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{{#Wiki_filter:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NO. 17 Replace pages 3/4 4-5, 3/4 4-33, 3/4 5-1, 3/4 5-6 and 6-17 with the attached revised pages 3/4 4-5, 3/4 4-Sa, 3/4 4-33, 3/4 5-1, 3/4 5-6 and 6-17.Proposed Changes See the attached revised pages.
{{#Wiki_filter:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NO. 17 Replace pages 3/4 4-5, 3/4 4-33, 3/4 5-1, 3/4 5-6 and 6-17 with the attached revised pages 3/4 4-5, 3/4 4-Sa, 3/4 4-33, 3/4 5-1, 3/4 5-6 and 6-17.
Page 3/4 4-33 was previously subr.itted on July 13, 1979, as part of Technical Specification Change Request No. 47.Reason for Proposed Change The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in their letter of November 11, 1977, requested Florida Power Corporation to submit additional information concerning the low temperature overpressure protection mitigating system (OMS) for Crystal River - Unit 3.
Proposed Changes See the attached revised pages. Page 3/4 4-33 was previously subr.itted on July 13, 1979, as part of Technical Specification Change Request No. 47.
As part of the response to that request, FPC proposed technical specification changes on January 23, 1978.
Reason for Proposed Change The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in their letter of November 11, 1977, requested Florida Power Corporation to submit additional information concerning the low temperature overpressure protection mitigating system (OMS) for Crystal River - Unit 3. As part of the response to that request, FPC proposed technical specification changes on January 23, 1978.
On June 20, 1979, the NRC contacted FPC and stated that the proposed Technical Specification Changes were inadequate and on June 25, 1979, FPC received a telecopy from the NRC which included certain items that the NRC would find acceptable in OMS technical specifications.
On June 20, 1979, the NRC contacted FPC and stated that the proposed Technical Specification Changes were inadequate and on June 25, 1979, FPC received a telecopy from the NRC which included certain items that the NRC would find acceptable in OMS technical specifications.
The enclosed proposed Technical Specification Change Request incorporates those items of the NRC telecopy that are applicable to the Crystal River - Unit 3 overpressure mitigating system.
The enclosed proposed Technical Specification Change Request incorporates those items of the NRC telecopy that are applicable to the Crystal River - Unit 3 overpressure mitigating system.
Safety Analysis of Proposed Change The overpressure mitigating system at Crystal River - Unit 3 for postulated low temperature overpressure events during shutdown conditions consists of (1) a steam bubble and/or nitrogen blanket in the pressurizer which provides the control room operator sufficient time to terminate an event, and (2) the pressurizer electromatic relief valve which limits the reactor coolant pressure to within Appendix G limits.The two subsystems are separate and independent and together they provide single failure protection against overpressurization.
Safety Analysis of Proposed Change The overpressure mitigating system at Crystal River - Unit 3 for postulated low temperature overpressure events during shutdown conditions consists of (1) a steam bubble and/or nitrogen blanket in the pressurizer which provides the control room operator sufficient time to terminate an event, and (2) the pressurizer electromatic relief valve which limits the reactor coolant pressure to within Appendix G limits. The two subsystems are separate and independent and together they provide single failure protection against overpressurization.
This Change Request incorporates those requirements needed to insure the operability of the overpressure mitigating system into the Crystal River - Unit 3 technical specifications.
This Change Request incorporates those requirements needed to insure the operability of the overpressure mitigating system into the Crystal River - Unit 3 technical specifications.
This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question nor does it revise any of the assumptions used in the Safety Analyses.
This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question nor does it revise any of the assumptions used in the Safety Analyses. It does bring the technical specifications in line with the installed equipment at Crystal River - Unit 3.
It does bring the technical specifications in line with the installed equipment at Crystal River - Unit 3.
OMSTechSpecD79 4}7     ]gg 79080 70   3 d[ ' g
OMSTechSpecD79 4}7]gg 70 3 d[ ' g 79080/~  
                                                                          /~
, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4.1 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:
 
a.A steam bubble, b.A water level between 40 and 290 inches.
,
APPLICABILITY:
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4.1   The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:
MODES 1 and 2 ACTION: With the pressurizer inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the control rod drive trip breakers open within 6 hours.
: a. A steam bubble,
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.4.1.The pressurizer shal1 be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying pressurizer level to be within limits at least once per 12 hours.
: b. A water level between 40 and 290 inches.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 4-5 427 18c)  
APPLICABILITY:   MODES 1 and 2 ACTION:
.REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPEP UION
With the pressurizer inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the control rod drive trip breakers open within 6 hours.
_3.4.4.2 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.4.1. The pressurizer shal1 be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying pressurizer level to be within limits at least once per 12 hours.
a.A steam bubble and/or a nitrogen blanket b.A water level <220 inches.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3               3/4 4-5 427     18c)
c.The he.ater banks deenergized when not required.
 
APPLICABI.
.
'Y : MODES 4*, 5* and 6*ACTIUti: With the pressurizer inoperable restore the cressurizer to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or vent the Reactor Coolant Sptem within 12 hours.
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPEP UION
SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.4.?.The pressurizer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by:
_
a.Verifying the pressurizer level to be within its limit, and b.Verifying the heater banks are deenergized if not equi red .
3.4.4.2   The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:
*With the Reactor Coolant System not vented.
: a. A steam bubble and/or a nitrogen blanket
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 4-Sa 4y jg;
: b. A water level <220 inches.
, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.11 The pressurizer electromatic relief valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 1550 psig.
: c. The he.ater banks deenergized when not required.
JPPLICABILITY:
APPLICABI. 'Y : MODES 4*, 5* and 6*
MODES 4*, 5* and 6*ACTION: a.Win the pressurizer electromatic relief valve not OPERABLE, restore the vi e to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or vent the Reactor Coolant System within 12 hours.
ACTIUti:
b.In the event the pressurizer electromatic relief valve is actuated and relieves Reactor Coolant System pressure, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation.
With the pressurizer inoperable restore the cressurizer to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or vent the Reactor Coolant Sptem within 12 hours.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.11 The pressurizer electromatic relief valve shall be demor. . crated OPERABLE: a.At least once per 7 days by verifying that the pressurizer electromatic relief isolation valve is open, and b.At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying the lift setting c.Prior to enabling the valve during startup and shutdown, by verifying its setpoint.
SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.4.?. The pressurizer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours by:
*With the Reactor Coolant System not vented.
: a. Verifying the pressurizer level to be within its limit, and
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 4-33 f9/
: b. Verifying the heater banks are deenergized if not equi red .
    *With the Reactor Coolant System not vented.
  ; CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3               3/4 4-Sa   4y       jg
 
,
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.11 The pressurizer electromatic relief valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 1550 psig.
JPPLICABILITY:     MODES 4*, 5* and 6*
ACTION:
: a. Win the pressurizer electromatic relief valve not OPERABLE, restore the vi e to OPERABLE status within 1 hour or vent the Reactor Coolant System within 12 hours.
: b. In the event the pressurizer electromatic relief valve is actuated and relieves Reactor Coolant System pressure, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.11 The pressurizer electromatic relief valve shall be demor. . crated OPERABLE:
: a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the pressurizer electromatic relief isolation valve is open, and
: b. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying the lift setting
: c. Prior to enabling the valve during startup and shutdown, by verifying its setpoint.
  *With the Reactor Coolant System not vented.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3             3/4 4-33               f9/
 
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)
CORE FLOODING TANKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
CORE FLOODING TANKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
__3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system core flooding tank shall be OPERABLE with: The isolation valve openl ,/a.b.A contained barated water volume between 7555 and 8005 gallons of borated water, c.Between 2270 and 3500 ppm of boron, and d.A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 575 and 625 psig.
__
APPLICABILITY:
3.5.1     Each reactor coolant system core flooding tank shall be OPERABLE with:
MODES 1, 2 and 3*
: a. The isolation valve openl/ ,
ACTION: a.With one core flooding tank inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in ;iOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours, b.With any core flooding tank inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in HOT STANDBY within one hour and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.SURVEILLAfiE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each core flooding tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: b. A contained barated water volume between 7555 and 8005 gallons of borated water,
a.At least once per 12 hours by:
: c. Between 2270 and 3500 ppm of boron, and
1.Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and 2.Verifying that each tank isolation valve is ope..
: d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 575 and 625 psig.
APPLICABILITY:     MODES 1, 2 and 3*
ACTION:
: a. With one core flooding tank inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in ;iOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours,
: b. With any core flooding tank inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in HOT STANDBY within one hour and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
SURVEILLAfiE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1     Each core flooding tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
: a. At least once per 12 hours by:
: 1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and
: 2. Verifying that each tank isolation valve is ope..
*With Reactor Coolant pressure >750 psig.
*With Reactor Coolant pressure >750 psig.
I/ Each core flooding tank isolation valve may have its power supply breakert " racked out" in Modes 4, 5, and 6.
I / Each core flooding tank isolation valve may have its power supply breakert " racked out" in Modes 4, 5, and 6.
427/ p. g CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 5-1<  
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3             3/4 5-1   427    / p. <g
.EMERGENCY CORE CCOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T3yg_<280 F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
 
__3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS r rtial subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:
.
a.One OPERABLE high pressure injection (HPI) pump, b.One OPERABLE low pressure injection (LPI) pump, c.One OPE 2ABLE decay heat cooler, and l An OPERABLE flow path / capab"e tf taking suction from the borated d.water storage tank (B7ST) and transferring suction to the containment emergency sump.
EMERGENCY CORE CCOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T3yg_<280 F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
APPLICABILITY:
__
MODE 4.ACTION: a.With no ECCS partial subsystem OPERA 8LE because of the inoperability of either the HP: purb or the flow path from the borated water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS suosystem to OPERABLE status within one nour or de in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours.
3.5.3     As a minimum, one ECCS r rtial subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:
b.With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the decay heat cooler oP LPI pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System T avg less than 280 F by use of alternate heat removal methods c.In the event the CCCS is actuated and injects water into the reactor coolant system, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total actuation cycles to date.
: a. One OPERABLE high pressure injection (HPI) pump,
: b. One OPERABLE low pressure injection (LPI) pump,
: c. One OPE 2ABLE decay heat cooler, and
: d. An OPERABLE flow path l / capab"e tf taking suction from the borated water storage tank (B7ST) and transferring suction to the containment emergency sump.
APPLICABILITY:       MODE 4.
ACTION:
: a. With no ECCS partial subsystem OPERA 8LE because of the inoperability of either the HP: purb or the flow path from the borated water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS suosystem to OPERABLE status within one nour or de in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours.
: b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the decay heat cooler oP LPI pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System T avg less than 280 F by use of alternate heat removal methods
: c. In the event the CCCS is actuated and injects water into the reactor coolant system, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total actuation cycles to date.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 The ECCS par ial subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 The ECCS par ial subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.
1/ The high pressure injection isolation valves may have their power supply breakers " racked out" in Modes 4, 5, and 6 when the Reactor Coolant System is not vented.
1
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 5-6 427 193  
      / The high pressure injection isolation valves may have their power supply breakers " racked out" in Modes 4, 5, and 6 when the Reactor Coolant System is not vented.
-,.ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS occurrence of the event.
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3                 3/4 5-6 427 193
The written report shall include, as a minimum, a completed copy of a licensee event report form.
 
Information provided on the licensee event report form shall be supplemented, as needed, by additional narrative material to provide complete explanation of the circumstances sur-rounding the event.
  -
c.Reactor protection system or engineered safety feature instrument settings which are found to be less conservative than those estab-lished by the technical specifications but which do not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of affected systems.b.Conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.
,.
c.Observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls which threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection systems or engineered safety feature systems, d.Abnormal degradation of systems other than those specified in 6.9.1.8.c above, designed to contain radioactive material result-ing from the fission process.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS occurrence of the event. The written report shall include, as a minimum, a completed copy of a licensee event report form.       Information provided on the licensee event report form shall be supplemented, as needed, by additional narrative material to provide complete explanation of the circumstances sur-rounding the event.
SPECIAL REPORTS 6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II, within the time period specified for each report.
: c. Reactor protection system or engineered safety feature instrument settings which are found to be less conservative than those estab-lished by the technical specifications but which do not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of affected systems.
These reports shall be submitted covering the activities identified below pursuant to the requirements of the applicable reference specification:
: b. Conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.
a.ECCS Actuation, Speci fication 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.
: c. Observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls which threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection systems or engineered safety feature systems,
b.Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation, Specification 3.3.3.
: d. Abnormal degradation of systems other than those specified in 6.9.1.8.c above, designed to contain radioactive material result-ing from the fission process.
c.Inoperable Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation, Specifica-tion 3.3.3.4.
SPECIAL REPORTS 6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II, within the time period specified for each report. These reports shall be submitted covering the activities identified below pursuant to the requirements of the applicable reference specification:
d.Seie~ic event analysis, Specification 4.3.3.3.2.
: a. ECCS Actuation, Speci fication 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.
e.Inoperable Fire Detection Monitoring Instrumentation, Specifica-tion 3.3.3.7.
: b. Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation, Specification 3.3.3.
f.Inoperable Fire Suppression System, Specifications 3.7.11.1, 3.7.11.2, and 3.7.11.3.
: c. Inoperable Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation, Specifica-tion 3.3.3.4.
g.a 1on of Pressurizer Electrom c Relief Valve, Specification 7 CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 6-17[N4}}
: d. Seie~ic event analysis, Specification 4.3.3.3.2.
: e. Inoperable Fire Detection Monitoring Instrumentation, Specifica-tion 3.3.3.7.
: f. Inoperable Fire Suppression System, Specifications 3.7.11.1, 3.7.11.2, and 3.7.11.3.
: g.       a 1on of Pressurizer Electrom     c Relief Valve, Specification 7
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3                   6-17           [N4}}

Revision as of 23:23, 7 October 2019

Tech Specs Change Request 17 to Amend App a of License DPR-72 Re Low Temp Overpressure Protection Mitigating Sys
ML19225D131
Person / Time
Site: Crystal River Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/02/1979
From:
FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML19225D129 List:
References
NUDOCS 7908070386
Download: ML19225D131 (7)


Text

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST NO. 17 Replace pages 3/4 4-5, 3/4 4-33, 3/4 5-1, 3/4 5-6 and 6-17 with the attached revised pages 3/4 4-5, 3/4 4-Sa, 3/4 4-33, 3/4 5-1, 3/4 5-6 and 6-17.

Proposed Changes See the attached revised pages. Page 3/4 4-33 was previously subr.itted on July 13, 1979, as part of Technical Specification Change Request No. 47.

Reason for Proposed Change The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in their letter of November 11, 1977, requested Florida Power Corporation to submit additional information concerning the low temperature overpressure protection mitigating system (OMS) for Crystal River - Unit 3. As part of the response to that request, FPC proposed technical specification changes on January 23, 1978.

On June 20, 1979, the NRC contacted FPC and stated that the proposed Technical Specification Changes were inadequate and on June 25, 1979, FPC received a telecopy from the NRC which included certain items that the NRC would find acceptable in OMS technical specifications.

The enclosed proposed Technical Specification Change Request incorporates those items of the NRC telecopy that are applicable to the Crystal River - Unit 3 overpressure mitigating system.

Safety Analysis of Proposed Change The overpressure mitigating system at Crystal River - Unit 3 for postulated low temperature overpressure events during shutdown conditions consists of (1) a steam bubble and/or nitrogen blanket in the pressurizer which provides the control room operator sufficient time to terminate an event, and (2) the pressurizer electromatic relief valve which limits the reactor coolant pressure to within Appendix G limits. The two subsystems are separate and independent and together they provide single failure protection against overpressurization.

This Change Request incorporates those requirements needed to insure the operability of the overpressure mitigating system into the Crystal River - Unit 3 technical specifications.

This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question nor does it revise any of the assumptions used in the Safety Analyses. It does bring the technical specifications in line with the installed equipment at Crystal River - Unit 3.

OMSTechSpecD79 4}7 ]gg 79080 70 3 d[ ' g

/~

,

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM 3/4.4.4 PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.4.1 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A steam bubble,
b. A water level between 40 and 290 inches.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2 ACTION:

With the pressurizer inoperable, be in at least HOT STANDBY with the control rod drive trip breakers open within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.4.1. The pressurizer shal1 be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying pressurizer level to be within limits at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 4-5 427 18c)

.

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURIZER LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPEP UION

_

3.4.4.2 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with:

a. A steam bubble and/or a nitrogen blanket
b. A water level <220 inches.
c. The he.ater banks deenergized when not required.

APPLICABI. 'Y : MODES 4*, 5* and 6*

ACTIUti:

With the pressurizer inoperable restore the cressurizer to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or vent the Reactor Coolant Sptem within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.4.?. The pressurizer shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

a. Verifying the pressurizer level to be within its limit, and
b. Verifying the heater banks are deenergized if not equi red .
CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 4-Sa 4y jg

,

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.11 The pressurizer electromatic relief valve shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 1550 psig.

JPPLICABILITY: MODES 4*, 5* and 6*

ACTION:

a. Win the pressurizer electromatic relief valve not OPERABLE, restore the vi e to OPERABLE status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or vent the Reactor Coolant System within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
b. In the event the pressurizer electromatic relief valve is actuated and relieves Reactor Coolant System pressure, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.4.11 The pressurizer electromatic relief valve shall be demor. . crated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the pressurizer electromatic relief isolation valve is open, and
b. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by verifying the lift setting
c. Prior to enabling the valve during startup and shutdown, by verifying its setpoint.

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 4-33 f9/

3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

CORE FLOODING TANKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

__

3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system core flooding tank shall be OPERABLE with:

a. The isolation valve openl/ ,
b. A contained barated water volume between 7555 and 8005 gallons of borated water,
c. Between 2270 and 3500 ppm of boron, and
d. A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 575 and 625 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3*

ACTION:

a. With one core flooding tank inoperable, except as a result of a closed isolation valve, restore the inoperable tank to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in ;iOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />,
b. With any core flooding tank inoperable due to the isolation valve being closed, either immediately open the isolation valve or be in HOT STANDBY within one hour and be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLAfiE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each core flooding tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:
1. Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and
2. Verifying that each tank isolation valve is ope..

I / Each core flooding tank isolation valve may have its power supply breakert " racked out" in Modes 4, 5, and 6.

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 5-1 427 / p. <g

.

EMERGENCY CORE CCOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T3yg_<280 F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

__

3.5.3 As a minimum, one ECCS r rtial subsystem comprised of the following shall be OPERABLE:

a. One OPERABLE high pressure injection (HPI) pump,
b. One OPERABLE low pressure injection (LPI) pump,
c. One OPE 2ABLE decay heat cooler, and
d. An OPERABLE flow path l / capab"e tf taking suction from the borated water storage tank (B7ST) and transferring suction to the containment emergency sump.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 4.

ACTION:

a. With no ECCS partial subsystem OPERA 8LE because of the inoperability of either the HP: purb or the flow path from the borated water storage tank, restore at least one ECCS suosystem to OPERABLE status within one nour or de in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />.
b. With no ECCS subsystem OPERABLE because of the inoperability of either the decay heat cooler oP LPI pump, restore at least one ECCS subsystem to OPERABLE status or maintain the Reactor Coolant System T avg less than 280 F by use of alternate heat removal methods
c. In the event the CCCS is actuated and injects water into the reactor coolant system, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total actuation cycles to date.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 The ECCS par ial subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE per the applicable Surveillance Requirements of 4.5.2.

1

/ The high pressure injection isolation valves may have their power supply breakers " racked out" in Modes 4, 5, and 6 when the Reactor Coolant System is not vented.

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 3/4 5-6 427 193

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ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS occurrence of the event. The written report shall include, as a minimum, a completed copy of a licensee event report form. Information provided on the licensee event report form shall be supplemented, as needed, by additional narrative material to provide complete explanation of the circumstances sur-rounding the event.

c. Reactor protection system or engineered safety feature instrument settings which are found to be less conservative than those estab-lished by the technical specifications but which do not prevent the fulfillment of the functional requirements of affected systems.
b. Conditions leading to operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation or plant shutdown required by a limiting condition for operation.
c. Observed inadequacies in the implementation of administrative or procedural controls which threaten to cause reduction of degree of redundancy provided in reactor protection systems or engineered safety feature systems,
d. Abnormal degradation of systems other than those specified in 6.9.1.8.c above, designed to contain radioactive material result-ing from the fission process.

SPECIAL REPORTS 6.9.2 Special reports shall be submitted to the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Region II, within the time period specified for each report. These reports shall be submitted covering the activities identified below pursuant to the requirements of the applicable reference specification:

a. ECCS Actuation, Speci fication 3.5.2 and 3.5.3.
b. Inoperable Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation, Specification 3.3.3.
c. Inoperable Meteorological Monitoring Instrumentation, Specifica-tion 3.3.3.4.
d. Seie~ic event analysis, Specification 4.3.3.3.2.
e. Inoperable Fire Detection Monitoring Instrumentation, Specifica-tion 3.3.3.7.
f. Inoperable Fire Suppression System, Specifications 3.7.11.1, 3.7.11.2, and 3.7.11.3.
g. a 1on of Pressurizer Electrom c Relief Valve, Specification 7

CRYSTAL RIVER - UNIT 3 6-17 [N4