ML20150F057

Insp Rept 50-382/88-04 on 880201-0315.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Operational Safety Verification,Onsite Followup of Events,Monthly Maint Observation,Esf Sys Walkdown,Monthly Surveillance Observation & Plant Status

ML20150F057
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	03/29/1988
From:	Chamberlain D, Will Smith, Staker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20150F042	List: ML20150F039 ML20150F052 ML20150F057
References
50-382-88-04, 50-382-88-4, NUDOCS 8804040252
Download: ML20150F057 (8)

See also: IR 05000382/1988004

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APPENDIX B

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/88-04 Operating License: NPF-38

Docket: 50-382

Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)

142 Delaronde Street

New Orleans, Louisiana 70174

Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3

Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted: February 1 through March 15, 1988

Inspectors: .ad 3fM !88

p W. Smittt, Sdhio Resident Inspector Date

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Approved:

sectio # Chief, Projects

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Sectifn A, Division of Reactor Projects

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted February 1 through March 15, 1988 (Report 50-382/88-04)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection consisting of:

(1) operational safety verification, (2) monthly maintenance observation,

(3) onsite followup of events, (4) engineered safety feature (ESF) system

walkdown, (5) monthly surveillance observation, (6) followup of previously

identified items, (7) licensee event report followup, (8) cold weather

preparation, and (9) plant status.

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Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified. This

violation involved a failure to adhere to fire protection procedures

(paragraph 2).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Principal Licensee Employees

J. G. Dewease, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

• N. S. Carns, Plant Manager, Nuclear

P. V. Prasankumar, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Support

D. P. Packer, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance

J. J. Zabrits.ki, Manager, Operations Quality Assurance (QA)

L. W. Myers, Manager, Nuclear Operations Support and Assessments

J. R. McGaha, Manager, Nuclear Operations Engineering

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W. T. Labonte, Radiation Protection Superintendent

3. E. Baker, Manager, Events Analysis Reporting & Responses

• G. E. Wuller, Onsite Licensing Coordinator

D. W. Vinci, Maintenance Superintendent

A. F. Burski, Acting Manager, Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs

R. S. Starkey, Operations Superintendent

• C. R. Gaines, Events Analysis Supervisor i

• Denotes those present at the exit interview.

In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions

with various operations, engineering, technical support, maintenance, and

administrative members of the licensee's staff.

2. Operational Safety Verification

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The objectives of this portion of the inspection were to ensure that this

facility was being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory

l requirernents, to ensure that the licensee's management controls were

effectively discharging the licensee's responsibilities for continued safe

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operation, to assure that selected activities of the licensee's

radiological protection programs were implemented in conformance with

plant policies and procedures and in compliance with regulatory

requirements, and to inspect the licensee's compliance with the approved

physical security plan.

When onsite, the NRC inspector visited the control room daily. Control

room staffing, access, operator behavior, and shift turnovers were

observed. The NRC inspector reviewed operators' logs and control panels

to verify compliance with technical specification (TS) limiting conditions

for operation. No problems were identified.

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Routine tours of accessible areas of the plant were performed in order to t

observe housekeeping and general equipment condition. Several  ;

observations en plant housekeeping are identified in paragraph 5. The NRC :

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inspector also observed that personnel usud the proper dosimetry and

anticontamination devices during access to, and performed required ,

frisking during egress from, radiologically controlled areas.

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The NRC inspector observed the operation of the secondary alarm station

and the implementation of propec controls at the protected area access.

During tours, the NRC inspector verified that security barriers appeared

to be well maintained. '

On February 9,1988, during an engineered safety feature (ESF) system

inspection, the NRC inspector observed two 5 gallon, flammable safety cans

in the containment penetration room (wing area) on the -4 level of the

reactor auxiliary building. The two containers were enclosed in poly

bags, and health physics survey tags were attached indicating that the

cans contained reactor coolant pump lubrication oil and had been surveyed

on February 8, 1988. The NRC inspector observed that this was in conflict *

with Procedere FP-1-017, Revision 4, "Transient Combustiblos and Hazardous

Materials," which requires lubrication oils used by maintenance to he in

safety cans and stored in flammable liquid lockers when not in use. Two

previous failures to store combustible fluids in flammable liquids lockers ,

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were identified as NRC violations 382/8616-02 on August 19, 1986, and

i 382/8722-07 on October 6, 1987. Upon further investigation, the

NRC inspector observed that Enclosure 7.7 of Procedure FP-1-017 included a

list of transient combustibles storage areas in the plant. This list

, included a flammable liquid locker on the -4 level of the wing area.

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There was no storage locker in this area. The NRC inspector expressed ,

1 concern to the licensee that corrective actions taken to prevent a

1 recurrence of the previous similar violations were apparently inadequate

and required more senior management attention. Failure to adhere to fire

protection procedures is an apparent violation (382/8804-01).  ;

No other violations or deviations were identified.

3. Monthly Maintenance Observation

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The below listed station maintenance activities affecting safety-related

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systems and components were observed and documentation reviewed to

! ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved

procedures, TSs, and appropriate industry codes or standards:

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a. Work Authorization 01007788 - The NRC inspector observed the limit 1

, switch adjustment and verification during the performance of

preventive maintenance tasks on control room emergency filtration

unit "A" north outside air intake upstream isolation valve HVR-201A.

Work was performed per Procedure ME-7-008, Revision 6, "Motor

Operated Valve." The NRC inspector observed that during retesting,

, the valve stroke time met the acceptance criteria ^f

Procedure OP-903-032, Revision 5, "Quarterly ISI Valve Tests." The

! NRC inspector identified the following deficiencies in

j Procedure ME-7-008, Revision 6:

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(1) Step 8.1.5.1 and the preceeding note reference "Figure J" to

illustrate proper torque switch settings. There is no such

figuro in the procedure.

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(2) Step 8.2.7 incorrectly references Step 4.1.4. Step 4.1.3 should

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be referenced.

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(3) Step 8.3.1.4.a references "Figure G." The procedure contains no

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such figure.

(4) Step 8.3.1.4.b incorrectly references Step 8.3.1. Step 8.3.1.1

should be referenced.

(5) Step 8.4.8.3 states "disengage operator lever." This step

should state "depress declutch lever."

In addition to the above, the procedure includes steps to clean

electrical controls and contacts, check electrical terminations,

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inspect and adjust limit and torque switches, and install and remove

a temporary switch in series with control power. The steps for

establishing a safety clearance in order to perform these tasks 6

1 safely are required only if applicable, and no clearance was

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established. Instead, a power supply breaker was operated by

operations as reouested by the technicians performing the procedure.

The NRC inspector observed that the procedure did not include steps

to control the operation of this breaker in order to perform these

tasks in a safe manner when not using a safety clearance. This was ,

l identified to the licensee and change No. 5 to the procedure was '

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promptly issued to include these controls. The NRC inspector

observed that the change was incomplete because the pcwer supply

, breaker must be opened to perform Section 8.1 and Steps 8.3.1.1

and 8.4.12 in a safe manner. This was not included in the change.

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Followup of the licensee's correction of the above procedure i

deficiencies is an open item (382/8804-02). i

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b. Work Authorizations 01007687 and 1009300 - In response to NRC l

violation 382/8725-01, the licensee contacted the component cooling '

water dry cooling tower fan vendor (Hudson Products Corporation) to i

discuss fan failures due to the loosening of fan blade hub bolts. It

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j was determined that a modification to add lock washers to these bolts

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would reduce the probability of future fan failures. The NRC

inspector observed the implementation of this modification on dry

2 cooling tower fan 8A. The NRC inspector also observed preventive

maintenance tasks being performed on the fan and motor. The pitch of

J the fan blades (13 degrees) was measured and found to be acceptable.

The fan drive box lube oil was changed out. Vibration readings were

taken on the fan motor and drive box. No problems were noted.

No violations or deviations were identified,

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4. Onsite Followup of Events  ;

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On February 12, 1988, during review of a Plant Engineering Information '

Request, the licensee observed that the suction strainers on all three

essential services chilled water pumps were not in conformance with the

design documentation. Since the installed strainer body, pipe nipple, and

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attached blowdown valve were found not to be ASME Section III, Class 3, ,

certified as required, an engineering evaluation was performed, and it was

determined that the installed strainers would withstand postulated

transients. The licensee performed a safety evaluation per 10 CFR

i Part 50.59 and decided to continue operating while expediting strainer

replacement. All three suction strainers were replaced by February 15,

1988.

No violations or deviations were identified.

ESF System Walkdown

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5.

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The NRC inspector conducted a walkdown of the accessible portions of the

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Controlled Area Ventilation System to independently verify the operability ,

of the system. A review was performed to confirm that the licensee's i

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system operating procedure matched plant drawings and the as-built

configuration. Equipment condition, valve and breaker position,

housekeeping, labeling, permanent instrument indication, and apparent

operabiiity of support systems essential to actuation of the E5F system

were all noted as appropriate. The NRC inspector found no significant

j problems that would preclude the system from performing its intended

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safety functions.

) The NRC inspector identified the following items to licensee management ,

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for correction:

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! a. The control circuit light on controlled ventilation area system

i heater control panel "B," HVR-ECP-4651, was out.  :

l b. Instrument root valve HVR-331A was not labeled.

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c. Scaffolding installed in shutdown heat exchanger room "A" had an

installation tag which indicated that it would be removed by

j October 28, 1987. ,

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2 d. A ladder was found stored in the safeguards room "B" resting on

j seismic qualified piping.

! e. Condition Identification Tag No. 250706 was found resting on a

contaminated floor drain in the "A" shutdown heat exchanger room,

i The listed component was Valve SI-408A. The NRC inspector could not l

determine whether the tag was supposed to be attached to the valve or

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discarded (condition cleared).

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f. A condition identification tag dated February 5, 1986, was found i

installed on the "B" shutdown cooling heat exchanger stating "Leaking

boron on floor through gasket." No evidence of leakage was observed,

g. The piping to the oil bubbler installed on high pressure safety I

injection pump "A/B" was wrapped with several layers of masking tape,

h. A speaker in the corridor on the -4 elevation of the reactor

auxiliary building was observed to be muffled by installation of what

appeared to be a cloth sack.

Correction of the above items shall be tracked under an open

item (382/8804-03).

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Monthly Surveillance Observation

The NRC inspector observed surveillance testing listed below of

safety-related systems and components to verify that the activity was

being performed in accordance with the TSs. The applicable procedures

were reviewed for adequacy, test instrumentation was verified to be in

calibration, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and completeness.

The inspectors ascertained that any deficiencies identified were properly

reviewed and resolved,

a. Procedure MI-3-126, Revision 6, "Core Protection Calculator

Functional Test," was performed on core protection calculator

channel "A." On February 23, 1988, the NRC inspector observed

performance of the operating system and integrated diagnostic test, ,

power supply check, cabinet condition abnormal and temperature high

checks, analog meter comparison check, DNBR/LPD trip test, power fail

test, and addressable constant comparison. The NRC inspector noted  ;

that the addressable constants were identified as correct, and all l

procedural acceptance criteria were met.

b. Procedure OP-903-068, Revision 3, "Emergency Diesel Generator

Operability Verification." On March 8, 1988, the NRC inspector

witnessed performance of a manual remote start of Emergency Diesel

Generator (EDG) "A" to verify that the EDG would start and reach

design voltage and frequency within the 10 seconds required by the

TSs. The NRC inspector noted that the EDG met the acceptance

criteria, but within about 20 seconds, the EDG tripped due to low

turbocharger lubricating oil pressure. This was a spurious trip

caused by a feature normally bypassed when in the emergency mode and

has been previously identified as a problem with the trip feature ,

rather than a lack of lubricating oil. The licensee has plans to l

correct this condition during the refueling outage scheduled for

early April 1988. The trip was reset, and then the EDG was

successfully started on the next attempt within 10 seconds and fully

loaded within 176 seconds as required by the procedure. The licensee

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will report the trip to the NRC as a nonvalid failure in accordance

with TS 4.8.1.1.3. No other problems were identified. All

acceptance criteria were met, and the EDG operated smoothly under

full load without further incident.

No violations or deviations were identified. .

7. Followup of Previously Identified Items

(Closed) Open Item 382/8725-03: Followup of the licensee's implementation

of controls for field copies of QA procedures. The NRC inspector verified

that the licensee issued Revision 7 to Procedure QAP-002, "Preparation and

Revision of Quality Assurance Group Procedures," to require these

controls. The procedure now requires field copies of quality control

- procedures to be controlled in accordance with UNT-4-009, "Control,

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Distribution, Handling, and Use of P0M Procedures," to ensure that the

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latest revision is used.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup

The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The NRC inspector verified

that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified,

corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been

considered, and that the LER forms were complete. The NRC inspector

confirmed that unreviewed safety questions and violations of TSs, license i

conditions, or other regulatory requirements had been adequately ,

described. ,

(Closed) LER 382/87-10, "Isolation Valve Retest Not Performed Due to

Personnel Error."  !

l (Closed) LER 382/87-28, "Reactor Trip Due to a Failed Solenoid Valve

During Main Steam Isolation Valve Testing."

No violations or deviations were identified.

9. Cold Weather Preparation

The NRC inspector observed that Procedure OP-2-007, Revision 3 "Freeze

Protection," was entered on February 11, 1988, at 7:06 p.m., as required  !

by local ambient temperature. The NRC inspector noted that required

actions including the establishment of a trend from the primary

meteorological tower temperature instrument was initiated. The freeze

panel annunciators were observed to be clear. Procedure OP-2-007 was

i exited at 12:51 p.m. on February 12, 1988.  !

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10. Plant Status l

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At the beginning of the inspection period, the plant was at full power and ,

continued to operate until February 13, 1988, when power was reduced to '

86 percent. This reduction was accomplished in order to comply with the  !

, more restrictive operating limits in effect when the core operating limit 4

! supervisory system became inoperable. The system was returned to service j

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on February 14, 1988, and the plant was returned to full power.

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i At 8:47 a.m. on February 15, 1988, the turbine tripped, and the reactor

i power cutback system actuated af ter a test lever was allowed to  !

momentarily move out of the test position during performance of ,

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Procedure OP-904-003, Revision 2, "Main Turbine Protection Devices Trip ,

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Tests." Reactor power was stabilized at 47 percent with regulating rod l

groups five and six fully inserted. Later that day, the reactor was l

restored to full power. 3

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j Power was reduced to 90 p"ercent on March 5, 1988. The licensee decided to

i reduce power because the X" channel of pressurizer pressure failed high i

i causing a permissive in the steam bypass control system logic. On '

March 7, 1988, after repairs to the pressurizer pressure instrument, the

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plant was returned to 100 percent power on March 7, 1988.

No violations or deviations were identified.  !

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11. Exit Interview

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The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 12, 1988, with l

l those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The licensee acknowledgeC  !

4 the NRC inspectors' findings. The licensee did not identify as -

proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the NRC

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inspectors during this inspection.

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