ML20084H681

Technical Guide TG-OP-902-008 for Rev 0 to OP-902-008, Safety Function Recovery Procedure

ML20084H681
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	05/02/1984
From:	LOUISIANA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20084H675	List: ML20084H681 W3P84-1242, Forwards Functional Recovery Technical Guidelines Which Complete Procedures Generation Package Per Suppl 1 to NUREG-0737
References
W3101400, NUDOCS 8405080158
Download: ML20084H681 (491)

Text

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LOUISIANA POWER AND LIGHT WATERFORD-3 SES TG-0P-902-008 TECHNICAL GUIDE for OP-902-008 Rev. O SAFETY FUNCTION RECOVERY PROCEDURE Revision:

Approved:

Operations superintendent Approval Date

, titective Date Total Pages: 489 o i 8405080158 840502 PDR ADOCK 05000 j F .j W3101400

-A

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Page i l

TECHNICAL GUIDE for SAFETY FUNCTION REC 0VERY PROCEDURE Table cf Contents PaSe 1.0 Procedure Step Guidelines '

1 2.0 Guidelines for Safety Function Status Checklist 456 3.0 Generic Steps not included in Waterford-3 E0P 467 4.0 List of Instruments and Ranges 488 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008

." Revision 0 4-7-84

1. 0 Procedure Step Guidelines  !

E. Recovery Actions: General Instructions 0

E0P Step Content:

Step 1. Using the Plant Paging System, announce the following two times:

Objective:

This step informs plant personnel of the event and gains additional personnel for the control room.

Basis:

This step gains additional support for the control room personnel and ensures that other site personnel are properly informed of the plant status.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

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l E0P Step Content:

Step 2. Advise the Shift Supervisor to implement EP-1, EMERGENCY PLAN.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to direct entry into the Emergency Plan for ciassification of the event and required notifications.

Basis:

This step ensures that action is taken to implement the Emergency Plan to gain additional support for the control room personnel and to ensure the safety of the site personnel and general public.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA i

Source Document:

NUREG-0654, Appendix 1.

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l E0P Step Content:

Step 3. Refer to Foldout: Safety Function Status Checklist AND check ALL

of the following Success Path-1 criteria to determine which

]

safetyfunctionsareinjeopardy:

Objective:

l The objective of this step is to initially assess all safety functions to determinewhichonesareinjeopardy.

l j Basis: (CEN-152,page10-4, steps 2and3)

! The primary purpose of this check is to provide an assessment of all relevant safety functions. Since the Safety Function Recovery Procedure may be used for a wide variety of events, it is not possible to know in advance which success path will be the primary one for each safety function or which safety function will be most affected. All the safety i

functions are assessed before any other actions are taken.

Operational Considerations:

If any Success Path-1 criteria are not satisfied, then the safety function isinjeopardy.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152,page10-103, steps 2and3)

Using the Safety Function Status Check, Figure 10-3, identify the status of safety functions. This is done by identifying the success path

{ currently in use for each safety function and then checking the criteria i

for each path.

Assess all safety functions before going to resource assessment trees.

I l

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TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E. Recovery Actions: General Instructions 0

E0PStep3(Continued).

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step identifies which success path is currently in use. However, the basis says it is not possible to know in advance witich success path will be the primary one for each safety function. Therefore it was decided that for the initial assessment, all safety functions would be checked against the Success Path-1 criteria, since this is the preferred success path. This also clearly defines which safety functions are in jeopardy, that is, not meeting the Success Path-1 criteria. This ensures that the operator consults the subprocedure for each safety function in jeopardy to verify alternate success paths are properly implemented instead of assuming the success path is properly implemented just because

! the criteria associated with that success path are being satisfied.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

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E0P Step Content:

Step 4. Refer to Foldout: Safety Function Status Checklist AND check ALL criteria are being maintained for the success path in use.

Objective:

This step verifies that all safety functions are being satisfied by

comparing control board parameters to the criteria of the Safety Function Status Checklist for the success path in use.

Basis: (CEN-152,pages10-4and10-10, steps 3and4)

The operator is required to continually verify that all relevant safety functions are being satisfied by comparing control board parameters to the criteria in the Foldout: Safety Function Status Checklist. This ensures that the status of all relevant safety functions is being monitored and that the appropriate success path criteria are being used as the plant lineup and conditions change. Since more than one success path for each safety function may be in use, the criteria associated with the lowest priority success path in use should be used. The criteria which are used to judge the status of each function are organized around the success paths for each function. Since each path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are para-meters which can be read directly from the control board. Thus, reactiv-e ity control criteria related to CEAs uses CEA bottom lights and that related to borating uses indications of reactor power and boron addition

rate.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. Safety functions, as specified on Safety Function Status Checklist, shall be continuously l monitored throughout the use of this procedure. ,

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E. Recovery Actions: General Instructions 0

E0PStep4(Continued).

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-103, step 4)

Whenever the Functional Recovery Guideline is in use, continuously assess the status of each safety function. Verify that all safety functions are being satisfied or identify those in jeopardy by comparing control board parameters to the criteria on Figure 10-3.

Justification of Differences:

The E0P step was expanded to check the criteria for the success path in use.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E. Recovery Actions: General Instructions 0

E0P Step Content:

Step 5. For each safety function in jeopardy, refer to the appropriate subprocedure AND perform ALL the following Recovery Actions:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to identify available success paths for each safety function in jeopardy, and implement success paths until one is completed, with its associated criteria being satisfied. This step also terminates lower priority success paths as higher priority success paths are implemented with associated criteria being satisfied.

Basis: (CEN-152,pages10-10,10-11,and10-12, steps 5and7)

For each safety function not being satisfied, the operator can identify plant resources or success paths by referring to the resource assessment trees. The resource assessment trees provide information to the operator to assist in a determination of the availability of plant resources to be used to satisfy safety functions. The resource assessment trees provided are structured to show the intended priority (left to right) of implementation of success paths. Note that more than one success path may be employed for each safety function in order to satisfy the criteria of the last path (to the right) in use. Also note that the path with the highest priority is the path which corresponds to current plant conditions (e.g. the ECCS is designed to manage inventory control problems resulting from a LOCA). Each plant resource assessment tree pictorializes all the generic resources available for fulfilling a safety function. Limits have been developed for each component of the success path which permit the operator to interrogate the control board to decide if that success path is available. The operator performs the subprocedure recovery actions for the success paths, to be implemented to satisfy the safety functions in jeopardy.

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TG-0P-902-008  !

Revision 0 i 4-7-84 E. Recovery Actions: General Instructions 0

E0PStep5(Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

The subprocedure recovery actions provide step-by-step operational guidance, criteria for determining the successful control of a safety function, and associated precautions, all of which are necessary to implement the success paths identified on the resource assessment trees.

Each subprocedure contains all the actions necessary to implement success paths recovering control of a jeopardized safety function. Criteria are included for determining the degree of success achieved in the attempt.

Additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. For instance, if control of the safety func-tion is achieved, the operator may be instructed to go on to the next safety function in jeopardy. Alternatively, the operator may be told to implement another success path in the case when the current path is inadequate.

Operational Considerations:

Each safety function in jeopardy should be treated one at a time, in order of priority, as they are listed on the Safety Function Status Checklist. On the Resource Assessment Trees, the order of priority for success paths is from left to right in descending order. More than one success path may be implemented at a time. When more than one success path is in use, then the success path criteria to be met are the criteria associated with the lowest priority success path in use.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152,page10-103, steps 5and7)

For each safety function that is not being satisfied, identify plant resources or success paths which can be used to fulfill them. Refer to Figures 10-4 through 10-9.

Perform the appropriate recovery action guidelines associated with the identified success paths.

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. E. Recovery Actions: General Instructions 0

E0PStep5(Continued).

Justification of Differences

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E. Recovery Actions: General Instructions 0

E0P Step Content:

Step 6. When ALL safety functions are being controlled by satisfactorily maintaining the criteria associated with the implemented success path, go to OP-902-000, EMERGENCY ENTRY PROCEDURE, Section D.

Diagnostics.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to diagnose and go to an optimal recovery procedure, if possible, and cooldown.

Basis: (CEN-152,page10-12, step 8)

When all safety functions are satisfied, the operator shifts to the Emergency Entry Procedure and attempts to systeutically evaluate the plant status to determine, if possible, what the cause of the emergency was, what course of action to take (e.g. proceed to cold shutdown) and what further emergency operating guidance is available.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152,page10-103, step 8)

Once each safety function is being satisfied, refer to Long Term Actions.

Justification of Differences:

The EPG Long Term Actions section was not used in the E0P. Most of the actions called for in the Long Term Actions section are already covered in the General Instructions. The only action not covered is deciding whether to cooldown. This decision will be made by the Technical Support  !

Center and the shift supervisor, since it is dependent upon a variety of l conditions which include Emergency Plan considerations. By our Adminis- I rative Procedures the Technical Support Center will be manned by 30-minute responders.

o Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Ey . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 1. IF notified that electrical power is available to Startup Trans-formers AND Emergency Diesel Generators A AND B are NOT avail-able, THEN restore electrical power with the Startup Transform-ers. Refer to OP-6-001, PLANT DISTRIBUTION (7KV, 4KV, and SSD)

SYSTEMS, Section 6.1.

Objective:

The objective of this step to restore electrical distribution to a normal ,

lineup.

Basis:

The preferred method of providing vital auxiliaries is from offsite power i

throup the startup transformers. This step ensures offsite power is restored properly to the plant from a station blackout condition.

Operational Considerations:

NA i

EPG Step Content:

m Justification of Differences:

K Source Document: , l M

i i

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 El . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. IF notified that electrical power is available to Startup Transformers AND Emergency Diesel Generators A- AND B are operating, THEN restore electrical power to normal distribution lineup. Refer to OP-6-001, PLANT DISTRIBUTION (7KV, 4KV, and SSD) SYSTEMS,Section6.6.3.

Objective:

! The objective of this step is to restore electrical distribution to a

, normal lineup.

Basis:

j The preferred method of providing vital auxiliaries is from offsite power through the startup transformers. This step ensures offsite power is I

restored properly to the plant from a loss of offsite power and that the 1

emergency diesel generators are restored to normal standby lineup.

1 Operational Considerations:

i NA l EPG Step Content:

NA

~

Justification of Differences:

NA

)

{ Source Document:

NA i

)

i l

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 3. When electrical power is restored to normal distribution lineup, restore Main Turbine Lube Oil System to normal operation AND place Main Turbine on turning gear. Refer to OP-3-017, TURBINE

- LUBE OIL SYSTEM, Section 6.1.

Objective: ,

The objective of this step is to verify that turbine lube oil system is

! restored to normal lineup and placed on turning gear.

Basis:

This step is done to restore normal operating equipment to operation which was lost as a result of the loss of power.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA i

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-1  !

E0P Step Content:

Step 4. IF Main Feed pump A is NOT operating AND electrical power is restored, THEN locally restore Main Feed Pump A Turbine Lube Oil System to normal operation AND place Main Feed Pump Turbine on turning gear. Refer to OP-3-003, CONDENSATE-FEEDWATER, Section

6.7. Objective

The objective of this step is to verify that main feed pump A turbine lube oil system is restored to normal lineup and placed on turning gear.

Basis:

This step is done to restore normal operating equipment to operation which was lost as a result of the loss of power.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA l

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 14 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Ey . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries .

l Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF Main Feed pump B is NOT operating AND electrical power is restored, THEN locally restore Main Feed Pump B Turbine Lube Oil System to normal operation AND place Main feed Pump Turbine on turning gear. Refer to OP-3-003, CONDENSATE-FEEDWATER, Section

6.7. Objective

The objective of this step is to verify that main feed pump B turbine lube oil system is restored to normal lineup and placed on turning gear.

Basis:

This step is done to restore normal operating equipment to operation which was lost as a result of the loss of power.

Operational Considerations:

l NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA i

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, TG-0P-902-008 I

Revision 0 l 4-7-84 i E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l

l Success Path I-l l

E0P Step Content:

Step 6. When electrical power is restored to normal distribution lineup, locally perform the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that seal oil system is restored to normal lineup.

Basis:

This step is done to restore normal operating equipment to operation which was lost as a result of the loss of power.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA l

l

- Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA l

l l

e l

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l

Success Path I-1

E0P Step Content:

Step 7. When electrical power is restored to normal distribution, start a Turbine Cooling Water pump. Refer to OP-3-027, TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that turbine cooling water system is restored to normal lineup.

Basis:

This step is done to restore normal operating equipment to operation which was lost as a result of the loss of power.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA i

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l

Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

l Step 8. E a Turbine Cooling Water pump is operating AND Instrument Air Compressors have been aligned to Potable Water System, THEN locally align Seal Water Cooler to the Turbine Closed Cooling Water System by the following:

I Objective:

i The objective of this step is to ensure that cooling water for the

.j instrument air compressors is aligned to the normal source of cooling.

Basis:

l When turbine cooling water system is restored to normal lineup, the instrument air compressors are aligned to the normal source of co611ng.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA I

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA I

O i .

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l

Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 9. E CIAS has occurred, THEN open CNTMT ISOLATION INSTRUMENT AIR (IA 908) valve.

! Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that instrument air is available

to containment.

Basis:

If instrument air is isolated from containment, then it has to be aligned so that pneumatic valves can be operable.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 19 i W3101400 I

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l

. Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. IF Letdown has been isolated AND SIAS has NOT occurred, THEN restore normal Charging AND Letdown to maintain Pressurizer level as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to restore normal pressurizer level control and to restore reactor coolant pump bleedoff to normal lineup.

Basis:

The preferred means of controlling pressurizer level is by the chemical and volume control system. Since charging pumps will be started when power is restored, letdown needs to be placed in service to preclude a high inventory condition.

Operational Considerations

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: .

NA 20 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. When BUS A3S is energized, verify Emergency Feedwater pump A operating.

Objective:

1 The objective of this step is to verify that emergency feedwater pump A is operating when power is restored.

Basis:

When the steam generators are being used for heat removal from the reactor coolant system, emergency feedwater has to be supplied to the steam generator to ensure a heat sink. For reliability, motor driven emergency feedwater pumps are verified operating when the appropriate electrical bus is energized, i

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

l NA

Source Document:

NA J

t i

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TG-0P-902-008 1 Revision 0 4-7-84 El . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. When BUS B3S is energized, verify Emergency Feedwater pump B operating.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that emergency feedwater pump B is operating when power is restored.

Basis:

When the steam generators are being used for heat removal from the reactor coolant system, emergency feedwater has to be supplied to the steam generator to ensure a heat sink. For reliability, motor driven emergency feedwater pumps are verified operating when the appropriate electrical bus is energized.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

l NA o

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TG-0P-902-008 Ravision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-l i E0P Step Content:

Step 13. Restore Pressurizer Proportional heaters by the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that pressurizer proportional heaters are available for pressure control.

Basis:

By ensuring pressure control, limits will be maintained on the post-1 accident pressure and temperature limits graph.

Operational Considerations:

NA i

EPG Step Content:

NA

Justification of Differences

NA Source Document:

NA l

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l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 14. IF the following breakers are open AND BOTH A AND B safety busses are energized, THEN locally close the following breakers:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to restore electrical loads on distribution panels after electrical power is restored to normal distribution lineup.

Basis:

The action of this step is to ensure that electrical loads are restored to normal lineup so that all instrumentation is available to the control room operators.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Docupent:

NA 24 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R0 vision 0 4-7-84 Ey . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 15. E CSAS has occurreo, AND Containment pressure <17.7 psia, AND RAS has NOT occurred, THEN realign Containment Spray for auto-matic initiation as follows:

Objective:

This step ensures that the containment spray system is available for operations.

Basis:

The containment spray system should be realigned for automatic operation when the CSAS relays are energized.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-

) ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

)

1 EPG Step Content:

1 NA Justification of Diffe m ces:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 El . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 16. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis:

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. Thecriteriaareusedtojudgethestatusofeachsafety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to l judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA -

'\

Source Document:

NA -

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Ey . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 17. E the success path criteria (step 16) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis:

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 4

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries .

1 Success Path I-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 18. E the success path criteria (step 16) are E met, THEN go to Success Path I-2.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis:

! After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA

(

t

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Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 1. IF EITHER BUS A2 TO A35 TIE BKR OR BUS A3S TO A2 TIE BKR opens, THEN check the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify the emergency diesel generator A is providing electrical power to the A train safety busses.

Basis:

This step verifies that A safety busses are energized to provide power to safety related equipment. One train of safety related equipment operating is sufficient to verify adequate core cooling capability exists and that other safety functions are being satisfied.

Operational Considerations:

Emergency diesel generator load should not exceed 4840KW for two hours nor 4400KW for continuous loading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. IF EITHER BUS B2 TO B35 TIE BKR OR BUS B3S TO B2 TIE BKR opens, THEN check the following: .

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify the emergency diesel generator B is providing electrical power to the B train safety busses.

Basis:

This step verifies that B safety busses are energized to provide power to safety related equipment. One train of safety related equipment operating is sufficient to verify adequate core cooling capability exists and that other safety functions are being satisfied.

Operational Considerations:

Emergency diesel generator load should not exceed 4840KW for two hours nor 4400KW for continuous loading.

EPG Step Centent:

M Justification of Differences:

M Source Document:

M

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)

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 3. IF Emergency 3iesel Generator A did NOT start AND Emergency Diesel Generator A breaker did NOT close, THEN perform EITHER of the follcwing:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to attempt to start emergency diesel genera-tor A in order to provide electrical power to the A train safety busses.

Basis:

This step attempts to energize A safety busses in order to provide power to safety related equipment. One train of safety related equipment operating is sufficient to verify adequate core caoling capability exists

• and that other safety functions are being satisfied.

Operational Considerations:

Emergency diesel generator load should not exceed 4840KW for two hours nor 4400KW for continuous loading.

1 EPG Step Content: ,

NA j Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 4. I_F Emergency Diesel Generator B did NOT start AND Emergency Diesel Generator B breaker did NOT close, THEN perform EITHER of the following:

Objective:

Theobjectiveofthisstepistoattempttostartemergencydieselgenera-tar B in order to provide electrical power to the B train safety busses.

Basis:

This step attempts to energize B safety busses in order to provide power to safety related equipment. One train of safety related equipment operating is sufficient to verify adequate core cooling capability exists and that other safety functions are being satisfied.

Operational Considerations:

l Emergency diesel generator load should not exceed 4840KW for two hours nor 4400KW for continuous loading.

EPGStjpContent:

NS Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: -

n NA I T i

o 32 W3101400 e

e, e- ---p--m-- , - ,y--

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 r,

E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF any Reactor Coolant Pump is operating AND Component Cooling Water is lost to Reactor Coolant Pumps for >3 minutes, THEN stop ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ,stop reactor coolant pump operation when component cooling water is lost.

Basis:

When component cooling water is lost to the reactor coolant pumps, damage to pump components could occur if the reactor coolant pumps are not secured. -

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 33 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 El . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 6. IF BOTH Turbine Cooling Water pumps are NOT operating, THEN locally perform the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that cooling water is available to the instrument air compressors during a loss of offsite power.

Basis:

According to the Nash Engineering Company, the instrument air compressors can operate without a cooling water supply for a maximum time of 30 minutes and not have any damage to the compressor. When turbine cooling water is not operating, potable water is aligned for cooling of the air Compressors.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.

t i 34 l W3101400

\

t -

1 1

TG-0P-902-008  !

Revision 0 4-7-84 El . Recovery Action _s: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. IF CIAS has occurred, THEN open CNTMT ISOLATION INSTRUMENT AIR (IA908).

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that instrument air is available to containment.

Basis:

If instrument air is isolated from containment, then it has to be aligned so that pneumatic valves can be operable.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA e

f 35 W3101400 4

- -a_ --m - - - - - -- - -

• TG-0P-902-008 l Revision 0 4-7-84 E7 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 8. IF Letdown has been isolated AND SIAS has NOT occurred, THEN restore normal Charging AND Letdown to maintain Pressurizer level as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to restore normal pressurizer level control and to restore reactor coolant pump bleedoff to normal lineup.

Basis:

The preferred means of controlling pressurizer level is by the chemical and volume control system. Since charging pumps will be started when power is restored, letdown needs to be placed in service to preclude a high inventory condition.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

I EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

36 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries  ;

1 Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 9. When BUS A35 is energized, verify Emergency Feedwater pump A operating. .

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that emergency feedwater pump A is operating when power is restored.

Basis:

When the steam generators are being used for heat removal from the reactor coolant system, emergency feedwater has to be supplied to the steam generator to ensure a heat sink. For reliability, motor driven emergency feedwater pumps are verified operating when the appropriate electrical bus is energized.

Operational Considerations:

NA i

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: ,

NA 1

e i 37 1 W3101400

+ + -

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Ey . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. When BUS B35 is energized, verify Emergency Feedwater pump B operating.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that emergency feedwater pump B 4

is operating when power is restored.

Basis:

When the steam generators are being used for heat removal from the reactor coolant system, emergency feedwater has to be supplied to the steam generator to ensure a heat sink. For reliability, motor driven emergency feedwater pumps are verified operating when the appropriate electrical bus is energized.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA

^

Source Document:

NA i

)

a 38 W3101400 l

l TG-0P-902-008 R vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. Restore Pressurizer Proportional heaters by the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that pressurizer proportional heaters are available for pressure control.

Basis:

By ensuring pressure control, limits will be maintained on the post-accident pressure and temperature limits graph.

Operational Considerations:

If SIAS has occurred, then pressurizer heaters will be unavailable.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

39 W3101400 gr y--= w - m q

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. IF the following breakers are open AND BOTH A AND B safety busses are energized, THEN locally close the following breakers:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to restore electrical loads on distribution panels after electrical power is restored to normal distribution lineup.

Basis:

The action of this step is to ensure that electrical loads are restored to normal lineup so that all instrumentation is available to the control room operators.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA f

l l

l l

o 40 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 l 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries .

1 4

Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 13. E CSAS has occurred, AND Containment pressure <17.7 psia, AND

, RAS has NOT occurred, THEN realign Containment Spray for auto-matic initiation as follows:

Objective:

This step ensures that the containment spray system is available for operations.

Basis:

The containment spray system should be realigned for automatic operation when the CSAS relays are energized.

, Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

I NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

t 41 W3101400

_ , . , _ _ . - . - - - - . .__m._ _

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 14. IF normal operating oil pumps are NOT operating, THEN verify the emergency oil pump operating for the following systems:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that at least one oil pump is operating for the turbine, seal oil, main feed pump A, and main feed pump B.

Basis:

When nonsafety busses are deenergized, the normal supplying oil pumps are stopped. To protect equipment from damage, emergency oil pumps are automatically started. The emergency pump for the seal oil system is automatically started to prevent the hydrogen gas in the generator from leaking to the surrounding areas.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA e

42 W3101400

m - e , - a - - . m TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 15. IF ALL nonsafety busses are deenergized, THEN locally open one of the following Main Condenser vacuum breaker valves:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to break vacuum for the main condenser.

Basis:

Since gland sealing steam is lost, this step will help prevent air leakage by the seals to the main condenser. Breaking the vacuum minimizes the time it takes for the turbines to stop rotating.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 1

0 43 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 El . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 l

E0P Step Content:

Step 16. E a Main Condenser vacuum breaker valve is open AND Main Condenser vacuum is 0.0"Hg, THEN secure Gland Sealing Steam by locally closing Main Steam to Gland Steam Isolation (MS 148) valve.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify the gland sealing steam is isolated.

1 Basis:

Because steam will not be available from main steam or auxiliary steam, this step ensures that the gland seal system is isolated from the main steam piping.

Operational Considerations:

Where mulitple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-I ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA i

Source Document:

NA i

\

W3101400 1

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E

y Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 17. IF Emergency Diesel Generator A is supplying power to Train A safety busses, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to remove all nonsafety loads from motor control center 314AS prior to energizing the sump pumps in the dry cooling tower.

Basis:

When emergency diesel generator A is supplying electrical power to safety busses, nonsafety load breakers are opened to prevent overloading the generator. Because motor control center 314AS supplies power to dry cooling tower A sump pumps, the tie breaker has to be closed. Energizing the sump pumps prevents possible flooding of area where motor control center 315AS is located.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

W3P82-0652C,'ated d March 30, 1982.

l f

45 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 18. E nonsafety load breakers on MCC 314AS are open, THEN locally close the following Dry Tower Sump pump breakers:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that the dry cooling tower A sump pumps are energized. .

Basis:

Because motor control center 315AS is located in area of dry cooling tower, sump pumps are energized to prevent possible flooding of area which would not allow operation of safety related equipment.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: ,

W3P82-0652C, dated March 30, 1982.

o 46 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries j 1

Suc:ess Path I-2 l l

E0P Step Content:

Step 19. IJF Emergency Diesel Generator B is supplying power to Train B  ;

safety busses, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to remove all ncnsafety loads from motor control center 314BS prior to energizing the sump pumps in the dry cooling tower.

Basis:

When emergency diesel generator B is supplying electrical power to safety busses, nonsafety load breakers are opened to prevent overloading the generator. Because motor control center 314BS supplies power to dry cooling tower B sump pumps, the tie breaker has to be closed. Energizing the sump pumps prevents possible flooding of area where motor control center 315BS is located.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

W3P82-06520, dated March 30, 1982.

o a

47

, W3101400 f

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l

Success Path I-2 1

E0P Step Content: l Step 20. IF nonsafety load breakers on MCC 314B5 are open, THEN locally  !

close the following Dry Tower Sump pump breakers:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that the dry cooling tower B sump pumps are energized.

Basis:

Because motor control center 315BS is located in area of dry cooling tower, sump pumps are energized to prevent possible flooding of area which would not allow operation of safety related equipment.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

W3P82-0652C, dated March 30, 1982.

t 48 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008  !

Revision 0 )

4-7-84 Ey . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 21. Check the following success path criterion:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criterion associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis:

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to . control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are para-meters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

49 4 W3101400

. l 1

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 ,

l E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 22. E the success path criterion (step 21) is met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy. .

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis:

After checking the success path criterion, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

50 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008  ;

Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 23. IF the success path criterion (step 21) is NOT met, THEN go to Success Path I-3.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis:

After checking the success path criterion, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA l

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA f

s 51 W3101400 e

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 1. Record the time of the loss of ALL safety AND nonsafety busses in the Control Room log.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to record the time that all AC busses are deenergized.

Basis:

The plant can be safely controlled with all AC busses deenergized for two hours without jeopardizing safety functions. The A and B battery duty cycles will be in excess of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> when certain loads (specified in the source document) are removed from the batteries.

Operational Considerations:

NA 1

! EPG Step Content:

NA i

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document

1 LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.

t 52 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Ey . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. Verify BOTH CNTMT ISOL VLYS closed:

Objective:

i The objective of this step is to verify that all sources of inventory l loss are secured.

Basis:

When all methods of makeup to the reactor coolant system are lost, the sources of inventory removal have to be isolated.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

{

NA i

Justification of Differences:

NA 1

Source Document:

l LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.

i

)

i i

i o

l 53 W3101400

..n ,- - , . - . - - - - .-.--.e.- - _ . , - - - - - - - - , - . , - - - - - - , ,- - -. . - - - . , - - - - , . . . . - . ~ - - - - - ,

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7,-84 l Ey . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 3. Verify the following RCS SAMPLING ISOLATION valves closed:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that all sources of inventory loss are secured.

Basis-When all methods of makeup to the reactor coolant system are lost, the l

sources of inventory removal have to be isolated. '

Operational Considerations

NA EPG Step Content:

NA -

Justification of Differences:

NA e Source Document:

LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.

-\

9 AV f

54 W3101400 i ,

'l L

--_ _ __ _ _ _ U

TG-0P-902-008 R vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 4. Verify the following valves closed:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that all sources of inventory loss are secured.

Basis:

When all methods of makeup to the reactor coolant system are lost, the sources of inventory removal have to be isolated.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.

o 55 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R: vision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF Containment pressure <17.7 psia AND RAS has NOT occurred, THEN place the following switches in "0FF" position:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to prevent containment spray flow to the containment.

Basis:

When the ESFAS relays are deenergized, the containment spray pumps are locked out. This will prevent containment spray flow when the safety busses are energized because the CSAS relays are in the actuate position.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:  ;

NA I

Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

I i ,

1

)

56 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 6. Locally open the following breakers on PDP 3MA-S:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to secure unnecessary loads on the batteries.

Basis:

The plant can be safely controlled with all AC busses deenergized, but the time is restricted by the battery cycles. By opening the breakers for these loads, the battery duty cycles will be in excess of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, operability will be restored by offsite power or an emergency diesel generator.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983. ,

l 57 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. Locally open the following breakers on PDP 3MB-S:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to secure unnecessary loads on the batteries.

Basis:

The plant can be safely controlled with all AC busses deenergized, but the time is restricted by the battery cycles. By opening the breakers for these loads, the battery duty cycles will be in excess of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, operability will be restored by offsite power or an emergency diesel generator.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.

t 58 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 i Revision 0 1 4-7-84  !

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 8. Locally open the following breakers on PDP 3MC-S

1 Objective:

The objective of this step is to secure unnecessary loads on the batteries.

Basis:

The plant can be safely controlled with all AC busses deenergized, but the time is restricted by the battery cycles. By opening the breakers for these loads, the battery duty cycles will be in excess of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, operability will be restored by offsite power or an emergency diesel generator.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA l Justification of Differences:

NA 1

Source Document:

LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.

f I

59 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Ey . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 9. Locally open the following breakers on PDP 3MD-S:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to secure unnecessary loads on the batteries.

Basis:

The plant can be safely controlled with all AC busses deenergized, but the time is restricted by the battery cycles. By opening the breakers for these loads, the battery duty cycles will be in excess of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, operability will be restored by offsite power or an emergency diesel generator.

Operational Considerations:

NA

^

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA i Source Document:

1 LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.

o 60 W3101400

j TG-0P-902-008 R:.visicn 0 4-7-84 E

y Recovery Ac" ions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. IF EITHER of the following conditions exists, THEN throttle OR stop Emergency Feedwater flow to the Steam Generator:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to prevent excessive cooldown of the reactor coolant systam.

Basis:

If either of the conditions exists, emergency feedwater is throttled or stopped to prevent pressurizer level from dropping to a critical point.

This level drop could cause voids in the reactor vessel head. If a steam bubble forms in the vessel head, then adequate core cooling could not be verified.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

LW3-1666-83, dated December 12, 1983.

. e 61 W3101400 l

+

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 1

El . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. Verify Emergency Feedwater pump AB Turbine operating with EITHER of the following valves open:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that both steam supply valves are open for the AB emergency feedwater pump.

.)

Basis:

Since AB emergency feedwater pump is the only source of water to the

steam generators, the steam supply valves to the turbine shall be verified open.

{ Operational Considerations:

) l NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA a

l 0 i

62 W3101400

- , - - - . , . - , n , , . - . . - .-

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. Perform ALL the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that the emergency oil pumps are operating for the turbine, seal oil, main feed pump A, and main feed pump B.

! Basis:

When nonsafety busses are deenergized, the normal supplying oil pumps are stopped. To protect equipment from damage, emergency oil pumps are automatically started. The emergency pump for the seal oil system is  !

automatically started to prevent the hydrogen gas in the generator from leaking to the surrounding areas.

Operational Considerations:

NA i

EPG Step Content:

i NA Justification of N fferences:

NA i

Source Document:

NA l

1 e

i .

! 63 l W3101400 l 1

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 13. Locally open one of the following Main Condenser vacuum breaker valves:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to break vacuum for the main condcnser.

Basis:

Since gland sealing steam is lost, this step will help prevent air leakage by the seals to the main condenser. Breaking the vacuum minimizes the time it takes for the turbines to stop rotating.

Operational Considerations:

• NA l

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA .

Source Document:

NA 1

t W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries l

Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 14. When a Main Condenser vacuum breaker valve is open AND Main Condenser vacuum is 0.0"Hg, secure Gland Sealing Steam by locally closing Main Steam to Gland Steam Isolation (MS 148) valve.

Objective:

j The objective of this step is to verify the gland sealing steam is isolated.

I Basis:

Because steam will not be available from main steam or auxiliary steam, this step ensures that the gland seal steam system is isolated from the main steam piping.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA i

Justification of Differences:

NA 1

Source Document:

NA

)

i e

65 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 15. Verify the following valves closed for BOTH Steam Generators:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that the steam generators are isolated.

Basis:

Since inventory for emergency feedwater can be critical when station blackout is extended to two hours, the steam generators are isolated to help control heat removal.

Operational Considerations:

M I

EPG Step Content:

1 m

i Justification of Differences:

m i

Source Document:

l i

e 9

f 66 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 16. Verify the following isolation valves closed:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that the component cooling water isolation valves to the reactor coolant pumps are closed.

Basis:

During a station blackout, before electrical power is restored, component cooling water is isolated to the reactor coolant pumps. This action will prevent thermal shocking the reactor coolant pump seals which could cause seal failures.

Operatioral Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA l

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA O

o i

67 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84

. E Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 17. Check the following success path criterion:

Objective:

The objective of this step

• s to check the criterion associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis:

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. Thecriteriaareusedtojudgethestatusofeachsafety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can i be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use l different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are para-meters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

68 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 RGvision 0 4-7-84 E1 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 l

J E0P Step Content:

Step 18. IF the success path' criterion (step 17) is met, THEN go to the I

next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis:

After checking the success path criterion, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In j this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

, NA Source Document:

NA l

o 69 l W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 El . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

I Step 19. E the success path criterion (step 17) is NOT met, THEN

. continue with Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries until a success path criterion is satisfactorily being maintained.

i Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis:

If the criteria are not met, then Vital Auxiliaries is still in jeopardy.

The operator should not leave Vital Auxiliaries until this function is fulfilled.

I Operational Considerations:

NA

]

3 EPG Step Content:

NA l

I

Justification of Differences

NA I

Source Document:

! NA ,

a t

l' 70 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 I Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure I. Vital Auxiliaries 1

Success Path I-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 20. IF the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to 4 pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on Vital Auxiliaries.

Basis:

j The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish Vital Auxiliaries.

Operational Considerations:

i NA EPG Step Content:

.NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 1

l J

t 71 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path 11-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 1. E 12 CEAS are NOT fully inserted, THEN go to Success Path II-2.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to direct the operator to the next success path if 12 CEAs are not fully inserted.

Basis:

Since Success Path 11-1 only applies if >2 CEAs are not fully inserted, this step directs the operator to go to the next success path which deals with other causes for Reactivity Control being in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

Reactor coolant system temperature changes should be minimized anytime ReactivityControlisinjeoparity.

EPG Step Content:

NA l

Justification of Differences:

j NA Source Document:

NA i

r 72

. W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R3 vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2 '

Success Path 11-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. IF SST A32 FEEDER AND SST B32 FEEDER breakers were cycled in

OP-902-000, EMERGENCY ENTRY PROCEDURE, Section C. Imediate Actions, THEN go to step 4.

i Objective:

The objective of this step is to bypass step 3 if the operation has been performed.

Basis:

Since certain conditions require this operation to be performed in OP-902-000, Emergency Entry Procedure, Section C. Immediate Actions, it is not necessary to perform this operation again.

Operational Considerations:

NA

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA uummmes 6

s 73 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 l 4-7-84 Ep . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control .

Success Path 11-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 3. Open BOTH of the following breakers for 5 seconds AND reclose:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to open the supply breakers to the busses, which supply the CEDM MG sets, in an attempt to insert the CEAs into the Core.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-16, step 2)

An attempt is made to manually insert the CEAs into the core. This is done by performing as many of the following actions as necessary:

a) Manual trip buttons are pushed b) CEA trip breakers are opened c) Control rod drive motor generators are deenergized i d) [If other methods are available to insert CEAs, that information is inserted.]

j These actions are performed to deenergize the CEAs.

Operational Considerations:

If possible, to prevent core power increases following the initial tran-

, sient, reactor coolant system temperature is maintained constant until reactivity control is satisfied. Temperature is maintained constant instead of being reduced to prevent core power increases due to the negative moderator temperature coefficient.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-111, step 2)

Attempt to manually insert the CEAs into the core. Perform all of the following actions:

o 74 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 i

RevisiCn 0 4-7-84

! E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path 11-1 E0P Step 3 (Continued).

1 Justification of Differences:

In order to effectively attempt the CEA drive down of EPG Success Path RC-4, power must still be available to the CEDM MG sets. Therefore, EPG Success Path RC-4 was included in E0P Success Path II-1. The EPG step was divided into two E0P steps to include CEA drive down before deenergizing CEDM MG sets locally.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

1 I

I

'k 75 W3101400 B

TG-0P-902-008 R0 vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 4. IF >2 CEAs are still NOT fuly inserted, THEN perform the following: _

Objective:

The objective of this step is to attempt other methods of inserting CEAs into the core if the previous methods have failed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-16, step 2)

An attempt is made to manually insert the CEAs into the core. This is done by performing as many of the following actions as necessary:

a) Manual trip buttons are pushed b) CEA trip breakers are cpened c) Control rod drive motor generators are deenergized d) [If other methods are available to insert CEAs, that information is inserted.]

These actions are performed to deenergize the CEAs.

Operational Considerations:

NA o

E 76 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control l Success Path 11-1 '

E0P Step 4 (Continued).

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-111, step 2)

Attempt to manually insert the CEAs into the core. Perform all of the following actions:

1 Justification of Differences:

In order to effectively attempt the CEA drive down of EPG Success Path RC-4, power must still be available to the CEDM MG sets. Therefore, EPG Success Path RC-4 was included in E0P Success Path II-1. The EPG step was divided into two E0P steps to include control element assembly drive down before deenergizing CEDM MG sets locally.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

I i

l l

t 77 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84  ;

l E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control

, Success Path 11-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF Emergency Boration is in progress, THEN go to Success Path II-2.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to direct the operator to the appropriate procedure if emergency boration is in progress.

Basis:

Since this success path does not deal with emergency boration and since emergency boration may be in progress for Reactivity Control, the operator is directed to go to the success path which will deal with emergency boration.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

78 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path 11-1 l

E0P Step Content:  ;

Step 6. Check the following success path criterion:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criterion associated with satisfactorily completinc .his success path.

1 -

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. Thecriteriaareusedtojudgethestatusofeachsafety

function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success j paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for

judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

1 Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are para-meters which can be read directly from the control board.

i operational Considerations:

NA 4

EPG Step Content: '

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

I

• l t

79 W3101400

. _ _ _ _ _ - 1

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. If the success path criterion (step 6) is met, THEN go to the

nextsafetyfunctioninjeopardy.

I i

Objective:

i The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this

success path is satisfactorily coupleted.

l' Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided l which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operater is l instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

I Operational Considerations:

NA .

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

., NA ,

1 Source Document-l CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

e f

t 0

v l g ,

[

W3101400 t

=_

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 8. IF the success path criterion (step 6) is E met, THEN go to Success Path II-2.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this

~

success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is

! instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.

4 I Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

! NA Justification of Differences:

NA l

l Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 81 W3101400 8 ,

{

TG-0P-902-008 l Revision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 1. IF Emergency Boration is NOT in progress, THEN commence Emergency Boration as follows:

Objective: 1 The objective of this step is to ensure emergency boration is in progress if Reactivity Control is in jeopardy. ,

I

{

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)

In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can be accomplished by boron injection. Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition l portions of the CVCS.

Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits. The following actions are performed.

a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RW using gravity feed].

b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header. If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS l through the HPSI header. ,

l c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"].

l t

\

l 82 l W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 l R:visien 0 l 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-2 E0P Step 1 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].

The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps. These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.  ;

Boron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation. This is the preferred method for boron addition. Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool]. If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

Operational Considerations:

If possible, to prevent core power increases following the initial tran-sient, reactor coolant system temperature is maintained . constant until Reactivity Control safety function is satisfied. Temperature is main-tained constant instead of being reduced to prevent core power increases due to the negative moderator temperature coefficient.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)

Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with i Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS. Perform the following '

actions:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each. The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

83 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 l Revision 0 l 4-7-84 i E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. E Charging Header flow <40 gpm through the' normal Charging pump discharge path, THEN align Charging pumps to discharge through HPSI Header A OR B as follows:

Objective:

4 The objective of this step is to realign the charging pump discharge to the high pressure safety injection header if the normal charging path is not available.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)

In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can be accomplished by boron injection. Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.

Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits. The following actions are performed.

a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].

b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header. If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

c) Charging . pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"]. .

o 84 W3101400 -l w-m -r m ---p q -

m -y

TG-0P-902-008 R::visicn 0 4-7-84 )

E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-2 E0P Step 2 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].

The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps. These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.

Boron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation. This is the preferred method for boron addition. Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool]. If the nomal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

Operational Considerations:

If high pressure safety injection pumps are operating, the charging pumps should not be aligned to tlie high pressure safety injection header. The normal charging pump discharge path is through the charging header isola-tion valve (CVC 209). Charging header flow will not indicate with the charging header isolation valve (CVC 209) closed.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)

Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS. Perform the following actions:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each. The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.

o 85 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-2 E0P Step 2 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

-o l

86 g

W3101400 l

l -- -. . . . - . - . . - , ;

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-2 '

E0P Step Content:

Step 3. IF BORIC ACID MAKEUP TANK A LEVEL LO-LO (CP-4, H-6) alarm OR BORIC ACID MAKEUP TANK B LEVEL LO-LO (CP-4, H-7) alarm occurs with the associated Boric Acid pump operating, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to transfer to the opposite boric acid makeup tank if a low level occurs on the tank in service.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)

In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can be accomplished by boron injection. Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.

Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits. The following actions are performed.

a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].

b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header. If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"].

o l l

1 87 W3101400

, I

b TG-0P-902-008 R2visien 0 4-7-84 i E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-2 E0P Step 3 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].

The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps. These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation ,

1 (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation. i Baron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation. This is the preferred method for boron addition. Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool]. If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

Operational Considerations:

NA ,

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)

Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS. Perform the following actions:

Justification of Differences

The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the' suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each. The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o W3101400

.- ,_ , . . - - - .._-.-w,- .--y- - - .,y. -

w - g .-

l TG-0P-902-008 Rsvision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 4. Evaluate Emergency Boration flow capacity as follows: '

Objective:

The objective of this step is to determine if adequate emergency boration flow capacity exists from the boric acid makeup tanks.

., Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)

In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can be accomplished by boron injection. Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.

Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits. The following actions are performed.

a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid makeup tanks using either gravity -feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].

b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header. If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"].

h i

'89 -

W3101400 l

~

. , . _ . _ . , . - _ _ .m. _

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 1

E , Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-2 E0P Step 4 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].

The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps. These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.

Baron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation. This is the preferred method for boron addition. Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool]. If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)

Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS. Perform the following actions:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG ste9 was divided into several steps to cover all the suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each. The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration. i i

l Source Document: 1 CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 90 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 l R; vision 0 4-7-84 E Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF Emergency Boration flow capacity is NOT within specified limits (step 4), THEN align the . Charging pumps to take suction from the Refueling Water Storage Pool as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to align the charging pump suction to the refueling water storage pool if adequate emergency baration flow does not exist from the boric acid makeup tanks.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)

In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can be accomplished by boron injection. Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition i portions of the CVCS.

Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits. The following actions are performed.

a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].

b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header. If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"].

t 91 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R vision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-2 E0P Step 5 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].

The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps. These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.

Boron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation. This is the preferred method for boron addition. Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool]. If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)

Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS. Perform the following actions:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each. The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

t l

92 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actionr: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control

Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content

Step 6. Check the following Emergency Boration termination criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to determine if emergency boration can be terminated.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)

In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can be accomplished by boron injection. Borated water

can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.

Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin l in accordance with Technical Specification Limits. The following actions are performed.

a) The charging pumps are aligned to. take a suction from [ boric acid 1 makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup j pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].

b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header. If the j normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header, c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-

) surizer level between [35" and 245"].

a o

l 93

W3101400 I

I TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-2 E0P Step 6 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

The charging pumps are aligned to discha,rge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].

The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps. These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.

Boron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has bee.' continuous since event initiation. This is the preferred method for boron addition. Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool]. If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the 1 charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)

Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with

Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS. Perform the following actions

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into several . steps to cover all the suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each. The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

94 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control l Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content: i Step 7. IF the Emergency Boration termination criteria (step 6) are met AND Letdown is in operation, THEN terminate Emergency Boration as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to terminate emergency boration if the criteria are met and letdown is in service.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-18, step 2)

In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, reactivity control can be accomplished by' boron injection. Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.

Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits. The following actions are performed.

t a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid i makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed].

b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header. If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"].

o l 95 W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E , Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-2 )

E0P Step 7 (Continued). l Basis: (Continued)

The charging pumps are aligned to discharge the contents of the [ boric i acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].

The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps. These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.

Boron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated scurce has been continuous since event initiation. This is the preferred method for boron addition. Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool]. If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI header.

Operational Considerations:

If possible, to prevent core power increases following the initial tran-sient, reactor coolant system temperature is maintained constant until Reactivity Control safety function is satisfied. Temperature is main-tained constant instead of being reduced to prevent core power increases due to the negative moderator temperature coefficient.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2)

Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS. Perform the following actions:

Justification of Differences: )

The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each. The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.

t Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. l 96 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control l Success Path II-2 l E0P Step Content:

, Step 8. IF the Emergency Boration termination criteria (step 6) are met AND Letdown is NOT in operation, THEN terminate Emergency Bora-tion as follows:

Objective:

, The objective of this step is to terminate emergency boration if the  ;

) criteria are met and letdown is not in service. i i \

i Basis: (CEN-152,page10-18, step 2) i In the case where the control rods do not insert or where additional l negative reactivity is needed to compensate for temperature defect, I

reactivity control can be accomplished by boron injection. Borated water can be added to the RCS using charging and the boric acid addition portions of the CVCS.

j Maximum boration is commenced using the CVCS to achieve shutdown margin i in accordance with Technical Specification Limits. The following actions

are performed.

l

.i ,

j -

a) The charging pumps are aligned to take a suction from [ boric acid

! makeup tanks using either gravity feed or the boric acid makeup pumps, or from the RWT using gravity feed]. l b) The charging pumps are aligned to the normal charging header. If the normal charging lines are not available, line up to charge to the RCS

! through the HPSI header.

I c) Charging pumps and letdown are manually operated to maintain pres-surizer level between [35" and 245"].

4

.)

i 97 W3101400

, .,. .- -,.n , - ,

TG-0P-902-008 i Revision 0 4-7-84 i

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-2 E0PStep8(Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

The charging pumps are aligned to ' discharge the contents of the [ boric acid makeup tanks (primary source of boric acid to the RCS and core)].

The [ boric acid makeup tank] contents may reach the suction of the charg-ing pumps via gravity feed or via the boric acid makeup pumps. These sources should usually not be used past [1 hour] after event initiation (unless required for reactivity control) to prevent boron precipitation.

Boron precipitation is only a concern if charging from the concentrated source has been continuous since event initiation. This is the preferred method for boron addition. Alternative sources for boron are the RWT and the [ spent fuel pool]. If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the RCS through the HPSI i header.

Operational Considerations:

j If possible, to prevent core power increases following the initial tran-

sient, reactor coolant system temperature is maintained constant until Reactivity Control safety function is satisfied. Temperature is main-tained constant instead of being reduced to prevent core power increases due to the negative moderator temperature coefficient.

I EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-113, step 2) l

! Commence maximum boration to achieve shutdown margin in accordance with Technical Specification Limits using the CVCS. Perform the following actions:

Justification of Differences:

l The EPG step was divided into several steps to cover all the suction

! sources and discharge paths available as well as all the required actions of each. The E0P also covers termination of emergency boration.

t

. Source Document:

! CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

t 98 W3101400 i

I

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 9. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are l parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

t Operational Considerations:

1 NA j EPG Step Content:

} NA i

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

k i

l l

N j W3101400

. l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0  ;

4-7-84 l l

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. E the success path criteria (step 9) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

. NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 100 l W3101400 i T~--. . --

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 i

E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 1 Success Path II-2 1 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. IF the success path criteria (step 9) are NOT met, THEN go to Success Path II-3.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily ccapleted.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences: '

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

101 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

! Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 1. 2 Pressurizer pressure drops to <1684 psia OR Containment j pressure rises to >17.4 psia, THEN verify SIAS occurs as follows:

t

{ Objective:

I The objective of this step is to verify SIAS occurs when required.

l Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-21, step 2)

!' If pressurizer pressure decreases to 1684 psia or if containment pressure increases to 17.4 psia, initiation of an SIAS must be verified. If i necessary, SIAS is manually initiated. This action is primarily to ensure that RCS inventory, pressure, and heat removal are being maintained.

However, this will also provide another method of boration at reduced RCS

pressure

}

i

! a) If RCS pressure <1385 psia then the HPSI pumps may be effective

! b) If RCS pressure <250 psia then.the CS pumps may be effective i c) If RCS pressure <183 psia then the LPSI pumps may be effective.

' . Operational Considerations:

l Hot leg temperatures and cold leg temperatures may be influenced by safety injectionflow. Multiple indications and core temperatures should be used to determine the reactor coolant system temperature. If possible, to prevent core power increases following the initial transient, reactor coolant system temperature is maintained constant until Reactivity Control .

l safety function is satisfied. Temperature is maintained constant instead

! of reduced to prevent core power increases due to the negative moderator

temperature coefficient. Where multiple indications for ~one parameter l

exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular

reading.

I

. 102 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-3 E0P Step 1 (Continued).

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-117, step 2)

If pressurizer pressure decreases to [1600 psia] [or if containment pressure increases to 4 psig] verify initiation of an SIAS. If necessary manually initiate an SIAS and/or depressurize the RCS to permit ECCS injection. This action is primarily to ensure that RCS inventory, pres-sure, and heat removal are being maintained. However, this, will also provide another method of boration at reduced RCS pressures:

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: -

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

I i i O l 103 W3101400

, , _ . , _ -m- -

v- v - - - - - - - -

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 l 4-7-84 '

E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-3 i E0P Step Content:

Step 2. _IF either of the following conditions occur, THEN stop ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps: l l

Objective: l The objective of this step is to stop reactor coolant pump operation when pressurizer pressure 11621 psia following an SIAS or when component cooling water is lost.

Basis:

This step serves to prevent continued reactor coolant pump operation when reactor coolant system pressure is $1621 psia during a Loss of Coolant Accident. Continued reactor coolant pump operation at reactor coolant system pressures below 1621 psia during a Loss of Coolant Accident may result in more severe reactor coolant system conditions. When component cooling water is lost to the reactor coolant pumps, damage to pump components could occur if the reactor coolant pumps are not secured.

Operational Considerations:

Since other events could cause rapid depressurization, anytime pressurizer pressure drops below 1621 psia following an SIAS, all reactor coolant pump operation is terminated. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: ,

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4,' Pressure.

104 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Rsvision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 3. E SIAS has occurred, THEN complete Attachment 1: SIAS Automatic Actions.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify all actions required by an SIAS.

Basis:

Due to the number of valves, pumps, fans, and other equipment actuated by automatic safety signals, the verification is done by use of a checklist.

Operational Considerations:

This step should be performed concurrently with. this procedure and pre-ferably by an operator not required for other duties.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA i

I i

l l

105 l -W3101400 l

1.

t. . . , _. ___:

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 4. Check the following Safety Injection termination criteria:

Objective:

This step evaluates certain criteria associated with terminating safety injection flow.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-21, step 3)

If an SIAS has been initiated and the SIS is operating, it must continue to operate at full capacity until SIS termination criteria are met.

Early termination may be desirable when the criteria are met to preclude PTS situations or HPSI pump damage (e.g., shaft seals).

Operational Considerations:

Below 1000 psia, subcooling margin shall be determined by subtracting hot leg temperature from Pressurizer Temperature Water (TI 101). Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-117, step 3)

If the Technical Specification shutdown margin is achieved, the ECCS may be throttled or stopped one train at a time if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two steps, one step covering termination criteria and the other covering termination direction.

Control board indications of subcriticality were used instead of shutdown margin due to the time considerations of sampling reactor coolant system boron and calculating shutdown margin. This is more consistent with the success path criteria and the emergency boration termination criteria. ,

106 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84

)

E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control l

Success Path II-3 E0P Step 4 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-4, Pressure.

j J

o

. l 107 W3101400 l l

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF, ALL Safety Injection termination criteria (step 4) are satis-fied, THEN throttle OR stop Safety Injection FLOW one train at a time AND stop Charging pumps as necessary to control Pres- -

surizer level 33% to 60%.

Objective:

The step maintains pressurizer level and prevents solid water operation.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-21, step 3)

If the criteria are all met, the operator may either terminate or throttle the SIS. The operator may decide to throttle rather than terminate if SIS is to be used to control pressurizer level or plant pressure. Termination of SIS should be sequenced by stopping one pump at a time while observing the termination criteria.

Operational Considerations:

Solid water operation is permissible only when reactor coolant system

, subcooling margin is <28*F. To throttle cold leg injection valves, the switch must be taken to the "MORE" position which places them in SIAS override.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-117, step 3) -

If the Technical Specification shutdown margin is achieved, the ECCS may

, be throttled or stopped one train at a time if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

o 108 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-3 E0P Step 5 (Continued). ,

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two steps, one covering termination criteria 4

and the other covering termination direction. Specific direction to maintain pressurizer level is given since the safety injection system is providing inventory control until SIAS and CIAS are reset. This allows letdown and charging to be placed back into normal service.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

[

l l

1 e

i 4

i 109 W3101400 .

I

- - - . . , -~ r <

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Tg . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control

..; cess Path II-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 6. IJ_ ALL Safety Injection termination criteria (step 4) can NOT be maintained after throttling OR stopping Safety Injection flow, THEN reinitiate Safety Injection flow.

l Objective:

This step allows initiation of safety injection system flow should condi-tions warrant the need.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-22, step 4)

If any of the criteria of step 4 cannot be maintained, the safety injec-tion pumps must be restarted whenever necessary to satisfy all the criteria.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-117, step 4)

If all the criteria of step 3 cannot be maintained after the ECCS has been stopped, the ECCS must be restarted.

i Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l 1

l O

t 110 W3101400 l

_ _- )

TG-0P-902-008 R: vision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. E Pressurizer pressure drops to $1385 psia, THEN verify proper HPSI Header flow exists. Refer to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the reactor coolant system during a Loss of Coolant Accident.

Basis:

A Loss of Coolant Accident will result in actuation of safety injection.

The reactor coolant system pressure will respond during the accident according to the break size. Safety injection system flow rate will follow the reactor coolant system pressure according to the safety injec-tion system delivery curves. The safety injection system and charging flow rates should be checked and maximized relative to reactor coolant system pressure to enhance reactor coolant system inventory replenishment and/or core heat removal.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences: .

NA i

Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

o 4

111 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E .. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-3 )

E0P Step Content:

Step 8. IF Pressurizer pressure drops to <183 psia, THEN verify proper LPSI Header flow exists. Refer to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the reactor coolant system during a Loss of Coolant Accident.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 5-18, step 8)

A LOCA will result in actuation of safety injection. The RCS pressure will respond during the accident according to the break size. Safety injectinn system flow rate will follow the RCS pressure according to the SIS delivery curves (see Figures 5-8 and 5-9). The SIS and charging flow rates should be checked and maximized relative to RCS pressuro to enhance RCS inventory replenishment and/or core heat removal.

Operational Considerations:

g Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

)lA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

o 112 W3101400

~, , _, , ,7

I TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-3 1

E0P Step Content:

, Step 9. E BOTH LPSI pumps A AND B are NOT available AND Pressurizer pressure <250 psia, THEN align one Containment Spray pump to the i LPSI Header as follows:

Objective:

! This step ensures safety injection flow to the reactor coolant system if both low pressure safety injection pumps are unavailable by using a 3

containment spray pump to inject water.

l Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-21, step 2)

This step provides another method of boration at reduced RCS pressure.

If Pressurizer pressure <250 psia then the containment spray pumps may be effective.

Operational Considerations:

If CSAS has occurred, then this step should not be performed. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

9 EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

i l

i 113 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R: vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step C'o ntent:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

t 114 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R: vision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. IF the success path criteria (step 10) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instruct'ed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA l

t EPG Step Content:

NA i

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

J 1

4 115 W3101400

. l

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path II-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. E the success path criteria (step 10) are NOT met, THEN con-tinue with Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control until a success path criterion is satisfactorily being maintained.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this ,

success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-123)

If the criteria are not met, then Reactivity Control is still in jeopardy.

The operator should not leave Reactivity Control until this function is fulfilled.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA

Source Document

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

! I e

I 116 l W3101400 1

l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control Success Path II-3 l E0P Step Content:

Step 13. E the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on Reactivity Control.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-123)

The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish Reactivity Control.

Operational Considerations:

NA i

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

, i 117 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 i l

R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3 ,

Success Path III-1 E0P Step Content:  ;

Step 1: IfSIAShasoccurred,THENgotoSuccessPathIII-2.

Objective:

This step directs the operator to the next success path if SIAS has occurred.

Basis:

Since charging pumps are actuated by SIAS, the operator may have selected this success path on the resource assessment tree because it is a higher priority success path. If SIAS has occurred, the operator needs to read the actions associated with it. Therefore this step directs the operator to the appropriate success path.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA I

i 118 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E3 , Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. Verify Pressurizer Level Control System is maintaining OR restor-ing Pressurizer level to 33L Objective:

This step verifies pressurizer level control system is functioning to maintain or restore pressurizer level.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-26, step 1)

The PLCS is verified to be functioning to restore pressurizer level to the hot zero power band. If not, charging and letdown are operated manually to restore and maintain pressurizer level.

Limiting letdown while maximizing charging flow may be adequate to make up an insufficient RCS inventory condition. Conversely, maximizing letdown and minimizing charging flow may suffice in lowering a high RCS inventory condition.

In this mode, it is necessary that the operator check that pressurizer level is within the hot zero power range and to verify adequate RCS subcooling to verify that RCS inventory is being controlled. If pres-surizer level is not being maintained automatically, the operator has an alternate means of control by manually operating the charging pumps i

and letdown flowrate to regulate inventory into and out of the RCS.

Operational Considerations:

. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper l operation, l

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-124, step 1)

Verify that the PLCS is functioning to restore proper pressurizer level e l to the hot zero power band. If not, manually operate charging and letdown l

to restore and maintain pressurizer level between [35"] and [245"].

119 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 i Revision 0 4-7-84 l E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-1 E0P Step 2 (Continued). ,

i i

Justification of Differences: l

., NA  !

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l i

i 1

1 1

1 f

i

• 120 W3101400

I J

TG-0P-902-008 1

Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control i Success Path III-1 E0P Step Content:

l Step 3. Verify Charging pumps aligned to take suction from one of the i following sources as follows:

i Objective:

This step ensures the charging pumps have an adequate suction source.

I 4

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-26, step 2) l Adequate suction sources to the charging pumps are verified. If neces-

! sary, the VCT, boric acid storage tanks and RWSP are used.

l The source (s) of water for use in controlling RCS inventory depend on the

total amount of fluid necessary for makeup to the RCS and the time frame' l over which the fluid must be introduced. The volume control tank is the j primary source of fluid for RCS makeup. If necessary, for the cases j where RCS inventory losses are being incurred, the contents of the boric l acid makeup tanks and the refueling water tank may be used as backup sources of makeup water, j

j Operational Considerations: i l If SIAS has occurred, then the charging pumps suction may be aligned to

[ b'oth boric acid makeup tanks. If volume control tank level <65, then the l volume control tank cannot be used to supply the charging pumps.

] EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-124, step 2) j If operating charging pumps, verify adequate suction sources to the

{ charging pumps. If necessary, use the [VCT, boric acid storage tanks, spent fuel pool and RWT].

i i Justification of Differences: i NA i

o i

1 j 121 4

W3101400 I 1 s

l

- ' - - - - - ~ ~ '

i

. . . - . - - . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~~- - ---- ----- --

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-1 E0P Step 3 (Continued).

I Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

I J

i i

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t i

122 W3101400

. _ . ~ ,

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 l

j E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

l Success Path III-l

! E0P Step Content:

Step 4. Verify at least one Charging pump operating AND Charging Header f1ow >40 gpe.

Objective:

This step verifies a charging pump operating with proper flow.

Basis:

Once a charging pump suction path is verified, then charging header flow to the reactor coolar.t system is verified.

Operational Considerations:

NA .

i EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA 1

Source Document:

NA I

i s

e 123 W3101400

?

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 j E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-l E0P Step Content:

l Step 5. IF Charging Header flow <40 gpm through the normal Charging pump discharge path, THEN align Charging pumps to discharge through HPSI Header A OR B as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to realign the charging pump discharge to the high pressure safety injection header if the normal charging path is not available,

, Basis:

If the normal charging pathway is unavailable, the charging pumps may be lined up to discharge to the reactor coolant system through the high pressure safety injection header.

Operational Considerations:

If high pressure safety injection pumps are operating, the charging pumps should not be aligned to the high pressure safety injection header. The normal charging pump discharge path is through the charging header isola-tion valve (CVC 209). Charging header flow will not indicate with the charging header isolation valve (CVC 209) closed.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA f

124 W3101400 t

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control j Success Path III-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 6. IF Charging pumps are aligned to the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks AND Letdown is in operation, THEN within 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the time the Charging pumps were aligned to the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks, realign them as follows:

Objective:

This step terminates charging from a concentrated boron source within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> if letd n is in service.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-126, precaution 5)

Charging from the concentrated boron source should not continue past [1]

hour after event initiation unless required for activity control. This is to preclude boron precipitation. Charging pump suction should be shifted to the lower concentration source.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

. 0 125 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. IF, Charging pumps are aligned to the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks AND 3

Letdown is NOT in operation, THEN within 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the time the Charging pumps were aligned to the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks, realign them as follows:

Objective:

4 This step terminates charging from a concentrated boron source within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> if letdown is not in service.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-126, precautio, 5)

Charging from the concentrated boron source should not continue past [1]

4 hour after event initiation unless required for reactivity control. This is to preclude boron precipitation. Charging pump suction should be -

i shifted to the lower concentration source.

Operational Considerations:

NA

\

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA

! i Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 126 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E , Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

l Success Path III-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 8. IF Reactor Coolant Pumps are NOT operating, THEN monitor for Reactor Coolant System voiding as indicated by:

Objective:

This step provides guidance for detecting voids in the reactor coolant system.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-27, step 3)

Since there are certain reactor coolant system conditions for which the presence of voids is acceptable, then voids are not a problem as long as the core and reactor coolant system heat removal and the reactor coolant system inventory safety functions are being satisfied. If these safety

! functions are not being satisfied or voiding is causing the reactor coolant system to remain pressurized above the shutdown cooling entry conditions, then this step will indicate voids. voids are indicated, then step 9 will be performed.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-124, step 3)

, Monitor for RCS voiding. Indications of voiding are any of the following parameter changes or trends: ,

Justification of Differences:

l NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

e 4

e i 127 W3101400

\ -

TG-0P-902-008

. Revisicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control

3 i

Success Path III-l i.

E0P Step Content:

( Step 9. IF Reactor Coolant System voiding is indicated, THEN perform the following:

i Objective:

This step provides methods to eliminate voids of the reactor coolant system.

! Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-28, step 4) j Void elimination proceeds as follows:

l I a) Letdown is isolated or verified to be isolated to minimize further inventory loss '

b) The depressurization is stopped to prevent further growth of the void

.i c) Repressurizing and depressurizing the RCS within the limits of Figure

) 10-10 may condense the void. Repressurizing has the effect of filling

! the voided portion of the RCS with cooler fluid which will remove heat I from this region. Depressurizing and repeating this process several i times will cool and condense the steam void. The pressurizing and i depressurizing.may be accomplished using the pressurizer (heaters and auxiliary spray (preferred method)) or the ECCS/ charging (starting and I stopping pumps or throttling HPSI pumps) system (alternative method).

I i 1

)

i o

1 i

I 128 W3101400 s

J

- n-,. - , - - . - - , - . . , . . - - , , - - . - , . ---- -,-,-- --.- . . --..- - , ,- .-... . . . ~ . - - , -.- -,

.~

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory control Success Path III-1 E0P Step 9 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued) d) The [RV head vent system] may be operated to clear voids in the RV head. This system will clear gas voids withint minutes. If the RV head void is not cleared quickly with the [RV head vent system],

steam voiding should be suspected. The best method for condensing steam voids or for removing noncondensible gases from the S/G tube bundle is to run RCPs (if available). If that is not possible, cooling the generator by feeding and draining or by steaming will also be effective for condensing steam voids in the tube bundle.

Cooling the steam generators will not have an effect on nonconden-sibles trapped in the tube bundle. A buildup of noncondensibles in the tube bundles will not hinder natural circulation even with a large number of the tubes blocked. This is because of the small amount of steam generator heat transfer area required for the removal of decay heat.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-124, step 4)

Void elimination is performed as follows:

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

e 129 W3101400 4

TG-0P-902-008 Ravision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety i

function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

I Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are

. parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

j Operational Considerations:

NA

! EPG Step Content:

j NA

\ .

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

130 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 l 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control .

Success Path III-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. IF the success path criteria (step 10) are met, THEN go to the next safety function ja jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

M EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

M Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l t

131 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. IF_ the success path criteria (step 10) are NOT met, THEN go to Success Path III-2.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

I Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7) l After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.

1 Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

1 4

I . (

132 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 1. IF Pressurizer pressure drops to 11684 psia OR Containment pressure rises to >17.4 psia, THEN verify SIAS occurs as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify SIAS occurs when required.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-31, step 1)

SIS operation must be verified if pressurizer pressure decreases to 1684 psia or if containment pressure increases to 17.4 psia. Ifsafetyinjec-tion system operation has not commenced automatically when RCS pressure is below 1684 psia, it must be manually actuated. This action allows the RWSP inventory to discharge into the RCS. An insufficient RCS inventory may be associated with a loss of coolant accident, a steam generator tube rupture, a control system malfunction or an excessive heat removal event.

Of course, operation of the SIS also affects RCS pressure. When operating the SIS the operator must maintain or restore pressure to within the limits of Attachment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph unless 28 F subcooling cannot be maintained. If 28"F subcooling cannot be maintained, the SIS is kept running for core cooling considera-tions regardless of pressurizer level.

Operational Considerations:

Hot leg temperatures and cold leg temperatures may be influenced by safety injectionflow. Multiple indications and core temperatures should be used to determine the reactor coolant system temperature. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-127, step 1)

If pressurizer pressure decreases to [1600] psia [or if containment l

pressure increases to 4 psig], verify that an SIAS has been initiated. e If it has not, manually initiate SIS operation.

133 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R0 vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-2 E0P Step 1 (Continued).

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

t i

i l

134 l W3101400

,s_ , f

TG-0P-902-008 i RIvision 0

4-7-84 i

j E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

, Success Path III-2 l

l E0P Step Content:

l Step 2. IF, either of the following conditions occurs, THEN stop ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps:

1 Objective:

The objective of this step is to stop reactor coolant pump operation when i pressurizer pressure 11621 psia following an SIAS or when component cooling water is lost.

I

Basis

(CEN-152, page 10-31, step 2) l This step serves to prevent continued RCP operation when RCS pressure is j 11621 psia during a Loss of Coolant Accident. Continued RCP operation at

[ RCS pressures below 1621 psia during a Loss of Coolant Accident may result

in more severe RCS conditions. When component cooling water is lost to

) the reactor coolant pumps, damage to pump components could occur if the RCPs are not secured.

Operational Considerations:

Since other events could cause rapid depressurization, anytime pressurizer pressure drops below 1621 psia following an SIAS, all reactor coolant pump operation is terminated. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular j reading.

l EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-127, step 2)

If pressurizer pressure decreases to (1300 psia) following an SIAS, stop-j all operating reactor coolant pumps.

Justification of Differences:

Loss of component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps is added to this i step because component cooling water is isolated to the reactor coolant  ;

l pumps when an SIAS occurs, e l l I l j .

j 135 ~

W3101400 l 4 +

TG-0P-902-008 R vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-2 E0P Step 2 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

i 4 e i

it /

I e

136 W3101400

l i

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 '

4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 3. If, SIAS has occurred, THEN complete Attachment 1: SIAS Automatic Actions.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify all actions required by an SIAS.

Basis:

Due to the number of valves, pumps, fans, and other equipment actuated by automatic safety signals, the verification is done by use of a checklist.

Operational Considerations

This step should be performed concurrently with this procedure and prefer-ably by an operator not required for other duties.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Offferences:

NA Source Document:

I NA J

137 W3101400

I  :

TG-0P-902-008 R;; vision 0 4-7-84 l

l E , Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-2

E0P Step Content:

Step 4. Check the following Safety Injection termination criteria:

Objective:

This step evaluates certain criteria associated with terminating safety injection flow.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-32, step 3)

If an SIAS has been initiated and the SIS is operating, it must continue to operate at full capacity until SIS termination criteria are met.

Early termination may be desirable when the criteria are met to preclude PTS situations or HPSI pump damage (e.g., shaft seals).

Operational Considerations:

- Below 1000 psia, subcooling margin shall be determined by subtracting hot leg temperature from Pressurizer Temperature Water (TI 101), Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-127, step 3)

If the inventory success criteria are met, the ECCS may be throttled or stopped one train at a time if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two steps, one step covering termination criteria and the other covering termination direction.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

l

(

138 W3101400 H

, D .'.

l l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:  ;

Step 5. E ALL Safety Injection termination criteria (step 4) are satis- l fied, THEN throttle OR stop Safety Injection FL0E one train at a time AND stop Charging pumps as necessary to control Pres-surizer level 33% to 60%.

Objective: I The step maintains pressurizer level and prevents solid water operation.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-33, step 3)

If the criteria are all met, the operator may either terminate or throttle the SIS. The operator may decide to throttle rather than terminate if SIS is to be used to control pressurizer level or plant pressure. Termination of SIS should be sequenced by stopping one pump at a time while observing the termination criteria.

Operational Considerations:

Solid water operation is permissible only when reactor coolant system subcooling margin is <28"F. To throttle cold leg injection valves, the switch must be taken to the "MORE" position which places them in SIAS override.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-127, step 3)

If the inventory success criteria are met, the ECCS may be throttled or stopped one train at a time if all of the following conditions or satisfied:

o 139 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control l 3

Success Path III-2 E0P Step 5 (Continued).

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into,two steps, one covering termination criteria and the other covering termination direction. Specific direction to maintain pressurizer level is given since the safety injection system is providing inventory control until SIAS and CIAS are reset. This allows letdown and charging to be placed back into normal service.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

4 4

0 140  !

W3101400 o

4

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 i

! E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

l Success Path III-2 l l E0P Step Content:

Step 6. IF ALL Safety Injection termination criteria (step 4) can NOT be maintained after throttling OR stopping Safety Injection flow, THEN reinitiate Safety Injection flow.

l Objective:

This step allows initiation of SIS flow should conditions warrant the need.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-33, step 4)

If all of the criteria of step 4 cannot be maintained, the safety injec-tion pun gs must be restarted whenever necessary to satisfy all the criteria.

i l

Operational Considerations:

Wnere multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-127, step 4)

If all the criteria of step 3 cannot be maintained after the ECCS has been stopped, the ECCS must be restarted.

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 141 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. .If Pressurizer level >28%, THEN v'erify Pressurizer pressure is being restored by Pressurizer heaters.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify pressurizer heaters restored when inventory is restored.

1 Basis:

The preferred method of pressure control is using pressurizer heaters.

Pressurizer heaters are deenergized when pressurizer level is low to prevent damage to the heaters. When inventory is restored, pressurizer heaters should be reenergized for pressure controi.

Operational Considerations:

M EPG Step Content:

m Justification of Differences:

m Source Document:

PV-OP-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

o 142 W310145 I

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 8. IF Reactor Coolant Pumps are NOT operating, THEN monitor for Reactor Coolant System voiding as indicated by:

Objective:

This step provides guidance for detecting voids in the reactor coolant

i system.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-34, step 6)

Since there are certain reactor coolant system conditions' for which the presence of voids is acceptable, then voids are not a problem as long as the core and reactor coolant system heat removal and the reactor coolant system inventory safety functions are being satisfied. If these safety functions are not being satisfied or voiding is causing the reactor coolant system to remain pressurized above the shutdown cooling entry conditions, then this step will indicate voids. If voids are indicated, then step 9 will be performed.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-128, step 6)

Monitor for RCS voiding. Indications of voiding are any of the following parameter changes or trends:

Justification of Differences:

This step was placed before RAS actions to place steps more in the order they should occur.

i Source Document: .

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. '

143 W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 j 4-7-84 '

E . Recovery Acti ns: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control .

3 Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

l Step 9. IF Reactor Coolant System voiding is indicated, THEN perform the following: l Objective:

This step provides methods to eliminate voids of the reactor coolant system.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-35, step 7)

Void elimination proceeds as follows:

a) Letdown is isolated or verified to be isolated to minimize further inventory loss b) The depressurization is stopped to prevent further growth of the void c) Repressurizing and depressurizing the RCS within the limits of Figure 10-10 may condense the void. Repressurizing has the effect of filling the voided portion of the RCS with cooler fluid which will remove heat from this region. Depressurizing and repeating this process several times will cool and condense the steam void. The pressurizing and depressurizing may be accomplished using the pressurizer (heaters and auxiliary spray (preferred method)) or the ECCS/ charging (starting and stopping pumps or throttling HPSI pumps) system (alternative method).

e 144 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R: vision 0 4-7-84  ;

E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step 9 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued) d) The [RV head vent system] may be operated to clear voids in the RV head. This system will clear gas ' voids within minutes. If the RV void is not cleared quickly with the [RV head vent system], steam voiding should be suspected. The best method for condensing steam voids or for reeving noncondensible gases from the S/G tube bundle is to run RCPs (if available). If that is not possible, cooling the generator by feeding and draining or by steaming will also be effec-tive for condensing steam voids in the tube bundle. Cooling the steam generators will not have an effect on noncondensibles trapped in the tube bundle. A buildup of noncondensibles in the tube bundles will not hinder natural circulation even with a large number of the tubes blocked. This is because of the small amount of steam generator heat transfer area required for the removal of decay heat.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-128, step 7)

Void elimination is performed as follows:

Justification of Differences:

This step was placed before RAS actions to place steps more in the order they should occur.

Source Document:

' CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 145 W3101400 w - --- ~ -

e

~

'1 TG-0P-902-008 R1 vision 0 4-7-84 l

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3 l Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. IF_ Pressurizer pressure drops to <1385 psia, THEN verify proper HPSI Header flow exists. Refer to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the reactor coolant system during a Loss of Coolant Accident.

Basis:

A Loss of Coolant Accident will result in actuation of safety injection.

The reactor coolant system pressure will respond during the accident according to the break size. Safety injection system flow rate will follow the reactor coolant system pressure according to the safety injection system delivery curves. The safety injection system and charging flow rates should be checked and maximized relative to reactor coolant system pressure to enhance reactor coolant system inventory replenishment and/or core heat removal.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-

ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA

! Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

i PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

o 146 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visic,0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. IF Pressurizer pressure <600 psia, THEN verify Safety Injection

. Tank levels dropping.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the reactor coolant system during a large Loss of Coolant Accident.

Basis:

On the larger break Loss of Coolant Accidents, the safety injection tanks are required for reactor coolant system inventory and heat removal until the safety injection pumps supply inventory to the reactor coolant system.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

i NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: I NA ,

'i i

147 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control '

Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. When Pressurizer pressure is between 392 psia AND 350 psia, perform the following:

Objective:

This step isolates the safety injection tanks.

Basis:

The safety injection tanks should be isolated, vented, and drained at 250 psig to avoid introducing their nitrogen cover gas into the reactor coolant system and increasing the severity of the event.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Docuppet:

NA 4

1 l

t 148 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 R:visien 0 4-7-84 E

3 Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:  ;

Step 13. IF Pressurizer pressure drops to <183 psia, THEN verify proper l LPSI Header flow exists. Refer to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the reactor coolant system during a Loss of Coolant Accident.

Basis:

A Loss of Coolant Accident will result in actuation of safety injection.

The reactor coolant system pressure will respond during the accident according to the break size. Safety injection system flow rate will follow the reactor coolant system pressure according to the safety injection system delivery curves. The safety injection system and charging flow rates should be checked and maximized relative to reactor coolant system pressure to enhance reactor coolant system inventory

replenishment and/or core heat removal.

i Operational Considerations:

] Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

! NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

t 149 4

W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 14. E BOTH LPSI pumps A AND B are NOT available AND Pressurizer pressure <250 psia, THEN align one Containment Spray pump to the LPSI Header as follows:

Objective:

This step ensures safety injection flow to the reactor coolant system if both low pressure safety injection pumps are unavailable by using a containment spray pump to inject water.

Basis:

If both low pressure safety injection pumps are unavailable and pres-surizer pressure is <250 psia, then a containment spray pump may be aligned to inject water through the low pressure safety injection header to the reactor coolant system.

Operational Considerations:

If the CSAS has occurred, then this step should not be performed. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

O i

l 150 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R:; vision 0 4-7-84 l I

E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 l

ECP Step Content:

l Step 15. E SIAS has occurred AND Letdown is in operation, THEN within l 30 minutes to I hour from the time the SIAS occurred, terminate Emergency Boration as follows:

Objective: ,

This step terminates charging from a concentrated boron source within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> if letdown is in service.

Basis:

Charging from the concentrated boron scurce should not continue past 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after event initiation unless required for reactivity control. This is to preclude boron precipitation. Charging pump suction should be shifted to the lower concentration source.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

151 W3101400 I

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 16. IF SIAS has occurred AND Letdown is NOT in operation, THEN within 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the time the SIAS occurred, terminate Emergency Boration as follows:

Objective:

Tiiis step terminates charging from a concentrated boron source within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> if letdown is not in service.

Basis:

Charging from the concentrated boron source should not continue past 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after event initiation unless required for reactivity control. This is to preclude boron precipitation. Charging pump suction should be shifted to the lower concentration source.

Operctional Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 9

152 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 l

E0P Step Content:

Step 17. IF Containment pressure <17.4 psia THEN reset SIAS AND CIAS.

Refer to Attachment 3: SIAS and CIAS Reset Procedure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that automatic actuation of SIAS AND CIAS is available.

Basis:

When containment pressure is >17.4 psia, SIAS and CIAS cannot be reset.

Because component statuses are changed in this procedure, as the cooldown progresses, automatic engineered safeguards protection shall remain available until the reactor coolant system is cooled down and depres-surized.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

o 153 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 I

E0P Step Content:  !

Step 18. IF SIAS AND CIAS are reset AND Chemical and Volume Control System is available for operation, THEN restore normal Charging AND Letdown to maintain Pressurizer level as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to restore normal pressurizer level control.

Basis:

The preferred means of controlling pressurizer level is by the chemical and volume control system. To exit this procedure under stable plant conditions and enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must be performed which would ensure that the plant controlling systems are in proper alignment.

Operational Considerations:

If safety injection flow has not been throttled or terminated, then letdown should not be placed in operation. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA e W3101400 1

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 19. IF Refueling Water Storage Pool level drops to 10%, THEN verify that Recirculation Actuation Signal occurs AND check ALL the following:

Objective:

This step ensures that an RAS occurs to provide a suction source to the safetyinjectionpumps.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-33, step 5)

If the Refueling Water Storage Pool level falls to 10%, initiation of recirculation should be verified. Recirculation is actuated in order to maintain a continuous flow of safety injection fluid to the RCS and a continuous flow of containment spray water. The operator should be cautioned against prematurely initiating an RAS. An inadequate amount of level in the safety injection sump may cause air binding of safety injectionpumpsandloosingbothheatremovalloops.

Operational Considerations:

When a RAS occurs and safety injection sump level is <10 feet, monitor safety injection pumps should be monitored for potential air binding.

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-127, step 5)

Monitor the refueling water tank level. If the refueling water tank level falls to [10%], verify automatic actuation of recirculation. If necessary, manually actuate recirculation one ECCS train at a time [and close RWT outlet valves to the safety injection system].

I Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific e information.

l 155 W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 J E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-2 E0P Step 19 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

1 4

O t

156 W3101400

. 1

TG-0P-902-008 R2visicn 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control l Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 20. When the RAS actions (step 19) have been verified, close the

following valves

Objective:

This step directs the operator actions after an RAS.

i Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-33, step 5)

Manually closing the outlet valves from the Refueling Water Storage Pool will isolate the RWSP from the safety injection pumps. The pumps recir-

, culation valves are closed to prevent inventory loss from the safety

! injection sump to the RWSP.

Operational Considerations:

i NA h

I EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-127, step 5)

Monitor the refueling water tank level. If the refueling water tank level falls to [10%], verify automatic actuation of recirculation. If necessary, manually actuate recirculation one ECCS train at a time [and close RWT outlet valves to the safety injection system].

4 Justification of Differences:

i This EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information. .

j

) Source Document: -

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

]

l l

l

\

157 l W3101400 i

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84

. E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-2 l E0P Step Content:

Step 21. IFF RAS occurs, THEN on Attachment 4: HPSI and CS Pump Flow, record the HPSI AND Containment Spray pumps flow at the follow-ing time intervals:

Objective:

This step monitors the high pressure safety injection and containment spray pumps for performance requirements.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-36, step 8)

After the switch to recirculation, the HPSI and CS Pumps are monitored in order to ensure that the Emergency Core Coolant System performance requirements are maintained. This action helps to avert any possible permanent pump damage.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-128, step 8)

If the HPSI pumps are delivering less than [30 gpm] per pump during t

recirculation, turn off one charging pump and one HPSI pump (turn off the HPSI pump with the lower indicated flow) at a time until the HPSI pumps are delivering more than [30 gpm] per pump.

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 158 W3101400

1 TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 l E3 . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control  ;

Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 22. IF HPSI flow is NOT >25 gpm per operating HPSI pump, THEN sequentially perform the following until operating HPSI pump flow >25 gpm:

Objective:

This step ensures that each operating high pressure safety injection pump has a minimum flow >25 gpm.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-36, step 8)

After the switch to recirculation, the HPSI flows are monitored in order to ensure that the HPSI miniflow requirements for pump protection are met to avert any possible permanent HPSI pump damage. If they are not met, the operator should turn off the charging pumps one at a time until the miniflow requirements are met. If they are still not met with all the charging pup off and two HPSI pumps are operating, the operator turns off the HPSI pump with the lower flow. One HPSI pump should be left operating at all times, unless the criteria of step 4 are met.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-1 ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-128, step 8)

If the HPSI pumps are delivering less than [30 gpm] per pump during recirculation, turn off one charging pump and one HPSI pump (turn off the HPSI pump with the lower indicated flow) at a time until the HPSI pumps are delivering more than [30 gpm] per pump.

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information. e 159 W3101400 I

l TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

l Success Path III-2 l E0P Step 22 (Continued).

Source Document:

. CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

}

)

160 W3101400 l 7_

m ,

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 i E0P Step Content:

Step 23. Between two hours AND four hours post-LOCA, realign Safety Injection pumps discharge for equal flow to the Hot Legs AND Cold Legs as follows:

Objective:

This step aligns safety injection pump discharge to both hot and cold leg injection.

Basis:

Simultaneous hot and cold leg injection is used for both small break and large break Loss of Coolant Accidents at 2-4 hours after the start of the l Loss of Coolant Accident. In this mode, the high pressure safety injec-l tion pumps discharge lines are realigned so that the total injection flow 4

is divided equally between the hot and cold legs. Simultaneousinjection 4

into the hot and cold legs is used as the mechanism to prevent the precipi-tation of boric acid in the reactor vessel following a break that is too large to allow the reactor coolant system to refill. Injecting to both sides of the reactor vessel ensures that fluid from the reactor vessel 4

(when the boric acid is being concentrated) flows out the break regardless

! of the break location and is replenished with a dilute solutiun of borated water from the other side of the reactor vessel. The action is taken no

sooner than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the Loss of Coolant Accident since the fluid injected to the hot leg may be entrained in the steam being released from the core and hence possibly diverted from reaching the reactor vessel.

After 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, the core decay heat has dropped sufficiently so that there is insufficient steam velocity to entrain the fluid being injected to the hot leg. The action is taken no later than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the Loss of

( Coolant Accident in order to ensure that the buildup of boric acid is i

terminated well before the potential for boric acid precipitation occurs. .

Even though the action is required only for large breaks, it is taken for '

any Loss of Coolant Accident so that the operator need not be required to '

_ distinguish between large and small breaks so early in the transient.

l l 161 W3101400 l

]

TG-0P-902-008 R: vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-2 E0P Step 23 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

Simultaneous hot and cold leg injection is not required for small breaks, because for them the buildup of boric acid is terminated when the reactor coolant system is refilled. Once the reactor coolant system is refilled, the boric acid is dispersed throughout the reactor coolant system via natural circulation. .

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

! NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-5, Time.

r e

W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 24. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success -

paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the t;;hnical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

I 163 W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 l

Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control.

3 Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 25. E the success path criteria (step 24) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

l Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

I NA EPG Step Content: ,

NA Justification of Differences: ,

' ~

NA

=

Source Document: ,

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.  ;

s .

I a e Q

164 I' W3101400 ,

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path III-2 i

E0P Step Content:

Step 26. IF the success path criteria (step 24) are NOT met, THEN con-tinue with Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control until a success path criterion is satisfactorily being maintained.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-38)

If the criteria are not met, then RCS Inventory Control is still in

jeopardy. The operator should not leave RCS Inventory Control until this function is fulfilled.

Operational Considerations:

NA

] EPG Step Content:

NA .

I Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: .

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

I I

l 165 W3101400 F - - _ --.__ _ _ - . _ _ __

i TG-0P-902-008 )

R: vision 0 l 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 27. IF the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go, to the next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.

l Objective:

The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on RCS Inventory Control.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-38)

The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish RCS Inventory Control.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery G .6 '" o.

i' o

i e ,

l f

W3101400 1

l. .. .

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control '

4 Success Path IV-1 Low /High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 1. Verify Pressurizer Pressure Control System is maintaining OR restoring pressure within the limits of Attachment 5:

Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph.

Objective:

This step verifies pressurizer pressure control system is functioning to maintain or restore pressurizer pressure.

Basis: (CEM-152, page 10-44, step 1, and page 10-49, step 1)

Pressurizer heaters and/or main (preferred) or auxiliary spray are operated manually to restore and maintain pressure within the limits of Attachment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph.

Automatic PPCS operation is instituted if desired. This action ensures the RCS pressure control is being restored.

Operational Considerations:

Subcooling margin 28*F to 200*F shall be maintained. Below 1000 psia, subcooling margin shall be determined by subtracting hot leg temperature from Pressurizer Temperature Water (TI 101). Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating proper-ly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-132, step 1, and page 10-140, step 1)

Manually control heaters or main spray (preferred) or auxiliary spray to restore pressurizer pressure within the limits of Figure 10-10. If the normal pressure based is desired and if the PPCS if functioning, shift to automatic PPCS.

t a

'167 W3101400

)

TG-0P-902-008 RIvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-1 Low /High Pressure E0P Step 1 (Continued). '

l Justification of Differences:

EPG Success Paths PC-1 and PC-4 were combined in the E0P Success Path IV-1. Both involve basically the same actions. Also, the EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-2, Subcooling.

l r

168 W3101400

1 TG-0P-902-008 Rzvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-1 Low /High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 2. E Pressurizer level >28%, THEN verify Pressurizer heaters restored.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify pressurizer heaters restored when inventory is restored.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-41, step 1, and page 10-49, step 1)

Pressurizer heaters and/or main (preferred) or auxiliary spray are operat-ed manually to restore and maintain pressure within the limits of Figure 10-10. Automatic PPCS operation is instituted if desired. This action ensures the RCS pressure control is being restored.

Operational Considerations:

If SIAS and loss of offsite power exist, then pressurizer heaters will not be available for use. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-132, step 1, and page 10-140, step 1)

Manually control heaters or main spray (preferred) or auxiliary spray to rest",r3 pressurizer pressure within the limits of Figure 10-10. If the normal pressure based is desired and if the PPCS is functioning, shift to automatic PPCS.

Justification of Differences: l EPG Success Paths PC-1 and PC-4 were combined in the E0P Success Path IV-1. Both involve basically the same actions. Also, the EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information.

l l

169 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 l

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-1 Low /High Pressure '

E0P Step 2 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-2, Subcooling.

i h

1 l

\

170 W3101400

1 TG-0P-902-008 R:;visicn 0 4-7-84 E4 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control Success Path IV-1 Low /High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 3. IF Reactor Coolant Pump 1A OR 1B is operating, THEN verify Spray Valves selector switch is selected to the loop with the operating Reactor Coolant Pump.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that normal spray is available.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-41, step 1, and page 10-49, step 1)

Pressurizer heaters and/or main (preferred) or auxiliary spray are operat-ed manually to restore and maintain pressure within the limits of Attach-ment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph. Automatic PPCS operation is instituted if desired. This action ensures the RCS pressure control is being restored.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-132, step 1, and page 10-140, step 1)

Manually control heaters or main spray (preferred) or auxiliary spray to restore pressurizer pressure within the limits of Figure 10-10. If the normal pressure based is desired and if the PPCS is functioning, shift to automatic PPCS.

Justification of Differences: -

EPG Success Paths PC-1 and PC-4 were combined in the E0P Success Path IV-1. Both involve basically the same actions. Also, the EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-2, Subcooling. '

i 171 W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-1 Low /High Pressure E0P Step Content: l Step 4. E Reactor Coolant Pumps 1A AND 1B are NOT operating, THEN align Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray as follows:

Objective:

This step aligns charging pumps for auxiliary spray when normal spray is not available. .

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-41, step 1, and page 10-49, step 1)

Pressurizer heaters and/or main (preferred) or auxiliary spray are operat-ed manually to restore and maintain pressure within the limits of Attach-ment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph. Automatic PPCS operation is instituted if desired. This action ensures the RCS pressure control is being restored.

Operational Considerations:

Pressurizer pressure control with pressurizer auxiliary spray raises the pressurizer level when letdown is not in operation.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-132, step 1, and page 10-140, step 1)

Manually control heaters or main spray (preferred) or auxiliary spray to restore pressurizer pressure within the limits of Figure 10-10. If the normal pressure based is desired and if the PPCS is functioning, shift to automatic PPCS.

Justification of Differences:

EPG Success Paths PC-1 and PC-4 were combined in the E0P Success Path IV-1. Both involve basically the same actions. Also, the EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. #

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-2, Subcooling.

172 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 -

4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Suc;ess Path IV-1 Low /High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 5. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satis-factorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to

, judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judg-ing the success of that path are specific to the technical means. Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA 1

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

1 CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. l o

173 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4 l Success Path IV-1 Low /High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 6. E the success path criteria (step 5) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy. l l

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA t

! EPG Step Content:

NA

]

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline, o

174 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R2 vision 0 4-7-84 E4 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control  ;

Success Path IV-1 Low /High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 7. E the success path criteria (step 5) are NOT met due to low Pressurizer pressure, THEN go the Success Path IV-2, Low Pressure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.

Operational Considerations:

1 NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline, o

i 175 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-1 Low /High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 8. IF_ the success path criteria (step 5) are NOT met due to high Pressurizer pressure, THEN go to Success Path IV-4, High Pressure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this

, step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

t 176 W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 i

R visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure l E0P Step Content:

Step 1. IF Pressurizer pressure 11385 psia, THEN go to Success Path IV-3.

Objective:

This step directs the operator to the next success path if SIAS has occurred.

Basis:

Since charging pumps are actuated by SIAS, the operator may have selected this success path on the resource assessment tree because it is a higher priority success path. If SIAS has occurred, the operator needs to read l the actions associated with SIAS, therefore this step directs the operator to the appropriate success path.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA -

l Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

.i 1

i 0

l 177 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure l

E0P Step Content:

Step 2. Verify Charging pumps aligned to take suction from one of the following sources as follows:

Objective:

This step ensures the charging pumps have an adequate suction source.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-42, step 2)

Adequate suction sources to the charging pumps are verified. If neces-sary, the VCT, boric acid storage tanks and RWSP may be used. The source (s) of water for use in controlling RCS inventory depend on the total amount of fluid necessary for make up to the RCS and the time frame over which the fluid must be introduced. The volume control tank is the primary source of fluid for RCS makeup. If necessary, for the cases where RCS inventory losses are being incurred, the contents of the boric acid makeup tanks and the refueling water tank may be used as backup sources of makeup water.

Operational Considerations:

If SIAS has occurred, then the charging pumps suction may be aligned to both boric acid makeup tanks. If volume control tank level <6%, then the volume control tank cannot be used to supply the charging pumps.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-134, step 2)

Verify adequate suction sources from the (listed in order of priority)

[VCT, BAMT, RWT or spent fuel. pool] to the charging pumps.

t 178 W3101400

- _ _ ...-o _ _ - p

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure E0P Step 2 (Continued).

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was placed before the step for taking the pressurizer solid.

Since inventory control is a higher priority success path, pressurizer level control should have already been verified. Depending on which suction source the charging pumps were aligned to in inventory control, the, operator may need to verify the adequacy of that suction source for taking the pressurizer solid.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

t l

\ 179 W3101400 I

I

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 3. IF SIAS OR CIAS has occurred, THEN place Letdown in service as follows:

Objective:

This step places letdown back in service, following an SIAS or CIAS, in preparation for taking the pressurizer solid with the charging pumps.

Basis:

i Since pressurizer pressure is greater than the shutoff head of the high pressure safety injection pumps, the pressurizer is taken solid using charging pumps. Since the charging pumps are positive displacement pumps, letdown is used to regulate pressure when the pressurizer is solid. This provides smoother control of pressure and also prevents having to cycle charging pumps to maintain pressure. A charging pump may be left running instead and letdown is throttled to maintain pressure. Since SIAS and CIAS isolates letdown, this step will place letdown back in service using the override capability of the valves. This success path is only used if pressurizer pressure is >1385 psia. If pressurizer pressure is <1385 psia _

the high pressure safety injection pumps should be used to take the pres-surizer solid which is covered in the next success path.

Operational Considerations:

Letdown should not be placed in service unless pressurizer level is being maintained >28%. If CSAS has occurred, then letdown should not be placed in service, since component cooling water will not be supplied to the i

letdown heat exchanger. Where multiple indications for one parameter l exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

l i EPG Step Content:

NA e l

I 180 l

'W3101400

1. I TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84

> E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure E0P Step 3 (Continued).

l Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

o 181 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 l

Revisicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 4. IF Charging AND Letdown Systems are maintaining level 33% to 60%, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step takes the pressurizer solid to restore pressurizer pressure.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-42, step 1)

Raising pressurizer level with a steam bubble in the pressurizer will tend to increase pressure. If pressurizer heaters are not available the pres-surizer may be taken solid to control pressure with the charging pumps.

This should not be done unless 28"F minimum subcooling cannot be maintained.

Operational Considerations:

Solid water operation is permissible only when reactor coolant system subcooling margin <28*F. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-134, step 1)

Verify that the PLCS is automatically maintaining or restoring pressurizer level. If not, manually operate charging and letdown to restore and main-tain pressurizer level. The operator may take the pressurizer solid if

[20]*F subcooling cannot be maintained.

Justification of Differences:

! The E0P step addresses taking the pressurizer solid. It does not mention pressurizer level control since this was done in inventory control. The step was expanded to provide explicit instructions for taking the pres-surizer solid.

l e l

l 182 l W3101400 )

i

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure E0P Step 4 (Continued).

Source Document:

. CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-2, Subcooling.

i 4

l

[

] .

1 .

i i .

d i

, i 183

'd3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 5. E Charging pumps are aligned to the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks AND Letdown is in operation, THEN within 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the time the Charging pumps were aligned to the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks, realign them as follows:

Objective:

This step terminates charging from a concentrated boron source within I hour if letdown is in service.

Basis:

Charging from the concentrated boron source should not continue past 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after event initiation unless required for reactivity control. This is to preclude baron precipitation. Charging pump suction should be shifted to the lower concentration source.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA l

o 184 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 6. E Charging pumps are aligned to the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks AND Letdown is NOT in operation, THEN within 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the time the Charging pumps were aligned to the Boric Acid Makeup Tanks, realign them as follows:

Objective: .

This step terminates charging from a concentrated boron source within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> if letdown is not in service.

Basis:

Charging from the concentrated boron source should not continue past 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after event initiation unless required for reactivity control. This i

is to preclude boron precipitation. Charging pump suction should be shif ted to the lower concentration source.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

f NA Source Document:

NA e

l 0

e i 4

185 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 i E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure l

E0P Step Content:

Step 7. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

Theobjectiveofthisstepistocheckthecriteriaassociatedwithsatis-factorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can

be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judg-l Ing the success of that path are specific to the technical means. Also, f in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

l!

Operational Considerations:

NA f

4 EPG Step Content:

NA

! Justification of Differences:

I Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

b l i

1 186 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 i

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control

~

4

. Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 8. E the success path criteria (step 7) are met, THEN go to the

next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7) j After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this j step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is l instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

I j Operational Considerations:

! NA j EPG Step Content:

j NA i

{ Justification of Differences:

) NA i

! Source Document:

i CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l l

l i

is 1

187 W3101400

, . - - - - - - - - , - - - - , - - - . . ,- , . ~ , , -- - - - ,

TG-0P-902-008 R:visicn 0 4

4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-2 Low Pressure i

E0P Step Content:

Step 9. E the success path criteria (step 7) are NOT met, THEN go to Success Path IV-3, Low Pressure.

i Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this i step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is I instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.

l Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA

, Scurce Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

i J

0 I

l 4

188 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure l

l l E0P Step Content:

l l

Step 1. IF Pressurizer pressure drops to <1684 psia OR Containment pres-sure rises to >17.4 psia, THEN verify SIAS occurs as follows:

Objective:

i The objective of this step is to verify SIAS occurs when required.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-44, step 1)

ECCS operation must be verified if pressurizer pressure decreases to 1684 psia or if containment pressure increases to 17.4 psia. If safety injec-tion system operation has not commenced automatically on high containment pressure 17.4 psia or when RCS pressure is below 1684 psia, it must be j manually actuated. This action restores inventory so that pressure can be controlled by use of either pressurizer heaters and spray or by using the discharge head of the ECCS pumps to control pressure.

Operational Considerations:

Hot leg temperatures and cold leg temperatures may be influenced by safety injection flow. Multiple indications and core temperatures should be used to determine the reactor coolant system temperature. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-136, step 1)

If pressurizer pressure decreased to [1600 psia], [or if containment pressure increases to 4 psig], verify that an SIAS has been initiated.

If it has not, manually initiate an SIAS.

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: e CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table'5-4, Pressure.

189 W3101400 t

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 l E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

j Success P=th IV-3 Low Pressure i

E0P Step Content:

Step 2. E either of the following conditions occur, THEN stop ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to stop reactor coolant pump operation when pressurizer pressure 11621 psia following a SIAS or when component cooling water is lost.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-44, step 2)

This step serves to prevent continued RCP operation when RCS pressure is 11621 psia during a Loss of Coolant Accident. Continued RCP operation at RCS pressures below 1621 psia during a Loss of Coolant Accident may result in more severe RCS conditions. When component cooling water is lost to the reactor coolant pumps, damage to pump components could occur if the RCPs are not secured.

I Operational Considerations:

Since other events could cause rapid depressurization, anytime pressurizer pressure drops below 1621 psia following a SIAS, all reactor coolant pump operation is terminated. Where multiple indications for one parameter

!' exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-136, step 2)

If pressurizer pressure decreases to (1300 psia) following an SIAS, stop all reactor coolant pumps.

Justification of Differences:

Loss of component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps is added to this step because component cooling water is isolated to the reactor coolant pumps when an SIAS actuation occurs. ,

1 190 W3101400 i

)

TG-0P-902-008 l Revision 0 '

4-7-84 i E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

l Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure l E0P Step 2 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

i l

i

(

4 191 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

i Step 3. E SIAS has occurred, THEN complete Attachment 1: SIAS Automatic Actions.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify all actions required by an SIAS. '

0 f:

Basis:

Due to the number of valves, pumps, fans, and other equipment actuated by ,

automatic safety signals, the verification is done by use of a checklist.

,4 Operational Considerations: '

This step should be performed concurrently with this procedura and prefer-ably by an operator not required for other duties.

EPG Step Content:

NA 1

Justification of Differences: .,

NA

j i e Source Document: ,'

NA ,

3

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q. '

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W3101400 ,. '

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l TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure l

E0P Step Content:

Step 4. Check the following Safety Injection termination criteria

Objective

This step evaluates certain criteria associated with terminating safety 1

injection flow.

3 Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-45, step 3)

If an SIAS has been initiated and the SIS is operating, it must continue to operate at full capacity until SIS termination criteria are met. Early termination may be desirable when the criteria are met to preclude PTS

, situations or HPSI pump damage (e.g., shaft seals).

Operational Considerations

Below 1000 psia, subcooling margin shall be determined by subtracting hot

, leg temperature frem Pressurizer Temperature Water (TI 101). Where mul-tiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

}

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-136, step 3)

If the ECCS is operating, it may be throttle stopped one train at a time if the following conditions are satisfied:

. Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two steps, one step. covering termination

, criteria and the other covering termination direction.

Source Document:

4 ,- CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-2,

[: ' Subcooling.

i i

I s

193 l W3101400

\

1 - _

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84

.E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF ALL Safety Injection termination criteria (step 4) are satis-fled, THEN throttle OR stop Safety Injection FLOW one train at a time AND stop Charging pumps as necessary to control Pressurizer level 33% to 60%.

Objective:

The step maintains pressurizer level and prevents solid water operation, unless 28'F subcooling margin cannot be maintained. If 28 F subcooling margin cannot be maintained, then the pressurizer is taken solid with high pressure safety injection pumps.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-46, step 3)

If the criteria are all met, the operator may either terminate or throttle the SIS. The operator may decide to throttle rather than terminate if SIS is to be used to control pressurizer level or plant pressure. Termination of SIS should be sequenced by stopping one pump at a time while observing the termination criteria.

Operational Considerations:

Solid water operation is permissible only when reactor coolant system subcooling margin is <28*F. To throttle cold leg injection valves, the switch must be taken to the "MORE" position which places them in SIAS override.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-136, step 3)

If the ECCS is operating, it may be throttle stopped one train at a time if the following conditions are satisfied:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two steps, one step covering termination criteria and the other covering termination direction. , t 194 W3101400 l

l _-,.

'- ' GV

. . _ . ., ). ' : '

n v .s r-

$ , &.h.7:?

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E4 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step 5 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Documents Table 5-1, Level.

l l

195 W3101400

.a .

TG-0P-902-008 Revisicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 6. IF ALL Safety Injection termination criteria (step 4) can NOT be

- maintained after throttling OR stopping Safety Injection flow, THEN reinitiate Safety Injection flow.

Objective:

This step allows initiation of safety injection system flow should condi-tions warrant the need.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-46, step 4)

If all of the criteria of step 3 cannot be maintained, the safety injec-tion pumps must be restarted whenever necessary to satisfy all the criteria.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-136, step 4)

If all the criteria of step 3 cannot be maintained after the ECCS has been stopped, the ECCS must be restarted.

Justifica' tion of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

e 196 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 7. IF Pressurizer pressure drops to <1385 psia, THEN verify proper HPSI Header flow exists. Refer to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the reactor coolant system during a Loss of Coolant Accident.

Basis:

A Loss of Coolant Accident will result in actuation of safety injection.

The reactor coolant system pressure will respond during the accident accdrding to the break size. Safety injection system flow rate will follow the reactor coolant system pressure according to the safety injection system delivery curves. The safety injection system and charging flow rate should be checked and maximized relative to reactor coolant system pressure to enhance reactor coolant system inventory replenishment and/or core heat removal.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA l l

1 Justification of Differences: 1 NA l

l Source Document:

PV-0P-902, ~ Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

o 197 W3101400

. TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure i

E0P Step Content:

, Step 8. IF Pressurizer pressure drops to 5,183 psia, THEN verify proper LPSI Header flow exists. Refer to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the ,

reactor coolant system during a Loss of Coolant Accident.

Basis:

A Loss of Coolant Accident will result in actuation of safety injection.

The reactor coolant system pressure will respond during the accident according to the break size. Safety injection system flow rate will follow the reactor coolant system pressure according to the safety injection system delivery curves. The safety injection system and charging flow rate should be checked and maximized relative to reactor coolant system pressure to enhance reactor coolant system inventory replenishment and/or core heat removal.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA ,

Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

e 198 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84  ;

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 9. IF BOTH LPSI pumps A AND B are NOT available AND Pressurizer pressure is <250 psia, THEN align one Containment Spray pump to the LPSI Header as follows:

Objective:

This step ensures safety injection flow to the reactor coolant system if both low pressure safety injection pumps are unavailable by using a con-tainment spray pump to inject water.

Basis:

If both low pressure safety injection pumps are unavailable and pressur-izer pressure is <250 psia, then a containment spray pump may be aligned to inject water through the low pressure safety injection header to the reactor coolant system.

Operational Considerations:

If CSAS has occurred, then this step should not be performed. Where mul-tiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Stop Content:

Technical Guideline, Section 5.10, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

199 W3101400 ,

i I

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control .

4 Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure

.EOP Step Content:

Step 10. IF SIAS has occurred AND Letdown is in operation, THEN within 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the time the SIAS occurred, terminate Emergency Boration as follows:

Objective:

This step terminates charging from a concentrated boron source within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> if letdown is in service.

Basis:

Charging from the concentrated boron source should not continue past 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after event initiation unless required for reactivity control. This is to preclude boron precipitation. Charging pump suction should be shifted to the lower concentration source.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences: l NA l

Source Decument:

NA I

l e

M W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 11. E SIAS has occurred AND Letdown is NOT in operation, THEN 4

within 30 minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from the time the SIAS occurred, terminate Emergency Boration as follows:

Objective:

This step terminates charging from a concentrated boron source within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> if letdown is not in service.

Basis:

Charging from the concentrated boron source should not continue past 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after event initiation unless required for reactivity control. This is to preclude boron precipitation. Charging pump suction should be shifted to the lower concentration source.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

201 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure  !

i l

E0P Step Content:

Step 12. E Containment pressure <17.4 psia, THEN reset SIAS AND CIAS.

Refer to Attachment 3: SIAS and CIAS Reset Procedure. .

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that automatic actuation of SIAS and CIAS is available.

Basis:

When containment pressure is >17.4 psia, SIAS and CIAS cannot be reset.

Because component statuses are changed in this procedure, as the cooldown progresses, automatic engineered safeguards protection shall remain available until the reactor coolant system is cooled down and depres-surized.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

o 202 W3101400

1 TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 13. E SIAS AND CIAS are reset AND Chemical and Volume Control System is available for operation, THEN restore normal Charging AND Letdown to maintain Pressurizer level as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to restore normal pressurizer level control.

Basis:

The preferred means of controlling pressurizer level is by the chemical and volume control system. To exit this procedure under stable plant conditions and enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must be performed which would ensure that the plant controlling systems are in proper alignment Operational Considerations:

If safety injection flow has not been throttled or . terminated, then letdown should not be placed in operation. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular tweding. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then th'e system should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Documsat:

NA

• l I

203 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E4 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 14. IF Refueling Water Storage Pool level drops to 10%, THEN verify that Recirculation Actuation Signal occurs AND check ALL the following:

Objective:

This step ensures that RAS occurs to provide a suction source to the safety injection pumps.

Basis: (CEN-152, pagr 10-46, step 5)

If the Refueling Water Storage Pool level falls to 10%, initiation of recirculation should be verified. Recirculation is actuated in order to maintain a continuous flow of safety injection fluid to the RCS and a continuous flow of containment spray water. The operator should be cautioned against prematurely initiating an RAS. An inadequate amount of level in the safety injection sump may cause air binding of safety injec-tion pumps and loosing both heat removal loops.

Operational Considerations:

When RAS occurs and safety injection sump level is <10 feet, safety injection pumps should be monitored for potential air binding. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-136, step 5)

Monitor the refueling water tank level. If the refueling water tank level falls to [10%), verify automatic actuation of recirculation. If necessary, manually actuate recirculation one ECCS train at a time [and close RWT outlet valves to the safety injection system].

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific

• information.

204 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step 14 (Continued). l Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level. l l

l I

205 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 15. When the RAS actions (step 14) have been verified, close the following valves:

Objective:

This step directs the operators action after a RAS.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-46, step 5)

Manually closing the outlet valves from the Pefueling Water Storage Pool will isolate the RWSP from the safety injection pumps. The pumps recir-culation valves are closed to prevent inventory loss from the safety injection sump to the RWSP.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-136, step 5)

Monitor the refueling water tank level. If the refueling water tank level falls to [10%], verify automatic actuation of recirculation. If necessary, manually actuate recirculation one ECCS train at a time [and close RWT outlet valves to the safety injection system].

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 206 W3101400

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TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 16. .IF, F RAS occurs, THEN on Attachment 4: HPSI and CS Pump Flow, record the HPSI AND Containment Spray pumps flow at the follow-ing time intervals:

Objective:

This step monitors the high pressure safety injection and containment spray pumps for performance requirements.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-47, step 6)

After the switch to recirculation, the HPSI and CS Pumps are monitored in order to ensure that the Emergency Core Coolant System performance requirements are maintained. This action helps to avert any possible permanent pump damage.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-136, step 6)

If the HPSI pumps are delivering less than [30 gpm] per pump during .

recirculation, turn off one charging pump and one HPSI pump (turn off the HPSI pump with the lower indicated flow) at a time until the HPSI pumps are delivering more than [30 gpm] per pump.

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 207 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 17. IF HPSI flow is NOT >25 gpm per operating HPSI pump AND RAS has occurred, THEN sequentially perform the following until operat-ing HPSI pump flow >25 gpm:

Objective:

This step ensures that each operating high pressure safety injection pump has a minimum flow >25 gpm.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-47, step 6)

After the switch to recirculation, the HPSI flows are monitored in order to ensure that the HPSI miniflow requirements for pump protection are met I

to avert any possible permanent HPSI pump damage. If they are not met, the operator should turn off the charging pumps one at a time until the miniflow requirements are met. If they are still not met with all the charging pumps off and two HPSI pumps are operating, the operator- turns off the HPSI pump with the lower flow. One HPSI pump should be left operating at all times, unless the criteria of step 3 are met.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-136, step 7)

If the HPSI pumps are delivering less than [30 gpm] per pump during recirculation, turn off one charging pump and one HPSI pump (turn off the HPSI pump with the lower indicated flow) at a time until the HPSI pumps are delivering more than [30 gpm] per pump.

i Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information. ,

l 1

208 l W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visica 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step 17 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

a e

e i

1 i

209 W3101400 t

l TG-0P-902-008 :

Rsvision 0 I 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 18. Between two hours AND four hours post- LOCA , realign Safety Injection pumps discharge for equal flow to the Hot Legs AND Cold Legs as follows:

Objective:

This step aligns safety injection pump discharge to both hot and cold leg injection.

Basis:

Simultaneous hot and cold leg injection is used for both small break and large break Loss of Coolant Accidents at 2-4 hours af ter the start of the Loss of Coolant Accident. In this mode, the high pressure safety injec-tion pumps discharge lines are realigned so that the total injection flow is divided equally between the hot and cold legs. Simultaneous injection into the hot and cold legs is used as the mechanism to prevent the precip-itation of boric acid in the reactor vessel following a break that is too large to allow the reactor coolant system to refill. Injecting to both sides of the reactor vessel ensures that fluid from the reactor vessel (when the boric acid is being concentrated) flows out the break regardless of the break location and is replenished with a dilute solution of borated water from the other side of the reactor vessel. The action is taken no sooner than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> af ter the Loss of Coolant Accident since the -fluid injected to the hot leg may be entrained in the steam being released from the core and hence possibly diverted from reaching the reactor vessel.

After 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, the core decay heat has dropped sufficiently so. that there is insufficient steam velocity to entrain the fluid being injected to the hot leg. The action is taken no later than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the Loss of Coolant Accident in order to ensure that the buildup of boric acid is terminated well before the potential for boric acid precipitation occurs. ,

Even though the action is required only for large breaks, it is taken for ]

any Loss of Coolant Accident so that the operator need not be required to l distinguish between large and small breaks so early in the transient.

210 l W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 R2visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step 18 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

Simultaneous hot and cold leg injection is not required for small breaks, because for them the buildup of boric acid is terminated when the reactor coolant system is refilled. Once the reactor coolant system is refilled, the boric acid is dispersed throughout the reactor coolant system via natural circulation.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-5, Time, o

211 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 19. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for

] judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

l Also, in. order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

m EPG Step Content:

NA I

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

i 212 .

W3101400 l l

- l

TG-0P-902-008 ,

Revision 0 '

4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 20. E the success path criteria (step 19) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

a NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l I

213 W3101400

)

1 ll

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 l E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control .

4 Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 21. IF the success path criteria (step 19) are NOT met, THEN continue with Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control until a success path criterion is satisfactorily being maintained.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-48)

If the criteria are not met, then RCS Pressure Control is still . in jeopardy. The operator should not leave RCS Pressure Control until this function is fulfilled.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

i NA Source Document:

i CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o

.i 214 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedu;e IV. RCS Pressure Control l 4

Success Path IV-3 Low Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 22. IF the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on RAS Pressure Control.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-48)

The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish RCS Pressure Control.

Operational Consideratiems:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differenous:

NA

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

1 o

j l

215 W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedu.e IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 1. Verify Pressurizer heaters are deenergized.

Objective:

This step verifies pressurizer heaters are deenergized.

Basis:

Pressurizer heaters add heat to the pressurizer which raises pressurizer pressure. If pressure is too high the heaters should be deenergized to prevent raising pressure higher.

Operational Considerations:

If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA i

l 9

216 W3101400

1 TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 2. IF ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps are operating, THEN stop Reactor Coolant Pumps lA AND 2A as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to secure one reactor coolant pump in each loop to reduce reactor coolant system heat input.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-50, step 3)

Only one reactor coolant pump in each loop should be operated in order to minimize heat input to the RCS. If all reactor coolant pumps are operat-ing, then one reactor coolant pump in each loop should be stopped.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

217 W3101400

n. , - y

, TG-0P-902-008 R2visien 0 4-7-84 )

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS-Pressure Control l 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure 1

E0P Step Content:

Step 3. Verify Shutdown Margin in accordance with Technical Specifica-tions. Refer to OP-903-090, SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

Objective:

This step verifies shutdown margin before plant cooldown is commenced.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-50, step 1)

During any cooldown, the RCS is borated as necessary to maintain shutdown margin per Technical Specifications.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-142, step 1)

Borate as necessary to maintain shutdown margin per Technical Specifica-tions Limits (see RC-2 and RC-3).

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

218  !

W3101400 I 1

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 4. E ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps have been stopped, THEN check the following Reactor Coolant Pump restart criteria: l Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure the reactor coolant system employs the preferred means of coolant circulation. ,

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-50, step 3)

If RCP operation has been terminated, restarting of the reactor coolant pumps should be attempted to ensure continued forced circulation of coolant to the core for heat removal purposes. However, only one reactor coolant pump in each loop should be operated in order to minimize heat input to the RCS. Running any single RCP is adequate for heat removal purposes.

Operational Considerations:

If component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps has been lost for >10 ,

minutes, then reactor coolant pumps should not be restarted. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-142, step 3)

+

If RCP operation has been terminated, one RCP in each loop may be restarted if the following criteria are satisfied:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG was placed before the step allowing pres.surzier level to drop during cooldown to ensure the motive for coolant circulation used in this success path is in effect prior to commencing cooldown.

1 o 219 W3101400 t

, 1 l

TG-P.P-902-008 '-

Revision 0

\

4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step 4 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Tabic 5-2, s Subcooling.

s'

(-

t LI i

ss J

.c J

3 t t i -;

+, -, , .n

,s s  ;

l L 3 .

't o

s

.n s

• 3 220 ,

W3101400 ~;3 ,.

,e 4 , e a, ,

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 l

< E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control l 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure

. E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF ALL Reactor Coolant Pump restart criteria (step 4) are satis-x fled, THEN restart one Reactor Coolant Pump in each loop. Refer to OP-1-002, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION, Sections 4.0 AND

6.1. Objective

The objective of this step is to ensure the reactor coolant system employs the preferred means of coolant circulation.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-51, step 4)

If the RCPs have been stopped, operation of the reactor coolant pumps should be attempted to ensure continued forced circulation of coolant through the core and to permit the use of pressurizer sprays (if avail-able). However, only one reactor coolant pump in each loop should be operated in an effort to minimize heat input to the RCS.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-143, step 4)

If RCP operation has been terminated and the criteria of Step 3 are met:

Justification of Differences: l The EPG step was divided up into two steps, one which deals with restart- )

ing reactor coolant pumps and one which deals with cooldown.

l Source Document: -

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l d

221 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 6. IF Reactor Coolant Pumps are operating, THEN verify Spray Valves selector switch is selected to the loop with the operating Reactor Coolant Pump.

Objective:

i The objective of this step is to verify that normal spray is available.

Basis:

f With forced circulation of coolant through the core, this action ensures that the normal mode of pressurizer spray is available. <

Operational Considerations:

If the pressurizer auxiliary spray was being used, then charging shall be returned to normal lineup. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in ' manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA -

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: '

NA 1

m e

1 W3101400 o .

• f

TG-0P-902-008 R:visien 0 4-7-84 E4 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 7. IF NO Reactor Coolant Pumps are operating, THEN go to Success Path IV-5. .

Objective:

This step ':rects the operator to the next success path if no reactor coolant pumps are operating.

Basis:

If no reactor coolant pumps are operating, then the cooldown will be by natural circulation. This is covered in Success Path IV-5, High Pressure.

Operational Considerations: -

NA 1

l EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA i 223 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 8. Maintain level in at least one Steam Generator as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that the steam generator level is maintained in at least one steam generator.

Basis:

When the steam generators are being used for heat removal from the reactor coolant system, main or emergency feedwater has to be supplied to the steam generator to ensure a heat sink.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA e

224 i W3101400

)

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 9. E a Steam Generator Low Pressure Pretrip alarm occurs, THEN reset the setpoint.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to prevent an MSIS from occurring and inhibiting cooldown.

Basis:

During a controlled cooldown and depressurization the automatic operation of certain safeguard systems is undesirable. Therefore, the MSIS setpoint must be manually reset (lowered) as the cooldown progresses to ensure that automatic engineered safeguards protection remains available until the reactor coolant system is cooled down and depressurized.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Documpnt:

NA l

e 225 W3101400

=A ( -- - r+m-c $

TG-0P-902-008 Rsvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 10. Commence a Plant cooldown by EITHER of the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to cooldown the plant to effect a depressurization.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-51, step 4)

RCS depressurization should occur by feeding the steam generators with main or auxiliary feedwater and dumping steam to the condenser via the turbine bypass system. If the condenser or turbine bypass system is not available, steam should be discharged through the atmospheric dump valves.

The use of ataiospheric dump valves may have the potential for an unmoni-

! tored release of activity to the environment. If it is suspected that a

) steam generator (s) has tube leaks, then depressurization should be per-formed using the unaffected or least affected generator.

Operational Considerations:

Cooldown rate shall be limited for reactor coolant system <100*F/hr and for pressurizer <200*F/hr. If a steam generator is isolated -due to activity in the steam plant, then the use of the atmospheric dump valve on the isolated steam generator should be minimized.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-143, step 4)

If RCP operation has been terminated and the criteria of Step 3 are met:

Justification of Differences:  !

. The EPG step was divided up into two steps, one which deals with restart-ing reactor coolant pumps and one which deals with cooldown.

i Source Document: ,

l CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. e l

l 226

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TG-0P-902-008 R:;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 11. During Plant cooldown, allow Pressurizer level to drop as follows:

Objective:

This step allows pressurizer level to drop during the cooldown which reduces pressurizer pressure.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-50, step 2)

RCS inventory is controlled so as to permit pressurizer level to drop during RCS fluid contraction. This drop in level results in pressurizer bubble decompression which in turn results in RCS depressurization. It is also possible to cool the pressurizer gradually by filling the pressurizer with cooler loop fluid by charging to the loop. The level is then allowed to drop due to cooldown contraction and then refilled with cooler loop fluid. Repeated fillings will cool the pressurizer metal and steam bubble resulting in gradual depressurization.

Operational Considerations:

Minimum acceptable pressurizer level is 7L Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-142, step 2)

Control RCS inventory so as to allow pressurizer level to drop while cooling down in order-to effect depressurization. Observe the limits of IC-1.

I Justification of Differences:

This step was placed after the step for commencing cooldown to place the steps in the order they would be done. i I

e

, 227 W3101400

TG-OP-902-008 4

R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step 11 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

i i

I t e 228 W3101400

TG-O H 02-008 R; vision 0 1 4-7-84 E4 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Contrjo Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content: l Step 12. When Pressurizer pressure is within the limits of Attachment 5:

Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph, stabilize Reactor Coolant System temperature.

Objective:

This step stops the cooldown and depressurization when pressurizer pres-sure is restored to within limits.

Basis:

Once pressure is restored to within the limits of Attachment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph, the cooldown may be stopped and pressure and temperature stabilized.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 13. IF Feedwater AND Condensate Systems can feed at least one Steam Generator AND Cold Leg temperature 1450'F, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step aligns condensate and feedwater systems for condensate pump feed of the steam generators.

Basis:

If cold leg temperature is 1450*F then the condensate pumps can adequately supply water to the steam generators. This action feeds the steam genera-tors through normal system lineup at these conditions.

Operational Considerations:

Main feedwater pumps need not be operable. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA

Source Document

NA o

230 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 RIvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure ,

l E0P Step content:

Step 14. IF BOTH Main Feedwater AND Emergency Feedwater are lost, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step provides guidance for a total loss of feedwater.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-52, step 6)

If all feedwater is lost (both main and emergency) certain activities should be performed to keep the plant in a stable condition. These activities are listed below, a) Stop all RCPs b) Any cooldown is stopped to minimize steam discharge and conserve S/G inventories.

c) If in operation, the steam generator blowdown system, secondary sampling system or any other nonvital secondary discharge must be secured. Until feedwater is reestablished, the steam generator water inventories must be conserved.

d) The operator should attempt to restore the operation of the main or auxiliary feedwater system to provide a primary decay heat sink for a controlled depressurization to meet the success criteria of this recovery action guideline.

A moderate rate of increase in steam generator water level is suffi-

cient to restore S/G 1evel. If the refill rate is too fast, excessive cooldown of the RCS and shrinkage of RCS inventory may result.

Consequently, pressurizer level may fall below that required to l

maintain a bubble for pressure control. An adequate feed rate for restoring steam generator level is determined by operating experience.

I 8 1 l

231 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step 14 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued) e) If both main and auxiliary feedwater cannot be restored, all plant specific sources of feedwater which could be made available to replace steam generator boil off should be implemented. Examples of alternate sources of feedwater are fire pumps, condensate pumps, portable pumps, etc. When developing plant specific procedures, alternate sources of l feedwater should be identified and their use should be indicated in the procedures. Guidelines on steam generator depressurization should be developed for those cases when the operator is relying on low pressure sources of feedwater as a backup feedwater supply.

Operational Considerations:

Feedwater should not be restored to an empty steam generator. If both steam generators are empty, then feedwater should be restored to one steam generator only.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-144, step 6)

If all feedwater (main and auxiliary) is lost, conduct the following activities:

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

232 W3101400 1 _ _ _ _ - - - - -

=. .

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 15. IF using Emergency Feedwater to feed Steam Generators, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step ensures continuous suction supply to emergency feed pumps.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-53, step 8)

The available condensate inventory should be monitored and replenished from available sources as necessary to continually provide a source for a secondary heat sink. Example of alternate sources of condensate are nonseismic tanks, fire mains, lake water supplies, potable tanks, etc.

Plant specific alternate sources of feedwater should be identified and cited in the plant specific procedure.

I Operational Considerations:

Permission shall be obtained from control room supervisor prior to align-ing auxiliary component cooling system to the emergency feedwater system.

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-144, step 8)

If the auxiliary feedwater system is being used, ensure an adequate supply of condensate.

Justificar. ion of Differences:

4 The E0P step was expanded to include setpoints and plant specific information.

233 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step 15 (Continued).

I Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

4 i

e 234 W3101400

TC-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 l E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control '

4 Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

1 Step 16. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

i The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences: '

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 235 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recotery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success l'ath IV-4 High Pressure -

E0P Step Content:

Step 17 IF the success path criteria (step 16) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy. .

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

I i

i e

236 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visi:n 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-4 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 18. E the success path criteria (step 16) are NOT net, THEN con-tinue with Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control until a success path criterion is satisfactorily being maintained.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-64)

If the criteria are not met, then RCS Pressure Control is still in jeopardy. The operator should not leave RCS Pressure Control until this function is fulfilled. '

Operational Considerations:

NA

, EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

I l

237  !

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I TG-0P-902-008 i

Revision 0 4-7-84

. E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control l 4 l Success Path IV-4 High Pressure l E0P Step Content:

Step 19. IF the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on RCS Pressure Control.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-64)

The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish RCS Pressure Control.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 238 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 1. Verify Pressurizer heaters are deenergized.

Objective:

This step verifies pressurizer heaters are deenergized.

Basis:

r Pressurizer heaters add heat to the pressurizer which raises pressurizer pressure. If pressure is too high the heaters should be deenergized to prevent raising pressure higher.

! Operational Considerations:

If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA l

l 239 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 l Revision 0 4-7-84 1

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 2. Verify Shutdown Margin in accordance with Technical Specifica-tions. Refer to OP-903-090, SHUTDOWN MARGIN.

Objective:

This step verifies shutdown margin before plant cooldown is commenced.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-55, step 1)

During any cooldown, the RCS is borated as necessary to maintain shutdown margin per Technical Specifications.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-146, step 1)

Borate as necessary to maintain shutdown margin per Techncial Specifica-tions Limits (see RC-2 and RC-3).

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

240 W3101400 I

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 3. E a Steam Generator is isolated due to activity in the Steam

, Plant, THEN go to step 9.

Objective:

This step directs the operator to the applicable cooldown steps for an isolated steam generator.

Basis:

If a steam generator is isolated, then certain precautions must be taken to ensure the isolated steam generator is cooled down also at a rate consistent with the plant.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

2 NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA I

241 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 I 4-7-84 l E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 4. Maintain level in at least one Steam Generator as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that the steam generator level is maintained in at least one steam generator.

Basis:

When the steam generators are being used for heat removal from the reactor coolant system, main or emergency feedwater has to be supplied to the steam generator to ensure a heat sink.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 242 W2101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 5. Check AND continuously monitor Natural Circulation by ALL the following:

Objective:

The objective cf this step is to check the conditions that indicate natural circulation flow exists.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-56, step 3)

If all RCP operation is terminated and when inventory and pressure are controlled, natural circulation is monitored by heat removal via at least one steam generator. Natural circulation flow should occur within 5-15 minutes after the RCPs were tripped if there is adequata inventory in the RCS. The RCS temperature response during natural circulation will usually be slow (5-15 minutes) as compared to a normal forced flow system response time of 6-12 seconds, since the coolant loop cycle time will be signifi-cantly larger.

When single phase natural circulation is established in at least one loop the RCS indicates all of the following conditions:

a) Loop 4T (TH - T )C less than normal full power AT; b) Cold leg temperatures constant or decreasing; c) Hot leg temperatures stable (i.e. not steadily increasing) or slowly decreasing; d) No abnormal differences between THRTDs and core exit thermocouples.

Hot Leg RTD temperature should be consistent with the core exit ther-mocouples. Adequate natural circulation flow ensures that core exit thermocouples temperatures will be approximately equal to the hot leg RTDs temperature within the bounds of the instrument's inaccuracies.

An abnormal difference betweer HT and the CETs is greater than [10*F].

243 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84  !

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control .

4 Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step 5 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

Natural circulation is governed by decay heat, component elevations, primary to secondary heat transfer, loop flow resistance, and voiding.

Component elevations on C-E plants are such that satisfactory natural circulation decay heat removal is obtained by fluid density differences between the core region and the steam generator tubes.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-146, step 3)

If all RCPs have tripped and inventory and pressure are being controlled, verify by all the following indications that natural circulation flow has been established in at least one loop:

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was combined with EPG step 5 to continuously monitor.

1 Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-3, Temperature.

244 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 6. E a Steam Generator Low Pressure i etrip alarm occurs, THEN reset the setpoint.

Objective:

1 The objective of this step is to prevent an MSIS from occurring and inhibiting cooldown.

Basis:

During a controlled cooldown and depressurization the automatic operation cf certain safeguard systems is undesirable. Therefore, the MSIS setpoint must be manually reset (lowered) as the cooldown progresses to ensure that automatic engineered safeguards protection remains available until the reactor coolant system is cooled down and depressurized.

Operational Considerations:

NA i

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA I

1 245 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 7. Commence a Plant cooldown by EITHER of the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to cool down the plant to effect a depressurization.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-55, step 4)

Reactor plant depressurization should be performed preferentially by feeding the steam generators with main or auxiliary feedwater and dumping steam to the condenser via the turbine bypass system. If the condenser or turbine bypass system is not available, steam should be discharged through the atmospheric dump valves. The use of atmospheric dump valves may have the potential for release of activity to the environment. If it is suspected that a steam generator may be affected by a tube rupture, the natural circulation cooldown and depressurization should be performed using the unaffected or least affected generator.

Operational Considerations:

Cooldown rate shall be limited for reactor coolant system <50*F/hr and for pressurizer <100*F/hr.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-146, step 4)

Resume / commence an orderly reactor plant depressurization to meet the success criteria of this recovery action and to place RCS conditions within the limits of Figure 10-10 by conducting one of the following activities I

l Justification of Differences: l NA l

Source Document: *!

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

246 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R:visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 8. E ALL required actions of step 4 - 7 were completed, THEN go to step 17.

I Objective:

The objective of this step is to direct the operator to the correct step after completing steps. for cooldown with no steam generator isolated.

Basis:

The next 8 steps deal with cooldown of the plant with a steam generator isolated due to steam plant activity. If a steam generator is not iso-lated the operator skips these steps.

J Operational Considerations:

i NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA l

1

, I 247 .

W3101400

l

-s TG-0P-902-003 Revisicn 0 1 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 9. Maintain isolated Steam Generator level 77% to 94% Wide Range as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this stap is to ensure that the isolated steam generator level is maintained 77% to 94% wide range.

Basis:

By ensuring the isolated steam generator level is being controlled, overfilling should be prevented. If overfilled, then the steam generator steam space and the main steam piping to the main steam isolation valves filling could present additional problems. Through use of the blowdown systems as the preferred means, the spread of contamination is minimized.

If the blowdown system is not available, then steamir.g the affected steam generator will minimize radioactive release through the steam generator safeties. The minimum level ensures that the steam generator tubes are covered with water.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in ,

manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differencec:

NA Source Document:

• PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

248 i W3101400 ,

t i

\.

TG-0P-902-008 R2visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 10. Maintain level in the Steam Generator which is NOT isolated as follows

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that the steam generator level is maintained in the operable steam generator.

Basis:

! When the steam generators are being used for heat removal from the reactor l coolant system, main or emergency feedwater has to be supplied to the steam generator to ensure a heat sink. ,

Operational Considerations:

j Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrv-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

j NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA e

e 249 W3101400

z TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 a 4-7-84 Z E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content: $

Step 11. Check AND continuously monitor Natural Circulation by ALL the following:

]

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the conditions that indicate natural circulation flow exists.

4 Basis: =

During cooldown and depressurization to shutdown cooling initiating  ;

conditions, indications of natural circulation have to be verified. When single phase circulation is established in at least one loop, the reactor coolant system indicates all of the following-a) Loop AT (TH-TC ) less than full power AT  ;

b) Cold leg temperatures constant or dropping c) Hot leg temperatures stable (i.e. , not steadily rising) or dropping d) No abnormal differences between TH resistance temperature detectors /

and core exit thermocouples. Hot leg resistance temperature detector _

temperature should be consistent with the core exit thermocouples. _

Adequate natural circulation flow ensures that core exit thermocouples temperatures will be approximately equal to the hot leg resistance -

temperature detectors temperature within the bounds of the instru- j ment's inaccuracies. An abnormal difference between T and the core d H -

exit thermocouples is greater than (10) F. '

e If all reactor coolant pump operation is terminated, and when inventory 4 and pressure are controlled, then natural circulation is monitored by _

heat removal via at least one steam generator. p Operational Considerations: -

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. #

250 W3101400 j

=

TG-0P-902-008 R2visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step 11 (Continued).

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

1 PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level end Table 5-3, Temperature.

. e t

251 '

W3101400 I l .

)

TG-0P-902-008 R2 vision 0 4-7-84 E4 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 12. When a Steam Generator Low Pressure Pretrip alarm occurs, reset the setpoint.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to prevent an MSIS from occurring and inhibiting cooldown.

Basis:

During a controlled cooldown and depressurization the automatic operation of certain safeguard systems is undesirable. Therefore, the setpoint of MSIS must be manually reset (lowered) as the cooldown progresses to ensure that automatic engineered sateguards protection remains available until the reactor coolant system is cooled down and depressurized.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 252 ,

W3101400 I l

4

'l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure i E0P Step Content:

Step 13. Determine the optimum AT to be maintained between Steam Genera-tors during cooldown as indicated on STEAM GENERATOR OUTLET TEMP (MS-ITR-301A/B) recorder. Refer to Attachment 7: Steam Gener-ators Optimum AT Curve.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to provide the temperature difference allowed between steam generators when utilizing circulation for cooldown of the reactor coolant system.

Basis:

Natural circulation will occur in the isolated steam generator even if its temperature is slightly above reactor hot leg temperature. As the AT increases, more heat is tranferred to the primary coolant in the isolated steam generator, but natural circulation flow decreases. The optimum AT between steam generators to achieve maximum heat transfer is given in Attachment 7. Maintain this AT by bleeding steam from the steam generator not isolated, and cooling the isolated steam generator according to step 15.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: '

FSAR, question 211-94.

253 W3101400

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TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 14. IF the Control Room Supervisor determines that cooldown of the isolated Steam Generator is required, THEN feed AND drain as follows:

Objective:

This step ensures that the isolated steam generator is cooled down while the reactor coolant system is being cooled down.

Basis:

With no reactor coolant pumps operating, there usually will be litt1e flow through the isolated steam generator, which would limit the plant cooldown rat'e. The isolated steam generator may be cooled, if necessary, to accelerate plant cooldown.

1 Operational Considerations:

If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA f

l W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 l 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 15. Commence Plant cooldown AND maintain optimum AT by either of the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to cool down the plant to effect a depressurization.

Basis:

An orderly cooldown and depressurization is resumed with the steam gener-ator not isolated. These methods are presented in order, with the most preferred method listed first, to minimize radiological releases.

Operational Considerations:

Cooldown rate shall be limited for reactor coolant system 150 F/hr and for pressurizer 1100*F/hr. If maintaining the optimum AT slows down the cooldown rate of the isolated steam generator, then a slightly lower AT should be maintained. If the automatic function is not operating proper-ly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

255 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Rsvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 16. At the following time intervals, determine the optimum T.

Refer to Attachment 7: Steam Generators Optimum T Curve.

Objective:

This step determines the amount of decay power remaining for the time after reactor trip.

Basis:

As time elapses, the amount of decay power remaining shall be determined.

This decay power is used to determine the optimum T between the steam generators in the following step so that the maximum heat transfer to the reactor coolant system can be maintained.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

FSAR, question 211-94.

o 256 W 3101400

TG-0P-902-008

. Rzvisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control .

4 Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 17. During Plant cooldown, allow Pressurizer level to drop as follows:

Objective:

This step allows pressurizer level to drop during the cooldown which reduces pressurizer pressure.

t Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-55, step 2) i RCS inventory is controlled so as to permit pressurizer level to drop during RCS fluid contraction. This drop in level results in pressurizer bubble decompression which in turn results in RCS depressurization. It is also possible to cool the pressurizer gradually by filling the pres-surizer with cooler loop fluid by charging to the loop. The level is then allowed to drop due to cooldown contraction and then refilled with cooler loop fluid. Repeated fillings will cool the pressurizer metal and steam bubble resulting in gradual depressurization.

Operational Considerations:

Minimum acceptable pressurizer level is 7%. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-146, step 2)

Control RCS inventory so as to allow pressurizer level to drop while cooling down in order to effect depressurization. Observe the limits of IC 1.

Justification of Differences:

This step was placed after the step for commencing cooldown to place the steps in the order they would be done.

e 257.

W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step 17 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

J 4

h 258 W3101400 gy ,- .~ Ms-

TG-0P-902-008 R:: vision 0 4-7-84 E4 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 18. When Pressurizer pressure is within the limits of Attachment 5:

Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph, stabilize .

Reactor Coolant System temperature.

I L

Objective:

This step stops the cooldown and depressurization when pressurizer pres-sure is restored to within limits.

Basis:

Once pressure is restored to within the limits of Attachment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph, the cooldown may be i stopped and pressure and temperature stabilized.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

l l EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences: j NA Source Document:

l NA l

i

)

t l

259 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R::visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4 )

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 19. E ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps have been stopped, THEN check the following Reactor Coolant Pump restart criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure the reactor coolant system employs the preferred means of coolant circulation.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-59 thru 10-61, step 8)

During forced flow cooldowns of the RCS, with one steam generator isolat-ed, sufficient reverse (secondary to primary) heat transfer occurs to maintain the isolated steam generator at the same relative temperature as the operating RCS loop. However, with no RCPs operating natural '

circulation flow through the isolated steam generator and RCS loop will stop, leaving those components in a hot stagnant condition.

This condition by itself will not necessarily affect core cooling via natural circulation in the unisolated steam generator. As long as RCS pressure control, RCS inventory control, and RCS heat removal are properly maintained in the operating loop, sufficient natural circulation flow will .

be maintained through the core and operating loop.

The preferred method of cooling an isolated steam generator is to start any RCP, if one is available. Forced reactor coolant circulation through an isolated, steam generator will provide adequate heat transfer to main-tain the isolated steam generator's temperature approximately the same as the operating steam generator's temperature.

Operational Considerations:

If component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps has been lost for >10 _

minutes, then reactor coolant pumps should not be restarted. Where  ;

multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument e I should be used to obtain a particular reading. ,

260 W3101400 l l

l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV 5 High Pressure E0P Step 19 (Continued).

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-148, step 8)

If one steam generator was isolated, continue circulation by performing the following activities (listed in order of preference):

Justification of Differences:

The E0P step only deals with restarting reactor coolant pumps. The additional guidance for cooldown of an isolated steam generator and preventing overfill of an isolated steam generator is given in the steps for isolated steam generator in the same sequence and format as they are listed in OP-902-007, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery Procedure Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-2, j Subcooling.

l f

261 ,

W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4 )

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure l

l E0P Step Content:

Step 20. IF ALL Reactor Coolant Pump restart criteria (step 19) are satisfied, THEN restart one Reactor Coolant Pump in each loop.

Refer to OP-1-002, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION, Sections 4.0 AND 6.1.

Objective: .

The objective of this step is to ensure the reactor coolant system employs the preferred means of coolant circulation.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-59 thru 10-61, step 8)

During forced flow cooldowns of the RCS, with one steam generator isolat-ed, sufficient reverse (secondary to primary) heat transfer occurs to maintain the isolated steam generator at the same relative temperature as the operating RCS loop. However, with no RCPs operating natural circulation flow through the isolated steam generator and RCS loop will stop, leaving those components in a hot stagnant condition.

This condition by itself will not necessarily affect core cooling via natural circulation in the unisolated steam gererator. As long as RCS pressure control, RCS inventory control, and RCS heat removal are properly maintained in the operating loop, sufficient natural circulation flow will be maintained through the core and operating loop.

The preferred method of cooling an isolated steam generator is to start any RCP, if one is available. Forced reactor coolant circulation through an isolated steam generator will provide adequate heat transfer to main-tain the isolated steam generator's temperature approximately the same as the operating steam generator's temperature.

o 262 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step 20 (Continued).

Operational Considerations:

If component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps has been lost for >10 minutes, then reactor coolant pumps should not be restarted. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-148, step 8)

If one steam generator was isolated, continue circulation by performing the following activities (listed in order of preference):

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two steps, one which deals with restarting reactor coolant pumps and one which deals with cooldown.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l o

263 W3101400 l

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 21. _IfF Reactor Coolant Pumps are operating, THEN verify Spray Valves selector switch is selected to the loop with the operating Reactor Coolant Pump.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that normal spray is available.

Basis:

With forced circulation of coolant through the core, this action ensures that the normal mode of pressurizer spray is available.

Operational Considerations:

If the pressurizer auxiliary spray was being used, then charging shall be returned to normal lineup. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

264 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 22. E Feedwater AND Condensate Systems can feed at least one Steam Generator AND Cold Leg temperature 1450*F, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step aligns condensate and feedwater systems for condensate pump feed at the steam generators.

Basis:

If cold leg temperature is 1450 F then the condensate pumps can adequately supply water to the steam generators. This action feeds the steam gener-ators through normal system lineup at these conditions.

Operational Considerations:

Main feedwater pumps need not be operable. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: -

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

265 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 23. E BOTH Main Feedwater AND Emergency Feedwater are lost, THEN perform the follcwing:

Objective:

This step provides guidance for a total loss of feedwater.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-58, step 7)

If all feedwater is lost (both main and emergency) certain activities '

should be performed to keep the plant in a stable condition. These activities are listed below.

a) Stop all RCPs b) Any cooldown is stopped to minimize steam discharge and conserve S/G inventories.

c) If in operation, the system generator blowdown system, secondary sampling system or any other nonvital secondary discharge must be secured. Until feedwater is reestablished, the steam generator water inventories must be conserved.

d) The operator should attempt to restor'e the operation of the main or auxiliary feedwater system to provide a primary decay heat sink for a controlled depressurization to meet the success criteria of this recovery action guideline.

A moderate rate of increase in steam generator water level is suffi-cient to restore S/G level. If the refill rate is too fast, excessive .

cooldown of the RCS and shrinkage of RCS inventory may result.

Consequently, pressurizer level may fall below that required to maintain a bubble for pressure control. An adequate feed rate for restoring steam generator level is determined by operating experience.

o 266 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step 23 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued) e) If both main and auxiliary feedwater cannot be restored, all plant specific sources of feedwater which could be made available to replace steam generator boil-off should be implemented. Examples of alternate sources of feedwater are fire pumps, condensate pumps, portable pumps, etc. When developing plant specific procedures, alternate sources of feedwater should be identified and their use should be indicated in the procedures. Guidelines on steam generator depressurization should be developed for those cases when the operator is relying on low pressure sources of feedwater as a backup feedwater supply.

Operational Considerations:

• Feedwater should not be restored to an empty steam generator. If both steam generators are empty, then feedwater should be returned to one steam generator only.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-147, step 7)

If all feedwater (main and auxiliary) is lost, conduct the following activities: .

Justification of Differencos:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

i e 267 W3101400 l

i

1 TG-0P-902-008 l Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure l

E0P Step Content: 1 Step 24. IF using Emergency Feedwater to feed Steam Generators, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step ensures continuous suction supply to emergency feed pumps.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-62, step 9)

The available condensate inventory should be monitored and replenished from available sources as necessary to continually provide a source for a secondary heat sink. Example of alternate sources of condensate are nonseismic tanks, fire nains, lake water supplies, potable tanks, etc.

Plant specific alternate sources of feedwater should be identified and cited in the plant specific procedure.

Operational Considerations:

Permission shall be obtained from control room supervisor prior to align-ing auxiliary component cooling system to the emergency feedwater system.

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-148, step 9)

.If the auxiliary feedwater system is being used, ensure an adequate supply of condensate.

Justification of Differences:

The E0P step was expanded to include setpoints and plant specific information.

e 268 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E4 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Fressure Control Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step 24 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

l 4

5 4

269

-W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R:;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control .

4 Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 25. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple succc3 psths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 270 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 l E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

l Success Path IV-5 High Pressure l

E0P Step Content:

Step 26. E the success path criteria (step 25) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

i t

271 l W3101400 l

l

1 TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 27. E the success path criteria (step 25) are NOT met, THEN con-tinue with Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control until a success path criterion is satisfactorily being maintained.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-64)

If the criteria are not met, then RCS Pressure Control is still in jeopardy. The operator should not leave RCS Pressure Control until this function is fulfilled.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l 272 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path IV-5 High Pressure E0P Step Content:

Step 28. E the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.

Objective:

j The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to l pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on

RCS Pressure Control.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-64)

The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish RCS Pressure Control.

4 Operational Considerations:

NA 4

I EPG Step Content:

NA I Justification of Differences

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

273 W3101400 4

l TG-0P-902-008 R2 vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal S

Success Path V-1 I l

E0P Step Content:

Step 1. IF ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps are operating, THEN stop Reactor y Coolant Pumps 1A AND 2A as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to secure one reactor coolant pump in each loop to reduce reactor coolant system heat input.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-66, step 1)

Only one reactor coolant pump in each loop should be operated in order to minimize heat input to the RCS. If all reactor coolant pumps are operat-ing, then one reactor coolant pump in each loop should be stopped.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-154, step 2)

Start one RCP in each loop (or reduce the number to one in each loop).

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two E0P steps. One step starts a reactor coolant pump in each loop. The other step reduces to one reactor coolant pump operating in each loop.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l l

274 W3101400

~

T l

1 l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 l E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. IF_ ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps have been stopped, THEN check the following Reactor Coolant Pump restart criteria:

1 Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure the reactor coolant system employs the preferred means of coolant circulation. .

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-66, step 1)

If RCP operation has been terminated, restarting of the reactor coolant pumps should be attempted to ensure continued forced circulation of coolant to the core for heat removal purposes. However, only one reactor coolant pump in each loop should be operated in order.to minimiz'e heat input to the RCS. Running any single RCP is adequate for heat removal purposes.

Operational Considerations:

If component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps has been lost for >10 minutes, then reactor coolant pumps should not be restarted. Below 1000 psia, subcooling margin shall be determined by subtracting hot leg tem-perature from Pressurizer Temperature Water (TI 101). Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-154, step 1)

If the RCPs are operating or operation has been terminated and the follow-ing criteria are satisfied go to step 2. If the criteria cannot be met, go to HR-2. .

f Justification of Differences: i l

NA e

275 I W3101400 l l

TG-0P-902-008 '

R visicn 0 '

L 4 7 84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step 2 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guidelina.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-2,'

Subcooling.

gk- I J

i I

p i

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1 l

, TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84

'E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal S

l Success Path V-1 E0P Step content:

l Step 3. E ALL Reactor Coolant Pump restart criteria (step 2) are satis-fled, THEN restart one Reactor Coolant Pump in each loop. Refer to OP-1-002, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION, Sections 4.0 AND

6.1. Objective

The objective of this step is to ensure the reactor coolant system employs e the preferred means of coolant circulation.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-67, step 2)

If the RCPs have been stopped, operation of the reactor coolant pumps should be attempted to ensure continued forced circulation of coolant through the core and to permit the use of pressurizer sprays (if avail-able). However, only one reactor coolant pump in each loop should be operated in an effort to minimize heat input to the RCS.

1 3

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-154, step 2)

Start one RCP in each loop (or reduce the number to one in each loop).

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two E0P steps. One step starts a reactor coolant pump in each loop. The other step reduces to one reactor coolant pump operating in each loop.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. l

. 277 W3101400

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E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal '

5 Success Path V-1 l E0P Step Content:

Step 4. IF Reactor Coolant Pumps are operating, THEN verify Spray Valves selector switch is selected to the loop with the operating Reactor Coolant Pump.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that normal spray is available.

I Basis:

With forced circulation of coolant through the core, this action ensures that the normal mode of pressurizer spray is available.

1 Operational Considerations:

l If the pressurizer auxiliary spray was being used, then charging shall be l

l returned to normal lineup. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content: .

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA

,. e \

l t

~o l

l l

,1

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W3101400 l

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TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 i 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF NO Reactor Coolant Pumps are operating, THEN go to Success Path V-2. .

Objective:

This step directs the operator to the next success path if no reactor coolant pumps are operating.

Basis:

If no reactor coolant pumps are operating, then the cooldown will be by natural circulation. This is covered in Success Path V-2.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA

$~

279 W3101400 i

. l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 6. E any of the following occur, THEN complete the associated attachment:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify all actions required by any automatic actuated signal have occurred.

Basis:

Due to the number of valves, pumps, fans, and other equipment actuated by ,

automatic safety signals, the verification is done by use of a checklist.

The actuation signals are verified in immediate actions only so far as to ensure the actuation signal is valid. This step verifies all component actions required by MSIS, EFAS-1 and EFAS-2.

Operational Considerations:

This step should be performed concurrently with this procedure and pre-ferably by an operator not required for other duties.

EPG Step Content: .

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 1

280 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R:visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. IF MSIS has NOT occurred, THEN trip one Main Feed pump AND verify the associated valves closed:

Objective:

When a MSIS has not occurred, this step secures one of the two main feed pumps since only one is required below 50% power.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:  ;

OP-10-001, General 11 ant Operations. 1 1

l 0

281 W3101400 l

1 l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84

)

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 1 l

E0P Step Content:

Step 8. If MSIS has occurred, THEN verify BOTH Main Feed pumps tripped AND the associated valves closed:

Objective:

This step secures both main feed pumps since the main steam isolation valves are closed on a MSIS.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

282 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 9. Verify ALL Heater Drain pumps stopped.

Objective:

This step secures heater drain pumps which are no longer required below 30% power.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

e i

283 l W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. Verify one Condensate pump is operating.

Objective:

This step secures all condensate pumps which are not required to support the runhing main feed pump.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

l l

284 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 R:visien 0 4-7-84 1

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. E MSIS has occurred, THEN verify Main Condenser vacuum is 0.0" Hg.

Objective:

This step ensures condenser vacuum is 0.0" Hg if MSIS has occurred.

Basis:

If MSIS occurs, then vacuum is no longer required for secondary equipment since equipment will not be operating due to a loss of supply steam.

Therefore vacuum is verified to be 0.0" Hg to prevent any damage to turbine seals. If vacuum is not 0.0" Hg, then the operator manually lowers vacuum to 0.0" Hg.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA l

l 285 l W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 R: vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal S

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. IF_ MSIS has NOT occurred, THEN start the Auxiliary Boiler.

Refer to OP-5-001, AUXILIARY BOILER, Section 6.3.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to start the auxiliary boiler to supply steam loads and to permit removal of steam loads from the steam generators.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

i Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

h i

I l

286 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 13. When the Auxiliary Boiler is operating, transfer gland sealing steam to Auxiliary Boiler as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to transfer the steam load of gland sealing steam to the auxiliary boiler to remove steam loads from the steam generators.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

o 287 W3101400 w &

TG-OP-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 i E0P Step Content:

Step 14. E EITHER Main Feed pump is operating, THEN align it to the

, Auxiliary Boiler as follows:

l Objective:

The objective of this step is to transfer the steam load of the main feed l

l pump to the auxiliary boiler to permit removal of loads from the steam i

generators.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then

enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over I

control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

l Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

, NA

] Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

G

\

i 0

288

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1 TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 '

l l

E0P Step Content:

Step 15. Maintain level in at least one Steam Generator as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that the steam generator level in maintained in at least one steam generator.

Basis:

When the steam generators are being used for heat removal from the reactor s coolant system, main or emergency feedwater has to be supplied to the steam generator to enstre a heat sink.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the autoinatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

>A Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA l

1 l

\

289 W3101400

- l

TG-0P-902-008 R:ivision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core. Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

i Step 16. Maintain Reactor Coolant System temperature AND pressure within the limits of Attachment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temper-ature Limits Graph by either of the following:

Objective:

This step maintains temperature and pressure within the limits of Attach-ment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-67, step 3)

RCS and core heat removal should be performed by feeding at least one steam generator with main or auxiliary feedwater and dumping steam to the condenser via the turbine bypass system. If the condenser or turbine bypass system is not available, the next order of priority for dischar0ing i steam would be to use the atmospheric dump valves.

The use of atmospheric dump valves may have the potential for release of

activity to the environment. If it is suspected that a steam generator (s) 4 may be affected by a tube rupture, as indicated by area radiation monitor and/or other symptoms, S/G cooling should be performed using the unaf-fected or least affected generator.

Operational Considerations:

Subcooling margin shall be maintained 28*F to 200*F. Below 1000 psia, subcooling margin shall be termined by subtracting hot leg temperature from Pressurizer Temperature Water (TI 101). Cooldown rate shall be limited for reactor coolant system <50*F/hr and for pressurizer <100'F/hr.

If a steam generator is isolated due to activity in the steam plant, then -

the use of the atmospheric dump valve on the isolated steam generator should be minimized. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

i l

290

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TG-0P-902-008 RIvision 0 4-7-84 1

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step 16 (Continued).

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-154, step 3)

Maintain RCS temperature and pressure by conducting one of the following activities:

Justification of Differences:

NA l

4 Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

I t

?

f

{

o 291 W3101400

-- -s .- -+

TG-0P-902-008 R2 vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 17. Evaluate Condensate inventory. Refer to Attachment 11: Feed-water Required for Heat Removal to Tc _(Final) versus Tc (Initial), AND Attachment 12: Feedwater Capacity versus Time Remaining to Initiate Shutdown Cooling.

Objective:

This step evaluates the available condensate inventory and determines the amount of time the operator may remain at present conditions before needing to commence a plant cooldown.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-69, step 6)

The available condensate inventory should be monitored and replenished from available sources as necessary to continually provide a source for a secondary heat sink. Example of alternate sources of condensate are nonseismic tanks, fire mains, lake water supplies, potable tanks, etc.

Plant specific alternate sources of feedwater should be identified and cited in the plant specific procedure.

i Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEM-152, page 10-155, step 6)

[ If the auxiliary feedwater system is being used, ensure an adequate supply of condensate.

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two E0P steps. One evaluates the present available condensate inventory. The other deals with condensate makeup and alternate sources.

Source Document:

• CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

292 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 Rsvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal S

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 18. IF Feedwater AND Condensate Systems can feed at least one Steam Generator AND Cold Leg temperature 1450*F, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step aligns condensate and feedwater systems for condensate pump feed of the steam generators.

Basis:

If cold leg temperature is 1450 F then the condensate pumps can adequately

supply water to the steam generators. This action feeds the steam gener-ators through normal system lineup at these conditions.*

Operational Considerations:

. Main feedwater pumps need not be operable. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: i NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA i

9 293 W3101400 i

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 19. IF BOTH Main Feedwater AND Emergency Feedwater are lost, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step provides guidance for a total loss of feedwater.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-68, step 5)

If all feedwater is lost (both main and emergency) certain activities should be performed to keep the plant in a stable condition. These activities are listed below, a) Stop all RCPs b) Any cooldown is stopped to minimize steam discharge and conserve S/G inventories.

f c) If in operation, the steam generator blowdown system, secondary sampling system or any other nonvital secondary discharge must be secured. Until feedwater is reestablished, the steam generator water

, inventories must be conserved.

d) The operator should attempt to restore the operation of the main or auxiliary feedwater system to provide a primary decay heat sink for a controlled depressurization to meet the success criteria of this recovery action guideline.

A moderate rate of increase in steam generator water level is suffi-cient to restore S/G 1evel. If the refill rate is too fast, excessive cooldown of the RCS and shrinkage of RCS inventory may result.

Consequently, pressurizer level may fall below that required to

maintain a bubble for pressure control. An adequate feed rate for restoring steam generator level is determined by operating experience.

o 294 W3101400

~

e y.-m -- y ,,

TG-0P-902-008 Revisicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step 19 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued) e) If both main and auxiliary feedwater cannot be restored, all plant specific sources of feedwater which could be made available to replace steam generator boil-off should be implemented. Examples of alternate sources of feedwater are fire pumps, condensate pumps, portable pumps, etc. Nhen developing plant specific procedures, alternate sources of feedwater should be identified and their use should be indicated in the procedures. Guidelines on steam geneator depressurization should be developed for those cases when the operator is relying on low pressure sources of feedwater as a backup feedwater supply.

Operational Considerations: '

Feedwater should not be restored to an empty steam generator. If both i steam generators are empty, then feedwater should be restored to one steam generator only.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-155, step 5) ,

If all feedwater (main and auxiliary) is lost, conduct the following activities:

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l 295 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 ,

4-7-84  !

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. NCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 20. IF_ using Emergency Feedwater to feed Steam Generators, THEN perform the following

l Objective:

This step ensures continuous suction supply to emergency feed pumps.

l Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-69, step 6)

{ The available condensate inventory should be monitored and replenished

] from available sources as necessary to continually provide a source for a

secondary heat sink. Example of alternate sources of condensate are nonseismic tanks, fire mains, lake water supplies, potable tanks, etc.

! Plant specific alternate sources of feedwater should be identified and i

cited in the plant specific procedure.

i i Operational Considerations:

i j Permission shall be obtained from control room supervisor prior to align-

) ing auxiliary component cooling system to the emergency feedwater system.

l Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic l function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in j manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

l EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-155, step 6) j If the auxiliary feedwater system is being used, ensure an adequate supply j of condensate.

. Justification of Differences:

l The E0P step was expanded to include setpoints and plant specific infor-

mation. The EPG step was divided up into two E0P steps. One evaluates

the present available ccndensate inventory. The other deals with conden-

! sate makeup and alternate sources. e i

296 W3101400 L

i

__,-- . _ . . _ . . _ _ - _ ._ __ __ __ . _ ~ -_. _ _ ___ _ _ _ _

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84

. E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step 20 (Continned).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

l i

l 4

h 297 W3101400 l

)

- - . . r. - . . ~ - .c.-- .- -. .

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 21. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use j different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

4 298 W3101400

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E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 22. IF the success path criteria (step 21) are met, THEN go to the

. next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA

Justification of Differences:

NA l

t Source Document:

1 CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. ,

i l

299 W3101400.

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal )

5 Success Path V-1 EDP Step Content:

Step 23. IF the success path criteria (step 21) are NOT met, THEN go to Success Path V-2. '

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator

'is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

e 300 W3101400

TG-OP-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 '

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content: I Step 1. E any of the following occur, THEN complete the associated attachment:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify all actions required by any automatic actuated signal have occurred. .

Basis:

Due to the number of valves, pumps, fans, and other equipment actuated by automatic safety signals, the verification is done by use of a checklist.

Tt.a actuation signals are verified in immediate actions only so far as to ensure the actuation signal is valid. This ster verifies all component actions required by MSIS, EFAS-1 and EFAS-2.

Operational Considerations:

This step should be performed concurrently with this procedure and prefer-ably by an operator not required for other duties.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 301 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. E MSIS has NOT occurred, THEN trip one Main Feed pump AND verify the associated valves closed:

Objective:

When a MSIS has not occurred, this step secures one of the two main feed pumps since only one is required below 50% power.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

] Operational Considerations:

i NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA i

Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

o 302 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Remoul 5

, Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 3. E MSIS has occurred, THEN verify BOTH Main Feed pumps tripped AND the associated valves closed:

Objective:

This step secures both main feed pumps since the main steam isolation valves are closed on a MSIS.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

e 303 W3101400

s .

TG-0P-902-008 R:visicn 0 l 4-7-84 ,

's x, E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal -

5 '

Success Path V-2 s 4,

E0P Step Content: , ,

's  %

Step 4. Verify ALL H.'ter Drain pumps stopped.

1 . . .

".i Objective: I '

This step secures heater drain pumps which are no. longer required below 30% power.

4 Basis-To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then' i

enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating ' s "-

Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

! Operational Considerations:

i NA i

l EPG Step Content:

I NA -

.l:

1 - .

I P

Justification of Differences: ,. I.

a.

NA 'o Source Document:

\

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

I i

s

)

t i

304 W3101400 L

t

TG-0P-902-008 1 Revisien 0 4-7-84 i

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 5. Verify one Condensate pump is operating.

}' Objective:

This step secures all condensate pumps which are not required to support the running main feed pump.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then i

enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

- NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

s

$e t

4 0

305 W3101400 T

TG-0P-902-008 R:; vision 0 4-7-84 1

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 6. IF. MSIS has occurred, THEN verify Main Condenser vacuum is 0.0" Hg.

Objective:

This step ensures condenser vacuum is 0.0" Hg if MSIS has occurred.

Basis:

If MSIS occurs, then vacuum is no longer required for secondary equipment since equipment will not be operating due to a loss of supply steam.

Therefore vacuum is verified to be 0.0" Hg to prevent any damage to turbine seals. If vacuum is not 0.0" Hg, then the operator manually lowers vacuum to 0.0" Hg.

• Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

. NA l

t 1 1 o

aos

( W3101400 ,

~

l

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. E MSIS has NOT occurred, THEN start the Auxiliary Boiler.

Refer to OP-5-001, AUXILIARY BOILER, Section 6.3.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to start the auxiliary boiler to supply steam loads and to permit removal of steam loads from the steam generators.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations, o

307 W3101400 Y

i l

TG-0P-902-008 )

Revision 0 1 4-7-84 l E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 8. When the Auxiliary Boiler is operating, transfer Gland Sealing Steam to Auxiliary Boiler as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to transfer the steam load of gland sealing steam to the auxil,iary boiler to remove steam loads from the steam generators.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

308 W3101400

TG-OP-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E5 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal Success Path V-2 I

E0P Step Content:

Step 9. E EITHER Main Feed pump is operating, THEN align it to the Auxiliary Boiler as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to transfer the steam load of the main feed pump to the auxiliary boiler to permit removal of loads from the steam generators.

Basis:

To exit the Emergency Procedures under stable plant conditions and then enter the Plant Operating Procedure at a point where it will take over control of the plant, certain steps must first be performed. The steps that must be performed would normally be completed by the Plant Operating l Procedure prior to the point of entry from this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

NA -

EPG Step Content:

NA I

I Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-10-001, General Plant Operations.

l o

309 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008  ;

R; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. IF a Steam Generator is isolated due to activity in the Steam Plant, THEN go to step 15.

Objective:

This step directs the operator to the applicable cooldown steps for an isolated steam generator.

Basis:

If a steam generator is isolated, then certain precautions must be taken to ensure the isolated steam generator is cooled down at a rate consistent with the plant.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 1

310 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal i 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. Maintain level in at least one Steam Generator as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that the steam generator level is maintained in at least one steam generator.

Basis:

When the steam generators are being used for heat removal from the reactor coolant system, main or emergency feedwater has to be supplied to the steam generators to ensure a heat sink.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 0

311 W3101400

1 TG-0P-902-008 R:;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. Check AND continuously monitor Natural Circulation by ALL the

.following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the conditions that indicate natural circulation flow exists.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-71, step 1)

If all RCP operation is terminated and when inventory and pressure are controlled, natural circulation is monitored by heat removal via at least one steam generator. Natural circulation flow should occur within 5-15 minutes after the RCPs were tripped if there is adequate inventory in the RCS.

The RCS temperature response during natural circulation will usually be slow (5-15 minutes) as compared to a normal forced flow system response time of 6-12 seconds, since the coolant loop cycle time will be signifi-cantly larger.

When single phase natural circulation is established in at least one loop the RCS indicates all of the following conditions:

a) Loop AT (TH - T )C less than normal full power AT; o) Cold leg temperatures constant or decreasing; c) Hot leg temperatures stable (i.e. not steadily increasing) ,or slowly decreasing; d) No abnormal differences between THRTDs and core exit thermocouples.

Hot leg RTD temperature should ba consistent with the core exit thermocouples. Adequate natural circulation flow ensures that core exit <nermocouples temperatures will be approximately equal to the hot leg RTDs temperature within the bounds of the instrument's inac-curacies. An abnormal difference between HT and the CETs is greater e than [10*F].

l 312 W3101400 l

I

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E5 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal Success Path V-2 E0P Step 12 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

Natural circulation is governed by decay heat, component elevations, primary to secondary heat transfer, loop flow resistance, and voiding.

l Component elevations on C-E plants are such that satisfactorily natural I circulation decay heat removal is obtained by fluid density differences between the core region and the steam generator tubes.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

l EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-158, step 1)

If all RCPs have tripped, and inventory and pressure are being controlled, verify that natural circulation flow has been established in at least one loop by all the following indications:

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 1, Level and Table 5-3,

{ Temperature.

i l

l o

313 W3101400 1

l 1

l TG-0Pr992-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal S

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 13. Maintain Reactor Coolant System temperature AND pressure within the limits of Attachment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temper-ature Limits Graph by either of the following:

Objective:

This step maintains temperature and pressure within the limits of Attach- ,

ment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-72, step 2)

RCS and core heat removal should be performed by feeding at least one steam generator with main or auxiliary feedwater and dumping steam to the condenser via the turbine bypass system. If the condenser or turbine bypass system is not available, the next order of priority for discharging steam would be to use the att.mspheric dump valves.

The use of atmospheric dump valves may have the potential for release of activity to the environment. If it is suspected that a steam generator (s) may be affected by a tube rupture, as indicated by area radiation monitor and/or other symptoms, S/G cooling should be performed using the unaf-fected or least affected generator.

Operational Considerations:

Subcooling margin shall be maintained 28*F to 200*F. Cooldown rate shall be limited for reactor coolant system <50*F/hr and for pressurizer

<100*F/hr. If a steam generator is isolated due to activity in the steam plant, then the use of the atmospheric dump valve on the isolated steam generator should be minimized. Where multiple indications for one para-meter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain & particu-lar reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-158, step 2) .,

Resume / commence RCS heat removal and depressurization to meet the success criteria of this recovsry action by conducting one of the following activities':

314

I i

W3101400 I

{

t i

I l

l I

f I I

TG-0P-902-008 R: vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. PCS And Core Heat Removal .

j 5

Success Path V-2 l E0P Step 13 (Continued).  !

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l l

1 0

315-W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 14. E ALL required actions of steps 11-13 were completed, THEN go to step 22.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to direct the operator to the correct step after completing steps for cooldown with no steam generator isolated.

Basis:

The next 7 steps deal with cooldown of the plant with a steam generator isolated due to steam plant activity. If a steam generator is not iso-lated the operator skips these steps.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA l

l 316 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R ;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 l E0P Step Content:

Step 15. Maintain isolated Steam Generator level 77% to 94% Wide Range as follows: .

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that the isolated steam generator level is maintained 77% to 94% wide range.

Basis:

By ensuring the isolated steam generator level is being controlled, overfilling should be prevented. If overfilled, then the steh ganerator steam space and the main steam piping to the main steam isolation valve filling could present additional problems. Through use of the blowdown system as the preferred means, the spread of contamination is minimized.

If the blowdown system is not available, then steaming the affected steam generator will minimize radioactive release through the steam generator safeties. The minimum level ensures that the steam generator tubes are covered with water.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, thea systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: 'l PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Occument. Table 5-1, Level. I l

317 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 16. Maintain level in the Steam Generator which is NOT isolated as follows: ,

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that the steam generator level is maintained in the operable steam generator.

Basis:

When the steam generators are being used for heat removal from the reactor coolant system, main or emergency feedwater has to be supplied to the steam generator to ensure a heat sink.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored f.or proper operation.

EPG Step Content: .

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:  ;

NA I 318 W3101400 9

M

TG-0P-902-008 R visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 '

E0P Step Content:

Step 17. Check AND continuously monitor Natural Circulation by ALL the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the conditions that indicate natural circulation flow exists.

Basis:

During cooldown and depressurization to shutdown cooling initiating conditions, indicatior.s of natural circulation have to be verified. When single phase circulation is established in at least one loop, the reactor coolant system indicates all of the following:

a) Loop AT (TH-TC ) less than full power AT

^

b) Cold leg temperatures constant or dropping c) Hot leg temperatures stable (i.e. , not steadily rising) or dropping

d) No abnormal differences between TH resistance temperature detectors and CETs. Hot leg resistance temperature detector temperature should be consistent with the CETs. Adequate natural circulation flow ensures that CETs temperatures will be approximately equal to the hot leg resistance temperature detectors temperature within the bounds of the instrument's inaccuracies. An abnormal difference between TH araf the CETs is greater than (10)*F.

If all reactor coolant pump operation is terminated, and when inventory and pressure are controlled, then natural circulation is monitored by heat removal via at least one steam generator.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, use more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

l e 319 W3101400

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l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step 17 (Continued).

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA 8

Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-3, Temperature.

320 W3101400

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Revisicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2  !

i E0P Step Content:

Step 18. Determine the optimum AT to be maiistained between Steam Gener-ators during cooldown as indicated on STEAM GENERATOR OUTLET TEMP (MS-ITR-301A/B) recorder. Refer to Attachment 7: Steam Generators Optimus AT Curve.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to provide the temperature difference allowed between steam generators when utilizing circulation for cooldown of the reactor coolant system.

Basis:

Natural circulation will occur in the isolated steam generator even if its temperature is slightly above reactor hot leg temperature. As the AT increases, more heat is transferred to the primary coolant in the isolated steam generator, but natural circulation flow decreases. The optimum AT between steam generators to achieve maximum heat transfer is given in Attachment 7. Maintain this AT by bleeding steam from the steam generator not isolated, and cooling the isolated steam generator as per step 20.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one paramater exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

FSAR, question 211-94. e 321 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 19. E the Control Room Supervisor determines that cooldown of the isolated Steam Generator is required, THEN feed AND drain as follows:

Objective:

This step ensures that the isolated steam generator is cooled down while the reactor coolant system is being cooled down.

Basis:

With no reactor coolant pumps operating, there usually will be little flow through the isolated steam generator, which would limit the plant cooldown rate. The isolated steam generator may be cooled, if necessary, to accelerate plant cooldown.

Operational Considerations:

If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

322 W3101400

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4-7-84 '

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 20. Maintain Reactor Coolant System temperature AND pressure within the limits of Attachment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temper-ature Limits Graph by either of the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to cool down the plant to effect a depressurization.

Basis:

Maintain reactor coolant system temperature and pressure with the steam generator not isolated. These methods are presented in order, with the most preferred method listed first, to minimize radiological releases.

Operational Considerations:

Subcooling margin shall be maintained 28*F to 200*F. Cooldown rate for reactor coolant system 150*F/hr and for pressurizer 1100 F/hr. If main-taining the optimum AT slows down the cooldown rate of the isolated steam generator, then a slightly lower AT should be maintained. If the automa-tic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper cperation.

4 EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA i

Source Document:  !

NA o

323 i W3101400

)

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 l

E0P Step Content:

Step 21. At the following time intervals, determine the optimum T.

Refer to Attachment 7: Steam Generators Optimum T Curve.

Objective:

This step determines the amount of decay power remaining for the time '

after reactor trip.

Basis:

As time elapses, the amount of decay power remaining shall be determined.

This decay power is used to determine the optimum T between the steam generators in the following step so that the maximum heat transfer to the reactor coolant system can be maintained.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: .

FSAR, question 211-94.

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Success Path V-2 1

E0P Step Content: l Step 22. E ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps have been stopped, THEN check the following Reactor Coolant Pump restart criteria:

Objective:

NA Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-72, step 3)

RCPs may be restarted if all of the following criteria are satisfied:

a) At least one steam generator is available for removing heat from the RCS, thus providing an RCS heat removal function. This includes feedwater available for removing heat from the generator and a method for removing steam (e.g. athospheric dump valves, etc.).

b) Pressurizer level is greater than [100"] and constant or increasing.

This assures that pressurizer level is above pressurizer heat cutoff level and is an indication that RCS primary inventory and pressure are being controlled.

c) The RCS is greater than or equal to [20'F] subcooled. A subcooled condition in the RCS in conjunction with (b) above indicates that pressure and inventory are being controlled.

d) [All plant specific RCP operating criteria are satisfied before the RCPs are restarted to prevent damage to RCPs].

Operational Considerations:

If component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps has been lost for >18 minutes, then reactor coolant pumps should not be restarted. Where mul-tiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-159, step 3)

One RCP in each loop may be restarted if all of the following criteria are satisfied: e 325  :

W3101400 l

1

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E5 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal Success Path V-2 I

E0P Step 22 (Continued).

l Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided up into two E0P steps. One deals with the restart criteria. The other deals with the restart of one reactor coolant pump in each loop.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-2, Subcooling.

\;

326 W3101400 L .

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 23. I_F ALL Reactor Coolant Pump restart criteria (step 22) are satisfied, THEN restart one Reactor Coolant Pump in each loop.

Refer to OP-1-002, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION, Sections 4.0 AND 6.1.

. Objective:

NA Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-72, step 3)

RCPs may be restarted if all of the following criteria are satisfied:

a) At least one steam generator is available for removing heat from the RCS, 'thus providing an RCS heat removal function. This includes feedwater available for removing heat from the generator and a method for removing steam (e.g. atmospheric dump valves, etc.).

b) Pressurizer level is greater than [100"] and constant or increasing.

This assures that pressurizer level is above pressurizer heat cutoff level and is an indication that RCS primary inventory and pressure are being controlled.

c) The RCS is greater than or equal to [20*F] subcooled. A subcooled condition in the RCS in conjunction with (b) above indicates that pressure and inventory are being controlled.

d) [All plant specific RCP operating criteria are satisfied before the RCPs are restarted to prevent damage to RCPs].

Operational Considerations:

If component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps has been lost for >10

, minutes, then reactor coolant pumps should not be restarted. Where  !

multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

I e

i 327 W3101400 l

l 1

I TG-0P-902-008 '

Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step 23 (Continued).

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-159, step 3)

One RCP in each loop may be restarted if all of the following criteria are satisfied:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two E0P steps. One deals with the restart criteria. The other deals with the restart of one reactor coolant pump in each loop.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-2, Subcooling.

l 1

o i

W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R vision 0 4-7-84 E Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 24. IF Reactor Coolant Pumps are operating, THEN verify Spray Valves selector switch is selected to the loop with the cperating Reactor Coolant Pump.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that normal spray is available.

Basis:

With forced circulation of coolant through the core, this action ensures that the normal mode of pressurizer spray is available.

Operational Considerations:

If the pressurizer auxiliary spray was being used, then charging shall be

! returned to normal lineup. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

i NA

Source Document

, NA 1

3

. 329 W3101400 7 - r-y/

TG-0P-902-008 R::visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 25. Evaluate Condensate inventory. Refer to Attachment 11: Feed-water Required for Heat Removal to Tc (Final) versus Tc (Initial), AND Attachment 12: Feedwater Capacity versus Time Remaining to Initiate Shutdown Cooling.

Objective:

This step evaluates the available condensate inventory and determines the amount of time the operator may remain at present conditions before needing to commence a plant cooldown.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-76, step 7)

The available condensate inventory should be monitored and replenished from available sources as necessary to con'tinually provide a source for a secondary heat sink. Example of alternate sources of condensate are nonseismic tanks, fire mains, lake water supplies, potable tanks, etc.

Plant specific alternate sources of feedwater should be identified and cited in the plant specific procedure.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-160, step 7)

If the auxiliary feedwater system is being used, ensure an adequate supply of condensate.

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two E0P steps. One evaluates the present available condensate inventory. The other deals with condensate makeup and alternate sources.

Source Document:

• CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

330 W3101400

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4-7-84 E , Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

l Success Path V-2 i

E0P Step Content:

Step 26. IF Feedwater AND Condensate Systems can feed at least one Steam Generator AND Cold Leg temperature 1450*F, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step aligns condensate and feedwater systems for condensate pump feed at the steam generators.

Basis:

If cold leg temperature is 1450 F then the condensate pumps can adequately supply water to the steam generators. This action feeds the steam gener-ators through normal system lineup at these conditions.

Operational Considerations:

Main feedwater pumps need not be operable. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA l

331 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 i E0P Step Content:

Step 27. If BOTH Main Feedwater AND Emergency Feedwater are lost, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step provides guidance for a total loss of feedwater.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-75, step 6)

If all feedwater is lost (both main and emergency) certain activities should be performed to keep the plant in a stable condition. These activities are listed below.

a) Stop all RCPs b) Any cooldown is stopped to minimize steam discharge and conserve S/G inventories, c) If in operation, the steam generator blowdown system, secondary sampling system or any other nonvital secondary discharge must be secured. Until feedwater is reestablished, the steam generator water inventories must be conserved.

d) The operator should attempt to restore the operation of the main or auxiliary feedwater system to provide a primary decay heat sink for a controlled depressurization to meet the success criteria of this recovery action guideline.

A moderate rate of increase in steam generator water level is suffi-cient to restore S/G 1evel. If the refill rate is too fast, excessive-cooldown of the RCS and shrinkage of RCS inventory may result.

Consequently, pressurizer level may fall below that required to maintain a bubble for pressure control. An adequate feed rate for restoring steam generator level is determined by operating experience.

o 332 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step 27 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued) e) If both main and auxiliary feedwater cannot be restored, all plant specific sources of feedwater which could be made available to replace steam generator boil-off should be implemented. Examples of alternate sources of feedwater are fire pumps, condensate pumps, portable pumps, etc. When developing plant specific procedures, alternate sources of feeedwater should be identified and their use should be indicated in the procedures. Guidelines on steam generator depressurization should j be developed for those cases when the operator is relying on low l pressure sources of feedwater as a backup feedwater supply.

l Operational Considerations:

Feedwater should not be restored to an empty steam generator. If both steam generators are empty, then feedwater shculd be restored to one steam generator only.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-160, step 6)

If all feedwater (main and auxiliary) is lost, conduct the following activities:

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

)

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

i i

)

I i

333 W3101400 i

i '

I TG-0P-902-008 R;. vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 28. IF_ using Emergency Feedwater to feed Steam Generators, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step ensures continuous suction supply to emergency feed pumps.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-76, step 7)

The available condensate inventory should be monitored and replenished from available sources as necessary to continually provide a source for a secondary heat sink. Example of alternate sources of condensate are nonseismic tanks, fire mains, lake water supplies, potable tanks, etc.

Plant specific alternate sources of feedwater should be identified and cited in the plant specific procedure.

Operational Considerations:

Permission shall be obtained from control room supervisor prior to align-ing auxiliary component cooling system to the emergency feedwater system.

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-160, step 7)

If the auxiliary feedwater system is being used, ensure an adequate supply of condensate.

Justification of Differences: l The E0P step was expanded to include setpoints and plant specific infor-  !

1 mation. The EPG step was divided into two E0P steps. One evaluates the j present available condensate inventory. The other deals with condensate l makeup and alternate sources, e I

334 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V..RCS And Core Heat Pemoval 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step 28 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

i e

335 W3101400 n

l- TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 29. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for 4 judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen am f parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

i 1 Operational Considerations:

NA 7

EPG Step Content

i NA 5

I Justification of Differences:

NA m

J 1 Source Document:

! CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

t f 336 W3101400

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TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 l E0P Step Content:

Step 30. IF the success path criteria (step 29) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy, Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path critaria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l e

337 l W3101400 i

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 31. If the success path criteria (step 29) are NOT met, THEN go to Success Path V-3.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is instructed to implement another succes's path for this safety function.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l 0

338 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 i

E . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 1. IF_ Pressurizer pressure drops to <1684 psia OR Containment pressure rises to ,>17.4 psia, THEN verify SIAS occurs as follows:

Objective:

i The objective of this step is to verify SIAS occurs when required.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-79, step 2)

ECCS operation must be verified if pressurizer pressure decreases to 1684 psia or if containment pressure increased to 17.4 psia. Ifsafetyinjec-tion system operation has not commenced automatically when RCS pressure is below 1684 psia, it must be manually actuated. This action allows the RWT inventory to discharge into the RCS. An insufficient RCS inventory may be associated with a loss of coolant accident, a steam generator tube rup-ture, a control system malfunction or an excessive heat removal event.

Safety injection system flow rate will follow the RCS pressure according to the ECCS delivery curves. The SIS and charging flowrate should be check and maximized relative to RCS pressure to enhance RCS inventory

, replenishment and/or core heat removal.

Operational Considerations:

Hot leg temperatures and cold leg temperatures may be influenced by safety injection flow. Multiple indications and core temperatures should be used to determine the reactor coolant system temperature. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-163, step 2)

If pressurizer pressure decreases to [1600] psia [or if containment pressure increases to 4 psig], verify initiation of an SIAS. ECCS should be delivering flow which is consistent with Figure 10-11.

o 339 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E5. Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal Success Path V-3 E0P Step 1 (Continued).

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was placed before stopping all reactor coolant pumps to j f place steps in the order they would occur. {

}

l The EPG step was divided into two E0P steps. One step verifies SIAS

. actuation. The other step verifies proper HPSI flow.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

I J

l 340 W3101400 1

1 TG-0P-902-008 R:visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. E either of the following conditions occurs, THEN stop ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to stop reactor coolant pump operation when pressurizer pressure $1621 psia following an SIAS or when component cooling water is lost.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-79, step 1)

This step serves to prevent continued RCP operation when RCS pressure is 11621 psia during a Loss of Coolant Accident. Continued RCP operation at RCS pressures below 1621 psia during a Loss of Coolant Accident may result in more severe RCS conditions. When component cooling water is lost to the reactor coolant pumps, damage to pump components could occur if the RCPs are not secured.

Operational Considerations:

Since other events could cause rapid depressurization, anytime pressurizer pressure drops below 1621 psia following a SIAS, all reactor coolant pump operation is terminated. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-163, step 1)

If pressurizer pressure decreases to (1300 psia) following an SIAS, stop all reactor coolant pumps.

Justification of Differences:

Loss of component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps is added to this step because component cooling system is isolated to the reactor coolant l pumps wnen an SIAS actuation occurs, e i

l l 341 '

j W3101400

TG-OP-902-008 RIvisicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step 2 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

9 i

i 342 W3101400

--. v - -

++ ,

TG-0P-902-008

R: vision 0 4-7-84

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

i Success Path V-3 t

E0P Step Content:

Step 3. E Pressurizer pressure drops to 11385 psia, THEN verify proper HPSI Header flow exists. Refer to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.

Objective:

i The objective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the reactor coolant syste.' during a loss of coolant accident.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-79, step 2) i ECCS operation must be verified if pressurizer pressure decreased to 1684 psia or if containment pressure increased to 17.4 psia. If safety injec-tion system operation has not commenced automatically when RCS pressure is

, below 1684 psia, it must be manually actuated. This action allows the RTW inventory to discharge into the RCS. An insufficient RCS inventory may be associated with a loss of coolant accident, a steam generator tube rup-

ture, a control system malfunction or an excessive heat removal event.

Safety injection system flow rate will follow the RCS pressure according

} to the ECCS delivery curves. The SIS and charging flowrate should be checked and maximized relative to RCS pressure to enhance RCS inventory replenishment and/or core heat removal.

Operational Considerations:

Hot leg temperatures and cold leg temperatures may be influenced by safety injection flow. Multiple indications and core temperatures should be used to determine the reactor coolant system temperature. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG St.:p Content: (CEN-152, page 10-163, step 2)

If pressurizer pressure decreases to [1600] psia [or if containment ,

pressure increases to 4 psig], verify initiation of an SIAS. ECCS should e!

be delivering flow which is consistent with Figure 10-11.

343 W3101400

~

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal S

Success Path V-3 E0P Step 3 (Continued).

Justification of Differences:

, The EPG step was divided into two E0P steps. One step verifies SIAS actuation. The other step verifies proper HPSI flow.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

D

}

h 344 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 RIvisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3  :

E0P Step Content:

Step 4. Maintain level in at least one Steam Generator as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that the steam generator level is maintained in at least one steam generator.

Basis:

When the steam generators are being used for heat removal from the reactor coolant system, main or emergency feedwater has to be supplied to the steam generator to ensure a heat sink.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, use more than one instrument to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then the system should be placed in manual.

Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

EPG Step Content:

! NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 4

(

i 345 W3101400

l 1 i TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

l Success Path V-3 i

E0P Step Content:

Step 5. Maintain Reactor Coolant System temperature AND pressure within i the limits of Attachment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temper-ature Limits Graph by either of the following:

, Objective:

j This step maintains temperature and pressure within the limits of Attach-ment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph.

l Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-79, step 3)

Steam generator heat removal should be perfonned by feeding the steam generators with main or auxiliary feedwater and dumping steam to the condenser via the turbine bypass system. If the condenser or turbine

bypass system is not available, the next order of priority for discharging steam would be to use the atmospheric dump valves.

i 1

The use of atmospheric dump valves may have the potential release of activity to the environment. If it is suspected that a steam generator (s) may be affected by a tube rupture, S/G cooling should be performed using the unaffected or least affected generator.

l Operational Considerations:

If a steam generator is isolated due to activity in the steam plant, then i the use of the atmospheric dump valve on the isolated steam generator should be minimized. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content

(CEN-152, page 10-163, step 3)

Steam the steam generators to remove RCS heat using one of the following

, methods (listed in order of preference):

\

].

Justification of Differences: e I

l 1

346 W3101400 a

TG-0P-902-008 Rivisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 l E0P Step 5 (Continued). l i

Source Document: l CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

347 W3101400

• ,s - - - , -

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Reco'iery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Care Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 1

E0P Step Content:

Step 6. IF Pressurizer level >28%, THEN verify Pressurizer pressure is being restored by Pressurizer heaters.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify pressurizer heaters restored when inventory is restored.

Basis:

The preferred method of pressure control is using pressurizer heaters.

Pressurizer heaters are deenergized when pressurizer level is low to prevent damage to the heaters. When inventory is restored pressurizer heaters should be reenergized for pressure control.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA o

348 W3101400

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TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 1 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

, Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. IF NO Reactor Coolant Pumps are operating AND Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin >28'F, THEN check Single Phase Natural Circulation by ALL the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the conditions that indicate single phase natural circulation flow exists.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-82, step 6)

When single phase natural circulation is established in at least one loop the RCS indicates all of the following conditions

a) Loop AT (TH - T )C less than normal full power AT; b) Cold leg temperatures constant or decreasing; i

c) Hot leg temperatures stable (i.e. not steadily increasing) or slowly decreasing; d) No abnormal differences between THRTDs and core exit thermocouples.

Hot leg RTD temperature should be consistent with the core exit thermocouples. Adequate natural circulation. flow ensures that core exit thermocouples temperatures will be approximately equal to the hot leg RTDs temperature within the bounds of the instrument's inaccurac-ies. An abnormal difference between T and the CETs is greater than H

[10 F].

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

i 0

1 349 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 '

R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step 7 (Continued).

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-164, step 6)

If all RCPs have tripped, inventory and pressure are being controlled and 1

S/Gs are being used for heat removal, verify that natural circulation flow has been established in at least one loop by all the following indications:

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CF.N-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline, d

4 350 W3101400

i TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 l

l E0P Step Content:

Step 8. IF NO Reactor Coolant Pumps are operating AND Reactor Coolant System Subcooling Margin <28 F, THEN check Two Phase Natural Circulation AND Break Heat Removal by the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the conditions that indicate two phase natural circulation flow and break heat removal exist.

Basis:

i For two phase natural circulation and break heat removal, the operator relies upon maintaining the steam generator heat removal process and the strict rules that require the emergency core cooling system to be kept operating to restore inventory control. The CET temoerature is important in monitoring heat removal during two phase natural circulation cooling.

Operational Considerations:

This step need be performed only if all reactor coolant pumps have been stopped. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular. reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: .

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-3, Temperature.

o 1

l l

351 l l

W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 9. Check the following Safety Injection termination criteria:

Objective:

This step evaluates certain criteria associated with terminating safety injection flow.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-82, step 7)

If an SIAS has been initiated and the SIS is operating, it must continue to operate at full capacity until SIS termination critaria are met.

Early termination may be desirable when the criteria are met to preclude PTS situations or HPSI pump damage (e.g., shaft seals).

Operational Considerations:

Below 1000 psia, subcooling margin shall be determined by subtracting hot leg temperature from Pressurizer Temperature Water (TI 101). Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-164, page 10-136, step 7)

If the ECCS is operating, it may be throttle stopped one train at a time if the following conditions are satisfied:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two steps, one step covering termination criteria and the other covering termination direction.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-2, Subcooling.  :

o 352 W3101400 l

l

1 TG-0P-902-008 R::visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. I_F ALL Safety Injection termination criteria (step 9) are satisfied, THEN throttle OR stop Safety Injection FLOW one train at a time AND stop Cnarging pumps as necessary to control Pressurizer level 33% to 60%.

Objective: ,

The step maintains pressurizer level and prevents solid water operation unless 28 F subcooling margin cannot be maintained. If 28*F subcooling margin cannot be maintained, thcn the pressurizer is taken solid with high pressure safety injection pumps.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-82, step 7) i If the criteria are all met, the operator may either terminate or throttle the SIS. The operator may decide to throttle rather than terminate if SIS is to be used to control pressurizer level or plant pressure. Termination of SIS should be sequenced by stopping one pump at a time while observing the termination criteria.

Operational Considerations:

Solid water operation is permissible only when reactor coolant system subcooling margin is <28 F. To throttle cold leg injection valves, the switch must be taken to the "MORE" position which places them in SIAS override.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-164, step 7)

If the ECCS is operating, it may be throttle stopped one train at a time if the following conditions are satisfied:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two steps, one step covering termination criteria and the other covering termination direction. ,

I 353 W3101400 ww- - - -+

TG-0P-902-008 R2 vision 0 4-7-84 ES . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal Success Path V-3 E0P Step 10 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

i I

e l

e 354 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84

. E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. ,I_F ALL Safety Injection termination criteria (step 9) can NOT be maintained after throttling OR stopping Safety Injection flow, THEN reinitiate Safety Injection flow.

Objective:

This step allows initiation of safety injection system flow should condi-tions warrant the need.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-83, step 8)

If all of the criteria of step 7 cannot be maintained, the safety injec-tion pumps must be restarted whenever necessary to satisfy all the criteria.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-164, step 8)

If all the criteria of step 7 cannot be maintained after the ECCS has been stopped, the ECCS must be restarted.

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guide!ine.

e 355 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 RIvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. Evaluate Condensate inventory. Refer to Attachment 11: Feed-water Required for Heat Removal to Tc (Final) versus Tc (Initial), AND Attachment 12: Feedwater Capacity versus Time Remaining to Initiate Shutdown Cooling.

Objective:

This step evaluates the available condensate inventory and determines the amount af time the operator may remain at present conditions before needing to commence a plant cooldown.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-81, step 5)

The available condensate inventory should be monitored and replenished l from available sources as necessary to continually provide a source for a secondary heat sink. Example of alternate sources of condensate are nonseismic tanks, fire mains, lake water supplies, potable tanks, etc.

2 Plant specific alternate sources of feedwater should be identified and

, cited in the plant specific procedure.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-163, step 5)

If the auxiliary feedwater system is being used, ensure an adequate supply of condensate.

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two E0P steps. One evaluates the present available condensate inventory. The other deals with condensate makeup and alternate sources.

2 Source Document: e CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline, i

356 l W3101400 1

TG-0P-902-008 R:; vision 0 4-7-84 I E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 13. E Feedwater AND Condensate Systems can feed at least one Steam

. Generator AND Cold Leg temperature 1450'F, THEN perform the following:

I objective:

This step aligns condensate and feedwater systems for condensate pump feed of the steam generators.

Basis:

If cold leg temperature is 1450*F then the condensate pumps can adequately supply water to the steam generators. This action feeds the steam gener-ators through normal system lineup at these conditions.

Operational Considerations:

Main feedwater pumps need not be operable. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading. I EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: l l

NA h

357 W3101400

-TG-OP-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 14. E BOTH Main Feedwater AND Emergency Feedwater are lost, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step provides guidance for a total loss of feedwater.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-80, step 4)

If all feedwater is lost (both main and emergency) certain activities should be performed to keep the plant in a stable condition. These activities are listed below, a) Stop all RCPs b) Any cooldown is stopped to minimize steam discharge and conserve S/G l inventories.

l 1

c) If in operation, the steam generator blowdown system, secondary sampling system or any other nonvital secondary discharge must be secured. Until feedwater is reestablished, the steam generator water inventories must be conserved.

d) The operator should attempt to restore the operation of the main or auxiliary feedwater system to provide a primary decay heat sink for a controlled depressurization to meet the success criteria of this recovery action guideline.

A moderate rate of increase in steam generator water level is suffi-cient to restore S/G 1evel. If the refill rate is too fast, excessive cooldown of the RCS and shrinkage of RCS inventory may result.

4 Consequently, pressurizer level may fall below that required to maintain a bubble for pressure control. An adequate feed rate for restoring steam generator level is determined by operating experience.

358 W3101400

~

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal i 5

Success Path V-3 l

E0P Step 14 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued) e) If both main and auxiliary feedwater cannot be restored, all plant specific sources of feedwater which could be made available to replace steam generator boil-off should be implemented. Examples of alternate sources of feedwater are fire pumps, condensate pumps, portable pumps, etc. When developing plant specific procedures, alternate sources of feedwater should be identified and their use should be indicated in the procedures. Guidelines on steam generator depressurization should be developed for those cases when the operator is relying on low pressure sources of feedwater as a backup feedwater supply.

Operational Considerations:

Feedwater should not be restored to an empty steam generator. If both steam generators are empty, then feedwater should be restored to one steam generator only.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-163, step 4)

If all feedwater (main and auxiliary) is lost, conduct the following activities:

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

0 359 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R:; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal S

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 15. E using Emergency Feedwater to feed Steam Generators, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step ensures continuous suction supply to emergency feed pumps.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-81, step 5)

The available condensate inventory should be monitored and replenished from available sources as necessary to continually provide a source for a secondary heat sink. Example of alternate sources of condensate are nonseismic tanks, fire mains, lake water supplies, potable tanks, etc.

Plant specific alternate sources of feedwater should be identified and cited in the plant specific procedure.

Operational Considerations:

Permission shall be obtainea from control room supervisor prior to align-ing auxiliary component cooling system to the emergency feedwater system.

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual. Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation.

4 EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-163, step 5)

If the auxiliary feedwater system is being used, ensure an adequate supply of condensate.

Justification of Differences:

The E0P step was expanded to include setpoints and plant specific infor-mation. The EPG step was divided into two ESP steps. One evaluates the present .available condensate inventory. The other deals with condensate makeup and alternate sources. '

l W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R2visien 0 4-7-84 E . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step 15 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

4 4

f i

t i

361 W3101400

^~

i TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 ,

1 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 16. IF_ Refueling Water Storage Pool level drops to 10%, THEN verify that Recirculation Actuation Signal occurs AND check ALL the following:

4 Objective:

This step ensures that an RAS occurs to provide a suction source to the safety injection pumps.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-83, step 9)

If the Refueling Water Storage Pool level falls to 10%, initiation of recirculation should be verified. Recirculation is actuated in order to maintain a continuous flow of safety injection fluid to the RCS and a

! continuous flow of containment spray water. The operator should be cautioned against prematurely initiating an RAS. An inadequate amount of level in the safety injection sump may cause air binding of safety injec-

tion pumps and loosing both heat removal loops.

Operational Considerations:

When RAS occurs and safety injection sump level is <10 feet, safety injection pumps should be monitored for potential air binding. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-164, step 9)

If the refueling water tank level falls to [10%], verify initiation of recirculation. If necessary, manually initiate recirculation one SIS train at time [and close RWT outlet valves to the safety injection system].

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specifis '

l information. l I

362 W3101400

I l

TG-0P-902-008 '

R;visicn 0 I 4-7-84 4 E . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step 16 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. .

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

i o

l i

363 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 1

E0P Step Content:

Step 17. When the RAS actions (step 16) have been verified, close the following valves:

Objective:

This step directs the operators action after an RAS.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-83, step 9)

Manually closing the outlet valves from the Refueling Water Storage Pool will isolate the RWSP from the safety injection pumps. The pumps recir-culation valves are closed to prevent ' inventory loss from the safety injection sump to the RWSP.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-164, step 9)

If the refueling water tank level falls to [10%), verify initiation of f

recirculation. If necessary, manually initiate recirculation one SIS train at time [and close RWT outlet valves to the safety ' injection system].

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 364 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 18. IF RAS occurs, THEN on Attachment 4: HPSI and CS Pump Flow, record the HPSI AND Containment Spray pumps flow at the follow-l ing time intervals:

i

! Objective:

This step monitors the HPSI and CS Pumps for performance requirements.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-84, step 10) j After the switch to recirculation, the HPSI and CS Pumps are monitored in i order to ensure that the Emergency Core Coolant System performance

! requirements are maintained. This action helps to avert any possible permanent pump damage.

l r

Operational Considerations:

NA i

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-164, step 10) j If the HPSI pumps are delivering less than [30 gpm] per pump during j recirculation, turn off one charging pump and/or one HPSI pump (turn off the HPSI pump with the lower indicated flow) at a time until the HPSI l pumps are delivering more than [30 gpe] per pump.

Justification of Differences:

j The EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information.

• Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

I 2 l i l 1

i 365 W3101400 - _-

y = y- ,, -,+.-%.,-._-.__m.# -- --. y-- ,u.-.y,. -_.--.p. _.m-.m ._,-%,. g p.- ,,.,..y yse

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 )

l i

E0P Step Content:

Step 19. IF_ HPSI flow is NOT >25 gpm per operating HPSI pump, THEN sequentially perform the following until operating HPSI pump flow >25 gpm:

Objective:

This step ensures .that each operating high pressure safety injection pump has a minimum flow >25 gpm.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-84, step 10)

After the switch to recirculation, the HPSI flows are monitored in order to ensure that the HPSI miniflow requirement for pump protection are met to avert any possible permanent HPSI pump damage. If they are not met, the operator should turn off the charging pumps one at a time until the miniflow requirements are met. If they are still not met with all the charging pumps off and two HPSI pumps are operating, the operator turns off the HPSI pump with the lower flow. One HPSI pump should be left operating at all times, unless the criteria of step 81 are met.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-164, step 10)

If the HPSI pumps are delivering less than [30 gpm] per pump during recirculation, turn off one charging pump and/or one HPSI pump (turn off the HPSI pump with the lower indicated flow) at a time until the HPSI pumps are delivering more than [30 gpm] per pump.

Justification of Differencps:

The EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific.

information. #

366 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Penoval i 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step 19 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

367 W3101400 t

-+ -

4 TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84

! E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content

'

i Step 20. Between two hours AND four hours post-LOCA, realign Safety Injection pumps discharge for equal flow to the Hot Legs AND  !

Cold Legs as follows:

l l ,

! Objective:

This step aligns safety injection pump discharge to both hot and cold leg l injection.

i l Basis:

i Simultaneous hot and cold leg injection is used for both small break and large break Loss of Coolant Accidents at [2-4 hours] after the start of the Loss of Coolant Accident. In this mod *, the high pressure safety in-j jection pumps discharge lines are realigned so that the total injection i flow is divided equally between the hot and cold legs. Simultaneous in-j jection into the hot and cold legs is used as the mechanism to prevent the precipitation of boric acid in the reactor vessel following a break that is too large to allow the reactor coolant system to refill. Injecting to t both sides of the reactor vessel ensures that fluid from the reactor ves-sel (when the boric acid is being concentrated) flows out the break re-

) gardless of the break location and is replenished with a dilute solution of borated water from the other side of the reactor vessel. The action is taken no sooner than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the Loss of Coolant Accident since the fluid injected to the hot leg may be entrained in the steam being released

from the core and hence possibly diverted from reaching the reactor ves-

sel. After 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, the core decay heat has dropped sufficiently so that

)

there is insufficient steam velocity to entrain the fluid being injected i to the hot leg. The action is taken no later than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the loss of Coolant Accident in order to ensure that the buildup of boric acid is l terminated well before the potential for boric acid precipitation occurs, i l

. o i

368 I W3101400 '

. 1 1

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step 20 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued) i Even though the action is required only for large breaks, it is taken for any Loss of Coolant Accident so that the operator need not be required to distinguish between large and small breaks so early in the transient.

Simultaneous hot and cold leg injection is not required for small breaks, because for them the buildup of boric acid is terminated when the reactor coolant system is refilled. Once the reactor coolant system is refilled, the boric acid is dispersed throughout the reactor coolant system via natural circulation.

Operational Considerations:

NA l

EPG Step Content:

NA l

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-5, Time.

t 369

W3101400 i

TG-0P-902-008 R0 vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 21. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical mcans of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

1 1

I Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 9

370 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R:; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 22. IF the success path criteria (step 21) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The ob3ective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this

success path is satisfactorily completed.

1 Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this j step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 371 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R visicn 0

4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions

Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-3 E0P Step Content:

Step 23. IF the success path criteria (step 21) are NOT met, THEN go to Success Path V-4.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided i which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator l is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

, NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 372 W3101400

~~ ~ ~

l TG-0P-902-008 Revisicn 0 4-7-84 i E . Recoven Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

l Step 1. IJF Pressurizer pressure drops to 11684 psia OR Containment

pressure rises to >17.4 psia, THEN verify SIAS occurs as follows

Objective:

! The objective of this step is to verify SIAS occurs when required.

I j Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-86, step 2) '

j Once through cooling through an RCS pressure boundary opening is estab-

{ lished in the following manner. All operating RCPs are stopped since a LOCA or sustained opening the [PORVs] will probably result in saturation ,

, conditions in the RCS which is not a desirable fluid condition for RCP j operation. The SIS and charging pumps are started and the [PORV's] are j opened (unless there is already an adequate opening in the RCS for once l through cooling as there would be if a large break had occurred). This j provides the path and motive force for core flushing and will reduce RCS l temperature, since cooler safety injection fluid is replacing the hot RCS j fluid leaving through the opening. This cooling could also take place l l through a break in the RCS boundary. An adequate size break for adequate l core cooling usually results in an initial RCS depressurization to below l 300 psia.

4 1

l Operational Considerations:

I Hot leg temperatures and cold leg temperatures may be influenced by safety injection flow. Multiple indications and core temperatures should he used j to determine the reactor coolant system temperature. Where multiple j indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading. i j EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-167, step 2) l Establish once through cooling (either through the [PORVs] or, if present, through the break in the RCS boundary) by_ performing all of the following: #

i i

373  !

< W3101400 1

. - . , , - - - - , - - . . - , - . - . - - - - - - - - , . ~ . , , - - , - , - - - , , . , - - - . . - - - -

, , .- . ~ - - - - ---n- ---

TG-OP-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal .

5 Success Path V-4

, E0P Step 1 (Continued).

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was placed before stopping all reactor coolant pumps to place steps more in the order they would occur. Since Waterford-3 does

not have PORVs, this success path was written for a large break Loss of Coolant Accident.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure. i l

l 1

I i

1 i

374 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. E either of the following conditions occurs, THEN stop ALL Reactor Coolant Pumps:

i Objective:

The objective of this step is to stop reactor coolant pump operation when pressurizer presswe 11621 psia following a SIAS or when component cooling water is lost.

Basis

(CEN-152, page 10-86, step 1)

This step serves to prevent continued RCP operation when RCS pressure is 11621 psia during a Loss of Coolant Accident. Continued RCP operation at RCS pressures below 1621 psia during a loss of Coolant Accident may result in more severe RCS conditions. When corponent cooling water is lost to the reactor coolant pumps, damage to pump components could occur if the RCPs are not secured. -

Operational Considerations:

Since other events could cause rapid depressurization, anytime pressurizer .

pressure drops below 1621 psia following an SIAS, all reactor coolant pump operation is terminated. Where multiple indications for one parameter l exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-167, step 1)

If pressurizer pressure decreases to (1300 psia) following an SIAS, stop all reactor coolant pumps.

, Justification of Differences:

Loss of component cooling water to reactor coolant pumps is added to this step because component cooling water is isolated to the reactor coolant pumps when an SIAS actuation occurs, e 375 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step 2 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. .

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

i I s f

e 376 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 1 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 1

E0P Step Content:

j Step 3. _IF, Pressurizer pressure drops to 11385 psia, THEN verify proper HPSI Header flow exists. Refer to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.

Objective:

j The objective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the reactor coolant system during a Loss of Coolant Accident.

l

Basis

Emergency core cooling system operation must be verified if pressurizer pressure decreases to 1684 psia or if containment pressure increases to 17.4 psia. If safety injection system operation has not commenced auto- '

1 matically when reactor coolant system pressure is below 1684 psia, it must be manually actuated. This action allows the refueling water storage I pool inventory to discharge into the reactor coclant system. An insuf-i ficient reactor coolant system inventory may be associsted with a loss of I coolant accident, a steam generator tube rupture, a control system mal-function or an excessive heat removal event. Safety injection system flow rate will follow the reactor coolant system pressure according to the .

, emergency core cooling system delivery curves. The safety injection I

system and ' charging flowrate should be checked and maximized relative to j reactor coolant system pressure to enhance reactor coolant system inven-tory replenishment and/or core heat removal.

Operational Considerations:

Hot leg temperatures and cold leg temperatures may be influenced by safety 1

1 injectionflow. Multiple indications and core temperatures should be used f to determine the reactor coolant system temperature. Where multiple I

indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be j used to obtain a particular reading.

l o.

377 W3101400 L _- __ -- _ _. -_

_- _ . - _ - _ . . . . . , _ _ _ _ _ . - . , . l

TG-0P-902-008

R visi

n 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step 3 (Continued).

i EPG Step Content:

.i NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

4 i

3 l

I 1

I l

a 378

, W3101400 i

TG-0P-902-008 Rovision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

Step 4. E Pressurizer pressure drops to 5,183 psia, THEN verify proper LPSI Header flow exists. Refer to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that inventory is provided to the reactor coolant system during a Loss of Coolant Accident.

Basis:

Emergency core cooling system operation must be verified if prcssurizer pressure decreases to 1684 psia or if containment pressure increases to 17.4 psia. If safety injection system operation has not commenced auto-matica11y when reactor coolant system pressure is below 1684 psia, it must be manually actuated. This action allows the refueling water storage pool inventory to discharge into the reactor coolant system. An insuf-ficient reactor coolant system inventory may be associated with a loss of coolant accident, a steam generator tube rupture, a control system mal-function or an excessive heat removal event. Safety injection system flow rate will follow the reactor coolant system pressure according to the emergency core cooling system delivery curves. The safety injection system and charging flowrate should be checked and maximized relative to reactor coolant system pressure to enhance reactor coolant system inven-tory replenishment and/or core heat removal.

Operational Considerations:

Hot leg temperatures and cold leg temperatures may be influenced by safety injection flow. Multiple indications and cor.e temperatures should be used to determine the reactor coolant system temperature. Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

l t

EPG Step Content:

NA 379 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step 4 (Continued).

Justification of Differences

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

l o

380 l I

W3101400

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TG-OP-902-008 R visitn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 l

E0P Step Content:

Step 5. Check the following Safety Injection termination criteria:

Objective:

This step evaluates certain criteria associated with terminating safety injection flow.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-87, step 3)

If once through cooling has been established, it must be continued unless RCS conditions can be brought within the limits of Attachment 5: Post Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph and as follows:

a) RCS is at least [20*F] subcooled (Figure 10-10). Establishing [20*F]

I subcooling prevents void formation in the core when SIS flow is terminated, and provides sufficient margin for establishing flow should the [20*F] subcooling deteriorate when SIS flow is secured.

The [200*] subcooled limit minimizes the effects of PTS. a b) Pressurizer level is greater than [100]" and is constant or increas-

, ing. A pressurizer level greater than [100]" and responding normally ensure the RCS inventory control has been established.

c) At least one steam generator is available for removing heat from the RCS. A steam generator available for removing heat from the RCS ensures that primary to secondary heat removal is being maintained.

A steam generator available includes feedwater available for removing l

heat from the generator and a method for removing steam (e.g. atmos-l pheric dump valves, etc).

Operational Considerations:

Below 1000 psia, subcooling margin shall be determined by subtracting hot leg temperature from Pressurizer Temperature Water (TI 101). Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

o l

381 W3101400

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step 5 (Continued).

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-167, step 3)

Once through cooling may be stopped if core exit thermocouples < [800 F]

and all the following conditions are satisfi-1:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two steps, one , step covering termination criteria and the other covering termination direction. Since Waterford-3 does not have PORVs, this success path was written for a large break Loss -

of Coolant Accident.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-2, Subcooling.

i 382 W3101400

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TG-0P-902-008 Rr.visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step content:

Step 6. IF_ ALL Safety Injection termination criteria (step 5) are satis-fied, THEN throttle OR_ stop Safety Injection FLOW one train at a time ANO stop Charging pumps as necessary to control Pres-surizer level 33% to 60%.

Objective:

The step maintains pressurizer level and prevents solid water ope ation unless 28*F subcooling margin cannot be maintained. If 28*F subcooling l margin cannot be maintained, then the pressurizer is taken solid with j high pressure safety injection pumps.

i Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-87, step 3)

If once through cooling has been established, it must be continued unless

! RCS conditions can be brought within the limits of Attachment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph and as follows:

a) RCS is at least [20*F] ubcooled (Figure 10-10). Establishing [20*F]

I subcooling prevents void formation in the core when SIS flow is terminated, and provides sufficient margin for establishing flow should the [20*F] subcooling deteriorate when SIS flow is secured.

The [200*] subcooled limit minimizes the effects of PTS.

l b) Pressurizer level is greater than [100]" and is constant or increas-l ing. A pressurizer levei greater than [100]" and responding normally ensure the RCS inventory control has been established.

l c) At least one steam generator is available for removing heat from the .

l RCS. A steam generator available for removing heat from the RCS i ensures that primary to secondary heat removal is being maintained.

! A steam generator available includes feedwater available for removing l heat from the generator and a method for removing steam (e.g. atmos-i pheric dump valves, etc).

o 383 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step 6 (Continued).

Operational Considerations:

Solid water operation is permissible only when reactor coolant system subcooling margin is <28'F. To throttle cold leg injection valves, the switch must be taken to the "MORE" position which places them in SIAS override.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-167, step 3)

Once through cooling may be stopped if core exit thermocouples < [800 F]

and all the following conditions are satisfied:

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into two steps, one step covering termination criteria and the otner covering termination direction. Since Waterford-3 does not have PORVs, this success path was written for a large breat Loss of Coolant Accident.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values. Document. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-2, Subcooling.

384 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. IF ALL Safety Injection teruination criteria (step 5) can NOT be maintained after throttling OR stopping safety injection flow, THEN reinitiate Safety Injection flow.

Objective:

This step allows initiation of safety injection system flow should condi-tions warrant the need.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-87, step 4)

Once through cooling must be restarted if all the criteria in step 3 cannot be maintained. This provides a sufficient margin for restarting l once through cooling and minimizes the chances of void formation in the Core.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

l

, EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-167, step 4)

If all the criteria of step 3 cannot tv, maintained after the ECCS has been stopped, the ECCS must be restarted.

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o W3101400 l

l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

Step 8. IF Refueling Water Storage Pool level drops to 10%, THEN verify that Recirculation Actuation Signal occurs AND check ALL the following:

Objective:

, This step ensures that an RAS occurs to provide a suction source to the safety injection pumps.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-87, step 5)

If the Refueling Water Storage Pool level falls to 10%, initiation of recirculation should be verified. Recirculation is actuated in order to maintain' a centinuous flow of safety injection fluid to the RCS and a continuous flow of containment spray water. The operator should be cautioned against prematurely initiating an RAS. An inadequate amount of level in the safety injection sump may cause air binding of safety injec-tion pumps and loosing both heat removal loops.

Operational Considerations:

When an RAS occurs and safety injection sump level is <10 feet, monitor safety injection pumps should be monitored for potential air binding.

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-mant should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-167, step 5)

Monitor refueling water tank level. If the refueling water tank level falls to [10%], verify initiation of recirculation. If necessary, manu-ally initiate recirculation one train at a time [and close RWT outlet valves to the safety injection system].

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific e information.  !

386 l W3101400 1

TG-CP-902-008 R: vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal ,,

5 Success Path V-4 E0P Step 8 (Continued).

Source Document:

l CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-OP-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.

't l

I i

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t 387 W3101400

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TG-0P-902-008 ,

R;visicn 0 l 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Meat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

Step 9. When the RAS actions (step 8) have been verified, close the following valves:

Objective:

This step directs the operators action after an RAS.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-87, step 5)

Manually closing the outlet valves from the Refueling Water Storage Pool will isolate the RWSP from the safety injection pumps. The pumps recir-culation valves are closed to prevent inventory loss from the safety injection sump to the RWSP.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-127, step 5)

Monitor refueling water tank level. If the refueling water tank level falls to [10%), verify initiation of recirculation. If necessary, man-ually initiate recirculation one train at a time [and close RWT outlet valves to the safety injection system].

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information.

4 Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l l

388 "

! 's .

l W3101400 k

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TG-0P-902-008 R2 vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. IF RAS occurs, THEN on Attachment 4: HPSI and CS Pump Flow, record the HPSI AND Containment Spray pumps flow at the follow-ing time intervals:

i Objective:

This step monitors the high pressure safety injection and containment spray pumps for performance requirements.

I Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-88, step 6)

After the switch to recirculation, the HPSI and CS Pumps are monitored in order to ensure that the Emergency Core Coolant System performance requirements are maintained. This action helps to avert any possible permanent pump damage.

i Operational Considerations:

, NA l EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-168, step 6)

If the HPSI pumps are delivering less than [30 gpm] per pump during recirculation, turn off one charging pump and/or one HPSI pump (turn off the HPSI pump with the lower indicated flow) at a time until the HPSI i pumps are delivering more than [30 gpm] per pump.

i Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into several steps - to include plant specific I information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

~

t.

i l

l 389 W3101400 l

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l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. IF HPSI flow is NOT >25 gpa per operating HPSI pump AND RAS has occurred, THEN sequentially perform the following until operat-ing HPSI pump flow 125 gpm:

Objective:

This step ensures that each operating high pressure safety injection pump has a minimum flow 125 gpm.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-88, step 6)

After the switch to recirculation, the HPSI flows are monitored in order to ensure that the HPSI miniflow requirements for pump protection are met to avert any possible permanent HPSI pump damage. If they are not met, l the operator should turn off the charging pumps one at a time until the miniflow requirements are met. If they are still not met with all the charging pump off and two HPSI pumps are operating, the operator turns off the HPSI pumps with the lower flow. One HPSI pump should be left operating at all times, unless once through cooling termination criteria are met (step 3).

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indicaf.fons for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a partic"lar reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-168, step 6)

If the HPSI pumps are delivering less than [30 gpm] per pump during recirculation, turn off one charging pump and/or HPSI pump (turn off the HPSI pump with the lower indicated flow) at a time until the HPSI pumps are delivering more than [30 gpm] per pump.

Justification of Differences:

The EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific

• information.

390 W3101400  !

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e

TG-0P-902-008 RIvisicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step 18 (Continued).

1 Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

I l

391 W3101400

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l TG-0P-902-008 I R: vision 0 l 4-7-84 l E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. Between two hours AND four hours post-LOCA, realign Safety Injection pumps discharge for equal flow to the Hot Legs AND Cold Legs as follows:

Objective:

This step aligns safety injection pump discharge to both hot and cold leg injection.

Basis:

Simultaneous hot and cold leg injection is used for both small break and large break Loss of Coolant Accidents at 2-4 hours after the start of the Loss of Coolant Accident. In this mode, the high pressure safety in' jection pumps discharge lines are realigned so that the total injection flow is divided equally between the hot and cold legs. Simultaneous in-jection into the hot and cold legs is used as the mechanism to prevent the precipitation of boric acid in the reactor vessel following a break that is too large to allow the reactor coolant system to refill. Injecting to both sides of. the reactor vessel ensures that fluid from the reactor ves-sel (when the boric acid is being concentrated) flows out the break re-gardless of the break location and is replenished with a dilute solution of borated water from the other side of the reactor vessel. The action is taken no sooner than 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the Loss of Coolant Accident since the fluid injected to the hot leg may be entrained in the steam being released from the core and hence possibly diverted from reaching the reactor ves-sel. After 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, the core decay heat has dropped sufficiently so that there is insufficient steam velocity to entrain the fluid being injected to the hot leg. The action is taken no later than 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the Loss of Coolant Accident in order to ensure that the buildup of boric acid is terminated well before the potential for boric acid precipitation occurs.

I l

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392 W3101400 l

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TG-0P-902-008 R vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5  ;

Success Path V-4 '

E0P Step 12 (Continued).

Basis: (Continued)

Even though the action is required only for large breaks, it is taken for any loss of Coolant Accident so that the operator need not be required to distinguish between large and small breaks so early in the transient.

Simultaneous hot and cold leg injection is not required for small breaks, because for them the buildup of boric acid is terminated when the reactor coolant system is refilled. Once the reactor coolant system is refilled, the boric acid is dispersed throughout the reactor coolant system via natural circulation.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-5, Time.

393 W3101400 .

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 I

E0P Step Content: i Step 13. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can 1 be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use

different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for l judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA E

Justification Y

of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

f 394 W3101400 l

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

Step 14. E the success path criteria (step 13) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 395 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008  ;

R: vision 0 l I

4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

Step 15. E the success path criteria (step 13) are NOT met, THEN con-tinue with Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Re:noval until a success path criterion is satisfactorily being maintained.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-92)

If the criteria are not met, then RCS And Core Heat Removal is still in joepardy. The operator should not leave RCS And Core Heat Removal until

, this function is fulfilled. -

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

i l

3%

l W3101400 t

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TG-OP-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-4 E0P Step Content:

Step 16. IF_ the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on RCS And Core Heat Removal.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-92)

The operator may, if necessary, pursue 'other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish RCS And Core Heat Removal.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l r

397 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5

)

E0P Step Content:

Step 1. IF necessary, when Pressurizer pressure is lowered to 650 psia, THEN lower Safety Injection Tank pressure to between 300 psig AND 235 psig by operating the following SAFETY INJECTION TANKS vent valves:

Objective:

This step lowers safety injection tank pressure to prevent dumping tanks into reactor coolant system if they have not already done so as a result of inventory control being in jeopardy.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-91, step 2)

[The safety injection tanks should be isolated, vented, or drained at a RCS pressure of 250 psig to avoid introducing their nitrogen cover gas into the RCS and increasing the severity of the event.]

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-170, step 2)

[ Isolate, vent, or drain the safety injection tanks (SIT) at 250 psia RCS pressure.]

Justification of Differences:

This step was divided into two steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o l

398 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 l R3 vision 0 1

4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. If SIAS has been reset, THEN when Pressurizer pressure <400 psia, place the RPS/ESFAS PZR PRESS BYPASS switch to " BYPASS" on ALL four channels of Plant Protection System.

Objective:

. This step prevents SIAS and CIAS below minimum reset setpoint for low pressurizer pressure.

Basis:

During cooldown and depressurization, the automatic operation of certain safeguard systems is undesirable.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA e

i 399 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 3. When Pressurizer pressure is between 392 psia AND 350 psia, perform the following:

Objective:

This step isolates the safety injection tanks.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-91, step 2)

[The safety injection tanks should be isolated, vented, or drained at a RCS pressure of 250 psig to avoid introducing their nitrogen cover gas into the RCS and increasing the severity of the event.]

.i Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-170, step 2)

[ Isolate, vent, or drain the safety injection tanks (SIT) at 250 psia RCS pressure.]

Justification of Differences:

This step was divided into two steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline, i

o l

l 400 W3101400

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TG-0P-902-008 l R: vision 0 l 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal S

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 4. IF_ Pressurizer pressure is between 392 psia AND 205 psia, THEN check the following Shutdown Cooling criteria:

4 Objective:

This step checks the criteria which are required for entry into shutdown cooling.

j Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-90, step 1)

The operator should determine if SCS operation criteria are met. If pressurizer level is stable, tte pressurizer and/or HPSI pumps are main-taining system presst:re such that RCS hot and cold leg temperatures are at least [20*F] below saturation temperature for pressurizer pressure, and the steam generators are available (steam flow and feed flow) to reduce the RCS temperature to the shutdown cooling entry value, SCS operation may be appropriate if the SCS is available. Before the SCS is operated, RCS I

activity levels must be determined since the RCS fluid will now be circu-lated outside of the containment building. The operator must decide whether to circulate high activity RCS coolant outside containment if high activity is present and such circulation has the potential for release to the environment. If the potential for significant releases exists, it may

be more desirable to continue cooling with the steam generator. The condensate inventory must be checked to ensure that the supply is suffi-cient to cool down the plant to SCS entry conditions or continue cooling the RCS. Other plant specific prerequisites for SCS operation must be considered (e.g. component cooling water, instrument ali and valve control power).

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

l 401 W3101400 i _ _ _ _

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5 l l

E0P Step 4 (Continued). l EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-170, step 1)

If the RCS T H is cooled to [300*F] and depressurized to [300 psia] and the following criteria are met, initiate shutdown cooling per the SCS operating instructions.

Justification of. Differences:

This step was divided up into several steps to provide plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Docume~nt. Table 5-1, Level and Table 5-2, Subcooling.

o 402 W3101400 5

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TG-0P 902-008 Revision 0 1 4-7-84 '

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF Shutdown Cooling criteria (step 4) are NOT met, THEN go to step 10.

Objective:

This step directs the operator to the proper step if shutdown cooling criteria are not met.

Basis:

If the shutdown cooling entry conditions cannot be met the operator is directed to a step which will assure that shutdown cooling criteria are met before shutdown cooling is entered. This step also provides further guidance to the operator to ensure the RCS And Core Heat Removal safety function is being satisfactorily maintained.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA 1

e I

l l

403 W3101400

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y w -

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.y *.--

i TG-0P-902-008 RLvisien 0 4-7-84

. E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Re) oval 5

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 6. Verify Safety Injection flow aligned to Cold Legs as follows:

Objective:

This step ensures safety injection system is lined up properly for shut-down cooling.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-90, step 1)

If SCS operation is determined to be appropriate the ECCS (if operating) is aligned for cold leg injection.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

e 404 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. E Containment Spray pumps are operating, THEN stop either Containment Spray pump A OR Containment Spray pump B.

Objective:

This step secures one containment spray pump if both pumps are operating.

Basis:

For one train of shutdown cooling to be placed in service a shutdown cooling heat exchanger must be available. Since containment spray flow is through the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, one containment spray pump is removed from service so that the shutdown cooling heat exchanger may be used for shutdown cooling.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

- NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA i

0 405 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 8. Verify ALL the following:

Objective:

This step verifies the low pressure safety injection system is aligned for shutdown cooling.

Basis:

The low pressure safety injection pumps are used for shutdown cooling.

The low pressure safety injection pumps should be stopped prior to align-ing shutdown cooling.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

N 406 W3101400 e

TG-0P-902-008 Rsvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 9. Place one train of Shutdown Cooling in service. Refer to OP-9-005, SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM, Sections 3. 0, 4. 0, 5. 0, AND 6.0.

i Objective:

This step places one train of shutdown cooling in service.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-90, step 1)

If SCS operation is determined to be appropriate the ECCS (if operating) 4 is aligned for cold leg injection and the RCS is cooled down and

depressurized as follows. If necessary, RCS hot leg temperature should be cooled to less than [300*F] and depressurized to [300 psia]. The RCS l is depressurized to [300 psia] or less by using auxiliary spray.

< Depressurization may also be accomplished by stopping charging pumps, or stopping or throttling HPSI pumps. If auxiliary spray is used, the difference between the pressurizer temperature and the auxiliary spray water temperature should be maintained below [200*F] if possible. If RCS inventory control is satisfactory, auxiliary spray water temperature may be increased by increasing letdown flow or reducing charging flow which will increase the regenerative heat exchanger outlet temperature. Other plant specific methods to increase auxiliary spray water temperature may be used. If auxiliary spray is used when a [200*F] or more difference

! exists, then such a cycle must be recorded as per Technical Specifica-tions. The number of such cycles should be minimized. [Another opera-i tional alternative for the RCS pressure reduction is to throttle the HPSI pumps and adjust charging pump flow (if the pressurized is solid) to maintain level and control pressure.] i Operational Considerations:

If containment spray is in service, then the opposite train of shutdown cooling should be placed in service. If a steam generator'is isolated '

due to activity in the steam plant, then shutdown cooling should be lined l up to the loop with the steam generator which is not isolated.

'407 W3101400

l 1

TG-0P-902-008 l R: vision 0 l 4-7-84 l E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V.-RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5 E0P Step 9 (Continued).

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-170, step 1)

If the RCS TH is cooled to [300*F] and depressurized to [300 psia] and the following criteria are met, initiate shutdown cooling per the SCS operating instructions.

Justification of Differences: .

This step was divided up into several steps to provide plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

e

(

l i

408 W3101400

l l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 I E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use-different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

409 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Rsvision 0 l 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal S

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. IF the success path criteria (step 10) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

e

)

410 l W3101400 1

l TG-0P-902-008 R: vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. IF_ the success path criteria (step 10) are NOT met, THEN con-tinue with Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal until a success path criterion is satisfactorily being maintained.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-92)

If the criteria are not met, then RCS And Core Heat Removal is still in jeopardy. The operator should not leave RCS And Core Heat Removal until this function is fulfilled.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

t 411 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path V-5 E0P Step Content:

Step 13. E the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go to tiel next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on RCS And Core Heat Removal.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-92)

The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish RCS And Core Heat Removal.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

i

! 412 W3101400

.m - - - --

- ~v

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 l l

E . Recovary Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Centent:

Step 1. ,I F, Pressurizer pressure drops to <1684 psia OR Containment pressure rises to >17.4 psia, THEN verify CIAS occurs.

Objective:

This step verifies that a CIAS occurs when required by plant conditions.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-94)

If containment pressure rises to 17.4 psia or pressurizer pressure drops to 1684 psia, the automatic initiation of containment isolation is veri-fied. If it is necessary to close the containment isolation valves by manually initiating a containment isolation actuation signal, this action is taken.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

i EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-173, step 1)

If containment pressure increases to [4 psig], [or if pressurizer pressure decreases to 1600 psig], or if containment radiation levels exceed plant specific limits, verify initiation of containment isolation. If neces-sary, manually initiate containment isolation.

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into two different E0P steps so that the plant specific instructions could be given.

l Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

i 413 W3101400

-av.=

TG-0P-902-008 Ri; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. .If the RAD MONITORING SYS ACTIVITY HI-HI (CP-36, A-9) occurs due j to high Containment radiation, THEN manually initiate CIAS.

Objective:

This step checks that the radiation levels in the containment are normal.

Basis

(CEN-152, page 10-94)

If containment radiation exceeds plant specific limits, the containment should be isolated. If it is necessary to close containment isolation ,

, valves by manually initiating a containment isolation actuation signal, l this action is taken.

Operational Considerations:

NA I EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-173, step 1)

If containment pressure increases to [4 psig], [or if pressurizer pressure j decreases to 1600 psig], or if containment radiation levels exceed plant specific limits, verify initiation of containment isolation. If neces-sary, manually initiate containment isolation.

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into two, different E0P steps so that the plant j specific instructions could be given. -

1 l

Source Document: i

~

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

414 ,

W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 1

E0P Step Content:

Step 3. IF CIAS has occurred, THEN complete Attachment 13: CIAS Auto-matic Actions.

Objective:

This step has the operator verify automatic actions when a CIAS occurs.

Basis:

This step verifies all CIAS automatic actions occur.

Operational Considerations:

^

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA i

l t

l l

415 l I

W3101400

- - - - - , - - - , , , . , , , , . .- -~ y

'TG-0P-902-008 R: vision 0 4-7-84 ..

E6 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 4. IF any Containment Isolation valves on Attachment 13: CIAS Automatic Actions did NOT close, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

This step verifies that all containment penetrations are closed when not required for plant operation.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-94)

If the containment isolation actuation signal (either automatic or remote manual) has failed to cause a closure of the required isolation valves, they are manually closed by all means possible. 3 Operational Considerations:

Health Physics should be contacted before attempting any l'dcal containment =

isolation valve operations.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-173, step 2)

If containment isolation valves are not closed, attempt to close them remote manually or local manually as appropriate.

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

~

'a s

i 416 ,

W3101400

- m , ., _.m .,,y y , ,_ .-.<

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 1

E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF it is necessary to operate pi eumatic valves inside Contain-ment, THEN open CNTMT ISOLATION INSTRUMENT AIR (IA 908).

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that instrument air is available to containment.

Basis:

If instrument air is isolated from containment, then realignment is necessary for operation of pneumatically operated valves.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: .

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA f

417 W3101400

i 4

TG-0P-902-008 I Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 6. Check for Steam Plant activity as indicated by any of the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check that a steam generator with high activity is determined prior to further cooldown.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-94)

If activity is detected in the steam plant, this usually means that at least one steam generator has tube leaks. This step will provide infor-mation to the operator so containment integrity can be assured in the following steps of this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading. The blowdown radia-tion monitor will indicate only on the steam generator to which it is selected. Automatic feedwater modulations may mask the expected steam generator level rise due to a steam generator tube rupture.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-173, step 3)

If activity is detected in the steam, the operator should identify the

, leaking steam generator (s) and attempt to isolate that steam generator if 1

plant conditions permit.

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. e l

1 418 W3101400

~ ~'

TG-0P-902-008 '

R: vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. IF_ M Steam Plant activity is indicated, THEN go to step 18.

Objective:

This step directs the operator to go to other steps when steam plant activity is not indicated. )

Basis:

If steam plant activity is indicated, then the operator must proceed with step 8. If no steam plant activity is indicated, then the operator will go to the step for success path criteria.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

NA s

t 419 W3101400

-,c-

TG-0P-902-008 R. vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 8. Verify Condenser Vacuum pump exhaust diverts to the Plant Stack filters as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to stop an unfiltered radioactive release from the condenser vacuum pumps exhaust.

Basis:

This step aligns the exhaust from the vacuum pumps to the reactor auxil-iary building normal exhaust filter train to minimize the radioactive release to site personnel and the general public.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of. Differences:

NA Source Document:

FSAR, Section 10.4.2.2.

t 420 W3101400

. _ =__

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-l E0P Step Content:

Step 9. Verify Reactor Coolant System temperature is being controlled as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that the reactor coolant system temperature is being controlled at the desired value.

Basis:

Reactor coolant system temperature is controlled at <550 F so that the reactor coolant system heat inventory is not sufficient to cause steam generator safety valves to lift. The steam bypass control system is the i preferred means for control of steam generator pressure because the atmospheric dump valves would allow an unmonitored radioactive release to the environment.

Operational Considerations:

This step is performed before the leaking steam generator has been iden-tified and isolated to prevent the steam generator safety valves from lifting. If the condenser is available, then by using the steam bypass control system, a closed system is maintained. If the automatic function is not operating properly, then systems should be placed in manual.

Systems in manual should be monitored for proper operation. Where mul-tiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

e NA o

421 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E6 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation Success Path VI-1 E0P Step 9 (Continued).

Source Documpnt:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-3, Temperature and Table 5-4, Pressure.

i l

e i

422 W3101400

.m -.

...-i..-,,,.,-.,, , ,_s_ , ,..,.-r

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 l E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation ,

6 Success Path VI-1 1

E0P Step Content:

Step 10. Determine the Steam Generator to be isolated by one OR more of the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to ensure that the steam generator with the higher activity is determined prior to further cooldown and steam genera-tor isolation.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-94)

This action identifies the steam generator that is in jeopardy or has to be isolated due to higher activity. This step will provide information to the operator so containment integrity can be assured in the following steps of this procedure.

Operational Considerations:

If both steam generatcrs have a tube rupture, then the one with the higher radiation levels shall be selected for isolation. The blowdown radiation monitor will indicate only on the steam generator to which it is selected.

Automatic feedwater modulations may mask the expected steam generator level risc due to a steam generator tube rupture. Where multiple indica-tions for one parameter exist, more than one instrument should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-173, step 3)

If activity is detected in the steam, the operator should identify the leaking steam generator (s) and attempt to isolate that steam generator if plant conditions permit.

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific information. e 423 W3101400 w

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step 10 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l i

o i

424  !

W3101400 n - - - - , - - , - -

,. - --r, - ,- a

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 11. Isolate selected Steam Generator as follows:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to isolate the steam generator with the j tube rupture.

4 Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-94)

The steam generator with higher activity, higher radiation levels, or rising water level should be isolated. Isolation the steam generator is an attempt to reestablish the containment integrity.

Operational Considerations:

If a tube rupture is indicated in both steam generators, then both steam supplies to the A/B emergency feedwater pump may be isolated.

i EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-173, step 3) i If activity is detected in the steam, the operator should identify the a leaking steam generator (s) and attempt to isolate that steam generator if l plant conditions permit.

l Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into several steps to include plant specific '

information.

I Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l.

f 425 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 12. Check that the correct Steam Generator is isolated by any of the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to verify that the correct steam generator is isolated.

Basis:

4 Isolation of the correct steam generator should be verified by sampling, radiation level and changes in steam generator level. This provides l

feedback that the proper steam generator has been isolated.

Operational Considerations:

If a tube rupture is indicated in both steam generators, then the control room supervisor should be cautious in determining the correct steam generator.

EPG Step Content:

NA .

Justificat' ion of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

1 e

i r

426 W3101400

. - . . - . _ - . . , . - - - . - , . . - _ . _ ..s. , . - _ - - -

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 13. If detemined by step 12 that the incorrect Steam Generator was isolated, THEN perform the following:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to -isolate the correct steam generator.

i

(

Basis:

If the wrong steam generator has been isolated or confirmed by the pre-vious step, it should be realigned and the affected steam generator should be isolated.

Operational Considerations:

! If a tube rupture is indicated in both steam generators, then the control room supervisor should be cautious when realigning the steam generator which was isolated.

EPG Step Content:

g i

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

3 o

427 W3101400

,,w -

TG-0P-902-008 R;visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:  !

Step 14. When a Steam Generator Low Pressure Pretrip alarm occurs, reset the setpoint. 1 1

1 Objective:

This step prevents an MIS Trom occurring and inhibiting cooldown.

Basis:

During a controlled cooldown and depresstfrization, the automatic operation of certain safeguard systems is undesirable. Therefore, the setpoint of j the MSIS must be manually reset (lowered) as the cooldown progresses to ensure that automatic engineered safeguards protection remains available until the reactor coolant system is cooled down and depressurized.

Operational Considerations:

NA 4

EPG Step Content:

NA l Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

t 428 W3101400 )

- - , ,- , ,-e - -,- , .-,e -- .

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84  :

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 15. Commence a Plant cooldown to obtain Hot Leg temperature of 500*F for the loop with the Steam Generator which is NOT isolated by EITHER of the following:

Objective:

This step ensures cooldown prior to depressurization so that 50 F sub-cooling is maintained.

Basis:

This step is done to ensure that during the plant depressurization 28 F subcooling will be maintained. The 500*F will actually provide 45 F subcooling at 1000 psia. This provides an additional margin during the transient condition. The hot leg temperature of 500 F also considers core uplift when all reactor coolant pumps are operating.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru '

ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-3, Temperature, t

h 429 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 16. When Hot Leg temperature is 500*F for the loop with the Steam Generator which is NOT isolated, depressurize the Reactor Coolant System to 1000 psia as follows:

Objective:

This step depressurizes the reactor coolant system to 1000 psia to reduce the reactor coolant leakage into the steam generator.

Basis:

The general goals associated with reactor coolant system pressure control are providing subcooling to support the core heat removal process, avoid-ing overpressure situations for pressurizer thermal shock and RT NOT considerations, minimizing the pressure differential between the steam generator and the reactor coolant system to minimize the leakage and control reactor coolant system pressure so that it is below the steam generator safety valve setpoints.

Operational Considerations:

Controlled depressurization below 1621 psia does not require stopping reactor coolant pumps. Pressurizer level anomalies during controlled depressurization to 1000 psia may be tolerated. Below 1000 psia, sub-cooling margin shall be detemined by subtracting hot leg temperature from Pressurizer Temperature Water (TI 101).

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA o

430 W3101400

__ __ -- . . - _ . s

TG-0P-902-008 R2 vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step 16 (Continued).

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-3, Temperature.

i i

i i

i

,)

i e

431 i W3101400 l

, . l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 17. Maintain Pressurizer temperature 10 F to 20 F above isolated Steam Generator temperature.

Objective:

This step ensures that pressurizer pressure is slightly above steam generator pressure to minimize leakage through the affected steam generator.

Basis:

The small differential pressure will minimize the loss of primary fluid to the secondary side which will help to minimize potential releases of radioactive effluents to the environment. Since pressurizer pressure is above steam generator pressure, this will preclude secondary fluid from diluting reactor coolant system.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, use more than one instrument to obtain a particular reading. Due to the accuracy of the pressure transmitters, temperature difference is used to satisfy the objective of this step.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. ,

1 PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-3, Temperature.

0 l l

432 W3101400

TG-OP-902-008 RIvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 18. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can i

be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of edch safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

i Also, in order to facilitata operator use, the criteria chosen are

parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

I NA

> EPG Step Content:

NA l Justification of Differences:

NA i

! Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

r h

l 433 W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E6 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 19. IF the success path criteria (step 18) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA i

} Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

{ .CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l a

t 434 W3101400 w - ,- -

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation 6

Success Path VI-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 20. E the success path criteria (step 18) are NOT met, THEN con-tinue with Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation until the success path criteria are satisfactorily being maintained.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis:

If the criteria are not met, then Containment Isolation is still in jeopardy. The operator should not leave Containment Isolation until this function is fulfilled.

Operational Considerations:

EPG Step Content:

M Justification of Differences:

m Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

435 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VI. Containment Isolation .

6 Success Path VI-1 E0? Step Content:

Step 21. E the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on

! Containment Isolation.

I Basis:

1 The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish Containment Isolation.

i Operational Considerations:

l NA i

l EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

1 436

, W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R:;visitn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And 7

Pressure Control Success Path VII-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 1. IF Pressurizer pressure drops to <1684 psia OR Containment

. pressure rises to >17.4 psia, THEN verify the following:

Objective

This step verifies the containment fan coolers start in slow speed when required due to containment conditions.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-98)

The contain:nent fan cooling system removes heat from the containment by passing containment air through heat exchangers cooled by the component cooling water system. Four fan coolers running on slow are required to provide post-accident heat removal capability. These fans should start automatically. If not, the fans should be started manually. Component cooling water flow is verified to each fan cooler.

Operational Considerations:

i Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-176, step 1)

[ Verify automatic operation of the containment fan cooling system. If at least 2 containment fans are not running in slow they should be started manually.]

Justification of Differences:

This E0P step includes verification of component cooling water flow to 2

each fan cooler.

Source Document:

. CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline. ,

j PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure.

437 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R2 vision 0 4-7-84 E7 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And Pressure Control Success Path VII-l E0P Step Content:

Step 2. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are i

parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Consideratisms:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Just'ification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-3, Temperature and Table e 5-4, Pressure.

438 W3101400 w- ,ge ---

r, ---m--e- s- y -y- -,~r., ,---

l TG-0P-902-008 l R:visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And 7

Pressure Control Success Path VII-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 3. IF the success path criteria (step 2) are met, THEN go to the next safety functicn in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document: .

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

t 439 W3101400

,-c , - - - - , , , , , - , . _ .,.n +

TG-0P-902-008 R2visicn 0 1 4-7-84  ;

E7 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII.. Containment Temperature And Pressure Control Success Path VII-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 4. IF the success path criteria (step 2) are NOT met, THEN go to Success Path VII-2.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is not achieved, the operator is instructed to implement another success path for this safety function.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

. O b

440 W3101400

. s g

TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And 7

Pressure Control l Success Path VII-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 1. E Containment pressure >17.7 psia, THEN verify CSAS by the following:

1 Objective:

i This step verifies containment spray pumps start and header isolation valves open to supply flov t.o spray headers if required.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-99)

Operation of this system is required once containment pressure increases to 17.7 psia. Operation should commence automatically upon receipt of a

containment spray actuation signal; otherwise a manual CSAS should be initiated. In the event a manual CSAS does not start containment spray system operation, the system should be aligned and the pumps started manually.

l Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-

! ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

l EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-177, step 1)

If containment pressure increases to [10 psig], verify initiation of containment spray. If it does not start automatically, manually initiate containment spray.

Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

PV-0P-902, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-4, Pressure. ,

441 W3101400

-- r - ~ --------a ,- - ,- - , - ~ , - , , , - , - -- ,,c-c--

TG-OP-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 )

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And 7

Pressure Control Success Path VII-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. IF CSAS has occurred, THEN verify _ Containment Spray flow exists.

Objective:

This step verifies that containment spray flow exists when requires.

Basis: .

If a CSAS occurred, then containment spray flow is verified. The con ,

tainment spray system removes heat from the containment by sp' raying water droplets throughout the containment atmosphere. This condenses steam and cools the air, subsequently reducing containment pressure. ,

Operational Considerations:

NA l EPG Step Content:

NA 1

Justification of Differences

j NA l

Source Document:

l CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

4 l

e i

\

442 W3101400 l

TG-0P-902-008 i R;visien 0 4-7-84 l E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And 7

Pressure Control Success Path VII-2

. E0P Step Content:

Step 3. IF CSAS has occurred, THEN complete Attachment 14: CSAS Automa-tic Actions.

Objective:

This step has the operator verify automatic actions when a CSAS occurs.

Basis:

This step ensures all CSAS automatic actions occur.

Operational Considerations:

M EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

1 NA o

1 443 W3101400 ,

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And 7

Pressure Control Success Path VII-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 4. E Containment pressure <17.7 psia AND RAS has NOT occurred, THEN stop Containment Spray pumps A AND B.

Objective:

This step secures the containment spray pumps when they are not required.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-99, step 2)

Before terminating containment spray, the operator must verify that containment pressure is <17.7 psia. Termination may be useful to recover from the Loss of Coolant Accident since continuous use of the containment sprays may impact the operation of equipment inside containment. Since containment spray provides the cooling for long term cooling, the containment spray pumps cannot be secured when a RAS has occurred.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-177, step 2)

If the CSAS has been actuated and containment pressure subsequently falls below [7 psig], containment spray shou ~ld be terminated. Upon termination, it must be realigned for automatic actuation. It may be desirable to operate containment- spray to control containment atmospheric iodine levels.

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into three steps to include plant specific information.

l Source Document:

• l CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

l W3101400 I

• g m - ,- et - *tw gy-yy e g3--v e-4 7 g =

TG-0P-902-008 R2 vision 0 )

4-7-84 j E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And 7

Pressure Control Success Path VII-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF_ Containment Spray pumps are stopped, THEN realign Containment Spray for automatic initiation as follows:

Objective:

, This step ensures that the containment spray system is available for operations.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-99, step 2)

Since the containment pressure may rise again, the containment spray system should be relaigned for automatic operation when it is terminated.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-177, step 2)

If the CSAS has been actuated and containment pressure subsequently falls below [7 psig], containment spray may be terminated. Upon termination, it must be realigned for automatic actuation. It may be desirable to operate containment spray to control containment atmospheric iodine levels.

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into three steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recove y Guideline.

445 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And 7

Pressure Control Success Path VII-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 6. E sample of the Containment indicates rising iodine levels, THEN manually initiate Containment Spray.

Objective:

This step initiates containment spray when iodine levels rise in the containment.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-99, step 2)

The containment spray system is used to control iodine levels in the containment when chemistry samples indicate a problem with iodine.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content: (CEN-152, page 10-177, step 2)

If the CSAS has been actuated and conta'inment pressure subsequently falls below [7 psig], containment spray may be terminated. Upon termination, it must be realigned for automatic actuation. It may be desirable to operate containment spray to control containment atmospheric iodine levels.

Justification of Differences:

This EPG step was divided into three steps to include plant specific information.

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section'10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

i l 446 W3101400 i- 4

TG-OP-902-008 l R1 vision 0 l 4-7-84 l

E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And 7

i Pressure Control Success Path VII-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 7. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with satisfactorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the criteria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.-

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are i parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA i

Justification of Differences:  !

NA l

l Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o l

447 W3101400

-~__~.

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E7 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And Pressure Control Success Path VII-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 8. IF the success path criteria (step 7) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the. operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 448 W3101400 F

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 l

4-7-84 E7 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And Pressure Control Success Path VII-2 E0P Step Content:

. Step 9. E the success path criteria (step 7) are NOT met, THEN continue with Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And Pressure Control until a success path criterion is satisfactorily being maintained.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis:

If the criteria are not met, then Containment Temperature And Pressure Control is still in jeopardy. The operator should not leave Containment Temperature And Pressure Control until this function is fulfilled.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

E Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

449 W3101400 6 e- , --m _

1 i

! TG-0P-902-008 l R;visien 0 l 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VII. Containment Temperature And 7

Pressure Control Success Path VII-2 E0P Step Content:

Step 10. E the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy AR implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on Containment Temperature And Pressure Control.

Basis:

The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish Containment Temperature And Pressure Control.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA -

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

0 1

450 W3101400 j

~~

l TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 l 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VIII. Containment Combustible Gas Control 8

Success Path VIII-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 1. IF Containment hydrogen concentration reaches 3%, THEN perform either of the following:

Objective:

This step directs the operator actions if hydrogen concentration reaches 3%. .

Basis:

If the hydrogen concentration reached 3%, then either the hydrogen recom-biners or the containment atmospheric release system has to be placed in operation. This action will prevent or limit the rise of the hydrogen concentration in the containment. If the hydrogen concentration reaches 4%, then the containment atmospheric release system is placed in operation with the hydrogen recombiners.

Operational Considerations:

Where multiple indications for one parameter exist, more than one instru-ment should be used to obtain a particular reading.

EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

OP-8-006, Hydrogen Recombiner.

OP-8-002, Containment Atmospheric Release.

l 1

l f i I

l l .

l 451 W3101400 i

TG-0P-902-008 RIvision 0 4-7-84 E8 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VIII. Containment Combustible Gas Control Success Path VIII-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 2. Check the following success path criteria:

Objective:

The objective of this step is to check the criteria associated with

~

satis'f'actorily completing this success path.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-4, step 3)

The basis for each individual criterion is given in Section 2.0 of the technical guide. The criteria are used to judge the status of each safety function. Since each safety function has multiple success paths which can be used to control that safety function, the criteria which are used to judge the status of each safety function are organized around the success paths for each safety- function. Since each success path uses or may use different technical means of achieving a function, the critaria for judging the success of that path are specific to the technical means.

Also, in order to facilitate operator use, the criteria chosen are parameters which can be read directly from the control board.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

1 NA l

Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o I

452 W3101400 t

TG-0P-902-008 Revisien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VIII. Containment Combustible Gas Control 8

Success Path VIII-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 3. IF the success path criteria (step 2) are met, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is satisfactorily completed.

Basis: (CEN-152, page 10-12, step 7)

After checking the success path criteria, additional guidance is provided which aids the operator in determining the next course of action. In this step, if control of the safety function is achieved, the operator is instructed to go to the next safety function in jeopardy.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source pocument:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline, i

l l

i 453 W3101400 l . _ . . _ _ -

TG-0P-902-008 R vision 0 4-7-84 E8 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VIII. Containment Combustible Gas Control Success Path VIII-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 4. IF the success path criteria (step 2) are NOT met, THEN continue with Subprocedure VIII. Containment Combustible Gas Control until the success path criteria are satisfactorily being maintained.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to instruct the operator what to do if this success path is not satisfactorily completed.

Basis:

If the criteria are not met, then Containment Combustible Gas Control is still in jeopardy. The operator should not leave Containment Combustible Gas Control until this function is fulfilled.

Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

o 454 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 l Revision 0 1 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure VIII. Containment Combustible Gas Control 8

Success Path VIII-1 E0P Step Content:

Step 5. IF the Control Room Supervisor determines it is necessary to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy, THEN go to the next safety function in jeopardy AND implement its subprocedure concurrently with this subprocedure.

Objective:

The objective of this step is to allow the control room supervisor to pursue other safety functions in jeopardy while efforts are continued on Containment Combustible Gas Control.

Basis:

The operator may, if necessary, pursue other urgent safety functions but must continue to attempt to establish Containment Combustible Gas Control.

1 Operational Considerations:

NA EPG Step Content:

NA Justification of Differences:

NA Source Document:

~CEN-152, Section 10.0, Functional Recovery Guideline.

1

, e l

455 W3101400 l

l - . .

1

TG-OP-902-008

, Rzvision 0 ,

4-7-84 i 2.0 Guidelines for Safety Function Status Checklist Safety Function Criteria Bases i

Vital Auxiliaries Success Path I-1 a. BOTH A AND B Train 6.9KV AND Having both A and B 4TIEKV busses energized from nonsafety and safety the Startup Transformer busses ensures that all required auxiliaries

b. BOTH A AND B Train 4.16KV safety are available. If A busses energized from the 4.16KV and 8 train nonsafety nonsafety busses. busses are not avail-able, then one emer-gency diesel generator Success Path I-2 a. At least one Emergency Diesel supplying a safety bus Generator supplying a 4.16KV can supply enough loads safety bus with proper voltage to safely shutdown and AND frequency, cooldown the plant.

(LW3-1666-83) If no AC power is available Success Path I-3 a. ALL 125-volt DC busses energized: then maintaining all three battery busses

1) 3A-DC-S with the required re- ,

2) 3B-DC-S duced loading will

3) 3AB-DC-S. allow the operator to safely control the

plant for an expected battery duty cycle in excess of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

4 I -

t l

l 456 W3101400

( -

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Safety Function Criteria Bases Reactivity Control Success Path 11-1 a. Either of the following exists: (CEN-152, page 10-5)

1) <2 CEAs NOT fully inserted For all emergency XND Reactor power dropping events, the reactor OR must be shutdown. The U Reactor _ Dower is BOTH: minimum number of CEAs a) < 10 % which could remain b) Constant OR dropping, withdrawn and keep the reactor critical is approximately 2 CEAs.

Success Path II-2 a. Emergency Boration flow >40 gpm This criterion, occur-AND Reactor power dropping ring with decreasing OR reactor power ensures E One of the following Emergency that reactivity is Boration termination criteria under control.

is met: ,

1) ALL of the following are satisfied: Reactor shutdown may a) <2 CEAs NOT fully also be assured by the Inserted minimum boration rate-b) Emergency borated 165 ppm accompanied by decreas-c) Reactor power dropping ing core power or a OR constant reactor power

2) Riactor_gawer is BOTH: less than that at the a) <10 % maximum expected sub-b) Constant OR dropping critical multiplication OR level. Since proce-U RCS borated to 1300 ppm. dures require boration prior to cooldown, these criteria are Success Path II-3 a. Boron addition rate to the RCS adequate to ensure

>40 gpm AND Reactor power dropping shutdown.

UR

b. Reactor _gower is BOTH:

1) <10 % (W3Y84-0550)

2) Constant OR dropping If two rods are stuck OR out, then shutdown E RCS borated to 1300 ppm. margin requirements can be met by 165 ppm above reactor coolant system boron concentration.

If all rods were stuck out a boron concentra-tion of 1300 ppm would satisfy out shutdown margin requirements.

1 0

457 W3101400 l

~ ' ~

TG-0P-902-008 R:visien 0 4-7-84 Safety Function Criteria Bases RCS Inventory Control Success Path III-1 a. Pressurizer level between 7% AND (CEN-152, page 10-5 and 60% Technical Guideline,.

b. RCS >28*F subcooled.

Section 5.10, Parameter Values Document. Table 5-1, Level.) A value Success Path III-2 a. Safety Injection flow has been of 60% was chosen as an throttled OR terminated to upper limit for pres-maintain inventory surizer level to account OR for instrument accuracies 57 IF Pressurizer pressure <1385 and other uncertainties.

psia, THEN proper HPSI flow A value of 7% was exists. Refer to Attachment 2: chosed as the minimum HPSI and LPSI Flow versus dependable pressurizer Pressurizer Pressure level. These values OR bound the limits of c7 IF Pressurizer pressure <183 psia best estimate analysis.

AND RAS has NOT occurred, THEN proper LPSI TTow exists. KeTer to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI The value of 28'F sub-Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure. cooling is based on keeping the core cover-ed and thus ensuring adequate core cooling.

If the core is covered with fluid, the RCS will not indicate superheated conditions.

When the ECCS is opera-ting, its performance adequacy is judged by observing its delivery flow versus RCS pressure.

t ,

458 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Safety Function Criteria Bases RCS Pressure Control a

Success Paty IV-1 a. Pressurizer pressure <2300 psia (CEN-152, page 10-6)

Low /High Pressure b. Pressurizer Pressure Control RCS subcooling greater System maintaining OR restoring than 28*F ensure a pressure within limits of liquid state of the 4 Attachment 5: Post-Accident coolant for effective Pressure and Temperature Limits heat removal proper-Graph ties. Subcooling less

c. RCS Subcooling Margin between than 200*F is based on 28*F AND 200*F. PTS criteria.

When the ECCS is Success Path IV-2 a. Pressurizer pressure <2300 psia operating, its perform-Low Pressure b. Pressurizer pressure within ance adequacy is judged limits of Attachment 5: Post- by observing its de-Accident Pressure and Temperature livery flow versus RCS Limits Graph pressure.

c. RCS Subcooling Margin between 28"F AND 200*F. 2300 psia pressurizer i pressure is the max-imum expected pressure Success Path IV-3 a. Safety Injection flow has been following a reactor Low Pressure throttled 0_R_ terminated to maintain trip.

inventory OR E IF Pressurizer pressure <1385 Maintaining the RCS ps'ia, THEN proper HPSI flow within the PT curves

exists. Refer to Attachment 2

ensures adequate core HPSI and LPSI Flow versus cooling and minimizes Pressurizer Pressure the chance of PTS.

OR

c. IF Pressurizer pressure <183 psia THEN KRO properRAS LPSIhas NOT occurred, ReTer TTow exists.

to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus Pressurizer Pressure.

i Success Path IV-4 a. Pressurizer pressure <2300 psia High Pressure b. Pressurizer pressure within limits of Attachment 5: Post-Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph

c. RCS Subcooling Margin between 28*F

AND 200*F.

Success Path IV-5 a. Pressurizer pressure <2300 psia High Pressure b. Pressurizer pressure within limits of Attachment 5: Post- Accident Pressure and Temperature Limits Graph ,

c. RCS Subcooling. Margin between 28*F AND 200*F.

4 4

459 i W3101400 11 _. _ - _ . __ . _ _ . . . .__ _. . - . _ _ _ _ . - ~ _ . - _ . . _ _ . ____2.

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0-4-7-84

. Safety Function Criteria Bases RCS And Core Heat Removal Success Path V-1 a. At least one Steam Generator is (CEN-152, pages 10-6 satisfying either: through 10-8)

1) Steam Generator level Wide Decay heat levels may Range is BOTH: not be high enough to a) >5GE require feedwater flow.

b) Constant OR rising If this is the case,

, OR once steam generator 77 Level is being restored by level is returned to zero either MFW OR EFW flow power level band and

b. Loop AT <13*F feedwater remains avail-

c. Tc is BOTN: lable to maintain that

1) <550'F level, then the S/G

2) fonstant or dropping contribution to RCS

d. RCS Subcooling. Margin between 28*F heat removal is being AND 200*F. satisfied.

Feed flow is used in-stead of a minimum level since even on an uncomplicated reactor trip level may go below the instrument ranges.

Operators use flow, S/G pressure and RCS tem-peratures to verify the S/G is intact and that level will recover.

AT <13*F-is verified by best estimate analysis to be the maximum AT expected for minimum forced circulation with maximum decay heat.

1 RCS subcooling greater than 28*F ensures a liquid state of the coolant for effective heat removal properties.

Subcooling less than 200*F is based on PTS criteria.

o 460

-W3101400

, . . _ _ -.,,vy, _ . _ _ . , , .

_ ~

l TG-0P-902-008 i R;visien 0 4-7-84 Safety Function Criteria Basis RCS And Core Heat Removal (Continued)

Success Path V-2 a. At least one Steam Generator is 550 F is based on satisfying either: control program for

1) Steam Generator level Wide ADVs and steam genera-Range is BOTH: tor dusip bypass valves a) >50% and best estimate b) Constant OR rising analysis.

OR 27 Level is being restored by 64*F is based on best either MFW OR EFW flow estimate analysis which

b. Loop T <64*F reveals that 64*F T

c. Tc is BOTH: will not be exceeded for

1) <5 F F cooldown with maximum

2) fonstant OR dropping cecay heat and one steam

d. RCS Subcooling Margin between 28 F generator isolated with AND 200*F. cooldown rate <75'F/hr.

550*F is based on con-trol program for ADVs and steam generator dump bypass valves and best estimate analysis.

Decay heat levels may not be high enough to require feedwater flow.

If this is the case, once steam generator level is returned-to the zero power level band and feedwater m-mains available to maintain that level then RCS heat removal is possible.

Subcooling >28'F is necessary to assure an adequate medium for core heat transfer. 200*F is a limit based on PTS considerations.

t 461 W3101400

~ ' ~ ~ ~

~~

._ _ __ _. _._. _T' . ._ :

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Safety Function Criteria Bases RCS And Core Heat Removal (Continued)

Success Path V-3 a. Either of the following is (CEN-152 pages 10-6 satisfied: through 10-8) Adequate  ;

1) Safety Injection flow has S/G performance is indica- i been throttled OR terminated ted by level in the hot )

to maintain inventory zero power band or being l

OR restored with feedwater i U IF Pressurizer pressure <1385 available.  !

THEN proper HPSI flow i Ria, exists7 efer to Attachment 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus When ECCS is operating, Pressurizer Pressure its performance adequacy

b. Core temperature <700*F OR is judged by comparing l dropping expected to observed

c. At least one Steam Generator is delivery flow versus satisfying either: RCS pressure.

1) Steam Generator level Wide Range is BOTH:

a) >50%

b) fonstant OR rising -

OR U Level is being restored by either MFW OR EFW flow.

Success Path V-4 a. Any of the following are satisfied: Core exit thermocouples

1) Safety Injection flow has been less than 700*F or de-throttled OR terminated to creasing is a limit which maintain inventory recognizes that RCS tem-OR perature may be superheated U IF Pressurizer pressure <1385 for short periods during Ria,THENproperHPSIflow recovery. If temperatures exists - Nefer to Attachment are in excess of 700*F, the 2: HPSI and LPSI Flow versus trend must be decreasing to Pressurizer Pressure indicate satisfactory per-OR formance. 700*F is the I

U IF Pressurizer pressure <183 plant specific core exit Fia,ANDRAShasNOToccurred, termocouple temperature THEN proper LPSI fT5i exists. which will not be exceeded TeTer to Attachment 2: HPSI during events which are not and LPSI Flow versus complicated by significant, l Pressurizer Pressure multiple failures.

I b. Pressurizer pressure <1385 psia OR dropping When cooling by once through

( c. fore temperature <700*F OR -

cooling, RCS pressure should dropping be less than shutoff head of the HPSI pumps (1385 psia.)

-If greater than 1385 psia, then a decreasing trend '

indicated that pressure will be below 1385 PSIA soon.

462 l W3101400 9

a

. . . , , . ., , . _ , _. p. , , , , , _ , , . , , . , . , . , . , , , , . , - , , , - ._.p. , , , - - ...v.,,,. , y

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Safety Function Criteria Basis RCS And Core Heat Removal (Continued)

Success Path V-5 a. One train of Shutdown Cooling in service

b. Pres'surizer pressum 1392 psia

c. Tc 1350*F.

4 1

0 463 W3101400

i l

TG-OP-902-008 l R2visien 0 4-7-84 Safety Function Criteria Bases Containment Isolation Success Path VI-1 a. Either of the following is (CEN-152, page 10-8) satisfied: 17.4 psia is the CIAS

1) ALL of the following exist: setpoint. If pressure a) Pressurizer pressure goes above 17.4 psia

>1684 psia containment isolation b) Containment pressure valves should shut.

<17.4 psia (i.e. CIAS should be c) NO Containment Radiation present).

aTarms OR 27 At least one Containment Radiation alarms maf Isolation valve closed for also indicate the need each Containment penetration for containment isola-NOT in use tion. Steam plant

b. Either of the following is activity alarm may satisfied: indicate a steam gener-

1) NO Steam Plant activity ator tube rupture and OR reqJire isolating a S/G.

27 The faulted Steam Generator has been isolated.

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 Safety Function Criteria Bases Containment Temperature and Pressure Control Success Path VII-1 a. Containment pressure is BOTH: (CEN-152, page 10-9)

1) <17.4 psia 17.4 psia is based on con-2). Constant OR dropping tainment pressure alarm.

b. Containment temperature is B'lTH: It is not expected for

1) <120*F the selected events that

2) Constant OR dropping.

containment pressure will increase to the alarm set-point unless there is an Success Path VII-2 a. Containment pressure is BOTH: energy release into

1) <17.7 psia containment.

2) Constant OR dropping OR 120 F is the maximum ex-b ALL of the following are pected containment tem-satisfied: perature for the selected

1) Containment Spray flow exists events. It is not expect-

2) Containment temperature ed that containment tem-constant OR dropping perature will increase to

3) Containmeiit pressure constant 120 F unless there is an OR dropping. energy release.

During the selected event, containment temperature and pressure may exceed these limits if the break is inside containment. If this happens, a CSAS should be present and the CSPs should be pumping spray solution at [1500] gpm.

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TG-0P-902-008 '

R;visien 0 4-7-84 l

Safety Function Criteria . Bases Containment Combustible Gas Control Success Path VIII-1 a. Containment hydrogen concentra- (CEN-122, page 10-9) tion <3% H,_in the containment is OR iMicative of a primary ET Either of the following is systen leak to contain-satisfied: ment and may be indica-

1) BOTH Hydrogen Recombiners tive of core damage. The in operation explosive hazarad which OR may exist in the contain-27 Containment Atmospheric ment may present a threat Release System in operation. to containrant integrity.

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TG-0P-902-008 RIvisicn 0 4-7-84

, 3.0 Generic Steps not included in the Waterford-3 E0P In the items cited below, step, precaution, and page numbers refer to the appropriate sections of CEN-152.

E.0 Recovery Actions: General Instructions Step 6 (page 10-103):

If the first (on the left of each tree) success path is being used for all the safety functions on Figure 10-3 and the criteria for that path are satisfied, implement the Reactor Trip Recovery guideline.

Justification:

OP-902-000, Emergency Entry Procedure, Section D. Diagnostics provides diagnosis and kickouts to each optimal recovery procedure. Therefore, it was decided to use only one kickout step in this procedure. The kickout step directs the operator to go to the entry procedure when all safety functions are being controlled. No matter what success path is in use the diagnostics will determine the correct optimal recovery procedure to go to, if any, or return the operator to the safety function recovery procedure.

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E2 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control-Success Path RC-1 Precaution 5 (page 10-112):

Main or auxiliary pressurizer spray should be used as necessary to equal-ize the pressurizer and RCS loop water boron concentration as a change is made to the RCS boron concentration. If pressurizer spray is not avail-able, RCS boron concentration should be increased. This avoids an RCS dilution below minimum shutdown requirements by a possible pressurizer outsurge.

Justification:

Since the RCS Pressure Control safety function is a lower priority safety function, the availability of pressurizer spray may not have been deter-mined at this time. Using pressurizer spray during the Reactivity Control safety function deviates from the philosophy of this procedure and thereby can jeopardize other safety functions. Emergency boration is terminated when specific criteria are satisfied. If the criteria are satisfied, then the Reactivity Control safety function is no longer in jeopardy. If later, the criteria are not being satisfied thereby placing the Reactivity Control safety function in jeopardy, then the operator is required to return to the Reactivity Control safety function due to its higher priority.

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TG-OP-902-008 R2visien 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path RC-2 Precaution 3 (page 10-115):

Main or auxiliary pressurizer spray should be used as necessary to equal-ize the pressurizer and RCS loop water boron concentration as a change is made to the RCS boron concentration. If pressurizar spray is not avail-able, RCS boron concentration should be increased. This avoids an RCS dilution below minimum shutdown requirements by a possible pressurizer outsurge.

Justification:

Since the RCS Pressure Control safety function is a lower priority safety function, the availability of pressurizer spray may not have been deter-mined at this time. Using pressurizer spray during the Reactivity Control safety function deviates from the philosophy of this procedure and thereby can jeopardize other safety functions. Emergency boration is terminated when specific criteria are satisfied. If the criteria are satisfied, then the Reactivity Control safety function is no longer in jeopardy. .If later, the criteria are not being satisfied thereby placing the Reactivity Control safety function in jeopardy, then the operator is required to return to the Reactivity Control safety function due to its higher priority. .

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TG-0P-902-008 RIvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure II. Reactivity Control 2

Success Path RC-3 ,

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Precaution 7 (page 10-120):

4 Main or auxiliary pressurizer spray should be used as necessary to equal-ize the pressurizer and RCS loop water boron concentration as a change is made to the RCS boron concentration. If pressurizer spray is not avail-able, RCS boron concentration should be increased. This avoids an RCS l dilution below minimum shutdown requirements by a possible pressurizer outsurge.

Justification: '

Since the RCS Pressure Control safety function is a lower priority safety function, the availability of pressurizer spray may not have been deter- i mined at this time. Using pressurizer spray during the Reactivity Control safety function deviates from the philosophy of this procedure and thereby  !

can jeopardize other safety functions. Emergency boration is terminated when specific criteria are satisfied. If the criteria are satisfied, then the Reactivity Control safety function is no longer in jeopardy. If later, the criteria are not being satisfied thereby placing the Reactivity Control safety function in jeopardy, then the operator is required' to return to the Reactivity Control safety function due to its higher priority.

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i TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control 3

Success Path IC-1 Precaution 4 (page 10-126h Steam plant radiation alarms usually indicate a steam generator tube leak  ;

which may result in a loss of RCS inventory.

Justification:

This precaution is an information only precaution. There are no instruc-tions given here for what to do with a steam generator tube leak (i.e.,

isolate the affected steam generator). Steam plant activity is part of the Containment Isolation safety function. The safety function status checklist will alert the operator if the Containment Isolation safety function is in jeopar@ due to steam plant activity.

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TG-0P-902-008 R2visicn 0 4-7-84 E3 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure III. RCS Inventory Control Success Path IC-2 Precaution 5 (page 10-130):

Steam plant radiation alarms usually indicate a steam generator tube leak which may result in a loss of RCS inventory.

Justification:

This precaution is an information only precaution. There are no instruc-tions given here for what to do with a steam generator tube leak (i.e. ,

isolate the affected steam generator). Steam plant activity is part of the Containment Isolation safety function. The safety function status checklist will alert the operator if the Containment Isolation safety function is in jeopardy due to steam plant activity.

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TG-0P-902-008 Ravision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path PC-5 Step 5 (page 10-143):

[If the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) is started, perform the following i to prevent steam generator feedring damage:

Justification:

Per Combustion Engineering letter (C-CE-8998), the Waterford-3 design for automatic initiation of 200 gpm is acceptable. The design of the Waterford-3 feedring minimizes drainage of the feedring, thus the condi-tions for waterhammer are minimized.

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TG-0P-902-008 RevisiCn 0 4-7-84 1 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path PC-5 Step 7 (page 10-144): -

If all feedwater is lost and pressurizer sprays (main and auxiliary) are not available, go to PC-7, RCS Pressure Control using [PORVs].

Justification:

PC-7, RCS Pressure Control using PORVs, was not used since Waterford-3 does not have PORVs.

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f 474 W3101400 m m a-n- .

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E4 Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control Success Path PC-6 Step 6 (page 10-147):

[If the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) is started, perform the following to prevent steam generator feedring damage:

l Justification:

Per Combustion Engineering letter (C-CE-8998), the Waterford-3 design for automatic initiation of 200 gpm is acceptable. The design of the Waterford-3 feedring minimizes drainage of the feedring, thus the condi-tions for waterhammer are minimized.

475 W3101400

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TG-0P-902-008 Rsvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path PC-6 Step 7.c (page 10-147):

If feedwater cannot be regained in at least one operable steam generator, go to PC-7, [RCS pressure control using PORVs].

Justificqtion:

PC-7, RCS Pressure Control using PORVs, was not used since Waterford-3 does not have PORVs.

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476 W3101400 4

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TG-0P-902-008 R2visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path PC-6 Precaution 5 (page 10-149):

Natural circulation flow should not be verified until the RCPs have stopped coasting down after being tripped.

Justification:

This precaution was not used because it was decided that operators would be trained to know when to monitor natural circulation. Also, by the way ,

the procedures are structured, the steps for monitoring natural circula-tion are located at a point when reactor coolant pumps should have stopped coasting down.

477 W3101400

l TG-0P-902-008 i R;visien 0 1 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control 4

Success Path PC-6 Precaution 6 (page 10-149):

Verification of temperature responses to a plant change cannot be accom-plished until approximately 5 to 15 minutes following the action due to increased loop cycle times during natural circulation.

Justification:

This precaution was not used because it was decided that the operators would be trained to know that natural circulation had longer loop tran-sient times which causes plant responses to be slower.

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478 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E4 . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure IV. RCS Pressure Control ..

Success Path PC-6 Precaution 7 (page 10-150):

, When RCS heat removal is conducted by natural circulation with an isolated steam generator, an inverted AT (i.e. T chigher than T ) hmay be observed in the idle loop. This is due to a small amount of reverse heat transfer in the isolated steam generator and will have no affect on natural circu-lation flow in the operating steam generator loop.

Justification:

This precaution was not used because it was decided that operators would be trained to recognize this inverted aT and its effect on cooldown.

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TG-0P-902-008 R vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path HR-1 1

Step 4 (page 10-154):

[If the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) is started, perform the following to prevent steam generator feedring damage:

2 Justification:

Per Combustion Engineering letter (C-CE-8998), the Waterford-3 design for automatic initiation of 200 gpa is acceptable. The design of the Waterford-3 feedring minimizes drainage of the feedring, thus the condi-tions for waterhammer are minimized.

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E . Rec very Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path HR-1 Step 5.f (page 10-155):

If feedwater cannot be regained, go to [HR-4, RCS and Core Heat Removal using ECCS and PORVs]. .

Justification:

HR-4, RCS And Core Heat Removal using PORVs, was not used since Waterford-3 does not have PORVs.

481 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path HR-1 Precaution 6 (page 10-157):

If voids are present (see voiding guidance in IC-1 and IC-2), they may have to be eliminated to depressurize.

Justification:

By the philosophy of this procedure, anytime a higher priority safety function becomes in jeopardy the operator is required to go to that subprocedure. The operator will be trained to know and understand this philosophy.

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l TG-0P-902-008  ;

R;visicn 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path HR-2 Step 5 (page 10-159):

[If the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) is started, perform the following to prevent steam generator feedring damage:

Justification:

Per Combustion Engineering letter (C-CE-8998), the Waterford-3 design for automatic initiation of 200 gpm is acceptable. The design of the Waterford-3 feedring minimizes drainage of the feedring, thus the condi-tions for waterhammer are minimized.

o 483 W3101400 i

TG-0P-902-008 RQvision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal S

Success Path HR-2 Step 6.e (page 10-160):

If feedwater cannot be regained, go to [HR-4, RCS and Core Heat Removal using ECCS and PORVs].

Justification:

HR-4, RCS And Core Heat Removal using PORVs, was not used since Waterford-3 does not have PORVss l

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484 W3101400

TG-0P-902-008 R2 vision 0 4-7-84 E . Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path HR-2 Precaution 1 (page 10-162):

Natural circulation flow should not be verified until the RCPs have stopped coasting down after being tripped.

Justification:

This precaution was not used because it was decided that operators would be trained to know when to monitor natural circulation. Also, by the way the procedures are structured, the steps for monitoring natural circula-tion are located at a point when reactor coolant pumps should have stopped coasting down.

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485 W3101400 l

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E . Recovery Act. ions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 1 5

Success Path HR-2 Precaution 2 (page 10-162):

Verification of temperature responses to a plant change cannot be accom-plished until approximately 5 to 15 minutes following the action due to increased loop cycle times during natural circulation.

Justification:

This precaution was not used because it was decided that the operators would be trained to know that natural circulation had longer loop tran-sient times which causes plant responses to be slower.

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TG-0P-902-008 Revision 0 4-7-84 E Recovery Actions: Subprocedure V. RCS And Core Heat Removal 5

Success Path HR-2 Precaution 4 (page 10-162):

If cooling down by natural circulation with an isolated steam generator, an inverted AT (i.e. T chigher than T )h may be observed in the idle loop.

This is due to a small amount of reverse heat transfer in the isolated steam generator and will have no affect on natural circulation flow in the operating steam generator loop.

Justification:

This precaution was not used because it was decided that operators would be trained to aecognize this inverted AT and its effect on cooldown.

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TG-0P-902-008 R; vision 0 4-7-84 4.0 List of Instruments and Ranges Parameter and Ranges for Safety Function Recovery Procedure Parameters Required Range Available Range

1. Pressurizer pressure 350 to 2250 psia 0 to 3000 psia

2. Pressurizer level 28 to 60% 0 to 1005

3. Pressurizer temperature 430 to 652*F 0 to 700*F

4. Average temperature 544 to 582*F 525 to 625'F

5. Cold leg temperature 350 to 550*F 0 to 600*F

6. Hot leg temperature 350 to 611*F 50 to 750*F

7. Core temperature 350 to 800*F 200 to 2300*F

8. Subcooling margin 20 to 200*F -200 to 200*F

9. Volume control tank level 10 to 68% 0 to 1005 l

10. Charging header flow 40 to 132 gpm 0 to 150 gpa

11. Steam generator pressure 67 to 1050 psia 0 to 1200 psia

12. Steam generator level

a. Wide range 52 to 85% 0 to 100%

b. Narrow range 60 to 70% 0 to 100%

13. Steam generator outlet 300 to 572*F 0 to 600*F temperature .

6 6

14. Steam flow 0 to 7.5 x 10 1ba/hr 0 to 8.0 x 10 1ba/hr 6

15. Feed flow 0 to 7.5 x 10 1bm/hr 0 to 8.0 x 1061 k/hr

16. Emergency feedwater flow 0 to 400 gpm 0 to 800 gpa

17. Condensate storage pool level 27.7 to 97.7% 0 to 100% -

18. High pressure turbine 1.5 to 3 psig 0 to 15 psia gland sealing steam (local)

19. Low pressure turbine gland 1.5 to 3 psig -30 in Hg Vac to 15 psig sealing steam (local)

20. Main feed pump gland sealing 4 psig -30 in Hg Vac to 60 psig steam (local)

21. Gland steam pressure 140 psig 0 to 150 psig

22. Containment pressure O to 17.4 psia 0 to 30 psia

23. Safety injection tank pressure 235 to 625 psig 0 to 700 psig 488 W3101400 N.-

TG-0P-902-008 I R;visi:n 0 4-7-84 Parameters Required Range Available Range

24. High pressure safety injection

a. Flow 0 to 500 gpm 0 to 500 gpm

b. Pressure 0 to 2500 psig 0 to 2500 psig

25. Low pressure safety injection

a. Flow 0 to 5500 gpm 0 to 5500 gpm

b. Pressure 0 to 650 psig 0 to 650 psig

26. Steam generator blowdown 10 to 106cpm 10 to 106cpm activity monitor

27. Main steam line activity monitor 100 to 10 5mr/hr 100 to 10 5mr/hr

28. Condenser vacuum pump exhaust 10 to 107cpm 10 to 10 7cpm activity monitor

29. Containment radiation monitor 101 to 105 mr/hr 101 to 105mr/hr

30. Main condenser vacuum 0 to 30" Hg 0 to 30" Hg

31. Emergency diesel generator 0 to 7 MW 0 to 7 MW megawatts

32. Emergency diesel generator 0 to 5250 volts 0 to 5250 volts voltage

33. 4.16KV safety bus voltage 0 to 5250 volts 0 to 5250 volts -

34. 4.16KV nonsafety bus voltage 0 to 5250 volte 0 to 5250 volts y 35. Battery bus voltage 0 to 150 volts 0 to 150 volts o

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