IR 05000341/2022004
| ML23153A122 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/2023 |
| From: | Jamie Benjamin, Santiago E, Richard Skokowski NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | Detroit Edison, Co |
| Josey J | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML23160A152 | List: |
| References | |
| NCP-2023-002 IR 2022004 | |
| Download: ML23153A122 (1) | |
Text
NRC FORM 757 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (06-2019)
NRC MD 10.158 NON-CONCURRENCE PROCESS COVER PAGE The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) strives to establish and maintain an environment that encourages all employees to promptly raise concerns and differing views without fear of reprisal and to promote methods for raising concerns that will enhance a strong safety culture and support the agencys missio Employees are expected to discuss their views and concerns with their immediate supervisors on a regular, ongoing basis. If informal discussions do not resolve concerns, employees have various mechanisms for expressing and having their concerns and differing views heard and considered by managemen Management Directive (MD) 10.158, NRC Non-Concurrence Process, describes the Non-Concurrence Process (NCP).
The NCP allows employees to document their differing views and concerns early in the decision-making process, have them responded to (if requested), and include them with proposed documents moving through the management approval chain to support the decision-making proces NRC Form 757, Non-Concurrence Process, is used to document the proces Section A of the form includes the personal opinions, views, and concerns of a non-concurring NRC employe Section B of the form includes the personal opinions and views of the non-concurring employees immediate superviso Section C of the form includes the agencys evaluation of the concerns and the agencys final position and outcom NOTE: Content in Sections A and B reflects personal opinions and views and does not represent the official agencys position of the issues, nor official rationale for the agency decision. Section C includes the agencys official position on the facts, issues, and rationale for the final decisio . Was this process discontinued? If so, please indicate the reason and skip questions 2 and 3:
Process was not discontinued 2. At the completion of the process, the non-concurring employee(s):
Continued to non-concur - Jamie Benjamin; Concurred - Richard Skokowski, Elba Sanchez Santiago 3. For record keeping purposes:
This record has been reviewed and approved for public dissemination NRC FORM 757 (06-2019) Page 1 of 7 Use ADAMS Template NRC-006 (ML063120159)
NRC FORM 757 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NCP Tracking Number (06-2019) NCP-2023-002 NRC MD 10.158 Date NON-CONCURRENCE PROCESS (Continued) 2023-02-13 Section A - To Be Completed by Non-Concurring Employee Title of Subject Document REISSUE - FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE ADAMS Accession Number INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2022010 ML23163A172 Document Signer Document Signers Office Document Signers Email Karla Stoedter - BRANCH CHIEF REGION III Karla.Stoedter@nrc.gov Name of Non-Concurring Employees Non-Concurring Employee Offices Employee Emails Jamie Benjamin - BRANCH CHIEF; Richard REGION III Jamie.Benjamin@nrc.gov; Skokowski - CHANGE PRACTITIONER; Elba Richard.Skokowski@nrc.gov; Sanchez Santiago - SENIOR PROJECT Elba.SanchezSantiago@nrc.gov ENGINEER 1 Non-Concurring Employees Role for the Subject Document Document Contributor 1 Name of Non-Concurring Employee Supervisors 1 Non-Concurring Employee Supervisor Offices 1 Supervisor Emails Aaron McCraw - TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEAM REGION III Aaron.McCraw@nrc.gov; LEADER; Robert Ruiz - BRANCH CHIEF; Matt Robert.Ruiz@nrc.gov; Meyer (He/Him/His) - DEPUTY ASSISTANT Matthew.Meyer@nrc.gov FOR OPERATIONS 1 I would like my non-concurrence considered and would like a written evaluation in Sections B and . When the process is complete, I would like management to determine whether public release of the NCP Form (with or without redactions) is appropriate (Select No if you would like the NCP Form to be non-public):
Yes 1 Reasons for the Non-Concurrence, Potential Impact on Mission, and the Proposed Alternatives See attachment 1 Submitted By / Submitted On 2023-02-13 Jamie Benjamin - BRANCH CHIEF; Richard Skokowski - CHANGE PRACTITIONER; Elba Sanchez Santiago -
SENIOR PROJECT ENGINEER NRC FORM 757 (06-2019) Page 2 of 7 Use ADAMS Template NRC-006 (ML063120159)
NRC FORM 757 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NCP Tracking Number (06-2019) NCP-2023-002 NRC MD 10.158 Date NON-CONCURRENCE PROCESS (Continued) 2023-02-24 Section B - To Be Completed by Non-Concurring Employees Supervisor Title of Subject Document REISSUE - FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE ADAMS Accession Number INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2022010 ML23163A172 Name of Non-Concurring Employees Supervisor Non-Concurring Employees Supervisor Email Office Aaron McCraw - TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEAM Aaron.McCraw@nrc.gov; REGION III LEADER; Robert Ruiz - BRANCH CHIEF; Matt Robert.Ruiz@nrc.gov; Meyer (He/Him/His) - DEPUTY ASSISTANT FOR Matthew.Meyer@nrc.gov OPERATIONS Comments for the NCP Reviewer to Consider No additional comment. The technical subject matter of this NCP is outside of my areas of expertise, as well as my supervisory oversight. My employee in this NCP was conducting work outside of their normal roles and responsibilities within my work unit and under the purview of other managers in the regio . Reviewed By / Reviewed On 2023-02-24 Aaron McCraw - TECHNICAL SUPPORT TEAM LEADER; Robert Ruiz - BRANCH CHIEF; Matt Meyer (He/Him/His) - DEPUTY ASSISTANT FOR OPERATIONS NRC FORM 757 (06-2019) Page 3 of 7 Use ADAMS Template NRC-006 (ML063120159)
NRC FORM 757 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. NCP Tracking Number (06-2019) NCP-2023-002 NRC MD 10.156 NON-CONCURRENCE PROCESS (Continued) Date 03/03/2023 Section B - To Be Completed By Non-Concurring Employee's Supervisor 2. Title of Subject Document 3. ADAMS Accession Number REISSUE - FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2022010 ML23163A172 4. Name of Non-Concurring Employee's Supervisor 5. Office (Choose from the drop down list or fill in)
Robert Ruiz RIII 6. Title of Non-Concurring Employee's Supervisor 7. Supervisor's Telephone Number (Enter 10 numeric digits)
BRANCH CHIEF (630) 829-9732 8. Comments for the NCP Reviewer to Consider While I am Jamie Benjamin's current supervisor, Karla Stoedter (Region III DORS Branch Chief) was Jamie's supervisor at the time. It would be my recommendation to communicate with Karla on this matter going forward, as I am not knowledgeable of the issue at hand.
9. Signature and Date of Non-Concurring Employee's Supervisor Digitally signed by Robert Ruiz Date: 2023.03.03 13:06:21 -06'00'
NRC FORM 757 (06-2019) Use ADAMS Template NRC-006 (ML063120159) Page 3 of 4
NRC FORM757 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. NCP Tracking Number (06-2019) NCP-2023-002 NRC MD 10.156 NON-CONCURRENCE PROCESS (Continued) Date 03/06/2023 Section B -To Be Completed By Non-Concurring Employee's Supervisor 2. Title of Subject Document 3. ADAMS Accession Number REISSUE - FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2022010 ML23163A172 4. Name of Non-Concurring Employee's Supervisor 5. Office (Choose from the drop down list or fill in)
Matt Meyer OEDO 6. Title of Non-Concurring Employee's Supervisor 7. Supervisor's Telephone Number (Enter 10 numeric digits)
DEPUTY ASSISTANT FOR OPERATIONS (301) 415-6198 8. Comments for the NCP Reviewer to Consider No additional comment. The technical subject matter of this NCP is outside of my areas of expertise, as well as my regular supervisory oversight. My employee in this NCP was conducting work outside of their current roles and responsibilities within my work unit and under the purview of other managers in the region.
9. Signature and Date of Non-Concurring Employee's Supervisor Matthew R. Meyer Digitally signed by Matthew R. Meyer Date: 2023.03.06 11:07:03 -05'00'
NRC FORM 757 (06-2019) Use ADAMS Template NRC-006 (ML063120159) Page 3 of4
NRC FORM 757 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NCP Tracking Number (06-2019) NCP-2023-002 NRC MD 10.158 Date NON-CONCURRENCE PROCESS (Continued) 2023-05-01 Section C - To Be Completed by NCP Coordinator Title of Subject Document REISSUE - FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - DESIGN BASIS ASSURANCE ADAMS Accession Number INSPECTION (TEAMS) INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2022010 ML23163A172 Name of NCP Coordinator NCP Coordinators Email Office Jeffrey Josey - BRANCH CHIEF Jeffrey.Josey@nrc.gov RIV Agreed Upon Summary of Issues The following information was agreed up on April 5, 2023. During a 2022 Design Basis Assurance Inspection (DBAI) team inspection, the team identified an issue associated where the licensee had not adequately evaluated industry operating experience related to the adverse effects a design basis tornado induced pressure drop could have on the emergency diesel generators (EDG) functional availability and operability. Specifically, the EDG high crankcase pressure trip is set at approximately 0.5 inches of water. The design bases tornado induced atmospheric pressure drop of 3 psi at a rate of 1 psi/second would also result in a corresponding EDG room pressure drop, due to the EDG room backdraft dampers that directly communicate with the outside environment. Although the EDG crankcase(s) would not be experiencing an increase in pressure (loss of vacuum), the crankcase differential pressure device itself would see the drop in pressure outside of the crankcase caused by the atmospheric pressure drop and trip (1 psi is equivalent to approximately 28 inches of water). Based on this the licensee concluded that the EDGs were susceptible to tripping during a design bases tornado event and would require operator action to restart the EDGs to provide power to the emergency safety feature (ESF)
buses (CARD 22-28738). The nonconcurrence process (NCP) authors believe the licensee should have; 1) declared (should declare)
the Fermi 2 EDGs inoperable after the licensee reached their conclusion documented in licensee corrective action program report CARD 22-28738, and 2) reported the condition under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. Specifically, the EDGs were/are no longer capable of meeting the technical specification EDG Mode 1-5 specified safety function of automatically starting, loading, and continuous operations within the parameters specified in the Fermi 2 Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements. Additionally, because the compensatory measure proposed by the licensee does not prevent the EDGs from tripping, it does not maintain operability. This compensatory measure merely reinforces the post-alarm actions already in the plant procedures and provides additional training and awarenes . Evaluation of Non-Concurrence and Rationale for Decision The submitters are to be commended for their technical acumen and level of ownership of this issue. The technical aspects of this issue require a sophisticated level of understanding of not only the engineering principles but also the application of technical specifications and the operability process. The professional ownership of this issue highlights the NRC core values. An understanding of the event and its outcome is necessary. The submitters have raised a concern associated with a design basis tornado strike of the residual heat removal (RHR) complex (building that houses the EDGs) coincident with a loss of offsite power (LOOP). Section 8.2. of the UFSAR states that in the case of a major earthquake, tornado, or similar cataclysmic event, the simultaneous loss of all offsite power transmission is improbable. However, should a complete loss of offsite power occur, the ESF buses will be supplied from the standby EDGs. Next, one must ensure that the event is within the licensing bases of the facility is required. A LOOP is a credible event during a design basis tornado (UFSAR Section 8.2.2) and is assumed to occur. Section 8.3.1.1.8.1 of the UFSAR identifies that the EDGs are housed in reinforced-concrete, Category 1 structures. Each unit is completely enclosed in its own concrete cell and is isolated from the other units. Therefore, the EDGs will not be physically damaged by the design basis tornado winds or tornado generated missiles. However, the tornado will also cause an atmospheric pressure drop of 3 psi at a rate of 1 psi/second, lasting approximately 30 seconds (UFSAR Figure 3.3-2), and subsequent re-pressurization. The licensees UFSAR does not contain correct information on the depressurization that will occur in the RHR Complex. Specifically, Section 3.3.2.2 states, in part, that C ategory I structures have been designed to withstand the effects due to simultaneous action of tornado wind velocity pressures, atmospheric pressure drop, and a single tornado generated missile, and Section 3.3.2.3.5 states that because of the depressurization that can occur when the very low- pressure area within the funnel of a tornado engulfs a structure, structures housing equipment necessary for safe shutdown must either be designed for the depressurization, or be vented. In the Fermi 2 design, all such structures, with the NRC FORM 757 (06-2019) Page 4 of 7 Use ADAMS Template NRC-006 (ML063120159)
exception of the steam tunnel, are designed for the depressurization. This information is not correct and does not match how the facility is built. The inside of the RHR Complex would experience a pressure drop due to the EDG room backdraft dampers that directly communicate with the outside environment. As the pressure in the RHR Complex goes down the differential pressure sensors will trip causing all 4 EDGs to trip. So, the RHR Complex is a partially vented structure which will expose the EDGs to the drop in atmospheric pressure. Based on the above discussed information the tornado, atmospheric depressurization and LOOP are within the facilities design bases. In response to the issue the licensee initiated CARD 22-28664 to evaluate this concern. As part of their review the licensee contacted the EDG vendor and confirmed that for this event all 4 EDGs would trip on crankcase overpressure due to the lowering atmospheric pressure. The licensee recognized that this was contrary to UFSAR section 8.3.1.1.8.2(i) which states, in part, that the EDGs are designed to be operable during and after a design-basis tornado. The licensee recognized that the presumption of operability was lost and developed an operability position which credited compensatory measures. The measure was to manually restart the EDGs post tornado event if necessary. The time critical action for this event was the need to restore torus cooling within 20 minutes. For their evaluation the licensee assumed a single active failure of a division of ESF equipment resulting from the failure of the associated EDGs. Additionally, it was assumed that both cooling tower fans initially are damaged to such an extent as to be unavailable as a result of the tornado. One fan would be restored to service after six hours, and the second fan could be restored after twelve hours. The scenario assumes one RHR pump, one RHR heat exchanger, and two RHR service water pumps are in operation (in the operable division). The atmospheric conditions last for 30 seconds, and during this time, the EDGs trip due to high crankcase pressure. Operations will receive four EDG Trouble alarms (one for each EDG), and it would be apparent to the operators that this condition was caused by the tornado depressurization. The licensee also assumed that no action could be taken for the first 10 minutes of the event (UFSAR 7.5.2.4.1). The design bases of all ESF systems to mitigate accident event conditions take into consideration that no operator action or assistance is required or recommended for the first 10 minutes of the event. This requirement makes it mandatory that all protective action necessary in the first 10 minutes be automatic. Therefore, although continuous tracking of variables is available, no operator action based upon them is intended. The site made changes to station procedure 20.307.01, EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE, to capture this apparent condition to improve operator efficiency in reaching the same conclusion. In addition, there is a 2 min time delay relay from the time the EDG reset button is depressed to the time the EDG receives a start signal and then another 1Os for the engines to be started. The Torus cooling valve lineups take approximately 5 minutes to complete. The licensee concluded that it would take approximately 18 minutes to restore torus coolin The submitters have asserted that the licensee should have; 1) declared (should declare) the Fermi 2 EDGs inoperable after the licensee reached their conclusion documented in licensee corrective action program report CARD 22-28738, and 2) reported the condition under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. Specifically, the EDGs were/are no longer capable of meeting the technical specification EDG Mode 1-5 specified safety function of automatically starting, loading, and continuous operations within the parameters specified in the Fermi 2 Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements. Additionally, because the compensatory measure proposed by the licensee does not prevent the EDGs from tripping, it does not maintain operability. This compensatory measure merely reinforces the post-alarm actions already in the plant procedures and provides additional training and awareness. I also considered the following information in my review. General Design Criteria (GDC) 2 states: Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornados, hurricanes, floods, tsunami, and seiches without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. The design bases for these structures, systems, and components shall reflect: (1) appropriate consideration of the most severe of the natural phenomena that have been historically reported for the site and surrounding area, with sufficient margin for the limited accuracy, quantity and period of time in which the historical data have been accumulated; (2) appropriate combinations of the effects of normal and accident conditions with the effects of the natural phenomena; and (3) the importance of the safety functions to be performed. UFSAR Section 3.1.2.1.2 states: Criterion 2 Conformance - The design bases enumerated in this criterion are incorporated into the design of structures, systems, and components of Fermi 2. Among the natural phenomena considered are wind and tornado loadings, including static and dynamic water level loadings caused by floods, hurricanes, and other severe storms with wave runup effects; and seismic loadings. In each case the most severe of these phenomena is used as the design basis, together with appropriate combinations of normal and accident conditions. These design bases are developed from detailed analysis of the occurrence and history of these phenomena in the area surrounding the plant location. Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2013-05, NRC Position on the Relationship Between General Design Criteria and Technical Specification Operability Issued to clarify the NRC FORM 757 (06-2019) Page 5 of 7 Use ADAMS Template NRC-006 (ML063120159)
relationship between Appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, to 10 CFR Part 50, and 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications. In addition, the RIS clarified the process for addressing any structure, system, or component (SSC) nonconforming condition with GDC as incorporated into a plants current licensing basis (CLB). Identifies that the GDC, or a plant-specific equivalent as incorporated into the CLB, have an important relationship to the operability requirements of the TS. Comprehending this relationship is critical to understanding how licensees should address nonconformance with CLB design requirements. Notes that the GDC and the TS differ from each other in that the GDC specify NRCs requirements for the design of nuclear power reactors, whereas the TS are included in the license and specify requirements for the operation of nuclear power reactors. As such, the GDC cover a broad category of SSCs that are important to safety, including those SSCs that are covered by TS. It is the staffs position that failure to meet GDC, as described in the licensing basis (e.g., nonconformance with the CLB for protection against flooding, seismic events, tornadoes) should be treated as a nonconforming condition and is an entry point for an operability determination if the nonconforming condition calls into question the ability of SSCs to perform their specified safety function(s) or necessary and related support function(s). If the licensee determination concludes that the TS SSC is nonconforming, but operable or the necessary and related support function is nonconforming but functional, it would be appropriate to address the nonconforming condition through the licensees corrective action program. However, if the licensees evaluation concludes that the TS SSC is inoperable, then the licensee must enter its TS and follow the applicable required actions. Fermi Technical Specifications (TS) define operability as: A system, subsystem, division, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, division, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s). From this it is understood that for a structure or system to be operable in accordance with the TS definition it must be able to perform the specified safety function. Additionally, the TS application of the defined term operable has attendant requirements in excess of those physical requirements of the system or structure that must be in place for the system or structure to perform its specified safety function (e.g., use and application rules and conservatisms or other requirements in excess of the accident analysis included in the TS). Inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0326, Operability Determinations, The definition of operability refers to the capability to perform the specified safety function. The specified safety function of a SSC is that specified safety function(s) in the CLB for the facility. Not all SSC functions described in the current licensing bases are specified safety functions required for operability. More specifically, SSCs that are not explicitly required to be operable by TS but perform necessary and related support functions for TS SSCs are required to be operable by TS. SSCs may also have design functions that do not perform a necessary and related support function for TS SSCs. Section 06.07 states, in part that compensatory measures may be established to restore or maintain operability of an SSC. Section 06.08 states, in part that compensatory measures should have minimal impact on the operators or plant operations, should be relatively simple to implement, and should be documented. Section 08.05 states, in part: * It is not appropriate to consider an SSC operable by taking credit for manual action in place of automatic action for protection of safety limits, operator action cannot be a substitute for automatic safety limit protection. * For situations where substitution of manual action for automatic action is proposed for an operability determination, the evaluation of manual action must focus on the physical differences between automatic and manual action and the ability of the manual action to accomplish the specified safety function(s). The physical differences to be considered include the ability to recognize input signals for action, ready access to or recognition of setpoints, design nuances that may complicate subsequent manual operation (such as auto-reset, repositioning on temperature or pressure),
timing required for automatic action, minimum staffing requirements, and emergency operating procedures written for the automatic mode of operation. * The licensee should have written procedures in place and personnel should be trained on the procedures before any manual action is substituted for the loss of an automatic action. Based on my review of the above information I have determined the following: The specified safety functions of interest are: 1. The EDGs are designed to be operable during and after a design-basis tornado (which includes atmospheric depressurization) in accordance with UFSAR section 8.3.1.1. . Torus cooling must be started within 20 minutes of a LOOP to maintain torus temperature below 140 F. The submitters are correct with regards to operability and reportability for the EDGs for the period of time prior to the licensee developing the operability determination documented in CARD 22-2873. Specifically, all four EDGs at Fermi should have been considered inoperable. Therefore, the licensee should have submitted a 10 CFR 50.73 report for inoperable equipment longer than allowed by technical specification Additionally, the licensee should have reviewed this condition to determine if the actual configuration of the building versus how it is NRC FORM 757 (06-2019) Page 6 of 7 Use ADAMS Template NRC-006 (ML063120159)
described in the UFSAR represented and unanalyzed condition, Specifically, UFSAR 3.3.2.3.5 says that all structures are designed to withstand tornado depressurization and none are vented when in fact, the RHR Complex is a partially vented structure which exposes the EDGs to an atmospheric condition that has an effect on operatio However, after the condition was identified and evaluated the licensee demonstrated compliance with the guidance that the NRC has published in IMC 0326 and has established a reasonable expectation of operability using compensatory measures. The licensee has demonstrated that they can restore power by manually restarting the EDGs following a tornado within the critical time requirements for torus cooling. UFSAR Section 8.3.1.1.8.1 notes that the EDGs are capable of being started or of being restarted from a hot shutdown condition. Additionally, the EDGs realistically could be restarted approximately 8 minutes after the tornado (10 minute wait is an artificiality for design purposes). So, from a reasonableness standpoint the specified safety functions are maintained with crediting the compensatory measure . Coordinated By / Coordinated On 2023-05-01 Jeffrey Josey 1 Approved By / Approved On 2023-05-01 Jason Kozal (He/Him/His) - DEP DIR, DIV OPERATING REACTOR SAFETY NRC FORM 757 (06-2019) Page 7 of 7 Use ADAMS Template NRC-006 (ML063120159)