IR 05000341/2021003
| ML21298A200 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/2021 |
| From: | Nestor Feliz-Adorno Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4 |
| To: | Peter Dietrich DTE Electric Company |
| References | |
| IR 2021003 | |
| Download: ML21298A200 (29) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2021003
Dear Mr. Dietrich:
On September 30, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2. On October 14, 2021, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. One of these findings involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2.
October 28, 2021 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000341 License No. NPF-43
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000341
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2021-003-0087
Licensee:
DTE Electric Company
Facility:
Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2
Location:
Newport, MI
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2021 to September 30, 2021
Inspectors:
S. Bell, Health Physicist
T. Briley, Senior Resident Inspector
G. Hansen, Sr. Emergency Preparedness Inspector
R. Ng, Project Engineer
T. Taylor, Acting Senior Resident Inspector
D. Turpin, Reactor Engineer
Approved By:
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section: 71111.1
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Adequately Position Alternate Diesel Fire Pump Suction Hose and Strainer Resulted in Equipment Damage During General Service Water Sluice Gate Operation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000341/2021003-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71111.15 A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified when the licensee failed to adequately position the alternate diesel fire pump (ADFP) suction hose and strainer to prevent interference with plant equipment as specified in Temporary Modification 21-0001. Specifically, during performance of routine general service water sluice gate operation, the ADFP suction hose and strainer were caught on a sluice gate and subsequently damaged. As a result, the ADFP was declared non-functional.
Unanalyzed Condition due to Open Steam Tunnel Door Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/2021003-02 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.15 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance with an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) for the licensee's failure to assess and manage the risk associated with maintaining the reactor building steam tunnel (RBST) door open for longer than needed for normal ingress/egress. As a result, an unanalyzed condition was created regarding high energy and medium energy line breaks (HELBs and MELBs), and internal flooding.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
PLANT STATUS
Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On July 2, 2021, the plant commenced a power reduction to approximately 58 percent to address a main condenser tube leak. The leak was repaired, and the plant returned to rated thermal power on July 11, 2021.
On August 27, 2021, plant power was reduced due to an unexpected loss of the center heater drain pump. The plant was stabilized at approximately 55 percent power, the north heater drain pump was placed in service, and the plant was returned to rated thermal power later the same day. On September 16, 2021, the plant commenced a power reduction to approximately 47 percent for the repair of non-safety-related steam leaks and a rod pattern adjustment. The plant returned to rated thermal power on September 17, 2021 and remained there for the remainder of the inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident and regional inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time, the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week, increasing the amount of time on site as local COVID-19 conditions permitted.
As part of their onsite activities, resident inspectors conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk significant activities; and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Impending Severe Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the adequacy of the overall preparations to protect risk-significant systems from impending storms forecasted during the week ending September 18, 2021.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Division 2 residual heat removal/residual heat removal service water during emergency diesel generator (EDG) 12 maintenance during the week ending August 7, 2021
- (2) Standby feedwater (SBFW) during unplanned high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)inoperability during the week ending August 14, 2021
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Relay room during the week ending August 14, 2021
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during placement of the north heater drain pump (HDP) in service and the associated power ascension following the center HDP trip and unplanned power reduction on August 28, 2021. Additionally, the inspectors observed a planned power reduction on September 16, 2021 to address non-safety-related steam leaks and a rod pattern adjustment.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples 1 Partial)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) General Electric type HFA relays
- (2) Standby gas treatment system (3)
(Partial)
Residual heat removal service water system
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed:
- (1) Planned EDG 11 and reactor core isolation cooling system work the week ending April 10, 2021
- (2) Main condenser tube leak and associated emergent work activities for investigation and repair during the weeks ending July 3 and July 10, 2021
- (3) Unplanned HPCI inoperability during the week ending August 14, 2021 due to an error signal on the controller
- (4) Trip of the center HDP on August 27, 2021
- (5) Removal of the southeast reactor building subbasement sump covers during maintenance during the week ending September 4, 2021
- (6) Swap of reference leg backfill system the week ending September 25, 2021
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Alternate diesel fire pump suction hose damaged by general service water sluice gate during the week ending April 24, 2021
- (2) Spent fuel pool Boral test coupon results during the week ending July 24, 2021
- (3) Operability and functionality of reactor building steam tunnel equipment with area temperatures above the administrative design limit due to a steam leak, completed May 8, 2021
- (4) Mechanical draft cooling tower (MCDT) fan 'C' low oil level during the week ending July 31, 2021
- (5) Reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) isolation operability based on design calculation questions on September 2, 2021
- (6) Impact of maintaining the reactor building steam tunnel door open during at-power operations during the week ending October 2, 2021
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post-maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Planned maintenance on EDG 12 during the week ending August 21, 2021
- (2) HPCI run following orifice plate inspections during the week ending September 18, 2021
- (3) Emergent DC power issue during the week ending September 18, 2021
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Jet pump 5 calibration during the week ending July 17, 2021
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) EDG 14 diesel generator service water test (w/ fuel oil and air testing) during the week ending August 7, 2021
71114.02 - Alert and Notification System Testing
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the following maintenance and testing of the alert and notification system:
Annual siren inspection and maintenance records for the period from June 2019 to June 2021
Monthly alert notification system (siren) tests for the period from June 2019 to June 2021
71114.03 - Emergency Response Organization Staffing and Augmentation System
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01-02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the readiness of the Emergency Preparedness Organization
71114.05 - Maintenance of Emergency Preparedness
Inspection Review (IP Section 02.01 - 02.11) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the maintenance of the emergency preparedness program
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) Emergency preparedness drill on August 10,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
Radiological Work Planning (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radiological work planning. The inspectors reviewed the following activities:
- (1) RWP 20-2040; Torus Recoat Project - Overall Diving, Decon, Wash Down, Water Management and Associated Work
- (2) RWP 20-2042, Torus Recoat Project - Grit Blasting, Painting, Demob, Shipping and Associated Work
- (3) RWP 20-2043, Downcomer Vent Header Emergent Repairs Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems (IP Section 03.02) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated dose estimates and exposure tracking. The inspectors reviewed the following as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning documents and the associated radiological outcome evaluations:
- (1) RWP 20-2040; Torus Recoat Project - Overall Diving, Decon, Wash Down, Water Management and Associated Work; ALARA Plans, Work in Progress Reports, and Post Job Completion ALARA Evaluations
- (2) RWP 20-2042, Torus Recoat Project - Grit Blasting, Painting, Demob, Shipping and Associated Work, ALARA Plans, Work in Progress Reports, and Post Job Completion ALARA Evaluations
- (3) RWP 20-2043, Downcomer Vent Header Emergent Repairs., ALARA Plans, Work in Progress Reports and Post Job Completion ALARA Evaluations
- (4) RWP 20-2025, G33 (RWCU), P73 (HWC) System Maintenance and Inspection, ALARA Plans, Work in Progress Reports and Post Job Completion ALARA Evaluations
- (5) RWP 20-4002, RB5 - Reactor Core Alterations, Bridge Maintenance, LPRM Replacement and Support Activities, ALARA Plans, Work in Progress Reports and Post Job Completion ALARA Evaluation
Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (IP Section 03.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed as low as reasonably achievable practices and radiological work controls. The inspectors reviewed the following activities:
- (2) RWP 21-013, Scaffold Group Tasks
Radiation Worker Performance (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed the following activities:
- (1) The build of scaffolding in the drywell personnel access area which was located in a high radiation area
71124.03 - In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation
Permanent Ventilation Systems (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the configuration of the following permanently installed ventilation systems:
- (1) Radioactive Waste Building Ventilation Turbine Building Ventilation
Use of Respiratory Protection Devices (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of respiratory protection devices including the observation of quantitative respirator fit tests
Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus for Emergency Use (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed the licensees inspection of the MSA Air Hawk self-contained breathing apparatuses.
71124.05 - Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radiation detection instrumentation during plant walkdowns:
- (1) The inspectors observed the operation of the Atlan-Tech Whole Body Counter
- (2) The inspectors observed the operation of the Hopewell Designs instrumentation calibrator
- (3) The inspectors observed the instrumentation available for use at the RP instrumentation calibration facility and the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) exit
- (4) The inspectors observed the operation of the continuous air monitors located within the Turbine Building
- (5) The inspectors observed the radioactive source response checks of the instrumentation located at the alternate RCA access facility
71124.06 - Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
Walkdowns and Observations (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive effluent systems during walkdowns:
- (1) Liquid radioactive effluent release system including release tanks and liquid effluent release monitor
- (2) Gaseous effluent off gas system
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07)===
- (1) July 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021
MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems (IP Section 02.09) (1 Sample)
- (1) July 1, 2020 through June 30, 2021
EP01: Drill/Exercise Performance (DEP) Sample (IP Section 02.12) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021 EP02: Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Drill Participation (IP Section 02.13) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021 EP03: Alert and Notification System (ANS) Reliability Sample (IP Section 02.14) (1 Sample)
- (1) October 1, 2020 through March 31, 2021
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) Scaffold and storage issues during the week ending September 18, 2021
- (2) E5150F008 reactor core isolation cooling valve packing leak during the week ending September 18,
INSPECTION RESULTS
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.13 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) states, in part, before performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities.
Contrary to the above, on April 4, 2021, the licensee did not assess and manage the increase in risk before performing planned lockout relay surveillance testing associated with emergency diesel generator (EDG) 11 and planned corrective maintenance on the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) warmup bypass inlet motor operated valve E5150F095 at the same time. Specifically, the licensee listed only valve E5150F095 as unavailable in the maintenance work order. However, the entire RCIC system was unavailable due to the clearance and tagging boundary impacting other RCIC structures, systems, and components.
Therefore, the online probabilistic risk model was updated during work implementation to only show both EDG 11 and E5150F095 as unavailable. This resulted in a green probabilistic risk classification. After work had already commenced rendering both EDG 11 and RCIC systems unavailable, an on-shift senior reactor operator recognized the entire RCIC system should have been input to the online probabilistic risk model as unavailable. The result was a model output of a yellow probabilistic risk classification, which was an unplanned change in risk classification and missed opportunity to manage the increase in risk that resulted from the proposed maintenance activities beforehand.
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix K, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process." Because the performance deficiency was associated with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) performance (Flow Chart 1), the incremental core damage probability deficit was <1E-6 and the incremental large early release probability deficit was <1E-7, the finding screened to Green.
Corrective Action References: CARD 21-23130 Failure to Adequately Position Alternate Diesel Fire Pump Suction Hose and Strainer Resulted in Equipment Damage During General Service Water Sluice Gate Operation Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000341/2021003-01 Open/Closed
[P.2] -
Evaluation 71111.15 A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified when the licensee failed to adequately position the alternate diesel fire pump (ADFP) suction hose and strainer to prevent interference with plant equipment as specified in Temporary Modification 21-0001. Specifically, during performance of routine general service water sluice gate operation, the ADFP suction hose and strainer were caught on a sluice gate and subsequently damaged. As a result, the ADFP was declared non-functional.
Description:
On August 27, 2019, an ADFP was temporarily installed due to an equipment problem with the permanently installed diesel fire pump. The ADFP suction line was routed through the general service water pump house and into the general service water pump pit using flexible hoses with an attached suction strainer via temporary modification 19-0014. The general service water pump pit contained two motor operated sliding sluice gates that were used to physically isolate the general service water pump pit from Lake Erie if needed (such as during low lake level conditions). On October 20, 2020, during periodic general service water east and west sluice gate cycling operation, the west sluice gate was observed by local equipment operators to be catching on the ADFP flexible suction hose. Sluice gate operation was subsequently stopped prior to any equipment damage to the suction hose or sluice gate.
CARD 20-31437 was generated to document the issue and corrective action was taken to physically remove the ADFP suction hose from the general service water pump pit. The ADFP was not in service at the time, nor required to be functional, as the permanently installed diesel fire pump had been returned to functional status on August 27, 2020 following maintenance. The licensee did not perform additional evaluation to determine the cause of the ADFP suction hose interference with the west general service water sluice gate since the temporary equipment had been removed.
On February 7, 2021, the ADFP was re-installed via temporary modification 21-0001 due to an equipment problem with the permanently installed diesel fire pump. Temporary modification 21-0001 listed CARD 20-31437 as applicable operating experience and stated, in part, the ADFP suction line will be routed to avoid interference with other plant equipment.
In addition, it included a special precaution to ensure the suction hose strainer was positioned to preclude catching/interfering with the sluice gates.
On April 20, 2021, while performing routine general service water sluice gate operation, the ADFP suction hose was observed by local equipment operators to be catching on the west general service water sluice gate and an abnormal noise was heard. The ADFP was subsequently declared non-functional. Visual inspection of the ADFP suction line revealed damage to the flexible hose and the suction strainer had become detached. Technical Requirements Manual Limiting Condition for Operation 3.12.2, Condition A, allows up to a 14-day completion time to either restore or provide an alternate backup pump with one fire suppression pump non-functional. The ADFP was declared functional on April 28, 2021 following repair and installation of an additional suction line restraint to prevent catching on the general service water sluice gates.
Corrective Actions: The licensee's corrective actions included, but were not limited to, an investigation into the causes of the circumstances that led to the damaged ADFP suction line, installation of an additional ADFP suction line restraint, and additional written notes in the work instructions associated with periodic sluice gate operation for awareness of the potential for interference with the sluice gate when the ADFP is installed.
Corrective Action References: CARD 21-23483
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee's failure to adequately position the ADFP suction hose and strainer to prevent interference with plant equipment was contrary to Temporary Modification 21-0001 and was a performance deficiency. As a result, during performance of routine general service water sluice gate operation, the ADFP suction hose and strainer were caught on a sluice gate and subsequently damaged.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to adequately position the ADFP suction hose and strainer resulted in the ADFP being declared non-functional due to interference with the west general service water sluice gate and subsequent equipment damage.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix F, Fire Protection and Post - Fire Safe Shutdown SDP. In accordance with Step 1.4.3, Fire Water Supply, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). Specifically, the electric fire pump was available to provide adequate fire water capacity for protection of equipment important to safe shutdown in the most limiting location onsite for the duration that the ADFP was non-functional.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.2 - Evaluation: The organization thoroughly evaluates issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, an evaluation was not performed to determine the cause of the ADFP suction hose catching on the west general service water sluice gate in 2020. As a result, the ADFP suction line was re-installed in a similar manner in 2021 and the ADFP suction hose was caught again on the west general service water sluice gate.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
Unanalyzed Condition due to Open Steam Tunnel Door Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000341/2021003-02 Open/Closed
[H.13] -
Consistent Process 71111.15 The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance with an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) for the licensee's failure to assess and manage the risk associated with maintaining the reactor building steam tunnel (RBST) door open for longer than needed for normal ingress/egress. As a result, an unanalyzed condition was created regarding high energy and medium energy line breaks (HELBs and MELBs), and internal flooding.
Description:
In April of 2021, the licensee noted indications of a steam leak in the RBST based on an upward trend in steam tunnel temperatures. Over the course of about a week, the licensee conducted three planned entries of personnel into the RBST to try to identify the leak source.
The normally closed watertight door R1-11 was maintained open for longer than needed for normal ingress/egress but less than an hour for each entry. This door provided access from the reactor building first floor to the RBST and protected safety-related equipment in the reactor building from the effects of a HELB, MELB, and flooding from pipes in the RBST.
Door R1-11 was listed as a barrier for these events in licensee procedure 35.000.242, "Barrier Identification and Classification," Revision 58.
While the licensee considered the industrial, radiological, and fire protection aspects of entering the RBST, the inspectors noted the licensee did not evaluate the impacts of maintaining door R1-11 open on temperature instruments inside the RBST and on components outside the RBST should a HELB, MELB, or flood occur. After evaluating the inspectors concern, the licensee determined maintaining the door open for longer than normal ingress/egress was an unanalyzed condition due to the lack of an evaluation for these events with the door open at full power. The licensee also noted four other occasions within the past three years that the door was maintained open at power for longer than needed for ingress/egress, including an occasion that lasted 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. On May 3, 2021, the licensee submitted a notification to the NRC regarding the unanalyzed condition (i.e., Event Notification 55231) and stopped maintaining the RBST door open. The licensee later completed a planned shutdown and repaired a leak from the packing area of a valve in the steam tunnel.
Corrective Actions: The licensee performed a root cause evaluation and initiated an analysis to determine the effects of maintaining door R1-11 open on components outside the RBST.
Corrective Action References: CARD 21-23855
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to assess and manage the increase in risk before maintaining door R1-11 open for longer than needed for ingress and egress as part of maintenance activities was contrary to 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) and was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to assess and manage the increase in risk before maintaining door R1-11 open for longer than needed for ingress and egress did not ensure multiple mitigating systems remained available, reliable, and capable of responding to pipe breaks originating in the RBST.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. The inspectors first referred to IMC 0609 Appendix K, "Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process," as the finding involved the licensees assessment and management of risk associated with performing maintenance activities in accordance 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4).
Appendix K contains a note that states it does not apply for situations where the licensee only performed qualitative analyses of plant configuration risk due to maintenance activities. For this finding, the risk was qualitative as it dealt with a degraded barrier (door R1-11). Per the note, the significance of this finding must be determined by an internal NRC management review using risk insights where possible. The inspectors utilized IMC 0612 Appendix M, to determine the significance of the finding.
The inspectors performed an initial evaluation per step 4.1 of Appendix M which had several qualitative considerations. The door to the steam tunnel was not blocked open, rather, it was held open by licensee personnel. It was designed to close in the outward direction, thereby offering a reasonable chance of being shut by any pressure buildup. Additionally, the steam tunnel contains blowout panels that are designed to relieve pressure to the turbine building.
Severe ruptures would likely blow the panels out and divert a significant amount of energy to the turbine building which is devoid of safety related components. Each period of time the door was open recently was less than one hour. Although there was a time in 2018 the door was open for approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />, the plant was at low power for that entry. Given the low probability of a rupture in those time windows and the fact there was operable temperature detection instrumentation that would have isolated most ruptures in the steam tunnel quickly, the inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.13 - Consistent Process: Individuals use a consistent, systematic approach to make decisions. Risk insights are incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, the licensee root cause evaluation determined that individuals inconsistently referenced the applicable precautions and limitations contained in revision 58 of procedure 35.000.242 when managing the risk of HELB/MELB/flood barriers.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) states, in part, that before performing maintenance activities, the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. The licensee implemented this requirement, in part, with procedure 35.000.242, "Barrier Identification and Classification," Revision 58. It listed door R1-11 as a HELB/MELB/flood barrier and stated that doors in the power block should remain closed in Modes 1, 2, and 3 except for normal ingress and egress.
Contrary to the above, on April 17, 18, and 21 of 2021, the licensee did not assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from maintaining RBST door R1-11 open while performing a maintenance activity. Specifically, the licensee maintained door R1-11 open for longer than needed for ingress and egress while performing corrective maintenance inside the RBST. However, the licensee did not assess and manage the impact of a HELB, MELB, or flood originating in the RBST would have on safety-related components in the reactor building.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On October 14, 2021, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. P. Dietrich, Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
On July 16, 2021, the inspectors presented the emergency preparedness baseline inspection results to Mr. P. Dietrich, Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
On August 11, 2021, the inspectors presented the radiation protection baseline inspection results to Mr. E. Olson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
Miscellaneous
Risk
Management
Plan
Replace Reference Leg Backfill Train Filter
08/03/2021
20.000.01
Acts of Nature
46.000.046
Operation of the Reactor Reference Leg Backfill System
Procedures
MOP01-200
Severe Weather Guidelines
Condensate Storage and Transfer System Diagram
BJ
Piping and Instrument Diagram Standby Feedwater
System
U
Drawings
M-5706-03
RHR Service Water Make Up Decant and Overflow
Systems Functional Operating Sketch
AH
Procedures
MMA 08
Corrective Action
Documents
21-23209
Relay Room Main Halon Cylinder 'D' Indicating Low
Pressure
04/11/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21-28273
NRC Identified Label and or Fire Pre Plan Deficiencies
09/20/2021
FP-AB-2-8
Relay Room, Zone 8, Elevation 613'6"
FP-RHR-1-13-
RHR Complex, EDG 13 Room, Elevation 590'0"
FP-RHR-1-13-
OS
RHR Complex, EDG 13 Oil Storage Room, Elevation
590'0"
FP-RHR-1-14-
RHR Complex, EDG 14 Room, Elevation 590'0"
Fire Plans
FP-RHR-1-14-
OS
RHR Complex, EDG 14 Oil Storage Room, Elevation
590'0"
2.000.03
Power Operation 25 Percent to 100 Percent to
Percent
107
Procedures
23.108
Extraction Steam and Heater Drains
18-25702
N2 Rack Very Low Margin for the Nitrogen Bottles
07/26/2018
Corrective Action
Documents
18-27012
Pressure Low for Nitrogen Bottles (20" Torus
09/18/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
Purge/Exhaust and Control for HCVS)
20-33146
Upgrade T4600F420 from Category 3 to Category 2A in
AOV Program
2/22/2020
21-22837
Secondary Containment Hardened Vent and RB HVAC
High Pressure N2 Supply Pressure Low
03/30/2021
21-22988
T4600F407 Failed to Stroke During 24.404.03
04/04/2021
21-22997
Vent Header Recoat Project Requires SGTS Division 1
and Division 2 Charcoal Replacement
04/05/2021
21-24863
E4150F042 Valve Slow to Open During 44.030.153
06/03/2021
21-25328
Identified Enhancements for HFA Relay Contact
Inspections
06/16/2021
21-26025
E4150F042 Extent of Condition
07/08/2021
21-26058
New Relay Procedure
07/09/2021
21-25339
Response to NRC Question Regarding HFA Relays
Extent of Condition
06/16/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21-28269
NRC Question: Accuracy of MRFF for CARD 21-22988
09/20/2021
TE-ELC-17-046
Evaluation of GE HFA Relay Service Life
Engineering
Evaluations
TE-T46-21-026
T46K008A, Division 1 SGTS Exhaust Fan Vortex
Damper E/P Transmitter, Out of Calibration
Miscellaneous
T4600 - (a)(1)
Action Plan
Division 1 SGTS Flow Out of Spec High
29.ESP.07
Primary Containment Venting
35.318.017
Inspection and Testing of Multi-Contact Auxiliary Relays
MMR Appendix
E
Maintenance Rule SSC Specific Functions
Procedures
MMR 03
Scoping
21-23130
Unplanned Risk Change from Green to Yellow
04/08/2021
21-25888
Main Condenser Tube Leak (SW Quad)
07/03/2021
21-26061
Leaking Tube in Main Condenser Located with Helium
07/09/2021
21-26388
Step Change in Division 1 Reference Leg Backfill
07/22/2021
21-26554
Internal Contamination While Performing Tagout D074
07/28/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-26581
Unplanned Contaminated Area Greater Than
100 Square Food RBB SE Quad
07/29/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
21-26582
Crew Learning Opportunity: D074 Sump Cover
Removed and Clearance Hung Without Engineering
Evaluation
07/29/2021
21-26646
Temporarily Removing Sump Covers for Inspections
Needs to be Evaluated
07/31/2021
21-27053
HPCI Flow Controller E4-K615 has "Flow Bad" Alarm
Locked In
08/11/2021
21-26574
NRC Identified Transient Combustibles RB-1
07/28/2021
21-26575
NRC Identified Inconsistent Labeling for G1103-C037B
RB SE Equipment Drain Sump G1101-D074 West Pump
07/28/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21-26577
NRC Identified: Removed Cover for RB SE Equipment
Drain Sump 74 is a HELB/MELB/Flood Barrier
07/29/2021
Condensate System
BZ
Sump Pump Diagram Radwaste System
Drawings
Equipment Drains All Floors Auxiliary and Reactor
Buildings
Y
TE-G11-08-030
Justification for Why D073 Sump Cover is not a
HELB/MELB Barrier
Engineering
Evaluations
TE-N61-15-078
Condenser Tube Plugging Limit
EF2-PRA-011
Internal Flood Walkdown Summary Notebook
Miscellaneous
Operator Log
08/10/2021
2.000.03
Power Operation 25% to 100% to 25%
107
23.101
105
23.108
Extraction Steam and Heater Drains
46.000.046
Operation of the Reference Leg Backfill System
MCE 03
Chemistry Sampling and Analysis
MCE 03002
Chemistry Excursion Engineering Evaluation Report
MMR APP H
Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual - Appendix H - On-
Line Core Damage Risk Management Guidelines
MMR 12
Equipment Out of Service Risk Management
20A
MOP 05
Control of Equipment
Procedures
ODE-20
Protected Equipment
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
ODE-8
Administrative Guidelines and Desk Instructions
05/27/2021
53648451
Replace E41K615
2/15/2021
278418
Functionally Test Undervoltage LOR 27X-72EA
04/08/2021
58655283
G1101D074 Requires Cleaning to Mitigate Dose Rates
on Sump Transfer Line
07/26/2021
266679
E5150F095 Is Leaking Steam
04/08/2021
Work Orders
61684950
Main Condenser Tube Leak (SQ Quad)
07/04/2021
DC-5426
PBOC - High and Moderate Energy Line Break
Evaluation
08/14/2015
DC-5589
Reactor Building Environmental Response for HELB and
LOCA Conditions
08/04/2007
DC-5779
Calculation of Mass and Energy Release Rates for High
Energy Line Breaks (HELB)
11/12/1999
Calculations
DECO-04-4653
Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2 RWCU Line
Break Effects Evaluation of the Leak Detection
Thermocouples on the Reactor Building Second Floor
June 1986
10-25814
RB-1 Steam Tunnel Temperature is at the Max Design
Temperature
07/10/2010
19-27887
RWCU HELB Analysis in Torus Room did not Consider
the Effects of Jet Impingement
10/16/2019
20-31437
West GSW Sluice Gate Catching on ADFP Suction
Hose
10/20/2021
21-23483
West GSW Sluice Gate Catching on ADFP Suction
Hose
04/20/2021
21-23574
CLO: Poor Communication Causes Repeat Event on
Surveillance
04/22/2021
21-23904
Non-conservative Assumption in MSLB/FWLB Design
Calcs
05/04/2021
21-25105
Review of Vendor Inspection Report of Boral Test
Coupons
06/09/2021
21-25216
Oil Level 'C' MDCT Fan Gear Reducer is Low
06/12/2021
21-26041
RB1 Temperature Excursion Long Term EQ Impact
07/09/2021
21-26119
Lowered MDCT Oil Level
07/12/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-27125
RWCU HELB Analysis in Torus Room Suggested
08/12/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
Approach for Resolution of Jet Impingement
(CARD 19-27887)
21-27168
Operability Determination Potentially Impacted by On-
Going Investigation Information Entered as CARD Note
08/13/2021
2359
Rack Construction BWR Spent Fuel Storage Racks
27
Rack Construction BWR Spent Fuel Storage Racks
2515
Test Coupon and Coupon Tree Spent Fuel Storage
Racks
Drawings
M-S-2000
General Service Water Pump House Mechanical
Equipment Layout
E
TM 19-0014
Alternate Diesel Fire Pump
F
Engineering
Changes
TM 21-0001
Alternate Diesel Fire Pump
A
Root Cause
Evaluation
Report
Potential Unanalyzed Condition Following Opening of
Door R1-11
08/30/2021
Engineering
Evaluations
TE-T22-21-019
PSA Risk Evaluation of Door R1-11 Open
Site EFD Reset - HU Reset Briefing Sheet
08/30/2021
0000 0024 8320
J1100Y000, F1600E011, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I
[Confidential]
3002013119
Evaluation of the Impact of Neutron Absorber Material
Blistering and Pitting on Spent Fuel Pool Reactivity
May 2018
Miscellaneous
NET-28084-002-
Inspection and Testing of BORAL Surveillance Coupons
from Fermi 2 Generating Station [Proprietary]
35.000.242
Barrier Identification/Classification
Procedures
MMR 12
Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual
20A
60388549
Implement AWA Number 1 for TM 21-0001 Rev A
2/24/2021
Work Orders
60987174
West GSW Sluice Gate Catching on ADFP Suction
Hose
04/28/2021
21-26665
PI Testing
08/02/2021
21-26702
08/02/2021
21-26721
Significant Wear on 2 and 10 Lower Pistons
08/03/2021
21-26804
R30FA04C and R30FA05C are Continuously Leaking
Air Through their Vent Ports
08/06/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-26860
EDG 12 Starting Air Compressor Lube Oil Moisture
08/07/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
Greater Than Expected
21-26991
EDG12 SAC Increased Run Times Post SSO
08/09/2021
21-27388
HPCI and Division 2 EDG Sequencer Power Failures
08/22/2021
21-27395
130V Battery Charger 2B-2 Low Voltage
08/23/2021
21-27397
Division 2 EDG Automatic Load Sequencer Power
Supply (PS-2) Failed
08/23/2021
21-27428
Bench Calibration Found OOT for New Inverter
08/24/2021
21-27683
Equalize Timer will Spuriously go into Equalize
08/31/2021
HPCI System Power Distribution
S
EDG Automatic Digital Load Sequencing System
H11P898B
G
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Reactor
Building
BQ
High Pressure Coolant Injection System Barometric
CNDR Reactor Building
AJ
Drawings
260/130V Essential Dual Battery 2PB Distribution -
Division 2
Plan of the Day
E4100 - High Pressure Coolant Injection General
08/16/2021
Miscellaneous
VME8-1.1
Colt Industries 12 Cylinder Model 38TD8-1/8 Emergency
Diesel Generators [Confidential]
24.202.01
HPCI Pump and Valve Operability Test at 1025 PSI
2
34.307.001
Emergency Diesel Generators - Inspection and
Preventive Maintenance
35.307.017
Emergency Diesel Generators - Electrical Inspection
and Preventive Maintenance
Procedures
MMA 17
Foreign Material Exclusion (FME)
56641508
Replace 2301A and (DRU) Unit in EDG 12 Control
Panel
08/02/2021
56973956
Perform 24.202.08 Sec-5.2 HPCI LSFT and Pump
Operability at 1025 PSIG
08/17/2021
57163006
08/04/2021
210107
Disassemble, Inspect and Reassemble Spectacle
Flanges (LR, OTL, AMP) E4150D016
08/16/2021
Work Orders
61945080
EDG 12 Significant Wear on 2 and 10 Lower Pistons
08/02/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21-26565
NRC Identified: Adding Vibration Analysis Point Diagram
to 24.307.37
07/28/2021
Procedures
47.000.02
Mechanical Vibration Measurements for Trending
56787386
Perform 24.307.37DGSW, DFOT and Starting Air
Operability Test - EDG 14
07/28/2021
Work Orders
60331762
Calibrate RPV Jet Pump 5 Flow/Pressure Indicating
Loop
07/15/2021
CARD 20-23535
Monroe County Central Dispatch Encoder
03/30/2020
CARD 20-29639
Siren 32 Rotation Fail
08/26/2020
CARD 20-31696
Unexpected Results During Monthly Siren Test
10/28/2020
CARD 20-31697
Monroe County Central Dispatch Encoder
03/30/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CARD 21-23363
Evaluate ANS Siren Failures to Determine Reliability
Improvement Actions
04/15/2021
FEMA Approval Letter for Fermi 2 ANS Design Report,
Revision 1
11/30/2015
Siren Test Results
05/01/2019-
05/31/2021
Siren Annual Preventative Maintenance Records
09/01/2019-
06/30/2021
Miscellaneous
DTE Energy Emergency Preparedness for Monroe and
Wayne Counties 2021 (Handbook)
Fermi 2 Radiological Emergency Response
Preparedness Plan
Alert and Notification System (ANS) Design Report
Alert and Notification System (ANS) Design Report
Procedures
Alert and Notification System Operation and
Maintenance
CARD 19-27240
Post ECOS Test Result Roll Up - Blue Team
09/25/2019
CARD 19-27945
Suggestion to Improve Usability of ECOS
10/18/2019
CARD 20-31620
Red Team I and C Engineer Failed to Respond to ECOS
10/27/2020
Corrective Action
Documents
CARD 21-23024
Two RERP EOF Team Members did not Respond to
ECOS Call-Out (Red Team)
04/05/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
Fermi 2 On-shift Staffing Analysis
2/20/2012
Fermi 2 ERO Team List
06/21/2021
ERO Team Training and Qualification Records
(Sample - 12)
07/14/2021
Miscellaneous
ERO Quarterly Augmentation Drill Records
06/01/2019-
06/30/2021
Fermi 2 Radiological Emergency Response
Preparedness Plan; Section B, Emergency Response
Organization
Emergency Notifications
Emergency Call Out - Backup Method
Drills and Exercises
RERP Training Program
5B
Emergency Call Out System - Testing and Maintenance
6A
ECOS Test Reviews (Quarterly)
June 2019-June
21
Procedures
QP-ER-670
Radiological Emergency Response Preparedness
Selection, Training and Qualification Program
Description
19-28480
RERP Drill 10/13/2019: Weaknesses Observed in Dose
Assessment - Marginal Performance
11/06/2019
20-32545
Missed EAL Classification (DEP Opportunity) During
LOR Annual Exam
2/01/2020
21-10089
The Intent of EP-204-01, Damage Control and Rescue,
Section 4.2 is not Being Met Based on Current
RERP/DCRT Staffing/Canvassing Practices
05/20/2021
Emergency Notifications
Emergency Call Out - Backup Method
Equipment Important to Emergency Response (EITER)
Corrective Action
Documents
CFR 50.54(q) Screens and Evaluations
Emergency Preparedness Letters of Agreements with
Off-Site Response and Support Organizations
09/01/2019-
09/30/2020
Miscellaneous
Select Exercise and Drill Evaluation Reports
09/01/2019-
04/30/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
Quarterly Control Room ERF Testing and Maintenance
Records
09/01/2019-
04/30/2021
Quarterly Emergency Operations Facility ERF Testing
and Maintenance Records
09/01/2019-
04/30/2021
Quarterly Technical Support Center ERF Testing and
Maintenance Records
09/30/2019-
04/30/2021
Quarterly Operations Support Center ERF Testing and
Maintenance Records
09/30/2019-
04/30/2021
Audit Report 19-
0109
Quality Assurance Audit of the Emergency
Preparedness Program
09/27/2019
Audit Report 20-
0111
Quality Assurance Audit of the Emergency
Preparedness Program
10/08/2020
KLD TR-1137
Fermi 2 Nuclear Power Plant 2020 Population Update
Analysis
09/26/2020
Classifications
43A
Procedures
Public Education and Information
Miscellaneous
August 10, 2021 Emergency Preparedness Drill
Package
08/10/2021
Procedures
Classification of Emergencies
43A
20-2025
G33 (RWCU), P73 (HWC) System Maintenance and
Inspection - ALARA Plans, Work in Progress Reports,
and Post Job Evaluation
Various
20-2040
Torus Recoat Project - Diving, Decon, Wash Down,
Water Management, and Associated Work - ALARA
Plans, Work in Progress Reviews, and Post Job
Evaluation
Various
20-2042
Torus Recoat Project - Grit Blasting, Painting, Demob,
Shipping and Associated Work - ALARA Plans, Work in
Progress Reviews, and Post Job Evaluation
Various
20-2043
Torus Downcomer Vent Header Emergent Repairs -
ALARA Plans, Work in Progress Reviews, and Post Job
Evaluation
Various
ALARA Plans
20-4002
RB5 - Reactor Core Alterations, Bridge Maintenance,
LPRM Replacement and Support Activities - ALARA
Various
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
Plans, Work in Progress Reviews and Post Job ALARA
Evaluation
21-1031
June 2021 RWCU System Outage
20-25334
RWCU Line Hydrolazing Evolutions Lessons Learned
04/28/2020
20-32652-02
SAC Benchmarking Improvements
01/15/2021
20-32652-08
Self-Assessment Recommendation - Improvements in
Outage RWP Dose Estimates
04/23/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-23101
Self-Assessment Deficiency - Gap in RF20 Work in
Progress Quality
04/07/2021
Miscellaneous
Station ALARA Committee Reports for Refueling Outage
RF20
Various
63.000.200
ALARA Reviews
Procedures
MRP 05
ALARA/RWPS
Radiation
Surveys
Survey P-M-
210616-7
Q-35 DW Personnel Access
06/16/2021
Self-
Assessments
NPRP-21-0037
QHAS - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
(Inspection Plan 71124.02)
05/23/2021
Grade D Air Sample Analysis for the Scott Air
Compressor System (Second Quarter 2019 through
Second Quarter 2021)
Various
MSA SCBA Inspection Records (First Quarter 2021)
Various
MSA SCBA Annual Calibration and Flow Tests
05/13/2021
Miscellaneous
SCBA Qualification Records for the SRO/ROs On Shift
06/21/2021
Various
65.000.704
Issuance of Respiratory Protection Equipment
65.000.717
Inspection, Maintenance and Hydrostatic Testing of
Breathing Air Cylinders
MRP 09
Respiratory Protection
Procedures
WI-RH-018
Work Instruction for Performing Quantitative Respiratory
Fit Testing Using the TSI Model 8030 Portacount
Radiation
Surveys
RWP 21-1031, RWCU System Outage, Airborne
Radioactivity Determinations
06/21/2021 -
06/22/2021
Self-
Assessments
NPRP-21-0038
Quick Hit Self-Assessment 71124.03 - In Plant Airborne
Radioactivity Control and Mitigation and 71124.04 -
06/03/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
Occupational Dose Assessment
CARDs related to E5100
07/01/2020-
6/30/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
D
NRC Performance Indicators-RERP
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21-28580
NRC Identified Error in RHRSW MSPI Hours for
February 2021
09/28/2021
Fermi 2 - Mitigating Systems Performance Index (MSPI)
Basis Document
MSPI Derivation Report - Cooling Water System
Unavailability Index
06/2021
MSPI Derivation Report - Cooling Water System
Unreliability Index
06/2021
MSPI Derivation Report - Residual Heat Removal
System Unavailability Index
06/2021
MSPI Derivation Report - Residual Heat Removal
System Unreliability Index
06/2021
Site MSPI Submittals for Heat Removal System
July 2020 - June
21
ALC Narrative Logs Containing E5100 7/1/2020 -
9/1/2020; 12/1/2020 - 2/1/2021; 5/1/2021 - 7/1/2021
09/20/2021
Alert and Notification System Reliability Records
10/01/2020-
03/31/2021
Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation
10/01/2020-
03/31/2021
71151
Miscellaneous
Drill and Exercise Performance Records
10/01/2020-
03/31/2021
21-24269
Observed Change in IPCS RCIC Steam Flow Indication
05/15/2021
21-24290
Leak Walkdown - Damage to Valve Stem
05/16/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
21-27280
APS: Removal of Scaffolds Pending Engineer Approved
Permanent Platforms
08/18/2021
Corrective Action
21-26212
NRC Identified Missing Reviews on the 50-59 Form on a
07/15/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or Date
Scaffold, WO 59193074
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21-26754
NRC Identified 4 Scaffolds Constructed > 90 Days Ago
08/04/2021
Drawings
4" 900 OSY Powell OSY Gate Valve with Limitorque
Operator
Fermi Plant Log
Scaffold Log
August/September
21
Miscellaneous
PEP 33
Valve Packing Guide
MMA 08
Procedures
MOP 23
Plant Storage
7