ML18033B480
ML18033B480 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Browns Ferry ![]() |
Issue date: | 08/08/1990 |
From: | Kingsley O TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
References | |
NUDOCS 9008140203 | |
Download: ML18033B480 (70) | |
See also: IR 05000259/1990007
Text
ACi ELERATED DISTRIBUTION
DEMONSTRATION
SYSTEM REGULATORY
INFORMATION
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9008140203
DOC.DATE: 90/08/08 NOTARIZED:
NO FACZL:50-259
Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Tennessee 50-260 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Tennessee 50-296 Browns Ferry Nuclear Power'Station, Unit 3, Tennessee AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION
KINGSLEY,O.D.
Tennessee Valley Authority RECIP.NAME
RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)SUBJECT: Responds to SALP Repts 50-259/90-07,50-260/90-07
&50-296/90-07
for Jul 1989 to Mar 1990.DISTRIBUTION
CODE: IE40D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR
ENCL J SIZE: 5 TITLE: Systematic
Assessment
of Licensee Perfor ance (SALP)Report NOTES:1 Copy each to: B.Wilson,S.
BLACK 1 Copy each to: S.Black,B.WILSON
1 Copy each to: S.Black,B.WILSON
DOCKET g 05000259 05000260 05000296!: S/05000259 05000260 05000296 L RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME KREBS,M PD KREBS,M ROSS,T.INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB
DEDRO NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11
NRR/DOEA/OEAB11
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NRR SHANKMAN,S
NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10
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OE DIR EWFILE 02 LPDR NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 0 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 R D NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
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'1y
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY RUB 08 Pg 6N 38A Lookout Place U.S..Nucl'ear Regulatory
'Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen:
In.the Matter of Tennessee Vali'ey Authority Docket Nos.50-259 50-260 50-296 BROWNS'ERRY
NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)-UNITS 1, 2, AND 3-INSPECTION
REPORT 50-259, 260, 296/90-07-RESPONSE TO THE 1990 SYSTEMATIC
ASSESSMENT
OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE (SALP)REPORT The preliminary
SALP report for BFN.Units.1, 2, and 3 for the period'f July 1, 1989 to March 31, 1990 was issued by the NRC on June 14, 1990.Subsequently, a meeting was held, at the BFN Training Center on July 9, 1990 between the.NRC and TVA representatives
to discuss the SALP report.Enclosure l,to this letter provides TVA's response to the SALP report findings and recommendations, including a descripti:on
of corrective
actions and improvements
that have been implemented.
or are planned to address these issues.Enclosure 2 provides a listing of specific commitments
being made by this submittal..TVA considers the 1990 SALP report to provide.a representative
evaluation
of BFN's performance
during the assessment
period.TVA recognizes
that significant
challenges
lie ahead and that further improvement
at BFN is important for long-term success.'TVA considers that the ratings, findings, and recommendations
of the SALP Board provide valuable: input to'the process of improving performance
at BFN.Our goal is to operate BFN at a level.well above the minimum regulatory
requirements.
The many actions described in the enclosure to this letter are intended to, be responsive
to that goal.900Sie0203
W0080:-PDR ADOCK 05000259 9 PDC~ygP.An Equal Opportunity
Employer
IP.P
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
AUli 0.8 1990 TVA will continue.to be.diligent in stressing further improvement
at BFN as we work toward safe startup, power ascension and operation of Unit 2.TVA will pursue this goal with increased, critical'elf-examinations
and prompt corrective
actions.Areas of.particular
management, emphasis will be the surveillance
program and the mod'ifications
area.In the former TVA has already taken steps, to improve proced'ures
and the attention to.detail of personnel.performing
those procedures.-
In the latter area management
will emphasize both the quality and quantity of the work performed.
Please feel free to contact me if there are any questions concerning
the enclosed response or the actions described in that response.Very'tru yours, VAL EY AUTHORITY'.D.ing ey Senior Vice P de Nuclear Power Enclosures
cc: See page 3
I
U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
gus ()8 8%cc (Enclosures):
Ms.S.C.Black, Deputy Director Project Directorate
II-4 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Route 12, Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35609-2000
Thierry M.Ross, Project Manager U.S.Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 Mr.B.A.Wilson, Project Chief U.S..Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Region II 101,Marietta
Street, HW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
ENCLOSURE 1 TVA Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN)Response to 1990 Systematic
Assessment
of Licensee Performance (SALP)I.FUNCTIONAL
AREA': SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS
BOARD'RECOMME DATIONS The Board recommended
continuation
of the high level of management.attention
to ensure safe and essentially
trouble free startup, power ascension and operation of Unit 2.The Board further noted that a more aggressive
involvement
and a sense of'wnership
by the Operations.
staff could have prevented some of the problems in other areas such as post-maintenance/modification
testing.In addition, the Board recommended
that the effort to minimize personnel error continue to receive increased management
attention.
RESPONSE TVA concurs with the Board's assessment
in this functional
area and agrees with the need for a high level of management
attention.
To that end, beginning with approach to criticality
and continuing
into power ascension activities, senior, plant managers with power operations
experience
will be assigned full-time shift coverage in the power block.TVA will continue the high level of management
involvement
and attention in the full spectrum of operational
activities.,For example, with respect to operator performance, the Operator Review Committee periodically
reviews operator performance,to
assess strengths and weaknesses,, and provides remediation
where necessary.
In the area of operator training,.
the high level'f: management
attention continues with the Curriculum
Review Committee.
This committee revi'ews the operator training program from analysis.through implementation
and evaluation.
Additionally, TVA's Operational'eadiness
Review (ORR)team and the ,Senior Management
Assessment
Review Team (SMART), through their assessment
of Unit 2 readiness for restart, will provide both experience
and TVA senior management
involvement.
The operations
manager chairs biweekly meetings with the:shift operations
supervisors (SOS)and weekly meetings with the operations
groups to stress ownership, attention to detail, and procedural'ompliance.
In addition, the threshold for incident investigations
is being lowered by the plant manager and.site director to reduce personnel errors.For example,.management
will concentrate
on areas such as ma'intenance
rework.and'inspection
rejections.
Senior management
monitors these incident investigation
reports at the plant management
meetings.
E,
Enclosure 1 Page 2 of 28 Management
has taken many corrective
actions and will be implementing
additional
corrective, actions to address current issues in the operations
area, particularly
in the area of personnel error.A brief description
of some of.those corrective, actions responsive
to the Board's recommendations
and concerns is provided below.A.Response to Control Room Instrumentati'on
During Normal Shift Operations
The report stated that the Operations
organization
continues to have problems with.performing
timely and'dequate
actions in response to control room alarms assoc'iated
with off-normal
conditions.
The operators response to alarms, will be improved.First, management
has and will continue to communicate
to the plant operators its expectations
to,ensure that, alarms are adequately
investigated
when they are received.Through requalification
training, biweekly management
meetings with the shift operations
supervisors (SOS), and daily management
tours of the control room, management
has stressed to each operating group.that alarms/indications
must be, assumed to indicate actual conditions
until proven false.Second, operators are being refreshed in the use of alarm response procedures (ARPs).During operator simulator training,.
TVA initiates off-normal
conditions
which require the use of ARPs and then evaluates the group on their implementation
and use.Third, in the event of an inadequate
response to an alarm, operations.
personnel associated
with the event, now perform a review of the event, independent
of the incident investigation
process, to provide operations, management
with, an independent
assessment
of the, incident investigation
conclusions
and corrective
actions.This ensures prompt corrective
actions by the individuals
most knowledgeable
of the event and also provides an incentive, through peer recognition
of errors, for prevention
of future events.Finally, control room instrument
failures are placed on the daily emergent-work priority list.This list is discussed during.,the
daily plant management
meeting.B.Compensatory
Fire Protection
Measures The report cited continuing
problems with compensatory
fire protection (FP)measures, and provid'ed, several examples of technical specification (TS)violations
assessed during the assessment
period.In February 1990, the responsibility
for FP was incorporated'nto
the Operations
organization.
The day-to-day
operation of this group is controlled
by a licensed, senior reactor operator (SOS qualified)
who reports, directly to the on-shift SOS.During backshift and weekends, the,FP foreman reports directly to the SOS.The SOSs have been trained in their duti'es and responsibilities
for FP.The effective
Enclosure 1 Page 3 of 28 integration
of FP into the Operations
organization
has been defined as an element of the SOS and assistant shift operations
supervisor (ASOS)performance
plans (i.e., it will be part of their performance
evaluations).
The FP'oreman also participates
in shift turnover meetings to ensure current plant conditions
are known and shift expectations
are properly communicated.
Numerous management/staff
meetings have been held to foster a close working relationship
between shift operations
and FP personnel.
This is expected to promote an increased awareness of FP compensatory
measures.In addition, close controls.over FP compensatory
measures have been implemented.
This includes a computerized
limiting condi'tion
for operation tracking system maintained
by on-shift personnel.
Management
will continue to assess the performance
of the fire protection
program to ensure that identified
corrective
actions are effective.
Additionally, the Nuclear Managers Review Group conducted a special review of the adequacy of our implementation
of TS including FP.Noted areas of improvement
will be implemented
prior to restart.As part of the realignment
of FP responsibilities, a Technical Support Fire Protection
organization
was established
to consolidate
the technical function for the FP program in the Technical Support organization.
An upgrade program for FP compensatory
action procedures
has been initiated to remedy programmatic
deficiencies
in this area.These procedures
will be upgraded by November 29, 1990.C.Ability of the Operations
Organization
to Function as a Team in an Operating, Plant The report stated that the ability of the new Operations
organization
to function as a.team in an operating plant has not yet been demonstrated.
TVA has and will continue to take steps to ensure that the Operations
organization
is prepared to operate BFN prior to restart.TVA has strengthened
operations
management
expertise by hiring three new unit operations
managers with considerable
experience
in plant operations
and restart activities.
These new managers complement
and diversify existing management
experience.
At the time of restart, thi's new management
team and the majority of the Operations
organization
will have been working together for over a year.Prior to startup the SOSs will have participated
in INPO peer evaluations
at other utilities;
SOSs, ASOSs, and unit operators will have received training at an operating plant.In addition, TVA will send assistant, unit operators to.Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN)to participate
in operational
activities.
This will provide these individuals
with an opportunity
to observe and learn how operational
activities
are conducted at other plants.TVA believes that this
Enclosure l Page 4 of 28 training and the many testing, surveillance, and system return-to-service
activities
prior to startup will provide additional
opportunities
to further develop and solidify this team.Recent performance
during operator requal'ification
training and initial licensed operator.examinations
also provide evidence of operational
readiness.
The requalification
program provides the operations
groups with an opportunity
to work as a team during simulator training.Additionally, the restart test program and power ascension program will provide.plateaus for the operating.
groups to develop teamwork.This performance
will provide a positive data point for the operations
staff to assess measures implemented'o
improve teamwork.In addition, the upcoming INPO evaluation
will provide TVA with an independent, assessment
of the effectiveness
of the operations
management
team and inter-departmental
coordination.
D.Housekeeping
and Identification
of Material Deficiencies
in Less Frequently
Traveled Areas of the Plant The report noted that while housekeepi'ng
is generally good, housekeeping
and identi'fication
of material,deficienc'ies
in less frequently
traveled areas of the plant was poor.TVA will take steps to improve housekeeping
a'nd identification
of material deficiencies
in less frequently
traveled areas as well as all areas, of the plant.First, responsibility
for housekeeping
and identification
of material deficiencies
will be shifted from system responsibility
to plant area responsibi'lity.
That is, individual
operations
groups will be made responsible
for housekeeping
in specific plant areas.'Second, operations
procedures
covering routine walkdowns and examinations
of plant areas and equipment have been revised to specifically
include housekeeping
and identificat'ion
of material deficiencies
as items to be addressed during walkdowns and examinations.
Additionally, twice per week, operations
management
performs the Operations
Management
Observation
Checklist to verify appropriate
operating.and housekeeping
conditions.
As noted above, each operating group has also been assigned'pecific
responsibilities
for monitoring
housekeeping
and material conditions
in the power block.Once per week, senior site, management
conducts a plant tour with emphasis on housekeeping
activities.
TVA will continue these practices as equipment and associated
areas are returned'o
service.In addition,.
as physical work decreases in scope prior to startup, station personnel will have increasing
control.over housekeeping
conditions.
!P I
Enclosure 1 Page 6 of 28'TVA agrees with this observation
and recognizes
its past problems with involvement
and ownersh'ip
by.the operations
staff.TVA will expend considerable
effort to instill an operational
philosophy
at BFN.This.philosophy
stresses the development
and acceptance
of plant ownership by.its operators.
It also emphasizes
teamwork and communication
among plant operators, the responsibility
for maintaining
cognizance
of plant status, and following principles
of good operation.
BFN plant management
is clearly communicating
the need to assume ownership of the plant.For example, meetings are currently being conducted on a biweekly basis with the SOS's and operations
management.
One item continuously
stressed i's the need to assume ownership of the plant.Weekly meetings are held with the operations
group assigned to training and with a group on shift, where the importance
of involvement
and plant ownership are further reinforced
for the:entire
group.Additionally, one of the senior unit managers will be specifically
assigned responsibilities
with the ass'istant
unit, operators to emphasize their responsibilities
for space conditions
and'quipment
operation.
'As noted above, another action taken involves the assignment
of a licensed senior reactor operator (SOS qualified)
to the FP group to increase operations.
involvement
in FP activities.'FN
management
has designed the System Preoperability
Checklist (SPOC)process to close the modificati'ons
effort and subsequent
system.return-to-service
activities
prior to startup.This process will provide add'itional
opportunity
to demonstrate
increasing
operations
involvement
and ownership.
System return-to-service
requires detailed reviews and walkdowns by operations
and other plant organizations
prior to system acceptance.
Additional
emphasis will be placed on this area by, operations
management, as the return-to-service, process continues for'lant systems.The operations
group will be held accountable
for systems as they are accepted for operations..G.Personnel Error The Board recommended
that the effort to minimize personnel error continue.to receive increased management
attention.
TVA concurs with'the Board's observation
and is committed to reduce personnel'rror.
This commitment
is not limited to the Operations
organization
but extends to the enti're BFN site.TVA considers that the personnel error problem has several major causes.Personnel errors have resulted in part from a lack of attention to detail and a lax attitude toward.procedural
adherence.
Personnel errors have also been influenced
by factors such as inadequate
procedures
and poor.human factors consid'erations.
BFN management
has taken and will continue to take corrective
actions to address these elements of the problem.
)
Enclosure 1 Page 5 of 28 E.Management
Involvement
and'Attention
The Board recommended
that the high level of management
attention continue to ensure a safe and trouble free startup,, power ascension and operation of Unit 2'.TVA will continue aggressive
management
involvement
and attention at BFN.This is.especially, important during startup and power ascension, and will continue throughout
operation of Unit 2.Prior to restart, TVA will conduct two senior management
reviews: one by the ORR team and another by SMART.The eight-member
ORR team is independent
of BFN management.
Only two of the members are TVA employees.
The team is experienced
in restart efforts.Five members participated
in the SQN Unit 2 ORR team, and six members participated
in the SQN Unit 1 ORR team.'To date, the team has conducted two assessments
of BFN Unit 2.readiness
for restart: one.in June 1989 and another in March 1990.Corrective
actions to address concerns identified
during the two assessments
are in the process of being implemented.
The team will return prior to restart to perform an independent
review of operations
and work control.Subsequent
to the ORR team,, SMART wil'1 perform its assessment
of BFN's readiness for restart.The team is chaired by the Vice President (VP)of Nuclear Power Production
and is composed of other VPs.reporting.
to the Senior VP Nuclear Power with BFN support responsibiliti'es.
The team.objectives
are to: 1)assess whether there has been adequate resolution
of NRC commitments, 2)review compl'etion
of programs to establi'sh
operability
of systems, 3)assess implementation
of sel'f-assessment
programs, 4)evaluate independent
review results, and 5)evaluate performance
trends.Additionally, TVA has established
a formal management
assessment
process for the power ascension test program.Seven management
hold points have been integrated
into the power ascension test program to ensure a controlled
return to full power operation.
The program will allow management
to monitor the progress o'f the startup and evaluate equipment and personnel performance
at specific power plateaus to verify that the plant is ready to proceed to the next'.power level.During the actual startup activities
senior plant managers will be assigned full-time shift coverage.These actions.are intended to provide the high level of management
attention necessary throughout
the startup.F.Operations
Involvement
and Ownership The-Board, as noted above, also generally recommended
more aggressive
involvement
and"sense of ownership" by the operations
staff.
Enclosure l Page 7 of 28 BFN management
'is stressing to its supervisors
in every organization
the importance
of communicating
the need for procedural
adherence and attention to detail.First, the plant manager has had two separate talks with plant personnel (management
to craft)to stress the importance
of reduced personnel error, procedural
compliance, and'ood work practices.
Additionally, and as noted above, at the biweekly meetings between the SOSs and operations
management, plant ownership, procedural
adherence, and reduction of personnel, errors are continuously.
emphasized.
Weekly meetings are also held with operations
shift groups, one by the plant operations
manager and one by the operations
superintendent, where these items are further reinforced
for the entire group.Specific actions in the Modifications, and Maintenance.
organizations
are discussed in Items A, H and I of the Maintenance/Surveillance
functional
area.Quality Assurance monitors plant activi'ties
to gauge performance
in these areas.As noted above, TVA is aware of instances where personnel have been influenced
by factors such as inadequate
procedures
and poor human factors considerations.
BFN management
will be self-critical
in the evaluation
of events through the incident investigation
process and is identifying.corrective
actions to reduce these impediments.
For example, as a direct result of an assessment
of events which resulted in ESF actuations,'TVA
concluded that the working environment
of personnel who generate hold orders was a contributing
factor.Consequently, TVA has relocated the operations
work control area.The new location is quieter, more private (reducing distractions), contains centralized
reference material and provides increased supervision.
This area houses the personnel who generate hold, orders (unit operators), personnel who review hold orders (unit managers), and personnel who coordinate
work in the plant (shift support supervisors).
Personnel who place hold orders on plant equipment (assistant
unit operators)
al'so work out of th'is.area.This example illustrates
the degree to which TVA will evaluate events in the future." TVA feels that these types of corrective
actions will reduce the number of personnel errors.BOARD RECOMMENDATIO
S None RESPONSE'TVA's pleased with the Board's appraisal of this functional
area.However, TVA recognizes
that.continued and improved performance
is necessary in'the upcoming assessment
period in order to maintain the Category l rating.TVA will continue to emphasize a high level, of performance
and program development
in this functional
area.
Enclosure 1 Page 8 of 28 Since mid-April 1990, TVA has taken several initiatives
to.reduce personnel radiation exposure.For example, a lifetime radiation dose limit of 1N rem,(where
N i;s the individual's
age in years)was implemented
for BFN workers.in July.1990 based on recommendations
of the National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements
and the International
Committee on Radiation Protection.
A 3.5 rem interim annual administrative
dose limit for individuals
was also implemented
at BFN effective July 12, 1990.Effective January 1, 1991, a new administrative
procedure will be in place to restrict dose accrual at BFN.In addition to the efforts to reduce the individual
radiation exposure described above, TVA is implementing
measures to minimize collective
radiation exposure for the site.A comprehensive
source term reduction program is being developed.
A.capital project is in progress to clean out the fuel pools for all three units and to chemically, decontaminate
the fuel pool cooling heat exchangers.
Other elements of the program include cobalt replacement
in control rod blades and various system valves, and radiation shield walls around the fuel pool cooling heat exchangers.
ALARA initiatives
are also being', incorporated
into the planning for Unit 3 recovery.Shielding, decontamination, wipedowns, flushes, and containment
devices will be used to minimize personnel exposure.Portable conti'nuous
airborne.contamination
monitors will be used where practical to minimize use of respiratory
protective
equipment.
To further reduce personnel exposure video cameras will be used for remote surveillance
of work in radiation areas.Generic shield tables are being developed to streamline
the process for shielding installation
on various components.
Shield tables for shutdown and operational
conditions, will be completed in Fiscal'ear
1991.A startup preparation
team is being assembled to address radiological
controls-specific.concerns associated
with the transition
from shutdown to operational
conditions..
Prior to startup, operations
personnel and maintenance
craft personnel will be trained in startup and operating radiological
conditions.
The Radiological
Controls organization
is, also developing.
and implementing
a program to aid and encourage radiological
controls staff, personnel to become certified by the National Registry of Radiologi'cal
Protection
Technologists
or the American Board of Health Physics.III.FUNCTIONAL
AREA: MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE
BOARD'RECOMMENDATIO
S The Board recommended
continued management
attention in the area of surveillance
testing to ensure that the corrective
actions taken as a result of escalated enforcement, actions are"effective.
The Board also commented that the.maintenance
area generally showed significant
,~il h i
Enclosure 1 Page 9 of 28 improvement
but recommended
that management
attention continue, particularly
in areas, not assessed by the NRC's Maintenance
Team Inspection.
In addition,.
the Board noted that implementation
of modifications.
is a weakness and recommended
that emphasis on problem resolution
be conti'nued.
~ESPONSE TVA concurs with the Board's appraisal of this functional
area.TVA wi.'ll continue to provide'ncreased
management
attention to the surveillance
program in order to monitor the effectiveness
of corrective
actions already taken and to assure full implementation
of corrective
actions in progress.TVA is pleased with the improvement
in the maintenance
area at BFN, but also realizes that several weaknesses
remain and,must be corrected.
TVA is confident that the changes described below will continue to show improvement.
In the modifications.area, TVA will continue the current attention on compliance
with programs and procedures, and the completion
of older and,more di'fficult
workplans.
A description
follows of actions already taken or planned to address the key weaknesses
in this functional
area.A.Modifications
Performance
The report noted weaknesses
in the modifications
area, and focused on poor.performance
in both the quantity and quality of work output, inattention
to detail, poor work practices, and the failure of personnel to follow instructions.
TVA recognizes
that performance
in the modifications
area is a weakness.Accordingly,'TVA's implementing
specific programmatic
changes directed to improve the quantity and quality of work and to stress the importance.
of reducing personnel errors.First, TVA is focusing increased attention on the process by which work i's accomplished., TVA concluded that the system was complex.To correct this problem an increased, effort on streamlining
the existing,.program
has been emphasized~.
Workplans prepared recently are less'han half the size of the workplans prepared one year ago.Standardization
of the.different phases of workplans, computer generation
of workplans, and more specific engineering
change notices/design
change notices have resulted in workplans half the size of work plans prepared one year ago.Second, TVA management
is placing increased attention on compliance
with modifications
program requirements.
As described in Item G of the Shutdown Operations
functional
area, management
consistently
emphasizes
the importance
of procedural
adherence.
Disciplinary
action for repeated or flagrant disregard for procedures
can include terminati'on.
Face to face meetings between senior management
and each craft discipline.
are now held to discuss personnel errors and other significant
incidents involving modifications
personnel.
.I
Enclosure 1 Page 10 of 28 Third, to increase accountabili'ty
and overall compliance
with programs and procedures:and
to improve the quality of work performed, the size of work crews has been reduced and standardized
to approximately
six craftsmen:(within
the.technical
craft arena).A Lead Foreman, Quality Control (QC)Inspector(s), and.Field Support Engineer have now been assigned for every two to three crews.Fourth, TVA reformatted
many of the working procedures
utilized by modifications
personnel and placed them in user friendly formats.This reduces the burden on craft and QC personnel.
Procedure/program
orientation
sessions have been and continue to be conducted to familiarize
workers with program revisions made and with revisions in progress..Speci'fic
areas of orientation
include independent
verification, second party verification (which was recently initiated as a.management
tool')of certain activities
to improve the quality of modificat'ions
work, and the streamlining
of the welding control program.A required reading matrix has also been established
for field support personnel as well as craft supervisors.
Finally, TVA recognizes
that in the past many projects, were not driven to completion, which caused difficulties
in surveill'ance
testing and preventive
maintenance.
To improve in this area, management
has initiated an effort to finish-the older and more difficult workplans.
In addition, partially completed modification
packages are being researched
and forced to completion.
To date, the above changes have resulted in an increase in productivity
from 30 percent in total related work at the end of the assessment
period to the current level of approximately
50 percent.In addition, the initial workplan review rejection rate of over 70 percent one year ago has been reduced to less than five percent as of June 1, 1990.In summary, management
attention is centered on total work completion, configuration
maintenance, and the research and completion
of partially completed modifications.
TVA management
is focusing on higher standards for employee performance
and accountability, which should'mprove
performance
in the, modifications
area.B.Maintenance
'Backlog The Board concluded that the maintenance
backlog at BFN appeared to be excessive.
The report also identi'fied
a large number of open maintenance
requests (MRs)'nd attributed
the backlog to inadequate
coordination
of the work control process, delays caused by the unavailability
of spare parts, drawing discrepancies, and incomplete
modifications.
The report also stated that there appeared to be inadequate
coordination
between individual
maintenance
craft groups, and other organizations
such as operations, modifications, and planning and scheduling.
I I
Enclosure 1 Page ll of 28 TVA recognizes
that a maintenance
backlog exi'sts as identified
in the report.BFN is making progress,to
address that backlog.At the conclusion
of the assessment
period'pproximately
2300 outstanding
unit 2 startup MRs (now called work orders or WOs)existed.As of the end of July 1990, this number has been reduced to approximately
1400, 350 of which, are for post-maintenance
testing only.Non-restart
'WOs have been, reduced from over 2300 in January 1990 to the current 1200, and late preventive
maintenance
items which totaled approximately
900 in March 1990 have been reduced to less than 200.A work order review group wil'1 be created to monitor, pri'oritize
and reduce the backlog.Shift managers have been assigned to each shift to provide overall coordination
on shift and to ensure accurate turnover to the next shift.This change will increase management's
awareness of work status and improves the direct supervision
and coordinati'on
of work on each shift.The addition of management
personnel also ensures the continuity
of critical work, and allows management
to correct problems expeditiously
and remain aware of potential problem areas.Another improvement
i's in the area of work scheduling.
Prior to schedul'ing
work, each work request is evaluated by the scheduling
group for system/component
impact.Work schedulers
then coordinate
work on an individual
system/component
to reduce outages, maximize accomplishments
during outages, and return equipment to service expeditiously.
Schedul'ers
work closely with the maintenance
general foreman who ensures that scheduled.
work can be performed.
Management
will monitor work completed on a daily basis.To enhance the scheduling
process TVA has,established
a scheduling
information
center that provides the-maintenance
general foremen, foremen, and planner access to information.
This action will enable the foremen to acquire an understanding
of the impact of each maintenance
assignment.
The information
center allows supervisors
to identify backlog tasks ready to be worked when scheduled work is completed early, or to determine when work cannot be completed as planned.Additionally, work schedules will be reviewed and accepted by foremen and general foremen to ensure commitment
to the schedule.To address the drawing aspect of this SALP Board finding, the work ,process will be improved.BFN's previous process for implementing
MRs/WOs required'hat
work be stopped and a drawing deviation (DD)initiated if the as-installed
configuration
of a component being worked on did not match an as-constructed
drawing.Work could not be resumed until the DD was resolved, thus contributing
to the MR/WO backlog.To alleviate this problem, Site Director Standard Practice (SDSP)7.6,"Maintenance
Management
System,." has been revised to allow reinstallation
of components
based on Nuclear Engineering (NE)approved drawings, manuals, and specifications.
In
I'J
Enclosure 1 Page 12 of 28 addition, SDSP 9.1,"Processing
Drawing Discrepancies," has been revised to allow MR/WO work to continue utilizing the DD and a marked-up drawing as long as the MR/WO maintains the exi'sting plant condition (leaves the plant configuration
as-found).
F To correct problems with material availability, in early 1990 the Materials and Procurement
organization
implemented
an action plan to achieve a 95 percent service level'n parts and material availability.
To support this goal specific actions were defined and, are being implemented.
This included identification
and listing of material availability
deficiencies
followed by analysis to determine generic/programmatic
problems.This analysis identified
the following generic problems with the availability
of materials:
1)the quantity and location of materials.
is not accurate,'2)stock materials are not reordered in a timely manner, 3)procurement
lead.times are insufficient, and 4)interfaces
with other plant.organizations
are ineffective/inefficient.
Upon completion
of the analysis actions were developed to resolve these problems and deficiencies.
For example, to address the problem with the quantity and location of materials, TVA has performed an inventory of the warehouse located in the protected area, established
a dedicated inventory control department, loaded direct charge material into the Materials Automated Management
System database, and improved the methodology
for returning credit material to stock.In addition, the Materials and Procurement
organization
coordinated
with the ma'intenance
and mod'ifications
organizations
to ensure required items were stocked.Similar actions have been and are being taken to address the remaining generic problems identified
above.Next, a new warehouse outside the protected area with 70,000 square feet of storage space and an additional
20,000 square feet of office space was constructed.
This new warehouse provided the Materials and Procurement
organization
with an adequate facility to address many longstanding
problems,.
such, as stocking levels, consolidate
material location, and centralization
of personnel associated, with the procurement
process.Since warehouse construction
is now complete, the Materi'als
and Procurement
organization
is focusing on completing
material relocation
to this new facility.This involves specific tasks, such as performing
an inventory, verifying contract traceability, relocating
needed material into the new facility at adjusted inventory levels, and.surplusing
excess or obsolete items.The inventory is also being evaluated to ensure equipment qualification
is maintained.
C.'Maintenance
Data Base The report identified
that the maintenance
data base had insufficient
trending capability
and limited operating history.
I
Enclosure 1 Page 13 of 28 TVA agrees with this finding and is addressing
this concern..Prior to the end of the assessment
period, a new maintenance
planning and control (MPAC)computer software program was implemented
to improve maintenance
planning and scheduling, and to provide retrievable
historical
data.This new system is linked to,the equipment information
system (EQIS)which provides access to equipment information.
Maintenance
history, previously
in the maintenance
request computer.program, has been incorporated
into MPAC.New work order history data, including balance of plant, is now loaded into MPAC as if it were reportable
in, accordance
with INPO's Nuclear Plant Reliability
Data System (NPRDS).Non-NPRDS data.as well as NPRDS reportable
data are therefore readily available for planning and moni'toring,purposes.
Updating the history data bases is done , daily for both MPAC and EQIS.The MPAC software program can readily call up similar jobs for planning, purposes.MPAC also has capabilities
for trending failures by several parameters
including type, function, and manufacturer.
In addition to the above, the maintenance
planning and technical group has a current action item to implement the recording and trending of work request discrepancies
into MPAC.This improvement
will allow minor problems, such as missing screws and washers, to.be assessed to determine whether they have widespread
generic implications
or are only isolated instances.
This discrepancy
trending will be implemented
by October 1, 1990.D.Tagging Practices The report noted unattended, partly disassembled
equipment which had not been tagged to identify in-process
work.Tagging practices were identified
as a weakness during the Maintenance
Team Inspection (MTI).Maintenance
and modifications
materials were previously
controlled
by two separate procedures.
These procedures
specified unique tagging requirements
for the affected organization.
'To address this.problem the two procedures
have been replaced by a common site procedure that provides for consistent
direction.
This new procedure,, which became effective July 2, 1990, standardizes
material control at BFN and eliminates
redundant and conflicting
requirements
found in the old procedures.
The standardized
tagging procedure, in conjunction
with the instruction
given in that procedure, are.directed at improving, tagging practices.
Management
and supervisory
control of work in progress has been increased by the addition of several general foremen and shift managers'n
the latter part of 1989.These new personnel are improving adherence to procedures
for activities
such as tagging.
Enclosure 1 Page 14 of 28:Additionally, the maintenance
production
group recently implemented
the periodic use of a comprehensive
peer evaluation
checklist that includes material tagging.The checklist is reviewed by management
and provides areas for corrective
action.E.Staffing Levels in the Maintenance
Organization
The report noted that, staffing levels in the Maintenance
organization
were reduced following.
completion
of the MTI, and that the effect of the.new staffing levels had, not:been.assessed.
The maintenance
staff was reduced in early 1990 due to organizational
responsibility, changes and to staff the maintenance
department
consistent
with the industry average for maintaining
one operating unit.In addition, some duties, (such as system engineering
functions and component specialist
duties)previously
performed by the Maintenance
organization
were assigned to other organizations.
TVA will continue to monitor maintenance
performance.
TVA considers, however, that realignment
of., and reduction in, the maintenance
staff will not adversely affect the organization's
ability to safely perform maintenance, as evidenced by the decreasing
work backlog, lower error rates, and the lower number of late preventive-maintenance
items.Additionally, management
continues to improve the maintenance
processes.and monitors the effectiveness
of the maintenance
group to scheduled activities.
F.Communication
Between Upper Management
and Lower Levels of Management
and Craft Personnel The report identified'
weakness with the communication
between upper management
and lower levels.of maintenance
management
and craft personnel in that the existing communication
did not appear to be effective in improving the conduct of maintenance.
TVA recently reassigned
several managers and supervisors
to improve communications
between and among upper maintenance
management,, lower maintenance
management, and craft personnel'.
The plant manager and the maintenance
production
manager hold monthly and weekly meetings, respectively, with the job stewards to provide a forum for open communications.
Ideas, problems, and complaints
are discussed freely at these meetings.The maintenance
production
manager and the supervisors
who report to him also have monthly meetings with maintenance
craftsmen to discuss plant issues and provide personnel with the opportunity
to communicate
directly with management.
These changes should improve commun'ications.
WI,
Enclosure 1 Page 15, of 28 G.Training of Maintenance
Personnel The report noted that electrical
maintenance
personnel required to.perform, Surveillance
Instructions (SIs)had not received training in SI,performance.
Further, the report stated that instrumentation
and control (I&C)maintenance
personnel received little or no refresher training, and-that few onsite mockups for I&C training existed.TVA acknowledges
that electrical
maintenance
personnel are not currently trained in SI performance
in the same manner as the I&C technicians.
TVA will, however,, implement an SI performance
training program for electrical
maintenance
personnel.
This SI training program, which will be limited to infrequently
performed SIs, will be implemented
by February 1, 1991.In the interim, maintenance
electricians
that perform SIs receive systems and component training through TVA's training programs, and are also task-certified
in accordance
with a program that meets INPO guidelines.
In addition, prior to performance
of a task, the SI is reviewed in a pre-job briefing to familiarize
personnel with plant conditions
and any procedural
changes that may have occurred.Regarding training of I&C maintenance
personnel, additional
I&C mockups will be incorporated
into the I&C training program by July 1, 1991.I&C personnel currently complete a'two-year training program and receive SI performance
training prior to performing
SIs.In addition, prior to performance
of a task, the relevant SI is reviewed in a pre-job briefing intended to familiarize
technicians
with.plant conditions
and any recent procedural
changes.H.Management
Attention in the Maintenance
Program The Board recommended
continued management
attention be focused on the maintenance
area, particularly
on areas not assessed by the NRC's Maintenance
Team Inspection.
TVA.is committed to continued management, attention on the maintenance
area.'Many specific examples have been previously
discussed;
additional.
management
actions are.provided below.TVA has initiated several changes and enhancements
to improve accountability, increase productivity, and improve the quality of work.First, maintenance
uses peer evaluations
as a teaching.tool, to assess performance, and make improvements.
Second, maintenance
, has implemented
changes for planning and execution of work activities
that trace.responsibilities
'to individuals.
This permits monitoring'ndividual
performance
of work activities.
Third, maintenance
program support.personnel are providing work monitoring, tracking,, and'tatusing;
these personnel also coordinate
corporate support.Fourth, increased, attention by on-shift managers will provide the direct involvement
necessary to identify.and correct, problems and to ensure that maintenance
is performed as desired.
Enclosure 1 Page 16 of 28 Another example of TVA's attention to this area is an emphasis on a'"no excuses" philosophy
in the areas of safety,,quality, housekeeping, and procedural
adherence.
As a result, safety performance
in maintenance
activities
has improved and will continue to have high priority.The quality of workmanship
and documentation
is being monitored closely by the maintenance
production
manager and the maintenance
programs support group.BFN plant management
wil'1 continue its attention on housekeeping
and procedural
adherence.
performance
indicators
that are commonly used in the nuclear industry and other industries.
These indicators
enable maintenance
to make rel'ative performance
comparisons
with the industry and other TVA plants.The maintenance
organization
also implemented
a system of performance
goals and objectives
commensurate
with plant and corporate goals, and objectives.
This system tracks 18 critical parameters, including personnel errors and procedure violations.
Using, these programs, maintenance
issues monthly status reports to communicate
progress to maintenance
employees.
Self-assessments
of maintenance
performance
are periodically
performed using INPO guidelines
such as INPO 85-038,"Guidelines
for the Conduct of Maintenance
of Nuclear Power Stations," and INPO 85-001,"Performance
Objectives
and Criteria for Operating and Near-Term Operating License Plants." Areas needing improvement
are , identified
and corrective
actions developed and tracked to completion.
TVA also is continuing
its efforts to ensure that maintenance
personnel are highly qualified.
All three maintenance
disciplines-
electrical, mechanical, and ISC are certified in accordance
with INPO guidelines.
Managers and supervisors
are being trained in such areas as TVA policies and practices, job-specific
supervision, and personnel guidelines
to enable them to perform their jobs more effectively.
Managers are participating
as peer evaluators
on INPO evaluation
teams and plant visits.I.Surveillance
Program The report discussed problems with BFN's surveillance
program, including TVA's abil'ity,to
correct 1'ong-term.
deficiencies
involving unclear, difficult to use procedures
and insufficient
attenti'on
to detail by personnel performing
procedures.
The report also stated that program changes had been instituted, but demonstration
of significant
and sustained progress was not evident when the assessment
period ended.Further, the Board recommended
conti'nued
management
attention to ensure that corrective
steps taken as a result of.escalated enforcement
actions are effective.
Enclosure 1 Page 17 of 28 TVA has previously
acknowledged
problems with, the BFN surveillance
program.'Toward the end of the assessment
period, TVA.initiated a broad range of actions to address these problems and to address the NRC's enforcement
action.BFN management
will continue to monitor the corrective
actions discussed below to ensure improved performance
in the next assessment
period.As an example, Revision 10 to Plant, Managers Instruction (PMI)-17.1, Conduct of Testing, and new procedure PMI-17.12, Implementation
of the Surveillance
Program, will clarify many of the testing requirements
that had previously
resulted in performance
problems.Training will be held, to ensure personnel involved in testing are familiar with the new procedural
requirements
for the testing and surveillance, programs.This training will be completed by August 31, 1990., BFN is also correcting
long-term deficiencies
in its surveillance
program involving unclear, difficult-to-use
pxocedures, and insufficient
attention to d'etai'1 by personnel performing
procedures.
A style guide and a writer's guide utilized for the preparation
of surveillance
instructions, (SI)ensure human factors are considered
during the SI development
process.TVA also established
the Verification
and Validation (V&V)program which provides for a walkdown during the procedure approval cycle and also provides for a detailed validation
by a qualified individual, as designated
by.'the respons'ible
supervisor, during scheduled first use performance.
This approach should ensure that SIs are clear, concise, and understood
by the performer.
Measures have been taken to increase management
attention and involvement
in the TS surveillance
program.Specifically, TVA has established
requirements
for management
involvement
in field observations, in documentation, and in feedback of the results.TVA has also mandated management
involvement
in the V/V process so that management
must review deficiencies
that have been identified
and must concur with changes.Programmatic
deficiencies
in the surveillance
program have been addressed by actions such as improvements
in the programs and procedures
governing the implementation
and control of procedures
and work at BFN-.These improvements
include a restriction
on the use of nonintent changes and, as discussed above, a revision to the procedure governing procedure reviews to require preapproval
walkdowns and walkdowns by, the cognizant/system
engineer with the procedure implementor.
In summary,.TVA management
has taken significant.actions to improve the surveillance
testing program at BFN., Nevertheless, TVA recognizes
that additional
progress is necessary, and will continue increased management
involvement
in surveillance
testing until the problems are resolved.
II a
Enclosure 1 Page 18 of 28 BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS
None RESPONSE TVA concurs with the Board's assessment
of this functional
area.TVA agrees that there has been improvement
in the Emergency Preparedness
area at BFN.Nevertheless, TVA is mindful that further improvement
is necessary.
As a result, TVA has taken actions that should improve performance
in the upcoming assessment
period.First, five of six deficiencies
identified
in TVA's critique of the November 1989 emergency preparedness
exercise have been resolved.Resolution
of the sixth deficiency, which involves an unreliable
plant radio repeater communication
system, will be completed prior to Unit 2 startup.Second, TVA will complete installation
of Phase I of the safety parameter display system in the Technical Support Center and the control room prior to Uni't 2 restart.Third, responsibility
for development
of emergency plan exercise.scenarios, has been transferred
to the site emergency preparedness
organization.
Scenario development
will be further enhanced by the addition of in-plant chemistry/radiological
data models, which will provide a greater array of data.At the SALP meeting conducted July 9,.1990 at BFN, the NRC identified
a weakness with the timeliness
of implementation
of measures to improve notification
and evacuation.of personnel from high noise areas.TVA has committed to upgrade BFN's public address and alarm system prior to restart from the.Unit 2 Cycle 6 refueling outage.This schedule has been approved by the NRC.TVA will implement Phase I of the upgrade project prior to Unit 2 restart.This phase involves upgrading the plant radio repeater and antenna system.BOARD RECO ATIONS The Board recommended.
that special attention be placed on maintenance
of existing security system equipment until full implementation
of the.major security system upgrade project.RESPONSE TVA concurs with, the Board's assessment
of this functional
area.To ensure continued improvement, TVA is undertaking
a number of programmatic
efforts.
I
Enclosure 1 Page 19 of 28 A.Upgrades to Resolve Long-Term Compensatory
Posts The SALP report noted that slippage of scheduled completion
dates on interim aecurity system upgrade project items has resulted in the continued use of long-term compensatory
measures.Completion
of the interim security system upgrade will result in the removal of most long-term compensatory
measures.Representative
of TVA's commitment
to resolving long-standing
security system deficiencies
which have resul'ted in compensatory
measures is the initiation
of an add'itional
closed circuit television (CCTV)upgrade project, which will enhance alarm assessment
capabilities
on the south and west sides of the protected area (PA)barrier.This project, coupled with'the CCTV modifications
to the-north and east perimeter accomplished
as part of'the interim upgrade project, will provide improved alarm assessment
capabilities
for the entire PA barrier and remove all such compensatory, posts.B.Maintenance
of Existing Security Systems The SALP Report recommended
that special attention be, placed on maintenance
of existing equipment until full implementation
of the-major security system upgrade project.TVA will emphasize an effective security maintenance
program at BFN.For example, a security system supervisor
and maintenance
request specialist
on the site security staff are assigned to provide attention to the maintenance
of security systems.A generic maintenance
request system ensures maintenance
is performed on system components
when they fail;when component failures result in the, establishment
of compensatory
posts, high priority is assigned to restore the component to service and remove the compensatory
measure at the earliest opportunity.
Additionally, TVA's trending and corrective
action program-noted by NRC in the'SALP Report-identifies
recurring system deficiencies
so that proactive preventive
maintenance
and corrective
actions can be taken on appropr'iate
system components.
C.,Special Nuclear Material Inventory The report noted problems with the control of special nuclear material (SNM)inventories.
On November 4,, 1989'VA discovered
several SNM items.that were determined
to be unaccounted
Subsequent
investigation
uncovered discrepanciep
in the SNM inventory.
This resulted in an escalated NRC enforcement
action.Corrective
actions, characterized
by direct management
involvement, were immediately
initiated.
These actions included searches and development
of an SNM action plan.
D
Enclosure 1 Page 20 of 28 TVA's, plans on thi's issue provide further short-and long-term corrective
actions.Short-term
actions included root cause analysis and physical searches of certain plant areas.Long-term actions include training personnel on identifying
SNM items, additional
searches, of plant areas, and identification
of remaining discrepancies
by a comparison
of inventory to the results of the searches.Training on identification
of SNM items has been implemented;
the remaining actions will be completed by Unit 2 restart.In addition,,:administrative
changes were made to label and assign unique identifiers
to new-found SNM, establish a temporary SNM disposal storage area, implement a disposal plan for SNM, develop a new SNM program based on industry practices and TVA's lessons learned, and initiate QA oversight of the SNM program.Completion
of the actions described above will result in a more accurate and reliable SNM inventory and improvements
in the SNM program.VI.FUNCTIONAL
AREA: ENGINEERING/TECHNICAL
SUPPORT BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS
None~RES ONSE TVA concurs with the Board's assessment
of this functional
area.A number of continuing
programmatic
efforts have been initiated to provide continued improvement
in this area.A brief discussion
of these efforts, and a response to specific Board observations
and concerns,, is provided below.A.Timeliness
of Followup on Identified
Issues The report stated that timeliness
of followup on identified
issues could be improved.TVA has experienced
difficulties
addressing
engineering, issues in a timely manner primari'ly
due to the large number of such issues that have emerged.The large numbers during the past.assessment
period were the result of the many discovery programs being conducted at BFN.With discovery activities
concluding, the number.of issues is , expected to decline as BFN approaches
restart and TVA expects that there will be improvement
in this area.TVA has also made changes in the conduct of NE activities
to address the timeliness
concern.NE now schedules resolution
of inspection
findings and NRC commitments
in its detailed.schedule, which is monitored weekly by the Project Engineer.Other emerging issues are discussed at daily NE staff, meetings where the actions are assigned and tracked.These actions, and the associ'ated
management
involvement,,should'mprove
the timeliness
of responses to individual
items.
a
Enclosure 1 Page 21 of 28 B.Drawing Deviations
The report stated that the, number of drawing deviations
increased during the assessment
period.The report also observed inconsistencies
in the procedural
time limits for revision/correction
of primary drawings significant
to plant operational
safety.To clear this backlog, drawing deviations
will be resolved on a system return-'to-service
basis to allow better control of the cumulative
impact of a large number of drawing, changes on each system and to reduce the number of drawing revisions required during the restart effort.Subsequent
to system return-to-service, new drawing deviations
will be expeditiously
evaluated, and the resulting drawing revisions will be issued in a timeframe which is consistent
with the drawing's:
importance
to safety.Additionally,, TVA has contracted
engineering
series to reduce the backlog and support system return-to-service.
SDSP 9.1,'"Processing
Drawing Discrepancies," has been revised to establish the plant system engineer as the focal point for the evaluation
of potential drawing deviations.
Previously, NE was required to, review and disposition
drawing, deviations
even if corrective
action by NE was not required (i.e., the plant configuration
was in error and a maintenance
request was required to reconfigure
the plant to comply with the design configuration), thus, creating a backlog of drawing deviations
within NE.SDSP 9.1 as revised also requires prompt categorization
of the potential drawing deviation's
impact on plant operation and safety.This categorization
establishes
the priority for resolution
of the potential drawing deviation.
TVA agrees that the drawing deviation backlog needs improvement
and that the previous program to correct the backlog was ineffective
and contained procedural
inconsistencies
and administrative
inefficiencies.
TVA considers the changes described above have improved the program, made it less cumbersome, and provide control for the expeditious
resolution
of drawing deviations.
C'.Engineering
'Calculations
The SALP report stated that a detailed review, by an NRC inspection
team of the BFN core spray system indicated that the calculations
and modification
controls areas required additional
TVA attention and'RC followup.TVA has committed substantial
attention to calculation
problems and , to the modifications
control area.Th'is is discussed in the Safety Assessment/Quality
Verification
functi'onal
area (see Item D regarding calculation
problems)and in the Maintenance/Surveillance
functional
area (see Item A related to modification
controls).
iS
Enclosure 1 Page 22 of 28 D.Simulator Problems The report noted fidelity problems with the simul'ator.
TVA recognized
the;problems
associated
with the.existing BFN simulator.
This led to the previous decision to completely
replace the simulator computer system, modeling software,, and instructors'tation
as part of the simulator upgrade project.This project will upgrade the BFN simulator computer equipment software to satisfy the criteria for certification
of simulation
facilities
delineated
in 10 CFR 50.55 and'NSI/ANS
3.5-1985, as endorsed by Regulatory
Guide 1.1'49.This upgrade project is currently 40 percent complete and will be completed by November 30, 1991.TVA also understands
the importance
of maintaining
the existing simulator to, high standards for operator training until the upgrade project is completed.
Accordingly, modifications
to the existing simulator due to pl'ant changes or simulator problems, if judged to be significant, continue to be worked even though the existing simulator software will be scrapped at the end of the upgrade project.Examples of modifications
to the existing simulator include integration
of 56 out of 105 plant modifications
that impact the simulator which include the Phase I Control Room Design Review modifications.
In addition, four of the.six new control panels which are part of the upgrade project are expected to be operational~
on the existing simulator after the next simulator outage.E.Adequacy of Emergency Operating Instructions
The report stated that the emergency.
operating instructions (EOIs)were not user friendly, although adequate for Unit 2 restart.In addition, the report identified
a need to revise the EOI Writer'Guide to reflect the.specific human factors concerns previously
identified
in NRC Inspection
Report 88-200.The.BFN EOIs are currently being upgraded'o
implement Revision 4 of the Emergency Procedure Guidelines (EPG).The upgrade process, which will be.completed by December 31, 1991, will change the EOIs from a prose format to a flow chart format, which will enhance user friendliness>
TVA obtained the services of a contractor
to develop the EOIs and',program
materials for implementati'on
of EPG'Revision 4.This contractor
was chosen based on significant
industry experience, including experience
with flow chart development
and human factors engineering.
In addition to the upgrade process discussed above, other changes have been made to the EOIs and associated
Writer's Guide to address defici'encies
'identified
in Inspection
Report 88-200.For example, the EOIs and Writer's Guide have been-revised to increase emphasis on logic statements, as recommended
by NRC.The EOIs and Writer'.Guide have also been revised to clearly define conditions
under which logic diagrams are to be used, rather than the.previous method of using multiple logic terms.
I
Enclosure l Page 23 of 28 BOARD RECOMMENDAT
0 S None RESPONSE TVA concurs with the Board's assessment
of performance
in this functional
area.A number of improvements
have already been made in this area and are ongoing.These improvements
wi'll address many of the issues and observations
raised in the SALP report.A brief description
of some of these efforts follows.A.Timeliness.
and Thoroughness
of Submittals
and Responses The report noted weaknesses
in the timeliness
and thoroughness
of submittals
and responses to the NRC.TVA is addressing
the timeliness
and thoroughness
of submittals
and responses to the NRC with increased management
attention through the use of the Project Plan.This plan identifies
major commitments
and programs required'o
be completed prior to and fo'llowing
Unit 2 startup.It includes NRC inspections;
technical specification
amendments;
closure of NRC bulletins, generic letters, and TMI items;and other TVA submittals.
Responsible
TVA and NRC personnel are identified
for each issue, and established
milestones
are provided for TVA actions.The plan is updated weekly and provides TVA upper management
with an overall summary and action plan for resolution
of regulatory
issues and commitments.
Key issues in the plan are also included in the restart schedule.With respect to the mechanics of preparing submittals
to NRC, actions are now initiated as soon as a particular
issue is identified (e.g., NRC exit meeting).This includes meeting with appropriate
plant management
'to discuss and,obtain
concurrence.
on the plan of act'ion to be taken, and followup meetings to evaluate progress on the action plans.These actions enhance communication
among TVA"organizations
with responsibilities
for technical input and provi'de management
with early opportunity
to assess the thoroughness
of the information.
B.Escalation
of Items to Management
for Corrective
Actions The report noted that management
feedback was obtained through the semiannual
audits of the Correction
of Deficiencies
Program;however, the NRC expressed a concern regarding the large number of items that must be escalated to management
prior to corrective
action'being taken.
- I
Enclosure 1 Page 24 of 28 TVA has taken several actions to resolve this condition.
One example is that the Site Director now schedules weekly meetings to discuss escalated items.At these meetings the responsible
managers are required to report the status of each escalated item, and also any actions taken or planned to correct the problem.As a result of the added management
attention, the number of escalated items has decreased from 71 in February 1990 to 23 in June 1990.The site quality organization
also continues to monitor escalations
in the monthly trend report for adverse trends.In addition, escalations
remain a high visibility
issue with upper management
and the BFN Site Director.C.Implementation
of Corrective
Action Programs The report noted problems with implementation
of corrective
act'ion programs.TVA recognizes
that difficulties
exist with the successful
implementation
of corrective
action programs.These include failures to develop proposed corrective
actions.in a timely manner, failures to implement corrective
actions, and a lack of ownership of problems.To address this concern, regular Management
Review Commi'ttee
meetings are conducted to resolve questions regarding corrective
actions and unresolved
items, and to assign responsibility
for specific actions.Following an assignment
of ownership of a problem in this manner, plant procedures
require, the responsible
organization
to identify and implement corrective
actions to address the item in a timely fashion.If corrective
actions are not promptly identified
or implemented, the item is escalated to upper management.
Improvement
has been made in the timeliness
of actions required under the conditions
adverse to quality (CAQ)program.As a result of trending timeliness
of CAQ corrective
action implementation, an overall timeliness
problem was identified.
and resolved in conjunction
with the escalations
issue noted in, Item B (above).As a result of the corrective
actions taken, BFN has shown an overall improvement
for the CAQ process from a high of 41 percent delinquent
actions in February of 1990 to the present 14 percent in July 1990.D.Correction
of Identified
Deficiencies
with Engineering
Calculations
and Melding Record Retrievability
The report stated that several examples were identified
of the failure to take prompt effective action to correct deficiencies
related to problems with engineering
calculations
and welding record retrievability.
Encl'osure
1 Page 25 of 28 Previous errors in the core spray, calculations
were caused by the failure of a contractor
to rigorously
apply a check function to these calculations.
During internal quality assurance audits conducted in August 1988 and October 1989, TVA discovered
that the calculations
containing
errors were limited to mechanical
calculations
performed by a particular
engineering
contractor.
This problem was corrected by the.contractor's
development
of a plan to perform another check function review on BFN Mechanical
Engineering
calculations.
In addition, TVA committed to review essential mechanical
calculations
performed by the contractor
for errors, and to correct.any errors discovered.
TVA also investigated
the possibility
of similar problems existing in the essenti'al
calculations
of the civil and electrical
disciplines.
The investigation.
determined
that the problems were unique to mechanical
calculations
performed by the identified
contractor..
With regard to actions taken to correct.previously
identified
deficiencies
with the retrieval of welding records, TVA recognizes
that the corrective
actions taken were inadequate., However, TVA ,subsequently
developed.
a systematic
method for retrieving
test records.This method, allows records to be retrieved utilizing a mini'mum of basic information.
Verification
of this corrective
action was demonstrated'y
selecting ten wel'ds from the residual heat removal system and locating the affected certified material test reports in an expeditious
fashion with a minimum, of effort.'While TVA has now taken thorough corrective
actions to address the calculational
problems and welding records retrieval deficiencies
discussed above, TVA recognizes
that.these actions should'have been initiated in a more timely fashion.TVA is aware of NRC's emphasis on the prompt resolution
of deficiencies
and, as described in Item A of the Engineering/Technical
Support functional
area, will be working to improve in this area for the, next assessment.
E.Identi'ficati'on
of Hardware Deficiencies, During Walkdowns The report cited TVA's failure to identify hardware deficiencies
during a walkdown on the core spray system whi'ch was performed before.the NRC's vertical slice inspection.
A site procedure provides guidance to system engineers.conducting
.routine-system walkdowns in accordance
wi'th schedules approved by their supervisors.
TVA has conducted additional
field training for system engineers, and has increased management
attention on the conduct of walkdowns.
This should'increase the attention to detail and lower the threshold for recording deficiencies.
D
Enclosure 1 Page 26 of 28 In addition, TVA is developing
a special area walkdown procedure for restart.The area walkdowns are intended to detect existing field'eficiencies
that resulted from past practices.
The walkdowns will be performed by, a multi-discipline
group that shall consist of at, least the following:
system engineering
representative, qualified operations
representative, modifi'cations
engineer, and civil/structural
engineer.The area walkdowns will be a detailed exam'ination
of an area after modifications
work in the area is complete., Any, findings of the walkdown group will be evaluated for impact on suitability
of equipment/structures
for startup.If any finding impacts operability, the.matter will be corrected prior to rel'easing
the area as ready for startup.In addition to the routine and special area walkdowns, TVA is also committed to a strong System Plant Acceptance
Evaluation (SPAE)/System
Preoperability
Checklist (SPOC)process.During the SPAE/SPOC process for the core spray system, TVA found that the process was.uncovering
new issues in addition.to being a verification
of work completion.
Consequently,, XVA is performing
a detailed evaluation
of open items on a system-by-system
basis.This evaluation
looks at drawing deviations, change documents, essential calculations, conditions
adverse to quality, restart test program items,.programmatic
punchlist items, design criteria, and primary and critical drawings.This is used to ensure identification
of the open items on each system.With the open items identified, the SPAE/SPOC process to be conducted at the time of system return-to-service
will be used to verify closure of open items as intended'..
F.Instrument
Sense Line and Control Room Emergency Ventilation
System The report i'dentified
several examples of TVA's responsiveness
to ,certain issues..Specifically, the report noted that the schedule for correction
of the instrument
sense line was delayed at least twice and,correction
of a long-known
deficiency
in the control room emergency ventilation, system had not been completed by the end of the assessment
period., The report also cited'VA's
recent Operational
Readiness Review (ORR)which indicated that BFN's response to NRC Bulletin 88-04,"Potential
Safety-Related
Pump Loss," may, reflect a lack of technical and critical review.Correction
of the design deficiency
in the control room emergency ventilation, system was ident'ified
to NRC as a startup commitment
for Unit 2 Cycle 7 operation.
This schedule was reviewed and approved by NRC as documented
in a September 18, 1989 letter approving TVA's request.TVA's current pl'an to evaluate CREVS by Unit 2 Cycle 7 is consi'stent
with this commitment.
Regarding the instrument
sense line issue, TVA acknowledges
that the schedule for correction
of
Enclosure 1 Page 27 of 28 this issue has been delayed.These delays were due to the factors that have affected the restart schedule in general.As BFN begins power operations, TVA will'e able to focus attention on issues since major programs will be completed and will no longer affect the.ability to perform work.Regarding BFN's response to NRC Bulletin 88-04, BFN's May 25, 1990 response to the referenced
ORR report documents the re-evaluation
performed to address this issue.This evaluation
notes that site specific calculations
were utilized in conjunction
with industry information
in responding
to the Bulletin.The re-evaluation
also identifies
'that industry operating and maintenance
history, along with BFN specific information, was used to determine the adequacy of existing miniflow line flow rates.In addition, the re-evaluation
specifies that, although they are outside the scope of Bulletin 88-04, non-safety-related
pump configurations
were also reviewed and no configurations
which could permit adverse pump-to-pump
interaction
as discussed in the Bulletin were identified.
The re-evaluation
concludes that BFN's original response to Bulletin 88-04 is still acceptable
and has received sufficient
technical and, critical review.G.Procedural
Compliance
The report confirmed that.procedural
compliance
continued to be a problem.The report offered that this was a result of inadequate
training and line organization
interfaces.
TVA has committed substantial
management
attention to procedural
compliance
at,BFN..While this issue.underlies many of the areas addressed in the report and is accordingly
discussed throughout
this enclosure, procedural
compliance
is specifically
addressed in the Maintenance/Surveillance
functional
area (see Items A and I).H.Quality of Procedures
The report stated that there are still'uality
problems with some procedures.
BFNhas upgraded a significant
number o'f procedures
as.part of a dedicated'pgrade.program, both before and during the assessment
period.These upgrades will continue as part of the long-term effort.The validation
process described in the Maintenance/
Surveillance
functional
area (see item I, Surveillance
Program)was also established'n.
response to the problems identifi'ed
during the assessment
period'nd will improve the quality'f the procedures
and ensure their usability.
4
Enclosure 1 Page 28 of 28 TVA will continue to.emphasize prompt identification
and correction
of procedural
inadequacies
and is closely monitoring
events and incidents related to procedural
content and compliance.
While the number of events caused by procedural
non-compliances
and procedural
inadequacies
has decreased during, the latter part of the assessment
period, TVA acknowledges.the need for continued improvement.
I.Human Factors Deficiencies
in Procedures
and Writer's Guides The report noted'hat a TVA assessment
identified
human factors concerns,, similar to those identifi'ed
by NRC in Inspection
Report 88-200, in a wide variety of procedures:
and'ssociated
guides.cj In early 1987 BFN established
writer's guides and style guides which were incorporated
into plant procedures.
The purpose of these guides.was to provide specific direction to procedure and instruction
writers on the format and content of plant procedures.
In addition, guidance on addressing
human factors concerns was also provided.Following the establishment
of the writer's guides and style gui'des, and as part of the Nuclear Performance
Plan near-term upgrade effort, many plant procedures
were revised to incorporate
this guidance.Other plant maintenance
procedures, which were not revised at that time, will be revised as part of the long-term upgrade effort.The estimated completion
date for this effort is September 1992.TVA acknowledges
that the deficiencies
identified
in TVA's Phase II Operational
Readiness Review Report exist.The identified
procedures
had not been revised to address human factors deficiencies
because they are part of the NPP long-term upgrade effort.In the future, plant procedures.
that are part of the NPP long-term upgrade process will be revised using the guidance provided in the pl'ant style guide and writer's guides.The style guide was recently revised to address the specific concerns identified
in TVA's Phase II Operational
Readiness Review Report, and also to incorporate
INPO Good Practices.
Guidance is also provided to correct human factors deficiencies
during.the two-year review process.
ENCLOSURE 2 LIST OF COMMITMENTS
1.Senior plant managers with power operations
experience
will be assigned full-time shift coverage in the power block beginning with approach to criticality
and continuing
into power ascension activities.
2.Fire protection
compensatory
action procedures
will be upgraded to correct programmatic
deficiencies.
by November 29, 1990.3.Areas needing improvement
identified
in the Nuclear Managers Review Group review of the adequacy of TS implementation
will be implemented
prior to restart.4,.Prior to startup the shi'ft operations
supervisors
will have participated
in INPO peer evaluations
at other utilities.
5.Prior to.startup.shift operations
supervisors, assistant shift operations
supervisors, and unit operators will receive training at an operating plant.6.Pri'or to startup, TVA will send assistant unit operators to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.7.Responsibility.for housekeeping
and identification
of material deficiencies
will be.shifted from system responsibility
to plant area responsibility.
8.Prior to startup TVA will conduct two senior management
reviews: one by the ORR team and another by SMART.The ORR team will perform an independent
review of operations
and work.control.9..A senior unit manager will be assigned responsibilities
with the assistant unit operators to emphasize their responsibilities
for space conditions
and equipment operation.
10.Effective January 1, 1991, a new admini'strative
procedure will be in place to restrict dose accrual at BFN.11.Shielding, decontamination, wipedowns,, flushes, and containment
devices will be used to minimize personnel exposure during Unit 3 recovery ,activities.
12.Portable continuous
airborne contamination
monitors will be used where practical during Unit 3 recovery, activities
to minimize, use of respiratory
protective
equipment.
13.During Unit 3 recovery activities
video cameras will be used for remote surveillance
of work in radiation areas.14.Operations
personnel and, maintenance
craft personnel will be, trained in startup and operating radiological
conditions, by Unit 2 startup.
~I'7 l/
Enclosure 2 Page 2 of 3 15.Generic shield tables for shutdown and operational
conditions
will be developed in Fiscal Year 1991.16.A work order weview group will be created to monitor, prioritize, and reduce the maintenance
backlog.17.The recording and trending of work request discrepancies
will be impl'emented
into the'maintenance
planning and control computer software program by October 1, 1990.18.Electrical
maintenance
personnel that perform surveillance
instructions
.(SI)will be trained on infrequently
performed SIs by February 1, 1991.19.TVA will incorporate
additional
ISC, mockups into the ISC training program by July 1, 1991.20.Training will be conducted to ensure personnel involved in surveillance
testing are familiar with the new procedural
requirements
found in PMI 17.1, Revision 10, and PMI 17.12.This training will be completed by August 31, 1990'.21.The plant radio repeater communication
system will be upgraded to address the findings of TVA's critique of the November 1989 emergency preparedness
exercise.This will be completed by Unit 2 startup.22.TVA will complete installation
of Phase I of the safety parameter display system in the Technical Support Center and,the control room by Unit 2 startup.23.Additional
searches of plant areas for SNM will be completed by Unit 2 startup.24.Identification
of remaining SNM discrepancies
by comparison
of inventory to the results of the additional
searches wi'll be completed by Unit 2 startup.25.Drawing deviations
will be resolved on a system return-to-service
basis to allow better.control of, the cumulative
impact of a large number of drawing changes on each system and to reduce the number of drawing revisions required during the restart effort.26.Subsequent
to system return-to-service, new drawing deviations
will be expeditiously
evaluated, and the resulting drawing revi'sion's
will be issued in a timeframe which is consistent
with the drawing's importance
to safety.27.The simulator upgrade,pro'ject
will be completed by November 30, 1991'.28..BFN emergency operating instructions
will be upgraded to implement Revision 4 of the Emergency Procedure Guidelines
by December 31, 1991.
l I
Enclosure 2 Page 3.of 3 29.The special area walkdown procedure being developed for restart will require walkdowns to be performed by a system engineering
representative, a qualified operations
representative, a modifications
engineer,, and a civil/structural.
engineer.30.The area walkdowns will be a detailed examination
of an area after modifications
work in the area is complete.Findings will be evaluated for impact on.suitability
of equipment/structures
for startup.If any finding impacts operabil'ity, the matter will be corrected prior to releasing the area as ready for startup.31.Plant maintenance
procedures
that are part of the long-term upgrade process will be revised usi'ng the.guidance provided in the plant style guide and writer's guides.