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- Thres Mila Isl:nd Nucl:;sr Stati:n Special Temporary Procedure Noteziostructions and guidelnies in AP1001 A 10.STP No. @- ION -lOlolAj41 must be followed wnen compleung tnis form.
- 11. implementation Date h[.N8~h. ,
SS SF Signature * *e
- 1. Title OTSCw SeCOMsb a bu "roLA clMc M > CS a
- 2. Purpose 2 g 70 d owetA. h vw 59 0 Md St.a.ka p J % ,,w.d- h h CDg Wh em -- Mg ful.n a s w e.ce L a d
- 3. Attach procedure to this form written according to the following format.
Note: If ESAS, EFW, RPS and/or RMS Systems are affected by this STP -insure procedural requirements are satisfied - see AP1001 A section 3.6 for details. -
A. Limitations and Precautions
- 1. Nuclear Safety
- 2. Environmental Safety
- 3. Personnel Safety /La.A a. .
- 4. Equipment Protection i
B. Prerequisites C. Procedure
- 4. Duration of STP Snall be no longer than 90 days from the implementation data of tne STP or (a) or (b) below . wnichever occurs first.
(a) STP will be cancelled by incorporation into existing or new permanent procedure submi:ted by O (b) STP is not valid af ter 90 MNs Fulin circumstances which wdt resM in STP being cancelled)
[
5 is the procedure "important to Safety")
If "yes. complete Safety Evaluation. (Side 2 of this Form) .. . Yes N o O
- 6. Does tne procedure affect Environmental Protection?
If "yes", complete Environmental Evaluation. (Side 2 of this Form) Yes O No V" Review Signatures
- 7. Generated by N (d D I signa:ure ' ' ore
- 8. Reviewed by & IMT b fg) /h (g'"" '
g,/g,ygg,
- 9. Approvals (per AP1001 A)
(,) / 8 i *
- 2. Note: If tne answers to questions tr5 and or 6 l
l were "yes" tnen approvals must ce per l AP1001A 1'. Note: If tne answers to questions 85 and 6 g
were "no" then tne SS may approve tne l
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STP . /1/l 4f9 3
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OTSC SECONDARY SIDE PRESSURIZATION DURING H 0 CLEANING 22 A. LIMITS AND PRECAUTIONS
- 1. Nuclear Safety - see GPUNC SE 120019-006 (attached).
- 2. Environmental Safety - N/A
- 3. Personnel Safety - Observe standard RWP and safe work practices.
- 4. Equipment Protection -
(a) Do not pressurize the OTSG secondary side to >200 psig with the OTSG shell temp. $100 F (T.S. 3.1.2.2). -
(b) N2 e nnecti n at MSL m st be secured / isolated prior ~to increasing OTSG pressure to >150 psig (piping rated at 150 psig) .
B. PREREQUISITES
- 1. The temporary mechanical jumper is installed between NI-V-32 and FW-V-56A and between NI-V-29 and FW-V-56B. See attached sketch.
- 2. OTSG A&B in full wet layup (FWLU) with 10-20 psig N2 being supplied to the main steam lines. .
- 3. OTSG to be pressurized to RCS pressure has an average shell temp. >100 F and UTS 02 concentration >100 ppb.
- 4. Permission has been received from the Manager, Plant Operations to pressurize the OTSG to >200 psig.
- 5. The valve line'up on the temporary N e nnecti n is as follows:
2 NI-V-29 Closed NI-V-32 Closed FW-V-56A Closed FW-V-56B Closed TV-2A Closed TV-2B Closed TV-1A Open
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_ TV-1B; 'Open TV-4A. Closed
.TV-4B [ Closed FW-Vl55A' Closed FW-V-55B Closed
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L C. ' PROCEDURE ,(Components in parenthesis represent the B OTSG)
A-0TSG- B-0TSG
- l. Verify OTSG average shell temp >100 F and Manager -
Plant Operatons. permit shall pressurization to >200 psig.
- 2. Isolate normal MS line N 8UPPl y by closing MS-V-70A(C),
2
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and MS-V-70B(D) and closing NI-V-ll2A(3).
- 3. Close N 2
t8mP rary 8uPPl y valve TV-1A(B).
4.- Open N t8mPorary supply valve,TV-2A(B).
2
[ $. Open FW-V-56A(B).
Sa. Open FW-V-55A(B).
- 6. Establish Auxiliary operators in communication with the control room at the N 2650 psig' supply manifold in the.
Che. Add. room Aux. Bldg. and at NT-V-32(29).
- 7. While carefully monitoring N 2
8uPPl y Pressure and RCS
, pressure, slowly open NI-V-32(29) to pressurize the OTSG shell.' While pressurizing regulators may be reset or bypassed to compensate for flow losses as long as
, operators are present at the regulator and are aware of RCS/0TSG pressures. Do not attempt to pressurize the .
l p , OT5G any more rapidly than that which will also maintain
. an adequate N2 supply to the RCS.
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~ . . . , - - - . - - . - - - , , . , - - - . . _ , _ . ~ . _ _ . . . _ _ . . . . , . , . - _ , , . _ _ , . . _ . - . - , . . . - _ - _ - _ _ - ,
a= .
- CAUTION: If RCS pressure drops'below l 299 psig, secure the Reactor-
. : Coolant Pumps.
A-0TSC ~B-0TSG
-8. Once desired pressure has been obtained (=307 18 psig) reset.the regulators and close the regulator bypasses .
as nece'ssary to control RCS/0TSG pressure at 307 1 8 psig.
- 9. When it becomes necessary to depressurize the OTSG,.
close NI-V-32(29) and open TV-4A(B).
- 10. Restore'OTSG to normal FWLU N Pressure supply by b Asd Fw-V- svM6 2 g&
closing FW-V-56A/Baand opening MS-V-70A(C), MS-V-70B(D), i and NI-V-112A(B).
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. . k1.f hd,3 2lggg* Reiease No 013330 %
Document Release Form (Refer to EMP o08:
oo te... . f/3/83.... _.
Page / of /
Release Action To: E M _h_C_C_ O Review / Comment a Construction D As-Builts o Procurement ja Record a Operations / Maintenance C Hold Construction Originator bJ . C . 64A M Home Base E3 Co . Tel 2a49 Unit '7~M I- I Budget Activity
- IE0019 WO/SO a 86M -El719 1.ist of Released items (attached) ,
Company Document No. Sheet Rev. Title QCL.
GPuh1 SE I2.co19-c.oS G 1 GMsr1 EVALuAwu M N!1Acw NM suPPhy Fut acs cL M -uP t
Specialinstructions References
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L5 T- [.,-[il N 9 n E g mm it Wn87 DOCUMENT NO.
SLE - 20019-003 NITROGEN SUPPLY FOR RCS CLEAN-UP I
.REV
SUMMARY
OF CHANGE APPROVAL DATE 1
-Changed nitrogen supply connections for OTSG secondary (.3-E.7 side frc= main steam line pressure taps to feedwate r / jar line vents for case of installation. ,
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Page 1 of 6 SE No.120019-003 Nuclear Safety / Environmental impact Evaluation Summary Sheet
. (R.t.r to EP-01el Title NITROGEN' SUPPLY FOR RCS CLEAN-UP 1,la) . Does the change require revision of the system / component description in the Safety~YESO Analysis NO$
- (b) ' Does the change alter procedures from those described in the Safety Analysis Report? .
YESO NO E (c) Afe tests o'r experimenta conducted which are not described in the Safety Analysis Report? YES S-NO C Nite:
if any of the answers to 1 (a), (b), or (c) are YES, a detailed evaluation must be attached.
' 2.(a) . Has the probability of occurrencs or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of YESO equipme 1
~ important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report been increased? i NO 3
-(b) - Has the possibility for an accident.or malfunction of a ditforent type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report been created ? YESO NO E)
(c) Has the margin of safety as defined in the bases for any Technical Specification been reduced?
YESO NO S - i Note:
' If any of the answers to 2(a), (b), or (c) are YES, the change must be approved by the NRC.
3.
Does this design change, test er experiment adversely affect Nuclear Safety and therefore,is it an "Unreviewed Safety Question" (per 10CFR50:59)? YES O 'i NO E)
-N;te:
If the statement in 3 above is checked YES, either recesign or provide supporting documentation whicn willpermit licensing to request the NRC's approval. l l
4 Does'the design change possibly involve a significant environmentalImpact or an environmental question '
.not having previous regulatory agency review and approval? YESO
. N05 Nr.te:
If the statement in 4 above is enecked YES, either redesign or provide supporting documentation which l will permit licensing to request the necessary regulatory approval. , I N. C. Shah
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5/17/83 o.
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-['k' (iQDOhOb7 SCfaty Evalusti:n TMI-l Nuclear Station
.Ref er to EP.0101 Page 2 _ ofy
, SE No. 120019-003 yjtj, NITROGEN SUPPLY FOR RCS CLFAN-UP Safety Evaluation SEE ATTACP.ED.
4F i
Reforences: SAR SDD If lia), (b) or (c)is YES,in'dicate Task Request assignments below:
Yes No TRn Does the change require an update of the FSAR ?
O $
' Does the change require a TechnicalSpecification amendment? O E Does the change require a Quality Classification List amendment? O E Other
, O O 1
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NRC
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T .- SE No. 120019-003
.-,. Page 3 of 6 - j 1.0. TITLE r~
Nitrogen Supply for RCS Clean-Up 2.0 PURPOSE
'The purposs'of this safety evaluation is to address the adequacy of design and safety impact of using nitrogen at a pressure of about 310 psig on -(A) primary side (reactor coolant) at the pres- .
surizer, and (3) OTSG secondary side, if necessary. This tempor-ary modification will be used- during RCS clean-up operations.
3.0 ' SYSTEMS AFFECTED~
3.1 'GAI Dwg. C-302-720 Nuclear Plant Nitrogen and Hydrogen Supply 3.2 GAI Dwg. C.302- 081'7eedwater g 3.3 Auxiliary System, FSAR Section 9.0 4.0 EFFECTS ON SAFETY The tempcrary modifications required are as follows:
.(A) Primary Side Nitrogen Supply The system will consist of the following components:
- 1. A pressure regulater at the nitrogen cruck, which will supply
, nitrogen to the TMI-1 nuclear nitrogen system manifold (NI-N3, Flow Diagram, GAI C-302-720) at a pressure of 410 psig, through valve NI-V241,
- 2. The existing pressure reg'lators, u NI-V80 A&B in series with the above regulator will reduce nitrogen pressure from 410 psig toes 320 psig for the RCS pressure control.
- 3. Existing electromatic relief valve on the pressurizer will be ,
set at 485 psig with NDTT mode switch in auto.
An alternative to adding the regulator at the truck, a properly sized relief valve to be set at 410 psis can be added in the nitrogen piping to provide overpressure protection for an initiat-ing event of 'the failure of the regulator, NI-V80 A&B.
(3) OTSG Secondary Side Nitrogen Supply .
The nitrogen to be used for pressurizing secondary side will be from the same header which supplies nitrogen to the primary side during RCS clean-up. The supply header connection to be' used will be at valves NI-V32 or NI-V29 for OTSG's A and B (Ref. GAI Dws. C-302-720) by removing the existing spoo,l piece.
The nitrogen injection will be at the feedwater vent connection
~
downstrea:L of TW-V56A for OTSG A and W-V563 for OTSG B (see g GAI C-302-081) . The nitrogen supply to the OTSG secondary side b will be connected using stainless steel tubing.
L _. . _ _____ . - . . . - - . . . - _ _ . . - . - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - . . - -
SE No. 120019-003 ,.-
. . . . .. Peg 2 4 of 6 A check valve will be insec11ed in the nitrogen supply to the RCS to prevent depressurization should a failure occur in the nitrogen supply to the secondary side.
4.1 Descrintion of Icoortant to Safety Function The reactor coolant system, nuclear nitrogen supply and the OTSG secondary side, affected by this modification, are Important to Safety. Nuclear nitrogen supplies nitrogen for RCS blanketing and for pressurizing core flood tanks.
4.2 Effect of Procesed Modification on Important to Safety Function This temporary modification will be used during RCS clean-up when the reactor is in cold shutdown ecndition. The existing system will be returned to its original configuration before power operation.
. r.
4.2.1 System Perfor=ance (A) Primary System Nitrogen Supply
, Allowable combinations of pressure and temperature during perfor:snee of RCS cleaning are within the limitations of Tech. Spec. Fig. 3.1-1, Vhich assures y prevention of nonductile failure. As per this figure
'the maximu= allowable pressure at RCS cleanup tempera-ture of 1250F is 410 psig.
An initiating event causing the failure of the regulator at the truck and a single failure of either the remain-ing r.egulator or the electromatic relief valve would result in the following:
(a) If the failure of the remaining regulator occurs, the electromatic relief valve will protect the the system by limiting the pressure to 485 psig
. under upset conditiens. This is acceptable per para. 3.1.12.2 of the technical specification.
(b) If the failure of electromatic valve occurs, the second' regulator will provide protection against overpressure by limiting the maximum pressure to 410 psig.
The nitrogen pressure at the outlet of the regulator at the truck shall be periodically monitored to provide an indication of regulator failure.
The other relief valves in the system (NI-V47 and NI-V103) are set at 710 psig and would provide protection caninst gross overpressure in the syste=, The low pressure relief valve, NI-V118, will be sagged (taken out of service) since its set pressure of 105 psig is lower than the RCS cleanup cperating pressure'.
SE No. 120019-003
,. . ,, Pcso 5 cf 6 (3) OTSG Secondary Side Ni'trogen Supply This te=porary modification will supply about 310 psig nitrogen to the OTSG secondary side from the nuclear plant nitregen supply system during RCS clean-up, in order to reduce primary to secondary side let.kage. The OTSG secondary side will be pressurized only if the ex-cessive primary to secondary side leakage exists as determined by Task 9 Advisory Croup.
In order to satisfy Toch. Spec. Section 3.1.2.2, second-ary side of OTSG shall not be pressurized above 200 psig if the te=perature,of the shell is below 1000F. This technical specification is not to be violated; pressuriza-t' ion vill not be done if the temperature is less than 1000F. The existing main steam line nitrogen, OTSG Drain Pu=p, WDL-P23 and Wet Lay-Up Tank are. to be isolated if the secondary side is pressurized above 75 psig.
4.2.2' Quality Standards This te=porary modi.fication is classified as Not I=portant to Safety.
4.3 The following aspects of design have been evaluated for the proposed installation:
/
4.3.1 Seismic Classification - This installation is te=porary and classified as non-seismic. The probability of seismic event during the short period (approximately 700 hours0.0081 days <br />0.194 hours <br />0.00116 weeks <br />2.6635e-4 months <br />) of RCS clean-up operation is very low and therefore a non-seismic design is acceptable.
4.3.2 Design Condition - This installation shall be designed for 485 psig and 150 0 F based on the operating limits set for RC system clean-up and electromatic relief valve set point with NDTT mode' switch in auto.
4.3.3 Environmental Protection - Not applicable.
4.3.4 Fire Protection - This installation vill not require any fire protection other than that presently existing. No combustibles added.
. 4.3.5 Material Compatibility - Materials used in existing RCS are stainless steel and inconel (OTSG tubes). To Be compatible with this require =ent, this installation will use stainless mat e rial s .
4.3.6 High Energy Line Break - The failure of nitrogen supply may dep'ressurize RCS and/or OTSG secondary side. This will not affect the safety, since the water inventcry in the RCS will be maintained under such conditions.
. bi ho. 120019-003 ! -
Page 6 of 6 "
5.0 ccNCLUSION -
The proposed codification does not reduce the margin of safety and does ;
no: adversely affect the nuclear safety for the reasens stated in y Section 4.0. 4 i
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GENERAL PlBLIC UTILITIES
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OTSG REPAIRS DATE 6/10/83 DATE ITEM DESCRIPTION RESPONSIBILITY REQUIRED
- 1. Restoration Secondary Side
. Teg. Chem. System S. Levin TBD
. Remove Air Compressor R. Harper TBD
- 2. Ops OTSG Status
. OTSG Level "A" J758 18,,
. OTSG Level "B" Full Wet Laytp
- 3. Tube Plugging & Stabilization
. Reslove Tapered Plug Problem g +p ~6/5 6/10
. Issue IP Revision G. Kull 6/9
. Issue DRF's T. Functions TBD
- 4. Snoop & Drip Test a "A" eM TBD
- 5. Eddy Current Test .
. Resolve Blocked Tubes in "A" 17-59; A5-9
- 6. Install Lower Permanent Manway 8 "B" 6/7
- 7. Miscellaneous Items to Resolve
. Decon of Equip In Progress
. Revised Spec for Flushing Rev. 5 G. Reed TBD
. RCS/0TSG Pressurization TMM Plt. Eng. 6/8 i
. GAP Growth Measurement STP Plt. Eng. 6/10
. Ship W Equip.
- 8. Waiting Documentation hA M6 %
ER Responsibility 215-82 Plug Exploded .at Wrong Area of Tube QC 091-83 Feltplug Blowing QC 119-83 Misplugged Tubes - M QC 142-83 Documentation Discrepencies QC 143-83 Documentation Discrepencies QC 146-83 B&W Plug Leaks (127-2) QC 155-83 W Plugs QC
- 9. Rad Con Exposure Data (Based on SRDs) as of 6/8
. Total OTSG Exposure since 1st Blast - 1002.2 Man Rem
. Total OTSG Exposure since Nov 1981 - 1178.4 Man Rem
. Final Estimate Exposure Since Nov 1981 - 1204 Man Rem
- 10. Anticipated Ju gs Date Description Responsibility A - Upper - Levin / Catalytic 6/10 un%W b se ( 4 4 A - Lower - r..A 349a p g g 6/10 B - Upper - g No e d B - Lower - )
9 M7
Inter-Office Memorancium Date June 29, 1983 Subject FINAL 0TSG BUBBLE TEST; JUNE 26, 1983 '
Muc ear 3310-83-175 To R. O. BARLEY, LEAD MECHANICAL Location Three Mile Island ENGINEER, TMI-l 1.)" Background. Prior to final closeout of the A and B OTSG's, a bubble test was performed to document the "As Left" condition of the OTSG's.
The bubble test was performed in accordance with STP 1-83-0069, OTSG A/B Bubble Test. In brief, the test was conducted with primary water level approximately 5" above the Upper Tubesheets of each OTSG. Secondary level, after the N Pressure 2
was applied, was approximately 480" in the A OTSG and 560" in the B OTSG. The secondary side was pressurized via the Plant Nitrogen System to approximately 150 psig.
2.) Test Performance. Plant Operations Department performed admirably in manipulating primary and secondary level to facilitate performance of the test. All evolutions which I observed were performed quickly, effi-ciently, and professionally. The actual testing started about 1600 on June 26, 1983. The testing was completed by 2000, same date.
The initial intent was to videotape the test. This taping was performed on the B OTSG. The A OTSG camera, however, failed almost innediately and leaking tubes in this OTSG were identified manually by the writer and T. Kimmel of Site QC.
3.) Test Results.
(a) A OTSG: (As noted, these tubes were identified manually). Ten leaks were found in the UTS. These leaks are broken down as follows:
Leaking tubes : 3 .
Leaking W plugs : ,6 Leaking B&W plugs: 1.
All of the tubes and W plug leaks were very fine streams of tiny bubbles. These streams of bubbles did not cause any surface dis-turbance when they hit the surface.
The leaking B&W plug, on the other hand, can be classified as a moderate "gurgler". A steady stream of moderately sized bubbles
. issued from the tubes. The bubbles caused a very noticeable surface disturbance.and made tube identification difficult.
A listing of the leaking tubes and plugs are given on Attachment #1.
, (b) B OTSG: No leaks were observed on the B UTS. A complete video scan
[ ,
was perf ormed and the UTS was visually inspected from the manway. The
[
results of this test were videotaped. gf
o R. O. Barley Page 2 June 29, 1983 4.) Discussion. I am unable to determine why the 1[ plug and tube leaks were not identified ~on previous bubble tests. The only logical argument that I can arrive at 1s that the verf fine streams of bubbles noted were below
-the resolving capability of the B&W provided camera system. These bubble streams were also observable from the manway..
The leaking .B&W plug should have been identified during previous bubble tests. ~his tube, however,' is in an area of the OTSG where extensive' plugging and weld repairing was performed. The plug weld could have been damaged during this work and the damage not noticed.
5.) Recommendation. I believe that it would be wise to SNOOP test all welded plugs af ter they are . installed to check for leakage. This is a fast, simple test which can verify that no pinholes, defects, etc., exist on the weld. At present, this test is covered by an STP and is performed as the situation warrants. This test should be made a requirement in any future plug Installation Procedures.
6.) Conclusion. Based on my viewing of the Crystal River tapes and the kinetic expansion test block, the leakage from the tubes and }[ plug is very minor in nature and will probably be self sealing when the plant is heated up. The leaking B&W welded plug, however, is a direct hole from the pri-mary to the secondary side and should be repaired prior to the H 022 flush.
. SUBMITTED BY: hh Mo //
F. W. PAULEWlCZ l Engineer III, THI-l WP:gh Attachment cc: A. L. Cazaban, Pressure Components Engineer, Tech. Functions, Parsippany J. J. Colitz, Plant Engineering Director, TMI-l F. R. Faist, Resident B&W Engineer
-F. S. Giacobbe, Manager - Materials Engr./ Fail. Anal. Tech. Functions, .
Parsippany C. K. Lee, Heat Transfer Aux. Equip. Manager, Tech. Functions, Parsippany S. Levin, M&C Director (Acting) , 'TMI-l T. . Richter, Pressure Components Manager, Tech. Functions, Parsippany
. M. J. Ross, Manager, Plant Operations, TMI-l H. B. Shipman, Engineer Senior II, Plant Operations, TMI-l D. G. Slear, Manager - TMI Engineering Projects, Tech. Functions, Parsippany R. J. Toole, Op'erations and Maintenance Director, TMI-l CARIRS - TMI-l ,
- 1 ATTACllMENT #1 s BUBBLE TEST LEAKERS A OTSG, 6/26/83 L aking Plugs Row-Tube Type Plug Date Installed Comment 1.) 107-1 W -
3-82 2.) 9-21 g 3-82 3.) 15-12 y 3-82 4.) 8-10 g 3-82 5.) 148-8 g 3-82 6.) 1-11 W 3-82 7.)69-126 B&W Kinetic Expansion 4-83 95% T.W. @ 15+22"; 60-65% T.W. O US+2 Stabilizer Cap Leaking Tubes (See Note 1) . .
0.510 0.540 II.G.
Row-Tube Expansion Length E.C. Test E.C. Test 1.) 147-45 17" TOK TOK 2.) 135-71 17" US+20/85%/lv TOK 3.) 138-64 22" TOK US+10/95% lv NOTE 1: 8xl and 4x1 E.C. Data not available.
Prepared by:
F. Paulewicz . .
6-28-83 D
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