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#REDIRECT [[IR 05000341/2022004]]
{{Adams
| number = ML23039A155
| issue date = 02/14/2023
| title = Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2022004
| author name = Dickson B
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2
| addressee name = Dietrich P
| addressee affiliation = DTE Electric Company
| docket = 05000341
| license number = NPF-043
| contact person =
| document report number = IR 2022004
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter
| page count = 1
}}
See also: [[see also::IR 05000341/2022004]]
 
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:February 14, 2023
Peter Dietrich
Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer
DTE Electric Company
Fermi 2 - 260 TAC
6400 North Dixie Highway
Newport, MI 48166
SUBJECT:        FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2-INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
                05000341/2022004
Dear Peter Dietrich:
On December 31, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an
inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2. On January 25, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed
the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this
inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Five findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of
these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as
non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this
inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection
report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional
Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector
at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a
regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date
of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the
Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant,
Unit 2.
 
P. Dietrich                                        2
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public
Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
                                              Sincerely,
                                                                      Signed by Dickson, Billy
                                                                      on 02/14/23
                                              Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief
                                              Reactor Projects Branch 2
                                              Division of Operating Reactor Safety
Docket No. 05000341
License No. NPF43
Enclosure:
As stated
cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV
 
 
ML23039A155
                                  Non-Sensitive                  Publicly Available
        SUNSI Review
                                  Sensitive                      Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE RIII                RIII
NAME      RNg:mb          BDickson
DATE      02/10/2023      02/14/2023
                                     
                          U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                        Inspection Report
Docket Number:        05000341
License Number:        NPF-43
Report Number:        05000341/2022004
Enterprise Identifier: I2022004-0042
Licensee:              DTE Electric Company
Facility:              Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2
Location:              Newport, MI
Inspection Dates:      October 01, 2022 to December 31, 2022
Inspectors:            T. Briley, Senior Project Engineer
                      R. Edwards, Branch Chief
                      J. Gewargis, Resident Inspector
                      G. Hansen, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector
                      T. Iskierka-Boggs, Senior Operations Engineer
                      M. Jones, Emergency Response Coordinator
                      J. Kutlesa, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
                      R. Ng, Senior Project Engineer
                      T. Taylor, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:          Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief
                      Reactor Projects Branch 2
                      Division of Operating Reactor Safety
                                                                          Enclosure
 
                                            SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, in accordance
with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for
overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
                                  List of Findings and Violations
  Failure to Monitor Moderate Energy Line Break Flood Barriers
  Cornerstone          Significance                                Cross-Cutting      Report
                                                                    Aspect            Section
  Mitigating            Green                                        [P.2] -            71111.06
  Systems              NCV 05000341/202200401                      Evaluation
                        Open/Closed
  The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of
  10 CFR 50, appendix B, criterion III, Design Control, when the licensee failed to validate the
  design of certain internal flood barriers protecting safety-related equipment. Specifically, the
  inspectors identified degraded and missing spray shields designed to protect safety-related
  equipment from the effects of moderate energy line breaks (MELBs).
  Failure to Follow Housekeeping Procedure on Residual Heat Removal Complex (Ultimate
  Heat Sink) Roof
  Cornerstone          Significance                                Cross-Cutting      Report
                                                                    Aspect            Section
  Mitigating            Green                                        [H.12] - Avoid    71111.07T
  Systems              FIN 05000341/202200402                      Complacency
                        Open/Closed
  The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to
  document housekeeping findings and initiate a condition assessment resolution document
  (CARD) for discrepancies on the residual heat removal (RHR) complex roof in accordance
  with licensee procedure MOP 21, "Housekeeping." Specifically, the inspectors identified
  miscellaneous debris (such as food wrappers, ear plugs, security drill rounds, plastic bags,
  moss clumps, tie wraps, small plastic pieces, and paint chips) that had not been documented
  by the licensee despite multiple individuals touring the area.
  Vendor Oversight Issues During RF20 Torus Recoat Project
  Cornerstone          Significance                                Cross-Cutting      Report
                                                                    Aspect            Section
  Mitigating            Green                                        [H.5] - Work      71152A
  Systems              FIN 05000341/202200403                      Management
                        Open/Closed
  The NRC identified a Green finding associated with vendor oversight of the 2020 torus recoat
  project when unexpected degradation of the coating prompted a review that determined
  control of supplemental personnel during the 2020 outage was inadequate.
                                                  2
 
Some Industry Standards Not Incorporated into Torus Recoat Procedures
Cornerstone            Significance                              Cross-Cutting    Report
                                                                Aspect            Section
Mitigating            Green                                    [H.11] -          71152A
Systems                NCV 05000341/202200404                  Challenge the
                      Open/Closed                              Unknown
A Green finding with an associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 appendix B,
criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was self-revealed while inspecting the
torus during the RF21 refueling outage (spring 2022). Some areas of degradation were
observed that were unexpected given the torus had been recoated during the previous
refueling outage. Upon further review, the licensee identifies that some applicable industry
standards had been omitted from the torus recoat procedures, and certain portions of the
work instructions were not followed.
Failure to Perform a Required Code Evaluations for Standby Liquid Control System Leakage
Cornerstone            Significance                              Cross-Cutting    Report
                                                                Aspect            Section
Mitigating            Green                                    [H.12] - Avoid    71152A
Systems                NCV 05000341/202200405                  Complacency
                      Open/Closed
The inspectors identified a Green finding with an associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of
10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Standards," for the licensees failure to follow the ASME Code
after discovering boric acid leakage in the standby liquid control system (SLC). Specifically, a
code required evaluation was not performed as an alternative to corrective actions.
                                  Additional Tracking Items
Type      Issue Number                Title                          Report Section  Status
URI        05000341/202200303        Seismic Displacement for        71111.18        Closed
                                      Safety-Related Piping Not
                                      Verified
LER        05000341/2021002-00        LER 2021002-00 for Fermi      71153            Closed
                                      2 Power Plant, Unplanned
                                      Inoperability of High
                                      Pressure Coolant Injection
                                      System Due to an Inverter
                                      Circuit Failure
LER        05000341/2021002-01        LER 2021002-01 for Fermi      71153            Closed
                                      Power Plant, Unit 2,
                                      Unplanned Inoperability of
                                      High Pressure Coolant
                                      Injection System Due to an
                                      Inverter Circuit Failure
LER        05000341/2021001-00        LER 2021001-00 for Fermi,      71153            Closed
                                      Unit 2, Unrecognized Impact
                                      of Opening of Barrier Doors
                                      on High Energy Line Break
                                      Analysis
LER        05000341/2022003-00        LER 2022003-00 for Fermi      71153            Closed
                                      2 Power Plant, Turbine Trip
                                                3
 
                        and Subsequent Reactor
                        Trip Due to Mayflies
LER 05000341/2022001-00 LER 2022001-00 for Fermi 71153 Closed
                        2 Power Plant, Reactor
                        Scram on Low Reactor
                        Pressure Vessel Level
                                4
 
PLANT STATUS
Fermi Unit 2 started the inspection period at or near 100 percent power, and remained there for
the quarter.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515,
appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of
IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and
interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules
and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
    (1)    The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to
            the onset of seasonal cold temperatures for the following systems:
            General service water, circulating water, and residual heat removal service water
            (RHRSW) for the week ending on November 18, 2022
External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
    (1)    The inspectors evaluated that flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures,
            and equipment are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk
            analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding for the week ending on
            November 4, 2022.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
    The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
    systems/trains:
    (1)    Division 1 emergency equipment cooling water (EECW) with division 2 EECW TCV
            maintenance during the week ending October 21, 2022
    (2)    Division 1 non-interruptible air system (NIAS) during division 2 control center heating,
            ventilation, and air conditioning (CCHVAC) safety system outage during the week
            ending October 21, 2022
                                                  5
 
    (3)  Division 1 130/260 engineered safety feature direct current (DC) power and battery
          system during the week ending October 29, 2022
    (4)  Electric fire pump while the alternate diesel fire pump was out of service on
          November 9, 2022
    (5)  Division 2 residual heat removal (RHR) drywell spray with work on division 1 during
          the week ending November 26, 2022
    (6)  Division 1 RHRSW with the division 2 RHR pump and valve surveillance during the
          week ending November 25, 2022
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
    (1)  The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the
          division 2 core spray system during the week ending on November 4, 2022.
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
    The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a
    walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,
    material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
    (1)  Southwest quadrant of the reactor building basement and sub-basement during the
          week ending October 21, 2022
    (2)  Northwest quadrant of the reactor building basement and sub-basement during the
          week ending November 18, 2022
    (3)  Reactor core isolation cooling quad sprinkler question during the week ending
          December 10, 2022
    (4)  Reactor building 3 and reactor building 4 standby liquid control area during the week
          ending December 12, 2022
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
    The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the following:
    (1)  Auxiliary building third and fourth levels, completed the week ending
          December 31, 2022
71111.07T - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance
Heat Exchanger (Service Water Cooled) (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
    The inspectors evaluated heat exchanger performance on the following:
    (1)  P4400B001B, EECW division 2 plate and frame heat exchanger
Heat Exchanger (Closed Loop) (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
    The inspectors evaluated heat exchanger performance on the following:
                                                  6
 
    (1)    P5002B004, control air compressor (CAC) after cooler - north non-interruptible
          control air (NIAS)
Ultimate Heat Sink (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
    The inspectors evaluated the ultimate heat sink performance on the following:
    (1)    The ultimate heat sink, specifically sections 03.04.a and 03.04.e were completed.
71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
    (1)    The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure
          rates for the requalification annual operating tests administered between
          October 11, 2022 and November 10, 2022.
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
(1 Sample)
    (1)    The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control
          room during a planned high pressure coolant injection system surveillance that
          resulted in a yellow risk condition, with complications regarding the performance of
          two valves in the system, on November 15, 2022.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)
    (1)    The inspectors observed and evaluated performance of an annual operating test in
          the control room simulator on October 26, 2022.
    (2)    The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification training for
          technical specifications and emergency action level entry, and simulator exercise
          scenarios in the main control room simulator during the week ending
          November 18, 2022.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
    The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following
    structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended
    function:
    (1)    4160V electrical switchgear
    (2)    Power supply inverters for safety-related instrumentation and control loads
    (3)    Review of issues associated with the transversing incore probe system, completed
          the week ending December 24, 2022
                                                  7
 
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
  The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the
  following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and
  appropriate work controls were addressed:
  (1)    Troubleshooting and electric shock associated with the reactor water cleanup system
          during the week ending November 12, 2022
  (2)    Gland seal exhaust motor replacement on November 02, 2022
  (3)    Mechanical draft cooling tower fan 'B' maintenance November 28, 2022
  (4)    Approach to a leaking sensing line for reactor feed pump suction pressure, completed
          the week of December 31, 2022
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
  The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the
  following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
  (1)    Abnormal noise from the 'B' mechanical draft cooling tower motor during the week
          ending December 3, 2022
  (2)    Recirculation pump seal pressure changes during the week ending
          December 10, 2022
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
  (1)    The inspectors verified the site SAMG were updated in accordance with the BWR
          generic severe accident technical guidelines and validated in accordance with NEI
          1401, Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for Beyond Design Basis
          Events and Severe Accidents, Revision 1.
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
  The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system
  operability and/or functionality:
  (1)    Division 1 CCHVAC outage during the week of October 3, 2022
  (2)    Division 1 NIAS during the week ending November 4, 2022
  (3)    Diesel fire pump post installation testing, completed during the week ending
          December 23, 2022
                                                  8
 
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
  The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system
  operability and/or functionality:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
    (1)  Electrical bus 64B undervoltage testing and relay calibrations during the week ending
          October 8, 2022
    (2)  HPCI pump and valve surveillance after pressure control valve repair and outboard
          main steam isolation valve packing adjustment on December 1, 2022
    (3)  EECW pump and valve during the week ending December 14, 2022
    (4)  Validation of acceptable level bands for oil and tank levels on select motors and
          tanks, completed the week ending December 24, 2022
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
    (1)  EDG 11 SW pump and minimum flow valve testing during the week ending
          October 21, 2022
RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
    (1)  RCS leakage increasing trend during the week ending October 29, 2022
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
    (1)  Dominator and Neptune pump run surveillances, completed by the week ending
          December 31, 2022
71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.0102.03) (1 Sample)
    (1)  The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and
          Emergency Plan changes:
                202108E, Spent fuel pool level updates for RA2.3, RS2.1, and RG2.1,
                  September 21, 2021
                202135S, Spent fuel pool level updates for RA2.3, RS2.1, and RG2.1,
                  September 21, 2021
          This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01)
(1 Sample)
    (1)  The inspectors evaluated drill and exercise performance indicator opportunities
          associated with a licensed-operator requalification activity on October 26, 2022.
                                                9
 
OTHER ACTIVITIES-BASELINE
71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
  The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program
  related to the following issues:
  (1)    Ongoing issues with effluent sampling systems and potential impacts to declaring
          emergency action levels, the week ending December 10, 2022
  (2)    Select review of degraded/non-conforming conditions carried by the licensee,
          completed the week of December 31, 2022
  (3)    Review of 2020 torus recoat project following degradation identified in 2022,
          completed the week of December 31, 2022
71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
  (1)    The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential
          adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (4 Samples)
  The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
  (1)    LER 05000341/2021001, Unrecognized Impact of Opening of Barrier Doors on High
          Energy Line Break Analysis (ADAMS Accession No. ML21182A291). The inspection
          conclusions associated with this LER are documented in Inspection
          Report 05000341/2021003 under Inspection Results section 71111.15 (ADAMS
          Accession No. ML21298A200). An analysis to assess the potential impacts on
          components outside the reactor building steam tunnel (RBST) during a line break in
          the RBST does not exist. Current analyses assume the door is shut. Subsequent to
          NRC identification of the issue in 2021, the licensee took steps to conduct an analysis
          on effects outside the RBST. This effort was not completed. As a result, the
          inspectors cannot validate the accuracy of several of the 10 CFR 50.73 reporting
          criteria, such as loss of safety functions and conditions prohibited by technical
          specifications (TS). While the licensee did report under those criteria (assuming a
          worst case scenario where all equipment required to respond to a line break in the
          RBST was inoperable due to the break), without an analysis on the environmental
          impacts outside the RBST, it is impossible to assess whether or not these criteria
          were actually met. Despite that, the licensee did report under criteria for an
          unanalyzed condition and a condition prohibited by TS 3.0.3 specifically. The
          inspectors determined it was appropriate to report under those criteria given the lack
          of analysis and multiple types and trains of equipment that may have been impacted
          to the point where operability was brought into question. The non-cited violation
          associated with this issue screened as very low safety significance given the small
          amount of time the door had been open in the past 3 years. The licensee instituted
                                                  10
 
          corrective actions to better recognize and control important doors throughout the
          plant. No further findings nor violations were identified.
    (2)    LER 05000341/2021002-00 and 05000341/2021002-01, Unplanned Inoperability of
          High Pressure Coolant Injection System Due to an Inverter Circuit Failure (ADAMS
          Accession Nos. ML22075A087). The inspectors determined that it was not
          reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no
          performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of
          NRC requirements. The inspectors reviewed the previous, as well as the updated
          LER submittal.
    (3)    LER 05000341/2022001, Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Pressure Vessel Level
          (ADAMS Accession No. ML22094A155). The inspection conclusions associated with
          this LER are documented in Inspection Report 0500341/2022003 under Inspection
          Results section 71152A. No further findings or violations were identified.
    (4)    LER 05000341/2022003, Turbine Trip and Subsequent Reactor Trip due to Mayflies
          (ADAMS Accession No. ML22235A106). The inspection conclusions associated with
          this LER are documented in Inspection Report 0500341/2022003 (ADAMS Accession
          No. ML22311A531) under Inspection Results section 71152A. No findings nor
          violations were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES-TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855 - Operation of an ISFSI
The inspectors evaluated the licensees activities related to the long-term operation and
monitoring of its Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The inspectors reviewed
relevant documentation remotely during the weeks of October 10 and October 17, 2022, and
were onsite on October 19, 2022. During the onsite walkdown, the inspector toured the ISFSI
and evaluated the material and radiological conditions of the ISFSI pad and loaded HISTORM
100 systems. The inspectors verified radiological conditions on the ISFSI pad were as expected
during the walkdown. The inspectors interviewed licensee staff regarding periodic surveillances
of the loaded HISTORM casks.
Since the last inspection, the inspectors evaluated corrective action documents and changes
performed in accordance with 10 CFR 72.48, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments."
INSPECTION RESULTS
  Failure to Monitor Moderate Energy Line Break Flood Barriers
  Cornerstone          Significance                                Cross-Cutting    Report
                                                                    Aspect          Section
  Mitigating            Green                                      [P.2] -          71111.06
  Systems              NCV 05000341/202200401                    Evaluation
                        Open/Closed
  The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of
  10 CFR 50, appendix B, criterion III, Design Control, when the licensee failed to validate the
  design of certain internal flood barriers protecting safety-related equipment. Specifically, the
                                                  11
 
inspectors identified degraded and missing spray shields designed to protect safety-related
equipment from the effects of moderate energy line breaks (MELBs).
Description:
On November 29, 2022, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the third floor and fourth
floor of the auxiliary building (AB) as part of an internal flooding inspection sample. During the
walkdown, the inspectors discovered that the MELB spray shields in the division 2 switchgear
room and AB fourth floor were degraded or missing from sections of emergency equipment
cooling water (EECW) piping. The spray shield design consists of a fiberglass-impregnated
material that encloses susceptible piping to contain and divert water away from safety-related
equipment, namely electrical switchgear. The inspectors questioned the potential effects of
the degraded/missing spray shields on nearby equipment. In response, the licensee
performed technical evaluations that concluded that safety-related equipment remained
operable in the current condition but not in accordance with the design.
A subsequent review by the licensee revealed that a condition assessment resolution
document (CARD) had been written in 2020 documenting the degraded spray shields in the
division 2 switchgear room, consistent with what was identified on the NRC walkdown almost
3 years later. While the licensee had generated a work order to fix the shields, it was still in a
delay status, and no monitoring plan was in place to ensure the barrier could still fulfill its
design functions (e.g., following work in the area or periodic checks of the tape holding the
barrier in place at some locations). The licensee found no evidence for other piping sections
that the missing shields had been identified or documented by the licensee. Through
discussion with the inspectors, the licensee determined that the work activity to inspect spray
shields throughout the plant had not been performed when last scheduled in July 2019.
During the extent of condition walkdowns following NRC's discovery of the issue, further
degraded spray shields were identified; however, most were determined not be a part of the
internal flooding design basis anymore. The licensee evaluated the others to ensure no
impacts to safety-related equipment existed.
Corrective Actions: The licensee completed a technical evaluation to support the operability
of the division 2 switchgear and confirmed other areas of missing/degraded spray shields did
not constitute a deviation from design nor have adverse impacts on nearby equipment as part
of their extent of condition walkdowns. In response to the inspectors' questions, the licensee
also started a review to determine if they properly administrated the periodic inspection
activity to validate the flood barrier design.
Corrective Action References: CARDs 2231414, 2020846, 2231541, 2231415, and
2231571.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensee failed to perform a
scheduled verification of flooding barriers. Additionally, deviations from MELB protection
features were not controlled due to inspector identification of missing/degraded spray shields
on EECW piping that had not been identified by the licensee nor properly monitored.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
                                                12
 
consequences. Specifically, degraded MELB barriers had not been identified, monitored,
and/or properly assessed that could impact nearby safety-related equipment.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609
appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Specifically, the finding screened to Green (very low safety significance) because questions 2
through 6 on exhibit 2 of the mitigating systems screening were answered as No.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to
ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their
safety significance. Specifically, when degraded MELB barriers were identified, the licensee
failed to ensure appropriate technical assessments were performed, that effective monitoring
was in place, and an extent of condition was performed to identify other issues.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50, appendix B, criterion III, "Design Control," states, in part, that measures
established shall include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified
and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are controlled.
Contrary to the above, from January 24, 2020 to January 9, 2023, the licensee failed to
assure that deviations from quality standards were controlled. Specifically, the licensee failed
to complete a scheduled inspection of flood barriers. Further, the licensee did not perform a
technical assessment nor monitoring to support shroud functionality once degradation was
identified.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with section 2.3.2 of
the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Follow Housekeeping Procedure on Residual Heat Removal Complex (Ultimate
Heat Sink) Roof
Cornerstone            Significance                              Cross-Cutting      Report
                                                                  Aspect            Section
Mitigating            Green                                      [H.12] - Avoid    71111.07T
Systems                FIN 05000341/202200402                    Complacency
                      Open/Closed
The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to
document housekeeping findings and initiate a condition assessment resolution document
(CARD) for discrepancies on the residual heat removal (RHR) complex roof in accordance
with licensee procedure MOP 21, "Housekeeping." Specifically, the inspectors identified
miscellaneous debris (such as food wrappers, ear plugs, security drill rounds, plastic bags,
moss clumps, tie wraps, small plastic pieces, and paint chips) that had not been documented
by the licensee despite multiple individuals touring the area.
Description:
On October 18, 2022, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the residual heat removal
complex roof. The inspectors noted that the lower roof contained miscellaneous debris in the
form of food wrappers, ear plugs, security drill rounds, plastic bags, moss clumps, tie wraps,
small plastic pieces, and paint chips. The inspectors also noted that one of the large plastic
storage bins containing ice melt material had been lined with a plastic bag and turned into a
makeshift trash can. The identified debris was generally in the vicinity of roof drains and/or
grating that led to or was directly over the division 1 and division 2 ultimate heat sink water
reservoirs used to transfer heat from structures, systems, and components important to
                                                13
 
safety. Natural phenomena (such as rainfall or wind gusts) could potentially transport the
debris into the reservoirs and potentially challenge pump operation for residual heat removal
service water, emergency equipment service water, and/or emergency diesel generator
service water. Periodic diving inspection records from 2020 and 2022 also indicated the
presence of miscellaneous debris such as plastic signage, moss clumps, and ear plugs
located under water in the reservoirs (debris was documented as removed by the divers upon
discovery).
The personnel doors used to access the RHR complex roof indicated the area was a
"housekeeping category."
Licensee procedure MOP 21, "Housekeeping," Revision 7, contains procedural guidance for
ensuring adequate levels of housekeeping to ensure safe plant operation and included all
activities related to controlling material in all areas of the facility. The procedure also stated, in
part, that individuals are expected to maintain the same level of housekeeping inside and out
of the power block. Procedure step 2.3.9 stated, in part, that persons performing a plant tour
shall 1) document findings on the housekeeping inspection report form and 2) initiate a
condition assessment resolution document (condition report) for discrepancies when
required.
The debris identified by the inspectors had not been documented as a housekeeping finding
nor entered into the corrective action program via a condition assessment resolution
document until brought to the licensee's attention. It is unknown how long the miscellaneous
debris was present on the residual heat removal complex roof, however, the inspectors
determined that some of the miscellaneous debris had most likely been on the roof for an
extended period of time based on environmental degradation.
Corrective Actions: The miscellaneous debris was subsequently removed from the residual
heat removal complex roof and a follow-up investigation into the cause(s) was planned.
Corrective Action References: CARD 2230462
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to document housekeeping findings and
initiate a CARD for discrepancies on the RHR complex roof in accordance with licensee
procedure MOP 21, "Housekeeping," was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the
inspectors identified miscellaneous debris (such as food wrappers, ear plugs, security drill
rounds, plastic bags, moss clumps, tie wraps, small plastic pieces, and paint chips) that had
not been documented by the licensee despite multiple individuals touring the area.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety
concern. Specifically, debris on the residual heat removal complex roof can be washed or
blown directly into the ultimate heat sink reservoirs and could potentially impact safety-related
residual heat removal, emergency equipment, and emergency diesel generator service water
systems. The inspectors also noted previous dive inspection records in both 2020 and 2022
of the ultimate heat sink reservoirs housed in the residual heat removal complex contained
debris found such as plastic signage and bags, paint chips, and ear plugs to name a few
(items were retrieved during periodic diving activities).
                                                  14
 
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609
appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Specifically, the mitigating systems screening questions for structures, systems, and
components and probabilistic risk analysis functionality were all answered no. Therefore, the
finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the
possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful
outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, multiple
individuals from multiple organizations routinely traversed the RHR complex roof and
appeared to not consider the potential undesired consequences of their actions in leaving
miscellaneous debris on the roof, verify housekeeping procedure prerequisites despite being
prompted by the access door signs stating "housekeeping category," nor performed a
thorough review of the area every time work was performed (such as operator rounds) rather
than relying on past successes and assumed conditions.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
URI                  Seismic Displacement for Safety-Related Piping Not            71111.18
                      Verified
                      URI 05000341/202200303
Description:
During the fourth quarter of 2022, the licensee provided additional information from a design
basis calculation of record associated with the division 1 residual heat removal service water
(RHRSW) supply and return piping inside the reactor building. Calculation No. DC6953,
"Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System Subsystem: EX15," Revision 0 provides the
design basis and licensing basis information associated with the seismic and thermal
displacements of the piping and determination of whether the maximum piping displacement
impacts any systems, structures, or components (SSCs).
The licensee provided the piping displacement information from Calculation No. DC6953 to
demonstrate that the RHRSW piping will not impact any SSCs. The inspector reviewed this
information and concluded this issue is closed. No performance deficiencies or findings were
identified.
Corrective Action Reference(s): condition assessment resolution document 2227033,
NRC Identified: Evaluation of Potential Rattle Space Violation, dated 06/10/2022.
Vendor Oversight Issues during RF20 Torus Recoat Project
Cornerstone          Significance                              Cross-Cutting    Report
                                                                Aspect            Section
Mitigating            Green                                      [H.5] - Work      71152A
Systems              FIN 05000341/202200403                    Management
                      Open/Closed
The NRC identified a Green finding associated with vendor oversight of the 2020 torus recoat
project when unexpected degradation of the coating prompted a review that determined
control of supplemental personnel during the 2020 outage was inadequate.
                                                15
 
Description:
The unexpected torus coating degradation discovered during the 2022 refueling outage
prompted an investigation by the licensee into the operability of the torus and the potential
causes of the degradation. Non-cited violation (NCV) 05000341/202200404, documented in
this inspection report, describes the issues with the work instructions associated with the
2020 torus project. Further investigation by the licensee as a result of NRC questions
prompted a condition assessment resolution document (CARD) 2227942 to be written to
explore the extent of work control/process gaps that may have existed for the torus project.
An organizational effectiveness evaluation determined that supplemental personnel assigned
to the torus project failed to follow site processes regarding procedure use and adherence.
One of the potential causes for the degradation of the new torus coating was the lack of tarps
to protect uncoated areas from the spraying of coating in nearby areas. Despite the work
instructions calling for tarps, they were not used. A review of the work instructions later
revealed steps were inappropriately marked as complete or not applicable (N/A)
inappropriately.
Besides evaluating the extent of the condition of the failure to follow site processes for
execution of the torus work instructions, CARD 2227942 sought to identify the causes of the
issues. NRC review of this CARD revealed that the licensee correctly identified several
instances of contractors not following site processes. Examples included how to mark steps
as complete, how to use a 'N/A,' and when and by whom steps should be marked off. As a
result, the inspectors determined supplemental personnel control associated with the torus
recoat project was inadequate. CARD 2227942 identified a potential reason:
a new-tonuclear, non-proficient worker had been selected to ensure steps for the torus
project were complete and marked appropriately. While the licensee's CARD stated it was
contractor supervision who placed the worker in that position, the inspectors noted site
procedure MGA31 had requirements for licensee personnel: such as ensuring contractors
had specific training assigned based on needs.
Additionally, the procedure requires updated information to be communicated to the
contractors with sufficient time so that they can acquaint workers with the new information (an
apparent decision not to use tarps was made but not conveyed to the individual signing for
steps in the work instructions). Step 5.4.7 requires observations of work activities to check
adherence to station policies and procedures. Step 5.4.1 requires vendor oversight plans to
be developed. The licensee's evaluation in CARD 2227942 did not explore if there were
shortfalls with the last two requirements on behalf of licensee personnel. If observations and
oversight plans were, in fact, part of the project, they were ineffective at detecting the gaps in
contractor performance.
Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program.
Corrective Action References: CARD 2227942
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Contrary to requirements in MGA31, Supplemental Personnel
Control Practice, the licensee did not provide adequate oversight of supplemental workers
associated with the 2020 torus recoat project.
                                                16
 
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
consequences. Specifically, inadequate supplemental worker oversight partly contributed to
degraded conditions in the torus. The issue also screened as more than minor under the
barrier integrity cornerstone, as the torus forms part of the primary containment barrier.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609
appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The end
result of the performance deficiency was a questioning of the operability of the torus given the
degradation that occurred. Under the mitigating systems cornerstone, questions 26 in
section A of exhibit 2 were answered 'no.' Further, under the barrier integrity cornerstone,
questions 12 under section C of exhibit 3 were also answered 'no.'
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of
planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding
priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate
to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Following the
2020 and 2022 refueling outages, after-action reviews and input from external stakeholders
revealed weaknesses in the outage planning and preparation process that drove poor outage
performance, to include planning for and managing contract work onsite.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
Some Industry Standards Not Incorporated into Torus Recoat Procedures
Cornerstone            Significance                                Cross-Cutting    Report
                                                                  Aspect            Section
Mitigating            Green                                      [H.11] -          71152A
Systems                NCV 05000341/202200404                    Challenge the
                      Open/Closed                                Unknown
A Green finding with an associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 appendix B,
criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was self-revealed while inspecting the
torus during the RF21 refueling outage (spring 2022). Some areas of degradation were
observed that were unexpected given the torus had been recoated during the previous
refueling outage. Upon further review, the licensee identified that some applicable industry
standards had been omitted from the torus recoat procedures, and certain portions of the
work instructions were not followed.
Description:
During the spring 2022 refueling outage, RF21, the inspectors opened an indepth PI&R
sample to review the effectiveness of corrective actions taken during the prior outage (spring
2020) regarding the recoating of the inside of the torus. The inspection sample involved
degradation, which developed before 2020, and the licensee's inadequate tracking and
assessment of that degradation over time, was the subject of an NRC special inspection in
2019. The results of the special inspection are documented in inspection
report 05000341/2019050 (ML20031D253). A confirmatory action letter also resulted from the
special inspection, which prompted the entire recoating of the torus in 2020.
Following the identification of the degradation, the licensee worked with various vendors and
                                                17
 
consultants to assess the impact on the torus's operability and to determine a cause.
Degradation ranged from small areas of rust deposits to small bubbles that appeared on the
surface. The areas in question were spread throughout the torus in discrete locations. The
licensee concluded the total degraded area was far below that which would call into question
the operability of the torus. This conclusion was supported by a series of 'pull-tests,' which
validated that areas surrounding the pockets of degradation had sound, tightly adhered
coating. Inspection by the onsite resident inspectors, region-based inspectors involved with
the 2019 special inspection, and experts from NRC headquarters did not find any issues with
the licensee's conclusion. The licensee developed several theories on how the degradation
originated and documented the conclusions in CARD 2222967 via an equipment cause
evaluation.
Essentially, the licensee concluded several factors likely led to the areas of degradation.
Ultimately, the licensee determined inadequate work instructions for the torus recoat project
were the cause because several of the contributing factors were not properly accounted for in
the work instructions. One example involved time elapsed between 'stripe coating' and
application of the main coating (stripe coating being areas 'cut-in' prior to the main spray of
coating). The licensee concluded that during the project, between 2.5 and 7.5 hours elapsed
between stripe coating and spraying in the various areas. During the licensee's investigation,
several industry references discovered pointed to a much shorter time (< 10 minutes) being
appropriate to prevent a phenomenon known as 'amine blush' from occurring, which can
affect coating adherence. As another example, testing for specific surface contaminants such
as chlorides was not directed by the work instructions. While certain industry standards
regarding surface preparation were followed, the fact the torus remained 'prepped' for coating
for an unexpectedly long period (due to COVID impacts) should have prompted a check for
contaminants that may not have otherwise been present had the torus been promptly coated.
In addition, the work instructions called for tarps to protect uncoated areas from the
'overspray' of other areas being coated. Steps for installation of the tarps were marked
complete; however, a later investigation by the licensee revealed the steps had not been
performed. It appears that as the project was progressing, the use of tarps was being
debated given a change in coating strategy that had occurred and the speed at which
activities were progressing. Per licensee processes, if a decision to not use tarps had been
made, the work instructions should have been updated accordingly. Areas not protected from
overspray may have led to some of the degradation noted.
Corrective Actions: The licensee performed tests to confirm the coating in general was
satisfactorily applied. Select areas were repaired, and evaluations were performed to verify
operability of the coating in the asfound and goforward conditions.
Corrective Action References: CARD 2222967 documented an equipment cause evaluation
and organizational effectiveness cause evaluation.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The implementing work instructions for the torus recoat project were
inadequate and certain portions were not followed.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
consequences. Specifically, unexpected degradation was noted on the interior torus coating
                                                18
 
after one cycle of operation, calling into question the ability of the coating to remain intact
during accident conditions (which can impact the suctions of safety related pumps aligned to
the torus). The inspectors also determined the issue was more than minor under the barrier
integrity cornerstone, as inadequate coating can also impact the primary containment barrier.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609
appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Specifically, under the mitigating systems cornerstone, questions 26 in section A of exhibit 2
were answered 'no.' Further, under the barrier integrity cornerstone, questions 12 under
section C of exhibit 3 were also answered 'no.'
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with
uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically,
the inspectors utilized the associated common language attribute (QA.2) from NUREG2165,
Safety Culture Common Language, to inform assignment of an appropriate cross-cutting
aspect. Applicable tenets of QA.2 include:
        "Leaders reinforce expectations that individuals take time to do the job right the first
        time, seek guidance when unsure, and stop if unexpected conditions are
        encountered."
        "Individuals maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs and jobsite reviews to
        identify and resolve unexpected conditions."
        "Individuals stop work activities when confronted with an unexpected condition,
        communicate with supervisors, and resolve the condition prior to continuing work..."
        "If a procedure or work document is unclear or cannot be performed as written,
        individuals stop work until the issue is resolved."
The dynamic nature of the COVID health emergency led to changing conditions (e.g., longer
period between surface preparation and coating) that presented opportunities to revalidate
appropriate standards and controls in the work instructions that may have prevented the
scope of degradation. Further, work was not stopped when the instructions could not be
performed as written when it was decided to not use tarps.
Besides the work instructions for the coating, the inspectors also broadened their review to
other work activities that were part of the torus project. The attributes of H.11/QA.2 were
lacking in several areas throughout the project. A worker was injured when others saw an
unsafe platform but did not stop the job before the injury. When workers in the torus
questioned the speed at which material was being hoisted out of the torus, workers above
told them multiple times that they would not slow down. In approaching the unknowns
associated with confined space rescue in a fully drained torus, the necessary practice and
coordination for such a complex activity was not provided prior to start of work. This missed
opportunity was only realized when the rescue team was called out for an injury after work
had started.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50 appendix B, criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,
requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented
instructions of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in
accordance with these instructions. Contrary to the above, during the spring 2020 refueling
                                                  19
 
Outage (March 2020-August 2020) and until discovery the following refueling outage (which
commenced in February 2022), the licensee did not prescribe documented instructions
appropriate to the circumstances, nor accomplish activities in accordance with appropriate
instructions, for activities affecting quality. Specifically, the instructions associated with
recoating the safety related torus lacked steps to help prevent degradation of the coating.
Further, some steps intended to protect the new coating were in the instructions but not
followed.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Perform a Required Code Evaluations for Standby Liquid Control System Leakage
Cornerstone            Significance                                  Cross-Cutting      Report
                                                                    Aspect            Section
Mitigating            Green                                        [H.12] - Avoid    71152A
Systems                NCV 05000341/202200405                      Complacency
                      Open/Closed
The inspectors identified a Green finding with an associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of
10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Standards," for the licensees failure to follow the ASME Code
after discovering boric acid leakage in the standby liquid control system (SLC). Specifically, a
code required evaluation was not performed as an alternative to correction actions.
Description:
During a review of condition assessment resolution documents (CARDs) as part of the
indepth PI&R baseline inspection sample, the inspectors reviewed CARD 2230062, initiated
on October 2, 2022. This licensee-identified CARD described evidence of borated water
leakage from a flanged connection between the SLC system tank and heater C4101S002
during planned VT2 examinations. While no active leakage was noted, the CARD mentioned
that this was a repeat issue from CARD 1927781, initiated on October 11, 2019. While
reviewing 1927781, the inspectors noted that CARD 1826451 (created August 27, 2018)
had also documented the same borated water leak (however, this was not during a Code
VT2 exam). Per section XI of the 2013 ASME Code, specifically IWA5250 and IWA5251,
leaks of this nature require one of two primary activities to be accomplished following
identification. One option described in IWA5250 involves removing a bolt from the affected
connection and performing a VT3 exam with a subsequent evaluation of it and the remaining
bolts. Alternatively, a licensee could opt to replace all bolts. The other option, described in
IAW5251, involves the performance of an evaluation of the joint following IWA5251(c).
Corrective action for CARD 1826451 did not involve either code-required option. The
licensee generated a work order, but as of the issuance of 1927781 (a little over a year
later), the work order still needed to be prepared. After identifying the issue again in
1927781, the corrective action was to create a work order to accomplish the requirements of
IWA5250 during the RF20 refueling outage (spring of 2020). While the licensee provided
some facts supporting operability, they did not perform an evaluation involving the criteria
listed in IWA5251(c). During RF20, the licensee removed the work activity to do the repairs
and/or inspections to satisfy IWA5250. An evaluation per IWA5251 was also not completed
at that time.
                                                  20
 
NRC inspector review of the most recent CARD identifying the leakage (2230062) revealed
that despite the cancellation of the work order in RF20, the licensee did not put actions in
place to schedule the work during RF21, the spring 2022 refueling outage. In response to
NRC questions, the licensee generated CARD 2230116 to document that fact. After further
discussions with the NRC, the licensee completed an evaluation per IWA5251(c) in
December 2022. The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and noted that the licensee had also
identified a similar situation existed for another SLC system component. The licensee
identified a possible body-tobonnet leak on C4100F001, the SLC storage tank isolation
valve, on October 2, 2022. This leakage had also been identified previously in 2019, along
with the C4101S002 leakage, but did not have the appropriate action taken per IWA5251(c).
The inspectors reviewed the evaluation performed for both components and did not have an
issue with the licensee's conclusions that the components remained operable.
Corrective Actions: The licensee performed an evaluation per IWA5251(c) to demonstrate
operability of affected components.
Corrective Action References: CARDs 2230062, 2230061, and 2230116
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: Following discovery of borated water leakage from SLC system
components, the licensee did not perform the required actions set forth in the ASME Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Code, section XI, 2013 edition (the edition the licensee is committed to).
Specifically, the evaluation described in IWA5251(c) to demonstrate acceptable continued
operation after choosing to not perform the actions in IWA5250, was not performed.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety
concern. Specifically, continuing to not repair nor perform evaluations per the ASME Code for
degraded safety-related components could lead to further degradation where operability
could be a concern.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609
appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.
Specifically, after reviewing the evaluation performed by the licensee, the inspectors
answered 'no' to all of the questions in section A of exhibit 2 regarding impacts to operability.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the
possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful
outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the licensee
deferred work on the degraded components but did not recognize until after the following
refueling outage an opportunity had been missed to perform the work. Additionally, specific
ASME Code requirements were not recognized despite multiple instances of identifying the
same evidence of borated water leakage.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, incorporates by reference the ASME Boiler
and Pressure Vessel Code, section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant
Components-Division 1, 2013 addenda. Section IWA5251 of the Code states, in part, that as
an alternative to corrective action under IWA5250 for leakage at bolted connections in
                                                21
 
systems borated for the purposes of controlling reactivity, an evaluation incorporating the
criteria of IWA5251(c) can be performed to evaluate the consequences of continuing
operation. Contrary to the above, since identification of conditions covered by IWA5250/5251
on October 11, 2019, for safety-related SLC components C4101S002 and C4100F001, until
an evaluation was performed on December 13, 2022, the licensee did not complete
evaluations in accordance with the requirements of IWA5251(c).
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Corrective Action Program Product Quality                                  71152S
The inspectors identified a potential negative trend in CAP execution and product quality. The
issues identified by the inspectors were discussed with licensee management in the
applicable departments, along with the performance improvement department. The licensee
recognizes the issue and, in addition to revising some of the products in question, has
created plans to improve and validate product quality. One example was the creation of a
monthly condition assessment resolution document (CARD) closure quality reviews to be
done by each department and NQA. Specific issues are listed below:
      The inspectors reviewed the causal evaluation associated with the scram in June of
        2022 caused by a swarm of mayflies. The evaluation indicated problems between
        security and operations regarding working together to establish a plant lighting
        strategy. Further, it identified one of the causes as not utilizing the "DTE Mayfly
        Infestation Plan." There were also references to other site or departmental issues
        unrelated to the event. After questioning the licensee for more contextual information,
        the inspectors learned DTE never had an infestation plan until after the event
        occurred. Also, there wasn't a problem of security and operations resolving
        differences; rather, there was no discussion following the 2020 mayfly event to
        explore what could be done regarding the lighting. The licensee revised the evaluation
        to address those items and remove references to issues not relevant to the event.
      The inspectors reviewed the root cause evaluation associated with the February 2022
        scram caused by a feedwater transient. While not having an issue with the root cause
        or proposed corrective actions, the inspectors uncovered more detail behind the
        'legacy procedural issue' for securing a feed pump that appeared relevant to the
        cause and could inform future modifications to the procedure. The inspectors
        determined the legacy procedure issue stemmed from a specific procedure change in
        2001 that changed how plant operators managed the feed pump speed and the
        minimum flow control valve during the shutdown.
      The inspectors reviewed the corrective action tools used to assess the actuator/yoke
        separation of a primary containment isolation valve and determined the performance
        gap analysis was too narrowly focused for the issue. Concurrently, site management
        also identified the issue, and as a result, a more detailed organizational cause
        evaluation was conducted.
      The licensee NQA organization identified a trend in December 2022 which highlighted
        several failed causal evaluation products. One particular product involved responding
        to an NRC non-cited violation (NCV) regarding reporting requirements. The inspectors
        noted that before the most recent NCV, another NCV in the same area from 2020 had
        been documented, indicating difficulty in achieving sustainable corrective actions for
        reportability issues.
                                                  22
 
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
      On January 25, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to
      P. Dietrich, Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer and other members of the licensee
      staff.
      On November 4, 2022, the inspectors presented the ISFSI interim exit inspection results
      to P. Dietrich, Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer and other members of the licensee
      staff.
      On November 10, 2022, the inspectors presented the triennial heat sink inspection
      results to B. Sullivan and other members of the licensee staff.
      On December 1, 2022, the inspectors presented the emergency action level and
      emergency plan changes inspection results to P. Dietrich, Senior VP and Chief Nuclear
      Officer and other members of the licensee staff.
THIRD PARTY REVIEWS
Inspectors reviewed Institute on Nuclear Power Operations mid-cycle assessment reports that
were issued during the inspection period.
                                                23
 
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type              Designation    Description or Title                                      Revision or
Procedure                                                                                              Date
60855      Corrective Action 1924210        NQA - Holtec Field Condition Report                      06/03/2019
            Documents        2031838        ISFSI Helium Backfill Volume Calculation Uncertainty      11/02/2020
                              2130193        MOP11 Requires Revision for Combustible Material in ISFSI 11/16/2021
                                              Building
            Corrective Action 2230743        No Written Evaluation Performed per 10 CFR 72.212(b)(7)  10/31/2022
            Documents
            Resulting from
            Inspection
            Miscellaneous                    10 CFR 72.212 Report                                      3
                              72.48 Screen    EDP 80028                                                0
                              200003
                              72.48 Screen    WO 57799481                                              0
                              200005
            Procedures        MRP04          Radiation Protection Conduct Manual                      47
            Radiation        PM202106286  ISFSI Pad                                                06/28/2021
            Surveys          PM202111242  ISFSI Pad                                                11/24/2021
                              PM2022062912 ISFSI Pad                                                06/29/2022
                              PM202210079  ISFSI Pad                                                10/07/2022
            Self-Assessments  Audit Report    ISFSI Program                                            05/16/2022
                              220103
            Work Orders      49479374        HISTORM Annual Inspection                                10/07/2019
                              52206872        Perform 35.710.055 HISTORM Monthly Screen Inspection    03/28/2020
                              52805754        HISTORM Annual Inspection                                11/04/2020
                              56125177        Perform 35.710.055 HISTORM Monthly Screen Inspection    05/19/2021
                              57629881        HISTORM Annual Inspection                                10/20/2021
                              57799481        Contingency ISFSI Haul Path                              06/25/2020
                              58429284        Perform 35.710.055 HISTORM Monthly Screen Inspection    01/27/2022
71111.01  Corrective Action 2032050        2022 Seasonal Readiness-Cold Weather Preps Milestones    11/06/2020
            Documents                        Tracking - Refuel Outage Dates
                              2230324        Request Drawing Update to Shore Barrier Drawings          10/12/2022
                                              Following Yearly Survey
                                                        24
 
Inspection Type              Designation  Description or Title                                        Revision or
Procedure                                                                                              Date
                            2230675      Alternate Diesel Fire Pump Enclosure Heater Not              10/27/2022
                                          Functioning Correctly
                            2230812      Additional Information and Engineering Support Required to  11/02/2022
                                          Troubleshoot U4100F171A
          Corrective Action 2230305      NRC Identified-Bolt Missing from Pin on Door R18            10/11/2022
          Documents
          Resulting from
          Inspection
          Drawings          6A7212071    Reactor and Auxiliary Building Door Schedule and Types      09/06/2022
                            6M7215720    Circulating Water System Functional Operating Sketch        03/18/2022
                            6M7215726    General Service Water System Functional Operating Sketch    10/10/2018
          Procedures        23.101        Circulating Water System                                    107
                            23.131        General Service Water System                                114
                            23.208        RHR Complex Service Water Systems                            134
                            35.000.242    Barrier Identification/Classification                        62
                            MWC16100    Seasonal Readiness                                          2
71111.04  Corrective Action 0900177      Packing Leak: Div. 2 Core Spray Keep Fill Isolation Valve    01/05/2009
          Documents                      Has 2 dpm Packing Leak
                            CARD 1821676 Division 2 Core Spray Fill Outlet Isolation Valve Swing Bolt 02/27/2018
                                          Broken
          Drawings          6M2712015    Diagram Station and Control Air                              04/26/2022
                            6M2715706-3  RHR Service Water Make-Up Decant and Overflow Systems        03/15/2022
                                          Functional Operating Sketch
                            6M7212034    Diagram Core Spray System C.S.S Reactor Building            04/09/2022
                            6M7212084    Diagram Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Division 1              03/17/2022
                            6M7212084    Diagram Residual Heat Removal Division 1                    BS
                            6M7212135    Diagram Fire Protection System (Sheet 1)                    BA
                            6M7212135-1  Diagram Fire Protection System (Sheet 2)                    BL
                            6M7215444    Emergency Equipment Cooling Water Division 1                03/15/2022
                            6M7215707    Core Spray System Functional Operating Sketch                04/09/2022
                            6M7215721-1  Condensate Storage and Transfer System Functional            03/26/2021
                                          Operating Sketch
                                                    25
 
Inspection Type          Designation  Description or Title                                Revision or
Procedure                                                                                  Date
                        6M7215729-1  Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (Division 1)      03/15/2022
                                      Functional Operating Sketch
                        6M7215729-2  Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (Division 2)      04/23/2022
                                      Functional Operating Sketch
                        6M721N2052  P&ID RHR Service Water System Division 1 RHR Complex 03/15/2022
          Miscellaneous              Division 1 RHR LPCI Standby Lineup Verification,    149
                                      Attachment 8A
          Procedures    23.127        Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water/Emergency      152
                                      Equipment Cooling Water System
                        23.127        Div. 1 EECW Valve Lineup                            09/21/2021
                        Attachment 1A
                        23.127        Div. 1 EECW Electrical Lineup                        04/09/2006
                        Attachment 2A
                        23.127        Div. 1 EECW Instrument Lineup                        11/15/2010
                        Attachment 3A
                        23.127        DIV RBCCW/ECCW Standby Verification Checklist        02/11/2021
                        Attachment 4
                        23.129        NIAS Valve Lineup                                    07/30/2015
                        Attachment 1C
                        23.129        Station and Control Air System Electrical Lineup    04/06/2009
                        Attachment 2
                        23.129        Station and Control Air System Instrument Lineup    01/27/2009
                        Attachment 3A
                        23.129        Div. 1 Control Air Standby Verification Checklist    01/11/2010
                        Attachment 4
                        23.203        Core Spray System: Div. 2 Initial Valve Lineup      11/15/2002
                        Attachment 1B
                        23.203        Core Spray System: Common Initial Valve Lineup      01/08/2001
                        Attachment 1C
                        23.203        Core Spray System: Div. 2 Electrical Lineup          11/15/2005
                        Attachment 2B
                        23.203        Core Spray System: Division 2 Instrument Lineup      04/07/2009
                        Attachment 3B
                                                26
 
Inspection Type        Designation      Description or Title                                        Revision or
Procedure                                                                                          Date
                      23.203          Core Spray System: Div. 2 Initial Fill and Vent Independent 01/11/2010
                      Attachment 5B    Verification Checklist
                      23.203          Shifting Div. 2 Core Spray Suction to CST Independent      03/03/2020
                      Attachment 6B    Verification Checklist
                      23.203          Shifting Div. 2 Core Spray Suction to Torus Independent    03/14/2020
                      Attachment 6D    Verification Checklist
                      23.203 Enclosure Core Spray Manual Operation                                11/27/2018
                      A
                      23.205          Residual Heat Removal System                                149
                      23.208          RHR Complex Service Water Systems                          134
                      23.208          Div. 1 RHRSW Valve Lineup                                  01/24/2022
                      Attachment 1A
                      23.208          Division 1 RHRSW Electrical Lineup                          01/24/2022
                      Attachment 2A
                      23.208          Division 1 RHRSW Instrument Lineup                          01/19/2006
                      Attachment 3A
                      23.303          Shifting Div. 2 Core Spray Suction to CST Independent      03/03/2020
                      Attachment 6B    Verification Checklist
                      23.309          Division 1 Distribution System Electrical Lineup            12/09/2020
                      Attachment 1
                      6SD7212530-10  One Line Diagram 260 /130V ESS Dual Battery 2PA            03/16/2022
                                        Distribution-Division 1
          Work Orders 29294552        CS Division 2 Discharge Header Keep Fill E21F026B PCV      02/19/2022
                                        Outlet Isolation Valve
71111.05  Fire Plans  FPRBB2b        Reactor Building Basement Northwest Corner Room,            3
                                        Zone 2, EL. 562'0"
                      FPRBB3b        Reactor Building Basement Southwest Corner Room,            4
                                        Zone 3, EL. 562'0"
                      FPRBSB2a      Reactor Building Sub-Basement Northwest Corner Room,        4
                                        Zone 2, EL. 540'0"
                      FPRBSB3a      Reactor Building Sub-Basement Southwest Corner Room,        5
                                        Zone 3, EL. 540'0"
          Procedures  FPRB315a      Reactor Building Thermal Recombiner System Area, Zone      4
                                        15, EL. 641'6"
                                                  27
 
Inspection Type              Designation Description or Title                                      Revision or
Procedure                                                                                          Date
                            FPRB417a Reactor Building SLC System Zone 17 EL. 659'6"            5
                            FPRBSB5A  Reactor Building Sub-Basement Northeast Corner Room        6
                                        Zone 5 EL 540'0"
71111.06  Corrective Action 2231531    Extent of Condition Walkdown Revealed More Degraded        12/02/2022
          Documents                    MELB Barriers
                            2231541    Walkdown of Division 1 SWRG for Possible Spray Barrier    12/02/2022
                                        Issues
          Corrective Action 2231414    NRC Identified: Spray Cover in Division 2 Switchgear Room  11/29/2022
          Documents                    Degraded
          Resulting from    2231415    NRC Identified: Pipe Cap Near P4400F449 Not Enclosed by    11/29/2022
          Inspection                    Spray Guard
                            2231417    NRC Identified: Metal Enclosure on AB4 Not Sealed at Floor 11/29/2022
                                        Level
                            2231419    NRC Identified: Piping Above HVAC Ducting on AB4 East      11/29/2022
                                        Side Is Not Fully Enclosed in Blue Spray Guard
                            2231505    NRC Identified: Degraded Spray Shield on Division 1 EECW  12/01/2022
                                        Piping
                            2231505    NRC Identified: Degraded Spray Shield on Division 1 EECW  12/01/2022
                                        Piping
                            2231518    NRC Identified: Degraded MELB Barrier on Drywell Seal      12/01/2022
                                        Rupture Drain to Condensate Storage Tank
                            2231571    NRC Identified: Work Order completed on 7/2/2019 Is Not    12/05/2022
                                        Vaulted in Webarms
                            2231571    NRC Identified: Work Order Completed on 7/2/2019          12/05/2022
          Miscellaneous    EF2PRA011 Internal Flood Walkdown Summary Notebook                  0
                            EF2PRA012 Internal Flood Analysis Notebook                          4
          Work Orders      49771630    Perform Inspection of Spray Shrouds                        01/29/2018
71111.07T  Calculations      DC0249    RBCCW Hydraulics and Miscellaneous EECW Calculation        K
                            DC0559    Vol I: Volume of Reservoir                                F
                            DC4931    Non-Interruptible Control Air System (NIAS) Calculations  J
                            DC6286    EECW Heat Exchanger Performance Requirements with          A
                                        Plugging
          Corrective Action 1830419    MDCT A and B Fan Brake Nitrogen System Leaking            12/28/2018
                                                  28
 
Inspection Type              Designation Description or Title                                    Revision or
Procedure                                                                                        Date
          Documents        1927521    Unexpected Increase in Div 1 EECW Heat Exchanger        10/03/2019
                                        Differential Pressure After Recent Swap
                            1927978    Trend in Anomalous System Parameter Measurements        10/21/2019
                                        During Surveillances
                            1928324    2019 NRC Triennial UHS Inspection: Average Silt          10/31/2019
                                        Accumulation in UHS Reservoir Was Not Calculated in WO
                                        47534163
                            2023408    Division 1 Ultimate Heat Sink General Foreign Material  03/28/2020
                                        (Found and Removed During Diving)
                            2023984    Unrecovered Foreign Material - Orange Zip Tie            04/07/2020
                            2030217    2020 MMR14 Structures Monitoring Inspection of RHR High  09/14/2020
                                        Roof (WO)
                            2125607    Unknown Substance Coating Corrosion Coupon Holder        06/24/2021
                            2128982    Housekeeping Concerns on RHR Complex Roof                10/08/2021
                            2222162    Review of RHR Div 1 Reservoir Diving Reports            02/20/2022
                            2222580    Abnormal Moss Buildup and Debris Noted During Div 1 UHS  02/24/2022
                                        Diving
                            2224712    Completion of RF21 RHR Div 2 Reservoir Inspection        04/05/2022
                                        Reports and Videos / Photos
          Corrective Action 2230458    2022 NRC Heat Sink Inspection: Degraded Concrete Noted  10/18/2022
          Documents                    on Pedestal Supports for EDGs 11, 12, 13, and 14 Exhaust
          Resulting from                Mufflers
          Inspection        2230462    2022 NRC Heat Sink Inspection: Poor Housekeeping Noted  10/18/2022
                                        During Walkdown
                            2230463    2022 NRC Heat Sink Inspection: Partial Blockage Noted on 10/18/2022
                                        South RHR Pump Pump Room HVAC Outside Air Inlet
                            2230480    WO Needed to Address Moss and Weeds on RHR Roof          10/19/2022
                            2230492    2022 NRC Heat Sink Performance Inspection: External      10/19/2022
                                        Corrosion Identified on Floor Penetration Sleeve
                            2230506    2022 NRC Heat Sink Inspection: Nitrogen Cylinders Not    10/22/2022
                                        Correctly Labelled
                            2230516    2022 NRC Heat Sink Performance Inspection: Enhancement  10/20/2022
                                        Needed to PM Events P244 and P245
                            2230549    Performance Engineering Extent of Condition per CARD    10/21/2022
                                                  29
 
Inspection Type          Designation      Description or Title                                    Revision or
Procedure                                                                                          Date
                                          2230538
                        2230666        2022 NRC Heat Sink Performance Inspection: Exterior Tape 10/27/2022
                                          on Service Water Piping in RHR Complex
          Drawings      6M7212015      Diagram Station and Control Air                          CU
                        6M7215357      Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System Division II    BW
                        MN2026        General Arrangement RHR Complex Basement Floor Plan      E
                        MN2031        General Arrangement RHR Complex Section "CC"            F
                        MN2050        Equipment Drains and Floor Drains Divisions 1 and 2 RHR  O
                                          Complex
          Miscellaneous                  Commercial Diving and Marine Services Fermi RF21 Outage  02/21/2022
                                          Diving Div 1
                                          Commercial Diving and Marine Services Fermi RF21 Outage  03/28/2022
                                          RHR Div 2 Dive Report
                        Consumable      Cryotech CMA                                            01/15/2021
                        Materials
                        Evaluation (CME)
                        210011
          Procedures    1D88            Division 1 EECW Outlet Temp                              21
                        20.127.01        Loss of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System    31
                        20.129.01        Loss of Station and/or Control Air                      38
                        23.127          Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water / Emergency        151
                                          Equipment Cooling Water System
                        23.129          Station and Control Air System                          124
                        23.208          RHR Complex Service Water Systems                        134
                        24.000.02        Shiftly, Daily, and Weekly Required Surveillances        161
                        7D3              Div 1 RHR Reservoir Level Abnormal                      19
                        E11XX          Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System      E
                                          Design Basis Document
                        MES 52          GL 8913 Safety Related Service Water Monitoring Program 10A
                        MES 54          Heat Exchanger Component Monitoring Program              8
                        MMA10            System Cleanliness                                      12
                        MMA17            Foreign Material Exclusion (FME)                        17
                        MMR14            Structures Monitoring                                    8
                                                    30
 
Inspection Type              Designation    Description or Title                                      Revision or
Procedure                                                                                            Date
                            MOP21          Housekeeping                                              7
          Work Orders      52194616      License Renewal Required Perform Div 1 Reservoir Zebra    03/25/2020
                                            Mussel Inspection Dive
                            52195243      License Renewal Req'd Perform Div 2 RHR Reservoir Zebra  04/08/2020
                                            Mussel and Ball Valve Inspection Dive
                            57269374      License Renewal - Perform Div 1 RHR Reservoir Zebra      02/13/2022
                                            Mussel and Ball Valve Inspection Dive [Confidential]
                            57269883      License Renewal - Perform Div 2 RHR Reservoir Zebra      03/27/2022
                                            Mussel and Ball Valve Inspection Dive
71111.11A  Miscellaneous    2022 LOR NRC  Fermi 2022 Licensed Operator Requalification Exam        11/21/2022
                            Annual OP Test Summary Which Provides the Exam Results for the Annual
                            Summary        Operating Tests Administered from 10/11/2022 - 11/10/2022
71111.11Q Miscellaneous      LPOP2022225 Containment Tech Specs and EALs                          0
                            SSOP2022243 Simulator Lesson Plan                                    0
                            SSOP9042283 Fermi 2 Evaluation Scenario                              0
          Procedures        24.202.01      HPCI Pump and Valve Operability Test at 1025 psi          123
                            29.100.01 SH 1 RPV Control                                              19
                            29.100.01 SH 2 Primary Containment Control                              17
                            29.100.01 SH 6 Curves, Cautions, and Tables                              19
                            ODE10        Emergency Operating Procedure Expectations                36
                            ODE3          Communications                                            75
71111.12  Corrective Action 1823026      Reactor Scram Due to Loss of 64 Transformer              04/14/2018
          Documents        2000399      TIP Detectors Retracting One Inch Behind the Programmed  01/06/2021
                                            InShield Position
                            2021388      TIP E Flux Readings Degrading Rapidly                    07/28/2020
                            2026872      TIP C and TIP D Ball Valves Opened with TIPS InShield    06/22/2020
                            2122080      ITE Type K600-s Breakers Failed to Close                  03/08/2021
                            2222886      Nova Inverters Found OOT                                  03/01/2022
                            2223206      Bus 72EB Pos 2D Failed to open                            03/07/2022
                            2223772      Nova Inverter Tech Evaluation for Frequency Needed Due    03/17/2022
                                            to Frequency Adjustment Issues
                            2226656      Ground Fault on 72U, Loss of Bus                          05/28/2022
          Drawings          6I7212421-05  Schematic Diagram RBCCW Supplemental Cooling Division    04/08/2017
                                                      31
 
Inspection Type              Designation      Description or Title                                        Revision or
Procedure                                                                                                  Date
                                              2 Cooling Pumps
          Miscellaneous    N/A              R1400 Electrical Switchgear 2021 Quarters 2 and 3 System    2021
                                              Health Report
                            R1400            R1400 Electrical Switchgear System Get Well Plan (GWP)      6
                            VMC1545          Installation and Operations Manual for Nova Electric Galaxy 0
                                              Inverter
          Procedures        MMR APP B        Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual Appendix B-Terms and        8
                                              Definitions
                            MMR APP E        Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual Appendix E-                27
                                              Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions
          Self-Assessments                    R1400 Electric Switchgear System Health Q2 and Q3 2021
                                              R1400 Electric Switchgear System Health Report Q4 2020
                                              R1400 Electric Switchgear System Health Q4 2021
71111.13  Corrective Action 2230935          Relay Room H11P613                                          11/07/2022
          Documents        2231390          MDCT Fan 'B' Loud Metallic Noise                            11/28/2022
          Drawings          6I7212045-28    Internal-External Wiring Diagram Division 1 Process        AG
                                              Instrumentation Cabinet H11P613 Part-3
                            6I7212265-02    Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System              AK
                                              Instrumentation
          Miscellaneous    MWC15001          Risk Management Plan for South RFP Suction Line Flow        12/20/2022
                                              Switch Low Source Valve Leak
                            VMR11.18        Millivolt to Current (MV/1) Transmitter                    A
          Procedures        MMR 12            Equipment Out of Service Risk Management                    20A
                            MMR Appendix H    Online Core Damage Risk Management Guidelines              17
          Work Orders      60510175          East Gland Seal Exhaust Motor Replacement                  11/02/2022
71111.15  Corrective Action 2228738          MES27 Evaluation Does Not Support the Immediate            08/15/2022
          Documents                          Operability Determination Assumptions in CARD 2228664
          Resulting from
          Inspection
          Engineering      TEE1122-034    E1156C001B Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Noise            0
          Evaluations      TER3022-068    Licensing Basis for the Effect of Tornado Depressurization  A
                                              on a Running EDG
          Miscellaneous    Adverse Condition B310F010B RRP B Seal Purge Regulating Valve                2
                                                          32
 
Inspection Type              Designation    Description or Title                                        Revision or
Procedure                                                                                                Date
                            Monitoring Plan
                            20010
                            DBD XXX02      Design Basis Document                                        26
                            Various        Various NRC Guidance Documents Pertaining to Operability    Various
                                            and the Meaning of Design Basis
          Procedures        20.307.01      Emergency Diesel Generator Failure                          21
                            22.307.01      Emergency Diesel Failure                                    22
                            23.138.01      Reactor Recirculation System                                119
71111.18  Corrective Action 2230843        PT FD76 Issues and EDM Impact                                11/03/2022
          Documents
          Corrective Action 2230932        NRC Identified: RB5 EDM Equipment Box Label Not Correct      11/07/2022
          Documents        2231503        NRC Identified Issue: 29.EDM.07 Procedure Issue              12/01/2022
          Resulting from
          Inspection
          Drawings          29.200.xx      29.200 series Severe Accident Management Guidelines          various
                                            Flowcharts
          Engineering      60106          Vehicle Barrier System Modification at Entrance to Alternate 0
          Changes                          Access Portal
          Miscellaneous    NEI 1401      Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for            1
                                            Beyond-Design-Basis Events and Severe Accidents
          Procedures        29.EDM.03      SFP Makeup/Spray - External Strategy                        5
                            29.EDM.07      Passive Ventilation of the Air Space Above the Fuel Pool    1
                                            [Confidential]
                            78.000.69      Chemistry Special Test Procedure                            27
                            MGA 14          Severe Accident Management Program                          6
71111.19  Corrective Action 2228853        T4100B007 Above Its Investigative Limit                      08/18/2022
          Documents        2230081        T41N227A AsFound Condition Not Functioning During the      10/03/2022
                                            Performance of WO 46289018
                            2230085        T4100 Failed PMT                                            10/03/2022
                            2230087        Unidentified Contingency Parts / Planning Impact            10/04/2022
          Drawings          6I7212451-13  Schematic Diagram NIAS Div. 1 Dryer Controls                06/02/2016
                            6M7215707      Core Spray System Functional Operating Sketch                04/09/2022
                            6M7215730-3    Non-Interruptible Control Air System Division 1 and 2        03/29/2012
                                                      33
 
Inspection Type              Designation  Description or Title                                      Revision or
Procedure                                                                                            Date
                                          Functional Operating Sketch
                            IS248103B EDP 80165.022 (Fermi 2 Diesel Fire Pump Modification      11/08/2022
                                          Alarm Circuitry)
          Engineering      EDP 80165    Fermi 2 Diesel Driven Fire Pump Replacement Modification  0
          Changes
          Work Orders      44128550    Calibrate Div. 1 CCHVAC Chiller Condenser EECW Outlet      10/03/2022
                                          Flow Switch
                            46289018    Calibrate Div. 1 CCHVAC Emergency Make-up and Recirc      10/03/2022
                                          Air Temperature Switch
                            47264945    PDMA Testing (Motor Tagged) of Control Air Compressor      11/02/2022
                                          Room Cool Unit
                            48640608    Replace Div. 1 Control Air Non-Interruptible Air Supply    11/02/2022
                                          Isolation Valve Solenoid Valve
                            48860374    Calibrate Div. 1 CCHVAC Chiller Evaporator Low            10/03/2022
                                          Temperature Switch
                            57420071    License Renewal Replace Suction and Discharge Valves      11/02/2022
                                          with New and Refurbished Valves
                            58187204    Replace Non-Interruptible Air Supply Solenoid Valve        11/02/2022
                            58471305    Control Air Non-Interruptible North Control Air Dryer West 11/02/2022
                                          Chamber Relief Valve
                            61353693    Replace Division 1 North Control Air Compressor Unloading  11/02/2022
                                          Cylinder Solenoid Valve
                            61563113    Calibrate Division 1 CCHVAC Equipment Room                10/03/2022
                                          Temperature Switch
                            63600050    Test Division1 CCHVAC Zone 2 Cable Spreading Room          10/03/2022
                                          Mixing Damper Temperature Loop
                            64193098    7D51 Division 1 Control Air System Trouble Due to High    11/02/2022
                                          Differential Pressure. Calibrate or Replace
                            66000026    Post Mod Testing for EDP 80165                            11/23/2022
71111.22  Corrective Action 0422892    EDG 11 DGSW Pump Min Flow Valve Not Indicating Fully      06/28/2004
          Documents                      Closed
                            0425803    Rework EDG11, 12, and 14 DGSW Minimum Flow Valves        11/19/2004
                            2123411    Step Change in RB Steam Tunnel Temperature Due to          04/16/2021
                                          Possible HPCI Steam Leak
                                                    34
 
Inspection Type              Designation    Description or Title                                        Revision or
Procedure                                                                                              Date
                            2226208      Rounds Needs Updated                                        05/11/2022
                            2229106      Increased Unidentified Leakage in Drywell DD72 Sump        08/29/2022
                                            During Division 2 EECW Pump and Valve Surveillance
                                            24.107.09 Section 5.1
                            2229187      Drywell Unidentified Leakage Update                        08/31/2022
                            2229282      Drywell Sump Leakage Increase                              09/02/2022
                            2229536      Performing MMA26 for CARD 2227022 DW Unidentified          09/14/2022
                                            Leakage
                            2230145      R30F402 Indicating 10 Percent Open When Valve Should      10/05/2022
                                            Be Closed
                            2230170      No Flow, Suspect Drain Line Clogged                        10/05/2022
                            2231365      0.8" Step Change in Drywell Floor Drain Sump Level          11/26/2022
                                            Following Pumpdown
                            2231450      Investigation of Parameters Around a Run of HPCI            11/30/2022
          Corrective Action 2223089      NRC Concern - Operations Rounds Details on Safety-          03/04/2022
          Documents                        Related Motor Oil Levels
          Resulting from
          Inspection
          Drawings          6I7212572-28  4160V ESS Buses 64B and 64C Load Shedding Strings          V
                            6I721257B-05  Relay and Metering Diagram 4160V ESS Bus 64B                U
                            6I721N257217 4160V ESS Diesel Bus 11EA Load Shedding Strings            Y
                            6I721N257806 Relaying and Metering Diagram Diesel Generator 11 Unit 2    X
                            6M7213361-1  Standby Liquid Control Pump, Reactor Building, Unit 2      P
                            6SD7212500-03 One Line Diagram 4160V System Service Buses 64B, 64C        S
          Miscellaneous    N/A            Control Room Narrative Logs from 11/13/2022 to              11/30/2022
                                            11/30/2022
                            VMR147.1      Union Pump                                                  B
                            VMR147.4      Gear Reducers                                              A
                            VMR162        Triclad Vertical Induction Motor                            F
                            VMS2539      Centrifugal Water Chillers                                  L
          Procedures        24.207.09      Division 2 EECW Pump and Valve Operability                  47
                            24.307.34      DGSW, DFOT, and Starting Air Operability Test EDG 11        58
                            42.302.07      Calibration and Functional Test of Division 1 4160 Volt Bus 38
                                                      35
 
Inspection Type              Designation Description or Title                                      Revision or
Procedure                                                                                          Date
                                        64B Undervoltage Relays
                            MES 49      Evaluation and Control of Leakage from Class 1, 2, and 3  9
                                        Piping Systems
          Work Orders      56289097    Perform 3Year Performance Testing of N+1 Train            09/03/2021
                                        Dominator and Neptune Equipment
                            60264432    Perform 42.302.07 Division 1 Bus 64B 4160V Undervoltage    10/06/2022
                                        Relays Cal/Funct
                            61256368    Perform 3Year Performance Test of N Train Dominator and  09/03/2021
                                        Neptune Equipment
                            61905540    Perform 24.307.34 Sec-5.1 and 5.2 DGSW and DFOT Pump      09/02/2022
                                        and Valve Operability Test - EDG 11
                            66926147    Perform 24.20201 HPCI Pump/Flow Test and Valve Stroke      11/29/2022
                                        at 1025 psig
71114.04  Miscellaneous    202108E    50.54(q) Evaluation - Spent Fuel Pool Level Updates for    09/21/2021
                                        RA2.3, RS2.1, and RG2.1
                            202135S    50.54(q) Screen - Spent Fuel Pool Level Updates for RA2.3, 09/21/2021
                                        RS2.1, and RG2.1
          Procedures        EP101      Classification of Emergencies                              43A
                            EP101      Classification of Emergencies                              44
71114.06  Procedures        EP101      Classifications of Emergencies                            44
71152A    Corrective Action 1324841    EDG Steady State Voltage and Frequency Tech Spec          07/10/2013
          Documents                    Ranges
                            1826451    SLC Storage Tank Heater B Leak                            08/27/2018
                            1927780    VT2 Inspection Results - C4100F001                        10/11/2019
                            1927781    VT2 Inspection Results - C4101S002                        10/11/2019
                            2024915    CSRT Dry Run Findings                                      04/21/2020
                            2027392    Safety Concern                                            06/28/2020
                            2027659    Safety Concern - Questionable Decision Making Leading to  07/05/2020
                                        Error Likely Situation
                            2124291    3D17 IPCS Computer Trouble Due to Loss of SS1              05/16/2021
                            2128792    SS1 CARD Documentation Requires Investigation            10/04/2021
                            2221059    Product Failed EQRT                                        02/03/2022
                            2223915    Discrepancy Identified in RF20 Torus Recoat WO 55151575    03/19/2022
                                                  36
 
Inspection Type              Designation      Description or Title                                      Revision or
Procedure                                                                                              Date
                            2225370        NQA RF21 - Complete MES 27 Risk Evaluation for CARD      04/19/2022
                                              1324841
                            2225370        NQA RF21 - Complete MES 27 Risk Evaluation for CARD      04/19/2022
                                              1324841
                            2228341        NQA Audit 220107 Deficiency - Untimely Actions for SPING 07/29/2022
                                              and SS1 Computer Replacement
                            2229030        SPING Flow Calibration Review                            08/25/2022
                            2230062        VT2 Exam Results - C4101S002                            10/02/2022
                            2230739        3D82 MS Steam Line Channel A/B/C/D Radiation Monitor      10/31/2022
                                              HiHi Due to Channel A
                            2231322        Non-Functional Category C EITER (EP580)                  11/22/2022
                            2231437        Evaluate Fermi Operating License 2.C.10 for Amendment    11/29/2022
          Corrective Action 2230092        NRC Identified: Missed LER for Past Operability of CARD  10/04/2022
          Documents                          2227461
          Resulting from    2230116        NRC Identified - Leaking SLC Bolted Connections not      10/04/2022
          Inspection                        Inspected During RF21
          Drawings          6I7212095-14    Schematic Diagram Nuclear Steam Supply Shut Off System    O
                                              Trip System A
                            6I7212185-03    Schematic Diagram Process Radiation Monitor SYS Main      N
                                              Steam Line Rad Monitor Sub SYS D1103
                            6I7212351-02    Schematic Diagram Condenser Vacuum Pump East              K
                                              (N6101C001)
          Miscellaneous                      RERP Plan                                                49
                                              U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide      3
                            22022 ISI/NDE-  Standby Liquid Control Flange Leakage Evaluation          0
                            IST Program
                            Evaluation Sheet
                            Equipment Cause  2222967, RF21 MES 83114 Inspection - Torus Immersion    03/02/2022
                            Evaluation      Space - Indications Identified in Coating on Bays 4 and 5
                            HP Cause        2024860, Worker Fell from Lower Work Platform            1
                            Evaluation
                            NEI 1503        Licensee Actions to Address Nonconservative Technical    2
                                              Specifications
                                                        37
 
Inspection Type              Designation      Description or Title                                      Revision or
Procedure                                                                                                Date
                            RERP Plan        Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan          12/18/2019
          Operability      MGA 21          General Administrative Conduct Manual                      9
          Evaluations
          Procedures        EP101          Enclosure A - Classification Matrix                        44
                            EP546          RERP Plan Implementing Procedure                          8
                            EP580          Equipment Important to Emergency Response (EITER)          10
                            MGA 31          Supplemental Personnel Control Practice                    4
71152S    Corrective Action 2227456        Ground Fault on YPhase on Output Form Main Unit          06/27/2022
          Documents                          Transformer to CM and CF Output Breakers
                            2227461        FO 2201 Start Up Walkdown: MOV Actuator Disconnected      06/27/2022
                                              From Bonnet
                            2227473        Procedure Revision for Mayfly Infestation Preparation      06/27/2022
                                              Plan 27.322
                            2227475        Actuator Broke Free of Yolk Mounting Bolts - B2103F019    06/27/2022
                            2227499        Add Circuits to 27.322 Mayfly Infestation                  06/28/2022
                            2231628        Trend in NRC Identified CARDs Related to MELB Spray        12/07/2022
                                              Shield Barriers
                            2231631        Procedure 23.107 Does Not Work as Written                  12/07/2022
                            2231951        Evaluate Emerging Trend of Failed MRC Products            12/19/2022
          Miscellaneous    Human            2230092 - NRC Identified: Missed LER for Past Operability 09/13/2022
                            Performance      of CARD 2227461
                            Cause Evaluation
                            Organizational  2027545 - Loss of 345kv Due to Mayfly Infestation        2
                            Effectiveness
                            Cause Evaluation
          Procedures        27.322          Mayfly Infestation Preparation Plan                        17, 23
71153      Corrective Action 2127388        HPCI and Div 2 EDG Sequencer Power Failures                08/22/2021
          Documents
          Miscellaneous    LER 2021001    Unrecognized Impact of Opening of Barrier Doors on High    0
                                              Energy Line Break Analysis
                            LER 2022003    Turbine Trip and Subsequent Reactor Trip Due to Mayflies  0
                            NRC220013      Licensee Event Report 2022001                            04/04/2022
                                                        38
}}

Latest revision as of 10:45, 6 July 2023

Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2022004
ML23039A155
Person / Time
Site: Fermi DTE Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/14/2023
From: Billy Dickson
NRC/RGN-III/DORS/RPB2
To: Peter Dietrich
DTE Electric Company
References
IR 2022004
Download: ML23039A155 (1)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000341/2022004

Text

February 14, 2023

Peter Dietrich

Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer

DTE Electric Company

Fermi 2 - 260 TAC

6400 North Dixie Highway

Newport, MI 48166

SUBJECT: FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2-INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT

05000341/2022004

Dear Peter Dietrich:

On December 31, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an

inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2. On January 25, 2023, the NRC inspectors discussed

the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this

inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Five findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Three of

these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. We are treating these violations as

non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this

inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection

report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:

Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional

Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector

at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a

regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date

of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the

Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant,

Unit 2.

P. Dietrich 2

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection

and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document

Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public

Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

Signed by Dickson, Billy

on 02/14/23

Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Docket No. 05000341

License No. NPF43

Enclosure:

As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

ML23039A155

Non-Sensitive Publicly Available

SUNSI Review

Sensitive Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE RIII RIII

NAME RNg:mb BDickson

DATE 02/10/2023 02/14/2023

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000341

License Number: NPF-43

Report Number: 05000341/2022004

Enterprise Identifier: I2022004-0042

Licensee: DTE Electric Company

Facility: Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2

Location: Newport, MI

Inspection Dates: October 01, 2022 to December 31, 2022

Inspectors: T. Briley, Senior Project Engineer

R. Edwards, Branch Chief

J. Gewargis, Resident Inspector

G. Hansen, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector

T. Iskierka-Boggs, Senior Operations Engineer

M. Jones, Emergency Response Coordinator

J. Kutlesa, Emergency Preparedness Inspector

R. Ng, Senior Project Engineer

T. Taylor, Senior Resident Inspector

Approved By: Billy C. Dickson, Jr., Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Operating Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees

performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, in accordance

with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for

overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to

https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Monitor Moderate Energy Line Break Flood Barriers

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [P.2] - 71111.06

Systems NCV 05000341/202200401 Evaluation

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of

10 CFR 50, appendix B, criterion III, Design Control, when the licensee failed to validate the

design of certain internal flood barriers protecting safety-related equipment. Specifically, the

inspectors identified degraded and missing spray shields designed to protect safety-related

equipment from the effects of moderate energy line breaks (MELBs).

Failure to Follow Housekeeping Procedure on Residual Heat Removal Complex (Ultimate

Heat Sink) Roof

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [H.12] - Avoid 71111.07T

Systems FIN 05000341/202200402 Complacency

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to

document housekeeping findings and initiate a condition assessment resolution document

(CARD) for discrepancies on the residual heat removal (RHR) complex roof in accordance

with licensee procedure MOP 21, "Housekeeping." Specifically, the inspectors identified

miscellaneous debris (such as food wrappers, ear plugs, security drill rounds, plastic bags,

moss clumps, tie wraps, small plastic pieces, and paint chips) that had not been documented

by the licensee despite multiple individuals touring the area.

Vendor Oversight Issues During RF20 Torus Recoat Project

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [H.5] - Work 71152A

Systems FIN 05000341/202200403 Management

Open/Closed

The NRC identified a Green finding associated with vendor oversight of the 2020 torus recoat

project when unexpected degradation of the coating prompted a review that determined

control of supplemental personnel during the 2020 outage was inadequate.

2

Some Industry Standards Not Incorporated into Torus Recoat Procedures

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [H.11] - 71152A

Systems NCV 05000341/202200404 Challenge the

Open/Closed Unknown

A Green finding with an associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 appendix B,

criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was self-revealed while inspecting the

torus during the RF21 refueling outage (spring 2022). Some areas of degradation were

observed that were unexpected given the torus had been recoated during the previous

refueling outage. Upon further review, the licensee identifies that some applicable industry

standards had been omitted from the torus recoat procedures, and certain portions of the

work instructions were not followed.

Failure to Perform a Required Code Evaluations for Standby Liquid Control System Leakage

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [H.12] - Avoid 71152A

Systems NCV 05000341/202200405 Complacency

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding with an associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of

10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Standards," for the licensees failure to follow the ASME Code

after discovering boric acid leakage in the standby liquid control system (SLC). Specifically, a

code required evaluation was not performed as an alternative to corrective actions.

Additional Tracking Items

Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status

URI 05000341/202200303 Seismic Displacement for 71111.18 Closed

Safety-Related Piping Not

Verified

LER 05000341/2021002-00 LER 2021002-00 for Fermi 71153 Closed

2 Power Plant, Unplanned

Inoperability of High

Pressure Coolant Injection

System Due to an Inverter

Circuit Failure

LER 05000341/2021002-01 LER 2021002-01 for Fermi 71153 Closed

Power Plant, Unit 2,

Unplanned Inoperability of

High Pressure Coolant

Injection System Due to an

Inverter Circuit Failure

LER 05000341/2021001-00 LER 2021001-00 for Fermi, 71153 Closed

Unit 2, Unrecognized Impact

of Opening of Barrier Doors

on High Energy Line Break

Analysis

LER 05000341/2022003-00 LER 2022003-00 for Fermi 71153 Closed

2 Power Plant, Turbine Trip

3

and Subsequent Reactor

Trip Due to Mayflies

LER 05000341/2022001-00 LER 2022001-00 for Fermi 71153 Closed

2 Power Plant, Reactor

Scram on Low Reactor

Pressure Vessel Level

4

PLANT STATUS

Fermi Unit 2 started the inspection period at or near 100 percent power, and remained there for

the quarter.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with

their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-

rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared

complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met

consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection

Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed activities described in IMC 2515,

appendix D, Plant Status, observed risk significant activities, and completed onsite portions of

IPs. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and

interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules

and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection

Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to

the onset of seasonal cold temperatures for the following systems:

General service water, circulating water, and residual heat removal service water

(RHRSW) for the week ending on November 18, 2022

External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated that flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures,

and equipment are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk

analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding for the week ending on

November 4, 2022.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following

systems/trains:

(1) Division 1 emergency equipment cooling water (EECW) with division 2 EECW TCV

maintenance during the week ending October 21, 2022

(2) Division 1 non-interruptible air system (NIAS) during division 2 control center heating,

ventilation, and air conditioning (CCHVAC) safety system outage during the week

ending October 21, 2022

5

(3) Division 1 130/260 engineered safety feature direct current (DC) power and battery

system during the week ending October 29, 2022

(4) Electric fire pump while the alternate diesel fire pump was out of service on

November 9, 2022

(5) Division 2 residual heat removal (RHR) drywell spray with work on division 1 during

the week ending November 26, 2022

(6) Division 1 RHRSW with the division 2 RHR pump and valve surveillance during the

week ending November 25, 2022

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the

division 2 core spray system during the week ending on November 4, 2022.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a

walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,

material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1) Southwest quadrant of the reactor building basement and sub-basement during the

week ending October 21, 2022

(2) Northwest quadrant of the reactor building basement and sub-basement during the

week ending November 18, 2022

(3) Reactor core isolation cooling quad sprinkler question during the week ending

December 10, 2022

(4) Reactor building 3 and reactor building 4 standby liquid control area during the week

ending December 12, 2022

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures

Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the following:

(1) Auxiliary building third and fourth levels, completed the week ending

December 31, 2022

71111.07T - Heat Exchanger/Sink Performance

Heat Exchanger (Service Water Cooled) (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated heat exchanger performance on the following:

(1) P4400B001B, EECW division 2 plate and frame heat exchanger

Heat Exchanger (Closed Loop) (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated heat exchanger performance on the following:

6

(1) P5002B004, control air compressor (CAC) after cooler - north non-interruptible

control air (NIAS)

Ultimate Heat Sink (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the ultimate heat sink performance on the following:

(1) The ultimate heat sink, specifically sections 03.04.a and 03.04.e were completed.

71111.11A - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Requalification Examination Results (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed and evaluated the licensed operator examination failure

rates for the requalification annual operating tests administered between

October 11, 2022 and November 10, 2022.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control

room during a planned high pressure coolant injection system surveillance that

resulted in a yellow risk condition, with complications regarding the performance of

two valves in the system, on November 15, 2022.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (2 Samples)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated performance of an annual operating test in

the control room simulator on October 26, 2022.

(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification training for

technical specifications and emergency action level entry, and simulator exercise

scenarios in the main control room simulator during the week ending

November 18, 2022.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following

structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended

function:

(1) 4160V electrical switchgear

(2) Power supply inverters for safety-related instrumentation and control loads

(3) Review of issues associated with the transversing incore probe system, completed

the week ending December 24, 2022

7

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the

following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and

appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1) Troubleshooting and electric shock associated with the reactor water cleanup system

during the week ending November 12, 2022

(2) Gland seal exhaust motor replacement on November 02, 2022

(3) Mechanical draft cooling tower fan 'B' maintenance November 28, 2022

(4) Approach to a leaking sensing line for reactor feed pump suction pressure, completed

the week of December 31, 2022

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the

following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Abnormal noise from the 'B' mechanical draft cooling tower motor during the week

ending December 3, 2022

(2) Recirculation pump seal pressure changes during the week ending

December 10, 2022

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Severe Accident Management Guidelines (SAMG) Update (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors verified the site SAMG were updated in accordance with the BWR

generic severe accident technical guidelines and validated in accordance with NEI

1401, Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for Beyond Design Basis

Events and Severe Accidents, Revision 1.

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance testing activities to verify system

operability and/or functionality:

(1) Division 1 CCHVAC outage during the week of October 3, 2022

(2) Division 1 NIAS during the week ending November 4, 2022

(3) Diesel fire pump post installation testing, completed during the week ending

December 23, 2022

8

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance testing activities to verify system

operability and/or functionality:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)

(1) Electrical bus 64B undervoltage testing and relay calibrations during the week ending

October 8, 2022

(2) HPCI pump and valve surveillance after pressure control valve repair and outboard

main steam isolation valve packing adjustment on December 1, 2022

(3) EECW pump and valve during the week ending December 14, 2022

(4) Validation of acceptable level bands for oil and tank levels on select motors and

tanks, completed the week ending December 24, 2022

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) EDG 11 SW pump and minimum flow valve testing during the week ending

October 21, 2022

RCS Leakage Detection Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) RCS leakage increasing trend during the week ending October 29, 2022

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Dominator and Neptune pump run surveillances, completed by the week ending

December 31, 2022

71114.04 - Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Inspection Review (IP Section 02.0102.03) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the following submitted Emergency Action Level and

Emergency Plan changes:

202108E, Spent fuel pool level updates for RA2.3, RS2.1, and RG2.1,

September 21, 2021

202135S, Spent fuel pool level updates for RA2.3, RS2.1, and RG2.1,

September 21, 2021

This evaluation does not constitute NRC approval.

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation

Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01)

(1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated drill and exercise performance indicator opportunities

associated with a licensed-operator requalification activity on October 26, 2022.

9

OTHER ACTIVITIES-BASELINE

71152A - Annual Follow-up Problem Identification and Resolution

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program

related to the following issues:

(1) Ongoing issues with effluent sampling systems and potential impacts to declaring

emergency action levels, the week ending December 10, 2022

(2) Select review of degraded/non-conforming conditions carried by the licensee,

completed the week of December 31, 2022

(3) Review of 2020 torus recoat project following degradation identified in 2022,

completed the week of December 31, 2022

71152S - Semiannual Trend Problem Identification and Resolution

Semiannual Trend Review (Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential

adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000341/2021001, Unrecognized Impact of Opening of Barrier Doors on High

Energy Line Break Analysis (ADAMS Accession No. ML21182A291). The inspection

conclusions associated with this LER are documented in Inspection

Report 05000341/2021003 under Inspection Results section 71111.15 (ADAMS

Accession No. ML21298A200). An analysis to assess the potential impacts on

components outside the reactor building steam tunnel (RBST) during a line break in

the RBST does not exist. Current analyses assume the door is shut. Subsequent to

NRC identification of the issue in 2021, the licensee took steps to conduct an analysis

on effects outside the RBST. This effort was not completed. As a result, the

inspectors cannot validate the accuracy of several of the 10 CFR 50.73 reporting

criteria, such as loss of safety functions and conditions prohibited by technical

specifications (TS). While the licensee did report under those criteria (assuming a

worst case scenario where all equipment required to respond to a line break in the

RBST was inoperable due to the break), without an analysis on the environmental

impacts outside the RBST, it is impossible to assess whether or not these criteria

were actually met. Despite that, the licensee did report under criteria for an

unanalyzed condition and a condition prohibited by TS 3.0.3 specifically. The

inspectors determined it was appropriate to report under those criteria given the lack

of analysis and multiple types and trains of equipment that may have been impacted

to the point where operability was brought into question. The non-cited violation

associated with this issue screened as very low safety significance given the small

amount of time the door had been open in the past 3 years. The licensee instituted

10

corrective actions to better recognize and control important doors throughout the

plant. No further findings nor violations were identified.

(2) LER 05000341/2021002-00 and 05000341/2021002-01, Unplanned Inoperability of

High Pressure Coolant Injection System Due to an Inverter Circuit Failure (ADAMS

Accession Nos. ML22075A087). The inspectors determined that it was not

reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER therefore no

performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors did not identify a violation of

NRC requirements. The inspectors reviewed the previous, as well as the updated

LER submittal.

(3) LER 05000341/2022001, Reactor Scram on Low Reactor Pressure Vessel Level

(ADAMS Accession No. ML22094A155). The inspection conclusions associated with

this LER are documented in Inspection Report 0500341/2022003 under Inspection

Results section 71152A. No further findings or violations were identified.

(4) LER 05000341/2022003, Turbine Trip and Subsequent Reactor Trip due to Mayflies

(ADAMS Accession No. ML22235A106). The inspection conclusions associated with

this LER are documented in Inspection Report 0500341/2022003 (ADAMS Accession

No. ML22311A531) under Inspection Results section 71152A. No findings nor

violations were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES-TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL

60855 - Operation of an ISFSI

The inspectors evaluated the licensees activities related to the long-term operation and

monitoring of its Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). The inspectors reviewed

relevant documentation remotely during the weeks of October 10 and October 17, 2022, and

were onsite on October 19, 2022. During the onsite walkdown, the inspector toured the ISFSI

and evaluated the material and radiological conditions of the ISFSI pad and loaded HISTORM

100 systems. The inspectors verified radiological conditions on the ISFSI pad were as expected

during the walkdown. The inspectors interviewed licensee staff regarding periodic surveillances

of the loaded HISTORM casks.

Since the last inspection, the inspectors evaluated corrective action documents and changes

performed in accordance with 10 CFR 72.48, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments."

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Monitor Moderate Energy Line Break Flood Barriers

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [P.2] - 71111.06

Systems NCV 05000341/202200401 Evaluation

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding and associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of

10 CFR 50, appendix B, criterion III, Design Control, when the licensee failed to validate the

design of certain internal flood barriers protecting safety-related equipment. Specifically, the

11

inspectors identified degraded and missing spray shields designed to protect safety-related

equipment from the effects of moderate energy line breaks (MELBs).

Description:

On November 29, 2022, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the third floor and fourth

floor of the auxiliary building (AB) as part of an internal flooding inspection sample. During the

walkdown, the inspectors discovered that the MELB spray shields in the division 2 switchgear

room and AB fourth floor were degraded or missing from sections of emergency equipment

cooling water (EECW) piping. The spray shield design consists of a fiberglass-impregnated

material that encloses susceptible piping to contain and divert water away from safety-related

equipment, namely electrical switchgear. The inspectors questioned the potential effects of

the degraded/missing spray shields on nearby equipment. In response, the licensee

performed technical evaluations that concluded that safety-related equipment remained

operable in the current condition but not in accordance with the design.

A subsequent review by the licensee revealed that a condition assessment resolution

document (CARD) had been written in 2020 documenting the degraded spray shields in the

division 2 switchgear room, consistent with what was identified on the NRC walkdown almost

3 years later. While the licensee had generated a work order to fix the shields, it was still in a

delay status, and no monitoring plan was in place to ensure the barrier could still fulfill its

design functions (e.g., following work in the area or periodic checks of the tape holding the

barrier in place at some locations). The licensee found no evidence for other piping sections

that the missing shields had been identified or documented by the licensee. Through

discussion with the inspectors, the licensee determined that the work activity to inspect spray

shields throughout the plant had not been performed when last scheduled in July 2019.

During the extent of condition walkdowns following NRC's discovery of the issue, further

degraded spray shields were identified; however, most were determined not be a part of the

internal flooding design basis anymore. The licensee evaluated the others to ensure no

impacts to safety-related equipment existed.

Corrective Actions: The licensee completed a technical evaluation to support the operability

of the division 2 switchgear and confirmed other areas of missing/degraded spray shields did

not constitute a deviation from design nor have adverse impacts on nearby equipment as part

of their extent of condition walkdowns. In response to the inspectors' questions, the licensee

also started a review to determine if they properly administrated the periodic inspection

activity to validate the flood barrier design.

Corrective Action References: CARDs 2231414, 2020846, 2231541, 2231415, and

2231571.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensee failed to perform a

scheduled verification of flooding barriers. Additionally, deviations from MELB protection

features were not controlled due to inspector identification of missing/degraded spray shields

on EECW piping that had not been identified by the licensee nor properly monitored.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because it was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,

reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

12

consequences. Specifically, degraded MELB barriers had not been identified, monitored,

and/or properly assessed that could impact nearby safety-related equipment.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609

appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.

Specifically, the finding screened to Green (very low safety significance) because questions 2

through 6 on exhibit 2 of the mitigating systems screening were answered as No.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to

ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their

safety significance. Specifically, when degraded MELB barriers were identified, the licensee

failed to ensure appropriate technical assessments were performed, that effective monitoring

was in place, and an extent of condition was performed to identify other issues.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50, appendix B, criterion III, "Design Control," states, in part, that measures

established shall include provisions to assure that appropriate quality standards are specified

and included in design documents and that deviations from such standards are controlled.

Contrary to the above, from January 24, 2020 to January 9, 2023, the licensee failed to

assure that deviations from quality standards were controlled. Specifically, the licensee failed

to complete a scheduled inspection of flood barriers. Further, the licensee did not perform a

technical assessment nor monitoring to support shroud functionality once degradation was

identified.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with section 2.3.2 of

the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Follow Housekeeping Procedure on Residual Heat Removal Complex (Ultimate

Heat Sink) Roof

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [H.12] - Avoid 71111.07T

Systems FIN 05000341/202200402 Complacency

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensee's failure to

document housekeeping findings and initiate a condition assessment resolution document

(CARD) for discrepancies on the residual heat removal (RHR) complex roof in accordance

with licensee procedure MOP 21, "Housekeeping." Specifically, the inspectors identified

miscellaneous debris (such as food wrappers, ear plugs, security drill rounds, plastic bags,

moss clumps, tie wraps, small plastic pieces, and paint chips) that had not been documented

by the licensee despite multiple individuals touring the area.

Description:

On October 18, 2022, the inspectors performed a walkdown of the residual heat removal

complex roof. The inspectors noted that the lower roof contained miscellaneous debris in the

form of food wrappers, ear plugs, security drill rounds, plastic bags, moss clumps, tie wraps,

small plastic pieces, and paint chips. The inspectors also noted that one of the large plastic

storage bins containing ice melt material had been lined with a plastic bag and turned into a

makeshift trash can. The identified debris was generally in the vicinity of roof drains and/or

grating that led to or was directly over the division 1 and division 2 ultimate heat sink water

reservoirs used to transfer heat from structures, systems, and components important to

13

safety. Natural phenomena (such as rainfall or wind gusts) could potentially transport the

debris into the reservoirs and potentially challenge pump operation for residual heat removal

service water, emergency equipment service water, and/or emergency diesel generator

service water. Periodic diving inspection records from 2020 and 2022 also indicated the

presence of miscellaneous debris such as plastic signage, moss clumps, and ear plugs

located under water in the reservoirs (debris was documented as removed by the divers upon

discovery).

The personnel doors used to access the RHR complex roof indicated the area was a

"housekeeping category."

Licensee procedure MOP 21, "Housekeeping," Revision 7, contains procedural guidance for

ensuring adequate levels of housekeeping to ensure safe plant operation and included all

activities related to controlling material in all areas of the facility. The procedure also stated, in

part, that individuals are expected to maintain the same level of housekeeping inside and out

of the power block. Procedure step 2.3.9 stated, in part, that persons performing a plant tour

shall 1) document findings on the housekeeping inspection report form and 2) initiate a

condition assessment resolution document (condition report) for discrepancies when

required.

The debris identified by the inspectors had not been documented as a housekeeping finding

nor entered into the corrective action program via a condition assessment resolution

document until brought to the licensee's attention. It is unknown how long the miscellaneous

debris was present on the residual heat removal complex roof, however, the inspectors

determined that some of the miscellaneous debris had most likely been on the roof for an

extended period of time based on environmental degradation.

Corrective Actions: The miscellaneous debris was subsequently removed from the residual

heat removal complex roof and a follow-up investigation into the cause(s) was planned.

Corrective Action References: CARD 2230462

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to document housekeeping findings and

initiate a CARD for discrepancies on the RHR complex roof in accordance with licensee

procedure MOP 21, "Housekeeping," was a performance deficiency. Specifically, the

inspectors identified miscellaneous debris (such as food wrappers, ear plugs, security drill

rounds, plastic bags, moss clumps, tie wraps, small plastic pieces, and paint chips) that had

not been documented by the licensee despite multiple individuals touring the area.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety

concern. Specifically, debris on the residual heat removal complex roof can be washed or

blown directly into the ultimate heat sink reservoirs and could potentially impact safety-related

residual heat removal, emergency equipment, and emergency diesel generator service water

systems. The inspectors also noted previous dive inspection records in both 2020 and 2022

of the ultimate heat sink reservoirs housed in the residual heat removal complex contained

debris found such as plastic signage and bags, paint chips, and ear plugs to name a few

(items were retrieved during periodic diving activities).

14

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609

appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.

Specifically, the mitigating systems screening questions for structures, systems, and

components and probabilistic risk analysis functionality were all answered no. Therefore, the

finding screened as of very low safety significance (Green).

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the

possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful

outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, multiple

individuals from multiple organizations routinely traversed the RHR complex roof and

appeared to not consider the potential undesired consequences of their actions in leaving

miscellaneous debris on the roof, verify housekeeping procedure prerequisites despite being

prompted by the access door signs stating "housekeeping category," nor performed a

thorough review of the area every time work was performed (such as operator rounds) rather

than relying on past successes and assumed conditions.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

URI Seismic Displacement for Safety-Related Piping Not 71111.18

Verified

URI 05000341/202200303

Description:

During the fourth quarter of 2022, the licensee provided additional information from a design

basis calculation of record associated with the division 1 residual heat removal service water

(RHRSW) supply and return piping inside the reactor building. Calculation No. DC6953,

"Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System Subsystem: EX15," Revision 0 provides the

design basis and licensing basis information associated with the seismic and thermal

displacements of the piping and determination of whether the maximum piping displacement

impacts any systems, structures, or components (SSCs).

The licensee provided the piping displacement information from Calculation No. DC6953 to

demonstrate that the RHRSW piping will not impact any SSCs. The inspector reviewed this

information and concluded this issue is closed. No performance deficiencies or findings were

identified.

Corrective Action Reference(s): condition assessment resolution document 2227033,

NRC Identified: Evaluation of Potential Rattle Space Violation, dated 06/10/2022.

Vendor Oversight Issues during RF20 Torus Recoat Project

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [H.5] - Work 71152A

Systems FIN 05000341/202200403 Management

Open/Closed

The NRC identified a Green finding associated with vendor oversight of the 2020 torus recoat

project when unexpected degradation of the coating prompted a review that determined

control of supplemental personnel during the 2020 outage was inadequate.

15

Description:

The unexpected torus coating degradation discovered during the 2022 refueling outage

prompted an investigation by the licensee into the operability of the torus and the potential

causes of the degradation. Non-cited violation (NCV) 05000341/202200404, documented in

this inspection report, describes the issues with the work instructions associated with the

2020 torus project. Further investigation by the licensee as a result of NRC questions

prompted a condition assessment resolution document (CARD) 2227942 to be written to

explore the extent of work control/process gaps that may have existed for the torus project.

An organizational effectiveness evaluation determined that supplemental personnel assigned

to the torus project failed to follow site processes regarding procedure use and adherence.

One of the potential causes for the degradation of the new torus coating was the lack of tarps

to protect uncoated areas from the spraying of coating in nearby areas. Despite the work

instructions calling for tarps, they were not used. A review of the work instructions later

revealed steps were inappropriately marked as complete or not applicable (N/A)

inappropriately.

Besides evaluating the extent of the condition of the failure to follow site processes for

execution of the torus work instructions, CARD 2227942 sought to identify the causes of the

issues. NRC review of this CARD revealed that the licensee correctly identified several

instances of contractors not following site processes. Examples included how to mark steps

as complete, how to use a 'N/A,' and when and by whom steps should be marked off. As a

result, the inspectors determined supplemental personnel control associated with the torus

recoat project was inadequate. CARD 2227942 identified a potential reason:

a new-tonuclear, non-proficient worker had been selected to ensure steps for the torus

project were complete and marked appropriately. While the licensee's CARD stated it was

contractor supervision who placed the worker in that position, the inspectors noted site

procedure MGA31 had requirements for licensee personnel: such as ensuring contractors

had specific training assigned based on needs.

Additionally, the procedure requires updated information to be communicated to the

contractors with sufficient time so that they can acquaint workers with the new information (an

apparent decision not to use tarps was made but not conveyed to the individual signing for

steps in the work instructions). Step 5.4.7 requires observations of work activities to check

adherence to station policies and procedures. Step 5.4.1 requires vendor oversight plans to

be developed. The licensee's evaluation in CARD 2227942 did not explore if there were

shortfalls with the last two requirements on behalf of licensee personnel. If observations and

oversight plans were, in fact, part of the project, they were ineffective at detecting the gaps in

contractor performance.

Corrective Actions: The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program.

Corrective Action References: CARD 2227942

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: Contrary to requirements in MGA31, Supplemental Personnel

Control Practice, the licensee did not provide adequate oversight of supplemental workers

associated with the 2020 torus recoat project.

16

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,

reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences. Specifically, inadequate supplemental worker oversight partly contributed to

degraded conditions in the torus. The issue also screened as more than minor under the

barrier integrity cornerstone, as the torus forms part of the primary containment barrier.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609

appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The end

result of the performance deficiency was a questioning of the operability of the torus given the

degradation that occurred. Under the mitigating systems cornerstone, questions 26 in

section A of exhibit 2 were answered 'no.' Further, under the barrier integrity cornerstone,

questions 12 under section C of exhibit 3 were also answered 'no.'

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of

planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding

priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate

to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. Following the

2020 and 2022 refueling outages, after-action reviews and input from external stakeholders

revealed weaknesses in the outage planning and preparation process that drove poor outage

performance, to include planning for and managing contract work onsite.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

Some Industry Standards Not Incorporated into Torus Recoat Procedures

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [H.11] - 71152A

Systems NCV 05000341/202200404 Challenge the

Open/Closed Unknown

A Green finding with an associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50 appendix B,

criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was self-revealed while inspecting the

torus during the RF21 refueling outage (spring 2022). Some areas of degradation were

observed that were unexpected given the torus had been recoated during the previous

refueling outage. Upon further review, the licensee identified that some applicable industry

standards had been omitted from the torus recoat procedures, and certain portions of the

work instructions were not followed.

Description:

During the spring 2022 refueling outage, RF21, the inspectors opened an indepth PI&R

sample to review the effectiveness of corrective actions taken during the prior outage (spring

2020) regarding the recoating of the inside of the torus. The inspection sample involved

degradation, which developed before 2020, and the licensee's inadequate tracking and

assessment of that degradation over time, was the subject of an NRC special inspection in

2019. The results of the special inspection are documented in inspection

report 05000341/2019050 (ML20031D253). A confirmatory action letter also resulted from the

special inspection, which prompted the entire recoating of the torus in 2020.

Following the identification of the degradation, the licensee worked with various vendors and

17

consultants to assess the impact on the torus's operability and to determine a cause.

Degradation ranged from small areas of rust deposits to small bubbles that appeared on the

surface. The areas in question were spread throughout the torus in discrete locations. The

licensee concluded the total degraded area was far below that which would call into question

the operability of the torus. This conclusion was supported by a series of 'pull-tests,' which

validated that areas surrounding the pockets of degradation had sound, tightly adhered

coating. Inspection by the onsite resident inspectors, region-based inspectors involved with

the 2019 special inspection, and experts from NRC headquarters did not find any issues with

the licensee's conclusion. The licensee developed several theories on how the degradation

originated and documented the conclusions in CARD 2222967 via an equipment cause

evaluation.

Essentially, the licensee concluded several factors likely led to the areas of degradation.

Ultimately, the licensee determined inadequate work instructions for the torus recoat project

were the cause because several of the contributing factors were not properly accounted for in

the work instructions. One example involved time elapsed between 'stripe coating' and

application of the main coating (stripe coating being areas 'cut-in' prior to the main spray of

coating). The licensee concluded that during the project, between 2.5 and 7.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> elapsed

between stripe coating and spraying in the various areas. During the licensee's investigation,

several industry references discovered pointed to a much shorter time (< 10 minutes) being

appropriate to prevent a phenomenon known as 'amine blush' from occurring, which can

affect coating adherence. As another example, testing for specific surface contaminants such

as chlorides was not directed by the work instructions. While certain industry standards

regarding surface preparation were followed, the fact the torus remained 'prepped' for coating

for an unexpectedly long period (due to COVID impacts) should have prompted a check for

contaminants that may not have otherwise been present had the torus been promptly coated.

In addition, the work instructions called for tarps to protect uncoated areas from the

'overspray' of other areas being coated. Steps for installation of the tarps were marked

complete; however, a later investigation by the licensee revealed the steps had not been

performed. It appears that as the project was progressing, the use of tarps was being

debated given a change in coating strategy that had occurred and the speed at which

activities were progressing. Per licensee processes, if a decision to not use tarps had been

made, the work instructions should have been updated accordingly. Areas not protected from

overspray may have led to some of the degradation noted.

Corrective Actions: The licensee performed tests to confirm the coating in general was

satisfactorily applied. Select areas were repaired, and evaluations were performed to verify

operability of the coating in the asfound and goforward conditions.

Corrective Action References: CARD 2222967 documented an equipment cause evaluation

and organizational effectiveness cause evaluation.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The implementing work instructions for the torus recoat project were

inadequate and certain portions were not followed.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,

reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences. Specifically, unexpected degradation was noted on the interior torus coating

18

after one cycle of operation, calling into question the ability of the coating to remain intact

during accident conditions (which can impact the suctions of safety related pumps aligned to

the torus). The inspectors also determined the issue was more than minor under the barrier

integrity cornerstone, as inadequate coating can also impact the primary containment barrier.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609

appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.

Specifically, under the mitigating systems cornerstone, questions 26 in section A of exhibit 2

were answered 'no.' Further, under the barrier integrity cornerstone, questions 12 under

section C of exhibit 3 were also answered 'no.'

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with

uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically,

the inspectors utilized the associated common language attribute (QA.2) from NUREG2165,

Safety Culture Common Language, to inform assignment of an appropriate cross-cutting

aspect. Applicable tenets of QA.2 include:

"Leaders reinforce expectations that individuals take time to do the job right the first

time, seek guidance when unsure, and stop if unexpected conditions are

encountered."

"Individuals maintain a questioning attitude during pre-job briefs and jobsite reviews to

identify and resolve unexpected conditions."

"Individuals stop work activities when confronted with an unexpected condition,

communicate with supervisors, and resolve the condition prior to continuing work..."

"If a procedure or work document is unclear or cannot be performed as written,

individuals stop work until the issue is resolved."

The dynamic nature of the COVID health emergency led to changing conditions (e.g., longer

period between surface preparation and coating) that presented opportunities to revalidate

appropriate standards and controls in the work instructions that may have prevented the

scope of degradation. Further, work was not stopped when the instructions could not be

performed as written when it was decided to not use tarps.

Besides the work instructions for the coating, the inspectors also broadened their review to

other work activities that were part of the torus project. The attributes of H.11/QA.2 were

lacking in several areas throughout the project. A worker was injured when others saw an

unsafe platform but did not stop the job before the injury. When workers in the torus

questioned the speed at which material was being hoisted out of the torus, workers above

told them multiple times that they would not slow down. In approaching the unknowns

associated with confined space rescue in a fully drained torus, the necessary practice and

coordination for such a complex activity was not provided prior to start of work. This missed

opportunity was only realized when the rescue team was called out for an injury after work

had started.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50 appendix B, criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,

requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented

instructions of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in

accordance with these instructions. Contrary to the above, during the spring 2020 refueling

19

Outage (March 2020-August 2020) and until discovery the following refueling outage (which

commenced in February 2022), the licensee did not prescribe documented instructions

appropriate to the circumstances, nor accomplish activities in accordance with appropriate

instructions, for activities affecting quality. Specifically, the instructions associated with

recoating the safety related torus lacked steps to help prevent degradation of the coating.

Further, some steps intended to protect the new coating were in the instructions but not

followed.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with

Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Failure to Perform a Required Code Evaluations for Standby Liquid Control System Leakage

Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report

Aspect Section

Mitigating Green [H.12] - Avoid 71152A

Systems NCV 05000341/202200405 Complacency

Open/Closed

The inspectors identified a Green finding with an associated Non-cited violation (NCV) of

10 CFR 50.55a, "Codes and Standards," for the licensees failure to follow the ASME Code

after discovering boric acid leakage in the standby liquid control system (SLC). Specifically, a

code required evaluation was not performed as an alternative to correction actions.

Description:

During a review of condition assessment resolution documents (CARDs) as part of the

indepth PI&R baseline inspection sample, the inspectors reviewed CARD 2230062, initiated

on October 2, 2022. This licensee-identified CARD described evidence of borated water

leakage from a flanged connection between the SLC system tank and heater C4101S002

during planned VT2 examinations. While no active leakage was noted, the CARD mentioned

that this was a repeat issue from CARD 1927781, initiated on October 11, 2019. While

reviewing 1927781, the inspectors noted that CARD 1826451 (created August 27, 2018)

had also documented the same borated water leak (however, this was not during a Code

VT2 exam). Per section XI of the 2013 ASME Code, specifically IWA5250 and IWA5251,

leaks of this nature require one of two primary activities to be accomplished following

identification. One option described in IWA5250 involves removing a bolt from the affected

connection and performing a VT3 exam with a subsequent evaluation of it and the remaining

bolts. Alternatively, a licensee could opt to replace all bolts. The other option, described in

IAW5251, involves the performance of an evaluation of the joint following IWA5251(c).

Corrective action for CARD 1826451 did not involve either code-required option. The

licensee generated a work order, but as of the issuance of 1927781 (a little over a year

later), the work order still needed to be prepared. After identifying the issue again in

1927781, the corrective action was to create a work order to accomplish the requirements of

IWA5250 during the RF20 refueling outage (spring of 2020). While the licensee provided

some facts supporting operability, they did not perform an evaluation involving the criteria

listed in IWA5251(c). During RF20, the licensee removed the work activity to do the repairs

and/or inspections to satisfy IWA5250. An evaluation per IWA5251 was also not completed

at that time.

20

NRC inspector review of the most recent CARD identifying the leakage (2230062) revealed

that despite the cancellation of the work order in RF20, the licensee did not put actions in

place to schedule the work during RF21, the spring 2022 refueling outage. In response to

NRC questions, the licensee generated CARD 2230116 to document that fact. After further

discussions with the NRC, the licensee completed an evaluation per IWA5251(c) in

December 2022. The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and noted that the licensee had also

identified a similar situation existed for another SLC system component. The licensee

identified a possible body-tobonnet leak on C4100F001, the SLC storage tank isolation

valve, on October 2, 2022. This leakage had also been identified previously in 2019, along

with the C4101S002 leakage, but did not have the appropriate action taken per IWA5251(c).

The inspectors reviewed the evaluation performed for both components and did not have an

issue with the licensee's conclusions that the components remained operable.

Corrective Actions: The licensee performed an evaluation per IWA5251(c) to demonstrate

operability of affected components.

Corrective Action References: CARDs 2230062, 2230061, and 2230116

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: Following discovery of borated water leakage from SLC system

components, the licensee did not perform the required actions set forth in the ASME Boiler

and Pressure Vessel Code, section XI, 2013 edition (the edition the licensee is committed to).

Specifically, the evaluation described in IWA5251(c) to demonstrate acceptable continued

operation after choosing to not perform the actions in IWA5250, was not performed.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety

concern. Specifically, continuing to not repair nor perform evaluations per the ASME Code for

degraded safety-related components could lead to further degradation where operability

could be a concern.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609

appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power.

Specifically, after reviewing the evaluation performed by the licensee, the inspectors

answered 'no' to all of the questions in section A of exhibit 2 regarding impacts to operability.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the

possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful

outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the licensee

deferred work on the degraded components but did not recognize until after the following

refueling outage an opportunity had been missed to perform the work. Additionally, specific

ASME Code requirements were not recognized despite multiple instances of identifying the

same evidence of borated water leakage.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, incorporates by reference the ASME Boiler

and Pressure Vessel Code, section XI, Rules for Inservice Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant

Components-Division 1, 2013 addenda. Section IWA5251 of the Code states, in part, that as

an alternative to corrective action under IWA5250 for leakage at bolted connections in

21

systems borated for the purposes of controlling reactivity, an evaluation incorporating the

criteria of IWA5251(c) can be performed to evaluate the consequences of continuing

operation. Contrary to the above, since identification of conditions covered by IWA5250/5251

on October 11, 2019, for safety-related SLC components C4101S002 and C4100F001, until

an evaluation was performed on December 13, 2022, the licensee did not complete

evaluations in accordance with the requirements of IWA5251(c).

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with

Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Corrective Action Program Product Quality 71152S

The inspectors identified a potential negative trend in CAP execution and product quality. The

issues identified by the inspectors were discussed with licensee management in the

applicable departments, along with the performance improvement department. The licensee

recognizes the issue and, in addition to revising some of the products in question, has

created plans to improve and validate product quality. One example was the creation of a

monthly condition assessment resolution document (CARD) closure quality reviews to be

done by each department and NQA. Specific issues are listed below:

The inspectors reviewed the causal evaluation associated with the scram in June of

2022 caused by a swarm of mayflies. The evaluation indicated problems between

security and operations regarding working together to establish a plant lighting

strategy. Further, it identified one of the causes as not utilizing the "DTE Mayfly

Infestation Plan." There were also references to other site or departmental issues

unrelated to the event. After questioning the licensee for more contextual information,

the inspectors learned DTE never had an infestation plan until after the event

occurred. Also, there wasn't a problem of security and operations resolving

differences; rather, there was no discussion following the 2020 mayfly event to

explore what could be done regarding the lighting. The licensee revised the evaluation

to address those items and remove references to issues not relevant to the event.

The inspectors reviewed the root cause evaluation associated with the February 2022

scram caused by a feedwater transient. While not having an issue with the root cause

or proposed corrective actions, the inspectors uncovered more detail behind the

'legacy procedural issue' for securing a feed pump that appeared relevant to the

cause and could inform future modifications to the procedure. The inspectors

determined the legacy procedure issue stemmed from a specific procedure change in

2001 that changed how plant operators managed the feed pump speed and the

minimum flow control valve during the shutdown.

The inspectors reviewed the corrective action tools used to assess the actuator/yoke

separation of a primary containment isolation valve and determined the performance

gap analysis was too narrowly focused for the issue. Concurrently, site management

also identified the issue, and as a result, a more detailed organizational cause

evaluation was conducted.

The licensee NQA organization identified a trend in December 2022 which highlighted

several failed causal evaluation products. One particular product involved responding

to an NRC non-cited violation (NCV) regarding reporting requirements. The inspectors

noted that before the most recent NCV, another NCV in the same area from 2020 had

been documented, indicating difficulty in achieving sustainable corrective actions for

reportability issues.

22

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On January 25, 2023, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to

P. Dietrich, Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer and other members of the licensee

staff.

On November 4, 2022, the inspectors presented the ISFSI interim exit inspection results

to P. Dietrich, Senior VP and Chief Nuclear Officer and other members of the licensee

staff.

On November 10, 2022, the inspectors presented the triennial heat sink inspection

results to B. Sullivan and other members of the licensee staff.

On December 1, 2022, the inspectors presented the emergency action level and

emergency plan changes inspection results to P. Dietrich, Senior VP and Chief Nuclear

Officer and other members of the licensee staff.

THIRD PARTY REVIEWS

Inspectors reviewed Institute on Nuclear Power Operations mid-cycle assessment reports that

were issued during the inspection period.

23

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

60855 Corrective Action 1924210 NQA - Holtec Field Condition Report 06/03/2019

Documents 2031838 ISFSI Helium Backfill Volume Calculation Uncertainty 11/02/2020

2130193 MOP11 Requires Revision for Combustible Material in ISFSI 11/16/2021

Building

Corrective Action 2230743 No Written Evaluation Performed per 10 CFR 72.212(b)(7) 10/31/2022

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Miscellaneous 10 CFR 72.212 Report 3

72.48 Screen EDP 80028 0

200003

72.48 Screen WO 57799481 0

200005

Procedures MRP04 Radiation Protection Conduct Manual 47

Radiation PM202106286 ISFSI Pad 06/28/2021

Surveys PM202111242 ISFSI Pad 11/24/2021

PM2022062912 ISFSI Pad 06/29/2022

PM202210079 ISFSI Pad 10/07/2022

Self-Assessments Audit Report ISFSI Program 05/16/2022

220103

Work Orders 49479374 HISTORM Annual Inspection 10/07/2019

52206872 Perform 35.710.055 HISTORM Monthly Screen Inspection 03/28/2020

52805754 HISTORM Annual Inspection 11/04/2020

56125177 Perform 35.710.055 HISTORM Monthly Screen Inspection 05/19/2021

57629881 HISTORM Annual Inspection 10/20/2021

57799481 Contingency ISFSI Haul Path 06/25/2020

58429284 Perform 35.710.055 HISTORM Monthly Screen Inspection 01/27/2022

71111.01 Corrective Action 2032050 2022 Seasonal Readiness-Cold Weather Preps Milestones 11/06/2020

Documents Tracking - Refuel Outage Dates

2230324 Request Drawing Update to Shore Barrier Drawings 10/12/2022

Following Yearly Survey

24

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2230675 Alternate Diesel Fire Pump Enclosure Heater Not 10/27/2022

Functioning Correctly

2230812 Additional Information and Engineering Support Required to 11/02/2022

Troubleshoot U4100F171A

Corrective Action 2230305 NRC Identified-Bolt Missing from Pin on Door R18 10/11/2022

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings 6A7212071 Reactor and Auxiliary Building Door Schedule and Types 09/06/2022

6M7215720 Circulating Water System Functional Operating Sketch 03/18/2022

6M7215726 General Service Water System Functional Operating Sketch 10/10/2018

Procedures 23.101 Circulating Water System 107

23.131 General Service Water System 114

23.208 RHR Complex Service Water Systems 134

35.000.242 Barrier Identification/Classification 62

MWC16100 Seasonal Readiness 2

71111.04 Corrective Action 0900177 Packing Leak: Div. 2 Core Spray Keep Fill Isolation Valve 01/05/2009

Documents Has 2 dpm Packing Leak

CARD 1821676 Division 2 Core Spray Fill Outlet Isolation Valve Swing Bolt 02/27/2018

Broken

Drawings 6M2712015 Diagram Station and Control Air 04/26/2022

6M2715706-3 RHR Service Water Make-Up Decant and Overflow Systems 03/15/2022

Functional Operating Sketch

6M7212034 Diagram Core Spray System C.S.S Reactor Building 04/09/2022

6M7212084 Diagram Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Division 1 03/17/2022

6M7212084 Diagram Residual Heat Removal Division 1 BS

6M7212135 Diagram Fire Protection System (Sheet 1) BA

6M7212135-1 Diagram Fire Protection System (Sheet 2) BL

6M7215444 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water Division 1 03/15/2022

6M7215707 Core Spray System Functional Operating Sketch 04/09/2022

6M7215721-1 Condensate Storage and Transfer System Functional 03/26/2021

Operating Sketch

25

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

6M7215729-1 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (Division 1) 03/15/2022

Functional Operating Sketch

6M7215729-2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (Division 2) 04/23/2022

Functional Operating Sketch

6M721N2052 P&ID RHR Service Water System Division 1 RHR Complex 03/15/2022

Miscellaneous Division 1 RHR LPCI Standby Lineup Verification, 149

Attachment 8A

Procedures 23.127 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water/Emergency 152

Equipment Cooling Water System

23.127 Div. 1 EECW Valve Lineup 09/21/2021

Attachment 1A

23.127 Div. 1 EECW Electrical Lineup 04/09/2006

Attachment 2A

23.127 Div. 1 EECW Instrument Lineup 11/15/2010

Attachment 3A

23.127 DIV RBCCW/ECCW Standby Verification Checklist 02/11/2021

Attachment 4

23.129 NIAS Valve Lineup 07/30/2015

Attachment 1C

23.129 Station and Control Air System Electrical Lineup 04/06/2009

Attachment 2

23.129 Station and Control Air System Instrument Lineup 01/27/2009

Attachment 3A

23.129 Div. 1 Control Air Standby Verification Checklist 01/11/2010

Attachment 4

23.203 Core Spray System: Div. 2 Initial Valve Lineup 11/15/2002

Attachment 1B

23.203 Core Spray System: Common Initial Valve Lineup 01/08/2001

Attachment 1C

23.203 Core Spray System: Div. 2 Electrical Lineup 11/15/2005

Attachment 2B

23.203 Core Spray System: Division 2 Instrument Lineup 04/07/2009

Attachment 3B

26

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

23.203 Core Spray System: Div. 2 Initial Fill and Vent Independent 01/11/2010

Attachment 5B Verification Checklist

23.203 Shifting Div. 2 Core Spray Suction to CST Independent 03/03/2020

Attachment 6B Verification Checklist

23.203 Shifting Div. 2 Core Spray Suction to Torus Independent 03/14/2020

Attachment 6D Verification Checklist

23.203 Enclosure Core Spray Manual Operation 11/27/2018

A

23.205 Residual Heat Removal System 149

23.208 RHR Complex Service Water Systems 134

23.208 Div. 1 RHRSW Valve Lineup 01/24/2022

Attachment 1A

23.208 Division 1 RHRSW Electrical Lineup 01/24/2022

Attachment 2A

23.208 Division 1 RHRSW Instrument Lineup 01/19/2006

Attachment 3A

23.303 Shifting Div. 2 Core Spray Suction to CST Independent 03/03/2020

Attachment 6B Verification Checklist

23.309 Division 1 Distribution System Electrical Lineup 12/09/2020

Attachment 1

6SD7212530-10 One Line Diagram 260 /130V ESS Dual Battery 2PA 03/16/2022

Distribution-Division 1

Work Orders 29294552 CS Division 2 Discharge Header Keep Fill E21F026B PCV 02/19/2022

Outlet Isolation Valve

71111.05 Fire Plans FPRBB2b Reactor Building Basement Northwest Corner Room, 3

Zone 2, EL. 562'0"

FPRBB3b Reactor Building Basement Southwest Corner Room, 4

Zone 3, EL. 562'0"

FPRBSB2a Reactor Building Sub-Basement Northwest Corner Room, 4

Zone 2, EL. 540'0"

FPRBSB3a Reactor Building Sub-Basement Southwest Corner Room, 5

Zone 3, EL. 540'0"

Procedures FPRB315a Reactor Building Thermal Recombiner System Area, Zone 4

15, EL. 641'6"

27

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

FPRB417a Reactor Building SLC System Zone 17 EL. 659'6" 5

FPRBSB5A Reactor Building Sub-Basement Northeast Corner Room 6

Zone 5 EL 540'0"

71111.06 Corrective Action 2231531 Extent of Condition Walkdown Revealed More Degraded 12/02/2022

Documents MELB Barriers

2231541 Walkdown of Division 1 SWRG for Possible Spray Barrier 12/02/2022

Issues

Corrective Action 2231414 NRC Identified: Spray Cover in Division 2 Switchgear Room 11/29/2022

Documents Degraded

Resulting from 2231415 NRC Identified: Pipe Cap Near P4400F449 Not Enclosed by 11/29/2022

Inspection Spray Guard

2231417 NRC Identified: Metal Enclosure on AB4 Not Sealed at Floor 11/29/2022

Level

2231419 NRC Identified: Piping Above HVAC Ducting on AB4 East 11/29/2022

Side Is Not Fully Enclosed in Blue Spray Guard

2231505 NRC Identified: Degraded Spray Shield on Division 1 EECW 12/01/2022

Piping

2231505 NRC Identified: Degraded Spray Shield on Division 1 EECW 12/01/2022

Piping

2231518 NRC Identified: Degraded MELB Barrier on Drywell Seal 12/01/2022

Rupture Drain to Condensate Storage Tank

2231571 NRC Identified: Work Order completed on 7/2/2019 Is Not 12/05/2022

Vaulted in Webarms

2231571 NRC Identified: Work Order Completed on 7/2/2019 12/05/2022

Miscellaneous EF2PRA011 Internal Flood Walkdown Summary Notebook 0

EF2PRA012 Internal Flood Analysis Notebook 4

Work Orders 49771630 Perform Inspection of Spray Shrouds 01/29/2018

71111.07T Calculations DC0249 RBCCW Hydraulics and Miscellaneous EECW Calculation K

DC0559 Vol I: Volume of Reservoir F

DC4931 Non-Interruptible Control Air System (NIAS) Calculations J

DC6286 EECW Heat Exchanger Performance Requirements with A

Plugging

Corrective Action 1830419 MDCT A and B Fan Brake Nitrogen System Leaking 12/28/2018

28

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Documents 1927521 Unexpected Increase in Div 1 EECW Heat Exchanger 10/03/2019

Differential Pressure After Recent Swap

1927978 Trend in Anomalous System Parameter Measurements 10/21/2019

During Surveillances

1928324 2019 NRC Triennial UHS Inspection: Average Silt 10/31/2019

Accumulation in UHS Reservoir Was Not Calculated in WO 47534163

2023408 Division 1 Ultimate Heat Sink General Foreign Material 03/28/2020

(Found and Removed During Diving)

2023984 Unrecovered Foreign Material - Orange Zip Tie 04/07/2020

2030217 2020 MMR14 Structures Monitoring Inspection of RHR High 09/14/2020

Roof (WO)

2125607 Unknown Substance Coating Corrosion Coupon Holder 06/24/2021

2128982 Housekeeping Concerns on RHR Complex Roof 10/08/2021

2222162 Review of RHR Div 1 Reservoir Diving Reports 02/20/2022

2222580 Abnormal Moss Buildup and Debris Noted During Div 1 UHS 02/24/2022

Diving

2224712 Completion of RF21 RHR Div 2 Reservoir Inspection 04/05/2022

Reports and Videos / Photos

Corrective Action 2230458 2022 NRC Heat Sink Inspection: Degraded Concrete Noted 10/18/2022

Documents on Pedestal Supports for EDGs 11, 12, 13, and 14 Exhaust

Resulting from Mufflers

Inspection 2230462 2022 NRC Heat Sink Inspection: Poor Housekeeping Noted 10/18/2022

During Walkdown

2230463 2022 NRC Heat Sink Inspection: Partial Blockage Noted on 10/18/2022

South RHR Pump Pump Room HVAC Outside Air Inlet

2230480 WO Needed to Address Moss and Weeds on RHR Roof 10/19/2022

2230492 2022 NRC Heat Sink Performance Inspection: External 10/19/2022

Corrosion Identified on Floor Penetration Sleeve

2230506 2022 NRC Heat Sink Inspection: Nitrogen Cylinders Not 10/22/2022

Correctly Labelled

2230516 2022 NRC Heat Sink Performance Inspection: Enhancement 10/20/2022

Needed to PM Events P244 and P245

2230549 Performance Engineering Extent of Condition per CARD 10/21/2022

29

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2230538

2230666 2022 NRC Heat Sink Performance Inspection: Exterior Tape 10/27/2022

on Service Water Piping in RHR Complex

Drawings 6M7212015 Diagram Station and Control Air CU

6M7215357 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System Division II BW

MN2026 General Arrangement RHR Complex Basement Floor Plan E

MN2031 General Arrangement RHR Complex Section "CC" F

MN2050 Equipment Drains and Floor Drains Divisions 1 and 2 RHR O

Complex

Miscellaneous Commercial Diving and Marine Services Fermi RF21 Outage 02/21/2022

Diving Div 1

Commercial Diving and Marine Services Fermi RF21 Outage 03/28/2022

RHR Div 2 Dive Report

Consumable Cryotech CMA 01/15/2021

Materials

Evaluation (CME)

210011

Procedures 1D88 Division 1 EECW Outlet Temp 21

20.127.01 Loss of Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System 31

20.129.01 Loss of Station and/or Control Air 38

23.127 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water / Emergency 151

Equipment Cooling Water System

23.129 Station and Control Air System 124

23.208 RHR Complex Service Water Systems 134

24.000.02 Shiftly, Daily, and Weekly Required Surveillances 161

7D3 Div 1 RHR Reservoir Level Abnormal 19

E11XX Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System E

Design Basis Document

MES 52 GL 8913 Safety Related Service Water Monitoring Program 10A

MES 54 Heat Exchanger Component Monitoring Program 8

MMA10 System Cleanliness 12

MMA17 Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) 17

MMR14 Structures Monitoring 8

30

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

MOP21 Housekeeping 7

Work Orders 52194616 License Renewal Required Perform Div 1 Reservoir Zebra 03/25/2020

Mussel Inspection Dive

52195243 License Renewal Req'd Perform Div 2 RHR Reservoir Zebra 04/08/2020

Mussel and Ball Valve Inspection Dive

57269374 License Renewal - Perform Div 1 RHR Reservoir Zebra 02/13/2022

Mussel and Ball Valve Inspection Dive [Confidential]

57269883 License Renewal - Perform Div 2 RHR Reservoir Zebra 03/27/2022

Mussel and Ball Valve Inspection Dive

71111.11A Miscellaneous 2022 LOR NRC Fermi 2022 Licensed Operator Requalification Exam 11/21/2022

Annual OP Test Summary Which Provides the Exam Results for the Annual

Summary Operating Tests Administered from 10/11/2022 - 11/10/2022

71111.11Q Miscellaneous LPOP2022225 Containment Tech Specs and EALs 0

SSOP2022243 Simulator Lesson Plan 0

SSOP9042283 Fermi 2 Evaluation Scenario 0

Procedures 24.202.01 HPCI Pump and Valve Operability Test at 1025 psi 123

29.100.01 SH 1 RPV Control 19

29.100.01 SH 2 Primary Containment Control 17

29.100.01 SH 6 Curves, Cautions, and Tables 19

ODE10 Emergency Operating Procedure Expectations 36

ODE3 Communications 75

71111.12 Corrective Action 1823026 Reactor Scram Due to Loss of 64 Transformer 04/14/2018

Documents 2000399 TIP Detectors Retracting One Inch Behind the Programmed 01/06/2021

InShield Position

2021388 TIP E Flux Readings Degrading Rapidly 07/28/2020

2026872 TIP C and TIP D Ball Valves Opened with TIPS InShield 06/22/2020

2122080 ITE Type K600-s Breakers Failed to Close 03/08/2021

2222886 Nova Inverters Found OOT 03/01/2022

2223206 Bus 72EB Pos 2D Failed to open 03/07/2022

2223772 Nova Inverter Tech Evaluation for Frequency Needed Due 03/17/2022

to Frequency Adjustment Issues

2226656 Ground Fault on 72U, Loss of Bus 05/28/2022

Drawings 6I7212421-05 Schematic Diagram RBCCW Supplemental Cooling Division 04/08/2017

31

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2 Cooling Pumps

Miscellaneous N/A R1400 Electrical Switchgear 2021 Quarters 2 and 3 System 2021

Health Report

R1400 R1400 Electrical Switchgear System Get Well Plan (GWP) 6

VMC1545 Installation and Operations Manual for Nova Electric Galaxy 0

Inverter

Procedures MMR APP B Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual Appendix B-Terms and 8

Definitions

MMR APP E Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual Appendix E- 27

Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions

Self-Assessments R1400 Electric Switchgear System Health Q2 and Q3 2021

R1400 Electric Switchgear System Health Report Q4 2020

R1400 Electric Switchgear System Health Q4 2021

71111.13 Corrective Action 2230935 Relay Room H11P613 11/07/2022

Documents 2231390 MDCT Fan 'B' Loud Metallic Noise 11/28/2022

Drawings 6I7212045-28 Internal-External Wiring Diagram Division 1 Process AG

Instrumentation Cabinet H11P613 Part-3

6I7212265-02 Schematic Diagram Reactor Water Cleanup System AK

Instrumentation

Miscellaneous MWC15001 Risk Management Plan for South RFP Suction Line Flow 12/20/2022

Switch Low Source Valve Leak

VMR11.18 Millivolt to Current (MV/1) Transmitter A

Procedures MMR 12 Equipment Out of Service Risk Management 20A

MMR Appendix H Online Core Damage Risk Management Guidelines 17

Work Orders 60510175 East Gland Seal Exhaust Motor Replacement 11/02/2022

71111.15 Corrective Action 2228738 MES27 Evaluation Does Not Support the Immediate 08/15/2022

Documents Operability Determination Assumptions in CARD 2228664

Resulting from

Inspection

Engineering TEE1122-034 E1156C001B Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Noise 0

Evaluations TER3022-068 Licensing Basis for the Effect of Tornado Depressurization A

on a Running EDG

Miscellaneous Adverse Condition B310F010B RRP B Seal Purge Regulating Valve 2

32

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Monitoring Plan

20010

DBD XXX02 Design Basis Document 26

Various Various NRC Guidance Documents Pertaining to Operability Various

and the Meaning of Design Basis

Procedures 20.307.01 Emergency Diesel Generator Failure 21

22.307.01 Emergency Diesel Failure 22

23.138.01 Reactor Recirculation System 119

71111.18 Corrective Action 2230843 PT FD76 Issues and EDM Impact 11/03/2022

Documents

Corrective Action 2230932 NRC Identified: RB5 EDM Equipment Box Label Not Correct 11/07/2022

Documents 2231503 NRC Identified Issue: 29.EDM.07 Procedure Issue 12/01/2022

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings 29.200.xx 29.200 series Severe Accident Management Guidelines various

Flowcharts

Engineering 60106 Vehicle Barrier System Modification at Entrance to Alternate 0

Changes Access Portal

Miscellaneous NEI 1401 Emergency Response Procedures and Guidelines for 1

Beyond-Design-Basis Events and Severe Accidents

Procedures 29.EDM.03 SFP Makeup/Spray - External Strategy 5

29.EDM.07 Passive Ventilation of the Air Space Above the Fuel Pool 1

[Confidential]

78.000.69 Chemistry Special Test Procedure 27

MGA 14 Severe Accident Management Program 6

71111.19 Corrective Action 2228853 T4100B007 Above Its Investigative Limit 08/18/2022

Documents 2230081 T41N227A AsFound Condition Not Functioning During the 10/03/2022

Performance of WO 46289018

2230085 T4100 Failed PMT 10/03/2022

2230087 Unidentified Contingency Parts / Planning Impact 10/04/2022

Drawings 6I7212451-13 Schematic Diagram NIAS Div. 1 Dryer Controls 06/02/2016

6M7215707 Core Spray System Functional Operating Sketch 04/09/2022

6M7215730-3 Non-Interruptible Control Air System Division 1 and 2 03/29/2012

33

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Functional Operating Sketch

IS248103B EDP 80165.022 (Fermi 2 Diesel Fire Pump Modification 11/08/2022

Alarm Circuitry)

Engineering EDP 80165 Fermi 2 Diesel Driven Fire Pump Replacement Modification 0

Changes

Work Orders 44128550 Calibrate Div. 1 CCHVAC Chiller Condenser EECW Outlet 10/03/2022

Flow Switch

46289018 Calibrate Div. 1 CCHVAC Emergency Make-up and Recirc 10/03/2022

Air Temperature Switch

47264945 PDMA Testing (Motor Tagged) of Control Air Compressor 11/02/2022

Room Cool Unit

48640608 Replace Div. 1 Control Air Non-Interruptible Air Supply 11/02/2022

Isolation Valve Solenoid Valve

48860374 Calibrate Div. 1 CCHVAC Chiller Evaporator Low 10/03/2022

Temperature Switch

57420071 License Renewal Replace Suction and Discharge Valves 11/02/2022

with New and Refurbished Valves

58187204 Replace Non-Interruptible Air Supply Solenoid Valve 11/02/2022

58471305 Control Air Non-Interruptible North Control Air Dryer West 11/02/2022

Chamber Relief Valve

61353693 Replace Division 1 North Control Air Compressor Unloading 11/02/2022

Cylinder Solenoid Valve

61563113 Calibrate Division 1 CCHVAC Equipment Room 10/03/2022

Temperature Switch

63600050 Test Division1 CCHVAC Zone 2 Cable Spreading Room 10/03/2022

Mixing Damper Temperature Loop

64193098 7D51 Division 1 Control Air System Trouble Due to High 11/02/2022

Differential Pressure. Calibrate or Replace

66000026 Post Mod Testing for EDP 80165 11/23/2022

71111.22 Corrective Action 0422892 EDG 11 DGSW Pump Min Flow Valve Not Indicating Fully 06/28/2004

Documents Closed

0425803 Rework EDG11, 12, and 14 DGSW Minimum Flow Valves 11/19/2004

2123411 Step Change in RB Steam Tunnel Temperature Due to 04/16/2021

Possible HPCI Steam Leak

34

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2226208 Rounds Needs Updated 05/11/2022

2229106 Increased Unidentified Leakage in Drywell DD72 Sump 08/29/2022

During Division 2 EECW Pump and Valve Surveillance

24.107.09 Section 5.1

2229187 Drywell Unidentified Leakage Update 08/31/2022

2229282 Drywell Sump Leakage Increase 09/02/2022

2229536 Performing MMA26 for CARD 2227022 DW Unidentified 09/14/2022

Leakage

2230145 R30F402 Indicating 10 Percent Open When Valve Should 10/05/2022

Be Closed

2230170 No Flow, Suspect Drain Line Clogged 10/05/2022

2231365 0.8" Step Change in Drywell Floor Drain Sump Level 11/26/2022

Following Pumpdown

2231450 Investigation of Parameters Around a Run of HPCI 11/30/2022

Corrective Action 2223089 NRC Concern - Operations Rounds Details on Safety- 03/04/2022

Documents Related Motor Oil Levels

Resulting from

Inspection

Drawings 6I7212572-28 4160V ESS Buses 64B and 64C Load Shedding Strings V

6I721257B-05 Relay and Metering Diagram 4160V ESS Bus 64B U

6I721N257217 4160V ESS Diesel Bus 11EA Load Shedding Strings Y

6I721N257806 Relaying and Metering Diagram Diesel Generator 11 Unit 2 X

6M7213361-1 Standby Liquid Control Pump, Reactor Building, Unit 2 P

6SD7212500-03 One Line Diagram 4160V System Service Buses 64B, 64C S

Miscellaneous N/A Control Room Narrative Logs from 11/13/2022 to 11/30/2022

11/30/2022

VMR147.1 Union Pump B

VMR147.4 Gear Reducers A

VMR162 Triclad Vertical Induction Motor F

VMS2539 Centrifugal Water Chillers L

Procedures 24.207.09 Division 2 EECW Pump and Valve Operability 47

24.307.34 DGSW, DFOT, and Starting Air Operability Test EDG 11 58

42.302.07 Calibration and Functional Test of Division 1 4160 Volt Bus 38

35

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

64B Undervoltage Relays

MES 49 Evaluation and Control of Leakage from Class 1, 2, and 3 9

Piping Systems

Work Orders 56289097 Perform 3Year Performance Testing of N+1 Train 09/03/2021

Dominator and Neptune Equipment

60264432 Perform 42.302.07 Division 1 Bus 64B 4160V Undervoltage 10/06/2022

Relays Cal/Funct

61256368 Perform 3Year Performance Test of N Train Dominator and 09/03/2021

Neptune Equipment

61905540 Perform 24.307.34 Sec-5.1 and 5.2 DGSW and DFOT Pump 09/02/2022

and Valve Operability Test - EDG 11

66926147 Perform 24.20201 HPCI Pump/Flow Test and Valve Stroke 11/29/2022

at 1025 psig

71114.04 Miscellaneous 202108E 50.54(q) Evaluation - Spent Fuel Pool Level Updates for 09/21/2021

RA2.3, RS2.1, and RG2.1

202135S 50.54(q) Screen - Spent Fuel Pool Level Updates for RA2.3, 09/21/2021

RS2.1, and RG2.1

Procedures EP101 Classification of Emergencies 43A

EP101 Classification of Emergencies 44

71114.06 Procedures EP101 Classifications of Emergencies 44

71152A Corrective Action 1324841 EDG Steady State Voltage and Frequency Tech Spec 07/10/2013

Documents Ranges

1826451 SLC Storage Tank Heater B Leak 08/27/2018

1927780 VT2 Inspection Results - C4100F001 10/11/2019

1927781 VT2 Inspection Results - C4101S002 10/11/2019

2024915 CSRT Dry Run Findings 04/21/2020

2027392 Safety Concern 06/28/2020

2027659 Safety Concern - Questionable Decision Making Leading to 07/05/2020

Error Likely Situation

2124291 3D17 IPCS Computer Trouble Due to Loss of SS1 05/16/2021

2128792 SS1 CARD Documentation Requires Investigation 10/04/2021

2221059 Product Failed EQRT 02/03/2022

2223915 Discrepancy Identified in RF20 Torus Recoat WO 55151575 03/19/2022

36

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

2225370 NQA RF21 - Complete MES 27 Risk Evaluation for CARD 04/19/2022

1324841

2225370 NQA RF21 - Complete MES 27 Risk Evaluation for CARD 04/19/2022

1324841

2228341 NQA Audit 220107 Deficiency - Untimely Actions for SPING 07/29/2022

and SS1 Computer Replacement

2229030 SPING Flow Calibration Review 08/25/2022

2230062 VT2 Exam Results - C4101S002 10/02/2022

2230739 3D82 MS Steam Line Channel A/B/C/D Radiation Monitor 10/31/2022

HiHi Due to Channel A

2231322 Non-Functional Category C EITER (EP580) 11/22/2022

2231437 Evaluate Fermi Operating License 2.C.10 for Amendment 11/29/2022

Corrective Action 2230092 NRC Identified: Missed LER for Past Operability of CARD 10/04/2022

Documents 2227461

Resulting from 2230116 NRC Identified - Leaking SLC Bolted Connections not 10/04/2022

Inspection Inspected During RF21

Drawings 6I7212095-14 Schematic Diagram Nuclear Steam Supply Shut Off System O

Trip System A

6I7212185-03 Schematic Diagram Process Radiation Monitor SYS Main N

Steam Line Rad Monitor Sub SYS D1103

6I7212351-02 Schematic Diagram Condenser Vacuum Pump East K

(N6101C001)

Miscellaneous RERP Plan 49

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 3

22022 ISI/NDE- Standby Liquid Control Flange Leakage Evaluation 0

IST Program

Evaluation Sheet

Equipment Cause 2222967, RF21 MES 83114 Inspection - Torus Immersion 03/02/2022

Evaluation Space - Indications Identified in Coating on Bays 4 and 5

HP Cause 2024860, Worker Fell from Lower Work Platform 1

Evaluation

NEI 1503 Licensee Actions to Address Nonconservative Technical 2

Specifications

37

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

RERP Plan Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness Plan 12/18/2019

Operability MGA 21 General Administrative Conduct Manual 9

Evaluations

Procedures EP101 Enclosure A - Classification Matrix 44

EP546 RERP Plan Implementing Procedure 8

EP580 Equipment Important to Emergency Response (EITER) 10

MGA 31 Supplemental Personnel Control Practice 4

71152S Corrective Action 2227456 Ground Fault on YPhase on Output Form Main Unit 06/27/2022

Documents Transformer to CM and CF Output Breakers

2227461 FO 2201 Start Up Walkdown: MOV Actuator Disconnected 06/27/2022

From Bonnet

2227473 Procedure Revision for Mayfly Infestation Preparation 06/27/2022

Plan 27.322

2227475 Actuator Broke Free of Yolk Mounting Bolts - B2103F019 06/27/2022

2227499 Add Circuits to 27.322 Mayfly Infestation 06/28/2022

2231628 Trend in NRC Identified CARDs Related to MELB Spray 12/07/2022

Shield Barriers

2231631 Procedure 23.107 Does Not Work as Written 12/07/2022

2231951 Evaluate Emerging Trend of Failed MRC Products 12/19/2022

Miscellaneous Human 2230092 - NRC Identified: Missed LER for Past Operability 09/13/2022

Performance of CARD 2227461

Cause Evaluation

Organizational 2027545 - Loss of 345kv Due to Mayfly Infestation 2

Effectiveness

Cause Evaluation

Procedures 27.322 Mayfly Infestation Preparation Plan 17, 23

71153 Corrective Action 2127388 HPCI and Div 2 EDG Sequencer Power Failures 08/22/2021

Documents

Miscellaneous LER 2021001 Unrecognized Impact of Opening of Barrier Doors on High 0

Energy Line Break Analysis

LER 2022003 Turbine Trip and Subsequent Reactor Trip Due to Mayflies 0

NRC220013 Licensee Event Report 2022001 04/04/2022

38

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