ML18038A759

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LER 87-023-00:on 870422,trip of Normal Reactor Bldg Ventilation & Initiation of Emergency Ventilation Occurred. Caused by Personnel Error.Fuse Replaced.On 871123,util Discovered LER Not Submitted for event.W/871222 Ltr
ML18038A759
Person / Time
Site: Nine Mile Point Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/22/1987
From: Lempges T, Mazzaferro P
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-023-01, NMP30256, NUDOCS 8712290385
Download: ML18038A759 (12)


Text

ACCELERATED DiOIRIBUTION

..DEMONSIOATION SYSTEM Lp q.I REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:8712290385 DOC.DATE: 87/12/22 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET P$FACIL:50-220 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit.1, Niagara Powe 05000220 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MAZZAFERRO,P.A.

Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.LEMPGES,T.E.

Niagara, Mohawk Power Corp.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION W/8 DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR

)ENCL II SIZE: TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.NOTES

SUBJECT:

LER 87-023-00:on 870422,reactor bldg emergency ventilation initiation because of fuse failure.ltr.RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 LA BENEDICT,R INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS NRR/DEST/ELB NRR/DEST/MEB NRR/DEST/PSB NRR/DEST/SGB NRR/DLPQ/QAB NRR/DREP/RAB-DR-I SIB RGF 02 S ELFORD, J RGN1 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: EG&G GROH,M H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G COPIES LTTR ENCL 1-~1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD1-1 PD HAUGHEY,M ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB NRR/DEST/ICSB NRR/DEST/MTB NRR/DEST/RSB NRR/DLPQ/HFB NRR/DOEA/EAB NRR/DREP/RPB NRR/PMAS/ILRB RES DEPY GI RES/DE/EIB FORD BLDG HOY,A LPDR NSIC HARRIS,J COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 j A D TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 47 ENCL 46

Ix NRC Form 366 (5 63)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.3)504104 EXPIRES: 5/31/SS FACILITY NAME (I)DOCKET NUMBER 11)o 5 n o o PAOE ISI 1 OF""'"'eactor Building Emergency Ventilation Initiation Because Of Fuse Failure And Failure T T nt'With R t F EVENT DATE (SI MONTH OAY YEAR YEAR LER NUMBER (6)SEOUENTtAL NrsMSEA NUMBER REVtSt0N MONTH OAY YEAR REPORT DATE(7)FACILI'TY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI 0 5 0 0 0 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 0))0 5 0 0 0 OPERATING MODE (5)POWER LEVEL (10)t.""@V".(~TI::.

j$%j(jan%,", NAME 20.402(S)20.405(~)ill(i)20.405(el(i)(ill 20.405(~l(1)(iiil 20.405(el(i)(iv) 20.405(~l(1)(s)20.405(cl 50.36(cl(11 50.36(c)(2)60.73(~l(2)(il 60.73(~l(1 l(ill 50.73(e l(2)(i(i l LICENSEE CON1'ACT FOR THIS LER (12)60.73(~I(2)liv)60.73(~l(2)(v)50,73(~l(2)(vBI 50.73(~l(2((villi~(A)Ei0.73(el(21(villi(B) 60.73(~l(2)(xl AREA CODE THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUASUANT 7 0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR ('): (Chests one or more Ot rhe fotiovtinti (11 73.71(tr)73.71(cl DTHER fspscIty in Aosfrecr perovr end In text, IVRC Form JSSAI TELEPHONE NUMBER Peter A.Hazzaferro, Assistant Su ervisor Technical Su ort 3 1 5 3 4 9-2 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACh COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.TURER TO NPADS P~P+~~g~@P.~P, CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT r!y4kayn.:.

x.N, MANUFAC.TVAER EPOSITABLE TO NPRDS yyytr~lgu gyes k%%+m~40'~B H F U H 175 N jg~)g~P'I(III'cj)k+t'@Rjk~~jb l&y~(i@414.

" SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED llll YES III yes, compieN EXPECTED SUBMISSION OA TEI NO ABSTRACT I(.imit to f400 sprees.I e., epproximereiy tifteen sinore specs typevvrsrren Ii nmi (15)EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (151 MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT This Licensee Event Report reports two related events.The.first event involved an Engineered Safety Feature actuation.

On April 22, 1987, Nine Mile Point Unit 1 (NMPl)was operating at full power.At 1434 hours0.0166 days <br />0.398 hours <br />0.00237 weeks <br />5.45637e-4 months <br />, the unit experienced a trip of the normal reactor building ventilation and an initiation of Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation (RBEV).The cause of this event w'as personnel error involving inadvertant shorting of a fuse to ground in the initiation circuit of the RBEV.Immediate corrective action involved replacing the fuse under a station work request.The RBEV was secured at 1645 hours0.019 days <br />0.457 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.259225e-4 months <br /> on April 22 and the normal reactor building ventilation was returned to service.On November 23, 1987, the NMP1 Technical Support Department became aware that the 10 CFR 50.73 report had not yet been submitted for the April 22 event.The cause of this event is personnel error.Immediate corrective action involved a discussion with the personnel involved as to how and why this event occurred.Subsequent corrective action will involve preparing a Lessons Learned Transmittal to inform the personnel of the affected departments of the need for attention to detail during work activities.

8712290385 871222 PDR ADOCK 05000220 S DCn NAC Form 365 io oil

O'RC Form 3BEA (94)3)LICENSEE NT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUA N U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMB NO.3150M)04 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME 111 OOCKET NUMBER 12)LER NUMBER (EI SEQUENTIAL

'Fr REVISION NUMBER r, r/NUMBER PACE 13)Nine Nile Point Unit 1 Tl)IT///rrroro 4/rBCO/4)o)/rlorS rrFF//BOor4////IC

%%dnrr 3/ES4'4/11 7)22 08 7 023 0 0 0 2"0 4 DESCRIPTION OF EVENT This Licensee Event Report (LER)reports two related events.The first event is an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF)initiation which occurred on April 22, 1987.The second event is the failure to report the first event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.Because of the period'f time involved between the event date and the discovery date of the second event, it has been difficult to reconstruct the specifics of these events with respect to the exact causes.However, according to the persons involved and all available documentation, the following narrative is an accurate account of the events.EVENT NUMBER ONE On April 22, 1987, NMPl was operating at full power with the mode switch in the NRUN" position.At 1434 hours0.0166 days <br />0.398 hours <br />0.00237 weeks <br />5.45637e-4 months <br />, the unit experienced a trip of the normal reactor building ventilation system and the subsequent Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation System (RBEV)initiation.

The cause of the initiation was deenergization of the Channel ll Reactor Protection System (RPS)Reactor Building Ventilation System logic.The reason for the trip was not immediately obvious, since the channel 11 and channel 12 reactor building ventilation radiatio'n.monitors (Equipment Piece Numbers[EPNs]202-11 and 202-12 respectively) indicated no high radiation condition present.in the reactor building ventilation.

A Station Work Request (WR), number 106300, was'nitiated to investigate the cause of the initiation.

The RBEV, however, remained in service until the cause of the trip could be identified.

At the time of the RBEV initiation, an Instrument and Control Department (I&C)technician was performing an unrelated surveillance test within an area of the control panel which is common to the control circuits of several different process monitoring systems.During the performance of the test, the technician inadvertantly shorted to ground a 6 amp fuse in one of the 24 volt control circuits.During the investigation of this event,.it was found that this fuse was associated with auxiliary relay 18K1.Relay 18Kl is one of two relays that, when deenergized, trip the normal reactor building ventilation and initiate RBEV.The logic for this operation is noncoincident, The affected fuse and the portion of the circuit that operates relay 18K1 are not an integral part of the indication/trip unit of radiation monitor EPN 202-11 or an associated auxiliary trip unit.Therefore, the only indication that operations personnel received as a result of the fuse failure was an annunciator actuation reflecting the trip of the normal reactor building ventilation.

The fuse was replaced, the RBEV was secured, and the normal reactor building ventilation was restored at 1645 hours0.019 days <br />0.457 hours <br />0.00272 weeks <br />6.259225e-4 months <br /> on April 22, 1987.EVENT NUMBER TWO Under WR 106300, 1&C personnel investigated the cause of the first event.The Occurrence Report (OR)initiated to track the event was inadvertantly attached to WR 106300.When the WR was closed out, it was not noticed by any of the reviewers that the OR was still attached.The WR was then filed.As a NRC FOAM 3444 I94)31 o U.S.GPO:1988 0.824'538r488 0

NRC Fotm 3SBA IQ43 I LICENSEE NT REPORT ILER)TEXT CONTINUA N U.S.NUCLEAR REOUI.ATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO 3ISO&10E EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME III OOCKET NUMBER ISI YEAR LER NUMBER I6I SEOVENTIAL NVMSER No REVISION NVM PACE ISI Nine Mile Point Unit 1 TEXT/4'/IKoe EPoop/E/oqvted, vM//I/oOo~/YRC Form 38SA'u/IITI EVENT NUMBER TWO (Cont'd)0 5 0 0 0 P P 0 8 7 0 2 3 p p p 3 QF result, the OR was not logged and did not receive the required second level review in a timely manner.Therefore, the Technical Support Department, responsible for second level review and LER preparation, was not aware that there had been a reportable event.On November 20, 1987, the NMPl Technical Support Department was contacted by telephone by a Nuclear Regulatory Commission consultant.

The subject of the call was the 10 CFR 50.72 notification made by the NMP1 Operations Department on April 22.The Technical Support Department had at that time no record of the occurrence.

A'n investigation was then initiated.

At approximately 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> on November 23, 1987, after the investigation had located the misplaced OR, Technical Support Department personnel became aware that although the initial telephone notifications regarding the event were made in a timely manner, the written (LER)report was not submitted within the required thirty day period.During the interval since the 10 CFR 50.72 notification, NMP1 had operated at up to full power.The second event was the failure to submit the 10 CFR 50.73 report within thirty days.This was a violation of, Nine Mile Point Unit, 1 Technical Specifications section 6.6.1a., which requires conformance to 10 CFR 50.73 reporting requirements.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT EVENT NUMBER ONE The root cause of the first event was equipment failure due to personnel error.The 6 amp fuse in the control circuit failed because it was inadvertantly shorted to ground by an 1&C technician.

EVENT NUMBER TWO The root cause of the second event was personnel error.The OR was inadvertently attached to the WR.During closeout of the paperwork no one noticed that the original OR was attached.ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of the first event.The RBEV operated as.designed and in the conservative direction.

This analysis would be valid under any normal operating configuration or power level.The second event involved subsequent reporting requirements only.Since plant operations and public safety were not affected, there were no adverse safety consequences

'as a result of the second event.NRC FORM SEEA I94ISI~U.S,OPO:I988 0.83E SBBMSS

')IRC Poem 388A)94)3)LICENSEE EV T REPORT ILER)TEXT CONTINUAT U.S.NUCLEAR REGUI.ATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OM8 NO.3)SONICS EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME 0)DOCKET NUMBER (2)YEAR LER NUMEER IEI SEOVSNTIAL NVM8ER r.'rM REVISION NVM884 PAGE (3)Nine l1ile Point Unit 1 TACT///IIMMo R>>oo/8/R)vfot/oso aRS5ono/HRC

%%d 3/ELd'8/)17)CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 05000/2087 0 2 3 0 0 OF Initial corrective action, with respect to the first event,'nvolved initiating a WR to investigate the cause of the event.Subsequent corrective action consisted of replacing the blown fuse, securing the RBEV, and returning the normal Reactor Building Ventilation System to service.Initial corrective action,'with respect to the second event, involved locating WR 106300 and verifying the failure to report the event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73.Subsequent corrective action on the second event included initiating an OR and performing an investigation into the event.In addition, a Lessons Learned Transmittal is being prepared in order to call attention to the need for attention to detail during work activities.

The transmittal will be reviewed by the departments involved.ADDITIONAL INFOIQIATION Similar events were discussed in NMPl LERs 86-10 (Actuation of Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation Resulting From Blown Fuse)and 85-07 (Initiation Of Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation Due To Power Supply Short).The fuse which was shorted is believed to have been a BUSS type, class H, NON, 6 amp fuse rated at 250 volts or less.It was manufactured by McGraw Edison Company of St.Louis, Missouri.The following table lists the identifier codes of the involved equipment according to IEEE 805-1983, IEEE 803A-1983, and Table 9 of the NPRDS Reporting Procedures Manual.EPN~tom onent Model Number IEEE 805 IEEE 803 NPRDS Table 9~decem~Satan Manufacturer Fuse NON, 6 AMP, BUSS Type BH FU M175 Geiger-Mueller Tube 18550 BH DET A370 RN04B-5 Detector Sensor and Converter 194X927G2 BH DET G080 RN07B-5 Radiation Monitor 129B2802 BH MON G080 RN25'rip Auxiliaries Unit 194X940G7 BH MON G080 NRC FORM Sdda)943)o U.S.GPO;1985 0 828 538M55

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION pe~NIAGARA~j MOHAWK THOMAS E.LEMPGES VCf PACSOtw1~VCLCAAOCI4AATON 301 PLAINFIELD ROAD SYAACUSE,NY 13212 NIIP30256 December 22, 1987 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 RE: Docket No.50-220 LER 87-23 Gentlemen:

In=accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report: LER 87-23 Which is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv),"Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported" and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B),"Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." The 10 CFR 50.72 report was made at 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br /> on April 22, 1987.This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, Supplement 2, dated September 1985.Very truly yours, Vice President Nuclear Generation TEL/meh Attachment cc: William T.Russell Regional Administrator i/I