IR 05000312/1987012

Insp Rept 50-312/87-12 on 870413-17.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Inspector Identified Items,Part 21 & Lers.Insp Procedures 30702,92700,92702 & 36100 Covered During Insp

ML20214R392
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	05/04/1987
From:	Richards S, Wagner W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML20214R366	List: IR 05000312/1987012 ML20214R363
References
50-312-87-12, NUDOCS 8706080108
Download: ML20214R392 (5)

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s U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i

REGION V

Report N /87-12

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Docket N .

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License N DPR-54

Licensee: Sacramento Municipal Utility District

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P. O. Box 15830 Sacramento, California 95813

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Facility Name: Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD)

Inspection Conducted

April 13-17, 1987 f

Inspected by: // ).

, Rdsctor h 3/ 4- f S //

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W. ld spect6'r Da46Sijded Approved by: S/'/f87 i S. Richards, Chief, Engineering Section Da'te Signed Summary: ,_

Inspection on April 13-17, 1987 (Report No. 50-312/87-12)

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i Areas Inspected: Routine unannounced inspection by regional based inspector

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of licensee action on inspector identified items, Part 21 and Licensee Event Report Inspection procedures 30702, 92700, 92702, and 36100 were covered

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Results: No violations of NRC requirements or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS Persons Contacted

• R. Day, Deputy Nuclear Plant Manager

• G. Clefton, Nuclear Maintenance Manager

• R. Cherba, QE Supervisor

• L. Rouen, Associate QA Engineer

• C. Stephenson, Regulatory Compliance Supervisor

• S. Wellsfry, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor

• S. Farkas, Regulatory Compliance Engineer

• J. Robertson, Nuclear Licensing Engineer T. Shewski, QA Engineer E. Wood, Nuclear Documents Supervisor D. Brock, Maintenance Program Supervisor M. Price, Mechanical Facilities Superintendent J. Gaor, Mechanical Engineer P. Grazier, Associate Mechanical Engineer

• Denotes those attending the exit meeting on April 17, 1987. Licensee Action on Previously Inspector Identified Items (Closed) Notice of Violation No. 50-312/86-21-02: " Inappropriate Acceptance Criteria for Functional Testing of Snubbers" This violation addresses the licensee's failure to include appropriate acceptance criteria in their procedure for functional testing of safety-related snubbers. Specifically, the acceptance criteria of

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Procedure SP 201.10B did not compensate for the effects of temperature i when determining the acceptance limits for lock-up velocity, as recommended by the respective vendor The licensee acknowledged the violation in their letter (JEW 87-225) to Region V dated February 23,

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198 The snubber manufacturers, Bergen-Paterson and ITT Grinell, supplied information to the licensee revealing that, as the test temperature i

increases, snubber lock-up velocity and bleed rates also increas Therefore, the temperature at which the functional test is performed needs to be known in order to accurately assess the snubbers'

operability. The inspector reviewed the snubber vendor manuals located in the Technical Manual Library which revealed that the Borgen-Paterson technical manual contained information stating that the effect of temperature must be considered when performing functional tests; this

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information was available since 1977. The licensee identifies the root cause of this violation to be insufficient documentation of the interaction with the vendor in 1979 when procedure SP 201.10B (Safety System Hydraulic Snubber Functional Testing) was written. In addition, the biannual review process for procedures during the period did not specifically require inclusion of new vendor information into the reviewed procedures. Inspector's discussions with maintenance and QA personnel indicated there was no reason to question the adequacy of the

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acceptance criteria and, consequently, it was assumed that temperature effects were considered. The corrective actions taken to assure that vendor information is incorporated into the surveillance program include revision of procedure AP.27 and Enclosure 4.7 of AP.2.01. Temporary Procedure Change (TPC) No. 87-0305 of March 20, 1987, to AP.27, " Biannual Procedure Reviews," revises Section 3.5 by requiring procedure reviews in accordance with Enclosure 4.7. TPC No. 87-0301 revised Enclosure 4.7,

" Procedure Review Checklist," to assure the use of vendor supplied information in the development and review of procedures (specifically

, acceptance criteria) for safety-related equipment supplied to the licensee. In addition to these procedures, the inspector reviewed AP.46,

" Control of Vendor Technical Manuals," Revision 4, of March 30, 198 It

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was noted that AP.46 designates Nuclear Engineering Document Control i (NEDC) as the central receipt point for all vendor / supplier technical manuals and documents, and requires personnel receiving vendor technical documents to forward them to NED The inspector is satisfied that the present program has been adequately strengthened so that vendor

information, when received, is incorporated into maintenance and surveillance procedures to assure that equipment is capable of performing its safety functio The inspector reviewed several NCRs written to identify snubbers which could not meet the new acceptance criteria. NCR's S-5741 and 5-5880 established the rew snubber acceptance criteria based on ambient temperature of the snubber at the time of testing and correlated to the design temperature of the cperating environmen NCR S-6148 identified 61 out of a total of 139 safety-related snubbers, that were previously tested and installed prior to the development of the new acceptance criteria. Since the actual test temperature was not recorded, the lowest temperature for the day was used as the snubber test temperature for evaluating the functionability of these snubbers. This

temperature was received from the plant meteorological tower or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for the City of Sacrament The inspector noted that Procedure MT.020, " Snubber Functional Testing," was recently revised to include recording of functional testing room ambient temperature. Fifty of the 61 snubbers

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were dispositioned accept as-is based on engineering calculation

. Z-ZZZ-M2026, which provided justification for the new acceptance criteri The remaining eleven were removed from the plant and tested;

! six did not meet the new acceptance criteria. These six were subsequently evaluated by engineering and deemed operable and would perform their design function. The inspector discussed these evaluations with licensee engineering personnel; specifically calculation Z-ZZZ-M2181 for Snubber No. 140. The piping seismic analysis for the piping system was performed by assuming that Snubber No.140 was inactive and then determining the actual velocity of the piping system in the direction the

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snubber is meant to ac The snubber would be deemed acceptable if its

. lock-up velocity is equal to or less than the velocity of the pip For

Snubber No.140, the lock-up velocity was 54 inches per minute which is considerably less than the pipe velocity of 183 inches per minute. The

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upper bound lock-up velocity of these snubbers during a seismic event, which is supported by calculation Z-ZZZ-M2026, also established the new a

acceptance criteria of SP 20.108, Revision 1 NCR S-5656 addresses the 78 remaining safety-related snubbers. Sixty-two were satisfactory tested to the new acceptance criteria. Thirteen of the 16 remaining are scheduled for functional testing during the upcoming decay heat outage Three of the 16 DHS snubbers were removed prior to i

the decay heat outage for testing, causing initiation of Licensee Event Report (LER) 86-1 These three snubbers were found acceptable based on

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evaluations similar to that for Snubber No. 140. With closure of NCR S-5656, all safety-related hydraulic snubbers will have been rebuilt with snubber seals replaced, if the expected service life is due to expire prior to next refueling outage, and functionally tested to the new acceptance criteria of SP 201.108, Revision 1 Based on the licensee's corrective actions and the inspector's examination of the licensee's stated actions, this violation is close . Licensee Action on LERs (0 pen) LER 87-11: Snubbers Found Out-of-Tolerance per New Temperature Compensated Acceptance Criteria This LER reported that previous testing done on hydraulic snubbers used

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inadequate acceptance criteria which allowed snubbers to be declared l

operable when it was later demonstrated that they were not operable based l on the corrected acceptance criteria. The LER describes this as an event

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where the plant was in a condition prohibited by the Technical Specifications and which alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, and where a single cause or condition rendered multiple trains inoperable.

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Several NCRs have been written addressing this type of event as described in Section 2 of this inspection report. The inspector is satisfied that the licensee's corrective actions taken will assure that the 139

! safety-related snubbers will perform their design functions, and that procedural changes should prevent recurrence of this event.

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As addressed in Section 2 of this inspection report, the inspector did i discuss, with licensee engineering personnel, the engineering evaluation and design calculations which concludes that the snubbers would perform their design functions. This conclusion, based on a new acceptance criteria for both test lock-up velocity and bleed velocity, is supported by design calculation Z-ZZZ-M2026. ,~.s of this inspection, the engineering department was in process of drafting a letter describing

' their evaluation, results, and conclusions regarding the operability of l these snubbers and their effect on the supported piping systems. This letter will be the basis for issuing a revised LER 87-11. LER 87-11 will remain open pending in-office review of the revised LE l

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4. Licensee Action on Part 21 Items (Closed) Part 21 No. 84-00-P: Potential Problem with BBC Brown Boveri,

) Inc. Voltage Balance Relay (ITE-60)

The licensee issued letter EMM 87-45 on March 26, 1987, stating that

"...the ITE voltage balance relays model ITE-60 addressed in the Brown Boveri memo are not used at Rancho Seco in any safety related systems."

This item is close . Exit Meeting The inspector met with licensee management representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on April 17, 1987. The scope of the inspection and the inspector's findings as noted in this report were discussed.

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