ML24052A277

Issuance of Amendment No. 229 Regarding Revision of Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirement SR 3.8.1.12

ML24052A277
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	04/30/2024
From:	Shilpa Arora NRC/NRR/DORL/LPL3
To:	Peter Dietrich DTE Electric Company
Arora S, NRR/DORL/LPL3
References
EPID L-2023-LLA-0069
Download: ML24052A277 (1)

Text

April 30, 2024

Peter Dietrich Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer DTE Electric Company Fermi 2 - 260 NOC 6400 North Dixie Highway Newport, MI 48166

SUBJECT:

FERMI, UNIT 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENT NO. 229 REGARDING REVISION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.1, AC SOURCES -

OPERATING, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT SR 3.8.1.12 (EPID L-2023-LLA-0069)

Dear Peter Dietrich:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission) has issued the enclosed Amendment No. 229 to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-43, for Fermi, Unit 2. The amendment includes changes to the technical specification (TS) in response to your amendment request dated May 5, 2023 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)

Accession No. ML23128A017), as supplemented by your letters dated October 12, 2023 (ML23286A120) and January 12, 2024 (ML24012A231).

The amendment revises the Fermi 2 TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.1.12 in TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating. Specifically, the amendment adds a requirement to verify the crankcase overpressure automatic trip for each emergency diesel generator is bypassed for an actual or simulated emergency start signal.

A copy of the related Safety Evaluation is also enclosed. A Notice of Issuance will be included in the Commissions monthly Federal Register notice.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Surinder S. Arora, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch III Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-341

Enclosures:

1. Amendment No. 229 to NPF-43

2. Safety Evaluation

cc: Listserv DTE ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-341

FERMI 2

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACI LITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 229 Renewed License No. NPF-43

1. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A. The application for amendment by DTE Electric Company dated May 5, 2023, as supplemented by letters dated October 12, 2023, and January 12, 2024, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commissions rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

C. There is reasonable assurance: (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations;

D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commissions regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

Enclosure 1

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 229, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this renewed license. DTE Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 6 months of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Jeffrey A. Whited, Chief Plant Licensing Branch III Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Renewed Facility Operating License and Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance: April 30, 2024

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 229

FERMI, UNIT 2

AMENDMENT TO RENEWED FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

DOCKET NO. 50_341

Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-43

Replace the following page of the Renewed Facility Operating Licenses No. NPF-43 with the attached revised page. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT

Technical Specifications

Replace the following page in Appendix A, Technical Specifications. The revised page is identified by amendment number and contains marginal line indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT

3.8-7 3.8-7

(2) Technical Specifications and Environmental Protection Plan

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 229, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, are hereby incorporated into this renewed license. DTE Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

(3) Antitrust Conditions

DTE Electric Company shall abide by the agreements and interpretations between it and the Department of Justice relating to Article I, paragraph 3 of the Electric Power Pool Agreement between DTE Electric Company and Consumers Power Company as specified in a letter from the Detroit Edison Company to the Director of Regulation, dated August 13, 1971, and the letter from Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to Bertram H. Schur, Associate General Counsel, Atomic Energy Commission, dated August 16, 1971.

(4) Deleted

(5) Deleted

(6) Deleted

(7) Deleted

(8) Deleted

(9) Modifications for Fire Protection (Section 9.5.1, SSER #5 and SSER #6)*

DTE Electric Company shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in its Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Amendment 60 and as approved in the SER through Supplement No. 5, subject to the following provision:

(a) DTE Electric Company may make changes to the approved fire protection program without prior approval of the Commission only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

• The parenthetical notation following the title of many license conditions denotes the section of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and/or its supplements wherein the license condition is discussed.

Renewed License No. NPF-43 Amendment No. 229 AC SourcesOperating 3.8.1

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY

SR 3.8.1.11 -------------------NOTE--------------------

All EDG starts may be preceded by an engine prelube period.

Verify on an actual or simulated Emergency In accordance Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiation with the signal each EDG auto-starts and: Surveillance

a. Frequency In 10 seconds after auto-start and Control Program during tests, achieves voltage 3950 V and frequency 58.8 Hz;

b. Achieves steady state:

i. voltage 3950 V and 4314 V for Division I EDGs; and

ii. voltage 3950 V and 4400 V for Division II EDGs; and

iii. frequency 59.5 Hz and 60.5 Hz for both Division I and Division II EDGs; and c.

Operates for 5 minutes.

SR 3.8.1.12 Verify each EDG's automatic trips are In accordance bypassed on an actual or simulated with the emergency start signal except: Surveillance Frequency

a. Engine overspeed; Control Program

b. Generator differential current;

c. Low lube oil pressure; and

d. Failure to start.

(continued)

FERMI - UNIT 2 3.8-7 Amendment No. 134, 178, 183, 201, 227, 229 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 229 TO FACI LITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-43

DTE ELECTRIC COMPANY

FERMI 2

DOCKET NO. 50-341

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By application dated May 5, 2023 (Reference 1), as supplemented by letters dated October 12, 2023 (Reference 3), and January 12, 2024 (Reference 4), DTE Electric Company (DTE or the licensee) submitted a license am endment request (LAR) to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) to modif y the technical specifications (TS) for the Fermi 2 Power Plant (Fermi 2). The proposed amendment to the Fermi 2 TS revises surveillance requirement (SR) 3.8.1.12 in TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating. Specifically, the proposed amendment would add a requirement to verify the crankcase overpressure automatic trip for each emergency diesel generator (EDG) is bypassed for an actual or simulated emergency start signal. The licensee stated that the proposed change will ensure surveillance testing of the bypassed automatic trip is performed consistent with other existing bypassed non-essential EDG protective trips.

On September 7, 2023, the NRC staff sent a request for additional information (RAI) (Reference

2) to the licensee. By letter dated October 12, 2023, the licensee provided responses to the RAI and on January 12, 2024, the licensee provided clarifications of its RAI responses. The supplements dated October 12, 2023, and January 12, 2024, submitted by the licensee provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the NRC staffs original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on July 11, 2023 (88 FR 44165).

2.0 REGULATORY EVALUATION

Under the NRC regulations in part 50 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),

section 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit, whenever a holder of a license wishes to amend the license, including technical specifications in the license, an application for amendment must be filed, fully describing the changes desired.

Under 10 CFR 50.92(a), determinations on whether to grant an applied-for license amendment are to be guided by the considerations that govern the issuance of initial licenses or construction permits to the extent applicable and appropriate.

Enclosure 2

The requested change is a change to a SR in the TS. 10 CFR 50.36 establishes regulatory requirements related to the contents of the TS at nuclear power plants. 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(i) requires TS to include items in the category of limiting conditions for operation (LCO), which are the lowest functional capability or performance levels of equipment required for safe operation of the facility. 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3) requires TS to include items in the category of SR, which are requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that the limiting conditions for operation will be met. The licensees request is to amend a SR to allow a specific EDG operating parameter (crankcase overpressure) to be bypassed on an actual or simulated emergency start signal to avoid inadvertently causing the EDG to be unavailable to perform its safety function. Accordingly, the amended SR will continue to assure that the EDG LCO will be met.

General Design Criterion (GDC) 17, Electric power systems, in 10 CFR, part 50, appendix A, General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, provides requirements for an onsite electric power system and an offsite power system to permit functioning of systems, structures, and components important to safety.

GDC 18, Inspection and Testing of Electrical Power Systems, in 10 CFR, part 50, appendix A, provides design requirements to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of important areas and features to assess the continuity of systems and condition of their components.

3.0 TECHNICAL EVALUATION

3.1 System Design and Operation

The onsite standby power source at Fermi 2 consists of four EDGs separated into two independent divisions. Each EDG starts automatically on a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) signal or on an engineered safety feature (ESF) bus degraded voltage or undervoltage signal.

After starting, the EDG automatically connects to its respective bus when offsite power is tripped as a consequence of ESF bus undervoltage or degraded voltage, independent of or coincident with a LOCA signal. The EDGs also start and operate in the standby mode without connecting to the ESF bus on a LOCA signal alone. Following the trip of offsite power, load shed relays remove power from nonpermanent loads from the ESF bus. When the EDG is tied to the ESF bus, safety-related loads are then sequentially connected to its respective ESF bus by the automatic sequencer. The sequencing logic contro ls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading the EDG. In the event of a loss of normal power, the ESF electrical loads are automatically connected to the EDGs in sufficient time to provide for safe reactor shutdown and to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA.

When the EDGs are operating in parallel with offsite power several protective relay functions are used to protect both the generator and engine. These trips are listed in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Reference 6), table 8.3-12, Emergency Diesel Generator Control Panel Alarms and Trips, for both the test condition and emergency condition. Under conditions that cause pickup of the emergency start relays, all of the trip circuits are blocked with the exception of overspeed trip, generator differential, low lube-oil pressure, crankcase overpressure, and start failure trip. The low lube-oil pressure and crankcase overpressure trips are each connected in a two-out-of-three logic (one out of three causes an alarm only). Although there is one start failure relay, once the engine is started either the low speed or running speed relays will inhibit initiation of the start failure relay. As discussed below, the licensee proposes in its LAR to remove the EDG crankcase overpressure trip for a real or simulated emergency.

There are two emergency start relays and either of these relays will initiate EDG startup as well as bypass the unnecessary trips. All of the bypassed trip circuits still retain their alarm function to alert the operator to an abnormal condition. In that the trip bypass is achieved with the emergency start relays the bypass circuitry is directly monitored by the annunciator position EDG - Auto Start.

Surveillance tests on the emergency start relays are performed in accordance with TS 3.8.1 to test the status and operability of the bypass circuits. The EDG logic is designed so that the non-emergency trip relay is automatically re set by the emergency start signal. This feature prevents the inadvertent lockout of an EDG during standby by a false or real non-emergency-mode trip.

3.2 Current Fermi 2 Technical Specification Requirements

TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, includes SR 3.8.1.12:

Verify each EDGs automatic trips are bypassed on an actual or simulated emergency start signal except:

a. Engine overspeed;

b. Generator differential current;

c. Low lube oil pressure;

d. Crankcase overpressure; and

e. Failure to start

The surveillance frequency is in accordance with the surveillance frequency control program at Fermi 2.

3.3 Proposed Fermi 2 TS Requirements

The proposed TS change is to revise SR 3.8.1.12 by deleting crankcase overpressure. The revised SR 3.8.1.12 will read as follows:

Verify each EDGs automatic trips are bypassed on an actual or simulated emergency start signal except:

a. Engine overspeed;

b. Generator differential current;

c. Low lube oil pressure; and

d. Failure to start

3.4 NRC Staff Review

In this LAR, the licensee proposed a change to TS SR 3.8.1.12 to allow the bypass of the high crankcase pressure trip for an actual or simulated emergency start signal for the EDGs at Fermi 2. In performing its review, the NRC staff evaluated the licensees actions and procedures to justify modifying the TS to allow the high crankcase pressure trip to be bypassed for an actual or simulated emergency start signal for the EDGs. In particular, the staff considered the potential consequences of the high crankcase pressure trip for the EDGs being bypassed for an

actual or simulated emergency start signal. The staff also evaluated the actions and time for the reactor operators to respond to a high crankcase pressure alarm during an actual or simulated emergency start signal for the EDGs at Fermi 2.

As indicated in the LAR, the EDG manufacturer, Fairbanks Morse Engine, has identified five failure modes which could result in high crankcase pressure. These failure modes are:

1. Broken piston rings

2. Cracked pistons

3. Blower seal failure

4. Liner water seal failure

5. Failed crankcase vacuum system

The current SR 3.8.1.12 for Fermi 2 requires verification that each EDG automatic trip is bypassed on an actual or simulated emergency start signal except (a) engine overspeed, (b) generator differential current, (c) low lube oil pressure, (d) crankcase overpressure, and (e) failure to start. The existing control configuration at Fermi 2 has the EDG crankcase pressure monitored by three pressure switches connected in a coincident logic arrangement to detect these five modes of failure. Should any of these failures occur, the resultant increase in EDG crankcase pressure will initiate an automatic EDG trip when any two of the three crankcase pressure switches exceed the setpoint of 0.500 inches water column.

In the LAR, the licensee proposes to modify the Fermi 2 TS to remove crankcase overpressure from SR 3.8.1.12 such that each EDG automatic trip is bypassed on an actual or simulated emergency start signal except (a) engine overspeed, (b) generator differential current, (c) low lube oil pressure, and (d) failure to start. Thus, the proposed TS change will allow the EDG high crankcase pressure trip to be bypassed for an actual (or simulated) emergency start signal. In response to a real emergency start signal with the EDG high crankcase pressure trip bypassed, the reactor operators might allow an EDG to operate with high crankcase pressure until the EDG fails if needed to respond to the emergency. During a simulated emergency start surveillance with the EDG high crankcase pressure trip bypassed, the reactor operators will monitor the operation of the EDGs and respond to any alarms. If a high crankcase pressure occurs during a simulated emergency start surveillance, the licensee will declare the EDG out of service and take appropriate actions in accordance with TS Section 3.8, Electrical Power Systems.

The EDG high crankcase pressure trip will not be bypassed for routine EDG testing and manual start surveillances. During the performance of a manually started EDG surveillance or test, the EDG will be automatically tripped if the crankcase pressure exceeds the 0.500 inches of water column setpoint. The maintenance of this trip for routine testing and manual start surveillances minimizes the potential for EDG damage during those activities. If the EDG trips during a manual EDG surveillance or testing, the licensee will declare the EDG out of service and take appropriate actions in accordance with TS, section 3.8, at Fermi 2.

During its review of the LAR, the NRC staff sent an RAI to the licensee (Reference 2), to obtain additional information regarding the proposed TS change. In Reference 3, the licensee reported that Fermi 2 is not committed to implement RG 1.9 (Revision 2), Selection, Design, and Qualification of Diesel-Generator Units Used as Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants. However, the licensee described its EDG controls at Fermi 2 that conform to several aspects of this RG. The NRC staff agrees with the actions by the licensee to apply guidance from RG 1.9 for the EDG controls at Fermi 2 to the extent appropriate.

The NRC staff agrees with the safety importance of maintaining the EDG crankcase high pressure trip during the performance of routine manual EDG testing and manual start surveillances to minimize potential damage to the EDGs when conducting those activities.

Further, the EDG crankcase high pressure trip will be alarmed in the main control room to alert the reactor operators for appropriate monitoring of the EDG condition. If the EDG trips during manual start testing or during a manual start surveillance, the licensee will declare the EDG INOPERABLE and enter the appropriate TS action statements.

In Reference 4, the licensee provided clarifications of its RAI response. Specifically noting that if an EDG high crankcase pressure alarm actuates while the EDG is performing its safety function, the alarm ensures that the reactor operators are made aware of the condition. No other operator action is required because the EDG will continue performing its intended safety function until the emergency condition requiring the operation of the EDG is resolved or the EDG fails.

In the LAR, the licensee stated that the annunciator response procedures for each EDG will be revised to reflect the change in the high crankcase pressure trip from an essential trip function to a nonessential trip function. In Reference 4, the licensee described these procedure changes as follows:

(1) If an EDG is operating in response to an automatic (emergency) start for a loss of offsite power (LOOP) and/or LOCA to perform its intended safety function, the annunciator response procedure will include guidance to reinforce reactor operator awareness that the high crankcase pressure trip is automatically bypassed. Should a high crankcase pressure condition occur, the EDG annunciator window (local and main control room) alarms will ensure that the reactor operators are aware of the condition and that long-term operation of the EDG might be challenged while the EDG remains in operation.

(2) If an EDG is operating during a simulated automatic (emergency) start surveillance for a LOOP and/or LOCA, the annunciator response procedure will include guidance to reinforce reactor operator awareness that the high crankcase pressure trip is automatically bypassed.

Should a high crankcase pressure condition occur, the EDG annunciator window alarms will ensure that the reactor operators are aware of the EDG condition and the need to perform an evaluation and conduct any necessary actions, including shutdown of the EDG, if appropriate, in accordance with the surveillance procedure.

(3) If an EDG is operating during a manual start for routine surveillance or maintenance testing, the annunciator response procedure will include guidance to reinforce reactor operator awareness that the EDG high crankcase pressure trip is enabled and will automatically trip the EDG. Should a high crankcase pressure condition occur, the EDG annunciator window alarms coincident with the EDG trip will ensure that the reactor operators are aware of the condition and the need for further evaluation of the EDG.

The NRC staff finds that the TS modification proposed in the LAR does not introduce changes to the onsite or offsite power system that would deviate from the existing Fermi 2 requirements to meet GDCs 17 and 18. If an EDG is needed to perform its intended safety function, bypassing the high crankcase pressure trip will allow the EDG to continue to operate until the emergency condition is resolved or until the EDG fails. If the continued operation of the EDG is needed to respond to the emergency any subsequent impact on the length of the out-of-service time for the EDG to perform repairs is not considered to be significant with respect to plant safety.

The NRC staff performed a qualitative evaluation of the risk impact of having an EDG crankcase overpressure signal bypass inserted versus not having the signal bypass inserted. This evaluation relies on the assumption that if the overpressure condition exists, then the EDG is already significantly damaged, and requires a lengthy repair process to run correctly. This key assumption is based on information from the EDG manufacturer as provided in the LAR. The conditions in the EDG that the NRC staff considered in this evaluation are: (1) whether an overpressure condition exists, (2) whether the signal from the overpressure sensor is valid or false, and (3) whether the overpressure signal bypass is inserted. These conditions lead to four sets of sequences, as shown below.

Overpressure (OP) condition No OP condition exists exists OP signal No OP signal No OP signal OP signal (valid) (false) (valid) (false)

Sequence 1 2 3 4 OP bypass EDG fails to run; EDG runs; EDG runs EDG runs inserted is damaged is damaged normally; is normally; is undamaged undamaged OP bypass not EDG runs; EDG runs; EDG runs EDG fails to run; inserted is damaged is damaged normally; is is undamaged undamaged

As shown above, in the sequences where there is no overpressure signal, there is no difference in results between having the bypass inserted, or not having it inserted. Therefore, the risk impact for Sequences 2 and 3 is zero. For Sequence 1, with an overpressure condition that exists and a valid overpressure signal, the difference is that with the bypass inserted, the EDG will continue to run for some time period once the overpressure condition exists, until the EDG stops running because of additional damage. With the assumption that the overpressure condition existing indicates that significant damage has already occurred, having the bypass inserted may allow the EDG to continue to operate for an additional, perhaps short, time period.

For Sequence 1, the staff finds that having the bypass inserted results in either no risk impact, or a minimal risk reduction. For Sequence 4, with no overpressure condition existing and a false overpressure signal, the difference is that, without the overpressure bypass inserted, the EDG will not start, causing a delay or preventing use of the undamaged EDG. For Sequence 4, the staff finds that having the bypass inserted results in a small risk reduction, the magnitude of which depends on the frequency of false overpressure signals. Based on its qualitative evaluation, the NRC staff has determined that having the overpressure signal bypass inserted results in either no risk impact, or only a minimal risk improvement.

In sum, the NRC staff has reviewed the licensees analysis provided in its LAR and the supplemental submittals. Based on the review, the NRC staff finds that the licensee has provided adequate justification to amend SR 3.8.1.12 to allow the EDG operating parameter crankcase overpressure to be bypassed on an actual or simulated emergency start signal to avoid inadvertently causing the EDGs to be unavailable to perform their safety functions.

Therefore, the NRC staff finds that the amended SR 3.8.1.12 will provide reasonable assurance that the EDGs will be available to perform their safety functions such that the applicable LCOs will be met in accordance with 10 CFR 50.36.

4.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commissions regulations, the Michigan State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment on February 20, 2024. The State official did not have any comments.

5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendment changes requirements with respect to the installation or use of facility components located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR, part 20, and changes the SRs. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, as published in the Federal Register on July 11, 2023 (88 FR 44165), and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for catego rical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.

6.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) there is reasonable assurance that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commissions regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

7.0 REFERENCES

1. Letter from Peter Dietrich, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Fermi 2 Power Plant, DTE Electric Company, to United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirement SR 3.8.1.12, dated May 5, 2023 (Agencywide Documents Access and M anagement System (ADAMS) Accession No. (ML23128A017).

2. NRC E-mail Capture, Fermi 2 - Request for Additional Information for License Amendment Request to Revise TS 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.12, dated September 7, 2023 (ML23250A273).

3. Letter from Peter Dietrich, Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, Fermi 2 Power Plant, DTE Electric Company, to United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, Response to Request for Additional Information for License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirement SR 3.8.1.12, dated October 12, 2023 (ML23286A120).

4. Letter from Christopher Domingos, Site Vice President, Fermi 2 Power Plant, DTE Electric Company, to United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk, Clarification for Request for Additional Information Responses for License Amendment

Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Surveillance Requirement SR 3.8.1.12, dated January 12, 2024 (ML24012A231).

5. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Revision 2, December 1979), Selection, Design, and Qualification of Diesel-Generator Units Used as Standby (Onsite) Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants (ML12305A253).

6. Fermi 2 Power Plant, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 24, Chapter 8, Electric Power (ML22325A125).

Principal Contributors: Thomas G. Scarbrough, NRR Sheila Ray, NRR

Date of issuance: April 30, 2024

ML24052A277 NRR-058 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL3/PM NRR/DORL/LPL3/LA NRR/DSS/STSB/BC NRR/DEX/EMIB/BC NAME SArora SRohrer SMehta SBailey DATE 2/21/2024 2/22/2024 3/01/2024 2/07/2024 OFFICE NRR/DEX/EEEB/BC NRR/DRA/APLB/BC OGC-NLO NRR/DORL/LPL3/BC NAME WMorton SMakor DRoth JWhited DATE 2/26/2023 3/04/2024 3/21/2024 4/29/2024 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPL3/PM NAME SArora DATE 4/30/2024