ML20199E086

Proposed Tech Specs Re Rev 1 for TS Change Request NPF-38-174

ML20199E086
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford
Issue date:	01/12/1999
From:	ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
To:
Shared Package
ML20199E075	List: ML20199E070 ML20199E086
References
NUDOCS 9901200307
Download: ML20199E086 (13)

Text

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NPF-38-174 ATTACHMENT A

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EXISTING SPECIFICATIONS

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i NPF-38-174 Revision 1 ATTACHMENT A EXISTING SPECIFICATIONS i

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TABLE 4.3-1 n

.g REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUNENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREfENTS B

8 CHAf81EL MODES FOR IdNICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE r

FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST IS REQUIRED

-4

.w 1.

Manual Reactor Trip N.A.

N.A.

R and S/U(1) 1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*

2.

Linear Power Level - High S

D(2,4),M(3,4), Q 1, 2 Q(4) 3.

Logarithmic Power Level - High S

R(4)

Q and S/U(1) 2f, 3, 4, 5' 4.

Pressurizer Pressure - High S

R Q

1, 2 S.

Pressurizer Pressure - Low S

R Q

1, 2 l

,s

[

6.

Containment Pressure - High 5

R Q

1, 2 l

t U

7.

Steam Generator Pressure - Low S

R Q

1, 2 8.

Steam Generator Level - Low S

R q

1, 2 9.

Local Power Density - High 5

D(2,4),R(4,5) Q,R(6) 1, 2 10.

DNBR - Low S

S(7),O(2,4),

Q,R(6) 1, 2 i

M(8), R(4,5) 11.

Steam Generator Level - High S

R Q

1, 2 R

z 12.

Reactor Protection System Logic M.A.

N.A.

Q and S/U(1) 1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*

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40 I

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TA8tE~4.3-1 (Continued)

D REACTOR PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREIENTS o5 CNAISIEL IRIDES FOR WICH CHANNEL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL SURVEILLANCE

$ FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK Call 8 RATION TEST 15 REQUIRED

" 13.

Reactor Trip Breakers M.A.

N.A.

M(10),S/U(1) 1, 2, 3*, 4*, 5*

14.

Core Protection Calculators 5

D(2,4),R(4,5) Q(9),R(6) 1, 2 15.

CEA Calculators 5

R Q,R(6) 1, 2 16.

Reactor Coolant Flow - Low 5

R Q

1, 2 4.s i

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TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

(6) This CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include the injection of simulated f

process signals into the channel as close to the sensors as l

practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip i

functions.

(7) Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by either using the reactor coolant pump differenti61 pressure instrumentation or by calorimetric calculations and if necessary, adjust the CPC addressable constant flow co-1 efficients such that each CPC indicated flow is less than or equal to i

the actual flow rate. The flow measurement uncertainty is included in the BERR1 term in the CPC and is equal to or greater than 4%.

(8) Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate l

as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by calorimetric calculations.

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(9) The quarterly CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include verification that i

the correct values of addressable constants are installed in each OPERABLE CPC.

I (10) At least once per 18 months and following maintenance or adjustment of the reactor trip breakers, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include independent verification of the undervoltage trip function l

and the shunt trip function.

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WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 3-12a AMENDMENT NO.125 l

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TABLE 4 3-1 (Continued) p y e pay,' f cg/ fe e f

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TABLE NOTATIONS d'

• With the reactor trip breakers in the closed position, the CEA drive system capable of CEA withdrawal, and fuel in the reactor vessel.

1. The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable when reducing reactor power to less than 10*% of RATED THERMAL POWER'from a reactor power level greater than 10*% of RATED THERMAL POWER (*'. Upon reducing power below 10d% of RATED THERMAL POWER (, a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be performed within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> if not performed during the previous 31 days. This requirement does not apply with the reactor trip breakers open.

(1)

Each startup or when required with the reactor trip breakers closed and the CEA drive system capable of rod withdrawal, if not performed in the previous 7 days.

(2)

Heat balance only (CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST not included):

a.

Between 15% and 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER, compare the Linear Power Level, the CPC at AT power, and CPC nuclear power signals to the calorimetric calculation.

If any signal is within -0.5% to +10% of the calorimetric calculation, then do not calibrate except as required during initial power ascension following refueling.

If any signal is less than the calorimetnc calculation by more than 0.5%, then adjust the affected signal (s) to within 0.0% to +10.0% of the calorimetric caluciation.

If any signal is greater than the calorimetric calculation by more than 10%, then adjust the affected signal (s) to within 0.0% to 10% of the calorimetric.

b.

At or above 80% of RATED THERMAL POWER, compare the Linear Power Level, the CPC A T power, and CPC nuclear power signals to the calorimetric calculation.

If any signal differs from the calorimetric calculation by an absolute difference of more than 2%, then adjust the affected signal (s) to agree with the calorimetric calculation within -2% to +2%.

During PHYSICS TESTS, these daily calibrations may be suspended provided these calibrations are performed upon reaching each major test power plateau and prior to proceeding to the next major test power plateau.

(3)

Above 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the linear power subchannel gams of the excore detectors are consistent with the values used to establish the shape annealing matrix elements in the Cors Protection Calculators.

(4)

Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

(5)

After each fuel loading and prior to exceeding 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, the incore detectors shall be used to determine or verify acceptable values for the shape annealing matrix elements used in the Core Protechon Calculators.

As measured by the Logarithmic Power Channels.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. 69;+25,145

i 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION f

BARFR 3/4 31 and 3/4 3 9 REACTOR PROTECTIVE AND ENGINFFRFM SAFETY FEATURFR ACTUATION SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATION condition while another RWSP - Low channel is in bypass, the receipt of a valid Safety injection Actuation Signal Actuation, and a coincident failure of one of the two remaining OPERABLE RWSP - Low channels. These conditions could cause the Emergency Core Cooling System and Containment Spray System suchons to be supplied from the Safety injection System Sump j

prematurely due to containment pressure being higher than RWSP outlet pressure and loss of l

the Low Pressure Safety injection Systems.

l When one of the inoperable channels is restored to OPERABLE status, subsequent j

operation in the applicable MODE (S) may continue in accordance with the provisions of i

ACTION 19.

The Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the ariginal design standards. The

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periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate i

this capability. The quarterty frequency for the channel funebonal tests for these systems i

comes from the analyses presented in topical report CEN-327: RPS/ESFAS Extended Test j

interval Evaluation, as supplemented.

RPS\\ESFAS Trip Setpoints values are determined by means of an explicit setpoint calculation analysis. A Total Loop Uncertainty (TLU) is calculated for each RPS/ESFAS

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instrument channel. The Trip Setpoint is then determined by adding or subtracting the TLU from the Analytical Limit (add TLU for decreasing process value; subtract TLU for increasing j

process value). The Allowable Value is determined by adding an allowance between the Trip Setpoint and the Analytical Limit to account for RPS/ESFAS cabinet Periodic Test Errors (PTE) which are present during a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. PTE combines the RPS/ESFAS i

cabinet reference accuracy, calibration equipment errors (M&TE), and RPS/ESFAS cabinet bistable Drift. Periodic testing assures that actual setpoints are within their Allowable Values. A i

channel is inoperable if its actual setpoint is not within its Allowable Value and corrective action must be taken. Operation with a trip set less conservative than its setpoint, but within its specified ALLOWABLE VALUE is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each trip Setpoint and the ALLOWABLE VALUE is equal to or less than the Periodic Test Error 4

allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

l The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that '

the protective and ESF action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

j i-Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total l

channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel responsa j

time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either (I)in place, i

onsite, or offsite test measurements or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified responsa j

times.

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1 WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-1a Amendment No. 440,143 i

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3/411NSTituMENTATION l

/bW &.e~ Asp 4

j 3/4 3.1 and 3/4 3 2 REACTOR PROTECTIVE AND ENGINFFRFri RAFETY FEATURER j

ACTUATION SYSTEMS NSTRUMENTATION i

The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Protective and Engineered Safety Features Actuation

- Systems instrumentation and bypasses ensures that (1) the associated Engineered Safety Features Actuation action and/or reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by i

sach channel or combination thereof reaches its setpoint, (2) the specified coincidence logic is i

maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for i

testing or maintenance, and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse i

parameters.

ij.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, 3

redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and j

mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these j

systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

I The redundancy design of the Control Element Assembly Calculators (CEAC) provides reactor protection in the event one or both CEACs become inoperable. If one CEAC is in test

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or inoperable, vertfication of CEA position is performed at least every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. If the second l

CEAC fails, the CPCs will use DNBR and LPD penalty factors to restrict reactor operation to some maximum fraction of RATED THERMAL POWER. If this maximum fraction is exceeded, a reactor trip will occur.

Table 3.3-3 ACTION 19 allows for continued operation in the applicable MODE (S) with j

one of the Refueling Water Storage Pool (RWSP)- Low channels inoperable provided the channel is placed in the bypass or tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. If an inoperable channel of i

the RWSP - Low is required to be placed in the tripped condition within one hour, then within 48 l

hours the channel must either be restored to OPERABLE status or be placed in the bypassed condition. The bypassed channel must be restored to OPERABLE status prior to entering i

MODE 4 following the next MODE 5 entry. With one of the RWSP - Low channels inoperable j

and in bypass, and testing or repairs is necessary on one of the remaining channels, ACTION 20 must be entered.

i ACTION 19a is annotated with an askerisk for the 3.0.4 exemption to allow the changing i

of MODES even though one channel is bypassed. MODE changes between MODES 1 and 4 l

with this configuration are allowed, to permit maintenance and testing on the inoperable channel. In this configuration, the protection system is in a two out-of-three logic, and the probability of a random failure affecting two of the OPERABLE channels is remote. The tripped condition does not have this annotation as a single failure could cause the Emergency Core l

Cooling System and Containment Spray System suctions to be supplied from the Safety injection System Sump prematurely and loss of the Low Pressure Safety injection Systems.

Table 3.3-3 ACTION 20 allows for continued operation in the applicable MODE (S) with two of the RWSP - Low channels inoperable provided that one of the inoperable channels is j

bypassed and the other inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.

I One of the inoperable RWSP - Low channels must be restored to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to allow removal of the channel from the tripped condition. The allowed time is a

i acceptable because operating experience has demonstrated the low probability of the following sequence of events occuring: the need to place one RSWP - Low channelin the tripped j

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 69;449.-143 m

a TABLE 4.3-1 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATIONS (Continued)

(6) This CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include the injection of simulated process signals into the channel as close to the sensors as practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

i (7) Above 70% of RATED 1HERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS i

total flow rate determined by either using the reactor coolant pump differential pressure instrumentation or by calorimetric calculations and if necessary, adjust the CPC addressable constant flow co-efficients such that each CPC indicated flow is less than or equal to the actual flow rate. The flow measurement uncertainty is included in the BERR1 term in the CPC and is equal to or greater than 4%.

(8) Above 70% of RATED THERMAL POWER, verify that the total RCS flow rate as indicated by each CPC is less than or equal to the actual RCS total flow rate determined by calorimetric calculations.

(9) The quarterly CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include verification that the correct values of addressable constants are installed in each OPERABLE CPC.

(10) At least once per 18 months and following maintenance or adjustment of the reactor trip breakers, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include independent verification of the undervoltage trip function and the shunt trip function.

m (11)

The quarterly CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and the quarterly Reactor Protection System Logic CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be scheduled and performed such that the Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) are tested at least every 6 weeks to accommodate the appropriate vendor recommended interval for cycling of each RTB.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 3/4 3-12a AMENDMENT NO.125 l

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION g

RARFE 3/4 31 and ild 2 7 REACTOR PROTECTIVE AND ENGINFFRFn RAFETY FEATURFR ACTUATION SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATION condition while another RWSP - Low channel is in bypass, the receipt of a valid Safety injection Actuation Signal Actuation, and a coincident failure of one of the two remaining OPERABLE RWSP - Low channels. These conditions could cause the Emergency Core Cooling System and Containment Spray System suchons to be supplied from the Safety injection System Sump prematurely due to containment pressure being higher than RWSP outlet pressure and loss of the Low Pressure Safety injection Systems.

When one of the inoperable channels is restored to OPERABLE status, subsequent operation in the applicable MODE (S) may continue in accordance with the provisions of ACTION ig.

The Surveillance Requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability. The quarterly frequency for the channel functional tests for these systems comes from the analyses presented in topical report CEN-327: RPS/ESFAS Extended Test Interval Evaluation, as supplemented.

RPS\\ESFAS Trip Setpoints values are determined by means of an explicit setpoint calculation analysis. A Total Loop Uncertainty (TLU) is calculated for each RPS/ESFAS instrument channel. The Trip Setpoint is then determined by adding or subtracting the TLU from the Analytical Limit (add TLU for decreasing process value; subtract TLU for increasing process value). The Allowable Value is determined by adding an allowance between the Trip Setpoint and the Analytical Limit to account for RPS/ESFAS cabinet Periodic Test Errors (PTE) which are present during a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. PTE combines the RPS/ESFAS cabinet reference accuracy, calibration equipment errors (M&TE), and RPS/ESFAS cabinet bistable Drift. Periodic testing assures that actual setpoints are within their Allowable Values. A channel is inoperable if its actual setpoint is not within its Allowable Value and corrective action i

must be taken. Operation with a trip set less conservative than its setpoint, but within its speerfied ALLOWABLE VALUE is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each trip Setpoint and the ALLOWABLE VALUE is equal to or less than the Periodic Test Error allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurana that '

the protective and ESF action funcbon associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those I

channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping, or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate the total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either (1) in place, onsite, or offsite test measurements or (2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

(

Testing frequency for the Reactor Trip Breakers (RTBs) is described and analyzed in CEN NPSD-951. The quarterly RTB channel functional test and the RPS channel functional test are scheduled and preformed such that RTBs are verified OPERABLE at least every 6 weeks to accommodate the appropriate vendor recommended interval for cycling of each RTB.

WATERFORD - UNIT 3 B 3/4 3-1a Amendment No. 440,143