ML20244C695: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot insert) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change) |
||
Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20244C695 | |||
| issue date = 06/08/1989 | |||
| title = Insp Rept 50-382/89-12 on 890416-0531.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Monthly Maint Observation,Monthly Surveillance Observation,Onsite Followup of Events & Evaluation of Licensee QA Program Implementation | |||
| author name = Chamberlain D, Smith W, Staker T | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000382 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| document report number = 50-382-89-12, NUDOCS 8906150099 | |||
| package number = ML20244C677 | |||
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 10 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000382/1989012]] | |||
=Text= | |||
{{#Wiki_filter:. . _ . . . . . . _ _ _ - . _ | |||
. | |||
. .' | |||
APPENDIX B | |||
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
REGION IV | |||
NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/89-12 Operating License: NPF-38 | |||
Docket: 50-382 | |||
Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L) | |||
317 Baronne Street | |||
New Orleans, Louisiana 70160 | |||
Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3' (Waterford-3) | |||
Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana | |||
Inspection Conducted: April 16 through May 31, 1989 | |||
Inspectors: | |||
7. F. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector l | |||
[-6'df | |||
Date | |||
/ y, | |||
T. R. Staker, Resident Irispector | |||
i | |||
(/ | |||
bY$ | |||
Date | |||
Approved: d ) bh | |||
D. D. Ottamberlain, Chief, Project Section A Date | |||
Division of Reactor Projects | |||
8906150099 890609 | |||
PDR ADOCK 05000382 | |||
O PDC | |||
_ _ - _ _ _ _ -_ _ _-_ __ | |||
e < | |||
I | |||
. | |||
. | |||
! | |||
< | |||
2 | |||
l | |||
Inspection Summary | |||
Inspection Conducted April 16 through May 31, 1989 (Report 50-382/89-12) | |||
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of plant status, monthly | |||
maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, onsite followup of ; | |||
events, evaluation of licensee quality assurance program implementation, ; | |||
operational safety verification, followup of previously identified items, and | |||
licensee event report (LER) followup. | |||
Results: Two violations were identified. The first violation (paragraph 3.d) ; | |||
involved failure to provide adequate maintenance instructions for the | |||
replacement of a torque switch in Limitorque Motor Operated Valve (MOV) MS-416. , | |||
As a result, the torque switch termination washer stackup was incorrectly ; | |||
performed. Additionally, because of confusing directives between the I | |||
maintenance procedure and the drawing detailing Okonite splices, the power < | |||
leads were improperly spliced. Conflicts and confusion between these two | |||
di vments have been the subject of considerat,'e discussion between the Region IV | |||
HRC staff and the licensee, yet problems continue to emerge. Revisions made to | |||
both documents appear to have created, as well as solved, some of these | |||
problems. See NRC Inspection Reports 50-382/87-31, -88-21, and -88-25 and | |||
LER 88-027. | |||
The second violation (paragraph 4.d) involved failure of operations personnel | |||
to comply with radiological warning signs. One operator reached into a | |||
radiologically restricted area without proper clearance from Health Physics. | |||
Others violated a radiation work permit requirement to wear a full set of | |||
protective clothing while climbing into contaminated areas. The MC inspectors ; | |||
' | |||
expressed concern that more stringent controls may be necessary to prevent | |||
similar problems from recurring. | |||
l | |||
l | |||
L________________._____ | |||
_ _ _______ _ _ __ - | |||
. | |||
. | |||
. | |||
l . . | |||
3 | |||
DETAILS | |||
1. Persons Contacted | |||
Principal Licensee Employees c | |||
*R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations | |||
*J. R. McGaha, Plant Manager, Nuclear | |||
P. V. Prasankumar, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Support | |||
*D. F. Packer, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance | |||
J. J. Zabritski, Quality Assurance Manager | |||
*D. E. Baker, Manager of Nuclear Operations Support and Assessments | |||
*R. G. Azzarello, Manager of Nuclear Operations Engineering | |||
W. T. Labonte, Radiation Protection Superintendent | |||
*G. M. Davis, Manager of Events Analysis Reporting & Responses | |||
L. W. Laughlin, Onsite Licensing Coordinator | |||
T. R. Leonard, Maintenance Superintendent | |||
A. F. Burski, Manager of Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs | |||
R. S. Starkey, Operations Superintendent | |||
*T. J. Gaudet, Onsite Licensing Coordinator | |||
*Present at exit interview. | |||
In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions | |||
with various operations, engineering, t - 'inical support, maintenance, and | |||
administrative members of the licenses staff. | |||
2. Plant Status (71707) | |||
The plant was operated at full power for the duration of this inspection | |||
period, except on April 21, 1989, when power was reduced to approximately | |||
95 percent for routine isothermal temperature coefficient testing, and on | |||
May 5,1989, when power was again reduced to approximately 95 percent for | |||
routine turbine valve and control element assembly testing. | |||
3. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703) | |||
The station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and | |||
components listed below were observed and documentation reviewed to | |||
ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved | |||
procedures, Technical Specifications (TS), and appropriate industry codes | |||
or standards. | |||
a. Work Authorization 01033676. The licensee performed an investigation | |||
to determine the cause of failure of component cooling water dry | |||
cooling tower fan motor high speed terminations. They determined | |||
that the failure occurred after the terminal lugs corroded because of | |||
moisture intrusion into the installed Okonite taped splices. The | |||
moisture intrusion was attributed to capillary action drawing | |||
moisture into the splices through the woven cable jacket material | |||
left installed next to the splices. The licensee's instructions for | |||
. | |||
. | |||
. e | |||
4 | |||
l | |||
installing these cable splices, found on Drawing LOLI-1564-B-288, were | |||
deficient because no requirement for removing the woven material from | |||
the cable when installing splices was included. The licensee | |||
indicated plans to reolace future taped splices with Raychem Class IE | |||
motor termination splie kits, which they think will provide better ; | |||
seals. Because of the lead time to obtain the Raychem kits, it will | |||
be some time before they become available. The licensee measured the i | |||
temperature of all high speed motor leads for Dry Cooling Towers A | |||
and B and found two motors in each division with questionable splices | |||
due to a higher relative temperi.ture. The licensee then replaced | |||
these splices and inspected the lugs. The NRC inspectors will follow i | |||
up on licensee actions to assure the reliability of these splices | |||
through periodic maintenance (Inspector Followup Item 382/8912-01). | |||
i b. Work Authorization 01035812. The NRL inspector. observed the drilling | |||
l of a 13/16-inch hole in the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) | |||
1 Pump B recirculation line flow restricting orifice. The hole was | |||
drilled to obtain access to resolve an indication by radiography | |||
during the licensee's investigation of a low recirculation flow | |||
condition during pump testing. The licensee found and retrieved a | |||
1/4-inch set screw from the flow orifice and later determined that | |||
the screw was the same as several screws used on the pump internals. | |||
Thelicenseeconsultedwiththepumpvendor(Ingersol-Rand)and ' | |||
proceeded to disassemble the pump to inspect for missing set screws. | |||
c. Work Authorization 01006018. High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B | |||
was disassembled to investigate the source of a set screw found in | |||
the pump recirculation line flow restricting orifice. The pump | |||
rotating assembly was removed and disassembled. The licensee found | |||
that two set screws were missing from the fourth stage impeller rings | |||
which were severely damaged. In addition, wear and/or fretting was | |||
found on eight of the nine stages. The NRC inspectors are following | |||
the licensee's activities related to HPSI Pump B as part of the | |||
response to issues raised in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/89-09. | |||
During pump reassembly, the NRC inspector observed the pump shaft | |||
. concentricity checks and noted that substantial adjustment was | |||
required to bring the inboard end within the required tolerance. The | |||
NRC inspectors are monitoring the licensee's investigation into the | |||
cause of the pump damage. As of the end of this inspection period, | |||
the results of that investigation were not yet available. | |||
d. Work Authorization 01037167. The NRC inspectors observed repairs on | |||
the Emergency Feedwater Pump A/B failed Steam Supply 1 solation | |||
Yalve MS-416. The licensee determined that the cause of the valve | |||
failure was that the torque switch swing arm pin had failed. The NRC | |||
inspectors observed the torque switch replacement. During | |||
installation, the NRC inspectors noted that the washers at the torque | |||
switch wiring connections were not stacked in accordance with the | |||
vendor's Manual No. 457000468, "Limitorque Maintenance Operation | |||
Instruction." This was identified to the licensee by the NRC | |||
inspectors and corrected prior to returning the valve to service. In | |||
l | |||
l | |||
l | |||
1 | |||
' | |||
. | |||
. | |||
' | |||
. , | |||
5 | |||
i | |||
addition, the NRC inspectors identified that the power supply i | |||
terminations were not spliced in accordance with Drawing LOU-1564-B-288, | |||
as required. ' This problem appeared to occur. because of inappropriate | |||
labeling on the drawing. Problems with Okonite cable splice , | |||
instructions have been previously identified by both the NRC inspectors | |||
and licensee personnel since January 1988. As a result of this ; | |||
additional' example, the NRC inspectors concluded that corrective ; | |||
actions .to date have been ineffective in preventing future viciations ; | |||
in this area. j | |||
l In January 1988, the NRC inspectors identified in Violation 382/8731-03 | |||
that Okonite splices were not constructed in accordance with the ; | |||
drawing. _ In September 1988, the NRC inspectors identified another ] | |||
problem with Okonite splice instructions in NRC Inspection | |||
Report 50-382/88-21. In October 1988, the issue was raised again in | |||
NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-25.- The licensee's performance in | |||
the correction of this problem has been poor. In LER 88-027, dated | |||
November 30, 1988, the licensee stated that the B-288 drawings have , | |||
been revised and that the instruction, Procedure ME-4-809, " Low i | |||
Voltage Power and Control Cable / Conduction Termination and Splices," l | |||
now references the B-288 drawings to ensure consistency in splice ' | |||
construction. However, it is apparent from the recent example that | |||
the licensee has not successfully removed all of the conflicts with ; | |||
the Okonite cable splice instructions. | |||
' | |||
Failure to properly stack the washers on the torque switch electrical i | |||
connections and failure to properly splice the power connections both ] | |||
appeared to be the result of inadequate work instructions and, as | |||
such, are in violation of NRC regulations (Violation 382/8912-02). | |||
4. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726) | |||
The NRC inspectors observed the surveillance testing of safety-related | |||
l systems and components listed below to verify that the activities were . | |||
l being performed in accordance with the TS. The applicable procedures were , | |||
reviewed for adequacy, test instrumentation was verified to be in | |||
calibration, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and completeness. | |||
The NRC inspectors ascertained that any deficiencies identified were | |||
properly reviewed and resolved. | |||
< | |||
a. Special Test 01037539, " Main Steam Isolation Valve 10% Exercise | |||
Stroke Test MSIV #1." On May 18, 1989, the NRC inspector observed | |||
the stroke test of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) No. 1. The | |||
valve testing was performed with a revised procedure to require | |||
checks of valve positions prior to manipulations to prevent excessive | |||
MSIV valve closure and a potential plant trip. The previous test | |||
method relied on automatic sequences of valves, and a sticking | |||
solenoid valve resulted in a plant trip in 1987 (LER 87-011). The | |||
test was conducted without any problems, | |||
i | |||
' | |||
a | |||
. , | |||
' | |||
. . ~l | |||
* | |||
. . | |||
} | |||
! | |||
' | |||
6. . | |||
) | |||
b. Work ' Authorization 01037873. On May 22, 1989, the NRC inspector. j | |||
1ob served th e performance of stroke time testing of Containment Cooler ; | |||
Isolation Valves CC-807A and CC-8228. The NRC inspector noted.that | |||
~ | |||
; | |||
< | |||
'the stroke times met the acceptance criteria and no problems were :) | |||
identified. | |||
~ | |||
, | |||
, | |||
' | |||
c. Procedure OP-903-032, Revision 6', "Surveillan'ce Procedure Quarterly | |||
ISI Valve Test." The NRC inspector observed the inservice testing of ; | |||
Emergency Feedwater Flow Control Valves EFW-223B and EFW-224B. The. ; | |||
NRC inspector noted that the.results were acceptable.- 1 | |||
i | |||
d. Procedures OP-903-011, devision 5, "High Pressure Safety. Injection- | |||
Pump Preservice Operability Check,'l and OP-903-030, Revision 6 | |||
" Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification." The'NRC inspectors | |||
observed the operability checks and establishment of new inservice | |||
testing reference values for HPSI Pump B following major repairs. i | |||
The evaluation was conducted without incident; however, there were j | |||
two deficiencies identified by the NRC inspectors which were 1 | |||
discussed with licensee management. | |||
~ | |||
-l | |||
Prior to testing the pump, the NRC inspector observed an auxiliary | |||
operator entering an area posted as "High Radiation Area," "High | |||
Contamination Areas," " Radiologically Restricted Area," and "Do Not | |||
Enter Without Health Physics Permission." This entry was made | |||
without obtaining Health Physics permission. This was not in. 1 | |||
accordance with Procedure HP-1-110,' Revision 8. " Radiation Work ! | |||
Permits," which requires adherence.to posted radiological-signs and I | |||
the applicable radiation work permit (RWP). The NRC inspector also ' | |||
noted that the applicable radiation work permit, RWP 89000002, ! | |||
required Health Physics permission prior to entering high radiation i | |||
areas or radiologically restricted areas. In' addition, several | |||
operations personnel were observed climbing in areas posted as | |||
contaminated without donning full protective clothing as required by | |||
RWP 89000002. Failure to follow radiological work procedures is a | |||
violationofNRCregulations(Violation 382/8912-03). I | |||
5. Onsite Followup of Events (93702) | |||
a. Fire Dampers Declared Inoperable . | |||
On April 25, 1989, the licensee declared 75 fire dampers inoperable | |||
because they were not installed in accordance with the manufacturer's | |||
requirements and fire test configurations. .They were installed in | |||
accordance with the Architect-Engineer's (Ebasco) drawings, which l | |||
were in error. This condition has existed'since construction. | |||
The licensee had been performing a 100 percent inspection of fire | |||
seals (see paragraph 5.b below). During the inspection, the licensee | |||
noted differences between penetration seals involving fire dampers. ' | |||
; | |||
1 | |||
I | |||
' | |||
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - | |||
q | |||
~ | |||
- | |||
; | |||
" | |||
. | |||
.- . | |||
- | |||
.. . | |||
7 | |||
l | |||
While resolving .the differences, the' licensee'noted that' fire dampers | |||
were not provided with adequate annular clearance to allow-for l | |||
. thermal expansion should the. damper be exposed to the' heat of 'a fire. { | |||
In addition silicone foam penetration seals installed adjacent.to 1 | |||
the dampers aggravated the condition because of thermal expansion of- ] | |||
the silicone foam which, according to the licensee,1s approximately; j | |||
-1 percent volume increase per 18'F. 1 | |||
! | |||
" | |||
Preliminary calculations by the licensee'.s design engineering. group- | |||
indicated that if' automatic' sprinkler protection existed on both | |||
sides of the damper. thermal. expansion would be lessened to where'the' | |||
l- operability of the damper would not be hampered. Waterford 3 has 154 | |||
fire-dampers, many.of which protect safety-related equipment. -Of the , | |||
:. 121 dampers questioned,' 75 have been declared inoperable. They | |||
l required further evaluation and/or rework. Fire watches required by | |||
.the licensee's Fire Protection Program had already.been established | |||
in support of thel fire seal-inspection. Forty-six did not appear to ! | |||
have a problem because their annular space conformed to the damper- l | |||
manufacturer's requirements and/or they had automatic sprinkler | |||
protection on both' sides; however, the licensee has indicated an- | |||
intent to inspect the 46 dampers to ensure they were properly | |||
installed. As of the end of this inspection period, the licensee had ] | |||
not . completed the evaluations ~nor was a decision made as to how to ; | |||
report the issue to the NRC. 'The NRC inspectors' will followup on 1 | |||
licensee actions under Inspector Followup Item 382/8912-04. | |||
'b. Fire SealTInspection and Repair Program ) | |||
1 | |||
The licensee's efforts to identify and correct all fire seal ') | |||
deficiencies at Waterford 3 have been documented in NRC Inspection ! | |||
Reports 50-382/88-28, -88-31, -89-03, -89-06, and -89-08. In 1 | |||
addition, the licensee identified the problem in LER 382/88-030, 'l | |||
dated December 12, 1988. As of the end of this inspection period, of | |||
the 2014 seals inspected, 634 required restoration. Of the 634 i | |||
seals' 446 have been restored to the proper configuration, thus there | |||
, | |||
were approximately 188 fire impairments in effect as of the end of ' | |||
this inspection period. j | |||
l | |||
In LER 382/88-030, the licensee indicated plans to submit a final | |||
report by May 30, 1989. In view of the unexpsted additional | |||
< | |||
discrepancies found, targeted completion dates havt slipped and, , | |||
therefore, the licensee informed the NRC inspectors that a brief | |||
status report will be published as a revision'to the LER on May 30, | |||
1989, with a final report by July-1!,1989. | |||
No violations or deviations were identifiec, | |||
, , | |||
. | |||
- | |||
e - - - - _ _ _- | |||
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. | |||
, | |||
. | |||
. . | |||
" - | |||
.. .. | |||
!h | |||
8 | |||
1 | |||
6. Evaluation af Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation (35502) | |||
On May 23, 1989, regional management performed an evaluation of.the | |||
effectiveness of the licensee's quality assurance (QA) program | |||
implementation by conducting an in-office evaluation of the following: | |||
a. NRC inspection reports for the past 12 months, | |||
b. Systematic assessment of licensee performance (SALP) reports for the I | |||
past 2 years. I | |||
c. Region IV outstanding open items list. | |||
1 | |||
d. Licensee corrective actions for NRC inspection findings. 1 | |||
e. Licensee event reports for the past 12 months. | |||
1 | |||
On the basis of the evaluation, the NRC steff found no negative | |||
performance trends in any of t;m seven SALP functional areas. Plant | |||
Operations and Radiological Controls appeared to indicate-an improving | |||
trend due, in part, to licensee actions to improve procedural compliance. | |||
The Maintenance / Surveillance functional area showed little improvement due l | |||
to continuing ' incidents of procedural noncompliance and procedure ; | |||
inadequacies. J | |||
! | |||
The NRC Maff determined that no adjustments to regional inspection plans | |||
will be required as a result of the above evaluation. j | |||
i | |||
7. Operational Safety Verification (71707) | |||
The objectives of this inspection were to ensure that this facility was | |||
being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, to , | |||
ensure that the licensee's management controls were effectively discharging j | |||
the licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation, to ensure 4 | |||
that selected activities of the licencee's radiological protection programs | |||
are implemented in conformance with plant policies and procedures and in | |||
compliance with regulatory requirements, and to inspect the licensee's | |||
compliance with the approved physical' security plan. | |||
. | |||
The NRC inspectors verified that proper control room staffing was | |||
maintained, access to the control room was properly controlled, and | |||
control. room activities were commensurate with the plant configuration and | |||
plant activities in progress. | |||
Panels containing nuclear instruments and other protection system elements | |||
, | |||
were examined to determine that required channels were operable. | |||
The NRC inspectors, reviewed the control room logs', tag-out book, standing | |||
orders, and the: equipment out-of-service log. No problems were found. | |||
. | |||
_ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ | |||
. | |||
--. _ _ | |||
... | |||
. . | |||
. .- - | |||
. | |||
9 | |||
, | |||
l | |||
Rwired leak rate calculations had been performed to quantify identified | |||
and unidentified leakage from the reactor coolant systems. Leak rates | |||
were within TS limits. | |||
1 | |||
jl | |||
Portions of the accessible plant areas were toured on a random basis such ' | |||
that, by the end of. the inspection period,'nearly all of the plant was | |||
observed at least once, with emphasis and repeated inspections in areas | |||
where there is more work and operations activity. The large number of | |||
scaffolds erected in support of fire seal work appeared to be declining as | |||
the work came nearer to completion. l | |||
l | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. j | |||
8. Followup of Previously Identified Items (92701) | |||
a. (Closed)Unresolveditem 382/8825-01: Resolution of. insulation | |||
thickness under pipe whip restraints installed on tne naactor 1 | |||
coolant, feedwater, and main steam systems in the reactor containment ! | |||
building. The NRC inspectors reviewed a detailed engineering j | |||
evaluation of Nonconforming Condition Report No. 258220, which j | |||
identified six whip restraints in the above systems which had no q | |||
insulation in the gap between the pipes and the U-Bars. .According to l | |||
the evaluation which was approved by the Plant Operations Review l | |||
Committee (PORC) on April 10, 1989 EBASCO(theArchitect-Engineer) ; | |||
performed a quantitative analysis and determir.ed that the whip | |||
' | |||
restraints will perform their intended functions without insulation. 4 | |||
The licensee's Design Engineering Group recommended installation of i | |||
the 1/4-inch Min-k insulation to reduce heat losses to the containment i | |||
building. This item is closed. | |||
b. -(Closed)UnresolvedItem 382/8717-01: Resolution of whether or not i | |||
the'PORC should have reviewed Mechanical Maintenance Procedure MM-6-004, ! | |||
Revision 3. " Shaft Coupling Alignment and Belt Tensioning,".as | |||
required by TS 6.5.1.6.a. On February 17, 1988, the licensee issued | |||
a comple.e rewrite of MM-6-004 (Revision 4). The procedure was- | |||
reviewed by the PORC. On May S,1989, the licensee revised the | |||
administrative procedures which controlled the PORC and procedure | |||
review requirements. They adequately identified the types of | |||
procedures which must be reviewed by the PORC and appeared to properly | |||
implement the PORC review requirements of the TS. Failure of the | |||
PORC to review MM-6-004 was in violation of NRC regulations. NRC | |||
Inspection Report 50-382/89-07, dated April 17, 1989, addressed , | |||
concerns over PORC failures to meet quorum requirements and to ! | |||
! | |||
conduct reviews required by the TS (Violation 382/8907-01). The NRC | |||
1 | |||
staff will follow up on the licensee's response to determine the j | |||
adequacy of corrective actions taken. No additional violation will be | |||
issued. This item is closed, | |||
l' No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
l | |||
l | |||
- _ | |||
- _ | |||
.- . _ - - _ _ -- - _ _ - _ _ . ._ _ | |||
, . | |||
. | |||
, | |||
.. . .., , , | |||
' | |||
10 | |||
1 | |||
l l' ' 9. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712) , | |||
' | |||
) | |||
'l | |||
' The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The NRC inspectors verifie'd ! | |||
that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, J | |||
corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been' . l | |||
considered, and the LER forms were complete. The NRC inspectors confirmed , | |||
that unreviewed safety questions and violations of TS, license conditions, :) | |||
or other regulatory requirements had been adequately described, j | |||
i | |||
a. (Closed)LER 382/88-033,-" Reactor Trip Resulting from Inadequate i | |||
Administration Control of. Work Around-Sensitive Equipment" J | |||
b., (Closed) LER 382h88-034, .'" Qualified Safety Parameter Display System | |||
. Seismic Supports-Missing Since Initial Construction" | |||
' | |||
I | |||
~ No violations:or deviations were identified. | |||
' | |||
10. Exit Interview' | |||
'' | |||
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 5,1989, with . | |||
. those persons indicated in ' paragraph 1 above. The' licensee acknowledged | |||
the NRC inspectors' findings. The licensee did not identify as; j | |||
proprietary any of the material provided to, or reviewed by,' the NRC .I | |||
inspectors during this ' inspection. j | |||
! | |||
l | |||
j | |||
. | |||
, | |||
] | |||
i | |||
4 | |||
i | |||
) | |||
! | |||
- | |||
.. - | |||
}} |
Latest revision as of 04:09, 17 February 2021
ML20244C695 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Waterford |
Issue date: | 06/08/1989 |
From: | Chamberlain D, Will Smith, Staker T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20244C677 | List: |
References | |
50-382-89-12, NUDOCS 8906150099 | |
Download: ML20244C695 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000382/1989012
Text
. . _ . . . . . . _ _ _ - . _
.
. .'
APPENDIX B
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report: 50-382/89-12 Operating License: NPF-38
Docket: 50-382
Licensee: Louisiana Power & Light Company (LP&L)
317 Baronne Street
New Orleans, Louisiana 70160
Facility Name: Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3' (Waterford-3)
Inspection At: Taft, Louisiana
Inspection Conducted: April 16 through May 31, 1989
Inspectors:
7. F. Smith, Senior Resident Inspector l
[-6'df
Date
/ y,
T. R. Staker, Resident Irispector
i
(/
bY$
Date
Approved: d ) bh
D. D. Ottamberlain, Chief, Project Section A Date
Division of Reactor Projects
8906150099 890609
PDR ADOCK 05000382
O PDC
_ _ - _ _ _ _ -_ _ _-_ __
e <
I
.
.
!
<
2
l
Inspection Summary
Inspection Conducted April 16 through May 31, 1989 (Report 50-382/89-12)
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of plant status, monthly
maintenance observation, monthly surveillance observation, onsite followup of ;
events, evaluation of licensee quality assurance program implementation, ;
operational safety verification, followup of previously identified items, and
licensee event report (LER) followup.
Results: Two violations were identified. The first violation (paragraph 3.d) ;
involved failure to provide adequate maintenance instructions for the
replacement of a torque switch in Limitorque Motor Operated Valve (MOV) MS-416. ,
As a result, the torque switch termination washer stackup was incorrectly ;
performed. Additionally, because of confusing directives between the I
maintenance procedure and the drawing detailing Okonite splices, the power <
leads were improperly spliced. Conflicts and confusion between these two
di vments have been the subject of considerat,'e discussion between the Region IV
HRC staff and the licensee, yet problems continue to emerge. Revisions made to
both documents appear to have created, as well as solved, some of these
problems. See NRC Inspection Reports 50-382/87-31, -88-21, and -88-25 and
LER 88-027.
The second violation (paragraph 4.d) involved failure of operations personnel
to comply with radiological warning signs. One operator reached into a
radiologically restricted area without proper clearance from Health Physics.
Others violated a radiation work permit requirement to wear a full set of
protective clothing while climbing into contaminated areas. The MC inspectors ;
'
expressed concern that more stringent controls may be necessary to prevent
similar problems from recurring.
l
l
L________________._____
_ _ _______ _ _ __ -
.
.
.
l . .
3
DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees c
- R. P. Barkhurst, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- J. R. McGaha, Plant Manager, Nuclear
P. V. Prasankumar, Assistant Plant Manager, Technical Support
- D. F. Packer, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations and Maintenance
J. J. Zabritski, Quality Assurance Manager
- D. E. Baker, Manager of Nuclear Operations Support and Assessments
- R. G. Azzarello, Manager of Nuclear Operations Engineering
W. T. Labonte, Radiation Protection Superintendent
- G. M. Davis, Manager of Events Analysis Reporting & Responses
L. W. Laughlin, Onsite Licensing Coordinator
T. R. Leonard, Maintenance Superintendent
A. F. Burski, Manager of Nuclear Safety and Regulatory Affairs
R. S. Starkey, Operations Superintendent
- T. J. Gaudet, Onsite Licensing Coordinator
- Present at exit interview.
In addition to the above personnel, the NRC inspectors held discussions
with various operations, engineering, t - 'inical support, maintenance, and
administrative members of the licenses staff.
2. Plant Status (71707)
The plant was operated at full power for the duration of this inspection
period, except on April 21, 1989, when power was reduced to approximately
95 percent for routine isothermal temperature coefficient testing, and on
May 5,1989, when power was again reduced to approximately 95 percent for
routine turbine valve and control element assembly testing.
3. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
The station maintenance activities affecting safety-related systems and
components listed below were observed and documentation reviewed to
ascertain that the activities were conducted in accordance with approved
procedures, Technical Specifications (TS), and appropriate industry codes
or standards.
a. Work Authorization 01033676. The licensee performed an investigation
to determine the cause of failure of component cooling water dry
cooling tower fan motor high speed terminations. They determined
that the failure occurred after the terminal lugs corroded because of
moisture intrusion into the installed Okonite taped splices. The
moisture intrusion was attributed to capillary action drawing
moisture into the splices through the woven cable jacket material
left installed next to the splices. The licensee's instructions for
.
.
. e
4
l
installing these cable splices, found on Drawing LOLI-1564-B-288, were
deficient because no requirement for removing the woven material from
the cable when installing splices was included. The licensee
indicated plans to reolace future taped splices with Raychem Class IE
motor termination splie kits, which they think will provide better ;
seals. Because of the lead time to obtain the Raychem kits, it will
be some time before they become available. The licensee measured the i
temperature of all high speed motor leads for Dry Cooling Towers A
and B and found two motors in each division with questionable splices
due to a higher relative temperi.ture. The licensee then replaced
these splices and inspected the lugs. The NRC inspectors will follow i
up on licensee actions to assure the reliability of these splices
through periodic maintenance (Inspector Followup Item 382/8912-01).
i b. Work Authorization 01035812. The NRL inspector. observed the drilling
l of a 13/16-inch hole in the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI)
1 Pump B recirculation line flow restricting orifice. The hole was
drilled to obtain access to resolve an indication by radiography
during the licensee's investigation of a low recirculation flow
condition during pump testing. The licensee found and retrieved a
1/4-inch set screw from the flow orifice and later determined that
the screw was the same as several screws used on the pump internals.
Thelicenseeconsultedwiththepumpvendor(Ingersol-Rand)and '
proceeded to disassemble the pump to inspect for missing set screws.
c. Work Authorization 01006018. High Pressure Safety Injection Pump B
was disassembled to investigate the source of a set screw found in
the pump recirculation line flow restricting orifice. The pump
rotating assembly was removed and disassembled. The licensee found
that two set screws were missing from the fourth stage impeller rings
which were severely damaged. In addition, wear and/or fretting was
found on eight of the nine stages. The NRC inspectors are following
the licensee's activities related to HPSI Pump B as part of the
response to issues raised in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/89-09.
During pump reassembly, the NRC inspector observed the pump shaft
. concentricity checks and noted that substantial adjustment was
required to bring the inboard end within the required tolerance. The
NRC inspectors are monitoring the licensee's investigation into the
cause of the pump damage. As of the end of this inspection period,
the results of that investigation were not yet available.
d. Work Authorization 01037167. The NRC inspectors observed repairs on
the Emergency Feedwater Pump A/B failed Steam Supply 1 solation
Yalve MS-416. The licensee determined that the cause of the valve
failure was that the torque switch swing arm pin had failed. The NRC
inspectors observed the torque switch replacement. During
installation, the NRC inspectors noted that the washers at the torque
switch wiring connections were not stacked in accordance with the
vendor's Manual No. 457000468, "Limitorque Maintenance Operation
Instruction." This was identified to the licensee by the NRC
inspectors and corrected prior to returning the valve to service. In
l
l
l
1
'
.
.
'
. ,
5
i
addition, the NRC inspectors identified that the power supply i
terminations were not spliced in accordance with Drawing LOU-1564-B-288,
as required. ' This problem appeared to occur. because of inappropriate
labeling on the drawing. Problems with Okonite cable splice ,
instructions have been previously identified by both the NRC inspectors
and licensee personnel since January 1988. As a result of this ;
additional' example, the NRC inspectors concluded that corrective ;
actions .to date have been ineffective in preventing future viciations ;
in this area. j
l In January 1988, the NRC inspectors identified in Violation 382/8731-03
that Okonite splices were not constructed in accordance with the ;
drawing. _ In September 1988, the NRC inspectors identified another ]
problem with Okonite splice instructions in NRC Inspection
Report 50-382/88-21. In October 1988, the issue was raised again in
NRC Inspection Report 50-382/88-25.- The licensee's performance in
the correction of this problem has been poor. In LER 88-027, dated
November 30, 1988, the licensee stated that the B-288 drawings have ,
been revised and that the instruction, Procedure ME-4-809, " Low i
Voltage Power and Control Cable / Conduction Termination and Splices," l
now references the B-288 drawings to ensure consistency in splice '
construction. However, it is apparent from the recent example that
the licensee has not successfully removed all of the conflicts with ;
the Okonite cable splice instructions.
'
Failure to properly stack the washers on the torque switch electrical i
connections and failure to properly splice the power connections both ]
appeared to be the result of inadequate work instructions and, as
such, are in violation of NRC regulations (Violation 382/8912-02).
4. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The NRC inspectors observed the surveillance testing of safety-related
l systems and components listed below to verify that the activities were .
l being performed in accordance with the TS. The applicable procedures were ,
reviewed for adequacy, test instrumentation was verified to be in
calibration, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and completeness.
The NRC inspectors ascertained that any deficiencies identified were
properly reviewed and resolved.
<
a. Special Test 01037539, " Main Steam Isolation Valve 10% Exercise
Stroke Test MSIV #1." On May 18, 1989, the NRC inspector observed
the stroke test of Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) No. 1. The
valve testing was performed with a revised procedure to require
checks of valve positions prior to manipulations to prevent excessive
MSIV valve closure and a potential plant trip. The previous test
method relied on automatic sequences of valves, and a sticking
solenoid valve resulted in a plant trip in 1987 (LER 87-011). The
test was conducted without any problems,
i
'
a
. ,
'
. . ~l
. .
}
!
'
6. .
)
b. Work ' Authorization 01037873. On May 22, 1989, the NRC inspector. j
1ob served th e performance of stroke time testing of Containment Cooler ;
Isolation Valves CC-807A and CC-8228. The NRC inspector noted.that
~
<
'the stroke times met the acceptance criteria and no problems were :)
identified.
~
,
,
'
c. Procedure OP-903-032, Revision 6', "Surveillan'ce Procedure Quarterly
ISI Valve Test." The NRC inspector observed the inservice testing of ;
Emergency Feedwater Flow Control Valves EFW-223B and EFW-224B. The. ;
NRC inspector noted that the.results were acceptable.- 1
i
d. Procedures OP-903-011, devision 5, "High Pressure Safety. Injection-
Pump Preservice Operability Check,'l and OP-903-030, Revision 6
" Safety Injection Pump Operability Verification." The'NRC inspectors
observed the operability checks and establishment of new inservice
testing reference values for HPSI Pump B following major repairs. i
The evaluation was conducted without incident; however, there were j
two deficiencies identified by the NRC inspectors which were 1
discussed with licensee management.
~
-l
Prior to testing the pump, the NRC inspector observed an auxiliary
operator entering an area posted as "High Radiation Area," "High
Contamination Areas," " Radiologically Restricted Area," and "Do Not
Enter Without Health Physics Permission." This entry was made
without obtaining Health Physics permission. This was not in. 1
accordance with Procedure HP-1-110,' Revision 8. " Radiation Work !
Permits," which requires adherence.to posted radiological-signs and I
the applicable radiation work permit (RWP). The NRC inspector also '
noted that the applicable radiation work permit, RWP 89000002, !
required Health Physics permission prior to entering high radiation i
areas or radiologically restricted areas. In' addition, several
operations personnel were observed climbing in areas posted as
contaminated without donning full protective clothing as required by
RWP 89000002. Failure to follow radiological work procedures is a
violationofNRCregulations(Violation 382/8912-03). I
5. Onsite Followup of Events (93702)
a. Fire Dampers Declared Inoperable .
On April 25, 1989, the licensee declared 75 fire dampers inoperable
because they were not installed in accordance with the manufacturer's
requirements and fire test configurations. .They were installed in
accordance with the Architect-Engineer's (Ebasco) drawings, which l
were in error. This condition has existed'since construction.
The licensee had been performing a 100 percent inspection of fire
seals (see paragraph 5.b below). During the inspection, the licensee
noted differences between penetration seals involving fire dampers. '
1
I
'
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -
q
~
-
"
.
.- .
-
.. .
7
l
While resolving .the differences, the' licensee'noted that' fire dampers
were not provided with adequate annular clearance to allow-for l
. thermal expansion should the. damper be exposed to the' heat of 'a fire. {
In addition silicone foam penetration seals installed adjacent.to 1
the dampers aggravated the condition because of thermal expansion of- ]
the silicone foam which, according to the licensee,1s approximately; j
-1 percent volume increase per 18'F. 1
!
"
Preliminary calculations by the licensee'.s design engineering. group-
indicated that if' automatic' sprinkler protection existed on both
sides of the damper. thermal. expansion would be lessened to where'the'
l- operability of the damper would not be hampered. Waterford 3 has 154
fire-dampers, many.of which protect safety-related equipment. -Of the ,
- . 121 dampers questioned,' 75 have been declared inoperable. They
l required further evaluation and/or rework. Fire watches required by
.the licensee's Fire Protection Program had already.been established
in support of thel fire seal-inspection. Forty-six did not appear to !
have a problem because their annular space conformed to the damper- l
manufacturer's requirements and/or they had automatic sprinkler
protection on both' sides; however, the licensee has indicated an-
intent to inspect the 46 dampers to ensure they were properly
installed. As of the end of this inspection period, the licensee had ]
not . completed the evaluations ~nor was a decision made as to how to ;
report the issue to the NRC. 'The NRC inspectors' will followup on 1
licensee actions under Inspector Followup Item 382/8912-04.
'b. Fire SealTInspection and Repair Program )
1
The licensee's efforts to identify and correct all fire seal ')
deficiencies at Waterford 3 have been documented in NRC Inspection !
Reports 50-382/88-28, -88-31, -89-03, -89-06, and -89-08. In 1
addition, the licensee identified the problem in LER 382/88-030, 'l
dated December 12, 1988. As of the end of this inspection period, of
the 2014 seals inspected, 634 required restoration. Of the 634 i
seals' 446 have been restored to the proper configuration, thus there
,
were approximately 188 fire impairments in effect as of the end of '
this inspection period. j
l
In LER 382/88-030, the licensee indicated plans to submit a final
report by May 30, 1989. In view of the unexpsted additional
<
discrepancies found, targeted completion dates havt slipped and, ,
therefore, the licensee informed the NRC inspectors that a brief
status report will be published as a revision'to the LER on May 30,
1989, with a final report by July-1!,1989.
No violations or deviations were identifiec,
, ,
.
-
e - - - - _ _ _-
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ..
,
.
. .
" -
.. ..
!h
8
1
6. Evaluation af Licensee Quality Assurance Program Implementation (35502)
On May 23, 1989, regional management performed an evaluation of.the
effectiveness of the licensee's quality assurance (QA) program
implementation by conducting an in-office evaluation of the following:
a. NRC inspection reports for the past 12 months,
b. Systematic assessment of licensee performance (SALP) reports for the I
past 2 years. I
c. Region IV outstanding open items list.
1
d. Licensee corrective actions for NRC inspection findings. 1
e. Licensee event reports for the past 12 months.
1
On the basis of the evaluation, the NRC steff found no negative
performance trends in any of t;m seven SALP functional areas. Plant
Operations and Radiological Controls appeared to indicate-an improving
trend due, in part, to licensee actions to improve procedural compliance.
The Maintenance / Surveillance functional area showed little improvement due l
to continuing ' incidents of procedural noncompliance and procedure ;
inadequacies. J
!
The NRC Maff determined that no adjustments to regional inspection plans
will be required as a result of the above evaluation. j
i
7. Operational Safety Verification (71707)
The objectives of this inspection were to ensure that this facility was
being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements, to ,
ensure that the licensee's management controls were effectively discharging j
the licensee's responsibilities for continued safe operation, to ensure 4
that selected activities of the licencee's radiological protection programs
are implemented in conformance with plant policies and procedures and in
compliance with regulatory requirements, and to inspect the licensee's
compliance with the approved physical' security plan.
.
The NRC inspectors verified that proper control room staffing was
maintained, access to the control room was properly controlled, and
control. room activities were commensurate with the plant configuration and
plant activities in progress.
Panels containing nuclear instruments and other protection system elements
,
were examined to determine that required channels were operable.
The NRC inspectors, reviewed the control room logs', tag-out book, standing
orders, and the: equipment out-of-service log. No problems were found.
.
_ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _
.
--. _ _
...
. .
. .- -
.
9
,
l
Rwired leak rate calculations had been performed to quantify identified
and unidentified leakage from the reactor coolant systems. Leak rates
were within TS limits.
1
jl
Portions of the accessible plant areas were toured on a random basis such '
that, by the end of. the inspection period,'nearly all of the plant was
observed at least once, with emphasis and repeated inspections in areas
where there is more work and operations activity. The large number of
scaffolds erected in support of fire seal work appeared to be declining as
the work came nearer to completion. l
l
No violations or deviations were identified. j
8. Followup of Previously Identified Items (92701)
a. (Closed)Unresolveditem 382/8825-01: Resolution of. insulation
thickness under pipe whip restraints installed on tne naactor 1
coolant, feedwater, and main steam systems in the reactor containment !
building. The NRC inspectors reviewed a detailed engineering j
evaluation of Nonconforming Condition Report No. 258220, which j
identified six whip restraints in the above systems which had no q
insulation in the gap between the pipes and the U-Bars. .According to l
the evaluation which was approved by the Plant Operations Review l
Committee (PORC) on April 10, 1989 EBASCO(theArchitect-Engineer) ;
performed a quantitative analysis and determir.ed that the whip
'
restraints will perform their intended functions without insulation. 4
The licensee's Design Engineering Group recommended installation of i
the 1/4-inch Min-k insulation to reduce heat losses to the containment i
building. This item is closed.
b. -(Closed)UnresolvedItem 382/8717-01: Resolution of whether or not i
the'PORC should have reviewed Mechanical Maintenance Procedure MM-6-004, !
Revision 3. " Shaft Coupling Alignment and Belt Tensioning,".as
required by TS 6.5.1.6.a. On February 17, 1988, the licensee issued
a comple.e rewrite of MM-6-004 (Revision 4). The procedure was-
reviewed by the PORC. On May S,1989, the licensee revised the
administrative procedures which controlled the PORC and procedure
review requirements. They adequately identified the types of
procedures which must be reviewed by the PORC and appeared to properly
implement the PORC review requirements of the TS. Failure of the
PORC to review MM-6-004 was in violation of NRC regulations. NRC
Inspection Report 50-382/89-07, dated April 17, 1989, addressed ,
concerns over PORC failures to meet quorum requirements and to !
!
conduct reviews required by the TS (Violation 382/8907-01). The NRC
1
staff will follow up on the licensee's response to determine the j
adequacy of corrective actions taken. No additional violation will be
issued. This item is closed,
l' No violations or deviations were identified.
l
l
- _
- _
.- . _ - - _ _ -- - _ _ - _ _ . ._ _
, .
.
,
.. . .., , ,
'
10
1
l l' ' 9. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712) ,
'
)
'l
' The following LERs were reviewed and closed. The NRC inspectors verifie'd !
that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, J
corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been' . l
considered, and the LER forms were complete. The NRC inspectors confirmed ,
that unreviewed safety questions and violations of TS, license conditions, :)
or other regulatory requirements had been adequately described, j
i
a. (Closed)LER 382/88-033,-" Reactor Trip Resulting from Inadequate i
Administration Control of. Work Around-Sensitive Equipment" J
b., (Closed) LER 382h88-034, .'" Qualified Safety Parameter Display System
. Seismic Supports-Missing Since Initial Construction"
'
I
~ No violations:or deviations were identified.
'
10. Exit Interview'
The inspection scope and findings were summarized on June 5,1989, with .
. those persons indicated in ' paragraph 1 above. The' licensee acknowledged
the NRC inspectors' findings. The licensee did not identify as; j
proprietary any of the material provided to, or reviewed by,' the NRC .I
inspectors during this ' inspection. j
!
l
j
.
,
]
i
4
i
)
!
-
.. -