ML20063Q245

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Provides Revised Response to Generic Ltr 89-19 Re Request for Action Concerning Resolution of USI A-47, Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants & Notification of Commitment Completion
ML20063Q245
Person / Time
Site: Browns Ferry  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 08/17/1990
From: Wallace E
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
REF-GTECI-A-47, REF-GTECI-SY, TASK-A-47, TASK-OR GL-89-19, NUDOCS 9008240091
Download: ML20063Q245 (3)


Text

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'b TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374ot 5N 157B Lookout Place AUB 171990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission y

ATTN -Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

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Cet.tlemen t In the Matter of

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Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee Valley Authority

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50-260 50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN) - REVISED RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER (GL)

L 89 REQUEST FOR ACTION RELATED TO RESOLUTION OF UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE A-47 " SAFETY IMPLICATION OF CONTROL SYSTEMS IN LWR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS" AND NOTIFICATION OF COMMITMENT COMPLETION References E. G. Wallace's letter to NRC dated May 4, 1990, titled Response to Generic Letter (GL) 89 Request for Action Related to Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47 " Safety Implication of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants" This letter provides TVA's revis6d response to GL 89-19 and written n>tification that TVA has completed the Unit 2 commitment that was contained la the referenced letter.

GL 89-19 requested licensecs/ applicants implement the recommendations contained in NUREG-1217. " Evaluation of Safety Implications of Control Systems in Light Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants" and NUREG-1218. " Regulatory I

Analysis for Resolution of USI A-47" in order to enhance safety. The referenced letter provided TVA's response to the three NRC reconnendations contained in the GL.

The following provides TVA's revised response to NRC's Boiling Water Reactor plant recommendations (Recommendation No 2) concerning revision to BFN's technical specifications (TS).

NRC Recommended Action:

2.

Incorporate appropriate changes to plant procedures and TSs to include requirements for periodically verifying operability of the system. The system design and setpoints should be selected with the objective of minimizing inadvertent trips of the main feedwater system during plant startup, normal operation and protective system surveillance.

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TVA's Pp 8 sed Resy nse1 The BFN Technical Specifications (TS) do not include surveillance test requirements specifically related to the main feedwater overfill protection system. However, a calibration and functional test on the circuitry is performed under existing plant procedures which is similar to TS surveillance testing performed on other reactor water level instruments.

This testing is scheduled to be performed every 18 months.

The procedure tests the circuits and relays up to but not including the relay contacts that trip the turbine and feed pumps. TVA has performed the engineering calculations that' form the basis for the Unit 2 setpoluts for the high vessel feedwater level switches.

The setpoints are selected to minimir.e inadvertent trips of the main feedWater system during plant startup, normal operations and testing.

The present procedures provide adequate guidance for the operation of the system.

Safety would not be enhanced by adding these level switches to the BFN TS.

In addition, adequate guidance is not currently available to licensees on what the NRC Staff considers acceptable concerning limiting conditions for operation, action requirements, or survelliance requirements for the overfill Protection Systems. Any TS requirements for these systems should be developed, reviewed and approved through the development process for the Improved Standard Technical Specifications currently being prepared by the four Owner's Groups and NRC.

TVA will perform the engineering calculations that determine the basis for the high feedwater level switches for Units 1 and 3 prior to the restart of the resp (etive units.

If there are any questions, please telephone Patrick P. Carter, BFM, Site Licensing. (205) 729-3570.

Very truly yours, i

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

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fr E. C. Wallace, Manager A'uclear Licensing and Regulatory Affairs cc See page 3 t

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Ms. S. C. Black Deputy Director Project Directorate II-4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852 NRC Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plar.t Route 12 Box 637 Athens, Alabama 35609-2000 I

Thierry M. Ross, Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 208 Mr. B. A. Wilson, Project Chief U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323