ML20210D052
| ML20210D052 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1999 |
| From: | ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210D040 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9907270116 | |
| Download: ML20210D052 (20) | |
Text
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NPF-38-217 l
ATTACHMENT A EXISTING SPECIFICATIONS l
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s 9907270116 990715 PDR ADOCK 05000382 p
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INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (Continued)
{
ACTIVITY.............................................
3/4 7-7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES.....................
3/4 7-9 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION.........
3/4 7-10 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER AND AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEMS...................................
3/4 7-11 3/4.7.4 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK......................................
3/4 7-12 3/4.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION........................................
3/4 7-15 I
3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING SYST2M....................
3/4 7-16 3/4.7.7 CONTROLLED VENTILATION AREA SYSTEM......................
3/4 7-19 3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS................................................
3/4 7-21 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION.............................
3/4 7-27 I
3/4.7.12 ESSENTIAL SERVICES CHILLED WATER SYSTEM.................
3/4 7-43 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING............................................
3/4 8-1 SHUTD0WN.............................................
3/4 8-8 3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES OPERATING............................................
3/4 8-9 SHUTD0WN.............................................
3/4 8-12 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 VIII Amendment No. 50
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR o
Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture.
This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1 gra primary to secondary tube leak in the :, team generator of the affected steam line and a concurrent loss-of-offsite electrical power.
These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line rupture.
This restriction is required to (1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment.
The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator secondary pressure and temperature ensures that-the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits.
The limitation to 115'F and 210 psig is based on a steam generator RT f 40*F and is NDT sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
Below this temperature of 115*F the systa nressure must be limited to a maximum of 20% of the secondary hydro-ste : test pressure of 1375 psia (corrected for instrument error).
Should steam generator temperature drop below 115'F an engineering evaluation of the effects of the overpressurization is required.
However, to reduce the poten-tial for brittle failure the steam generator temperature may be increased to a limit of 200*F while performing the evaluation.
The limitations on the primary side of the steam generator are bounded by the restrictions on the reactor coolant system in Specification 3.4.8.1.
3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER AND AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system and its corresponding auxiliary component cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions.
The redundant cooling capacity of these systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 7-3 Amendment No. 6
NPF-38-217 ATTACHMENT B PROPOSED MARKED-UP SPECIFICATIONS i
t INDEX LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
(
SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (Continued)
ACTIVITY.............................................
3/4 7-7 MAIN N
TION SV JL2-
/nMN FEED kMTER /.rol A M At MWGS STENGENE'R"AT01f'PRD3UR6TlfM'P~E% TURI ~dMM.....
3/4' 7 'la.
3/4.7.2 3/ 7-10
)
3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER AND AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEMS...................................
3/4 7-11 4
3/4.7.4 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK......................................
3/4 7-12 374.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION........................................
3/4 7-15 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM....................
3/4 7-16 3/4.7.7 CONTROLLED VENTILATION AREA SYSTEM......................
3/4 7-19 3/4.7.8 SNUBBERS................................................
3/4 7-21 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION.............................
3/4 7-27 Ii.
3/4.7.12 ESSENTIAL SERVICES CHILLED WATER SYSTEM.................
3/4 7-43 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING.....................
3/4 8-1 SHUT 00WN.............................................
3/4 8-8 3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES OPERATING............................................
3/4 8-9 SHUTD0WN.............................................
3/4 8-12 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 VIII Amendment No. 50
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PLANT SYSTEMS h(Q^Yg. 1k 0
MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES y
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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.6 Each Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (MFIV) shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.
ACTION:
Note: Separate Condition entry is allowed for each valve.
With one or more MFIV inoperable, close and deactivate, or isolate the inoperable valve within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and verify inoperable valve closed and deactivated or isolated once every 7 days; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
Tne provisions of Specification 3.0.4 do not apply.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.6 Each main feedwater isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. By verifying isolation < 5.0 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
- b. By verifying actuation to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal at least once per 18 months.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 7-9a Amendment No.
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY l
The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR o
Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture.
This dose also includes the effects of a coincident I gpm primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line and a concurrent loss-of-offsite electrical power.
These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE The OPERA 8ILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to (1) ~ minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment.
The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent ts h uWygese =
3_/4 r 7. I. & M M AI FEEblo4 76K /5 OL A TfoA) V M V c= $
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The limitation on steam generator secondary pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits.
The limitation to 115'F and 210 psig is based on a steam generator RT of 40*F and is NOT sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
Below this temperature of 115'F the system pressure must be limited to a maximum of 20% of the secondary hydro-static test pressure of 1375 psia (corrected for instrument error).
ShoLia steam generator temperature drop below 115'F an engineering evaluation of the effects of the overpressurization is required.
However, to reduce the poten-tial for brittle failure the steam generator temperature may be increased to a limit of 200*F while performing the evaluation.
The limitations on the primary side of the steam generator are bounded by the restrictions on the reactor coolant system in Specification 3.4.8.1.
3/4.7.3 COMPONENT C0OLING WATER AND AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system and its corresponding auxiliary component cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions.
The redundant cooling capacity of these systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 7-3 Amendment No. 6
l BASES INSERT
)
3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES The Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) isolate main feedwater (MFW) flow to the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break 1
-(HELB). Closure of the MFIVs terminates flow to both steam generators, mitigating the consequences for feedwater line breaks (FWLBs). Closure of the MFIVs effectively terminates the addition of main feedwater to an affected steam generator, limiting the mass and energy release for Main Steam Line Breaks (MSLBs) or FWLBs inside containment, and reducing the cooldown effects for MSLBs.
The MFIVs isolate the nonsafety related feedwater supply from the safety related portion of the system. In the event of a secondary side pipe rupture inside containment, the valves limit the quantity of high energy fluid that enters containment through the break, and provide a pressure boundary for the controlled addition of Emergency Feedwater (EFW) to the intact steam generator.
One MFIV is located on each MFW line, outside, but close to, containment. The MFIVs are located upstream of the EFW injection point so that EFW may be supplied to a steam generator following MFIV closure. The piping volume from the valve to the steam generator must be accounted for in calcuiating mass and energy releases, and refilled prior to EFW reaching the steam generator following either a MSLB or FWLB.
The MFIVs close on receipt of a Main Steam isolation Signal (MSIS) generated by either low steam generator pressure or high containment pressure. The MFIVs may also be actuated manually from the control room. The MSIS also actuates the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and Startup Feedwater Regulating Valves (SFRVs) to close. The Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves are normally closed and deactivated during power operation.
In MODES 1,2, 3, and 4, the MFIVs are required to be OPERABLE, except when they are closed and deactivated or isolated by either a closed manual valve or closed and
' deactivated automatic valve, in order to limit the amount of available fluid that could be
- added to the Steam Generator and/or containment in the case of a secondary system pipe break inside containment. When a MFIV is closed and deactivated or isolated by a closed manual valve or closed and deactivated automatic valve, it is already performing its safety function.
i in MODES 5 and 6, residual heat removal is through the Shutdown Cooling System and MFW is not required. Therefore, the MFIVs are normally closed.
i
p With one MFIV inoperable, action must be taken to close or isolate the inoperable valve within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. When the valve is closed or isolated, it is performing the required safety function (e.g., to isolate the main feedwater line) and continued operation in the applicable MODES is allowed.
The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the back up capability afforded by the OPERABLE MFRVs and the SFRVs, diversity of actuation signals, and the low l
probability of an event occurring during this time period that would require isolation of L
the MFW flow paths. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable to return the MFIV to OPERABLE status, close the MFIV, or otherwise isolate the affected flow path.
t Inoperable MFIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, l
but are closed or isolated, must be verified on a periodic basis that they are closed or l
isolated. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain L
valid. The 7 day time is reasonable in view of valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls to ensure that these valves are closed or isolated.
If the MFIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, closed, or isolated in the required time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 in the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power y
conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
l The TS is annotated with a 3.0.4 exemption, allowing entry into the applicable MODES to be made with an inoperable MFIV closed or isolated as required by the ACTIONS. The ACTIONS allow separate condition entry for each valve by using "With one or more MFIV...". This prevents immediate entry into TS 3.0.3 if both MFIVs are declared inoperable.
The Surveillance Requirement to verify isolation in less than or equal to 5 seconds is based on the time assumed in the accident and containment analyses. The static test demonstrates the ability of the MFIVs to close in less than or equal to 5 seconds under design basis accident conditions. The MFIVs should not be tested at power since even a partial stroke exercise increases the risk of a valve closure with the plant generating power and would create added cyclic stresses. The Surveillance to verify each MFIV can close on an actual or simulated actuation signal is normally performed when the plant is retuming to operation following a refueling outage.
Verification of valve closure on an actuation signal is not required until entry into Mode 3 consistent with TS 3.3.2. The 18 month frequency is based on the refueling cycle.
Verification of closure time is performed per TS 4.0.5. This frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint and is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.
(L
l i
NPF-38-217
{
t ATTACHMENT C PROPOSED SPECIFICATIONS
IN c LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND c
%. ANCE REQUIREMENTS SECTION PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS (Continued)
]
ACTIVI TY...................................
3/4 7-7 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES.......
3/4 7-9 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES...
3/4 7-9a l
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION... 3/4 7-10 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER AND AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEMS...
3/4 7-11 3/4.7.4 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK...
3/4 7-12 i
j 3/4.7.5 FLOOD PROTECTION.........................
3/4 7-15 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM....
3/4 7-16 3/4.7.7 CONTROLLED VENTILATION AREA SYSTEM...........
3/4 7-19 3/4.7.8 S N U B B E R S..
3/4 7-21 3/4.7.9 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION...................
3/4 7-27 3/4.7.12 ESSENTIAL SERVICES CHILLED WATER SYSTEM....
3/4 7-43 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3/4.8.1 A.C. SOURCES OPERATING...
3/4 8-1 SHUTDOWN...
3/4 8-8 l
3/4.8.2 D.C. SOURCES OPERATING...
3/4 8-9 SHUTDOWN........
3/4 8-12 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 Vill AMENDMENT NO. 59
PLANT SYSTEMS MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.6 Each Main Feedwater Isolation Valve (MFIV) shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3, and 4.
ACTION:
Note: Separate Condition entry is allowed for each valve.
With one or more MFIV inoperable, close and deactivate, or isolate the inoperable valve within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and verify inoperable valve closed and deactivated or isolated once every 7 days; otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 do not apply.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.6 Each main feedwater isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
a.
By verifying isolation 5 5.0 seconds when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
b.
By verifying actuation to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal at least once per 18 months.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 7-9a AMENDMENT NO.
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY '
The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1 gpm primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line and a concurrent loss-of-offsite electricalpower. These values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
-3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVE The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blow down in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to (1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and (2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the closure times of the Surveillance Requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES The Main Feedwater isolatioa Valves (MFIVs) isolate main feedwater (MFW) flow to the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break (HELB). Closure of the MFIVs terminates flow to both steam generators, mitigating the consequences for feedwater line breaks (FWLBs). Closure of the MFIVs effectively terminates the addition of main feedwater to an affected steam generator, limiting the mass and energy release for Main Steam Line Breaks (MSLBs) or FWLBs inside containment, and reducing the cooldown effects for MSLBs.
The MFIVs isolate the non-safety related feedwater supply from the safety related portion of the system. In the event of a secondary side pipe rupture inside containment, the valves limit the quantity of high energy fluid that enters containment through the break, and provide a pressure boundary for the controlled addition of Emergency Feedwater (EFW) to the intact steam generator.
One MFIV is located on each MFW line, outside, but close to, containment. The MFIVs are located upstream of the EFW injection point so that EFW may be supplied to a steam generator following MFIV closure. The pipir g volume from the valve to the steam generator must be accounted for in calculating mass and energy releases, and refilled prior to EFW reaching the steam generator following either a MSLB or FWLB.
The MFIVs close on receipt of a Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) generated by either low steam generator pressure or high containment pressure. The MFIVs may also be actuated manually from the control room. The MSIS also actuates the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and Startup Feedwater WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 7-3 AMENDMENT NO,6
PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (con't)
Regulating Valves (SFRVs) to close. The Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves are normally closed and deactivated during power operation.
{
in MODES 1,2,3, and 4, the MFIVs are required to be OPERABLE, except when they are closed and deactivated or isolated by either a closed manual valve or closed and deactivated automatic valve, in order to limit the amount of available fluid that could be added to the Steam Generator and/or containment in the case of a secondary system pipe break inside j
containment. When a MFIV is closed and deactivated or isolated by a closed manual valve or
- closed and deactivated automatic valve, it is already performing its safety function.
In MODES 5 and 6, residual heat removal is through the Shutdown Cooling System and MFW is not required. Therefore, the MFIVs are norma!Dj closed.
With one MFIV inoperable, action must be taken to close or isolate the inoperable valve within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. When the valve is closed or isolated, it is performing the required safety function (e.g., to isolate the main feedwater line) and continued operation in the applicable MODES is allowed.
The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the back up capability afforded by the OPERABLE MFRVs and the SFRVs, diversity of actuation signals, and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable to return the MFIV to OPERABLE status, close the MFIV, or otherwise isolate the affected flow path.
Inoperable MFIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, but are closed or isolated, must be verified on a periodic basis that they are closed or isolated. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day time is reasonable in view of valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls to ensure that these valves are closed or isolated.
if the MFIVs cannot be restored to OPEP.ABLE status, closed, or isolated in the required time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 5 in the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The allowed completion times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.
The TS is annotated with a 3.0.4 exemption, allowing entry into the applicable MODES to be made with an inoperable MFIV closed or isolated as required by the ACTIONS. The ACTIONS allow separate condition entry for each valve by using "With one or more MFIV..."
This prevents immediate entry into TS 3.0.3 if both MFIVs are declared inoperable.
WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 7-3a AMENDMENT NO.
PLANT SYSTEMS 1
BASES 3/4.7.1.6 MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (con't)
. The Surveillance Requirement to verify isolation in less than or equal to 5 seconds is based on the time assumed in the accident and containment analyses. The static test
. demonstrates the ability of the MFIVs to close in less than or equal to 5 seconds under design basis accident conditions. The MFIVs should not be tested at power since even a partial stroke exercise increases the risk of a valve closure with the plant generating power and would create
- added cyclic stresses. The Surveillance to verify each MFIV can close on an actual or simulated actuation signal is normally performed when the plant is returning to operation following a refueling outage. Verification of valve closure on an actuation signal is not required until entry into Mode 3 consistent with TS 3.3.2. The 18 month frequency is based on the refueling cycle.
Verification of closure time is performed per TS 4.0.5. This frequency is acceptable from a
- reliability standpoint and is in accordance with the Insarvice Testing Program.
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURETTEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator secondary pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitation to 115'F and 210 psig is based on a steam generator RTNDT of 40*F and is sufficient to prevent brittle fracture. Below this temperature of 115'F the system pressure must be limited to a maximum of 20% of the secondary hydrostatic j
test pressure of 1375 psia (corrected for instrument error). Should steam generator temperature drop below 115'F an engineering evaluation of the effects of the overpressurization is required.
However, to reduce the potential for brittle failure the steam generator temperature may be increased to a limit of 200*F while performing the evaluation. The limitations on the primary side of the steam generator are bounded by the restrictions on the reactor coolant system in Specification 3.4.8.1, 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER AND AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system and its corresponding auxiliary component cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety-related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of these systems, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
l WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 7-3b -
AMENDMENT NO.-6
NPF-38-217 ATTACHMENT D MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM DRAWING I
AND REACTOR TRIP OVERRIDE LOGIC DIAGRAM w
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I, NPF-38-217 ATTACHMENT E COMMITMENT IDENTIFICATIONNOLUNTARY ENHANCEMENT FORM
COMMITMENT IDENTIFICATIONNOLUNTARY ENHANCEMENT FORM Attachment E to W3F1-99-0078
Subject:
Technical Specification Change Request NPF-38-217 Addition of Main Feedwater Isolation Valves to Technical Specifications And Request for NRC Staff Review of an Unreviewed Safety Question D:te Page 1 of 1.
SCHEDULED ONE-COMPLETION TIME CONTINUING DATE(IF ASSOCIATED COMMITMENT (S)
ACTION
- COMPLIANCE
- REQUIRED)
CR OR ER In order to have the Reactor Trip Override X
Upon NRC available during manual operation, Approval Entergy will perform a minor modification to the plant.
A revision to the FSAR will be made to X
Upon NRC cddress the changes associated with this Approval TS Change Request and resolution of the unreviewed safety question.
Tcchnical Requirements Manual changes X
Upon NRC will be made for crediting backup valves Approval cod circuitry.
Testing of non-safety-related components X
Upon NRC credited for MFIV closure (RTO and AFW Approval pump high discharge pressure trip) will be dsveloped and consistent with that for safety-related equipment.
- Check one only VOLUNTARY ENHANCEMENT (S)
ASSOCIATED CR OR ER