IR 05000277/2011007
| ML111150200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 04/25/2011 |
| From: | Doerflein L T Engineering Region 1 Branch 2 |
| To: | Pacilio M J Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| IR-11-007 | |
| Download: ML111150200 (36) | |
Text
April 25, 20LLMr. Michael J. PacilioSenior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLCPresident and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear4300 Winfield RoadWarrenville, lL 60555
SUBJECT: PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION - NRC COMPONENT DESIGNBASES I NSPECTl ON REPORT 0500027 7 l 201 1 007 AND 05000 27 81 201 1 007
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On March 11,2011, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspectionat your Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3. The enclosed inspectionreport documents the inspection results, which were discussed with Mr. Thomas Dougherty,Site Vice President, and other members of your staff on March 11, 2011.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.In conducting the inspection, the team examined the adequacy of selected components andoperator actions to mitigate postulated transients, initiating events, and design basis accidents'T'he inspection involved field walkdowns, examination of selected procedures, calculations andrecords, and interviews with station personnel.This report documents two NRC-identified findings that were of very low safety significance(Green). These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However,because of the very low safety significance and because they were entered into your correctiveaction program, the NRC is treating these as non-cited violations (NCV), consistent withSection 2.3.2 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. lf you contest any NCV in this report, youshould provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis foryour denial, to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,Washington, D.C. 20555-0001, with copies to the RegionalAdministrator, Region l; theDirector, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at PBAPS. In addition, if you disagree with thecross-cutting aspect assigned to one of the findings in this report, you should provide aresponse within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for yourdisagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I and the NRC Resident Inspector atPBAPS. ln accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for the public inspection inthe NRC Public Docket Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of NRC'sdocument system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site athttp://www.nrc.qov/readinq-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,Lawrence T. Doerflein, Chief /Engineering Branch 2Division of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos. 5A-277',50-278License Nos. DPR-44, DPR-56
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 0500027712011007 and 0500027812011007
w/Attachment:
Supplemental lnformationcc Mencl: Distribution via ListServ
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1R 0500027712011007, 0500027812011007; 0211412011 -0311112011; Peach Bottom AtomicPower Station, Units 2 and 3; Component Design Bases Inspection.The report covers the Component Design Bases Inspection conducted by a team of four NRCinspectors and two NRC contractors. Two findings of very low risk significance (Green) wereidentified, which were also considered to be non-cited violations. The significance of mostfindings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using NRC Inspection ManualChapter (lMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). The cross-cutting aspectswere determined using IMC 0310, "Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas." Findings forwhich the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRCmanagement review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercialnuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4,dated December 2006.NRC-ldentified and Self-Revealinq Findinqs
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems.
- Green.
The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-citedviolation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion lll, "Design Control," in that, Exelon did notensure the ability to transfer fuel oil between underground fuel oil storage tanks.Specifically, Exelon had not performed adequate analyses or testing to demonstrateadequate net positive suction head available (NPSHn) for the EDG fuel oil transferpumps. In response, Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program andperformed an evaluation to assure the fuel oil transfer pump NPSHA was adequate.The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design controlattribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstoneobjective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond toinitiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team performed a Phase 1SDP screening, in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 - InitialScreening and Characterization of Findings," and determined the finding was of very lowsafety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmednot to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor of the performance deficiency isnot reflective of current licensee performance. (1R21 .2.1.1).
- Green.
The team identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-citedviolation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion lll, "Design Control," in that Exelon did notverify the adequacy of the seismic design for temporary battery cells that had beenplaced in-service in safety-related station batteries that were required to be operable.Specifically, Exelon did not evaluate whether mechanical stress could be transferredfrom one temporary battery cell to another via rigid bus bars attached to the cell terminalposts and, as a consequence, did not verify that damage to a cell post or cell case wouldnot result during a seismic event. During the inspection period, the temporary batterycells were not in-service and were not required to be operable. In response, ExelonEnclosure entered this issue into the corrective action program and performed a preliminarycalculation to verify seismic adequacy.This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design controlattribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstoneobjective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond toinitiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The team performed a Phase 1SDP screening, in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 - lnitialScreening and Characterization of Findings," and determined the finding was of very lowsafety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmednot to result in loss of operability or functionality.This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem ldentification andResolution, Corrective Action Program, because Exelon did not thoroughly evaluate theproblem such that the resolution addressed the cause. Specifically, a 2009 issue reportidentified that the battery cells on the cart did not have seismic spacers between thecells and did not have steel tie-rods installed for a cell clamp assembly, similar to thestation battery. The issue report incorrectly determined that plastic tubes in between thetwo cells would provide an adequate seismic restraint. IMC 0310, Aspect P.1(c)(1R21.2.1.2)illEnclosure
REPORT DETAILS
1. REACTOR SAFEryCornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier lntegrity1R21 Component Desiqn Bases Inspection (lP 71 111
,2.2.12Results of Detailed ReviewsResults of Detailed Component Reviews (19 samples).2.1.1 E2 Emeroencv Diesel Generator- Mechanical. OBG12a. lnspection ScopeThe team reviewed the adequacy and appropriateness of design assumptions andcalculations related to emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil consumption, air startsystem capability, and room ventilation. The team reviewed design calculations toensure underground fueloil tank capacities were sufficient to meet required fuel oilconsumption rates. Hydraulic design requirements for fuel oil transfer pumps related tovortexing in the tank outlet piping and net positive suction head (NPSH) were reviewedto verify the design capability of the EDG fuel oil transfer pumps. The EDG fuel oilchemistry tests were reviewed to verify testing was conducted in accordance with facilityprocedures and license requirements; and that the results were consistent with theassumptions contained in the fuel oil consumption calculation. The team performed areview of maintenance and surveillance test procedures to ensure that the thermalperformance of EDG heat exchangers, cooled by emergency service water, wasadequate. The preventive maintenance program for lube oil and fuel oilfilters wasreviewed to ensure filters were replaced when necessary. Field walkdowns wereperformed of the EDG to independently assess the material condition of the EDG andassociated equipment. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents todetermine if there were any adverse trends associated with the EDG and to assessExelon's capability to evaluate and correct problems.b. Findinqslntroduction: The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green)involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion lll, "Design Control,"in that Exelon did not ensure the ability to transfer fuel oil between underground fuel oilstorage tanks. Specifically, Exelon had not performed adequate analyses or testing todemonstrate adequate NPSH available (NPSHA) for the EDG fuel oil transfer pumps.Description: The fuel oil transfer pumps transfer fuel from buried fuel oil tanks to theEDG day tanks or, when required, can be used to transfer fuel oil from one storage tankto another. Each of the four EDGs has an associated underground fuel oil tank that wasoriginally designed to supply seven days of fuel, and a fuel oil transfer pump located inthe EDG room. There are no automatic trips of the fuel oiltransfer pumps on low tanklevel. Fuel oil pump NPSHn and vortex calculations are important to ensure that theEDGs have adequate volume of fuel oil available following a design basis event and thatadequate margin is available to prevent air entrainment when fuel tank levels approachthe tank bottom.Enclosure 3Calculation PM-0123, "Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Consumption for 6 Days and 7 DaysOperation with LOCA Dependent Loads," Rev. 0, indicated that the totalvolume of allfour EDG fuel oil storage tanks contain sufficient quantity of fuel oil for seven days ofEDG operation. However, fuel oilwould need to be transferred between theunderground tanks using the fuel oil transfer pumps in order to support operation of theEDG that has a higher electrical load using procedure AO 52D.1, "Transferring DieselFuel Oil Between Storage Tanks," Rev. 7.The team reviewed procedure AO 52D.1 and underground fuel oil storage tank levelalarm setpoints, and determined that no specific guidance existed in the procedure toatert operators when the fuel oil storage tank levels reach the vortex limit, or when therewas insufficient NPSH1 at the pump impeller. lssue Report (lR) 01185526 was writtenduring the inspection to evaluate and correct the issue.The team reviewed calculations for potential vortex formation at the fuel oil transferpump suction and for NPSHA Calculation PM-0046, "DieselGenerator FuelOil StorageTank Volume Determinations," Rev. 1, determined the usable volume of the storagetanks based on a vortex limit of 14 inches above the tank bottom. The vortex limit wasbased on a pump suction flow rate of 10 gpm. In 2006, lR 00476280 was written toevaluate a pump flow rate of 10 gpm as potentially non-conservative because the pumpin-service testing (lST) acceptance criterion was about 45 gpm. The 10 gpm flow ratewas specified by the architect/engineer on the originalfuel oil pump data sheet as thedesign input for the minimum pump flow rate. This lR stated that the appropriate fuel oilflow rate that should be used in the vortex calculation was about 24 gpm, based on a1991 test, which measured actualflow when the pump was providing fueloil to the daytank (i.e., the normalflow path). The lR preliminarily concluded that the present level of14 inches was sufficient for pump suction flow rate of 24 gpm. The team performed anevaluation of the vortex limit of 24 gpm to 45 gpm pump suction flow rates, anddetermined that the present level of submergence was satisfactory for vortex prevention.Regarding NPSH^, Exelon determined that they did not have a calculation for the fuel oiltransfer pumps, and in response, initiated lR 011185519. A preliminary evaluationperformed by Exelon identified that the NPSHA at a pump flow rate oI24 gpm had amargin of less than one inch of suction lift when compared to the fuel oil tank level atwhich unusable volume is determined (14 inches above tank bottom). The teamidentified that the pump flow rate could potentially be greater than 24 gpm during thetransfer from one tank to another tank due to the pumps' design capability of 45 gpmand the specific transfer pump and associated tank configuration. Higher flow rates,such as those that might occur during fuel oil transfer from one underground tank toanother, could result in not having adequate NPSHA at the pump suction. InsufficientNPSHA at the pump suction could lead to fluid cavitation at the pump impeller, leading todegradation of pump hydraulic performance, with subsequent pump failure. In response,Exelon demonstrated to the team that the 1991 flow test provided reasonable assurancethat the existing piping, tank, and throttle valve configuration bounds the assumed fueloil transfer pump flow rate at24 gpm.Enclosure 4Analvsis: The team determined that the failure to properly evaluate the NPSHnconsiderations for the EDG fuel oil transfer pumps for operation following a design basisevent was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Exelon's abitity toforesee and prevent. The finding was more than minor because it was associated withthe design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adverselyaffected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability ofsystems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Inaddition, this issue was similar to Example 3.j of lnspection Manual Chapter (lMC) 0612,Appendix E, "Examples of Minor lssues," which determined that calculation errors wouldbe more than minor if, as a result of the erors, there was reasonable doubt on theoperability of the component. For this issue, there was a reasonable doubt on theoperability of the fuel oil transfer pumps at low fuel oil storage tank levels because therequired NPSH was originally specified at flow rate of 10 gpm, but historical test resultsand design data indicated that the pump flow rate could have been between 24 gpm and45 gpm. Higher pump flow rates require additional NPSHA because the dynamicpressure loss in the inlet piping is a function of the fluid velocity. The higher flow rateswould require additional submergence of the suction pipe in the tank, resulting in moreunusable oil in the underground tanks. ln response to this issue, Exelon performed apreliminary calculation to demonstrate that the existing NPSHA with the pump operatingat a flow rate of 24 gpm would result in acceptable pump performance. Exelon alsoinitiated actions to improve procedure guidance when transferring EDG fuel oil.Traditional enforcement does not apply because the issue did not have any actual safetyconsequences or potential for impacting the NRC's regulatory function, and was not theresult of any willful violation of NRC requirements.In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," a Phase 1 SDP screening wasperformed and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)because it was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability orfunctionality. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the mostsignificant contributor of the performance deficiency was not reflective of currentlicensee performance.Enforcement: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion lll, "Design Control," requires, in part,that measures be provided for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as bythe performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculationalmethods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. These measures shallinclude provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified andincluded in design documents. Contrary to the above, prior to March 11,2011, themeasures established to verify the adequacy of the design of the EDG fuel oil transferpumps were not adequate. Specifically, Exelon did not verify design requirements (EDGfuel oil transfer pump NPSHA) were satisfied by either appropriate engineeringcalculations or in-situ testing. Because this violation is of very low safety significance(Green) and was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as lRs 01185519and 01 185526, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent withSection 2.3.2 ol the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 0500027712011007-01,05000278t20110007-Ol, Failure to Demonstrate the Gapability of the EDG Fuel OilTransfer Pumps to Fulfill Their Safety Functions Under all Gonditions)Enclosure 5.2.1.2 Unit 3'B' 125 Vdc Batterv. 38D01a. lnspection ScooeThe team reviewed the design, testing, and operation of the Unit 3'B' 125 Vdc battery(38D01), to verify it could perform its design basis function to provide direct current (DC)power to connected loads during normal, transient, and postulated accident conditions,including station blackout events. Specifically, the team reviewed design calculations,including battery sizing, load profile studies, voltage drop calculations, and batteryterminal connection resistances, to evaluate whether the battery capacity was adequatefor the equipment load and duration required by design and licensing bases, and toassess whether adequate voltage was available to meet minimum voltage specificationsfor connected loads during worst case loading conditions. The team also reviewed thebattery hydrogen generation analysis to determine whether hydrogen concentrationlevels would stay below acceptable levels during normal and postulated accidentconditions.The team reviewed battery tests, including modified performance and service dischargetests, and routine surveillance tests to assess whether the testing and maintenance wassufficient and performed in accordance with approved procedures, vendorrecommendations, industry standards, and design and licensing requirements. Theteam compared the service test and modified performance test load profiles to the loadprofile studies for the loss-of-coolant accident with a concurrent loss-of-offsite power andthe station blackout design assumptions to verify the load testing enveloped thepredicted worst case loading conditions. The team interviewed design and systemengineers regarding the design, operation, testing, and maintenance of the battery.Field walkdowns of the battery were performed to independently assess the materialcondition of the battery cells and associated electrical equipment. Finally, the teamreviewed corrective action documents to determine if there were any adverse trendsassociated with the battery and to assess Exelon's capability to evaluate and correctproblems.b. Findinqslntroduction: The team identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green)involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion lll, "Design Control,"in that Exelon did not verify the adequacy of the seismic design for temporary batterycells that had been placed in-service in safety-related station batteries that were requiredto be operable. Specifically, Exelon did not evaluate whether mechanical stress couldbe transferred from one temporary battery cell to another via rigid bus bars attached tothe cell terminal posts and, as a consequence, did not verify that damage to a cell postor cell case would not result during a seismic event. During the inspection period, thetemporary battery cells were not in-service and were not required to be operable.Description: In 1990, Exelon fabricated four steel battery carts to transport and supporttwo battery cells per cart. As needed, Exelon moved the cells on the four carts into abattery room, connected the temporary cells to an in-service safety-related battery, andthen removed a row of permanent cells from service (i.e., disconnected). While theEnclosure 6temporary cells were in-service and considered operable, they remained in the batterycarts. This method allowed Exelon to replace an entire battery, a row at a time, whilethe reactor plant remained at power (i.e., on-line battery replacement). Since 1990,Exelon has used this method to replace allfour station batteries in each unit twice (totalof 16 full battery replacements), and also for corrective maintenance when an individualcell needed to be removed from service while maintaining the battery operable.The team identified that the two cells, in a single battery cart, did not have any seismicrestraints or seismic spacer plates (e.9., Styrofoam sheets) between the cells, asrequired by the battery vendor for the seismically qualified station battery racks. The twocells were mechanically connected to each other via rigid bus bars attached to the cellposts. Calculation PS-028, "Design of Battery Cart to Transport and Support TemporaryBatteries," Rev. 1, documented Exelon's seismic analysis for the temporary cells wheninstalled in the battery carts. That analysis verifled that a cart with two cells (i.e.,evaluated as a single unit) would not tip over during a seismic event, but did not evaluateindependent movement, such as sliding, between the two cells (e.9., relative motion cellto cell). lf independent movement were to occur, then mechanical load and stress wouldbe transferred from one cell to the other via the bus bars attached to the cell terminalposts, and could result in damage to a post or case.During the inspection period, the temporary battery cells were not in-service and notrequired to be operable. The most recent usage was in November 2006, whentemporary cells were installed in the 28 Battery. Exelon entered this issue into theircorrective action program as lR 1 182989, and performed a preliminary calculation toverify seismic adequacy. The team reviewed the calculation and found it reasonable.Analvsis: The team determined that the failure to evaluate whether temporary batterycells would remain operable during a seismic event prior to substituting the cells into anin-service station battery during on-line battery replacement or maintenance was aperformance deficiency that was reasonably within Exelon's ability to foresee andprevent. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the designcontrol attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected thecornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systemsthat respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In addition, thisissue was similar to example 3.k of IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor lssues,"which determined that calculation errors would be more than minor if, as a result of theerrors, there was reasonable doubt on the operability of the component. For this issue,there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the temporary battery cells during aseismic event, in that a knowledgeable seismic engineer could not determine theadequacy of design based on a review of the existing seismic analysis, design details, oravailable vendor information. ln response to this issue, Exelon performed a preliminarycalculation to assess past seismic adequacy, which utilized material properties, such ascoefficient of friction, which were not available from typically utilized engineeringreference sources or material properties handbooks. Traditional enforcement does notapply because the issue did not have any actual safety consequences or potentialforimpacting the NRC's regulatory function, and was not the result of any willful violation ofNRC requirements.Enclosure 7In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," a Phase 1 SDP screening wasperformed and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)because it was a design deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability orfunctionality.This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem ldentification andResolution, Corrective Action Program, because Exelon did not thoroughly evaluate theproblem such that the resolution addressed the cause. Specifically, in 2009, ,R 844207identified that the battery cells on the cart did not have Styrofoam (i.e., seismic) spacersbetween the cells and did not have steeltie-rods installed for a cell clamp assembly,similar to the station battery. The lR incorrectly determined that plastic tubes in-betweenthe two cells would provide an adequate seismic restraint. IMC 0310, Aspect P.1(c)]Enforcement: 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion lll, "Design Control," requires, in part,that design control measures shall provide for verifying the adequacy of design, such asby design reviews, or the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods. Contraryto the above, from 1990 until 2011, Exelon did not verify the adequacy of the seismicdesign for temporary battery cells that had been placed in-service in safety-relatedstation batteries that were required to be operable. Calculation PS-028, "Design ofBattery Cart to Transport and Support Temporary Batteries," Rev. 1, verified seismicadequacy of the cart to support the total weight of two battery cells, but did not evaluateindependent movement, such as sliding, between the two cells (i.e., relative motion cellto cell). Specifically, Exelon did not evaluate whether mechanical load and stress couldbe transferred from one temporary battery cell to another via rigid bus bars attached tothe cell terminal posts and, as a consequence, did not verify that damage to a cell postor cell case would not result during a seismic event. The most recent usage was inNovember 2006, when the temporary cells were installed in the 28 Battery. Becausethis violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and was entered into Exelon'scorrective action program (lR 1182989), this violation is being treated as a non-citedviolation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. (NCVO 500027 7 l 20 1 1 007 -02, 0 500027 8 I 20 1 1 007 -02, Tem po rary Battery Cart Se is m i cConfiguration Deficiency).2.1.3 Unit 3 Core Sprav / Residual Heat Removal Room Coolers. 3DE057 / 3DE058a. Inspection ScooeThe core spray and residual heat removal (RHR) pump rooms are cooled by fan coilunits that remove heat to the emergency service water (ESW) system during postulatedaccident conditions. The team reviewed room heat load calculations and pump roomcooler thermal performance calculations to verify the units were capable of supplyingsufficient cooling to the rooms. Recent thermal performance test results were reviewedto determine whether the room coolers were capable of performing adequately duringpostulated accident conditions. The team performed a walkdown of the room coolerareas to assess material condition and cleanliness of the fan coil fins. The team alsoEnclosure Ireviewed corrective action documents and health reports to determine if there were anyadverse trends associated with the room coolers and to assess Exelon's capability toevaluate and correct problems.b. FindinosNo findings were identified..2.1.4 'B' Emerqencv Service Water Pump. 08P57a. lnspection ScopeThe team ensured river levels met vendor requirements associated with ESW pumpsuction submergence and NPSH design requirements to ensure the pump was capableof performing its safety function. The team verified that appropriate seismic analysiswas performed on the pump/motor assembly. Hydraulic calculations were reviewed toensure design requirements for flow, pressure, and vibration were appropriatelytranslated into acceptance criteria in pump in-service testing (lST) procedures. Theteam reviewed pump structure ventilation calculations to ensure environmentalconditions were adequately maintained. Design change history and IST results werereviewed to assess potential component degradation and impact on design margins; andan associated ESW pump replacement test was also reviewed to verify the pump'sability to perform its design safety function. The team also conducted a walkdown of theESW pump to assess the material condition and to verify the installed configuration wasconsistent with the plant drawings, and the design and licensing bases. Finally, theteam reviewed corrective action documents to determine if there were any adversetrends associated with the pump and to assess Exelon's capability to evaluate andcorrect problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.5 Unit 2 Condensate Storaqe Tank. 20T10a. Inspection ScopeThe condensate storage tank (CST) functions as the preferred source of water for thehigh pressure coolant injection (HPCI) pump and the reactor core isolation cooling(RCIC) pump. The team reviewed design documents, including the HPCI pump andRCiC pump vortex calculation when aligned to the CST, CST drawings, and tank leveluncertainty calculations. The team also reviewed results of recent visual inspections ofthe CST, and conducted a walkdown of the tank area to observe material condition.Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to determine if there were anyadverse trends associated with the CST and to assess Exelon's capability to evaluateand correct problems.Enclosure IIb. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.6 Unit 3 Hioh Pressure Service Water Pump. 3DP042a. lnspection ScopeThe team inspected the 'D' high pressure service water (HPSW) pump (3DP042) todetermine whether it could fulfill its design basis function of delivering cooling flow to theassociated residual heat removal heat exchangers and to provide water to the residualheat removal system to flood the primary containment after a postulated accident. Theteam reviewed applicable portions of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report(UFSAR), the Technical Specifications, the Technical Requirements Manual, designbasis documents, and calculations to identify the design basis requirements for thepump. The team interviewed the system engineer and reviewed pump testing results toassess pump performance. The team walked down the HPSW pump, the pump motor,and the pump structure to independently assess Exelon's configuration control, thematerial condition, the pump's operating environment, and flood protection. The pumpsubmergence requirement was reviewed to ensure adequate NPSHn. The stressanalysis of the pump and discharge piping restraints were reviewed to evaluatemaximum loading. The team reviewed IST results to ensure that the pump operationwas within the specified parameters. In addition, pump cooling requirements andoperating procedures were reviewed to ensure adequate pump operating temperatures.Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports todetermine if there were any adverse trends associated with the HPSW pump and toassess Exelon's capability to evaluate and correct problems'b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.7 Service Water lntakea. lnspection ScopeThe team inspected the service water intake to determine whether it could fulfill itsdesign basis function of supplying cooling water to safety-related and nonsafety-relatedsystems during normal and accident conditions. The team reviewed applicable portionsof the UFSAR, the Technical Specifications, the Technical Requirements Manual, designbases documents, and calculations to identify the design basis requirements for theservice water intake structure. Silting levels within the service water bay were reviewedto ensure proper HPSW and ESW pump operation. The team reviewed procedures andinstrumentation to ensure proper manual isolation of the service water bay portion of theintake structure in the event of a high or low water level in Conowingo Pond to ensureavailability of cooling water to the supplied safety-related systems. Additionally, theteam performed a walkdown of accessible areas on the intake structure to assessconfiguration control and the material condition of risk-significant structures, systems,Enclosure 10and components. Material condition of inaccessible areas was assessed by performinga review of periodic inspection reports performed by Exelon and independentcontractors. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to determine ifthere were any adverse trends associated with the service water intake structure toassess Exelon's capability to evaluate and correct problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.8 Unit 2 Core Sprav Iniection Valve. MO-2-14-012A. and Hioh Pressure Coolant IniectionSteam lsolation Valve. MO-2-23-016 (2 samples)a. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected two Unit 2 motor-operated valves (MOVs), the loop'A'core spray(CS) injection valve (MO-2-14-0124) and the HPCI steam isolation valve (MO-2-23-016),to verify the valves were capable of performing their design basis functions. Valve MO-2-14-012A is a normally closed valve with a safety function to open for CS injection anda safety function to close for primary containment isolation. MO-2-23-016 is a normallyopen valve with a safety function to close on a HPCI isolation signal.The team reviewed the UFSAR, the Technical Specifications, design basis documents,drawings, and procedures to identify the design basis requirements of each valve. Theteam reviewed periodic MOV diagnostic test results, stroke-timing test data, and logictest results to verify acceptance criteria were met. The team verified the MOV safetyfunctions, torque switch settings, performance capability, and design margins wereadequately monitored and maintained for each MOV. The team verified that diagnostictesting results were used to trend stem nut wear to ensure an adequate stem nutreplacement frequency. The team reviewed MOV weak link calculations to ensure theability of the MOVs to remain structurally functional while stroking under design basisconditions. The team verified that the valve analysis used the maximum differentialpressure expected across the valves during worst case operating conditions. Thermalbinding, pressure locking, and temperature induced pressure locking analyses werereviewed to determine susceptibility. Additionally, the team reviewed degraded voltageconditions, thermal overload sizing, and voltage drop calculation results to confirm thatthe MOVs would have sufficient voltage and power available to perform their safetyfunction at degraded voltage conditions.The team discussed the design, operation, and maintenance of the MOVs withengineering staff to evaluate performance history, maintenance, and overall componenthealth of the MOVs. The team also conducted a walkdown of MO-2-14-012A andremotely viewed MO-2-23-016 to assess the material condition and to verify the installedconfigurations were consistent with the plant drawings, and the design and licensingbases. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents to determine if therewere any adverse trends associated with the valves and to assess Exelon's capability toevaluate and correct problems.Enclosure 11b, FindinosNo findings were identified..2.1.9 'B' Emeroencv Service Water Pump Motor. 08P57a. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the'B' ESW pump (08P57) motor to determine whether it couldfulfill its design basis function of providing adequate horsepower for the pump to delivercooling flow to the associated EDG heat exchangers and room coolers. The teaminterviewed the system engineer and reviewed lRs that had been written for the ESWpump motor to assess its performance. The team walked down the ESW pump, thepump motor, and the pump structure to independently assess Exelon's configurationcontrol, the pump motor's operating environment, and its material condition. The teamreviewed ESW system sizing calculations and a design modification that replaced the'B'pump to determine and evaluate the required capacity for the break horsepower requiredby the pump motor during design basis conditions. The UFSAR and TechnicalSpecifications were reviewed to ensure consistency between the pump parameters andthe design basis flow requirements.The team reviewed the 4160 Vac system load flow calculation and motor nameplatedata to confirm that adequate voltage would be available at the motor terminals fordesign basis conditions. The team also reviewed the motor overcurrent relay settingcalculation , relay settings, and recent overcurrent relay calibration tests to evaluatewhether the protective relays would provide for reliable motor operation at design basisminimum voltage conditions. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documentsand system health reports to determine if there were any adverse trends associated withthe ESW pump motor and to assess Exelon's capability to evaluate and correctproblems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.10 E2 Emerqencv Diesel Generator- Electrical.OBGl2a. Inspection ScopeThe team inspected the E2 EDG to confirm that it was capable of meeting its designbasis accident load requirements. The EDG was designed to provide standby power tosafety-related 4160 Vac emergency auxiliary switchgear E22 (Unit 2) and E23 (Unit 3)when the preferred power supply is not available. The team reviewed the UFSAR,station single line diagrams, EDG vendor rating documentation, station operatingprocedures, and the generator nameplate data to confirm consistency in the load ratings.The team reviewed the brake horsepower basis for selected pump motors to ensureloads were adequately considered in the loading study at worse case motor loadconditions. The team reviewed the EDG load study for the worse case design basisEnclosure 12loading conditions and the periodic surveillance testing to confirm the EDG loadcapability. The team walked down the EDGs to independently assess Exelon'sconfiguration control, the generator's operating environment, and its material condition.The team also reviewed the design basis and periodic testing for the components thatcould trip the EDG during a design basis postulated accident to ensure that they wouldoperate reliably. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and systemhealth reports to determine if there were any adverse trends associated with thegenerator and to assess Exelon's capability to evaluate and correct problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.114160 Volt Emeroencv Auxiliarv Switchqear E22. 20416a. Insoection ScopeThe team inspected 4160 Vac emergency auxiliary switchgear E22to confirm that it wascapable of meeting its design basis requirements. Switchgear E22 was designed todistribute power to safety-related pump motors and load centers during design basisconditions. The team reviewed design basis load flow and short circuit currentcalculations to determine the design basis for maximum load, momentary andinterrupting duty, and bus bracing requirements, and reviewed switchgear equipmentvendor ratings for conformance with the design basis. The team also reviewed designbasis inputs for conservatism and reviewed vendor equipment data to confirm adequatemargin in breaker momentary and interrupting duty. The team reviewed protectiverelaying calculations for breaker coordination for incoming line and load center feederbreakeis, preventive maintenance for selected breakers, component replacements, andthe results of inspections/tests to confirm the reliability of the equipment. The teamperformed a walk down of the switchgear to independently assess Exelon's configurationcontrol, the operating environment, and its material condition. Finally, the team reviewedcorrective action documents and system health reports to determine if there were anyadverse trends associated with the switchgear, to confirm that the switchgear andbreakers were properly maintained, and to assess Exelon's capability to evaluate andcorrect problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.12 Unit 2 'A' Reactor Protection Svstem Motor-Generator Set / Scram Solenoid Pilot Valvesa. lnspection ScopeThe team reviewed the Technical Specifications and Bases, other design and licensingbases documentation, and surveillance requirements for the reactor protection systemelectric power monitoring assemblies for motor generator set undervoltage to confirm thedesign basis voltage at the scram solenoid pilot valves (SSPV). The team reviewed theEnclosure 13results of recent plant testing that determined maximum voltage drop to hydraulic controlunit (HCU) fuses and the results of testing that was conducted by Exelon to determinevendor (Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) and Automatic Valve Company (AVCO))solenoid electrical data, including pickup and dropout voltages. The team reviewed thevendor drawings and rating data for the originalASCO and the replacement AVCOsolenoids to confirm the capability of the solenoids to operate over the range of voltageexpected at the solenoid valves. The team reviewed the engineering change requestthat implemented the design change for AVCO valves to replace the ASCO valves forthe SSPVs, and vendor solenoid operator rating data for the replacement AVCO valves,to confirm that the Technical Specification undervoltage trip value supported continuousoperation of the AVCO solenoid valves. The team performed a walk down of the HCUSSPVs to independently assess Exelon's configuration control, the operatingenvironment, and the material condition. Finally, the team reviewed corrective actiondocuments and system health reports to determine if there were any adverse trendsassociated with the SSPVs, to confirm that the HCUs were properly maintained, and toassess Exelon's capability to evaluate and correct problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.13 Unit 3'B' 125 Vdc Batterv Bus. 3BD17a. Inspection ScopeThe team reviewed the design and operation of the 'B' 125 Vdc battery bus (38D17),and associated distribution panels to evaluate whether the loading of the DC bus waswithin equipment ratings and to determine whether the bus could perform its designbasis function to reliably power the associated loads under worst case conditions.Specifically, the team reviewed calculations and drawings, including voltage dropcalculations, short circuit analysis, and load study profiles, to evaluate the adequacy andappropriateness of design assumptions. The team also reviewed the DC overcurrentprotective coordination studies to verify there was adequate protection for postulatedfaults in the DC system.The team interviewed system and design engineers, and walked down the 125Vdcbattery bus and distribution panels to independently assess the material condition anddetermine whether the system alignment and operating environment was consistent withdesign basis assumptions. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents andsystem health reports to determine whether there were any adverse operating trendsand to assess Exelon's capability to evaluate and correct problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.Enclosure 14.2.1.14 Unit 3'B' 125 Vdc Batterv Charqers. 38D003-1 and 38D003-2a. Inspection ScooeThe team reviewed the design, testing, and operation of the 125 Vdc battery chargers38D003-1 and 38D003-2, to verify they could perform their design basis function toprovide DC power to connected loads during normal, transient, and postulated accidentconditions. The team reviewed design calculations, drawings, and vendor specificationsas related to battery charger sizing, short circuit fault current, load profile studies, andvoltage drop to evaluate battery charger capability.Maintenance and test procedures were reviewed to determine whether maintenance andtesting was adequate to ensure reliable operation; and that they were performed inaccordance with regulatory requirements, industry standards, and vendorrecommendations. The team compared as-found and as-left inspection and test resultsto established acceptance criteria to verify the charger's capability conformed to designbasis assumptions and requirements. In addition, the team interviewed system anddesign engineers, and walked down the battery chargers to independently assess thematerial condition, and determine whether the system alignment and operatingenvironment were consistent with the design basis assumptions. Finally, the teamreviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to determine if therewere any adverse trends associated with the chargers and to assess Exelon's capabilityto evaluate and correct problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.15 Unit 2 Hioh Pressure Coolant lniection Valves. MO-2-23-019 and MO-2-23-020a. lnspection ScopeThe team reviewed the design, testing, and operation of the HPCI system injectionvalves (MO-2-23-019 and MO-2-23-020) to verify they could perform their design basisfunctions during normal, transient, and postulated accident conditions. Both valves wereincluded in Exelon's safety-related MOV program. Valve MO-2-23-019 is a normallyclosed valve with a safety function to open for HPCI injection and a safety function toclose for primary containment isolation. Valve MO-2-23-020 is a normally open valve,with a safety function to open (if closed) for HPCI injection.The team reviewed Exelon's MOV program procedures, MOV design specifications,torque switch settings, and MOV calculations to assess thrust and torque limits andactuator settings. The team compared those values to applicable design conditions,such as maximum expected differential pressures, predicted stem nut wear, and weaklink analysis, to verify worst case system conditions were adequately incorporated intotest procedure acceptance criteria and component design. The team reviewed periodictST and MOV diagnostic test results, and stem lubrication and operator greaseinspection results to verify the MOV performance conformed to designEnclosure 15and regulatory requirements, predicted expectations and assumed margins. In addition,the team reviewed motor data, degraded voltage conditions, thermal overloadconfiguration, and voltage drop calculations to verify the MOVs would have sufficientpower available to perform their safety function at worst case degraded voltageconditions. Exelon's analyses for valve thermal binding, pressure locking, andtemperature induced pressure locking were also reviewed to determine susceptibility tothese phenomena. The team reviewed HPCI logic functional test results to verify valvecontrols were appropriately tested and would function as required.In addition, the team interviewed system and design engineers, and walked down theMOVs to independently assess the material condition and determine whether theoperating environment was consistent with the design basis assumptions. Finally, theteam reviewed corrective action documents and system health reports to determine ifthere were any adverse trends associated with the M.OVs and to assess Exelon'scapability to evaluate and correct problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.16 Unit 2 Torus Hardened Vent Valve. AO-2511 and Containment Emeroencv VentOutboard lsolation Valve, AO-80290a. lnspection ScopeThe Unit 2 torus hardened vent valve (AO-251 1) and the associated containmentemergency vent outboard isolation valve (AO-80290) were reviewed to verify their abilityto operate if called upon in the event of an emergency. These vent valves are manuallyoperated valves that were designed to allow operators to vent primary containmentduring a postulated accident that involved the loss of decay heat removal. The teamreviewed the design basis document, maintenance history, design changes, drawings,and associated surveillance testing for the valves to ensure they were capable ofperforming their intended safety function. The team also interviewed operators and thesystem engineer, and walked down associated equipment to assess the materialcondition of the valves, related piping, associated pipe support structures, and air andbackup nitrogen supply lines.The team reviewed the associated emergency operating procedure and assessed themanual operator actions required to operate the valves to ensure the operators wereprovided with clear guidance to perform the actions as credited in the design andlicensing bases. Finally, the team reviewed corrective action documents and systemhealth reports to determine if there were any adverse trends associated with the valvesand to assess Exelon's capability to evaluate and correct problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified.Enclosure 16.2.1.17 Unit 3 'C' Residual Heat Removal Pump. CP35a. lnspection ScopeThe team inspected the'C' RHR pump (CP35) to determine whether it could futfill itsdesign basis function of taking suction from the torus (suppression pool) and deliveringlow pressure, high volume, cooling water flow to the associated heat exchangers and thereactor vessel. The team reviewed NPSH and differential pressure calculations toensure consistency with design basis requirements and IST results. The teaminterviewed the system engineer, and reviewed pump test results and completed lRsassociated with the RHR pump to assess the pump's performance. The team walkeddown the four Unit 3 RHR pumps and motors, and other accessible portions of the RHRsystem to independently assess Exelon's configuration control, the pumps' operatingenvironment, and the RHR system material condition. In addition, the team reviewedsystem flow calculations, the UFSAR, and the Technical Specifications to ensure thepump parameters were consistent with design basis assumptions.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.1.18 Emersencv Coolinq Water Pump Discharqe Valve. MO-0-48-0841. and EmerqencvCoolino Water Pump Discharqe Check Valve. CKV-CC-V506a. Inspection ScopqThe team inspected the emergency cooling water pump discharge MOV, MO-0-48-0841,and its associated pump discharge check valve, CKV-CC-V506, to verify the valves werecapable of performing their design basis function. These normally closed valves weredesigned to open to provide a flow path for pump discharge flow during emergencycooling water (ECW) pump operation. The ECW system provides a reliable backupsource of cooling water in the event both ESW pumps fail to achieve adequate dischargepressure.The team reviewed the UFSAR, the Technical Specifications, design basis documents,drawings, and procedures to identify the design basis requirements of each valve. Theteam reviewed the check valve inspection results, and periodic MOV diagnostic testresults and stroke-timing test data to verify acceptance criteria were met. The teamverified the MOV safety function, performance capability, torque switch configuration,and design margins were adequately monitored and maintained in accordance withExelon's MOV program. The team reviewed MOV weak link calculations to ensure theability of the MOV to remain structurally functional while stroking under design basisconditions. The team verified that the MOV valve analysis used the maximumdifferential pressure expected across the valve during worst case operating conditions.Additionally, the motor data, degraded voltage conditions, and voltage drop calculationresults were reviewed to confirm that the MOVs would have sufficient voltage and poweravailable to perform their safety function at degraded voltage conditions.Enclosure 17The team discussed the design, operation, and maintenance of the valves withengineering staff to evaluate component performance history, maintenance, and overallcomponent health. The team also conducted walkdowns of the valves and associatedequipment to assess the material condition and to verify the installed configurations wereconsistent with the plant drawings, and the design and licensing bases. Finally, theteam reviewed corrective action documents to determine if there were any adversetrends associated with the valves and to assess Exelon's capability to evaluate andcorrect problems.b. FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.2 Review of Industrv Operatinq Experience and Generic lssues (4 samples)The team reviewed selected OE issues for applicability at PBAPS Units 2 and 3. Theteam performed a detailed review of the OE issues listed below to verify that Exelon hadappropriately assessed potential applicability to site equipment and initiated correctiveactions when necessary..2.2.1 10 CFR 21 Report. Linear lndications on Opposed Piston EDG Bearinqsa. lnspection ScooeThe team reviewed Exelon's applicability review and disposition of a Fairbanks Morse10 CFR 21 Notification (Log No.2011-05-00) related to a bearing defect. The nature ofthe identified defect was linear indications (hot tears) that were observed by a FairbanksMorse production inspector on an EDG main bearing. The indications went across theentire edge and extended about one inch deep into the bearing'The team verified that Exelon reviewed the 10 CFR 21 notification, which concluded thatnone of the suspected bearings were currently installed in the Peach Bottom EDGs, buttwo cam bearings from the vendor were in the warehouse, and were similarly subject tothe notification. The team reviewed Exelon's actions, which included quarantining thebearings so that they would not be used, to ensure the 10 CFR 21 report wasappropriately addressed.b. FindinosNo findings were identified..2.2.2 NRC lnformation Notice 2010-03. Failures of Motor-Operated Valves Due to DeqradedStem Lubricanta. lnsoection ScopeThe team evaluated Exelon's applicability review and disposition of NRC InformationNotice (lN) 2010-03. The lN was issued to inform licensees of recent failures andEnclosure 18corrective actions for MOVs due to degraded lubricant on the valve stem and actuatorstem nut threaded area. The team assessed the adequacy of Exelon's evaluation of lN2010-03 by reviewing specific lRs, results of MOV inspections and diagnostic testingresults, and by conducting interviews with engineering personnel.FindinqsNo findings were identified..2.2.3 NRC Information Notice 2007-01. Recent Operatinq Experience Concerninq HydrostaticBarriersa. Inspection ScopeThe team performed a detailed review of Exelon's evaluation of NRC lN 2007-01. ThislN discussed events involving water leaking into areas containing safety-relatedequipment due to deficient hydrostatic (water tight) barriers. The barriers were eitherdegraded, missing, or composed of non-watertight materials such as fire stops (e.9.,silicone foam). The team reviewed the UFSAR, the Technical Specifications, designbasis documents, vendor specifications, drawings, and procedures to identify the designbasis requirements for external flood seals. The team discussed the design, operation,and maintenance of the external flood seals with engineering staff to evaluate theirperformance history, maintenance, and overall component health. The team alsowalked down portions of safety-related buildings such as the EDGs, pump structure, andRHR to assess the material condition of visibly accessible external and internalfloodprotection seals.The team verified that Exelon had appropriately evaluated the OE and had completedengineering evaluations, modifications, and repairs for identified deficiencies to minimizeand limit the impact of potential externalflood events. The team also reviewed Exelon'scorrective actions to address previously identified leaking electric conduit seals leadingto the bottom of a safety-related pump structure motor control center (MCC-E224-P-A).b. FindinosNo findings were identified..2-2.4 NRC lnformation Notice 2006-29. Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-OperatedValves as a Result of Stem Nut Weara. lnspection ScopeThe team assessed Exelon's review and follow-up actions to address the issuedescribed in NRC lN 2006-29. This lN detailed ineffective maintenance practices whichresulted in undetected excessive stem nut wear that had the potential for common causefailure of multiple MOVs. Specifically, the team reviewed Exelon's maintenanceprocedures, engineering program documents, and completed MOV diagnostic testresults which evaluated stem nut wear, and interviewed engineering personnel thatEnclosure b.implemented the MOV diagnostic program at PBAPS to determine whether Exelon wasappropriately monitoring MOVs for excessive stem nut wear issues.FindinqsNo findings were identified.OTHER ACTIVITIESldentification and Resolution of Problems (lP 71152)lnspection ScopeThe team reviewed a sample of problems that Exelon had previously identified andentered into the corrective action program. The team reviewed these issues to verify anappropriate threshold for identifying issues and to evaluate the effectiveness ofcorrective actions. In addition, lRs written on issues identified during the inspection werereviewed to verify adequate problem identification and incorporation of the problem intothe corrective action system. The specific corrective action program documents thatwere sampled and reviewed by the team are listed in the Attachment.FindinosNo findings were identified.Meetinqs. Includino ExitThe team presented the inspection results to Mr. Thomas Dougherty, Site VicePresident, and other members of Exelon staff at an exit meeting on March 11,2Q11.The team reviewed proprietary information, which was returned to Exelon at the end ofthe inspection. The team verified that none of the information in this report isproprietary.4.4c.A2a.4046b.Enclosure A-1ATTACHMENT
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- W. Bennett, Mechanical Maintenance
- R. Bogar, Senior Engineer
- R. Brower, Design Engineering Manager
- J. Chizever, Design Engineering Manager
- H. Coleman, Design Engineer
- J. Coyle, Design Engineer
- C. Dye, System Engineer
- T. Fleischmann, Mechanical Maintenance
- W. Ford, System Engineer
- T. Grimme, System Engineer
- X. Haro, System Engineer
- E. Haupin, Program Engineer
- C. Howell, Design Engineering
- K. Kaufman, System Engineer
- P. Kester, Design Engineer
- R. Lack, System Engineer
- M. Long, Programs Branch Manager
- J. Lyter, Operations Support Engineer
- L. Nace, System Engineer
- T. Purcell, Design Engineer
- M. Ruff, Program Engineer
- R. Smith, Regulatory Assurance Engineer
- D. Tyson, Design Engineer
- T. Veale, Design Engineer
- R. Wagner, Design Engineer
- D. Wheeler, Maintenance Rule Coordinator
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSEDOpened and ClosedNCV0500027712011007-o105000278t2Q11007-010500027712011007-02
- 05000278/2011007-02Failure to Demonstrate the Capability of theEDG Fuel OilTransfer Pumps to FulfillTheirSafety Functions Under all Postulated Conditions(Section 1R21.2.1.1)Temporary Battery Cart Seismic ConfigurationDeficiency (Section 1R21 .2.1 .2)Attachment
A-2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Calculations
and Evaluations:1187-M-003, RHR System - Orifice Design, Rev. 01187-M-004, HPSW System - RHR Modification
- MO-89, New Internals, Rev. 11187-M-008, RHR Mode B and C Nozzle Pressure Drop and Adjustment, Rev. 01187-M-010, HPSW - RHR System Modification, Rev. 01 187-M-01 1, RHR System Orifice, Rev. 018247-EC-104 (102), ECCS Pump Room Cooling Parametric Study, Rev. 118247-M-A35, CST Minimum Water Level to Prevent Vortex Formation, Rev. 122.33, ESW System Network Analysis, Rev. 032-1H, Design of Support 2-32G8-S67 and 3-32GB-S-67 for Stress Calc 32-1, Rev. 033-03C, Analysis of ESW Pump Anchor Bolts and Supports, Design of New Supports, Rev. 16280-M11-55-3, Seismic Analysis, HPSW Pumps, Rev.
- 040004660, Silt Level Effects on the Circulating and Intake Bay Components, 1111219041486268, Evaluate for Replacement 4200 Parts for 2DB-R-B on the 250VDC Bus,12112/10A1607566, ESW/HPSW Bay Mud Level Measurements, 2118192A1695348 Eval-01, Determine Whether Spacers are Needed for 00D452 Batteries,2126110BLP-12,012, HPSW Technical Specification, 1Ql28l7 4ECR 10-308, Minor revision to
- PE-17, Battery Capacity Analysis, Rev. 0ECR 96-00990-0, Pressure LockinglThermal Binding Design Analysis for PBAPS, Rev. 2EWR
- 40036401, Temporary Battery Cable Torque Requirements, 5/3i91EWR A0158039, Battery Cell Change-out with One or Two Units at Power, 1017194EWR P-51694, lntercell Gonnection Resistance, 5/9/90G-080-VC-146, Safe and Alternate Shutdown Analysis, Rev. 0LIS-0401A Manual Calculation, EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank Level, Rev. 0MDE-86-0786, Safe and Alternate Shutdown Analysis, Rev. 1ME-02371-01, Minimum Acceptable Flow Rate for ESW Flow to RHR Room Coolers, Rev. 0ME-0538, Primary Containment Venting Flow Rates for Various Vent Paths, Rev. 0ME-171,
- MOD 1788, Determine RHR Pump Required Discharge Pressure, 1018185ME-3, RHR Heat Exchanger lnlet Pressures for All Modes of RHR/HPSW Operation, Rev. 1ME-507, Acceptance Criteria for IST of RHR Pumps (LPCI Mode), Rev. 3OTC-50, Operating Thrust Calculations, Rev. 1PE-0087, Determine CST Working Volume for New Settings of CST Level Switches, Rev. 0PE-0121, PBAPS Voltage Regulation Study, Rev.7PE-0166, Emergency Diesel Generator Loading for Cases Defined by UFSAR 8.5.2C1L, Rev. 7PE-017,
- 1251250 Vdc Battery Capacity Analysis, Rev. 12PE-0192, AC System Fault Study, Rev. 1JPE-O194, Coordination for 4kV 1E Switchgear, Rev. 4PE-088, 4160 Emergency Aux. Switchgear 20A17 Bus 32 Protective Relay Settings, Rev. 8PE-090, Cable Withstand Current Rating, Rev. 2PE-140,1251250 Vdc System What lf Cases, Rev. 10PE-181 ,125Vdc Voltage Analysis, Rev. 3PE-191 ,1251250 Vdc System Fault Current, Rev. 2PE-196,
- 1251250 Vdc System Coordination, Rev. 2PEAM-0004, HPCI and RCIC Loads During Fire Safe Shutdown Event, Rev. 0PEAM-0008, Station Blackout Time Line for HPCI and RCIC Loads, Rev. 0Attachment
- A-3Pl-00034, Level Uncertainty Calculation for
- LT-3-13-170 (CST Level), Rev. 1PM-0046, EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tank Volume Determinations, Rev. 1PM-0047, EDG Fuel Oil Consumption for 7 Days Continuous Operation at Full Load, Rev. 0PM-0123, Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Consumption for 6 Days andT Days Operation with LOCADependent Loads, Rev. 0PM-034, Required BHP (Mechanical) RHR Pump(s) for Different Modes of Operation, 10/11/89PM-0410, ldentify Licensing Requirements for Diesel Generator Air Start System, Rev. 0PM-0533, EDG Operability Curves with Reduced ESW Flow Rates, Rev. 1PM-0589, RHR Heat Exchanger Performance Evaluation, Rev. 4PM-0620, Determine Upstream and Downstream Line Pressures for
- GL 89-13 MOVs, Rev. 16PM-0760, Power Rerate Evaluation - SBO Analysis, Rev. 1PM-0958, RHR/Core Spray Pump Room Temperatures Post-LOCA with 95' River Water, Rev.2PM-1010, RHR Pump NPSH, Rev.6APM-104, Emergency Heat Sink TemperatureslRevised Flow Rates and Heat Loads, Rev. 3PM-1048, Design Basis for Internal Flood Protection, HPSWESW Pump Structure, Rev. 0PM-391, Determine Minimum Water Level in Emergency Cooling Tower Reservoir, Rev. 13PM-589, RHR Heat Exchanger Performance Evaluation, Rev. 4PM-620, Determine Differential Pressures for MOVs, Rev. 16PM-736, Battery Room Hydrogen Concentration, Rev. 2PM-824, Maximum Anticipated Bearing Oil Temperature of the HPSW Pumps, Rev. 1PS-028, Design of Battery Cart to Transport and Support Temporary Batteries, Rev. 1PS-155, Seismic Evaluation of Battery Racks for Cell Change-out Activity, Rev. 1SR-124, Seismic Weak Link Report, Rev. 4VO-00182
- OTe-46, Grane-Aloyco Operating Thrust Calculations, Rev. 1Completed Surveillance. Maintenance. and Modification Testinq:Daily Operator Rounds Logs for 38 Battery (2117111)Mf DAS Calculation and Diagnostic Trace Results for
- MO-2-14-012A(9121106,9128110)MO-2-23-019 MIDACALC As-left Test Setup Review, Rev. 1MO-2-23-019 MIDACALC Results, Rev. 1MO-2-23-020 MIDACALC As-left Test Setup Review, Rev. 1MO-2-23-020 MIDACALC Results, Rev. 1MOV Post-Test Data Review Worksheet for
- MO-2-14-012A(9l21lOO)MOV Post-Test Data Review Worksheet for
- MO-2-23-016 (9128110)RCM 072, Trash Rack Inspection (6/26109)RT-0-1 00-505-2, Emergency Operating Procedure Tool Inventory g 1812010)RT-f-033-631-3, RHR Room Cooler ESW Heat Transfer Test(1124111)RT-f-033-632-3, Core Spray Room Cooler ESW Heat Transfer TesI (212109, 212111)RT-M-033-675-2, Unit 2 Pump lntake Structure Inspection and Cleaning (9/25/10)RT-O-032-310-3, HPSW Oil Cooler Heat Transfer Capability Test (8127110)RT-O-033-600-2, Full Flow Test of ESW to ECCS Coolers and EDG Coolers (1102111)RT-O-052-252-2, E2 EDG lnspection Post Maintenance Functional Test (5/8/1 0)Sl2F-23-76-XXCQ, Calibration Check of HPCI Steam Line High Flow DPIS 2-23-76 (12115110)Sf 2M-54-E22-XXC4, Calibration Check and Functional Test of E22 Bus and E224 Bus Metersand Overcurrent Relays (1/9/08)Attachmenl
- A-4Sl2T-MlS'8547-C1CQ, Calibration/Functional Check of Channel C Group 1, 4 and 5 of PCISLogic for
- TI5-80547C (1115111)SP-1472, Diesel Generator Air Start Capacity and Full Load Reject Test (12130192)ST/LLRT 20.078J0, Torus Purge Exhaust (9121 108, 1015110)ST/LLRT 30.078.10, Torus Purge Exhaust (1019107, l0l2l0g)ST-0-33-310-2, ESW Booster and ECW Pump and Valve Functional lST (12122108, 3/5/09,12t22t09, 3t5t10)ST-8.1.9, Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Functional Test (1/16i91 )ST-C-095-884-2, Sampling Diesel Fuel Prior to Delivery to On-Site Storage Tanks (215111)ST-C-095-885-2, Diesel Generator Main FuelTank Sampling and Analysis (215111)ST-l-014-100-2, Core Spray'A' Logic System FunctionalTest(2121108, 3/10/10)ST-l-023-100-2, HPCI Logic System Functional Test (9/2/10)ST-LLRT-2Ol.06.01, 'A' Feedwater Local Leak Rate Test (9/17l10)ST-M-168-250-2, Safety Grade Instrument Gas System Functional and IST (1013108, 1016110)ST-M-168-250-3, Safety Grade lnstrument Gas System Functional and IST (10111107,10/4/09)ST-M-57 B-7 32-3, 38 Mod ified Battery Discha rge Performa nce Test (9 I 281 09)ST-M-578-7 42-3, 38 1 25 1 250 Vdc Battery Service Test ( 1 0/05/07)ST-M-578-750-3,
- 1251250 Vdc Battery Weekly Inspection (2112111)ST-M-57B-752-3, 38D001 Battery Yearly Inspection (11 l1 1 110)ST-M-578-7 62-3, 38D003 - I 12 Battery Charger Capability Test ( 1 1 l05l 10)ST-O-007-410-2, PCIS Valves Cold Shutdown IST (10/9/08, 10/6/10)ST-O-007-410-3, PCIS Valves Gold Shutdown IST (10/111A7, U27109, 10/08/09)ST-O-007-510-2, PCIS Valves Remote Position Indication Verification (1019108, 1016110)ST-O-007-510-3, PCIS Valves Remote Position Indication Verification (101111Q7, 10/4109)ST-O-01 0-301 -3,'A' RHR Functional and IST (7 l8l 10, 1 1 l 1 l 10, 1 l 1 1 l 1 1)ST-O-010-306-2, 'B' RHR Pump, Valve, Flow, and Cooler Functional and IST (8125110,2127111)ST-O-023-301-2, HPCI Pump, Valve, Flow and Cooler Functional and IST (1114110,
- 319110,61 1 1 l 10, 1 0/8/1 0, 121 121 10)ST-O-023-5Q1-2, HPCIValves Remote Position Indication Verification (10/15/08, 10/6/10)ST-O-032-301-3, HPSW Functional and IST (12128109,3130110,719110,
- 1019110,
- 12131110,)ST-O-033-300-2, ESW Valve, Cooler, ECT Fans FunctionalTest (7/31/10,
- 10123110,1129111)ST-0-033-635-2, ESW Piping Pressure Test Examination (7l25lOO)ST-O-052-212-2, E2 EDG Slow Start Full Load and IST Test, Rev. 28 (215111)ST-O-052-7 O2-2, E2
- EDG 24 Hour End urance Test, Rev. 17 (1 1 l 1 61 09)ST-O-52D-202-2, EDG Fuel OilTransfer Pump 08P060/Suction Check Valve IST (11127111)ST-O-578-7 20-3, 38D00 1 /3DD00 1 Battery Quarterly I nspectio n (21051 1 1 )TC No.00-179,
- RT-O-033-600-2, Flow Test of ESW to ECCS/EDG Coolers (4120100)Gorrective Action Documents:1080382148445110849731 1
- 058801 10638211068151
- 1075381 10804911081141 1 15030111988711201231 120916112092311269921
- 1396811 16161811649921166272117381811741021175594*1 1 76959.117754905641 080844207086781408797011010281105004310711301 071 3431179128.1179679.1180126.1 1 81 305*1 1 82989*1
- 1831691 1 83364 .1184319"Attachment
- 1184761*1184834*1185240"1185791.1
- 187639 "06005118981430781532272238494146934647628049519750464266031066838877299982038282248885901 5879701883424914639940062941208965488974218987344A-5A00452577400894291A01023025401107323A01 1351 18A01 135676A01 141508A01 150893A01 1 59574A01181771.401184771*A01186152.A1113462p.1127431A1167100A1249047A1355640A1397382A1410253A1412800A1423232A1468210A.153476241534763A153476441534786A1535069A1646532A1659013A1701061A17169924176264741777591A17775934177785641777857A1778747A1784851* Document written as a result of inspection effort.Drawings:6280-4-62, CW Pump Structure Plan Elev. Unit 3, Rev. 26280-C-24-54-3, Details, Condensate Storage Tank, Rev. 06280-E-1004, Raceway & Grounding Layout Pump Structure - Unit 2, Sh. 2, Rev. 326280-E-1004, Raceway & Grounding Layout Pump Structure - Unit 2, Sh. 3, Rev. 306280-E-1008, Raceway & Grounding Layout Pump Structure - Unit 3, Sh. 1, Rev. 326280-E-1079, Lighting, Communications Layout Circ Water Pump Structure, Sh. 1, Rev. 236280-E-1400, Conduit and Cable Trays Symbols, Notes and Details, Rev.O6280-E-1615, Single Line Meter/Relay Diagram E124andE224, Sh.1, Rev. 766280-E-1621, Single Line Meter/Relay Diagram Pump Structure, Sh.1, Rev. 65628A-E-47, Schematic Meter/Relay Diagram 4160 Vac Emer Aux Power Sys Unit 2, Rev. 276280-E-5254, Electrical Protective Relay Index, Rev. 446280-E-8, Single Line Meter/Relay Diagram EDG/4160 Vac, Sh. 1, Rev. 176280-E8-12-4, Motors for HPSW Pumps, Sh. 1, Rev.36280-M-11, Layne and Bowler Pump, Sh. 1, Rev. 26280-M-1 1-29, 18 FXH Pump Assembly, Sh. 1, Rev. 106280-M-1-DD-7-9, Core Spray Process Diagram, Sh. 1, Rev. 96280-M-1-DD-9-9, Residual Heat Removal Process Diagram, Sh. 1, Rev.96280-M1JJ-49, Core Spray Pump Curves, Sh. 1, Rev.06280-M-1-S-54-64, Electrical Schematic Diagram Reactor Protection System, Sh. 15, Rev.646280-M-1-S-54-64, Electrical Schematic Diagram Reactor Protection System, Sh. 16, Rev. 646280-M-309, Condensate and Refueling Water Storage and Transfer System, Rev. 646280-M-315, ESW and High Pressure Service Water Systems, Sh.3, Rev. 536280-M-330, Emergency Cooling System, Sh. 1, Rev. 356280-M-361, Residual Heat Removal System, Sh.3, Rev.676280-M-362, Core Spray Cooling System, Sh. 1, Rev. 356280-M-365, High Pressure Coolant Injection System, Sh. 1, Rev. 636280-M-366, High Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Turbine Details, Sh. 1, Rev. 576280-M-377, Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems, Sh. 1 through 3, Rev. 446280-M-377, Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems, Sh. 4, Rev. 40Attachment
- 280-M-377, Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems, Sh. 44, Rev. 16280-M-377, Diesel Generator Auxiliary Systems, Sh. 5, Rev. 86280-M-46-24, Cardox System Control Logic/Schematic Diagram EDG Building, Sh. 2, Rev.25682A-C-128, Misc. Details, ESW Pump and HPSW Pump, Rev. 36820-C-64, Underground Storage Tanks, Foundation and Manhole Details, Rev. 96820-M-77, Cooling Coils, Rev. 16820-M81-2-4, Diesel Generator Fuel OilTransfer Pump, Rev. 0E-1, Single Line Diagram Station, Rev. 47E-187, Electrical Schematic Diagram, ESW Pumps 4.16 kV Circuit Breaker, Sh. 3, Rev. 28E-187, Electrical Schematic Diagram, ESW Pumps 4.16 kV Circuit Breaker, Sh. 4, Rev. 28E-2365, Electrical Schematic Diagram RPS Power Distribution Protective Devices, Sh. 1, Rev. 7E-26, Unit 2 125125A Vdc Single Line Diagram, Sh. 1, Rev. 79E-27 , Unit 3
- 1251250 Vdc Single Line Diagram, Sh. 1 , Rev. 74E-27,Unit31251250 Vdc Single Line Diagram, Sh. 2,Rev.41E-27,Unit31251250 Vdc Single Line Diagram, Sh.3, Rev.5E-5-7, Electrical Schematic Diagram, Standby Diesel Generator, Sh. 6, Rev. 50E-8, Single Line Meter/Relay Diagram EDG & 4160 Vac Emer Power System - Unit 2, Rev. 17GE Drawing 992C558AD, Outline ESW Pump Motor PBAPS Units 2 & 3, Rev. 32301, HPCI Steam Supply, Sh. 1, Rev.6ISO 2-14, Core Spray, Sh. 12, Rev. 3Johnston Pump Curve, J.O. 00JC1 4045, Rev. 0M-102-B-235, Gate Valve Assembly with
- SMB-2-80 Motor Operator, Sh.1, Rev. 3M-11-28, SK Assembly Drawing for ESW Pumps OAP57 and OBP57, Rev. 4M-11-61, HPSW Pump Curve, Sh. 1, Rev.0M-1-K-11, Walworth Cast Steel 12-in Valve, Limitorque
- SMB-2 Operator, Sh. 1, Rev.
- FM-1-5-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 2 Rev. 73M-1-5-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 24 Rev. 73M-1-5-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 3 Rev. 75M-1-5-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 5 Rev. 74M-1-S-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 6 Rev. 74M-1-3-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 7, Rev. 75M-1-S-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 8, Rev. 73M-1-S-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 9, Rev. 74M-1-5-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 10, Rev. 74M-1-5-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 11 Rev. 76M-1-5-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 12 Rev. 81M-1-5-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 13 Rev. 83M-1-5-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 14 Rev. 75M-1-5-36, HPCI Elementary Diagram, Sh. 15, Rev. 79M-1-S-40, Electrical Schematic Diagram Core Spray, Sh. 8, Rev. 57M-1-S-70, Electrical Schematic Diagram RPS MG Set Control, Sh. 2, Rev. 14Desiqn Basis Documents:P-S-01A,
- 1251125 Vdc and 24148 Vdc System, Rev.14P-S-02, Emergency Service Water System, Rev. 12P-S-03, High Pressure Coolant Injection, Rev.21P-S-04, High Pressure Service Water System, Rev. 10Attachment
- A-7P-S-07, Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries, Rev. 7P-S-08C, Reactor Building HVAC System, Rev. 11P-S-08D, Miscellaneous HVAC Systems, Rev. 9P-S-09, Residual Heat Removal System, Rev. 17P-S-27, Emergency Cooling Water System, Rev. 10P-S-35, Intake Water System, Rev. 7P-S-44, Core Spray System, Rev. 11P-T-01, Structural, Rev. 8P-T-13, Station Blackout Event, Rev.7P-T-15, Motor-Operated Valves, Rev. 8Miscellaneous:0103111-08, Evaluation for NRC lN 2010-03, Failures of MOVs due to Degraded StemLubricant, 4111106280-E-7, Specification for Medium Voltage Metal-Clad Switchgear/Bus Duct, Rev. 46280-M561-20-1, AGASTAT Control Relays, Rev. 0AITL A1208913, Document and Control GL95-07 PLTB Design Changes, 3125104ER-AA-2030, Attachment 4, System Walkdown Standards, RHR, 9/30/10ISBN 0-444-87445-3, Tribology of Plastic Materials Table 1.10, 1990Letter, EnerSys to PBAPS, Re:White Material in DX Batteries, 5107104Letter, PBAPS to NRC, Response to NRC
- GL 96-05, Performance Verification of Design Bases Capability of Safety-Related Valves, 311 4197LS-AA-126-1001, FASA, Preparation for the 201 1 NRC CDBI, Rev. 5M-1-JJ-53-1, Residual Heat Removal Exchangers, Rev. 3, 3112108M-f-U-435-1, RHR Pump Curve, 2118178MO-0-48-841, AC Motor Operated Gate Valve Control Parameters, Rev. 2MO-2-23-019 Data Sheet, Rev. 1MO-2-23-020 Data Sheet, Rev. 1NCR-PB-92-389-001, External Flood Barrier Penetration Seal Evaluations, 216195NCR-PB-g2-39A-002, External Flood Barrier Penetration Seal Evaluations-Non Rx Bldg, 5i5l95NE-075, Specification for Penetration Seals in Hazard Barriers at PBAPS and Limerick, Rev. 4NEDC 31322, BWROG Design Basis of Selected Safety Related MOVs, 9186NEDC 31871, BWROG Phase-ll Operational Basis of Selected Safety-Related MOVs, 3/91NEDC 31890, BWROG Phase-l Operational Basis of Selected Safety-Related MOVs, 3/91OP-AA-1 02-1 03, Operator Work-Arounds and Challenges, 212/1 1Passport AR#
- 322722 Assignment #3: Diesel Vulnerability to Tornado Missiles, 4121105PBAPS Performance Monitoring Summary 10-1 RHR -LPCI Mode, 3/11PBAPS Performance Monitoring Summary 10-2 RHR SDC/Torus Cooling, 3i11PEA-91 134, Testing of ASCO and AVCO SV Assemblies, 4l9l1OPeach Bottom Operational and Technical Decision Making Review Matrix, Q2lQ3lQ4-2010Periodic Assessment of Maintenance Rule Program, April 2007 - March 2009R105-94-08.01, PBAPS
- GL 89-10 Test Program Completion Report, Rev. 1ST-O-33-310-2, Yearly ECW Pump (P186) Vibration Data, 2001'2011Stock Code 116-85068 Procurement Clause M-121375, Battery Design Requirements, 5113/03System Health Report, Emergency Cooling Water and Tower, Q3-2010System Health Report, DC Systems, Q3-2010Attachment
- A-8System Health Report, HPCI Systems, Q3-2010System Health Report, RHR and RHR Sample, Q3-2010System Health Report, Unit 2 Core Spray, Q2-2010System Health Report, Primary Containment, Q2-2010System Health Report, Service Water and Service Bay, Q3-2010System Health Report, Unit 3 High Pressure Service Water, Q3-2010TRT No. 11-2,Voltages Obtained in Support of
- ECR 09-00158, 1112111Modifications & 10
- GFR 50.59 Reviews:ECR 06-00428, HPSW Pumps Obsolete and Require Replacement Evaluation, 1017106ECR 95-01703, Replacement HPSW Motor Evaluation 2(3) A-DP042,413195PB 05-00385 002, ConverUUpgrade EDG Cardox System to Manual System, Rev. 2PB 09-00157 000, U2 SSPVs: Design Change from ASCO to AVCO, Rev. 0PB 99-02596 004, Procure Replacement Discharge Head for ESW Pumps, Rev. 4Procedures:Alarm Response Card Window F5, 'B' Diesel Fuel Storage Tank Level Hi-Lo, Rev. 12AO 29.3, Discharge Canal - lntake Pond Crosstie Gate Operation/Frazil lce Mitigation, Rev. 16AO 52D.1, Transferring Diesel Fuel Oil Between Storage Tanks, Rev. 7ARC 204 20C207R D-4, Outer Screen Structure Screen Stopped, Rev. 2ARC 212 20C205RR C-5, Unit 3 High Pressure Service Water Bay Level High-Low, Rev. 5ARC 317 3OC212R K-4, HPSW Pump Room High-Lo Temp, Rev. 3ARC 326 30C03D E-3, D High Press Service Water Pump Overcurrent, Rev. 3CC-AA-309, Controlof Design Analysis, Rev. 10CC-AA-309-1001, Guidelines for Preparation and Processing of Design Analysis, Rev. 6CC-PB-201 , Hazard Barrier Control Program, Rev. 0COL 30.1 .A-2, Emergency Service Water System (Unit 2 and Common), Rev. 31COL 33.1.A-2, Emergency Service Water System (Unit 2 and Common), Rev. 23COL 33.1.A-3, Emergency Service Water System (Unit 3 and Common), Rev. 21ER-M-2030, Conduct of Plant Engineering Manual, Rev. 9ER-AA-300, MOV Program Administrative Procedure, Rev. 6ER-AA-300-1001, MOV Program Performance lndicators, Rev. 5ER-M-302, MOV Program Engineering Procedure, Rev. 5ER-AA-302-1001, MOV Thrust/Torque Sizing and Setup Determination Methodology, Rev. 6ER-AA-302-1003, MOV Margin Analysis and Periodic Verification Test lntervals, Rev. 7ER-AA-302-1004, MOV Performance Trending, Rev. 5ER-AA-302-1005, MOV Design Database Control, Rev. 6ER-AA-302-1006,
- GL 96-05 Program MOV Maintenance and Testing Guidelines, Rev. 10ER-AA-302 -1007 , MOV Limitorque Actuator Capability Determination Methodology, Rev. 6ER-AA-302-1008, MOV Diagnostic Test Preparation lnstructions, Rev. 8ER-AA-302-1009, Final JOG MOV Periodic Verification Program lmplementation, Rev. 1ER-AA-520, Instrument Performance Trending, Rev. 3ER-PB-310-1010, Peach Bottom Maintenance Rule Structural Monitoring Program, Rev. 4M-057-013, 125 Volt Battery Replacement and Cell Post Cleaning, Rev. 12M-057-014, Cyberex 125 Volt Battery Charger Maintenance, Rev. 13M-057-017, Installation of Maintenance Battery 00D452, Rev. 1Attachment
- A-9M-511-120, Motor Inspection/Replacement for Motor Operators
- SMB-000 to
- SMB-S, Rev. 12MA-AA-723-300, Diagnostic Testing of Motor-Operated Valves, Rev. 4MA-AA-723-301, Periodic Inspection of Limitorque Model SMB/SB/SBD-000 to 5 MOVs, Rev. 6NE-119, MOV Thrust & Torque Determination Methodology, Rev. 12OP-PB-108-103-2, Locked Valve List - PBAPS Unit 2, Rev. 3RT-M-033-675-2, Unit 2 Pump Intake Structure lnspection and Cleaning, Rev. 4SE-1 1, Loss-of-Offsite Power, Rev. 13SE-11.1, Operating SBO Line during a Loss-of-Offsite Power Event, Rev.7SE-3, Loss of Conowingo Pond-Procedure, Rev. 19SE-4, Flood Procedure, Rev. 24SO 28A.7.A-3, Removalof One Circulating Water Pump from Service, Rev. 13SO 32.1.A-3, High Pressure Service Water System Startup and Normal Operations, Rev. 15SO 32.8.A-3, High Pressure Water System Routine Inspection, Rev. 6SO 48.1.B, Emergency Cooling Water System Startup, Rev. 13SO 52A.1.B, Diesel Generator Operations, Rev. 45SO-578.1-3,125125Q Volt Battery Charger Operations, Rev. 5ST-l-023-100-2, HPCI Logic System FunctionalTest, Rev. 17ST-l-052-252-2, E2 EDG lnspection Post Maintenance lnstrumentation and Logic Test, Rev. 9ST-l-37G-392-2, E-2 EDG Cardox System Simulated Actuation and Air Flow Test, Rev. 7ST-M-578-732-3,38 Modified Battery Discharge Performance Test, Rev. 13ST-M-578-742-3,38
- 1251250 Vdc Battery Service Test, Rev. 13ST-M-578-750-3,
- 1251250 Vdc Battery Weekly Inspection, Rev. 30ST-M-578-752-3,38D001 Battery Yearly Inspection, Rev. 5ST-M-57B-762-3, 3BD003 - 112 Bathery Charger Capability Test, Rev. 4ST-O-010-501-3, RHR Loop'A'Valves Remote Position lndication Verification, Rev. 4ST-O-578-7 20-3, 38D001 /3DD001 Battery Quarterly Inspection, Rev. 1 6T-200-2, Primary Containment Venting, Rev. 10T-2OOJ-2, Containment Venting via the Torus Hardened Vent, Rev.'1WC-PB-430-1001, Operation and Maintenance of Surveillance Testing Program, Rev. 2Vendor Manuals & Specifications:Crane-Aloyco Report No.
- OTC-156, Rev. 0MO-0-48-841, Diagnostic Test, 11251056280-M1
- 1-4902, Lanye and Bowler Vertical Turbine Pump, Rev. 56280-M1308-4, Type SMB Instruction and Maintenance Manual, 9i90Coltec lndustries Letter to PECO, Contract
- 205700 Reference 85782 EDG Load Rating, 7111191GEI-88761J, GE lnstructions/Parts for Maintenance Magne-Blast Circuit Breaker, Rev.
- JE-5-51-2, Emergency DieselGenerator, Rev. 0E-5-166, Emergency Diesel Generator, Rev. 10E-5-167, Emergency Diesel Generator, Rev. 3E-5-168, Emergency Diesel Generator, Rev. 1011 905 551(Colt lndustries) - Emergency Diesel Generator Flow, Rev. 3E-13-55-2, Assembling & Maintaining Standard Racks for Exide Batteries, Rev. 2E-13-123, EnerSys 2GN-23 Battery, Rev. 6NE-102-3, Cyberex 130/200R3-S Battery Charger, Rev. 2Proposed IEEE Criteria for Class 1E Electrical Systems for Nuclear Power, IEEE Transactionson Nuclear Science, Volume
- NS-16, No. 4, 8/69Attachment
- A-10IEEE 450, Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Lead-Acid Batteries, 1995 EditionIEEE 485, Sizing Lead Storage Batteries, 1983 EditionC-00028, Specification for Underground Tanks for PBAPS, Units 2 and 3, Rev. 0Work Orders:c0191657c0191657c0210254c0213000c0215360R091 1947R0912314R0920651R0956479R0956510R0968698R0969299R0980854R0987536R0990551R1014319R1031820R1031825R1032672R1034765R1056501R1087604R1092779R1 103855R1107243R1107824R1 108074R1 108326R1 108326R1114222R1114653R1 1 17400R1 138376R1140365R1 153965R1174864R1 179055R1 179056R1 179058R1 180981R1 182719R1 1 861 31R849482R889540R922217Attachment
- ACCFRCSCSTDCECWEDGESWHCUHPCIHPSWrMcINIPIRISTKVMOVNCVNPSHNPSHANRCOEPBAPSPRARAWRCICRHRRRWSDPSPARSSPVUFSARVacVdcA-11
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Alternating CurrentCode of Federal RegulationsCore SprayCondensate Storage TankDirect CurrentEmergency Cooling WaterEmergency Diesel GeneratorEmergency Service WaterHydraulic Control UnitHigh Pressure Coolant lnjectionHigh Pressure Service WaterInspection Manual Chapterlnformation NoticeInspection Procedurelssue ReportIn-service Testingkilo-VoltsMotor-Operated ValveNon-cited ViolationNet Positive Suction HeadNet Positive Suction Head AvailableNuclear Regulatory CommissionOperating ExperiencePeach Bottom Atomic Power StationProbabilistic Risk AssessmentRisk Achievement WorthReactor Core lsolation CoolingResidual Heat RemovalRisk Reduction WorthSignificance Determination ProcessStandardized Plant Analysis RiskScram Solenoid Pilot ValveUpdated Final Safety Analysis ReportVolts, Alternating CurrentVolts, Direct CurrentAttachment