ML20059H386
| ML20059H386 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 09/10/1990 |
| From: | Wallace E TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9009170138 | |
| Download: ML20059H386 (4) | |
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' T. ENNESSEE VALLEYi AUTHORITY :
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- CH ATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 374o1'
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SEP 101990 y
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~ATTNt Document Control. Desk e[ 7 Washington, D.C.
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[9: g,' In the Matter of J)
Docket Nos. 50-259 V
Tennessee Valley-Authority-
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50-260;-
50-296 4
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-259/89-411 m
50-260/89-41, AND 50-296/89 INFORMATION ON LICENSEE IDENTIFIED
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. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN:(REP) AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT (AFI)
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jThis letter provides TVA's corrective action plans to resolve the licensee.
j cidentified~ REP AFIs noted in section.'12 in.the subject-report, transmitted by
>%, o letter from B. Ap Wilson to 0. D. Kingsley,'Jr.-~ dated December 5, 1989..
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%,. 6 In tihe exercise critikue'sec tion- (Section il2) of Lthe: subject, report, the, _
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v : inspector notedithat the license'e identified six exercise'.AFIs.s.Atithe; time-Lof: thef exit' interview, TVA management stated that the Identified areas yould 0
{d V fh be' corrected;beforerthe~ restart of Unit'2. 'Aibrieffdescription of the' items:
l and TVA's 'correctiveiaction(s) are depicted in the. Enclosure. :Five of the:
noted areasDhave been completed.. Since the November 1989 emergency exercise, Sthe first five AFIs have been monitored during' eeveral TVA emergen;y drills'.
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- These'AFIs did not_ recur;-therefore, TVA concludes 3that ample corrective tactions'are-in place'for these areas. ;The sixth is currently scheduled to
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,;.completeuaprior to Unit 2irestart.
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If.you' have any questions, please telephone Patrick P. Carier at BFN, 0
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-Very truly yours, 4
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,>j, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY -
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E. G.-Wallace, Manager Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs y
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on 9--c Enclosures
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0t 9009170138 900910 j;h
_ {DR ADOCK 0500gg'*9 An Equal Opportunity Employer i
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[ U.S. Nuclear. Regelatory Conunission SEP 101990 r..
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Ms. S. C. Black, Deputy Director Project Directorate II-4L EU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jr One White Flint, North' 11555 Rockville-Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852 i
i NRC Resident Inspector.
Browns' Ferry Nuclear Plant
' A hens klbma 35609-2000 i
Mr. Thierry M.:Ross,~ Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission WP One White Flint, North 4
11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 208
- I Mr. B.
A'. Wilson,' Project Chief
}i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-
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- Region II
-101-Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 l;
, Atlanta, Georgia 30323-
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4 y4 ENCLOSURE-y h'
TVA:Identifidd Areas for Improveraent (AFI)and Corrective Action Plans
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Control Room Log -
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' *: IdentifledIAFI: Unit' operator (UO) was not maintaining a' log during i24 the events During a situation where the emergency operatit;g
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instructions (E01s) are being used to direct;the activities of the U0s,-
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.it is virtually impossible'for the UOs'to also maintain a log.
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Therefore., the'shif t operations supervisor' (SOS); log becomes-rhe
-official'. log for these events.
Because of his' duties, the SOS was.
J unable to' personally maintain the log.
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- Corrective Action (s):
Plant Manager Instruction (PMI) 12.12,
'Section'4.11.3.1, was revised to cl.srify that the SOS log is-the only-1
' operations log' required to be maintained inLan emergency situation.
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' AUO Qualifications:
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' Identified'AFI An AUO was unable to perform E01 appendices.
This.
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situation' arose:because a AUO who was not electrically qualified was j
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directed to perform an E01 appendix which required electrical'
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' manipulations. All AUOs are trained specifically on E0I appendices g.
W requiring. mechanical manipulations, and any electrical manipulation required.by an'E0I appendix is within the skill ef'an ele'etrically
'qualifled AUO.
'At the time of the 1989 emergency exercise approximately;60-percent of.
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- the'.AU0s-were fully. electrically qualified, and 90 percent of the AUO's-
-t had received. the classroom : training - (however, ~ the ' individual chosen 'was fromtthe remaining 10 percent).
A Corrective JAc tion (s ):
PMI 12.12 was revised to. address the assigning' i.!
of an electrically qualified AU0 to-perform E0I appendices requiring 9
electrical) manipulation.
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Improper Use of SCBA ID:
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-. ~ Identified AFI: ' Personnel were observed 'on.several occasions donning' self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)-equipment without proper-
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U equipment, checks as described in Radiological Control Instruction 3.
~Also, familiarity'with the location and use-of_the' donning checklist Si
. included in the' kits should be included in future training.
n" Corrective Action (s):
The checklist for donning the SCBA was Jincluded
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in each.SCBA' kit. -The checklist-also includesiequipment checks to be performed before using the SCBA. The checklist is-now printed on
- colored paper in order to make the instructions more conspicuous when W
the SCBA kit is opened.
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Enclosura Page 2 of-2q I
RADCON has coordinated with-BFN Site = Training to emphasir,e to personnel attending SCBA training ' annually,' that there is a SCBA donning.
checklist provided-in~each'SCBA kit, and that they are'to~ follow-the' checklist when donning a SCBA. This was included in SCBA training; g
classes after December 15, 1989..
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0SC Briefings:
1 identified AFI: lOne OSC team was inadequately briefed on environmental'
. conditions expected at:the job site. The team sent to close two valves 1
"q were not properly briefed on the high temperatures and' steam environment in the area.
Corrective Action (s):- The briefing. checklist contained in EPIP-7-has-i I; /
been revised to include " environmental' conditions."
REP Van' Team' Qualifications:'
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Identified AFI: Training had expired on one-Environmental van team d
member.' - This is contrary to Site Director Standard Practice 22.3.
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- . Corrective Action (s): Training now requires RADCON Field Operations technicians to receive the REP van training.- RADCON Administrative
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- Section Instruction' Letter-24-was revised to reflect the needed qualifications before'an individual is assigned,to a REP van during an
= emergency.
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k 64 Repeater System:
1 Identified AFI: Communications difficulties occurred using the inplant j.
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l aradio' repeater system for nperations Support Center (OSC) team n'
communications.. In.several instances, radio signals were scrambled,
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' reception was> weak, or dead spots were encountered. The' plant repeater.
' system.needs upgrading to. improve radio reception in the reactor
' building, turbine. building, and on the refueling floor, f;
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Corrective Action (s): The-inplant radio repeaters are being replaced v:
and one additional repeater'willibe installed to provide a separate repeater for Operations._ Remote-control units for the repeaters are
.being replaced with more flexible consoles.providing access to all
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required repeaters. =The repeaters will be connected to the new radlax 3
' antenna system.
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p Currently the radlax antenna cable has been installed in the reactor.
j and turbine buildings. The remaining cable and the repeaters are i
y currently scheduled to be installed by unit 2 restart. Even though the F 'l new system has not been activated there is improved radio reception in the reactor and turbine buildings due to the installation of the radiax
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antenna cable.
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