Text

Rev 4 to SDD-TI-614, Div I Sys Design Description for TMI-1 Remote Shutdown Sys
	ML20211Q825
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	06/02/1986
From:	Gan B; GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20211Q822	List: ML20211Q819; ML20211Q825;
References
	SDD-TI-614, NUDOCS 8607280023
	Download: ML20211Q825 (57)
	v • d • e

.

[r kd Nuclear s_ m m.

i-.

7 e.r rF T y n: ; e i t' i

( WOPTANTJpjAfEI{_j _

DIVISION 1 SYSTEM DESIGN DESCRIPTION FOR TMI-l REMOTE SIIUTDOC SYSTDI -

I F

DO [

/ -

' 3 PREPARATION Cri- DATE 2/14/83 CONCURRENCE / AAA ! N DATE 3'} I3 A AL k u b*E DATE 4[tr /f5 L r -o E,

~

i . T^ c __, ~ c ') ? ._

AOOOOO27 f 31

UCIME ,

DOCUMENT NO.

SDD-T1-614 Div.Ii l

i TITLE T.M._T _1 p r.u.n T. _v

. . . . .c.m. .t T... v ".mm.

evmrv REV

SUMMARY

OF CHANGE APPROVAL DATE Rev. 1 changes are in response to rtua cot.nents as 1

documented in ltr. FA-TMI-83-22 dated 5/24/83 Section 1.0 r2) Reviced Paragrnthe 2 and 3 b) Included definition of terms c) Deleted use of term alternate shutdown facility.

d) Referenced Section III.L of App. R c) Deleted term "cutually" in paragraph 3 Section 2.0 2.0 Added qualifier to use of reference.

24 Referenced current subrittals to NRC Section 3.0 3.1 Added itet j on page 6 3.1 Added statetent that cold shutdown capability cust exist within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

3.2.3.] Revised to delete VU-F-1A/a/C vercus MU-V-le actuuti;n and tdded turbine trip ekt. change.

i 3.;.7 I t a r e a "ren ; :._ i n :ra . .t. " tc "reactc shu ..- < ,et." in:1: :.-t_.

3.4 Listea plant functio:r providea via the remot .

shutdown syster.

( 3.2 Edde0 refere!.00 LO h L *. chOrt an~ nigI and IcW pre cure interfaces.

l 3.5 Clfarified WOrdin.{ 10 reflect Separ3*iLn i

Whleh precludeL daC3ge to DOth redund5nt channel in th- centrol room.

3.b ReviEed SeiC5ic criteria 3.c.I l...;3 thbt CurVei.lanci re pirer.cnti W111 be dFte.iled in 300 Dit. IT AOOOOC36 7.a:

Pace la

UCIM7 DOCUMENT NO.

SDD-T1-614 Div I TITLE TMI-1 REMOTE SHUTD0'45 SYSTEM REV i

SUMMARY

OF CHANGE APPROVAL ;

DATE l

(Continued) 1 3.7 Revised environnental qualification requirenente Section /. 0 Clarified QA requirenents to include distinction between NSE and ITS conponents Section 5.0 Added section requiring " full scale mockups" for walkthrough purpocer i

Appendix, Table 1 l, ni Added Plant Function eclu

to correlate control /instrucentation facility with specific plant function.

b) MU-P-3C revised to have auto start upon (

MU-P-lC transfer switch actuation c) Added: MU-P-1B MU-P-3B UR-V-15E \ [viC# (h/83 Nh-- V-16

f ..

NR-V-10E

[7 4,/rf) i

/ J MU-V-2A l

}/

! Seal Injection Flow k O r*A cx :tu}: 1.n = n on _ QC)J 7fl4Y' 3 Accooc3e Le:

tuclear DOCUMENT NO SDD-TI-614 Div. I 1, TITLE i

TMI-l REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM REV

SUMMARY

OF CHANGE APPROVAL DATE i 2 Rev. 2 changes are in response to documents issued by GPUN letters #TMI-EP/83-6266 dated 12/7/83, and THI-EP/84-0400 dated 7/3/84 Section 1.0 a) Deleted statement about redundant red and green panels and added statencnt on the nodification to the existing renote shut-down panels. (RSP) b) Deleted Main Remote Shutdown Station.

Added Auxiliary RSP (Aux. RSP) and Renote Shutdown Transfer Switch Panels !RSTSP).

Section 2.0 a) Deleted references 2.13, 2.14, and 2.15.

l Section 3.0 I a) Deleted statenent about redundancy beyond that of the RSP in paragraph 2. '

b) Replaced. paragraph 4 vith a nea paragraph l'

stating the requiremente of Section III L.5 cf Appendis R.

c) I n pa ra g r'dp h 6, deleted nain remote shut-down station, and added RSP and Aux. RSP.

l.

d) Added statenent about local panel near the MCC in paragraph 7.

e) Deleted connunication facility at Energency Diesel Generator 1B Relav Pancl and chanced

E.S. Switchgear 1S to "B" RSTSP.

k.

~ f) Deleted section 3.2.1 on the Main Remote 2 Shutdown Station. Added new section 3.2.1

on the Renote Shutdown Transfer Switch

? Panels and section 3.2.2 on the Renote '

x 2 Shutdown Panels.

E

~

A00CCC3612 8 3

DOCUMENT NO O N SDD-TI-614 Div. 1 l TITLE T!!!- 1 RE!!OTE SIIUTDOb'N SYSTEM REV

SUMMARY

OF CHANGE APPROVAL DATE 2 Section 3.0 (Continued) I g) Deleted para 7,raph on the components in the ISPH.

h) Changed control of D/G "B" from the diesel generator "B" protection panel to the 4160 volt E.S. switchgear lE.

i) Under circuitry changes, stated that the !

nain turbine trip circuit will be rerouted '

(not protected) and deleted the paragraph on the D/G B" overload protection.

j) Reworded first paragraph of section 3.3 in-corporating RSP, Aux. RSP, and bvpassing control of system. Added paragraph on switchgear, stating that the normal and by-pass mode is available when the transfer i switch is in the normal position.

k) Stated that RSTSP will be key lockable.

1) Stated D/G watthour meter vill be relocated to the IE 4160 volt swgr.

m) Under operational requirements, stated the turbine will trip upon reactor trip. Also stated that nultiple spurious actuations at high/ low pressure interfacer nust bc !

postulated.

n) In section 3.4, grouped conponents by function.

I o) In section 3.5, stated that the separation !

requirements of SDD 772-A apply, and the routing design will be done under S/A ir412384.

c p) In section 3.6, stated that the circuit k isolation transfer switches, auxiliary re-l

{ lays, remote shutdown panels, and local j g panels shall be seismically qualified.

x i

E l' Pace l <! ### ' b "

ENuclear TITLE

=cumm o SDD-T1-bl4 Div. 1 TMI-l REMOTE SHUTD0h'N SYSTEM REV

SUMMARY

OF CHANGE APPROVAL DATE i 2 Section 3.0 (Continued) q) In section 3.7, stated that RSD conpenents will be qualified to IEEE 323 where applic- i able. I Section 4.0 i

a) Added Important to Safety classification j and identified these components classified '

NSR/ITS.

Section 5.0 a) Added walk down requirenents for emergency lighting and communications.

I i

Appendix, Table 1 a) Recrdered components according to function.

t b) Deleted " Main Remote Shutdown Statior." and "Other Remote Shutdown Station" and added Aux. RSP and RSTSP "A", "E", and "C" c Added:

f) 460V Feeder to Estgr . IT i I

I 4 SOY Feeder to IF Screer House MCC '

EF-V-30C EF-V-30D EF-V-53 EF-V-54 Emergency Feedwater Flow Meters !

RC-V2 MU-V-14A !

5 ,i

~

n i

- e X

b pa q., 10 AOOOOC36 ?; E 2

DOCUMENT NO Muclear S9D-TI-61* Div. I TITLE I I

TM1-1 REMOTE S!!"TD0'JN S'iSTEM REV

SUMMARY

OF CHANGE APPROVAL DATE 2 Appendix, Table 1 (Continued) c) (Continued)

Added kevlock switches for:

RC-P-1A, IB, IC, ID DH-V-1 DH-V-2 CF-V-1A CF-V-1B RC-V-4 AH-P-9A/B AH-E-1B '

AH-E-18B AH-E-19B AH-E ~94B 7'D.Wich / W r/3/rf '

d) Deleted PORV fron RSP.

l 3 Safetv Evaluation 412244-001 is being revised ,

and issued as 412244-001 Rev. 2.

Section 1.0 Added paracraph rtating that RSD will be used l!

for a fire in CB-FA-3C. C h ani:ed "calarged" to

" replaced with a larger parel" for RSTSP "A" Added Paranraph h .

Secticr 2.0 Changed revisio, nunber for Reference 2.10. 1 Section 3.0 I 3.1 Deleted reference to local panels near each MCC.

Added diesel backed fluorescent fixturee ;

in last piracranh.

- a' g 3.2.1 Stated existinq panel vill be replaced

$ with a larger panel for RSTSP "A".

2 3 3.2.3 Revised second paranranh and deleted i fourth paracraph.

E 3.3 Stated that sone transfer seitches trill

$ be three position.

?

ADOC0036

2-2 3 P,an if

DOCUMENT No N Mf SD"-71-614 piv, 7 TITLE TMI-l RDtOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM REV

SUMMARY

OF CHANGE APPROVAL DATE 3 Revised Parar,raph 4 to state that the RSTSP and all trans fer switches on the switchgear shall be kev lockable. Stated what conponents are not key lockable.

Revised Paragraph 7 to add Diesel Generator B Renote Shutdo'm Panel.

3.4 Revised Paragraph 5 to add nain feedwater pump trip.

Deleted tripping of MFW punps in 4h.

3.6 Deleted local panels in Paragraph 2.

Section 4.0 Deleted local panels.

Section 6.0 Added sentence concerning walkdown of cut and innper procedures.

Table 1 Changed energency Connunication Svsten to the Gray Systen.

Added Autonatic Transfer Switch for the 1C ESV MCC.

Revised control facility for RC-P-1A, 1B, IC, ar.d ID.

Deleted FW-P-1A and IB.

Deleted EF-V-53 and 54 Charted key lock svitch te cut and jonpor procedure for DH-V-1 and 2, CF-V-1A and

!B, and IIC-V-4

^dded Pressurizer Hnater Groun 4 De l e t e d ' U- i- 1: , M"- Y - 1 B , and IC-r-1L.

Added AH-C-4B and Ati-P-3B.

Chanced to cut and ju- or procedure for AH-P-9A/B, AH-E-1B, AH-E-14B, AH-E-24B, . , j and AH-E-ISB. I D- IC/Ct i Mk%

7W '%r/kwe l ', '

i ,, i

} g ,j,[ .

i

!R -

/Elo o.Me .>/olit 3 4 Revised paragraph 3.5 t o be consistent with 1 ^ (I" 3 / ? : /it-reference 2.5: SD:) Div. I, 772A regarding % ( _ g .4 e separatior, of wiring within panels.

/K(O /An c /z/n

[

Pa :c Ic A000003e 12 83

SDD-T1-614, Div. I Kevision 4 May 8, 1986 Page 2 of 24 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Pane 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 3

2.0 REFERENCES

4 3.0 FUNCTIONS AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 5 3.1 Functions 5 3.2 System Configuration and Essential Features 7 3.3 Instrumentation and Controls 9 3.4 Operational Recuirements 10 3.5 Separation Requirements 11 3.6 Structural Requirements 11 3.7 Environmental Reauirements 12 3.8 Maintenance 12 3.9 Sprveillance and In-Service Inspection 12 3.10 Interfacinz Systems 12 3.11 Test Requirements 12 4.0 OUALITY ASSURANCE 13 5.0 SAFETY. HEALTH. AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 13 6.0 HUMAN FACTORS 14 7.0 LICENSING REQUTREMENTS 14 APPENDIX A - TABLE 1, Remote Shutdown Functions

SDD-T1-614, Div. I Revision 4 lby 8, 1986 Page 3 of 24 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE This document provides the design requirements for a Remote Shutdown System at TMI-1 Nuclear Generating Station.

Definition of terms:

1. Remote Shutdown System: This system provides the plant monitoring and control facility to perform a safe shutdown of the plant from outside the control room in the event of circuit destruction caused by a fire in the relay or control room. This facility allows selected electrically operated safe shutdown components and monitoring instruments to be operated independent of their circuits which run through either the relay or control room. Portions of this system will also be utilized to aid in the safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a fire in fire area CB-FA-3C.

2. Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP): This facility was installed per the guidance of NRC BTP 9.5-1 (Ref. 2.2) to provide the ability to monitor key process variables and control main steam and emergency feedwater in order to achieve a safe shutdown from outside the control room. The Remote Shutdown Panel is comprised of a red (Channel A) panel and a green (Channel B) panel and separate panels containing signal conditioning and circuit isolation transfer switches for the functions provided on the RSP.

The existing remote shutdown panels shall be modified to accommodate additional controls, instruments, and indicators.

3. Auxiliary Remote Shutdown Panel (Aux. RSP): This green (Channel B) panel will be installed near the RSP "B" and will contain control and indication for the secondary plant systems.

4. Remote Shutdown Station: This is an area of the plant where an operator will remotely operate a saf e shutdowr. compor.ent via the use of a circuit isolation transfer switch in order to control that component independent of the. component's circuits which run through the relay or control room.

5. Remote Shutdown Transfer Switch Panels (RSTSP): The "B" .

channel RSTSP shall be located on El. 322' of the Control Building in Fire Area CB-FA-28 where the operator will operate transfer switches (using relays to multiply contacts) to transfer control of critical safe shutdown components to either the RSP "E" or Aux. RSP "B".

The "A" channel RSTSP is presently installed on eles.338'6" of the Control Building in fire area CB-FA-3C. This panel will be replaced with a larger panel to contain additional transfer switches to transfer control of some "A" channel safe shutdown components to the RSP "A".

I

SDD-T1-6'4, Div. I Revision 4 May 8, 1986 Page 4 of 24 The "C" channel RSTSP shall be located in the same room as the RSP. This panel will contain an isolation transfer switch to transfer control of MU-P-1B from the control room to RSP "B".

6. Diesel Generator B Remote Shutdown Panel: This panel will be installed near the lE-4160V ES Switchgear to house the equipment relocated from the Control Room for Diesel Generator IB.

Per 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section IIIC, Safe Shutdown Evaluation (Ref. 2.4), the relay and control rooms have been identified as fire areas in which separation of redundant safe shutdown circuits as defined in 10CFR50, Appendix R (Ref. 2.1) cannot be achieved. This SDD identifies design and functional requirements for a remote shutdown system as required per 10CFR50, Appendix R, Sections IIIC and IIIL to allow the plant to be brought to a safe shutdown independent of circuits and control functions located in the relay and control rooms. The ability to bring the plant to a safe shutdown must exist with or without offsite power being available.

The Appendix R,Section III C, Safe Shutdown Evaluation also states that the Remote Shutdown System must be used to help prevent spurious operation of some shutdown equipment due to the spurious operation of the ES actuation system caused by a fire in CB-FA-3C.

The remote shutdown panels are an integral part of the remote shutdown system. TDR-088 (Ref. 2.3) details the original component selection criteria for the RSP. It is intended that in the event of a destructive fire in the relay or control rooms, safe shutdown would be achieved through the operation of the circuit isolation transfer switches at the RSTSP, in conjunction with the operation of components from the RSP, Aux. RSP, any other remote shutdown station,or manually at the component.

This document discusses all the components being equipped with controls which will allow the operator to achieve safe shutdown in the event that the control circuits in the relay and control rooms are damaged by a fire as postulated in accordance with 10CFR50 Appendix R.

This document also includes the requirements for the emergency lighting and communications systems to the extent they are necessary to support the remote shutdown activities.

Division I system design descriptions 614A and 614B which discuss the remote shutdown panel and the alternate shutdown facility respectively are superseded by this document.

2.0 REFERENCES

2.1 10CFR50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Operating Nuclear Power Plants.

SDD-T1-614 Div. I Rt cision 4 May 8,1986 Page 5 of 24 2.2 NRC Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 dated May 1, 1976.

2.3 TDR 088, Rev. 1, TMI-l Restart Study 4a, List of Additional Instrumentation and Equipment Required for Cold Safe Shutdown (Remote Shutdown).

2.4 10CFR50, Appendix R, Response Submittals to NRC:

GPUNC letter #5211-82-156 dated July 1, 1982; TMI-1 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section IIIC, Safe Shutdown Evaluation.

GPUNC Letter #5211-82-239 dated October 1, 1982 - Updated Information to the Safe Shutdown Evaluation.

GPUNC Letter $5211-82-270 dated November 15, 1982 - Alternate Shutdown Capability, Table on Guidelines for Shutdown.

CPUNC Letter #5211-82-302 dated December 28, 1982 - Revised Table on Guidelines for Shutdown.

GPUN Report: "TMI-1 Fire Hazards Analysis Report and Appendix R, Section IIIC - Safe Shutdown Evaluation" dated November, 1985.

2.5 SDD 772-A, Rev.0, Div.I - Electrical Cable and Raceway Routing 2.6 U.S. N.R.C. Reg. Cuide 1.100, Rev. 1, Seismic Qualification of Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants.

2.7 IEEE Standard 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

2.8 U.S. N.R.C. Reg. Guide 1.89, Rev. O, Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants.

2.9 IEEE Standard 323-1974, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations 2.10 Operational QA Pl an for GPUNC, #1000-PLN-7200 .01, Rev. 1, dated November 1, 1985.

2.11 GPUNC Engineering Standard 5401-0100, TMI-1 Human Engineering Guide.

2.12 SDD 611E, Rev. 0. Division II, TMI-l Annunciator Tiles Modification.

3.0 FUNCTIONS AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 3.1 Functions Per the guidance of NRC BTP 9.5-1 (Ref. 2.2), the remote shutdown panel is comprised of a safety channel "A" panel and a redundant channel "B" panel. The channel "A" panel is associated with flow loop "A" and the channel "B" panel is associated with flow loop "B". This redundancy is required only for the instruments and

SDJ-T1-614, Div. I Revision 4 May 8,1986 Page 6 of 24 controls identified in TDR 088 (Ref. 2.3) to allow safe shutdown of the plant during an event which renders the control room unusable.

Channel redundancy is not required in order to comply with 10CFR50 4

Appendix R Section III.C.3. Loss of offsite power is the only external event to be postulated concurrent-with a fire requiring the use of the remote shutdown system.

Plant electrically operated components which are necessary for achieving a hot shutdown from outside the control room shall be provided with circuit isolation and control facility at remote shutdown stations. This facility will allow operation of these

, components independent of their circuits which run through the relay and control rooms.

10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III L.5, states:

" Equipment and systems comprising the means to cehieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions shall not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems'shall be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ."

For control functions, circuit isolation transfer switches shall be provided which will allow control of certain components from either a centralized remote shutdown station or from the component's power distribution center. Circuits for readout instruments which are required for monitoring plant functions while bringing the plant to a hot or cold shutdown from outside the control room shall be provided with isolation devices which will permit operation of the ,

remote instrument in the event of instrument circuit damage at the control or relay rooms.

Instruments and controls for certain plant functions are required to operate pr'operly within minutes after the postulated fire which damages the circuits for these components. It is assumed that the circuit damage is such that open circuits, hot shorts, and shorts to ground may occur causing spurious actuation of these vital components. The controls and indicators for these vital functions shall be provided at the RSP, or Aux. RSP "B" and are identified in Table 1 of this SDD. The circuit isolatien transfer switches in combination with the controls at the RSP and Aux. RSP "B" will be used to stop the spurious operation of these components and electrically secure them in the safe position.

Selected valves, motors, and feeder breakers which are necessary for hot or cold shutdown but whose proper operation is not critical immediately following the postulated fire involving circuit damage, shall be provided with circuit isolation switches at their power distribution centers (MCC or switchgear units). These components, which are also identified in Table 1, shall be controlled from their individual power distribution panels in the event of fire which disables the normal control circuits routed through the control or relay rooms.

Paging and communications facilities shall be available in the event of the fire which destroys electrical circuits in the relay or the control rooms and concurrent with a loss of offsite power.

1 l

1

-- . - . --- - - - - ~

SDD-TI-614 Div. I Revision 4 May 8, 1986 Page 7 of 24 Facility shall be provided to manually isolate the circuits of the communication systems which are located in the relay room or control building El. 355' from the remair.ing communications system network. In the event of a relay room or control room fire, direct M/I (headset type) communication facility shall be available as a minimum between the following areas:

(a.) Remote shutdown station - 1 jack at RSP "A" and RSP "B" (b.) 4160 volt E.S. Switchgear IE (c.) Valve Callery at Aux. Bldg. elevation 281' (d.) Aux. Bldg. elevation 305' at lA/lB ES Valve MCC (e.) Fuel Handling Bdig. at 1C ES Valve MCC (f.) RSTSP "B" in Fire Area CB-FA-2B (g.) Intermediate Building Fire Zone 1B-FZ-1 (h.) Engineered Safeguards Actuation Relay Cabinet Room Fire Area CB-FA-3C (i.) 6900V Swgr. Room in Turb. Building Self contained 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months emergency lighting units or diesel backed fluorescent fixtures shall be provided at any equipment or control facility where operator action may be required during the remote shutdown process. As a minimum, emergency lighting shall be provided at all areas listed above as requiring the M/I communication system in the event of the postulated fire.

3.2 System Configuration and Essential Features 3.2.1 Remote Shutdown Transfer Switch Panels The "B" train remote shutdown transfer switch panel shall be located in fire area CB-FA-2b on elevation 322' of the control building. It shall be comprised of circuit isolation transfer switches and auxiliary relays. One (1) transfer switch (using relays to multiply contacts) will be used for each group of system components (e.g., make up) located on the RSP "B" or Aux. RSP "B".

The existing transfer switch enclosure located in fire area CB-FA-3C on elevation 338'-6" of the control building shall be replaced with a larger pancl designated as the "A" train remote shutdown transfer switch panel (RSTSP "A"). The circuit isolation transfer switches for the components to be controlled from the RSP "A" shall be located in this enclosure.

The "C" train remote shutdown transfer switch panel shall be located in fire area CB-FA-2C (patch panel room) on elevation 322' of the control building. This panel will contain one (1) circuit isolation transfer switch to transfer control of MU-P-1B to RSP "B".

SDD-T1-6:4 Div. I kevision 4 ,

Pay 8,1986 Page 8 of 24 3.2.2 Remote Shutdown Panels The remote shutdown panels shall be located in fire area CB-FA-2C.

A new "B" channel (green) remote shutdown panel will ne procured to replace the existing panel. This panel will include the controls, instraments, and indication as outlined in Table 1.

A new Aux. RSP "B" will be procured. This panel will include control and indication as outlined in Table 1.

A new insert for the existing "A" channel (red) remote shutdown panel will be purchased to accommodate the controls, instruments, and indicating lights outlined in Table I.

The channel "A" redundant readout instruments and controls located j at the RSP "A" shall have circuit isolation devices lo'cated in another fire area (CB-FA-3C) to preclude a fire at the remote shutdown station disabling both channels of a given function in the control room.

3.2.3 Remote Shutdown Facilities at Other Remote Shutdown Stations As part of the remote shutdown system and as identified in Table. 1, various systems required for safe plant shutdown are provided with circuit isolation facility and controls outside the areas of the RSTSP and RSP.

The following power distribution centers shall have local circuit isolation transfer switches and controls as summarized in Table 1:

1A and 1B 6900V Switchgear, 4160 Volt E.S. Switchgear lE, 480 Volt E.S. Switchgear IS, 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB, and 480 Volt E.S. Valve .

MCC's lA and IB. The 480 Volt automatic transfer switch which aligns the IC ESV MCC feeder to the IS Switchgear will be provided with a transfer switch _to isolate the control room circuitry. The transfer switch for AH-C-4B shall be provided at the York Chiller Control Panel.

Facility to start emergency diesel generator "B" (D/C "B") and to bypass its control circuits which run through the relay or control rooms shall be provided at the 4160 Volt E.S. Switchgear lE.

Facility to monitor D/C "B" volts and load shall also be provided at the lE 4KV Switchgear where manual diesel generator loading will be performed during the remote shutdown process.

3.2.4 Circuitry Changes The following circuitry changes shall be performed to preclude the possibility of a spurious actuation or short circuits damaging safe shutdown equipment.

A main turbine trip circuit which trips the turbine upon sensing a reactor trip shall be routed independent of the relay and control ,

rooms.

The emergency diesel generator feeder circuit breaker electrical interlock with the incoming line circuit breaker shall be rewired

SDD-TI-614 Div. I hevision 4 May 80 1986 Page 9 of 24 to preclude a possibility of a hot short occurring in the relay or control room promoting a bypass of the electrical interlock.

3.3 Instrumentation and Controls Each system located on the RSP or Aux. RSP "B", and each component requiring local control, sh'all have a circuit isolation transfer switch allowing a " Normal" vs. " Emergency" mode selection.

Switchgear components requiring Remote Shutdown control, which presently have " Normal" and "Bgpass" mode selector switches, will be equipped with 3 position: Normal", " Bypass", and " Emergency" transfer switches, which will replace the existing switches. In the " Emergency" mode, for a given system or component, control circuits which are located in the control or relay rooms shall be bypassed. In this emergency mode, control of the particular system or component becomes available only at the control location identified in Table 1, and the operation of the system or component is independent of any circuits in the relay or control rooms.

Switchgear powered components controlled from the RSP and presently having a normal and bypass mode will be buffered such that when the transfer switch is in the normal position, either the normal or bypass mode is available.

For all equipment having the circuit isolation facility, the

~

" Normal" mode shall be the position of the transfer svitch under all plant conditions except as required for the emergcncy postulated in this SDD. In the " Normal" mode, the component's control circuits shall be unchanged from the existing plant arrangement.

The RSTSP and all transfer switches located on the switchgear units shall be key lockable and administratively controlled. The transfer switches for components AH-C-4B, AH-P-3B, IA-P-1B, DH-V-6A, and DH-V-6B are not key lockable.

For remote shutdown functions, via transfer to the " Emergency" mode, a set of fuses shall be automatically connected to the circuit in place of the blown fuses which had interrupted the fault caused by the wiring damage in the postulated fire. In the

" Emergency" mode, the new fuses shall be connected to the circuit which is isolated from the control and relay rooms.

Annunciation in the control room shall be provided to alert the operator if one or more of the circuit isolation transfer switches is placed in the " Emergency" position.

The diesel generator watthour meter and instrument transducers connected to the D/C current transformers shall be relocated from the control room t o the Diesel Generator B Remote Shutdown Panel near the 4160 Volt E. S. Switchy, ear IE so that the current transf ormer secondary circuit s are removed f rom the relay and control rooms.

i For the remote shutdown display instrumenta, the circuit isolation

! devices shall be such that failures of the control room or relay room instrumer.t circuits shall not affect the remote shutdown l

instrumentation. Conversely, failures of the remote shutdcun

k - %+

SDD-TI-614, Li v, I Revision 4 lby 8, .986 Page 10 of 24 system instruments and/or circuits shall not disable the display function at the control room.

3.4 Operational Reauirements The remote shutdown system as discussed in this SDD shall be used in the event of a fire in the control or cable spreading rooms which causes damage to the plant control circuits. Portions of the remote shutdown system will also be utilized in the event of a fire in CB-FA-3C.

Using the remote shutdown system, the operator will have the capability to bring the plant to a cold shutdown within seventy-two hours.

The following assumptions apply for developing a response to an exposure fire, as defined in 10CFR50, Appendix R, in either the relay or control room.

The plant is operating at full power at the time of the fire and that a loss of offsite power may or may not occur.

. Reactor trip followed by turbine generator trip and main feedwater 4

pump trip are the only plant control functions which may be assumed to be operational from the Control Room. ;

Any or all automatic signals may fail to actuate.

Circuit damage caused by the fire is such that a hot short occurs-at any time which causes a single spurious actuation of a component to its most adverse state. Multiple spurious actuations must be postulated for high/ low pressure interfaces.

The following functions shall be capable of being perforrr.ed via the Remote Shutdown System.

1. Communications circuits isolation to facilitate paging and M/I l system communications with other areas of the plant (excluding the relay room and control building El. 355').

2. Verification and establishing power to vital busses. In the process of shutting down the plant using the remote shutdown system, The "B" emergency diesel generator may be manually started at the 4160 volt E.S. Switchgear lE in the event of a loss of offsite power. The loading of the diesel generator may also be performed manually at the 4160 Volt E.S.

4 Switchgear lE by operating the 4160 volt circuit breakers af ter isolating the switchgear control circuits from the circuitry in the relay and control rooms via the " Emergency",

" Bypass", and " Normal" mode circuit isolation transfer switches.

3. Reactivity Monitoring

bDD-11-bl4, Div. I l Revision 4 l tby 8, 1986 Page 11 of 24 4 RCS and Core Heat Removal

a. RCS Temperature Monitoring

b. Steam Generator Heat Removal - to include control of OTSG Pressure, Level and EFW Flow,

c. Establishing Decay Heat Removal

5. RCS Pressure and Inventory Control

a. RCS Pressure Control

b. RCS Inventory Monitoring and Makeup Control

c. Establishing Reactor Coolant Letdown

d. Status and control of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Cooling

6. Establishing component cooling, including Intermediate Closed Cooling, Nuclear Service Closed Cocling, Nuclear Service Cooling River Water, and Reactor Building Cooling

7. Provide support services to remote shutdown components The Remote Shutdown-System shall also allow plant response to particu-lar spurious actuations which could lead to unsafe conditions. The valve status at high and low pressure interfaces during normal plant operation shall be revised to preclude possible loss of coolant or release of irradiated water from containment caused by spurious actua-tions. The responses to various possible spurious actuations will be detailed in SDD-T1-614, Div. II.

Table 1 of this SDD correlates the above listed function numbers with the control and monitoring facilities of the components associated with that function.

3.5 Separation Recuirements New Channel A and Channel B control and instrumentation circuits required per this SDD shall be installed in conduit and trays which are dedicated to the respective channel circuits and separated in accor-dance with SDD 772-A (Ref. 2.5). The routing design for this modifica-tion will be done under the Cycle 6 Routing Task (B/A 412384).

When redundant safety train circuits are present in the same control panel, they shall be separated by six (6) inches of f ree air space or where this cannot be achieved, the circuit (s) of at least one (1) train shall be coated or wrapped with a protective, fire resistant, cable coating or tape wrap, or enclosed in metallic conduit.

Routing of remote shutdown system circuits shall be separated from existing circuits so that local fire in one fire area / zone will not disable the same function at both the remote shutdown area and the con-trol room and disable both redundant functions in the control room.

0632G

-. ~~ . ~ . ~ . . . . . -_ -

SDD-T1-614, Div. I Revision,4 May 8,1986 Page 12 of 24 3.6 Structural Requirements The Remote Shutdown Panel was designed and installed per the criteria established from the guidance of NRC BTP 9.5-1 (Ref. 2.2) to withstand a seismic event. Per the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R, a seismic event is not required to be postulated to occur during an exposure fire. The components requiring scismic qualification shall be those which serve as circuit isolation devices between the remote shutdown system components and existing channelized instrument or E.S. circuits. These include the circuit isolation transfer switches, auxiliary relays, and instrument loop isolating devices for nuclear safety related functions.

The remote shutdown panels, auxiliary RSP "B" and all equipment contained within them shall be qualified to withstand a seismic event.

All other new remote shutdown system components shall be supported so as not to create a missile hazard to surrounding nuclear safety related equipment in the event of a design basis earthquake.

Seismic qualification, where necessary, shall be in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.100 (Ref. 2.6) and IEEE 344-1975 (Ref. 2.7).

3.7 Environmental Requirements Remote shutdown components shall be qualified in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.89 (Ref. 2.8) and IEEE 323-1974 (Ref. 2.9) where applicable. (i.e. where they interface directly with Nuclear Safety Related equipment) 3.8 Maintenance During all times, the systems shall be accessible for maintenance.

Maintenance shall be accomplished in accordance with manufacturer's instructions.

3.9 Surveillar.ce and In-Service Inspection The systems shall be accessible at all times for surveillance and in-service inspection. These parameters shall be defined by the manufacturer.

3.10 Interfacing Systems This modification requires interfaces with many plant systems including r..e Electrical Distribution System, Main Control Room Annunciator Panel, and Engineered Safeguard Systems.

Additional loading will be added to Diesel Generator IB.

3.11 Test Requirements 3.11.1 Post Construction After installation of the remote shutdown system, all new control facilities shall be tested to demonstrate operability of safe shutdown equipment in the " Emergency" mode independent of the

SDD-T1-bl4, Div. I

^

Revision 4 May 8, 1986 Page 13 of 24 .

1 equipment's normal control circuits in the relay and control rooms. l Testing shall also demonstrate that the safe shutdown equipment l cannot be operated from the control room in the " Emergency" mode. '

The operation of all remote shutdown system instruments shall be verified and compared to corresponding readout instruments in the control room.

Annunciation of the " Emergency" mode selection in the control room I shall be demonstrated for each circuit isolation transfer switch.

Communications facilities at all remote shutdown stations shall be tested in the " Emergency" mode with the control and relay room circuits bypassed.

Operations of the emergency lighting units at each remote shutdown station under loss of A.C. lighting conditions shall be tested to demonstrate adequate lighting for operator control functions.

3.11.2 Surveillance Testing At each plant refueling outage, the proper operation of each remote shutdown system instrument and control function shall be verified .

Specific surveillance requirements will be specified in SDD-T1-614, Division II.

4.0 OUALITY ASSURANCE The Operational QA Plan for CPUNC (Ref. 2.10) shall apply. All circuit isolation transfer switches, auxiliary relays, and instrument loop isolating devices and circuitry upstream of these devices, which connect directly with existing nuclear safety related components in the " normal" (non-bypassed mode), shall be classified as Nuclear Safety Related/Important to Safety. The remote shutdown panels, Aux. RSP and components contained therein t

shall also be classified as Nuclear Safety Related/Important to Safety.

The balance of components and circuits in the remote shutdown system shall be classified as Important To Safety.

5.0 SAFETY, HEALTH. AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS Standard industrial good safety practices shall apply.

CPUN's basic radioactive protection procedures shall apply when installing and testing in contaminated areas.

Normal routine access to areas shall be provided through utilization of the TMI-l Security Plan.

A nuclear safety and environmental, impact evaluation shall be performed for the addition of this system.

l l

l

[

\

SDD-TI-614, Div. 1 Revision 4 thy 6, 1986 Page 14 of 24 6.0 HUMAN FACTORS The remote shutdown system controls, readout instruments, and indicating lights shall be selected and arranged per the guidelines established in CPUNC Engineering Standard 5401-0100 (Ref. 2.11).

Human Factors Engineering shall participate in the selection of control and readout devices prior to finalizing the controls arrangement.

Changes to the control room annunciator windows shall be made in accordance with SDD-611E Div. II (Ref. 2.12). All new annunciation points shall be reviewed for wording and arrangement by Human Factors Engineering prior to finalizing the design.

Controls and instrumentation layout shall be based on walk-throughs of the remote shutdown process conducted with plant operators and Human Factors Engineering using full scale mockups. Walk-throughs will be conducted at the actual proposed equipment locations using draft operating procedures. Results of the walk-throughs will be documented and incorporated into the final design. Final control panel layout shall be approved by Human Factors Engineering.

The adequacy of the proposed emergency lighting and communications system additions shall also be reviewed during the walk-throughs.

Walkdowns shall also be conducted to demonstrate that all " cut and jumper" procedures can be accomplished within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

7.0 LICENSING REQUIREMNENTS The remote shutdown panel (RSP) and the equipment associated with it were provided to satisfy NRC Branch Technical Position 9.5-1. A more extensive remote shutdown system had to be developed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R which was released after BTP 9.5-1. As described in this SDD, the remote shutdown panels become an integral part of the remote shutdown system required to meet 10CFR50 Appendix R.

J f

r - - . . _ _ _ . , , . . - . . . _ . - - -

. . . .SDD-T1-614, Div. I i Rsvision 4' May 8,L1986-Page 15 of 24' TABLE 1 REMOTE SilUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL AND MONITORING FACILITIES

) Control / Instrumentation Plant Function Camponent Facility- Facility Location (Ref. Section 3.4.2)

Communication System

~

M/I System Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" 1 Status Indication "B" Aux. RSP Cray System Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP."B" l Status Indication "B" Aux. RSP l

l Diesel Generator IB Control 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. 1E 2 l Status Indication 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. IE Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. 1E

' D/C Status " Cranking" Indication 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. IE D/C Status " Running" Indication 4140 Volt E.S. Swgr. lE and RSP "B" i D/C Status " Ready to Load" Indication 4160 Volt E.S. Swg. IE and JSP "B" 4160 Volt Bus IE Watts 4160 Volt E.S. Swg. IE 4160 Volt Bus lE Volts 4160 Volt E.S. Swg. lE 4160V Bus lE Bus Energized Status Light RSP "B" 2

' 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. IE 2 Aux. Xtmr lA Feeder control tu Bus IE ISA-E2 Status Indication 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. lE Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. IE Aux. Ximr 1B Feeder Same as for Circuit Breaker 1SA-E2 2 to Bus IE ISB-E2 Diesel Generator Feeder Same as for Circuit Breaker 1SA-E2 2 i

to Bus IE Cll-02 480V Bus IS Bus Energized Status Light RSP "B" 2 4160V Feeder to Same as for Circuit Breaker 1SA-E2 2 Xfmr IS SI-02 480V Feeder to Control 480 Volt E.S. Swgr. IS 2 Swgr IS IS-02 St at us indication Cin uit i nulat ion Trannt er Switch

_____ - -- - -- - -- - - - " -- - - - ~-

~ SDD-T1-614', Div? I.

Revision 4 May 8,1986 Page 16 of 24 I

TABLE 1 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL AND MONITORING FACILITIES control / Instrumentation Plant Function Component Faci 1in Facility Location (Ref. Section 3.4.2) l 480V Feeder to IB Control 480 Volt E.S. Swgr. IS 2 ES MCC 1S-lC Status indication Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch i

j 480V Bus IT Bus Energized Status Light RSP "B" 2 a

4160V Feeder to Same as for Circuit Breaker 1SA-E2 2 j Xfmr IT T1-02 480V Feeder to Control "B" Aux. RSP 2 Swgr IT IT-02 Status Indication "B" Aux. RSP Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" 480V Feeder to IB ES Control "B" Aux. RSP 2 Screen llouse MCC Status Indication "B" Aux. RSP i IT-4C Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" Automatic Transfer Switch Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch Near existing ASCO 2

! for the IC ESV MCC Automatic Transfer Switch l 480V IB ES MCC Bus Energized Status Light RSP "B" 2 i

! 480V IB ES Screenhouse Bus Energized Status Light RSP "B" 2 l MCC a

480V IB ESV MCC Bus Energized Status Light RSP,"B" 2 480V IC ESV MCC Bus Energized Status Light RSP "B" 2

! Neutron Flux Indicator 10-1 to 10-6 counts /sec RSP "B" 3 1

l RC-P-1A Trip control and Indication 6900 Volt Swgr. lA 4a Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch

RC-P-1B Trip Control and Indication 6900 Volt Swgr. IB 4a

. Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch i

j RC-P-IC Trip control and Indication 6900 Volt Swgr. lA 4a

Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch

}

. e . ---

N Revision 4 May 8,1986 .

Page 17 of 24.

TABLE 1 REMOTE SilUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL AND MONITORING FACILITIES Control / Instrumentation Plant Function Component Facility Faci 1ity Location (Ref. Section 3.4.2)

RC-P-ID Trip Control and Indication 6900 Volt Swgr. IB 4a Circuit isolation Transfer Switch RC Inlet Temp - Temperat ure Meter 50 - 650*F RSP "A" 4a Loop A (RC-P-1B)

RC Inlet Temp - Temperature Meter 50 - 650 F RSP "B" 4a Loop B (RC-P-lC)

RC Outlet Temp - Loop A Temperature Meter 120-920 F RSP "A" 4a RC Outlet Temp - Loop B Temperature Meter 120-920 F RSP "B" 4a Steam Generator A Pressure Indicator 0-1200 psi RSP "A" 4b Pressure St eam Generator B Pressure Indicator 0-1200 psi RSP "B" 4b Pressure Steam Dump to Control RSP "B" 4b Condenser Isolation S ta t.us Indication RSP "B" MS-V-8A Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" Steam Dump to Same as for MS-V-8A 4b Condenser Isolation MS-V-8B Atmospheric Dump MS-V-4A Cont rol Manual Loader RSP "A" 4b Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "A" Atmospheric Dump MS-V-4B Control hai.ual Loader RSP "B" 4b Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" Steam Generator "A" Digital Level Indicator 0-640 inches RSP "A" 4b Level Steam Generator "B" Digital Level Indicator 0-640 inches RSP "A" 4b 1.c ve l

SDD-T1-614, Div, I Revision 4 lby 8,1986 Page 18 of 24' TABLE 1 REMOTE SilUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL AND MCt"TORINC FACILITIES Control / Instrumentation Plant Function Component Facility Facility Location (Raf. Section 1.4.2)

Steam Generator "A" Digital Level Indicator 0-640 inches RSP "B" 4b Level Steam Generator "B" Digital Level Indicator 0-640 inches RSP "B" 4b Level Emergency Feedwater Control 4160 Volt E.S.Swgr IE 4b Pump EF-P-2B Status Indication 4160 Volt E.S.Swgr IE Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch 4160 Volt E.S.Swgr IE Emergency Feedwater Control Manual Loader RSP "A" 4b Control to OTSC-A Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "A" EF-V-30A Emergency Feedwater Control Manual Loader RSP "B" 4b Control to OTSC-B Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" EF-V-30B Emergency Feedwater Same as for EF-V-30A 4b Control to OTSC-B EF-V-30C Emergency Feedwater Same as for EF-V-30B 4b <

Control to OTSC-A EF-V-30D Emergency Feedwater Flow Indicator 0 - 800 gpm RSP "A" 4b "A" Flow Emergency Feedwater Flow Indicator 0 - 800 gpm RSP "A" 4b "B" Flow Emergency Feedwater Flow Indicator 0 - 800 gpm RSP "B" 4b "A" Flow Emergency Feedwater Flow Indicator 0 - 800 gpm RSP "B" 4b "B" Fl ow

_ . _ _ _ . . - - _ _ _ . _ . . _ _ _ . - _. __. ___ - - _ . . . . ., _ - . ._ . . m ..

i SDD-TI-614, Div. I Revision 4 May 8,1986 Page 19 of 24' TABLE 1 .

i l REMOTE SilUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL AND MONITORING FACILITIES

! Control / Instrumentation Plant Function

! Component Facility Facility Location (Ref. Section 3.4.2]

Decay lleat Suction Cut and Jumper Procedure 480 Volt E.S. Valve 4c i i DH-V-1 MCC IC i

Decay lleat Suction Cut and Jumper Procedure 480 Volt E.S. Valve 4c i Dil-V-? MCC IC i

Decay lieat Removal Control 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. IE 4c

Pump Dil-P-1B Status Indication 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. lE i Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. IE 1

Dil Removal Flow "A" Flow Indicator 0-5000 gpm RSP "A" - 4c Dil Removal Flow "B" Flow Indicator 0-5000 gpm RSP "B" 4c i Dil Return Temp at Temperature Meter 0 - 300*F RSP "A" 4c Dil-P-1A Suction

Dil Return Temp at Temperature Meter 0 - 300*F RSP "B" 4c

! Dil-P-1B Suction i

j Dil Removal Cooler Temperature Meter 0 - 300*F RSP "A" 4c

1A OutIet Temp Dl! Removal Cooler Temperature Meter 0 - 300*F RSP "B" 4c

! IB Outiet Temp J Decay lieat Closed Control Aux. RSP "B" 4c i Cycle Pump DC-P-1B Status Indication Aux. RSP "B"

! Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" 1

] Decay IIcat River Same as for DC-P-1B 4c j Water Pump DR-P-1B DR-P-1B Discharge Same as for DC-P-1B 4c

Valve DR-V-1B t J

l RCS Pressure - Pressure Indicator 0- 2500 psig RSP "A" Sa Loop A Wide

SDD-T1-614 Div.:I Revision'4-May 8, 1986, j Pcge 20 of.2.4 i TABLE 1 f

REMOTE SilUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL AND MONITORINC FACILITIES Control / Instrumentation Plant. Function Component Facility Facility Location (Ref. Section 3.4.2)

RCS Pressure - Pressure Indicator 0- 2500 psig RSP "B" Sa Loop B Wide

Core Flood Tank "A" Cut and Jumper Procedure 480 Volt E.S. Valve Sa

.: Outlet CF-V-1A MCC IC Core Flood Tank "B" Cut and Jumper Procedure 480 Volt E.S. Valve Sa Outlet CF-V-1B MCC IC i

i Pressurizer lleater Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch 480 Volt E.S. Swgr. IS Sa Croup 9 (for ES contact)

I Pressurizer Relief Control RSP "B" Sa Block Valve RC-V-2 Status Indication RSP "B" j Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" i

Pressurizer Spray Control RSP "B" Sa Block Valve RC-V-3 Status Indication RSP "B" Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" l

Pressurizer Quench Cut and Jumper Procedure 480 Volt E.S. Valve 5a

Valve RC-V-4 MCC IC j Pressurizer Level Indicator 0 - 400" RSP "B" Sb Makeup Tank Level Indicator 0 - 100" RSP "B" Sb 4

l BWST Level Level Indicator RSP "B" Sb 2

m

[ RB Sump to Dil Pump A Control 480 Volt E.S. Valve 5b

! Dil-V-6 A MCC 1A i Status Indication 480 Volt E.S. Valve i

MCC 1A j Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch 480 Volt E.S. Valve MCC 1A f

i

81!10-Vil-UlR0, W1v.1 Revision 4' May 8,1986~

Page 21_of 24-TABLE 1 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL AND MONITORINC FACILITIES-Control / Instrumentation Plant Function Component Facility Facility Location (Ref. Section 3.4.2)-

RB Sump to Dil Control 480 Volt E.S. Valve 5b Pump B Dii-V-6B MCC IB Status Indication 480 Volt E.S. Valve MCC IB Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch 480 Volt E.S. Valve MCC IB Makeup Pump B Cont rol . RSP "B" Sb MU-P-1B Status Indication RSP "B" Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "C" Makeup Pump C Control RSP "B" $b MU-P-lC Status Indication RSP "B" Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" MU-P Main Oil Aut o St art when Transfer Switch RSP "B" $b Pump for MU-P-1B for MU-P-1B Placed in " Emergency" Position Status Indication RSP "B" Sb.

MU-P-3C - Main Oil Auto Start when Transfer Switch RSP "B" Sb Pump for MU-P-lC for MU System Placed in " Emergency" Position Status Indication RSP "B" Sb Makeup Pump Suction Cont. rol RSP "A" Sb Isolation from Status Indication RSP "A" BWST MU-V-14A Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "A" Makeup Pump Suction Control RSP "B" Sb Isolation from Status Indication RSP "B" BWST MU-V-14B Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" Emergency Makeup Jog Control RSP "B" Sb MU-V-16C Status Indication RSP "B" Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B"

a m Finr;Uutri us w. u o Revision 4 May 8, 1986 Page 22 of 24 TABLE 1 REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL AND MONITORING FACILITIES Control / Instrumentation Plant Function Component Facility Facility Location (Ref. Section 3.4.2)

Emergency Makeup Same as for MU-V-16C Sb MU-V-16D Normal Makeup Control RSP "B" Sb MU-V-18 Status Indication RSP "B" Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" Makeup Pump Recire. Control RSP "A" Sb Isolation MU-V-36 Status Indication RSP "A" Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "A" Makeup Pump Recirc. Control RSP "B" 5b Isolation MU-V-37 Status Indication RSP "B" Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" Letdown Cooler IA Control RSP "B" Sc outlet Isolation Status Indication RSP "B" MU-V-2A Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" Letdown Cooler IB Same as for MU-V-2A Sc Outlet MU-V-2B Letdown Block MU-V-3 Control RSP "A" Sc Status Indication RSP "A" Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "A" Letdown Split to Makeup Status Indication RSP "B" Sc Tank / Bleed Tank MU-V-8 RCP Seal Injection Flow Flow Gauge At MU-V-32 Location 5d RCP Seal Water Control RSP "B" 5d Isolation MU-V-20 Status indication RSP "B" Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" Manually Open Valve Valve Location Aux. Bldg. Elev. 281'

41@-W-061 v. ! V Revision 4 May 8, 1986 Page 23'of.24' TABLE 1 .

REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL AND MONITORING FACILITIES Control / Instrumentation Plant Function Component Facility Facility Location -(Ref. Section 3.4.2)

RCP Seal Injection Status Indication (Flow /No Flow) RSP "B" 5d Control MU-V-32 Intermediate Cooling Control Aux. RSP "B" 6 Pump IC-P-1B Status Indication Aux. RSP "B" Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch .RSTSP "B" IC Isolation - Supply Same as for IC-P-1B 6 to Reactor Building IC-V-4 IC isolation - Return Same as for IC-P-1B 6 from Reactor Building IC-V-2 IC Isolation -Return Control RSP "A" 6 from Reactor Building Status Indication RSP "A" IC-V-3 Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "A" Nuclear Services Control Aux. RSP "B" 6 Cooling Pump Status Indication Aux. RSP "B" NS-P-IC Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" Nuclear Service Control Aux. RSP "B" 6 River Water Pump Status Indication Aux. RSP "B" NR-P-lC Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" NR-P-IC Discharge Same as for NR-P-lC 6 Valvc NR-V-lC IC Cooler Same as for NR-P-lC 6 IB Outlet NR-V-ISH Nuclear and IC Cooler Same as for NR-P-lc 6 Outlet NR-V-18

Revision 4 May 8,'1986 Page 24 of 24, TABLE 1 ,

REMOTE SliUTDOWN SYSTEM CONTROL AND MONITORINC FACILITIES Cont rol / Inst rumentation Plant Function Component Facility Facility Location (Ref. Section 3.4.2)

Reactor Building Control 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. 1E 6 Emergency Cooling River Status Indication 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. IE Water Pump RR-P-1B Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch 4160 Volt E.S. Swgr. lE RR-P-1B Discharge Valve Control Aux. RSP "B" 6 RR-V-1B Status Indication Aux. RSP "B" Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch RSTSP "B" Instrument Air Control 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB 7 Compressor IA-P-1B Status Indication 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB Status Indication RSP "B" Control Building Control York Chiller Control Panel 7 Chiller All-C-4B Stat es Indication El. 281' of Control Building Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch York Chiller Control Panel El. 281' of Control Building York Chiller Control Panet El. 281' of Control Building Cont rol Building Control 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB 7 Chilled Water Status Indication 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB Pump All-P-3B Circuit Isolation Transfer Switch 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB All-P-9 A / B Cut and Jumper Procedure 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB -

7 All-E- 1 B Cut and Jumper Procedure 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB 7 All-E- 18 B Cut and Jumper Procedure 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB 7 All-E- 19 B Cut and Jumper Procedure 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB 7 AH-E-24B Cut and Jumper Procedure 480 Volt E.S. MCC IB 7 m .

c. GPUN will confirm that new penetration seals will be at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months fire-rated.

Response

The additional penetration seals summarized in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report and Appendix R Section III.G Safe Shutdown Evaluation, Rev. 7, Section 1.2.10 and 1.3 which are presently identified as "non-combustible" shall utilize assembifes which are qualified for an hourly fire rating of at least one hour. The criteria of a "Bl" zone boundary will be revised to reflect this minimum hourly fire rating.

THI-1 utilizes a nine inch depth of RTV foam extensively as a three hour rated penetration fire seal. This seal assembly was originally approved by ANI, however, in 1985, ANI withdrew approval of this fire seal based on the manufacturers' ASTM E-119 exposure fire tested temperature rise on the unexposed side which exceeded 250*F af ter 2-1/2 hours. It should be noted that the existing seals passed the smoke, flame and hose stream requirements of this test and that combustible loadings at TMI-l do not approach the exposure fire of ASTM E-119 used in the test. Additional testing was performed by GPUN to verify the integrity of these fire seals. Results of these tests verified that the RTV foam seals provided a 3-hour rated fire barrier when tested in a configuration representative of the actual installation of these seals in the plant. On this basis, TMI-l continues to utilize nine inch RTV foam penetration seals as 3-hour rated fire seals. This was reviewed and discussed with the NRC during the May 1 and 2,1986 meeting.

d. GPUN will confirm that new doors referenced in the Fire Hazards Analy-sis Report will be 1 1/2 hour fire-rated, Class B doors.

Response o The new doors summarized in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report and Appendix R Section III.G Safe Shutdown Evaluation, Rev. 7, Sections 1.2.10 and 1.3, to replace the existing doors with louvers, shall be 1 1/2 hour fire-rated, Class B doors. These three doors provide separation of fire zones AB-FZ-2a, 2b-and 2c from AB-FZ-5.

i 1

l l

l

f~

c. GPUN will provide clarification that their analysis of associated cir-cuits by common power source and spurious operation was done on the basis of a complete review of all potential problem circuits. During the meeting and in subsequent telephone conversations I informed the j licensee that it was the staff's position that GPUN's associated cir-cuit analysis by common enclosure was not acceptable because it was '

done on the basis of a very small statistical sample and not a com-plete review of all potential problem circuits.

Response

All circuits associated with the shutdown circuits were fully identified and classified into three types as defined by the NRC.

Three distinct approaches were taken to determine the associated circuits of concern, one for each type of associated circuit.

The analysis for the circuits associated by spurious operation was identical to the analysis for the safe shutdown circuits. All mechanical and electrical components whose spurious operation could affect the shutdown capability were included in the shutdown system analysis and the circuits for these components were traced and analyzed through all fire areas / zones. The circuits were individually analyzed for the consequence of fire damage. Therefore, the analysis for the circuits associated by spurious operation is 100% complete.

Similarly, all non-essential electrical circuits having a common power source with the shutdown equipment were 100% identified and reviewed for overcurrent protection. All associated power circuits were identified for each 4160 volt switchgear, 480 volt switchgear, 480 volt motor control centers, and AC and DC distribution panels.

Although the overcurrent protection coordination study was limited to the incoming main breaker and the largest outgoing feeder breaker, the coordination review demonstrated that adequate protection and coordination is achieved for all outgoing circuits protected with circuit breakers (or fused) of smaller rating. Therefore, the review of the associated power circuits is considered 100% complete.

Although the circuits associated by common enclosure were 100%

identified, the review for the overcurrent protection was essentially based on statistical sampling. The statistical sample size was selected to provide a 95% confidence level with less than 5% defects in the population. The confidence level and defect level are consistent with those used in similar applications such as IE Bulletin j 79-02. The adequacy of overcurrent protection was determined by two i

methods. The first method involved reviewing the plant design practices for overcurrent protection for the various types of power, control and instrument circuits. The second method was to field l verify the overcurrent protection of a statistical sample of circuits to assure that the design criteria were properly implemented. The i statistical sample size utilized and the subsequent evaluation performed provides sufficient assurance that each power and control

! circuit has adequate short circuit and overload protection.

l

f. GPUN was informed that it was the staff position that the problem of multiple high impedance faults is a credible event and should be an-alyzed as part of the licensee's Appendix R compliance effort. The results of this analysis should be available in an auditable form for the upcoming Appendix R audit.

Response

The TMI-l overcurrent coordination analysis assured that upstream breakers or fuses would be prevented from tripping before the downstream breakers or fuses tripped for all types of faults on an associated power circuit. Multiple high impedance faults would require a fire to selectively damage multiple circuits in a manner which would create a fault current in the range between normal operating current and the trip setting for each circuit. The possibility of tripping the main breaker due to a single fire creating multiple high impedance faults on multiple associated power circuits rather than tripping the individual breakers is not considered a credible scenario for fire damage by GPUN.

l

)

g. GPUN will provide a response to I&E Information Notice 85-09 concern-ing the potential deficiency in the design of electrical isolation of the alternate shutdown system.

Response

I&E Information Notice No. 85-09, Isolation Transfer Switches and Post-Fire Shutdown Capability, dated January 31, 1985, has been reviewed for applicability to TMI-1. The concern identified in the subject notice is not applicable to TMI-1. The alternate shutdown system circuits for hot shutdown components at TMI-l are designed to include redundant fuses. The transfer scheme is such that upon selecting the " alternate" mode via the transfer switch, the existing fuses are automatically bypassed and the redundant fuses are switched into the circuit through the transfer switch contacts. Therefore the post-fire hot shutdown capability at TMI-l does not rely upon any troubleshooting or repair procedures.

t I

i i

h. GPUN will confirm the commitment to conduct a " work check" on installed Rockbestos cable to detect future cable damage / degradation.

Response

The following plant maintenance procedures involving work in the vicinity of installed Rockbestos fire-rated cable are being modified to incorporate a " work check" into the acceptance criteria to ensure that the Rockbestos sheathing is undamaged:

1. M.P.1420-Y-20, " Installation of Temporary Cable"

2. M.P.1420-Y-22, " Installation of Cable Tray and Conduit"

3. M.P.1420-Y-23, " Installing Wire and Cable"

4. S.P.1303-12.19, " Fire Barrier Seal Inspection" The Rockbestos fire-rated metal sheath will be visually inspected following work that could affect the barrier to verify the integrity of the sheathing.

1

f. GPUN will provide a response as to how the reactor coolant pumps oil collection system conforms with the criteria of Section III.0 of Appendix R. Specific emphasis will be placed on the safety implications of an overflow of the collection tank.

Response

The installed reactor coolant pump lube oil collection system provides a complete enclosure for all potential leakage points with exception of the oil level sight gauges on each pump motor. It is necessary to leave the gauges visible for viewing. A metal case is installed around the glass as a guard to protect the sight gauge from potential impact damage. The gauge is located away from frequently traveled routes. During normal operations, the areas around the pumps are restricted, thus further reducing the possibility of impact. This installation was acceptable to the NRC in Supplement No. 4 to the Fire Protection Safety Evaluation (

Reference:

Met-Ed/GPU letter TLL-476, dated September 30, 1980).

The oil collection system has two closed, 210 gallon tanks; one tank for each pair of reactor coolant pump motors. The reactor coolant pump mctors are seismically designed which precludes a catastrophic loss of oil from more than a single pump. Each pump contains less oil than the collection tank capacity. The oil collection tanks are built to non-nuclear seismic I specifications and meet the requirements of ASME Section VIII. The tanks are adequately vented for combustible liquids of approximately 450*F flash point. Additionally, tank vents are provided with flame arrestors. The oil collection tanks and the collection gutter are designed to withstand the safe shutdown earthquake. The piping is supported using the criteria for small bore, low energy piping.

Operating procedures are implemented which require that the reactor coolant pump oil collection tanks are empty prior to plant heatup.

Operating procedures also contain additional controls to be implemented whenever maintenance is performed on the reactor coolant pump motor lube oil system.

i The TMI-l reactor coolant pump oil collection system compliance with 10CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.0 was discussed with Mr. D. Dilanni and Mr. P. Sears of the NRC on April 28, 1981. During that discussion, it was concluded that no exemption from 10CFR 50 Appendix R, Section III.0 was required and that the existing design is in compliance. The results of that discussion were confirmed in Met-Ed/GPU letter LIL-142, dated May 15, 1981.

_g.

l v--- -- , - - , , - . - - , - . - . , , - , - . - - . - - - , . .- - - - - . , - . - - -

j. GPUN will reassess the separation of redundant shutdown systems in zones / areas separated by a barrier which contains ventilation openings not provided with fire dampers. Where such an unprotected opening exists in a barrier which separates redundant shutdown systems, the licensee will propose compensating protection. This includes the wall ,

separating the motor driven EFW pumps from the steam driven pump. I

Response

Fire zone boundaries which contain ventilation openings not provided with fire dampers are addressed as follows:

1. AB-FZ-5 and AB-FZ-6 A fire in AB-FZ-5 must be prevented from effecting cables for redundant components DC-P-1B (LS2) and NS-P-1C (LSS) in AB-FZ-6.

A fire in AB-FZ-6 must be prevented from effecting cables for NS-P-1 A (LP6) and DC-P-1 A (LP2) in AB-FZ-5. The duct penetrating the ceiling between AB-FZ-5 and AB-FZ-6 is not provided with a fire damper. However, the cables for redundant components DC-P-1 A and DC-P-1B and the cables for redundant components NS-P-1 A and NS-P-lC are more than 50' from each other with respect to the duct penetration location. Therefore, as currently discussed in the TMI-1 FHAR, Sections 1.3.7 and 1.3.8 and due to the separation distance provided, there is adequate assurance that a fire in one zone will not propagate to the adjoining zone through the ventilation duct and adversely effect cables for redundant components, which thereby precludes the need for a damper in the ventilation duct.

Four pipe penetrations (zone penetration numbers Z-50, 51, 52 and

55) through the ceiling of AB-FZ-5 are not being provided with penetration seals. This approach was agreed to in principle with the NRC during the May,1986 meeting based on penetrations opening into confining cubicles in AB-FZ-6 which have a very low combustible loading.

2. AB-FZ-2b and AB-FZ-2c The wall separating AB-FZ-2b and AB-FZ-2c contains a duct penetra-tion which is not equipped with a fire damper. This wall will be classified as a B2 boundary since it is not relied upon to separate redundant safe shutdown components from each other. MU-P-1A (located in AB-FZ-2a) can be utilized for a fire in AB-FZ-2b or AB-FZ-2c. Therefore, a fire damper is not required in the duct between A3-FZ-2b and AB-FZ-2c. The FHAR will be revised accordingly.

3. AB-FZ-2c and AB-FZ-3 The duct penetration between AB-FZ-2c and AB-FZ-3 will be provided with a 3-hour rated fire damper and the boundary will be classified as 3-hour rated. The valve reach rod penetrations are not considered capable of propagating a fire from one zone to the other due to the small size of the opening. The FHAR will be changed to reflect the fire damper addition.

4. AB-FZ-2c and AB-FZ-5 For a fire in AB-FZ-5, the makeup pump MU-P-1B in AB-FZ-2b will be used for shutdown. The subject boundary is presently classified as a Bl/ rated boundary with a qualifying statement that the existing ducts have no fire damper. The existing configuration of this boundary is adequate as described in the TMI-l FHAR, Revision 7.

This was agreed to in principle with the NRC during the May 1,1986 meeting based on cubicles separating the general hallway area of AB-FZ-5 from the duct penetrations into AB-FZ-2c.

5. IB-FZ-2 to IB-FZ-3 (EFW Pumps)

The open duct face at the wall separating these two fire zones will be provided with a 1 1/2 hour fire-rated damper. The FHAR will be revised accordingly.

6. IB-FZ-2 to IB-FZ-4 IB-FZ-4 (295' hallway) presents the possibility of a common exposure fire to IB-FZ-2 and IB-FZ-3 (turbine driven and motor driven EFW pumps, respectively). GPUN proposes to extend fire detection to IB-FZ-4. This approach was agreed to in principle with the NRC during the May 1,1986 meeting based on the very low combustible loading in the IB-FZ-4 hallway and the distance between unprotected openings in the common wall to IB-FZ-2 and IB-FZ-3. The FHAR will be revised accordingly.

7. FH-FZ-4 and FH-FZ-5 This boundary contains an HVAC penetration on elevation 380'-0" which is not equipped with a one hour fire damper. This boundary will be changed ^o B2 classification, because it is not relied upon to separate redundant shutdown components. This deletes the need for a fire damper in the existing duct or the need to seal around the duct. The FMAR will be revised accordingly.

l

8. FH-FZ-5 and CB-FZ-Sb i

This boundary contains an open duct penetration and an open louver.

This boundary will be changed to B2 classification, because it is j not relied upon to separate redundant shutdown components. Control building ventilation, Train "A" is protected in FH-FZ-5. This deletes the need for a fire damper in the existing duct penetra-tions and louver in this zone boundary. The FHAR will be revised accordingly.

9. FH-FZ-5 and CB-FZ-Sa This boundary contains an open duct penetration and an open louver.

The open duct penetration and the open louver will be provided with one hour rated fire dampers, since control building ventilation, Train "A" (located in CB-FZ-Sa) is required for shutdown during a fire in FH-FZ-5. The FHAR will be revised accordingly.

TMI-1 FHAR Section 1.3.17 describes an " unrated sheet metal wall" installed at the entrance to fire zones CB-FZ-Sa and 5b. This sheet metal wall is constructed of a 2" thick insulated metal panel consisting of fiberglass rigid bosrd fill with metal facing on both sides. The sheet metal wall section is 15' high and 10' wide. The FHAR will be revised accordingly to provide this informa tion.

10. AB-FZ-6 to AB-FZ-3 Four pipe penetrations (zone penetration numbers Z-56, 57, 58 and

59) through the ceiling of AB-FZ-3 are not being provided with penetration seals. Justification for two penetrations was provided in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report and Appendix R Section III.G Safe Shutdown Evaluation, Rev. 7. In actuality, there are four penetrations, and this approach was agreed to in principle with the NRC during the May 1,1986 meeting based on penetrations opening into confining cubicles in AB-FZ-6 which have very low combustible loading,

11. AB-FZ-7 to AB-FZ-9 The boundaries between AB-FZ-7 and AB-FZ-9 are being reclassified as B-2 boundaries based on the fact that AB-FZ-9 contains no safe shutdown equipment or cables and the walls do not separate any safe shutdown systems.

12. AB-FZ-6 to 6A to AB-FZ-9 and 7 The reactor purge exhaust duct of 10 gauge stainless steel routes from the reactor buf1 ding to the above fire zones. Justification for the acceptability of the fire zone boundaries without providing fire dampers at zone boundary penetrations was provided in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report and Appendix R Section III.G Safe Shutdown Evaluation, Rev. 7. The justification, based on substantial construction of the duct, was agreed to in principle with the NRC during the May 1,1986 meeting. In addition, the walls between AB-FZ-7 and 9 are being redesignated as B-2 fire boundaries.

13. AB-FZ-4 and 5 to AB-FA-1 and 2 It was agreed in principle with the NRC during the May 1,1986 meeting that the metal plates in the floor of AB-FZ-4 and 5 could be replaced with metal of half the existing thickness without reducing the level of barrier separation as justified in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report and Appendix R,Section III.G. Safe Shutdown Evaluation, Rev. 7 Accordingly, it is GPUN's intention to replace the existing metal plates to facilitate personnel access to the decay heat pump vaults.

o

k. GPUN will provide a suwnary of the basis for the time availability for manual valve operations, including all assumptions and a listing of zones / areas affected.

Response

The enclosed table lists all valves which require manual operation by system. It summarizes the basis for the time availability for manual valve operation, all assumptions, and zones / areas affected.

VALVES REQUIRING MANUAL OPERATIONS - BY SYSTEM REQUIRED TIME FOR MANUAL OPERATION' FIRE AREA /2DNE OR ACTION ACTION VALVE REQUIRING IN VALVE NO. SPURIOUS ACHIEVABLE REOUIRED LOCATION OPERATION tilL DTtreattfou AS-V-4 Spurtous 2 Hrs 2 Hrs IB-FZ-2 IB-FZ-3 120 This valve must rem in closed to prevent uncontrollable release of main steam when the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is used. The valve will be manually closed if it spuriously opens.

The 120 minute limit corresponds to the time allowed to operate EF-P-1 and the EF-V-30 control valves for the IB-FZ-3 fire, editch is the only fire for which this pump, and therefore AS-V-4, are required.

DH-V-6A Spurious 45 Min. 45 Min. AB-FA-1 AB-FZ-4 45 This RB sump tsolation valve must remain closed to prevent the See Discussion AB-FZ-6 45 contents of the SWST from draintne to the reactor s w dortne hot 45 Min. CB-FA-1 45 shutdown. It is also required to remain closed edten the corres-CB-FA-2a 45 ponding DH 1000 is used during the later stage of cocidown.

CB-FA-3a 45 Spurious operation of the valve util be corrected manually FH-FZ-1 45 (45 min. time limit). DH-V-5A(58) can also be closed to mitigate FH-FZ-6 45 spurious operation of DH-V-6A(65) during hot shutdown.

The 45 minute limit for settgating spurious opening of DH-V-6A or B is based on a calculatico of the allowable reduction in volume in the BWST which will still allow sufficient borated water for safe shutdown by feed-and-Lieed (HPI) cooline. The calculation (GPUN no. TI-5360-212-007) assumed a single open DH-V-6A or t valve, an initial BWST volume of 337.000 sailons, and a required volume of 17.000 gallons for feed-and-bleed cooline.

DH-V-6B Spurious 45 Min. 45 Min. AB-FA-2 AB-FZ-6a 45 Same remark as in DH-V-6A.

See Discussion CB-FA-2b 45 45 Min. CB-FA-2c 45 CB-FA-2d 45 CB-FA-2f 45 FH-FZ-1 45 FH-FZ-2 45 FH-FZ-5 45 EF-V-2A Spurious 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs.' IB-FZ-3 IB-FZ-3 120 One of EF-V-?A and EF-V-2B are required to remain open to allers feedwater into one steam generator when the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump is used. Spurious closure of one valve is acceptable. Manual correction is planned for the IB-FZ-3 fire, concurrent with manual operatior. of the turbine drtven emergency feedwater pump and control valves.

EF-V-2B Spurious 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs.' IB-FZ-3 IB-FZ-3 120 Same remark as in EF-V-2A.

EF-V-30A Required 2 Hrs. 20 Min.38 or IB-FZ-3 IB-FZ-3 120 EF-V-30A, 308, 30C. and 300 control the flow of feedwater into the 2 Hrs.' FH-FZ-5 20 steam generators. One valve for each steam generator is required See Discussion IB-FZ-8 120 to be coerable, while the remaining valves are required to stay closed to prevent overf tlling of the steam generators.

Since the valves are equipped with only a 2-hour backup air supply. they will be manually controlled after the first 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months if 1A is not available then. HPI Cooling requires operation within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for the IB-FZ-3 and IB-FZ-8 fires.

See Note 10 for discussion of the FH-FZ-5 fire.

Pace 2 of le VALVES REQUIRING MANUAL OPERATIONS - B'f SYSTEM REC 3 "~d TIME FOR MANUAL OPERATION" FIRE AREA /ZDNE OR ACTION ACTIDit VALVE REQUIRING IN VALVE NO. SPURIDUS ACHIEVABLE REOUIRID_ _ L3 CATION OPERATION lGL DISQgtIDM EF-V-30B Required 2 Hrs. 20 Min.88 or IB-FZ-3 IB-FZ-3 120 Same remark as in EF-V-30A.

2 krs' FH-FZ-5 20 IB-FZ-8 120 EF-V-30C Required 2 Hrs. 20 Min.88 or IB-FZ-3 IB-FZ-3 120 Same remark as in EF-V-30A.

2 krs' FH-FZ-5 20 IB-FZ-8 120 EF-V-300 Required 2 Hrs. 20 Min.38 or IB-FZ-3 IB-FZ-3 120 Same remark as in EF-V-30A.

2 Nrs.* FH-FZ-5 20 IB-FZ-8 12C IC-V-1A Spurious 2 Hrs. 4 Nrs." RB-FZ-Ic RB-FZ-1c 240 The valve corresponding to the letdown cooler to be used for shut-AB-FZ-4 240 down is required to remain open. The valve will be manually AB-FZ-5 240 corrected if it spuricusly operates.

AB-FZ-6a 240 CB-FA-2d 240 CB-F A-2 e 240 CB-FA-2f 240 FH-FZ-1 240 FH-FZ-2 240 FH-FZ-5 240 IC-V-18 Spurious 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs." RB-FZ-1c RB-FZ-Ic 240 Same remark as in IC-V-1A.

AB-FZ-4 240 CB-FA-2b 240 CB-FA-2d 240 j CB-FA-2f 240 FH-FZ-11 IC-V-2 Spurious 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs.* RB-FZ-1c AB-FZ-4 240 IC-V-2, 3. and 4. are in series and are required to remain open to AB-FZ-5 240 allow cooling water through the letdown coolers and RC pomp 1 AB-FZ-6a 240 coolers. Electrical cables for the valves are normally protected CB-FA-2b 240 from fire damage to provide thermal barrier cooling. Manual cor-CB-FA-3b 240 rection of spurious operation is necessary in some fire area /

zones. Seal injection is available in these cases (4 Mr. time).

Spurious operation of IC-V-3 and 4 can also be corrected by opening switches 17 of EH-DP-1E at CB-FA-2d and 5 of EH-DP-lM at CR-FA-2C. respectively.

In all of the areas requiring manual operations four hours are available for establishing letdown flow. In cases where therinal barrier cooling was required, modifications were made to ensure that no spurious closure would occur.

3563f

Page 3 of 9 VALVES REQUIRI M MANUAL OPERATIONS - BY SYSTEM pEQUIRED TIME FOR MANUAL OPERATION' FIRE AREA /2DNE OR ACTION ACTION VALVE REQUIRING IN VALVE MO. SPURIOUS ACHIEVABLE KOUIRED LOCATION OPERATION h DMflKCnti IC-V-3 Spurion 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs.* AB-FZ-4 AB-FZ-4 240 Same remark as in IC-V-2.

CB-FA-2b 240 CB-FA-3b 240 IC-V-4 Spurious 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs.* AB-FZ-7 AB-FZ-4 240 Same remark as in IC-V-2.

CB-FA-2b 240 CB-FA-3b 240 MS-V-2A Spurious 2 Hrs. 3 Hrs. IB-FZ-2 IB-FZ--2 180 The valve must remain open for the atmospheric steam dump. The (2 Hrs.) IB-FZ-3 120 steam will be allowed to duup to the code sahty valves if it CB-FA-1 180 spuriously closes. The valve will be manually opened if necessary CB-FA -2a 18ti for operation of turbine-driven EF-P-1 (2 Hrs.) or MS-V-4A/48.

CB-FA -3a 180 FH-FZ-1 180 The 180 minute times shown reflect an assumption of maintaining FH-FZ-6 180 hot shutdown for up to three hours before it is necessary to begin cooldown and, therefore, to use MS-y-4A or B.

MS-V-2B Spurious 2 Hrs. 3 Hrs. IB-FZ-2 IB-FZ-2 180 Same remark as in MS-V-2A.

(2 Hrs.) IB-FZ-6 180 IB-FZ-7 180 CB-FA-1 180 CB-FA-2a 180 CB-FA-2b 180 CB-FA-3a 180 FH-FZ-1 180 FH-FZ-5 180 F H - F.Z-6 180 TB-F A-1 180 MS-V-4A Required 2 Hrs. 3 Hrs. IB-FZ-2 IB-FZ-2 180 The valve must be under control for the atmospheric steam dump.

IB-FZ-4 180 If the valve cannot be remotely operated, the steam will be CB-FA-2d 180 allowed to dump to the code safety valves until the valve can be CB-FA-3a 180 manually controlled. Spurious opening of the valve will be cor-CB-FA-3b 180 rected by closing MS-V-2A/28.

FH-FZ-2 180 See the remark under MS-V-2A.

F H- F Z-:5 180 TB-FA-I 180 MS-V-4B Required 2 Hrs. 3 Hrs. IB-FZ-2 ID-FZ 2 180 Same remark as in MS-V-4A.

IB-FZ-3 180 IB-FZ '6 180 See the remark under MS-V-2A.

CB-FA-2c 180 CB-FA-2d 180 CB-FA-3a 180 CB-FA-3b 180 FH-FZ-2 180 FH-FZ-5 180 TB-FA-1 180 3563f

Pape 4 of le VALVES REQUIRING MANUAL OPERATIONS - BY SYSTEM REQUIRED TIME FOR MANUAL OPERATIDN' FIRE AREA /ZDNE OR ACTION ACTION VALVE REQUIRING IN ACHIEVABLE REQUIRED LCCATION DPERATION R DTCrtKCIDM VALVE NO. SPURIOUS MS-V-10A Required 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs. IE-FZ-2 IB-FZ-3 120 MS-V-10A and 108 supply steam to the EF turbine. One is required to be opened when the turbine-driven EF ptsup is used for shutdown.

(2 Hrs.) The MS-V-13A and 138 bypass pressurization valves will be used if available, but are not required.

MS-V-108 Required 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs. IB-FZ-2 IB-FZ-3 120 Same remark as in MS-V-10A.

4 Hrs." RB-FZ-Ic RB-FZ-1c 240 One of the inlet valves corresponding to the cooler in use must Mu-V-1A Spurious 2 Hrs.

AB-FZ-4 240 remain open if letdown is used. The valve will be manually cor-AB-FZ-5 280 rected if it spuriously closes.

CB-FA-2e 240 FH-FZ-1 240 FH-FZ-2 240 FH-FZ-5 240 HU-V-1B Spurious 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs.4 RB-FZ-Ic RB-FZ-1c 240 Same remark as in MU-V-1A.

AB-FZ-4 240 CB-FA-1 240 CB-FA-2b 240 CB-FA-2d 240 CB-FA-2f 240 FH-FZ-1 240 FH-FZ-6 Spurious 4 Hrs." RB-FZ-Ic RB-FZ-Ic 240 One of the outlet valves corresponding to the cooler in use must MU-V-2A 2 Hrs.

AB-FZ-4 240 remain open if letdown is used. The valve will be manually cor-AB-FZ-5 240 rected if it spuriously closes.

AB-FZ-6a 240 CB-FA-2b 240 CB-FA-2d 240 CB-FA-2e 240 CB-FA-3b 240 FH-FZ-1 240 FH-FZ-2 240 FH-FZ-5 240 HU-V-2B Spurious 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs." RB-FZ-1c RB-FZ-Ic 240 Same remark as in MU-V-2A.

AB-FZ-4 240 AB-FZ-5 240 AB-FZ-6a 240 CB-FA-2b 240 CB-FA-2d 240 i CB-FA-2e 240 CB-FA-3b 240 FH-FZ-1 240 FH-FZ-2 240 FH-FZ-5 240 3513f

Page 5 of 9 VALVES REQUIRING MANUAL OPERATIONS - BY SYSTEM S

REQUIRED TIME FOR MANUAL OPERATION FIRE AREA /ZDNE OR ACTION ACTION VALVE REQUIRING IN VALVE hQ, SPURIOUS ACHIEVABLE REQUIRED LOCATIDH DPERATION M142 DISCUSSIDM HU-V-3 Spurious 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs.* AB-FZ-4 AB-FZ-4 240 The valve must remain open if letdown is used. The position of CB-FA-2a 240 the valve will be manually corrected if it spuriously operates.

CB-FA-2b 240 CB-FA-3a 240 3

CB-FA-3b 240 FH-FZ-1 240

' FH-FZ-5 240 TB-FA-1 240 HU-V-4 Required / 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs." AB-FZ-3 AB-FZ-3 240 HU-V-4 with mechanical valve HU-V-99; HU-V-5 with mechanical Spurious CB-FA-1 240 valves HU-V-97A and 978; and mechanical valves HU-V-98 with CB-FA-2a 240 HU-V-109A and 1098 are three parallel paths for letdown flow. One

! CB-FA-3a 240 path must be opened for letdown. If letdown is required for RC FH-FZ-1 240 pressure control, the preferred means of flow control is through FH-FZ-6 240 HU-V-5 or MU-V-98; HU-V-4 must be closed. The position of the valve will be manually corrected if required.

HU-V-5 Required / 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs." AB-FZ-3 CB-FA-1 240 S&me remark as in HU-V-4.

Spurious FH-FZ-5 240 I HU-V-6A Spurious 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs." AB-FZ-6 CB-FA-2d 240 The valve corresponding to the demineralizer in use prior to the j CB-FA-2e 240 fire must remain open if letdown is used for shutdown. The valves CB-FA-2f 240 will be manually corrected if the pneumatic valve spuriously FH-FZ-1 240 closes. Mechanical valve MU-V-70A can also be manually opened to FH-FZ-2 240 bypass the demineralizer if required. Only one letdown flowpath FH-FZ-5 240 is uttitzed while the other is kept closed.

HU-V-6B Spurious 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs." AB-FZ-6 CB-FA-1 240 Same remark as in MU-V-6A.

CB-FA-2d 240 CB-FA-2e 240 CB-FA-2f 240 FH-FZ-1 240

'. FH-FZ-2 240 l FH-FZ-5 240 HU-V-8 Required 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs." AB-FZ-6 AB-FZ-2a 240 This valve is normally positioned such that letdown flow is 3 Way Valve AB-FZ-5 240 through the makeup tank. This valve should be available to trans-AB-FZ-9 240 fer letdown flow to the bleed tanks to prevent HU tank overflow.

CB-FA-2d 240 but is not required. This will be accomplished by manual opera-

! CB-FA-2e 240 tion, if necessary. Overflow to WDL-T-2 will occur about 5 CB-FA-2f 240 minutes after makeup tank suction isolation, with normal 140 spa FH-FZ-1 240 letdown flow. This overflow is acceptable.

FH-FZ-2 240 FH-FZ-5 240 i

3563f i

Page 6 of 10 VALVES REQUIRING MANUAL OPERATIONS - BY SYSTEM S

REQUIRED TIME FOR MANUAL OPERATION FIRE AREA /ZDNE OR ACTION ACTIDN VALVE REQUIRING IN VALVE MO. SPURIOUS ACHIEVABLE REDUIRED LOCATION OPERATION blN2 DfChitCTnM MU-V-11A Spurious 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs." AB-FZ-5 AB-FZ-5 240 The valve corresponding to the filter in use prior to the fire CB-FA-1 240 must remain open if letdown is used for shutdossi. The valve util CB-FA-2d 240 be manually repositioned if the pneumatic valve spuriously closes.

CB-FA-2e 240 Mechanical valve MU-V-11D can be manually opened to bypass the CB-FA-2f 240 filter. Only one letdown flowpath is uttitzed while the other is FH-FZ-2 240 kept closed.

FH-FZ-5 240 MU-V-IIB Spurious 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs." AB-FZ-5 AB-FZ-5 240 Same remark as in MU-V-11A.

CB-FA-2d 240 CB-FA-2e 240 CB-FA-2f 240 FH-FZ-2 240 FH-FZ-5 240 MU-V-14A Required 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs.5 AB-FZ-4 AB-FZ-4 120 MU-P-1A and 18 can take suction from the MU tank via MU-V-12 and AB-FZ-6 120 from the BWST via MU-V-14A. HU-V-12 or 14A will be protected from spurious closure where required. In some areas. MU-V-14A will be required to be manually opened for RC inventory control. Thenmal barrier cooling is available in these cases, so seal injection is not required. Normal make-up can be delayed approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months .

MU-V-16A Required / 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs.5 33 AB-FZ-4 AB-FZ-4 120 MU-V-16A. 16B. 16C. and 16D may be used for 2: inventory control Spurious AB-FZ-6 120 and are used for HPI cooling. One valve corresponding to the MU pump used during shutdown must be opened. Cables for these valves will be protected in some fire areas / zones for inventory control or to prevent spurious operation. In some areas, the valve will be required to be manually operated for RC inventory 1

control (as shown). In these areas, spurious operations can be

' mitigated by tripping the operating MU pump from the control room.

' HU-V-168 Required / 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs.5 33 AB-FZ-4 AB-FZ-4 120 Same remark as in MU-V-16A.

Spurious AB-FZ-6 120 HU-V-17 Required / 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs.'3 AB-FZ-3 AB-FZ-4 120 The makeup flow line through MU-V-17 and 18 is used for normal Spurious sakeup flow and for RC pressure control when the pressurizer heaters are not available. Mechanical valve MU-V-92 can be used i' to control makeup flow if MU-V-17 is unavailable. MU-V-17 can be isolated by nechanical valves MU-V-91 A and MU-V-918. MU-V-217 is a bypass around MU-V-17. and if this valve spuriously opens.

MU-V-18 must be closed to prevent uncontrollable makeup flow. If MU-V-18 spurtously closes, it can be manually opened. This makeup path can be used for normal RC inventory control.

Correction of spurious operation of MU-V-17 or 217 is required to stop uncontrolled makeup to the reactor coolant system (pressurizer overf111). This will be done by tripping the makeup pump from the Control Room. Makeup can be delayed, with the reactor in hot shutdown, for two hours.

l I

Page 7 of 10 VALVES REQUIRIkG MANUAL OPERATIONS - BY SYSTEM 8

REQUIRED TIME FOR MANUAL OPERATION FIRE AREA /20NE OR ACTION ACTIDN VALVE REQUIRING IN VALVE MO. SPURIOUS ACHIEVABLE REDUIRED LDCATIDN OPERATIDN MIN. DICPHCCIDM i

, MU-V-18 Required / 2 Hrs. 2 Hrs.II AB-FZ-4 AB-FZ-4 120 Same remarks as in MU-V-17.

Spurious

.i I

MU-V-20 Spurious I Hr. 1 Hr. FH-FZ-2 CB-FA-2b 60 In CB-FA-2b. both seal injection and thermal barrier cooling are

! used, and assuranice of adequate function is provided by the fact that no single spurious fault can disable both functions. Since I only a single spurious fault is postulated for MU-V-28, 32, 36 j and 37; NR-V-15A, 158 and 18; and IC-V-2. 3 and 4; no single fire event can both isolate seal injection and isolate thermal barrier l

! cooling, nor both close the MU-V-36 or 37 MU pump minimum flow bypass valves and isolate seal injection. Because of the number oF components threatened by the CB-FA-2b fire, manual action i

should however be taken within about one hour to restore seal injection.

MU-V-36 Spurious 1 Hr. 1 Hr. AB-FZ-3 AB-FZ-6 60 MU-V-36 and 37 must stay open to ensure minimum acceptable flow CB-FA-2b 60 through the MU pumps to prevent pump damage. The circuits are normally protected. Reopening within I hour is acceptable if seal injection is available.

The one hour value is a very conservative assumption, based on conversations with the pump manufacturer, who states that the pumps can operate at flows as low as the design seal injection flow for several hours without serious effects.

t MU-V-37 Spurious 1 Hr. 1 Hr. AB-FZ-3 AB-FZ-6a 60 Same remark as in MU-V-36.

j CB-FA-2b 60 MU-V-98 Required 2 Hrs. 4 Hrs." AB-FZ-3 CB-FA-1 240 Same remark as in MU-V-4.

FH-FZ-5 240 Spurious 30 Min. 30 Min. AB-FZ-1 AB-FZ-5 30 For fires in locations where RCP thermal barrier cooltog is NR-V-15A AB-FZ-6 30 required, the cables will be protected. For a fire in other AB-FZ-6a 30 locations (as shown), manual correction will be required.

CB-FA-2e 30 The analysis for NR-V-15A and B did not go further than assuring that no other demands require operation in less than 30 minutes.

Longer times may be acceptable. The analysts for NR-V-18 identified several HVAC demands which might require cooling water in times not much longer than 30 minutes, i' NR-V-158 Spurious 30 Min. 30 Min. AB-FZ-1 AB-FZ-5 30 Same remarks as in NR-V-15A.

AB-FZ-6 30 AB-FZ-6a 30 CB-FA-2b 30 CB-FA-2e 30 l

NR-V-18 Required 30 Min. 30 Min. AB-FZ-1 CB-FA-2b 30 See the remarks under NR-V-15A CB-FA-2c 30 3563f

Page 8 of 9 l

VALVES REQUIRING MANUAL OPERATIONS - BY SYSTEM TIME FOR MANUAL OPERATION

FIRE AREA /ZDNE REQUIRED IN ACTION ACTION VALVE REQUIRING OR tgh DICfH" Tom VALVE NO. SPURIOUS ACHIEVABLE ornu m n LOCATION OPERATION 4 Hrs." A8-FZ-6 AB-FZ-5 240 This pneumatic valve should be open to divert letdown flow to the WDL-V-1 Required / 2 Hrs.

240 bleed tanks if makeup tank overftlling is launinent. Overflow to Spurious As-FZ-9 FH-FZ-2 240 WDL-T-2 will occur about 5 minutes after makeup tank suction iso-FH-FZ-5 240 lation. with normal 140 gpm letdown flow. This overflow is

acceptable. The valve can be manually opened by connecting an 1 external air or nitrogen suoply if normal operation is not l possible.

I 4 Hrs." AB-FZ-6 AB-FZ-5 240 This pneumatic valve must be closed when W L-V-1 is open. The I

WDL-V-2 Required / 2 Hrs.

240 valve can be closed by disconnecting the air supply if normal Spurious AB-FZ-9 i

FH-FZ-2 240 operation is not possible.

FH-FZ-5 240

' Required / 4 Hrs." A8-FZ-5 AB-FZ-5 240 This valve or one of the redundant valves (W L-V-4 or 5) should be WOL-V-3 2 Hrs.

AB-FZ-9 240 open to divert letdown flow to a bleed tank with sufficient capa-i Spurious FH-FZ-2 240 city if makeup tank overfilling is launtnent. Overflow to WDL-T-2 FH-FZ-5 240 will occur about 5 minutes af ter makeup tank suction isolation, with normal 140 gpm letdown flow. This overflow is acceptable.

j The valve can be opened by connecting an external air or nitrogen supply if normal operation is not possible.

Required / 4 Hrs." AB-FZ-5 AB-FZ-5 240 This valve or one of the redundant valves (W L-V-3 or 5) should be WDL-V-4 2 Hrs.

AB-FZ-9 240 open to divert letdown flow to a bleed tarik with sufficient capa-Spurtous FH-FZ-2 240 city if makeup tank overf t11tne is imuninent. Overflow to WDL-T-2

' FH-FZ-5 240 will occur about 5 minutes after makeup tank suction isolation, with normal 140 gpm letdown flow. This overflow is acceptable.

The valve can be opened by connecting an external air or nitrogen supply if normal operation is not possible.

Required / 4 Hrs.* AS-FZ-5 AB-FZ-5 240 This valve or one of the redundant valves (W L-V-3 or 4) should be WDL-V-5 2 Hrs.

AB-FZ-9 240 open to divert letdown flow to a bleed tank with sufficient capa-j Spurious FH-FZ-2 240 city if makeup tank overfilling is launinent. Overflow to WDL-T-2 FH-FZ-5 240 will occur about 5 minutes after makeup tank suction isolation, with normal 140 gpm letdown flow. This overflow is acceptable.

The valve can be opened by connecting an external air or nitrogen supply if normal operation is not possible.

}

i 3563f 1

4

m i Page 9 of.lg

)

l i

VALVES REQUIRING MANUAL OPERATIONS - BY SYSTEM i

i FOOTNOTES N2te: These notes are from FHAR Rev. 7 attachment 3-2. Not all of them (e.g., 3, 7, 8) are referred to by the present table.

1. The initiation of the decay heat cooling system (DH) can occur anytime between 3 and 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months after an Appendix R fire. For fires that require equipment repair before the DH System can be used, the 72-hour time limit applies. For all but one other fire, DH can be initiated any time the reactor coolant system temperature and pressure are suitable, which can occur anytime after approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months . The IB-FZ-3 fire requires decay heat removal for HPI recirculation cooling, at a time determined

, by available borated water (BWST) inventory. None of the decay heat removal (or supporting systems) cables or components are affected by this fire, and powered components are insnediately available if required to operate. All operations related to the DH System operation therefore have the "3 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ." or the "3 to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or insnediate " or the "No Limit or Inunediate" i Action Required table entry.

i j 2. Deleted

$ 3. Main feedwater flow to the OTSGs must be stopped to prevent overcooling or overfeeding the OTSGs. If either the flow control 1 valves or their stop valves cannot be closed quickly, the main feedwater pumps or the condensate pumps must be tripped to stop MF flow. Therefore, "No Limit" Sntries have been used in the Action Required table, since valve action cannot be taken.

4. The letdown function will be used whenever it is available to ease reactor coolant system inventory and pressure control. The i letdown function is only absolutely necessary when the pressurizer heaters are not available and feed and bleed is used for solid plant pressure control. All Action Gequired table entries relative to the letdown function show "4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months " for the time 1 required to establish and maintain a letdown flow path. While components are listed for various letdown flow paths and l supporting equipment, only one path will be estabitshed, depending on available components.

5. The MU-V-16 valves are only needed for the following conditions:

a. HPI cooling is needed because emergency feedwater is not available (IB-FZ-3 fire); MU-V-16A or 168 and MU-V-16C or 160 needed.

l b. Pump MU-P-1C is used for makeup; MU-V-16C or 16D needed.

l c. Normal makeup path through MU-V-18 is not available; MU-V-16A or 16B needed. ,

1 The "2 hr." values for MU-V-14 and the MU-V-16's are based on events for which emergency feedwater is available, seal injection

is not required, and pressure control is available; so that normal makeup is not inanediately required.

6. The Action Achievable column should be regarded as a preliminary (but conservative) estimate, pending the development and verification of fire emergency procedures. The Action Required column is also a preliminary but conservative estimate. In most cases, an adequate margin can be shown without detailed analysis of the system and component operating sequences and times.

l 7. The Redundant Valves column refers in most cases to those valves which serve an equivalent function in a redundant train, and does not in all cases identify valves which provide the required shutdown function for all Appendix R fire events.

l

8. Position for HPI recirculation cooling. See Note I and the Discussion entries.

9. The "2 Hrs" limit applies for the IB-FZ-3 and IB-FZ-8 fire for which HPI cooling is used.

i i

10. At least one of the valves is required inanediately for EFW cooli:.s. The "20 Min." Action Required values are based on j

small-break LOCA analyses which show acceptable primary system re:ponse with neither high pressure injection por emet gency feedwater available for 20 minutes after reactor trip. For the fire in fire area. FH-FZ-5, remote operation of the valves can l

be reestablished in the Control Building utilizing controls on the Remote Shutdown systein within 20 minutes.

i 3563f

Page 10 of le

, 11. Makeup can be delayed, with the reactor in hot shutdown, for two hours. Prompt correction of spurious operation of MU-V-16A, B.

+

C, or D, or 17, or 217 ts however required, since uncontrolled makeup to the reactor coolant system (pressurizer overfill) must be prevented.

An alternative means of correcting spurious opening of these valves is to trip the makeup pump. This is acceptable so long as thermal barrier cooling is available, so that the RCP seal injection is not required. However, in the AB-FZ-4 case, thennal barrier cooling could be disabled by loss of local instrument air, or by a spurious hot short or ESAS actuation, causing closure of IC-V-3.

Since FHAR Rev. 7 was issued, a decision has been made to replace AB-FZ-4 cable for IC-V-3 and MU-V-14A with Rockbestos Firezone R material, to prevent localized fires from both producing spurious operation of IC-V-3 and disabling MU-V-14A. A combination of cable protection for the MU-V-16A and B and MU-V-17 valves in AR-FZ-4, plus MCC logic changes for MU-V-16A and 8 and MU-V-217, will be performed to prevent spurious operation of these makeup valves. The FHAR will be revised accordingly.

l 1

1 l

1 1

1 I

3563f 1

1. GPUN will provide a summary of the basis for their assertion that the loss of ventilation will not affect shutdown for fires in certain zones / areas referenced in the exemption requests, including all assumptions and a listing of the zones / areas affected.

Response

Loss of Control Building Ventilation:

The Fire Hazards Analysis Report and Appendix R Section III.G Safe Shutdown Evaluation, Rev. 7, discusses providing control building ventilation by manually opening dampers and doors then using the Control Building Ventilation System emergency supply fans to provide air flow. Based on further evaluation of the system configuration, GPUN considers the use of portable blowers and opening doors to be a more practical approach to assuring the necessary ventilation should the Control Building Ventilation System by affected by a fire.

The following tabulation identifies the postulated fire location, the control building areas which would require portable ventilation for protection of hot shutdown equipment due to loss of the control i building ventilation system, and the manual actions required to

! provide the portable ventilation:

Areas Requiring Portable Ventilation Fire Locatio_n or Manual Actions Manual Actions CB-FA-1 CB-FA-2b, 2e, 29 Open doors to exhaust air.

CB-FA-3a, 3d Install portable blower to CB-FA-4b supply air to CB-FZ-2b, 2e, 2g CB-FA-2a CB-FA-2b, 2e, 2g Install portable blower to supply air and open doors to exhaust air.

CB-FA-2b CB-FA-2a, 2d, 2f Install portable blower to supply air and open doors to exhaust air.

CB-FA-2d CB-FA-2b, 2e, 2g Install portable blower to supply air. Open door to l

exhaust air from CB-FA-2e 8 29 .

CB-FA-2e CB-FA-2a, 2d, 2f Open doors from CB-FA-2a into CB-FA-2d & 2f CB-FA-2t CB-FA-2b, 2e, 2g Install portable blower to supply air. Open doors to exhaust air from CB-FA-2g.

l l

l Areas Requiring Portable Ventilation Fire Location or Manual Actions Manual Actions CB-FA-2g CB-FA-2a, 2d, 2f Open doors to supply air to CB-FA-2f.

CB-FA-3a CB-FA-2b, 2e, 2g Install portable blowers to supply air and open doors to CB-FA-3b, 3d exhaust air.

CB-FA-3b CB-FA-3a,3d Open doors to exhaust air frem CB-FA-3d.

CB-FA-3c CB-FA-2b, 2e, 2g Install portable blowers to CB-FA-3b supply air and open doors to exhaust air.

CB-FA-3d CB-FA-2b, 2e, 2g Install portable blowers to CB-FA-3b supply air and open doors Eto exhaust air.

CB-FA-4a CB-FA-2b, 2e, 2g Install portable blowers to -

CB-FA-3b, 3d supply air and open doors to CB-FA-4b exhaust air, i CB-FA-4b CB-FA-2b, 2e, 2g Install portable blowers to CB-FA-3b supply air and open doors to exhaust air.

CB-FA-Sa CB-FA-2b, 2e, 2g Open doors to exhaust air.

CB-FA-3b, 3d CB-FA-4b FH-FZ-2 CB-FA-2a, 2d, 2f Open doors to exhaust air.

CB-FA-3a, 3d CB-FA-4b The selection of portable ventilation for the above fire areas is i based on the heat loads utilized in the probabilistic risk assessment i evaluation of loss of control building ventilation. The probabilistic 1

risk assessment temperature profiles utilized are conservative in that l they are based on higher electrical loads contributing to heat buildup in the room than would be present during the Appendix R postulated fire scenarios. Further evaluations are underway to determine the neat buildup based on reducing the electrical loads to reflect use of only the Appendix R shutdown equipment. This evaluation will reduce the scope of the portable ventilation required and/or extend the acceptable time period for implementing the manual actions. This evaluation will i' be complete prior to the Appendix R audit. The manual actions needed to provide portable ventilation are based on the worst case condition 1 which results in a maximum room temperature of 114*F (i.e., inverter '

and switchgear rooms).

l

,--v,, %--<- -

,. gw-t e- T =r s -=

-~++w. m o = ,- - -e,-, e.-rr.,-. - -- , , . , - -- ----e. ----- , , - - , -~- - - - .,y - , ,-,ww, -r _,-<rw,n- ,

Appropriate emergency procedures will be implemented to provide the necessary portable ventilation and manual actions described above.

The above evaluations identified that for a fire in FH-FZ-6, the Control Building Ventilation System is capable of providing adequate ventilation using outside air without operation of the Control Building Chilled Water System. Therefore, radiant energy heat shields will not be installed between redundant Control Building Chillers and Chilled Water Pumps in FH-FZ-6. The exemption previously requested in Section 3.7.6 of the FHAR is not required. The FHAR will be revised accordi ngly.

Loss of Emergency Feedwater Pump Room Ventilation:

The emergency feedwater (EFW) pumps have been qualified to operate following a high energy line break (HELB) in the Intermediate Buil di ng. The testing upon which this qualification is based includes operation at 324*F for 5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months . The EFW pumps can operate continuously at 122*F. Heat rate calculations for the EFW pump room indicate that an ambient temperature of 151*F would be reached 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after loss of ventilation. Portable ventilation will be established in fire zone IB-FZ-3 within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months for a fire in fire area CB-FA-1.

The portable ventilation will be capable of maintaining IB-FZ-3 at 122*F.

Loss of Diesel Generator Building Ventilation:

The maximum allowable ambient temperature in the diesel generator rooms is limited to 122*F due to electrical comporents in the generator. Analyses have determined that the maximum temperature in this area resulting from a loss of diesel generator building ventilation will not exceed 115*F. This analysis takes credit for the opening of doors in the diesel building and for the air flow created by the diesel radiator fan.

This method of ventilation will be utilized to ventilate fire area DG-FA-1 for a fire in DG-FA-2, and to ventilate fire area DG-FA-2 for a fire in CB-FA-1, CB-FA-2d, CB-FA-3d or CB-FA-4b. This method is also utilized to ventilate either of the diesel generator rooms for a fire in IB-FZ-3 or IB-FZ-4.

I

m. GPUk will provide a summary of the basis for their position that the loss of the intermediate cooling water pump and the nuclear services cooling water pumps will not affect shutdown in certain zones / areas referenced in the exemption requests, including all assumptions and a listing of the zones / areas affected.

Response

Intermediate Cooling Water Pumps - These pumps are required for thermal barrier cooling for the reactor coolant pump seals and for letdown cooling. Fire zones CB-FA-2a and CB-FA-2b, require manual control of one intermediate cooling pump after isolating interlocking control circuits via installed switches in the fire area not effected. Therefore, there is no need to extinguish the fire in the effected zone prior to manual operation of the pump. Manual control of these pumps can be established within 30 minutes. The operation of the pump can be delayed for 30 minutes (for thermal barrier cooling) or two hours (for letdown cooling) without experiencing any reactor coolant pump seal degradation.

Nuclear Service Cooling Water Pumps - These pumps are required to pro-vide cooling water to one makeup pump (MU-P-lB). Fire zones CB-FA-2a and CB-FA-2b require manual control of one Nuclear Service Cooling Water Pump after isolating interlocking control circuits via installed switches in the fire area not effected. Manual control of these pumps can be established within 30 minutes. Therefore, there is no need to extinguish the fire in the effected zone prior to manual operation of the pump. The operation of the makeup pumps can be delayed for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months where thermal barrier cooling water for the reactor coolant pump seals is available from the Intermediate Cooling Water Pumps.

ATTACHMENT'II l The following information provides a confirmation summary of the clarifications discussed at the May 1 and ? meeting.

1. a) With regard to proposed modifications in the Reactor Building, the installation of radiant energy shielding and Rockbestos cabling will be done on the basis that the Reactor Building is considered a single fire area, b) Radiant energy shields will consist of 1-hour fire-rated Rockbestos cable or 1/2 hour fire-rated TSI board. Openings in the TSI board will be located away from potential sources of radiant energy. These shields are built with fire-rated materials but may not be in fire-rated configurations.

2. With regard to modifications in areas outside of the Reactor Building, all proposed modifications such as rerouting cables, and the installation of fire barriers will be consistent with the assumptions regarding fire spread through "B-2" and "B-3" boundaries. For exanple, .a cable will not be rerouted into an adjoining zone / area if the boundary between these locations contains unprotected openings unless the rerouted cable comes no closer than 50' to its redundant counterpart.

3. Valve operators will not be protected for those valves which will be local manually re-aligned as damage to valve attachments will not prevent the valve from being manually repositioned.

4. All openings in fire-rated barriers are protected by fire doors, fire dampers or penetration seals which have a fire resistance rating consistent with the rating of the barrier. Exceptions have been documented.

5. Where credit has been taken for the presence of automatic fire detection or suppression systems in individual zones / areas, these systems are provided throughout the zone / area except where specifically identified in the Fire Hazards Analysis.

6. Regarding the response to NRC concern about the failure of fire dampers to close under design operating conditions, GPUN confirmed that all fire dampers are functionally tested every 18 months. If during testing the damper fails to close, the fire barrier is considered degraded per the plant Technical Specifications and appropriate remedial action is taken.

7. Regarding the issue of Technical Specification surveillance of zone / area boundaries which are relied upon to satisfy Appendix k requirements, GPUN confirmed that all fire-rated barriers as well as "B-1" barriers identified in the Fire Hazards Analysis will be covered by the plant Technical Specifications. All other barriers will be under surveillance to assure that fire protection related modifications are not degraded.

l l

l 1

k

ML20211Q825

Contents

Text

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

2.0 REFERENCES

2.0 REFERENCES

Response

Response

Response

Response

Response

Response

Reference:

Response

Response

Response

Response

Navigation menu

ML20211Q825

Text

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

SUMMARY

2.0 REFERENCES

2.0 REFERENCES

Response

Response

Response

Response

Response

Response

Reference:

Response

Response

Response

Response

Navigation menu

Search