IR 05000382/2005002
| ML051360146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 05/16/2005 |
| From: | William Jones NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-E |
| To: | Venable J Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR-05-002 | |
| Download: ML051360146 (23) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION, UNIT 3 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000382/2005002
Dear Mr. Venable:
On April 7, 2005, the NRC completed an inspection at your Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 21, 2005, with you and other members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has identified an issue that was evaluated under the risk significance determination process as having very low safety significance (Green). The NRC has also determined that a violation is associated with this issue. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. These findings are described in the subject inspection report. If you contest the subject or severity of this noncited violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with copies to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, facility.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Entergy Operations, Inc. -2-Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Sincerely,
/RA/
William B. Jones, Chief Project Branch E Division of Reactor Projects Docket: 50-382 License: NPF-38 Enclosure:
Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Vice President, Operations Support Entergy Operations, Inc.
P.O. Box 31995 Jackson, MS 39286-1995 Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway P.O. Box 651 Jackson, MS 39205 General Manager, Plant Operations Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road Killona, LA 70066-0751 Manager - Licensing Manager Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road Killona, LA 70066-0751 Chairman Louisiana Public Service Commission P.O. Box 91154 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-9154
Entergy Operations, Inc. -3-Director, Nuclear Safety &
Regulatory Affairs Waterford 3 SES Entergy Operations, Inc.
17265 River Road Killona, LA 70066-0751 Michael E. Henry, State Liaison Officer Department of Environmental Quality Permits Division P.O. Box 4313 Baton Rouge, LA 70821-4313 Parish President St. Charles Parish P.O. Box 302 Hahnville, LA 70057 Winston & Strawn 1400 L Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20005-3502
Entergy Operations, Inc. -4-Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (BSM1)
DRP Director (ATH)
DRS Director (DDC)
DRS Deputy Director (KSW)
Senior Resident Inspector (RVA)
Branch Chief, DRP/E (WBJ)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/E (VGG)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)
RITS Coordinator (KEG)
J. Dixon-Herrity, OEDO RIV Coordinator (JLD)
RidsNrrDipmIipb WAT Site Secretary (AHY)
W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)
SISP Review Completed: _WBJ__ ADAMS: / Yes G No Initials: __WBJ____
/ Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive / Non-Sensitive R:\_WAT\2005\WT2005-02RP-MCH.wpd RIV:RI/DRP/E SRI:DRP/E PE/DRP/C C:DRS/PSB C:DRS/EB GFLarkin MCHay RVAzua MPShannon JAClark E - WBJones NA /RA/ /RA/ /RA/
5/16/05 5/ /05 5/12/05 5/5/05 5/6/05 C:DRS/OB C:DRS/PEB C:DRP/E ATGody LJSmith WBJones PCGage for /RA/ /RA/
5/6/05 5/6/05 5/16/05 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket No.: 50-382 License No.: NPF-38 Report No.: 50-382/05-002 Licensee: Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 Location: Hwy. 18 Killona, Louisiana Dates: January 1 through April 7, 2005 Inspectors: M. C. Hay, Senior Resident Inspector R. V. Azua, Acting Senior Resident Inspector G. F. Larkin, Acting Senior Resident Inspector P. J. Elkmann, Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved By: W. B. Jones, Chief, Project Branch E ATTACHMENTS: Supplemental Information Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR05000382/2005-002; 01/01-04/07/2005; Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3;
Identification and Resolution of Problems.
The report covered a 14-week period of inspection by resident inspectors and a regional emergency preparedness inspector. The inspectors identified one Green finding. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the significance determination process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XVI, for the failure to implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence for a significant condition adverse to quality affecting operability of the essential chillers.
Specifically, on multiple occasions the essential chillers have failed to function as required due to cycle timer switch failure. Essential chiller malfunction could result in elevated chilled water system temperature used to cool areas containing safety significant equipment.
This finding was more than minor in significance because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events and would become a more significant condition if left uncorrected. The inspectors utilized NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A,
Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, dated December 1, 2004, for Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Cornerstones to assess the safety significance. The finding was determined to be of very low risk significance because, for each essential chiller malfunction, the affected train was inoperable for less than the Technical Specification allowed outage time. A problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect was identified for the failure to correct the condition which resulted in multiple timer failures (Section 4OA2).
Licensee-Identified Violations
None
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status: The plant was operated at approximately 100 percent power from January 1 through April 7, 2005, except when reactor power was reduced to approximately 88 percent on February 23, 2005, to conduct high-pressure turbine valve testing.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors completed a review of Entergy's preparation for cold weather including a review of plant procedures, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and the corrective action program to ensure the weather readiness of safety-related and risk significant systems. The inspectors also walked down portions of the ultimate heat sink, emergency feedwater system, nitrogen accumulators, and main steam and main feedwater systems to ensure that the cold weather protection features were sufficient for their safe shutdown functions and accident mitigation, and that operator staffing would ensure the readiness of these systems.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed the following three partial system equipment alignment inspections during this inspection period. The inspectors performed a walkdown of accessible portions of these systems assessing material condition, housekeeping issues, and system configuration:
- On January 16, 2005, the inspectors walked down the mechanical and electrical components of a critical portion of auxiliary component cooling system Train B. The inspectors considered whether the system was properly aligned as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report and Technical Specifications. This inspection focused on verifying that system valve and electrical breaker alignments were appropriate and that system instrumentation was both available and functional. The walkdown was conducted using Operating Procedure OP-002-001, "Auxiliary Component Cooling Water," Revision 13. The inspectors reviewed the auxiliary component cooling system design requirements in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report with the installed system to assess the systems ability to provide water to containment when required for safety-related mitigation operations.
- On March 9, 2005, the inspectors performed a partial equipment alignment inspection of emergency diesel generator system Train B while planned repairs were being performed on the other redundant train. A review of select maintenance work orders and corrective action documents was performed to assess the material condition and performance of emergency diesel generator Train A. System configuration was assessed using Operating Procedure OP-009-002, Emergency Diesel Generator, Revision 18. A walkdown of accessible portions of the system was performed to assess material condition, such as system leaks and housekeeping issues, that could adversely affect system operability.
- On March 24, 2005, the inspectors performed a partial equipment alignment inspection of the mechanical and electrical components of containment spray system Train B while planned repairs were being performed on the other redundant train. A review of select maintenance work orders and corrective action documents was performed to assess the material condition and performance of emergency diesel generator Train A. The inspectors performed the inspection using Operating Procedure OP-009-001, Containment Spray, Revision 11.
b. Findings
No Findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete System Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a complete equipment alignment inspection of the emergency feedwater system. A walk down of the mechanical and electrical components in the system was performed to verify that the system was configured and operated in accordance with operating procedures. The inspectors reviewed the system design requirements in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to verify the systems ability to perform its safety function for design-basis events. The inspectors reviewed applicable design documentation and selected condition reports to verify that degraded conditions were identified at the appropriate threshold and that corrective actions were adequate and implemented in a timely manner.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Routine Fire Protection Inspections
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted six inspections to assess whether Entergy had implemented a fire protection program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant, effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capabilities, and maintained passive fire protection features in good material condition.
The following areas were inspected:
- Fire Zone RAB 2, 17, 18, 23, 32, 37, and 38 on January 18, 2005
- Fire Zone RAB 1A, 2, 33, 35, 36, and Cooling Tower B on February 3, 2005
- Fire Zone RAB 16, 19, 20, and 22 on February 16, 2005
- Fire Zone RAB 1B, 1C, 1D, 8A, 8B, 8C, 11, 12, and 13 on March 6, 2005
- Fire Zone RAB 3A, 30, 31, and 39 on March 16, 2005
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
a. Inspection Scope
On March 24, 2005, the inspectors observed a licensed operator simulator training examination. During the examination, the inspectors evaluated the operator's ability to recognize, diagnose, and respond to: failed instruments (steam generator number 1 level and atmospheric dump valve controller setpoint); an automatic reactor trip signal without a coincident reactor trip; a small break loss-of-coolant accident on the number 1 hot leg; failure of a containment spray valve to open; and a high-pressure safety injection pump trip on overcurrent. The inspectors observed and evaluated the following areas:
- Understanding and interpreting annunciator and alarm signals
- Diagnosing events and conditions based on signals or readings
- Understanding plant systems
- Use and adherence of Technical Specifications
- Crew communications including command and control
- The crew's and evaluator's critiques
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors reviewed licensee implementation of the Maintenance Rule. The inspectors considered the characterization, safety significance, performance criteria, and the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions. The inspectors assessed Entergys implementation of the Maintenance Rule to the requirements outlined in 10 CFR 50.65, and Regulatory Guide 1.160, Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 2. The inspectors reviewed the following two components and/or systems:
- High pressure safety injection
- Chemical volume and control system
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed risk assessments for planned or emergent maintenance activities to determine if Entergy met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for assessing and managing any increase in risk from these activities. The following four risk evaluations were reviewed:
- On January 10-20, 2005, for emerged maintenance to correct control element drive mechanism control system logic power circuitry
- On February 17, 2005, during planned maintenance on the startup Transformer A motor-operated disconnect switch concurrent
- On February 4-17, 2005, for emerged maintenance to correct main generator potential transformer Phase C degraded voltage output
- On March 6-10, 2005, for planned inspection and maintenance outage for both emergency diesel Generators A and B
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the technical adequacy of four operability evaluations to verify that they were sufficient to justify continued operation of a system or component. The inspectors considered that, although equipment was potentially degraded, the operability evaluation provided adequate justification that the equipment could still meet its Technical Specification, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and design-bases requirements and that the potential risk increase contributed by the degraded equipment was thoroughly evaluated. The following four evaluations were reviewed:
- Operability evaluation addressing the automatic restart of reactor auxiliary building normal ventilation Train B following an engineered safety features actuation system test signal and its impact on emergency diesel generator fuel oil consumption (Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-0208)
- Operability evaluation addressing a small leak in a sample line off the bottom of the volume control tank in the chemical and volume control system (Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-0883)
- Operability evaluation addressing the unplanned simultaneous start of dry cooling tower Fans 5 through 12 following an engineered safety feature actuation test signal (Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-1104)
- Operability evaluation addressing deficiencies associated with the calibration and operation of emergency diesel generator Trains A and B differential relays (Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-0758)
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed postmaintenance tests to verify system operability and functional capabilities. The inspectors considered whether testing met design and licensing bases, Technical Specifications, and licensee procedural requirements. The inspectors reviewed the testing results for the following five components:
- Nitrogen accumulator number 8 following a planned maintenance outage on January 26, 2005
- Auxiliary feedwater pump following planned 18-month maintenance on February 15, 2005
- Emergency diesel generator B following the completion of the 2-year inspection and maintenance effort on March 5, 2005
- Containment spray containment isolation Valve CS-125B following solenoid replacement on March 24, 2005
- Fuel oil storage tanks A and B discharge header piping and valves, following installation of bypass lines and valves around EGF-105A(B) and EGF-106A(B) (Emergency Diesel Generator FOST outlet and crosstie valves respectively) on March 4 and 11, 2005
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed or reviewed the following six surveillance tests to ensure the systems were capable of performing their safety function and to assess their operational readiness. Specifically, the inspectors considered whether the following surveillance tests met Technical Specifications, the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, and licensees procedural requirements:
- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-046, Emergency Feedwater Pump Operability Check, Revision 15, performed on January 24, 2005. This surveillance verified operability of emergency feedwater Pump B.
- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-046, Emergency Feedwater Pump Operability Check, Revision 15, performed on January 24, 2005. This surveillance verified operability of emergency feedwater Train B and containment and flow control valves.
- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-006, Reactor Trip Circuit Breaker Test, Revision 8, performed on February 3, 2005. This quarterly surveillance manually tripped four reactor trip circuit breaker channels, one channel at a time, to functionally verify that each channel is able to be tripped.
- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-068, Emergency Diesel Generator and Subgroup Relay Operability Verification, Revision 13, performed on February 14, 2005. This surveillance tested the functional capability of emergency diesel generator Train A to start, load (4.2 MW), and run.
- Surveillance Procedure OP-903-024, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance, Revision 13, performed on March 7, 2005. This surveillance is used to determine the rate of identified and unidentified reactor coolant system leakage during steady-state operations required by Entergys Technical Specifications reactor coolant system leak rate. In addition, the inspectors evaluated Entergys accumulated results for both the months of February and March 2005 against the criteria set forth in Manual Chapter 2515, Appendix D, Attachment 1, Assessing Reactor Coolant System (RCS)
Unidentified Leakage Rate Trend. Trends that resulted in Entergy entering one or more of the actions levels were found to have been appropriately evaluated and dispositioned.
- Surveillance Procedure STA-001-005, Leakage Testing of Air and Nitrogen Accumulator for Safety Related Valves, Revision 6, performed on April 4, 2005. This surveillance performs a pressure decay test of nitrogen accumulator number 4 to verify that accumulator number 4 could provide a 10-hour air supply to safety-related loads following a loss of instrument air service.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector performed an in-office review of Revision 31 to the Waterford 3 Emergency Plan, implemented December 29, 2004. This revision:
- Added details on the review of emergency action levels by offsite authorities,
- Revised the description of the radiochemistry counting room to more accurately describe its arrangement,
- Added details regarding the training of station emergency response personnel,
- Added details regarding the conduct of remedial exercises,
- Added details regarding the conduct of emergency exercises with nonparticipating offsite authorities,
- Added details regarding the conduct of ingestion pathway exercises, and
- Added Memoranda of Agreement with two additional helicopter services.
The revision was compared to its previous revision, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, and to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and 50.54(q) to determine if the revision decreased the effectiveness of the plan.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
On February 17, 2005, the inspectors reviewed the drill scenario and observed activities in the simulated control room and the emergency operations facility. The drill scenario simulated equipment failures, a site evacuation, a reactor core transient with leakage of reactor coolant, and the release of radioactive material offsite. The inspectors evaluated performance by focusing on the risk-significant activities of emergency classification, notification and protective action recommendations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the drill critiques and the resolution of identified performance weaknesses.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Annual Sample Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed implementation of Entergys corrective action process involving multiple failures of essential chiller cycle timer switch.
b. Findings
Introduction.
The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for the failure to implement effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence for a significant condition adverse to quality affecting operability of the essential chillers. Specifically, on multiple occasions the essential chillers have failed to function as required due to cycle timer switch failure. Essential chiller malfunction could potentially result in elevated chilled water system temperature used to maintain safety significant space cooling cool enough to prevent equipment failure during accident conditions.
Description.
The inspectors reviewed Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-0346 pertaining to the failure of essential Chiller B to maintain local chill water outlet temperature less than the system design temperature of 42EF. The essential chillers each supply water at less than 42EF and 510 gpm to the chilled water system. The chilled water system furnishes chilled water for space cooling purposes and rejects heat through the component cooling water system to the ultimate heat sink. The chilled water system consists of two 100 percent capacity trains, each consisting of an essential chiller and a chill water pump. In addition, a third essential chiller (A/B) can be aligned to tither the A or B train. The cycle timer functions to gradually load the chiller compressor by moving the guide vanes in a stepped fashion (open for 1 second, then pause for 3 seconds, etc.). This prevents the essential chillers from loading too quickly and tripping on electrical overloads.
On January 29, 2005, the essential chill water Loop B was declared inoperable due to essential Chiller B not maintaining outlet temperature below 42EF. Locally, essential Chiller B guide vanes were found to be in a minimum open position. Shortly afterward, the guide vanes changed to the full open position. After a few minutes, the guide vanes began changing state from its full open position to its minimum open position. Essential Chiller B began surging for the next 10 to 15 minutes. Subsequent troubleshooting determined that the chiller cycle timer was malfunctioning. The cycle timer was replaced and essential Chiller B was retested satisfactorily. The inspectors found that three previous cycle timer failures occurred, which resulted in the unavailablility of the essential chillers on June 11, 2001, March 23, 2002, and on May 5, 2004. Entergy treated failures on June 11, 2001, and March 23, 2002, as a broke and fix repair. No failure analysis was performed nor were any corrective actions specified to prevent recurrence. On April 25, 2002, Entergy initiated an engineering request to install a more robust cycle timer in the essential chiller. However, these new, more robust, cycle timers were not scheduled to be installed until 2004, and that activity was postponed. Additional cycle timer failures occurred on May 5, 2003, and January 29, 2005, prior to Entergy finally installing a more robust replacement cycle timer on February 14, 2005. The inspectors determined that Entergys corrective actions to prevent the cycle timer failure from affecting the operability of the main feedwater isolation valves have not been effective and have repeatedly failed to prevent recurrence of this significant condition adverse to quality.
Analysis.
The deficiency associated with this finding was the failure to establish corrective measures to prevent recurrence of a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, corrective actions established to address cycle timer failures were not effectively implemented and failed to prevent recurrence resulting in the essential chillers being declared inoperable. The inspectors determined that the issue was more than minor in significance because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events. The inspectors utilized NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process [SDP], Appendix A, SDP Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, dated December 1, 2004, for Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Cornerstones to assess the safety significance. The finding was determined to be of very low risk significance because, in each essential chiller malfunction, the affected train was inoperable for less than the Technical Specification allowed outage time. A problem identification and resolution crosscutting aspect was identified for the failure to correct the condition which resulted in multiple timer failures.
Enforcement.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. The failure to establish corrective measures to prevent recurrence of essential chiller failures is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. Because the failure to prevent recurrence was of very low safety significance and has been entered into Entergys corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2005-0346, this violation is being treated as a noncited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000382/2005002-01 Failure to Prevent a Reoccurrence Cycle Timer Failure in the Essential Chiller.
4OA6 Meetings
Exit Meeting Summary
.1 On March 21, 2005, the inspector presented the inspection results to Mr. J. Lewis,
Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspector confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.
.2 The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. J Venable and other
members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on April 21, 2005.
Entergy acknowledged the findings presented.
The inspectors asked Entergy whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
- S. Anders, Superintendent, Plant Security
- J. Brawley, ALARA Coordinator, Radiation Protection
- N. Brumfield, Manager, Quality Assurance
- L. Dauzat, Supervisor, Radiation Protection
- R. Dodds, Manager, Plant Licensing Staff
- C. Fugate, Assistant Manager, Operations (Shift)
- J. Holman, Manager, Nuclear Engineering
- B. Pilutti, Manager, Radiation Protection
- B. Lanka, Supervisor, Design Engineering
- J. Laque, Manager, Maintenance
- J. Lewis, Manager, Emergency Preparedness
- R. Madjerich, Manager, Operations
- T. Mitchell, Director, Engineering
- R. Murillo, Senior Staff Engineer, Licensing
- R. Osborne, Manager, Programs and Components
- J. Rachal, Supervisor, Design Engineering
- J. Reese, Manager, Design Engineering
- G. Scott, Licensing Engineer
- C. Tacazar, Supervisor, System Engineering
- J. Venable, Vice President, Operations
- K. Walsh, General Manager, Plant Operations
NRC
- W.B. Jones, Chief, Project Branch E
Attachment
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
0500382/2005002-01 NCV Failure to Prevent a Reoccurrence Cycle Timer Failure in the Essential Chiller (Section 4OA2)