radioactive particle In addition, after being aware of the potential radiological consequences due to highly radioactive particles during February 3-4, 1988, a contract radiation protection technician providing coverage for the repair of the "A" Decay Heat Cooler Pump had not been instructed in the precautions or procedures to minimize his exposure and the exposures to co-workers, failure to instruct the workers and radiation protection technician on the potential health protection problems, radiological consequences frem exposure to highly radioactive particles and the precautions and procedures to minimize exposure is considered an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 19.12 (88-08-02).

The inspector brought the above observations to the licensee's attention at the exit interview conducted on March 11, 198 The licensee's staff informed the inspector that their assessment of the event and violations were consistent with the

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. inspectors' observations.. The licensee added that correcti"e actions, described in "Hot Particle Action Plan" which was developed for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of a similar event had been~ implemented. The licensee added that the action plan includes provisions for correcting both direct and indirect causes for the event. The staff added that an-intensive "Hot Particle" training program for workers and radiation protection technicians-had been developed and implemented. The training is expected to be completed in time to support restart of the plant on or about the week of March 20, 198 A meeting was held between the NRC Region V management staff and SMUD management staff on March 16, 1988 to discuss implications of the February 4,1988 potential overe :posure event as described in LER 88-0 The agenda discussed at the meeting is as follows:

(1) SMUD's basis for continued confidence in the capabilities of the radiation protection program, including craft workers' adherence to procedures, in light of events '

leading up to the potential overexposure that occurred on February 4,198 (2) SMUD's assessment of the effects of recent changes in personnel in the position of Radiation Protection Manager (e.g. staff morale, management direction, etc).

(3) SMUD's evaluation of the need for additional QA involverent in light of commitments made to NRC during an enforcement conference on September 28, 1984 as discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-312/84-2 (4) The training program outlined in LER 88-03, priorities and scheduling and the training to assure that all radiation protection technicians are well versed in the hot particle control' program prior to being assigned to a job involving such control (5) SMUD's assessment of training needed to emphasize applications beyond the scope of the hot particle control program (i.e. poor communications, poor shift turnover, etc).

(6) The schedule for completion of the evaluation of the potential overexposur The Arsistant General Manager, Nuclear Power Production (AGM/NPP), stated that the event shouldn't have happened. He stated that SMUD management view the event more as a "people problem" rather than a breakdown of the plants' radiation protection progra People problems identified were characterized as:

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Procedure adherence (by radiation protection and the worker)

Poor communication

Casual attitude

Inadequate supervision j The AGM/NPP identified that there were secondary and/or contributing cause These were characterized a j Inadequate worker training

Inadequate radiation protection technician training Incomplete Hot Particle program procedures Improvements in radiation protection program since December of 1985 were discussed at the meetin The licensee stated that recent changes in the position of Radiation Protection Manager did not have an effect on the performance of the Radiation Protection Progra The morale and attitudes of the plant staff with respect to the recent change was reviewed by SMUD management and was found to have improved. The licensee stated the morale and attitudes of the plant staff was and would continue to be closely monitored by SMUD managemen Improvements in the following areas have been or were in the process of being implemented:

Communications Shift turnovers Supervisory involvement The licensee informed the NRC staff of the following training programs that had or were implemented since the February 4, 1988 event:

Effective communication training Task Qualification Program

Hot Particle Trainin s The licensee stated that workers and/or radiation protection technicians will not be assigned duties in a Hot Particle Zone unless they have completed the Hot Particle Training cours Additional training improvements in training programs planned for includes Radiological Safety and Work Quality Trainin This training program emphasizes such areas as:

Procedure adherence

Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Requirements

Hot Particle awareness Attention to Detail Importance for quality work and a quality Radiation f Protection progra _ - - - - - - -

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l Another improvement item discussed was the licensee' i Management Action Plan which was implemented as a result of a discussion held between the Region V Regional Administrator and-Rancho Seco Chief Executive Officer. The purpose of the 1 Management Action Plan is to make workers aware of management's l expectations for assuring the health and safety of the. worker j and public are maintained. The plan emphasizes the need for: '

Procedure adherence

Attention to details Improved supervicion

Improved planning

Improved work control Holding people accountable for their actions

Professionalism Team work

Self-critical

Safety responsibilities Tho licensee's Quality Assurance Manager stated that steps will be taken to enhance Quality Assurance's involvement in radiation protectio The QA Manager stated that field

' inspections, surveillances and audits would continue to place emphasis on quality performance in the area of radiation protectio The AGM/NPP concluded by stating that the "Hot Particle" event was a significant occurrence which was an embarrassment to SMU He added significant improvements had been made and will continue to be made in the future as a result of the lesson learned from the event. The AGM/NPP stated that Rancho Seco management had confidence in the people and that the radiation protection program was ready for restar The licensee informed the Region V staff that the schedule for evaluation of the potential overexposure received by the worker would be completed by June 2, 1988 or sooner. The inspector informed the licensee that NRC open item number 50-312/88-07-01 would be examined upon completion of their determination of the exposure that was received by the worker involved in the February 4,1988 event As a result of the inspection findings discussed in paragraphs 3 and 4 and the management meeting. Region V found that the licensee's radiation protection program was adequate to support restar . Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more Information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or deviations. An unresolved item involving the determination of skin exposure is discussed in paragraph 4, abov . Facility Tour

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Several tours of the licensee's facility were conducted during the inspection. Personnel frisking and entry to and egress from controlled areas and/or contaminated areas were observed during the inspection period. In addition, independent radiation measurements were performed during the tour with a Eberline, Model R0-2, ion chamber survey instrument, Serial No. 837, that was due for calibration on May 29, 198 The following observations were made:

Plant cleanliness continued ~co improve over what was observed during the previous inspectio No unmonitored personnel were observed in the areas that were toure All portable radiation detection instruments observed were in current calibratio *

Personnel frisking habits were consistent with posted instruction Posting and labeling practices were consistent with 10 CFR Part 20.203,

"Caution Signs, Labels, Signals and Controls."

No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph i 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on March 11, 198 The scope and findings of the inspection were summarize The apparent violations and unresolved item discussed in paragraph 5(d)

were brought to the licensee's attention at the March 11, 1988, exit meetin ,

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