ML20217K901

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Proposed Tech Specs 3.6.2.2 Loc,Allowing Plant to Operate with Two Independent Trains of Containment Cooling, Consisting of One Fan Cooler Per Train,Operable During Modes 1,2,3 & 4
ML20217K901
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/18/1999
From:
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20217K897 List:
References
NUDOCS 9910270023
Download: ML20217K901 (13)
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I NPF-38-224 l

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i ATTACHMENT A

- EXISTING SPECIFICATIONS  ;

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e 9910270023 991018 s., PDR ADOCK 05000382

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 Two independent trains of containment cooling shall be OPERABLE with two fan 1 coolers to each train.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.

ACTION:

With one train of containment cooling inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable containment cooling train to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 Each train of containment cooling shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

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a. At least once per 31 days by:
1. Starting each operational fan not already running from the control room and  !

verifying that each operational fan operates for at least 15 minutes. I

2. Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 625 spm to I each cooler. l
b. At least once per 18 months by: '
1. Verifying that each fan starts automatically on an SlAS test signal. l
2. Vertfying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 1200 gpm to each cooler.
3. Verifying that each cooling water control valve actuates to its full open position on a SLAS test signal.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 6-18 Amendment No. 30,131

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4 6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION CYSTEM (Continue.11 Leskage integnty tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for j repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 0.60 La leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the I leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

l Operability concems for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves other than those addressed in Actions I "a" and "b" of Specification 3.6.1.7 are addressed under Specification 3.6.3, " Containment isolation Valves."

3/4 6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 and 3/4.6 2 2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM and CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or MSLB for any double ended break of the largest reactor coolant pipe or main steam line. Under post accident conditions these systems will maintain the containment pressure below 44 ps!g and temperatures below 269.3*F during LOCA conditions or 413.5'F during MSLB conditions. The systems also reduce the containment pressure by a factor of 2 from its post-accident peak within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, resulting in lower containment leakage rates and lower offsite dose rates.

The Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere under post-LOCA conditions to maintain doses in accordance with 10 CFR Part 100 limits as described in Section 6.5.2 of the FSAR.

In MODE 4 when shutdown cooling is placed in operation, the Containment Spray System is realigned in order to allow isolation of the spray headers. This is necessary to avoid a single failure of the spray header isolation valve causing Reactor Coolant System depressunzation and inadvertent spraying of the containment. To allow for this realignment, the Containment Spray System may be taken out-of tervies when RCS pressure is .< 400 psia. At this reduced RCS pressurs and the reduced temperature associated with entry into MODE 4, the probability and consequences of a LOCA or MSLB are greatly reduced. The Containment Cooling System is required OPERABLE in MODE 4 and is availab6e to provide depressurization I and cooling capability.

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- A train of Containment Cooling consists of two fans (powered from the same safety bus) and their l associated coolers (supplied from the same cooling water loop). One Containment Cooling train and Containment Spray train has sufficient capacity to meet post ax.edent heat removal requirements.

Operating each containment cooling train fan unit for 15 minutes and verifying a cooling water flow rate of 625 gpm ensures that all trains are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected and corrective action taken.

Revised by NRC Letter dated WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-3 March 17,1999

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NPF-38-224 i I

ATTACHMENT B l PROPOSED MARKED-UP SPECIFICATIONS

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT COOLING SY3 TEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 Two independent trains of containment cooling shall be OPERABLE withen6 fan rix to each train.

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APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2,3, and 4.

ACTION-Wth one train of containment cooling inoperable, restors the inoperable train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable containment cooling train to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.2 Each train of containment cooling shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

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a. At least once per 31 days by:
1. Starting each operational fan not already running from the control room and vertfying that each operational fan operates for at least 15 minutes.
2. Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 625 gpm to each cooler.
b. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Vertfying that each fan starts automatically on an SIAS test signal. l
2. Vertfying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 1200 gpm to each cooler, l
3. Verif91ng that each cooling water contml valve actuates to its full open l positon on s SIAS test signal.

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WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4618 Amendment No. 30,131 o

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ,,,_, ,

BASES 3/4.61.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued) l Leakage integrity tests with a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degradation and will allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 0.60 La leakage limit shall not be exceeded when the inakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these valves are added to the previously dstermined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B and C tests.

Operability concems for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves other than those addressed in Actions a" and "b" of Specification 3.6.1.7 are addressed under Specification 3.6.3, " Containment isolation Valves."

3/4 6.2 DEPRESSURl2ATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 and 3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM and CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA or MSLB for any double-ended break of the largest reactor coolant pipe or main steam line. Under post-accident conditions thtse systems will maintain the containment pressure below 44 psig and temperatures below 269.3*F during LOCA conditions or 413.5'F during MSLB conditions. The systems also reduce the containment pressure by a factor of 2 from its post-accident peak within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, resulting in lower containment leakage rates and lower offsite dose rates.

The Containment Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment l atmosphere under post-LOCA conditions to maintain doses in accordance with 10 CFR Part 100 limits as 4 dsscribed in Section 6.5.2 of the FSAR.

in. MODE 4 when shutdown cooling is placed in operation, the Containment Spray System is realigned in  ;

order to allow isolation of the spray headers. This is necessary to avoid a single failure of the spray header isolation valve causing Reactor Coolant System depressurization and inadvertent spraying of the containment. To allow for this realignment, the Containment Spray System may be taken out-of service when l

RCS pressure is s 400 psia. At this reduced RCS pressure and the reduced temperature associated with {

sntry into MODE 4, the probability and consequences of a LOCA or MSLB are greatly reduced. The l Containment Cooling System is required OPERABLE in MODE 4 and is available to provide depressurization and cooling capability.

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- Cent:!r. men; Opr;y tr !r Me e"w@t ~re:My te ret get :::!f:r' h;;t ioniev i i-4vire.; r.ts l Operating each containment cooling train fan unit for 15 minutes and verifying a cooling water flow rate of 625 gpm ensures that all trains are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected and corrective action taken.

';;d;;d by SC L:"cr d;;;d WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 6-3 - 7/;ich U, GGG =

l INSERT 1 The Containment Cooling System consists of two redundant trains and is designed such that a single failure does not degrade the systems' ability to provide the required heat removal capability. A train of Containment Cooling consists of two fans (powered from the same safety bus) and their associated coolers (supplied from the same cooling waterloop). An operable train of containment cooling consists of one of the two fans  ;

and its associated cooler. One Containment Cooling train, consisting of one. fan and its associated cooler, and a Containment Spray train has sufficient capacity to meet post accident heat removal requirements and maintain containment temperatures and pressures below the design values.

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NPF-38-224 ATTACHMENT C 4

PROPOSED SPECIFICATIONS !

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS

6 CON AINMENT COOLING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.2 Two independent trains of containment cooling shall be OPERABLE with one fan cooler to each train.

i APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

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l ACTION: j i

With one train of containment cooling inoperable, restore the inoperable train to OPERABLE I status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />; restore the inoperable containment cooling train to OPERABLE status within the next 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS I 4.6.2.2 Each train of containment cooling shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 31 days by:
1. Starting each operational fan not already running from the control room and verifying that each operational fan operates for at least 15 minutes.
2. Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 625 gpm to each cooler.
b. At least once per 18 months by:
1. Verifying that each fan starts automatically on an SIAS test signal.
2. Verifying a cooling water flow rate of greater than or equal to 1200 gpm to -

each cooler. l

3. Verifying that each cooling water control valve actuates to its full open position on a SIAS test signal.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 6-18 AMENDMENT NO. -39,-sh

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l CONT / NMENT SYSTEMS l 1 l

l BASES-3L4 P,d 7. CONTAINMENT VENilLATION SYSTEM (Continued)

Leakage integrity tests with' a maximum allowable leakage rate for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves will provide early indication of resilient material seal degndation and will '

allow the opportunity for repair before gross leakage failure develops. The 0.60 La leakage limit

= shall not be exceeded when the leakage rates determined by the leakage integrity tests of these l v6es are added to the previously determined total for all valves and penetrations subject to Type B end C tests.

Operability concems for purge supply and exhaust isolation valves other than those addressed in Actions "a" and "b" of Specification 3.6.1.7 are addressed under Specification

. 3.6.3,

  • Containment Isolation Valves."

~3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEf ,

dt6.2.1 and 3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM and CONTAll. ' MENT COOLING SYSTEM

' The OPERABILITY of the Containment Spray System and the Containment Cooling System ensures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the L event of a LOCA or MSLB for any double-ended break of the largest reactor coolant pipe or ma;n steam line.L Under post-accident conditions these systems will maintain the containment pressure below 44 psig and temperatures below 269.3'F during LOCA conditions or 413.5'F during MSLB conditions. The systems also reduce the containment pressure by a factor of 2 i from its post-accident peak within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, resulting in lower containment leckage rates and i lower offsite dose rates.

The Containr..ent Spray System also provides a mechanism for removing iodine from the Leontainment atmosphere under post-LOCA conditions to maintain doses in accordance with ,

10 CFR Part 100 limits as described in Section 6.5.2 of the FSAR.

I

' in MODE 4 when shutdown cooling is placed in operation, the ContainmeN Spray, System is realigned in order to allow isolation of the spray headers. This is necessary to avoid a si,igle . ,

failure of the spray header isolation valve causing Reactor Coolant System depressuri.Tation and inadvertent spraying of the containment. To allow for this realignment, the Containment Spray System may be taken out-of-service when RCS pressure is s 400 psia. At this reduced RCS

. pressure and the reduced temperature associated with entry into MODE 4, the probability and )

consequences of a LOCA or MSLB are greatly reduced. The Containment Coc'ing System is l required OPERABLE in MODE 4 and is evailable to provide depressurization and cooling capability. l i

Revtsed+y NCO L;=r did i

. WATERFORD -UNIT 3 B 3/4 6-3 "tich 17,199G g

m CONTAINMENT SY_QTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1.7 CONTAINMENT VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)

The Containment Cooling System consists of two redundant trains and is designed such that a single failure does not degrade the systems' ability to provide the required heat removal capability. A train of Containment Cooling consists of two fans (powered from the same safety bus) and their associated coolers (supplied from the same cooling water loop). nn operable train of containment cc.r. ling consists of one of the two fans and its associated cooler. One Containment Cooling train, consisting of one fsn and its associated cooler, and a Containment Spray train has sufficient capacity to meet post accident heat removal requirements and maintain containment temperatures and pressures below the design values.

Operating each containment cuoling train fan unit for 15 minutes and venfying a cooling

- water flow rate of 625 gpm ensures + hat all trains are OPERABLE and that all associated controls are functioning properly. It also ensures that blockage, fan or motor failure, or excessive vibration can be detected and corrective action taken.

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, ncicd by NRO Lctici daicd i

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 8 3/4 6-3a March 17,1000 l i

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l NPF-38-224 ATTACHMENT D REFERENCES l

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LIST OF REFERENCES

1. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Rev. 2, July 1981
2. CEFLASH-4A, a FORTRAN-IV Digital Computer Program for Reactor Blowdown Analysis, CENPD 133P, August 1974 CEFLASH-4A, a FORTRAN-IV Digital Computer Program For Reactor Blowdown Analysis (Modifications), CENPD-133P, Supplement 2, February 1975 CEFLASH-4A, a FORTRAN-IV Digital Computer Program for Peactor Blowdown Analysis, CENPD-133P, Supplement 4-P, April 1977.

CEFLASH-4A, a FORTRAN 77 Digital Computer Program For Reactor Blowdown Analysis, CENPD-133P, Supplement 5, June 1985.

3. Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation related to Amendment No.

108 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-41, Amendment No.100 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-51, and Amendment No. 80 to Facility Operating License No. NPF-74, Arizona Public Service Company. et al, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units Nos.

1,2, and 3, Docket Nos. STN 50-528, STN 50-529, and STN 50-530.

4. USNRC Safety Evaluation Report related to the preliminary design of the Standard Reference System CESSAR System 80, NUREG-75/112, dated December 1975.
5. ABB-CE Topical Report CENPD-140-A, dated June 1976, Description of the CONTRANS E 'gital Computer Code for Containment Pressure and Temperature Transient Analysis.
6. USNRC letter to Combustion Engineering, O. D. Parr to A. E. Scherer, April 1975, Staff Evaluation of CENPD-140.
7. Combustion Engineering letter DP-456, F. M. Stern to E. Case, dated August 19,1974, Chapter 6, Appendix 6B to CESSAR System 80 PSAR.
8. DRN-M9901006 / LDCR-98-0058, UFSAR Section 6.2 update to reflect revised containment peak pressure and temperature design basis analyses and results, approved December 11, 1998
9. Waterford 3 letter (W3F1-99-0100) to NRC Document Control Desk, " Response to Enforcement Action (EA)98-022 and URI 9906-04, " June 23,1999.
10. Waterford 3 letter (W3F1-99-012'3), to NRC Document Control Desk, " Response to Request for Additional Informat,'on for Technical Specifications Change Request NPF-38-208, " July 29,1999 11.Waterford 3 Condition Report CR-WF3-1998-1033, MSIV Closure Time, dated July 31,1998
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