ML18038A258

LER 87-025-00:on 870519,secondary Containment Isolation Signal Generated Due to Technician Relanding Lifted Lead Prematurely.Caused by Breakdown in Communications.Gaitronics Phone &/Or Headset Jack installed.W/870615 Ltr

ML18038A258
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	06/15/1987
From:	Lempges T, Randall R NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-025, LER-87-25, NMP23895, NUDOCS 8706230102
Download: ML18038A258 (18)

Text

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RE; RY lNFORMATION DISTRI I SYSTEM (RIDB)

ACCESSION NHR: 870LI>230102 DOC. DATE: 87/06/15 NOTARIZED: NQ DOCKET 8 FACIL: 50-410 Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station> Unit 2> Niagara Moha 05000410 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION RANDALL> R. G. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.

LEMPQES> T. E. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.

REC I P. NAME I REC I P ENT AFF l L I*T ION SUHJECT: LER 87-025-00: on 87051'P> secondary containment isolation signal generated due to technician relanding lifted lead prematurelg. Caused bg breakdown in communications between control room Zc technicians in field. 4l/870615 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR I ENCL TITLE: 50. 73 Licensee Event Report (LER)> Incident Rpt>

j SIZE:

etc.

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COP I ES RECIPlENT CQP IEB ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD1-1 LA 1 1 PD1-1 PD 1 1 NEIGHHORS> D 1 1 MINER> B 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 ACRS MQELLER 2 2 AEOD/DOA 1 AEOD/DSP/ROAH 2 2 AEOD/DBP/TP*H 1 1 DEDRO 1 NRR/DEBT/ADE 1 0 NRR/DEBT/ADS 1 0 NRR/DEBT/CEH 1 NRR/DEST/ELH NRR/DEBT/ICSH 1 NRR/DEBT/MEH 1 NRR/DEBT/MTH 1 NRR/DEST/PSH 1 1 NRR/DEBT/RSH 1 NRR/DEBT/BGH NRR/DLPG/HFH 1 NRR/DLPQ/GAH 1 NRR/DQEA/EAH 1 NRR/DREP/RAH 1 NRR/DREP/RPH 2 2 S/ILRH NRR/PMAS/PTBH 1 02 1 1 REB DEPY GI 1 1 RGN1 FILE 01 1 EXTERNAL: EQ8 M 5 5 H BT LOHHY NARD LPDR 1 NRC PDR NSIC HARRIS> S 1 NBIC MAYS> Q TOTAL NUMBER OF CQP I ES REQUIRED: LTTR 43 ENCL 41

~0 NRC Form 3dd U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (943)

AppRDYED DMS ND. 31600101 fk EXPIRES: 8(31(88

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IC LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (21 PA E 3 N P 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 oF 3 TITLE (e)

S nd r Containment Isolation Initiation.due to Communications Breakdown EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

."~gad SEOVENTIAI. FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)

MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR OAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH 0 5 0 0 0 05 19 8787 2 5 000615 8 7 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR (Ir (Check one or more N/A ol the folloylnp) (11) 0 5 0 0 0 OPERATINO MODE (9) 20A02(B) 20A06(e) 60.73(el(2) livl 73.71(B)

POWER 20A05(e) (I l(l) 50.35(e) (1) 50.73(e) (2)(v) 73.71(e)

LEYEL (vill)(B) 0 0 0 20A06( ~ l(1)(8) 50.38(el(2) 50.73(el(2)(vB) OTHER (Specify in Arntrect hefovr end In Terr, NRC Form 20AOS( ~ l (I I (ill) 60.73( ~ l(2) (ll 50,73(e) (2) (villi(A) 3SSAI 20A05( ~ l(1)(lv) 60.73( ~ ) (2) (III 50.73(e) (2) 20AOS(el(1) (v) 60.73(el(2)(lll) 50.73(e)(2)(rl LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE Robert G. Randall, Supervisor Technical Support 315 349 - 2 445 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAG TURER EPORTABLE TO NPRDS EIQ(C~  ?.<.3 cAUsE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC.

TURER FPORTABLE TO NPRDS SNc r+

rep.rr:......:. I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (Ie) MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (16)

YES (If yer, complete EXPECTED SVSMISSIDN DATEI X NO ABSTRACT (Llmlt to Ie00 rpecer, I.e.. epprorimerely fifteen rlnpleepece typewritten linn( (18)

On May 19, 1987 at 1655 with the reactor at OX power with all rods inserted and the mode switch in "REFUEL" Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an Engineered Safety Feature Actuation. A secondary containment isolation signal was generated as a result of technicians, who while performing a surveillance procedure, re-landed a lifted lead prior to the step in the procedure which requires the lead landed. This was a direct result of a cotI)1unications breakdown between the technicians. performing this surveillance test. The early replacement of the lead produced a Secondary Containment Isolation signal which subsequently caused the reactor building ventilation system to isolate and all associated dampers to close. All equipment operated as designed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION A modification has been generated which will add a Gaitronics phone and/or headset jack in the immediate area. This modification is scheduled to be completed prior to the first refueling outage.

>>o>>~o~ (B)DOCH, 2

050oooeio PDR PDR L 8 NRC Form 388 (9.831

~0 r, NRU Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (94)31 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3160M)04 EXPIRES: 6/31/SB FACIL(TY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

YEAR SEQVSNTIAL 46vrsroN NUM864 NVM864 OF Nine Mile Point Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 4 O TEXT ///rrroro 4/>>co /4 or/rdrod. ore odd dorro///RC Form 3654's/ ()7)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On May 19, 1987 at 1655 with the reactor at OX power with all rods inserted and the mode switch in "REFUEL" Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced. an Engineered Safety Feature actuation. A secondary containment isolation signal was generated as a result of a Niagara Mohawk Instrument and Control (I8C) technician who, while performing a surveillance procedure, re-landed a lifted lead prior to the step in the procedure which requires the lead landed. The procedure which the technicians were performing is N2-RSP-RMS-R107, UChannel Calibration Test of the Reactor Building Below the Refuel Floor Process Radiation Monitors". Radiation Protection technicians-were performing the surveillance test with the Instrument 5 Control technicians as a support group. While in the process of finishing up the 2HVR*RE32A channel test a comIunications breakdown occurred between the technician in the control room and the technician in the field. The technician in the field questioned if it was time to re-land the lead. The response was of the only partially received, which subsequently resulted in the re-landing lead. The early replacement of the lead produced a secondary containment isolation signal which caused the reactor building ventilation system to isolate and all associated dampers to close. No emergency ventilation systems initiated due to them being in the pull-to-lock position for this particular test. All equipment operated as designed.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT The cause of the event was a breakdown in comunications between the technician in the control room and the technicians in the field. The technician in the control room had to convey messages through a hand held radio to a technician in the field on another radio. This technician then in turn had to convey that message to the technician performing the work, approximately 75 feet away. This poor method of coomunications allowed the technician performing the work to proceed ahead of the technician in the control room resulting in the lifted lead being landed prior to the step in the procedure.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event, since the reactor mode switch was in Refuel and all rods were fully inserted. The procedure which the technicians were performing is used to test the automatic trip functions which result from exceeding the high radiation trip setpoint..

This includes isolation of the Normal Reactor Building Ventilation System and activation of the Standby Gas Treatment System. Since the intention of this test was to generate signals and not actuate equipment, the emergency ventilation systems were in the pull-to-lock position. If emergency ventilation systems were deemed necessary operations personnel could have taken the fans out of pull-to-lock. In addition, all'equipment and associated dampers operated as designed and no significant safety hazards occurred as a result of this event.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION A modification has been generated (N2Y87MX038) which will add a Gaitronics phone and/or headset jack in the immediate area. This modification is scheduled to be completed prior to the first refueling outage.

NRC FORM eeeA (94)3)

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NRC Form'3ddA V.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (94)31 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 9/31/(8 FACIE)TY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (5) PACE (3)

YEAR NBK sdoUENTIAL 'pQ RdvlsloN

'AP NUMBEA NUMBER Nine Mile Point Unit 2 0 5 0 0 0 4 I 0 8 7 025 0 0 03 o' 3 TEXT ///mare epece /4 rer/Irrred, ore eddr//one///RC Farm 355AS/ ()7)

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION Identification of Components Referred to in this LER IEEE 803 IEEE 805 Component EI IS Funct System ID Secondary Containment Isolation System N/A 'A Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) N/A BH Radiation Honitors tlON IL Dampers DMP "VA There have been no previous similar events as a result of poor conmunications between technicians.

NAC FOAM JSBA (94)3)

~0 NMP23895 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NIAGARA

~ MOHAWK 301 PLAINFIELDROAD SYRACUSE. NY 13212 THOMAS E.I.EMPGES VCE HLESOCNT~CAA OENKAATION June 15, 1987 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 RE: Docket No. 50-410 LER 87-25 Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 87-25 Is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported."

A telephone notification was made at 1835 hours0.0212 days <br />0.51 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.982175e-4 months <br /> on Nay 19, 1987 per 10 CFR 50.72 part (b) (2) (iv).

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, Supplement 2, dated September 1985.

Very truly yours, Thomas E. Lempges Vice President Nuclear Generation TEL/SCN/mjd Attachments cc: Regional Administrator, Region 1 Sr. Resident Inspector, W. A. Cook

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NAC Form 355 U.S. NUCLEAR AEOULATOAYCOAR4ISSIOre (943) APPROVED OMB NO. 31500104 EXPIRES: SISIISS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

DOCKET NUMBER (2) PA 1*

FACILITY NAME (I)

' 0 5 0 0 0 1 OF 3 N

TITLE (4)

S nd r Con inment Isolation Initiation. due to Communications Breakdown MONTH EVENT DATE (SI DAY YEAR YEAR LE R N VMS F R SEOVENTIAL::Xg NVMSER (5)

RE ~

NUMBER MONTH REPORT DATE (7)

OAY YEAR OTHEA FACILITIES INVOLVED ISI FACILITYNAMES DOCKET NUMBER(SI 0 5 0 0 0 05 19 8 7 8 7 2 5 0 O 0 6 1 5 8 7 N/A ol the 0 5 0 0 0 THIS AEPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT T 0 THE AEOUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR gt IChreh one or morr IOIIoryinPI (11 OPERATINO MODE (5) 20A02(S) 20A05(cl 50.73(r)(2) Iiv) 73.71(II) 5 20.405 (e l(1 I (il 50.35(e) ( I I 50.73(e I (2)(r) 73h71(c)

POWER LEYEL (rill OTHER ISprcity in Ahrrrret O O O 20.405 (e I (I)(4 I 50.35 I el (2) 50.73(e I (2 I Below rnd In Tert. NRC Fovm 20.405( ~ I II Hi(i) 50.73(e l(2) Ii) 50.73(el(2)(riiil(AI JBBAI 20A05(el(1)(iv) 50.73(el(2)(Q) 50.73(e) (2)(villi(BI ei~jy@~(Fjj~pg 20.405( ~ l(l)Hl 50.73(el(2) I(ill 50.7 3(r I (2)(e )

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA (12)

NAME TELEPHONE NVMBEA AREA CODE Robert G. Randall, Supervisor Technical Support 315 349 - 2 445 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCAIBED IN THIS AFPORT (13)

MANUFAC COMPONENT MANVFAC EPORTABL CAUSE SYSTEM COMI'ONENT CAUSE SYSTEM TVAER TURER TO NPADS i%~/ I' or'/gag,~q'w' lnhrr ..Rc 'Sh er Ph Yrrlvlrelk SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

YES III yrr, cornpietr EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATEI X NO ABsTRAcT (Limit to )400 tprcrt, ir., rpprorimrrrry lifteen tinpir.tpeee typehrritren linrd (15)

On Nay 19, 1987 at 1655 with the reactor at OX power with all rods inserted and the mode swit'ch in "REFUEL" Nine Hi le Point Unit 2 experienced an Engineered Safety Feature Actuation. A secondary containment isolation signal was generated as a result of technicians, who while performing a surveillance procedure, re-landed a lifted lead prior to the step in the procedure which requires the lead landed. This was a direct result of a comunications breakdown between the technicians performing this surveillance test. The early replacement of the lead produced a Secondary Containment Isolation signal which subsequently caused the reactor building ventilation system to isolate and all associated dampers to close. All equipment operated as designed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION A modification has been generated which will add a Gaitronics phone and/or headset jack in the ioeediate area. This modification is scheduled to be completed prior to the first refueling outage.

NRC Form 355

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NRC+orm 34SX ~ U.S. NUCLEAR RECU(.ATORV COMMISSION (9431 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTIN ATI N APPROVEO OMB NO 3150&104 EXPIRES: B/31/BB FACILITY NAME (11 OOCKET NUMBER (31 I'ACE (31 LER NUMBER (B)

SEOVSNTIAL &'<r rr<YfSf0rr rrVM ER  ::(f'/V4ISSA Nine Mile Point Unit 2 0 s 0 0 0 4 OF p

TEXT /// mr/a Neer /r /r/frfrd, r/st sddla'onal HRC %%drm 3SSA 3) () 7)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT On May 19, 1987 at 1655 with the reactor at OX power with all rods inserted and the mode switch in "REFUEL" Nine Mile Point Unit 2 experienced an Engineered Safety Feature actuation. A secondary containment isolation signal was generated as a result of a Niagara Mohawk Instrument and Control { I&C) technician who, while performing a surveillance procedure, re-landed a lifted lead prior to the step in the procedure which requires the lead landed. The procedure which the technicians were performing is N2-RSP-RMS-R107, "Channel Calibration Test of the Reactor Building Below the Refuel Floor Process Radiation Monitors". Radiation Protection technicians were performing the surveillance test with the Instrument

& Control technicians as a support group. While in the process of finishing up the 2HVR*RE32A channel test a cormunications breakdown occur red between the technician in the control room and the technician in the field. The technician in the field questioned if it was time to re-land the lead. The response was only partially received, which subsequently resulted in the re-landing of the lead. The early replacement of the lead produced a secondary containment isolation signal which caused the reactor building ventilation system to isolate and a'll associated dampers to close. No emergency ventilation systems initiated due to them being in the pull-to-lock position for this particular test. All equipment operated as designed.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT The cause of the event was a breakdown in comunications between the technician in the control room and the technicians in the field. The technician in the control room had to convey messages through a hand held radio to a technician in the field on another radio. This technician then .in turn had to convey that message to the technician performing the work, approximately 75 feet away. This poor method of coomunications allowed the technician performing the work to proceed ahead of the technician in the control room resulting in the lifted lead being landed prior to the step in the procedure.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT There were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event, since the reactor mode switch was in Refuel and all rods were fully inserted. The procedure which the technicians were performing is used to test the automatic trip functions which result from exceeding the high radiation trip setpoint.

This includes isolation of the Normal Reactor Building Ventilation System and activation of the Standby Gas Treatment System. Since the intention of this test was to generate signals and not actuate equipment, the emergency ventilation systems were in the pull-to-lock position. If emergency ventilation systems were deemed necessary operations personnel could have taken the fans out of pul 1-to-lock. In addition, all 'equipment and associated dampers operated as designed and no significant safety hazards occurred as a result of this event.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION A modification has been generated {N2Y87MX038) which will add a Gaitronics phone and/or headset jack in the immediate area. This modification is scheduled to be completed prior to the first refueling outage.

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NRO Form 3883 U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION

$ 43)

~ V LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER).TEXT CONTIN AT N APPROVEO OMB NO. 3150M)04 v

EXPIRES: 8/31/88 FACILITY NAME (1) OOCKET NUMBER (3) LER NUMBER (8) PAOE (3)

YEAR jyiIv SEQUENTIAL ')8'VMSER REVISION NVMSER Nine Mile Point Unit TEXT /// moro opooo /F /or)II/ror/ me ~ 2 H/IC Fonrr 388A3) (17) 0 5 0 0 0 4 ] 0 8 7 025 00 03 OF 0 3 V. ADDITIONAl INFORMATION Identification of Components Referred to in this lER IEEE 803 IEEE 805 Component EIIS Funct System ID Secondary Containment Isolation System N/A VA N/A BH Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)

Radiation Monitors MON Il

'VA Dampers DMP There have been no previous simi lar events as a result of poor cormunications between technicians.

NRC FORM 308A

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QQ NMP23895 NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION NIAGARA I~/ MOHAWK 301 PLAINRELD ROAO SYRACUSE, NY 13212 THOMAS E. LEMPOES VCE PRtSDENT~tAA OfIICIIATOII June 15, 1987 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 RE: Docket No. 50-410 LER 87-25 Gentlemen:

R In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 87-25 Is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).

However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS, that resulted from and was part of the preplanned sequence during testing or reactor operation need not be reported."

A telephone notification was made at 1835 hours0.0212 days <br />0.51 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.982175e-4 months <br /> on tray 19, 1987 per 10 CFR 50.72 part (b) (2) (iv).

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, Supplement 2, dated September 1985.

Thomas E. Lempges Vice President Nuclear Generation TEL/SCN/mjd Attachments cc: Regional Administrator, Region 1 Sr. Resident Inspector, W. A. Cook

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