ML19350A946

Forwards LER 81-008/03L-0

ML19350A946
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	03/12/1981
From:	Finfrock I JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML19350A947	List: ML19350A946 ML19350A948
References
NUDOCS 8103170633
Download: ML19350A946 (3)

Text

.

OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION A1 (609)693-6000 P.O 30X 388

• FORKED RIVER

• NEW JERSEY

• C8731 w C'"4*%.'s.v.7 C' h uu -

March 12, 1981 Mr. Boyce H.' Grier, Director hkj 5

s k

Office of Inspection and Enforcenent pegion I [6 l

United States Nuclear Pegulatory Ccntnission .

MAR 101931 =

631 Park Avenue 83 p s.noto emum j

""" ' ~

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 y O

Dear Mr. Grier:

\9 SUMECT: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 Licensee Event Report Peportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-08/3L

'Ihis letter forwards three copies of a Licensee Event Peport to report Peportable Cv e ce No. 50-219/81-08/3L in capliance with paragra# 6.9.2.b.4 of the Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours, hf}7)

Ivan R. Finf Jr Vice President - J &L Director - Oyster Creek IEF:dh Enclosures cc: Director (40 copies)

Office of Inspection and EnforCErent United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, D.C. 20555 Director (3)

Office of Managecent Infonnation i and Program Control l United States Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission Washington, D. C. 20555 NRC Resident Inspector (1)

Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, N. J.

8103170 la33 S

OYSTER CREEK NUCIEAR GE2ERATING STATICH Forked River, New Jersey 08731 Licensee Event Report Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/81-08/3L Report Date March 12, 1981 Oceturece Date February 10, 1981 Identification of Occurrence An umonitored release of radioactive water due to seepage through the 3 foot thick outsida wall at the northwest side of the New Radwaste Bi41 ding.

h is event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.4.

Conditions Prior to occurrence The plant was operating at steady state power.  ;

Major Plant Parameters:

Power: Reactor 1756IWt Generator 597 MWe Flow: Recirculation 15.0 x 410 y 6

Feedwater 6.37 x 10 lb h Description of Occurrence On February 10, 1981 at apprcedmately 0740 hours0.00856 days <br />0.206 hours <br />0.00122 weeks <br />2.8157e-4 months <br />, the offgoing New Radwaste operator discovered water seeping through the NRW biilding at various locations along the west wall. By visual observation during the time period of the occurrence, the total aucunt of water releasai was estimated at approximately 15 gallons.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence me cause of the occurrence was attributed to the unusually high level of water contained in the Cheira_1 Waste Collection Tank vaults and to the fact that the concrete wall did not contain this water within the building. W e high water level in the vaults was due to the overflow o# the three Chemical Waste Collection Tanks, caused by inle:kage frm the condensate Transfer Systen.

Reportabh Occurrence Page 2 Report No. 50-219/81-08/3L Art. lysis of Occurrence Saples were taken of g watcr outside the building and the gross beta con-centration was 3.2 x 10 uCi/ml. %e Radiological Controls department conducted direct frisks of various points alcng the wall, showing contamination levels ranging frcm approximately 15,000 DPM up to 120,000 DPM. More inportantly, the direct survey showed detectable ground contamination only within 6 inches of tAe wall. Soil core saples were also taken on February 18 and on February 26, and i these suples are being prepared to be shipped off-site for testirq. Se results of these tests will not be available in time to be included in this report, but will be included in a subseq%nt revision. Based on the above discussion, the safety significance of this event is considered minimal.

m is building was designed and constructed in accordance with Regulatory Guides 1.26 rev. 2 and 1.29 rev. 2. te concrete of the floor and lower five feet of ,

the walls is all designed and constructed to Seismic Category I specifications.

mis dive foot high " bathtub" is designed to withstard the Safe Shutdown Earth-i quako (SSE) and is capable of preventing the instantaneous release of the total invantory of water in all tanks in the event of a comon mode failure (such as SEE).

Corrective Action me innadiate corrective actions taken were to rope off the area around the northwest corner of the NRW bi41 ding and to post the area a " Contaminated Area RWP Required". Herculite was secured and sealed against the wall in order to 4

contain the seepage. Cnce the continuous overflow of the Cbanical Waste Collec-tion tanks was . halted, the effort was concentrated on processing the water frce the vaults and frce the tanks to the waste surge tank, where it could be stored and later processed.

%ere is presently an engineering request to investigate the extent of leakage pathways through the biilding and to determine a suitable means of assuring bi41 ding integrity. m ere is also an engineering request to evaluate the possible instal 15cion of level detectors in the tank vaults. %e NRW operators have received instructions not to exceed 95% level in any tank, and have been made aware. of what actions to take in the event a tank reaches a level greater than 95%. Also, the PORC is reviewing possible pMare changes which would change talve lineups in order to more easily verify that an overflow condition exists in a tank.

F_a_ilure Data Not applicable.

. ._ .