ML20059H386

Forwards Corrective Actions Re Radiological Emergency Plan, Per Insp Repts 50-259/89-41,50-260/89-41 & 50-296/89-41. Corrective Action:Plant Manager Instruction 12.12,Section 4.11.3.1 Revised

ML20059H386
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	09/10/1990
From:	Wallace E TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9009170138
Download: ML20059H386 (4)

Text

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Gentlement- ' i

[9: g ,' In the Matter of . J) Docket Nos. 50-259 '

V Tennessee Valley-Authority- ) 50-260;-  ;

50-296 '

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" BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-259/89-411 50-260/89-41, AND 50-296/89 INFORMATION ON LICENSEE IDENTIFIED

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. RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN:(REP) AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT (AFI)

.' (" jThis letter provides TVA's corrective action plans to resolve the licensee . >

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'; cidentified~ REP AFIs noted in section.'12 in.the subject-report, transmitted by j letter from B. Ap Wilson to 0. D. Kingsley,'Jr.-~ dated December 5, 1989..

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%, . 6 v : inspector In tihe exercise critikue'sec tion- (Section il2) of Lthe: subject , report, the , _ q notedithat the license'e identified six exercise'.AFIs.s .Atithe; time- /

Lof: thef exit' interview, TVA management stated that the Identified areas yould 0 be' corrected;beforerthe~ restart of Unit'2. 'Aibrieffdescription of the' items:

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and TVA's 'correctiveiaction(s) are depicted in the. Enclosure. :Five of the:

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, noted areasDhave been completed.. Since the November 1989 emergency exercise, Sthe first five AFIs have been monitored during' eeveral TVA emergen;y drills'.

These'AFIs did not_ recur;-therefore, TVA concludes 3that ample corrective

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.. tactions'are-in place'for these areas. ;The sixth is currently scheduled to:be. !a{

l ,; .completeuaprior to Unit 2irestart. ,  ;

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t If.you' have any questions, please telephone Patrick P. Carier at BFN,  ?

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-Very truly yours, 4

qy M,>j, wi TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - ,

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'" E. G.-Wallace, Manager Nuclear Licensing and  ;

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bi [ U.S. Nuclear. Regelatory Conunission SEP 101990 r..

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Ms. S. C. Black, Deputy Director Project Directorate II-4L Jr EU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint, North'

, 11555 Rockville-Pike, _

Rockville, Maryland 20852 i

i NRC Resident Inspector .  !

Browns' Ferry Nuclear Plant

!! : ' A hens klbma 35609-2000 i Mr. Thierry M.:Ross,~ Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission WP One White Flint, North 4 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 208 -I Mr. B. A'. Wilson,' Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission- }i

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Region II

-101-Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 l;

, Atlanta, Georgia 30323- '

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4 , y4 ENCLOSURE-  !

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h' TVA:Identifidd Areas for Improveraent (AFI)and Corrective Action Plans ,

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, .l.: Control Room Log - i o

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' *: IdentifledIAFI: Unit' operator (UO) was not maintaining a' log during

@ the events During a situation where the emergency operatit;g =i instructions (E01s) are being used to direct;the activities of the U0s,-

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.it is virtually impossible'for the UOs'to also maintain a log.

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Therefore., the'shif t operations supervisor' (SOS); log becomes- rhe  !

-official'. log for these events. Because of his' duties, the SOS was. J

, unable to' personally maintain the log. -i O

- Corrective Action (s): Plant Manager Instruction (PMI) 12.12, . .

'Section'4.11.3.1, was revised to cl.srify that the SOS log is-the only- 1

, ' operations log' required to be maintained inLan emergency situation.

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12. ' AUO Qualifications: 4

-s / ' Identified'AFI An AUO was unable to perform E01 appendices. This.

g' situation' arose:because a AUO who was not electrically qualified was j J. ,

directed to perform an E01 appendix which required electrical' -i

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' manipulations. All AUOs are trained specifically on E0I appendices , ,

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requiring. mechanical manipulations, and any electrical manipulation ,

required.by an'E0I appendix is within the skill ef'an ele'etrically

'qualifled AUO.

'At the time of the 1989 emergency exercise approximately;60-percent of. U

• . :the'.AU0s-were fully. electrically qualified, and 90 percent of the AUO's- -t had received. the classroom : training - (however, ~ the ' individual chosen 'was

, fromtthe remaining 10 percent).

1. A PMI 12.12 was revised to. address the assigning' Corrective JAc tion (s ): i.!

of an electrically qualified AU0 to-perform E0I appendices requiring 9 i electrical) manipulation. I

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.3.. Improper Use of SCBA ID: l M - . ~ Identified AFI: ' Personnel were observed 'on .several occasions donning' "

self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)-equipment without proper-

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U equipment, checks as described in Radiological Control Instruction 3.

, ~Also, familiarity'with the location and use-of_the' donning checklist Si

. included in the' kits should be included in future training. ,

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Corrective Action (s): The checklist for donning the SCBA was Jincluded in each.SCBA' kit. -The checklist-also includesiequipment checks to be

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performed before using the SCBA. The checklist is-now printed on

colored paper in order to make the instructions more conspicuous when W the SCBA kit is opened.

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Enclosura

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RADCON has coordinated with-BFN Site = Training to emphasir,e to personnel attending SCBA training ' annually,' that there is a SCBA donning.

checklist provided-in~each'SCBA kit, and that they are'to~ follow-the' checklist when donning a SCBA. This was included in SCBA training; g

,, classes after December 15, 1989.. '

!4'. 0SC Briefings: 1 identified AFI: lOne OSC team was inadequately briefed on environmental' 1

. conditions expected at:the job site. The team sent to close two valves "q were not properly briefed on the high temperatures and' steam environment in the area.

Corrective Action (s):- The briefing. checklist contained in EPIP-7-has- i I; / , been revised to include " environmental' conditions."

REP Van' Team' Qualifications:' t a

Identified AFI: Training had expired on one-Environmental van team d member.' - This is contrary to Site Director Standard Practice 22.3.

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. Corrective Action (s): Training now requires RADCON Field Operations 1 technicians to receive the REP van training.- RADCON Administrative

Section Instruction' Letter-24-was revised to reflect the needed

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qualifications before'an individual is assigned ,to a REP van during an

= emergency. <

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64 Repeater System: 1 j.

Identified AFI: Communications difficulties occurred using the inplant E~ , l ,

aradio' repeater system for nperations Support Center (OSC) team n' communications.. In.several instances, radio signals were scrambled,

' reception was> weak, or dead spots were encountered. The' plant repeater.

' system.needs upgrading to. improve radio reception in the reactor ]l

' building, turbine. building, and on the refueling floor, f;

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, Corrective Action (s): The-inplant radio repeaters are being replaced v: and one additional repeater'willibe installed to provide a separate repeater for Operations._ Remote-control units for the repeaters are

.being replaced with more flexible consoles.providing access to all

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required repeaters. =The repeaters will be connected to the new radlax 3

' antenna system.

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l p Currently the radlax antenna cable has been installed in the reactor. j and turbine buildings. The remaining cable and the repeaters are i y currently scheduled to be installed by unit 2 restart. Even though the F 'l new system has not been activated there is improved radio reception in the reactor and turbine buildings due to the installation of the radiax

,g , antenna cable. l 4

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