ML20210B341

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Proposed Tech Specs 4.5.2.f.2,increasing Performance Requirement for LPSI Pumps
ML20210B341
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/19/1999
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20210B324 List:
References
NUDOCS 9907230128
Download: ML20210B341 (9)
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Text

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NPF-38-219 ATTACHMENT A EXISTING SPECIFICATIONS I

9907230128 990719

-PDR ADOCK 05000382 P PDR

' EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. A visual inspection of tne safety injecti<>n system sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trath racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
3. Verifying that a minimum total of 380 cubic feet of granular l trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (T!P) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
4. Verifying that when a representative sample of 13.07 i 0.03 grams of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 4 i 0.1 liters of 120 i 10*F water borated to 3011 1 30 ppe, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to greater than or equal to 7 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on SIAS and RAS test signals.
2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:
a. High pre'ssure safety injection pump.
b. Low pressure safety injection pump.
3. Verifying that on a recirculation actuation test signal, the low pressure safety injection pumps stop, the safety injection system sump isolation valves open.
f. By verifying that each of the following pumps required to be OPERABLE performs as indicated on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
1. High pressure safety injection pump differential pressure greater than or equal to 142g psid.
2. Low pressure safety injection pump discharge pressure greater than or equal to 177 psig.

WATERFORD UNIT 3 3/4 5-5 AMENDMENT NO. 64,127,

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS .fContinued)

With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactmty condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The trisodium F-:+?:': dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is prowded to menemme the possibility of cormoion creciong of certain metal components during opersbon of the ECCS followng a LOCA. The TSP provides this protechon by dissolwng in the sump water and causing its final pH to be remed to greater than or equal to 7.0. The requirement to desolve a representatwo sample of TSP in a sample of water borated to be repc:::ns of post-LOCA sump condibons prowdes assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post-LOCA temperatures. A boron concentration of 3011 ppm boron is postulated to be representative of the highest post-LOCA i sump boron concentration. Post-LOCA sump pH will remain between 7.0 and 8.1 for the I maximum (3011 ppm) and mirumum (1504 ppm) boron concentrations calculated using the maximum and minimum post-LOCA sump volumes and conservatively assumed maximum and minimum source boron concentrabons.

With the excephon of systems in operation, the ECCS pumps are normally in a standby, nonoperstmg mode. As such, flow path piping has the potenbal to develop voids and pockets of entramed gases. Maintaming the piping from the ECCS pumps to the RCS full of water ensures that the system will perform property, inlochng its full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will prevent water hammer, pump cavitabon, and pumping noncondensible gas (e.g., sir, rwtrogen, or hydrogen) into the reactor vessel following an SIAS or dunng SDC. The 31 day frequency takes into considersbon the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping and the adequacy of the procedural controls govemmg system operation.

The Surveillance Requirements gesed to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a merumum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintamed. Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing prowde assurance that proper ECCS flows will be mamtsined in the event of a LOCA. Mantenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each ingschon point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow fmm exceeding runout condstions when the system is in its meimum reestance configurshon, (2) prowde the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an ee=f*=hla level of total ECCS flow to all irjoction points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, i The requirement to verify the mirumum pump decharge pressure on recirculabon flow ensures that the pump performance curve has not degraded below that used to show that the pump exceeds the desagn flow condibon assumed in the safety analyse and is consstent with the requirements of ASME Sechon XI.

8 3/4 5 2 AMENDMENT NO. 1 0 .130,147 WATERFORD - UNIT 3

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NPF-38-219 ATTACHMENT B PROPOSED MARKED-UP SPECIFICATIONS l

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' EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0UIREMENTS (Continued)

2. A visual inspection of the safety injection system sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
3. Verifying that a minimum total of 380 cubic feet of granular l trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
4. Verifying that when a representative sample of 13.07 i 0.03 grams of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 4 i 0.1 liters of 120 f 10*F water borated to 3011 i 30 ppe, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to greater than or equal to 7 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on SIAS and RAS test signals.
2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:
a. High pressure safety injection pump.
b. Low pressure safety injection pump.
3. Verifying that on a recirculation actuation test signal, the low pressure safety injection pumps stop, the s;fety injection

' system sump isolation valves open.

f. By verifying that each of the following pumps required to be OPERABLE performs as indicated on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
1. High pressure safety injection pump differential pressure greater than or equal to 1429 psid.

.h%eDh n or q7al!o i 1

IG8 pdid, l

WATERFORD UNIT 3 3/4 5-5 AMENDMENT NO. 64,t27, 1

,. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ,

BASES ECCS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure considershon on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requrements. .

The tnsodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in desolvmg baskets located in the containment basement is provided to mammize the possitnlity of corrosen cracking of certain metal components dunng opersbon of the ECCS followmg a LOCA. The TSP provides this p,v;.;0en by dissolving in the sump water and causmg its final pH to be remed to greater than or i equal to 7.0. The requrement to dissolve a representabve sample of TSP in a sample of water borated to be rep. :::Ms of post-LOCA sump conditions provides assurance that the stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post-LOCA temperatures. A boron )

concentration of 3011 ppm boron is postulated to be representabve of the highest post-LOCA sump boron conoontration Post-LOCA sump pH will remain between 7.0 and 8.1 for the maximum (3011 ppm) and minimum (1504 ppm) boron concentrabons calculated using the maximum and minimum post-LOCA sump volumes and conservabwely assumed maximum and minimum source boron concentrabons.

With the excephon of systems in operation, the ECCS pumps are normally in a standby, nonoperating mode. As such, flow path popmg has the potenbal to develop voids and pockets of entramed gases. Maintaining the (# ng i from the ECCS pumps to the RCS full of water ensures that the system will perform property, irischng its full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will prevent water hammer, pump cavitaten, and pumping noncondensible gas (e.g., sir, nitrogen, or hydrogen) into the reactor vessel following an SlAS or dunng SDC. The 31 day frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulabon in the ECCS piping and the adequacy of the procedural controis govemmg systern opershon.

The Surveillance Requrements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumphons used in the safety analyses are met and that i subsystem OPERABILITY is mentamed. Surveillance Requrements for throttle vahre position j stops and flow belance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows wiu be mamtained in the event of a LOCA. Mactonance of proper flow reestance and pressure drop in the piping l system to each ingschon point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its maimum resetance conAguration, (2) provide the proper flow spilt between injechon points in accordance with the assumphons used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an =~=fe level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

SW eAa(

The requirement to venty the mirumum pump preesure on recrculation flow ensures that the pump performance curve has not dMbolow that used to show that the pump exceeds the design flow condinon assumed in the safety analyse and is consstent with

. the requrements of ASME Sechon XI.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 5 2 AMENDMENT NO. 07.0^147

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NPF-38-219 ATTACHMENT C t

PROPOSED SPECIFICATION 1

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, s EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued)

2. A visual inspection of the safety injection system sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
3. Verifying that a minimum total of 380 cubic feet of granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.
4. Verifying that when a representative sample of 13.07 i 0.03 grams of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 4 i 0.1 liters of 120 i 10 F water borated to 3011 i 30 ppm, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to greater than or equal to 7 within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.
e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:
1. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on SIAS and RAS test signals.
2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a safety injection actuation test signal:
a. High pressure safety injection pump.
b. Low pressure safety injection pump.
3. Verifying that on a recirculation actuation test signal, the low pressure safety injection pumps stop, the safety injection system sump isolation valves open.
f. By verifying that each of the following pumps required to be OPERABLE performs as indicated on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:
1. High pressure safety injection pump differential pressure greater than or equal to 1429 psid.
2. Low pressure safety injection pump differential pressure greater than or equal to 168 psid.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 5-5 AMENDMENT NO. 64,-4N I

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/ k EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES EC. CS SUBSYSTEMS (Continued)

I With the RCS temperature below 350*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

I The trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) stored in dissolving baskets located in the containment basement is provided to minimize the possibility of corrosion cracking of certain i metal components during operation of the ECCS following a LOCA. The TSP provides

) thisprotection by dissolving in the sump water and causing its final pH to be raiseo to greater '

l than or equal to 7.0. The requirement to dissolve a representative sample of TSP in a sample of l water borated to be representative of post-LOCA sump conditions provides assurance that the l stored TSP will dissolve in borated water at the postulated post-LOCA temperatures. A boron )

l concentration of 3011 ppm boron is postulated to be representative of the highest post-LOCA  !

l sump boron concentration. Post LOCA sump pH will remain between 7.0 and 8.1 for the j maximum (3011 ppm) and minimum (1504 ppm) boron concentrations calculated using the maximum and minimum post-LOCA sump volumes and conservatively assumea maximum and minimum source boron concentrations.

With the exception of systerns in operation, the ECCS pumps are normally in a standby, nonoperating mode. As such, flow path piping has the potential to develop voids and pockets of entrained gases. Maintaining the piping from the ECCS pumps to the RCS full of water ensures that the system will perform properly, injecting its full capacity into the RCS upon demand. This will prevent water hammer, pump cavitation, and pumping noncondensible gas (e.g., air, nitrogen, or hydrogen) into the reactor vessel following an SIAS or during SDC. The 31 day frequency takes into consideration the gradual nature of gas accumulation in the ECCS piping l and the adequacy of the procedural controls governing system operation.

l The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensure that at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained. Surveillance Requirements for throttle valve position l stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping l system to each injection point is necessary to: (1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding I runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

The requirement to ve ifv the minimum pump differential pressure on recirculation flow I ensures that the pump pea . .urve has not degraded below that used to show that the i pump exceeds the desigt ion assumed in the safety analysis and is consistent with i the requirements of ASME: *o 41.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 5-2 AMENDMENT NO. +27,430,-147 l

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DOCURMENT DWID>R I

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i INSERTED BY DOCUMENT RECEIPT & PROCESSING Y i ,

NUD00S FORM 123

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