IR 05000341/2021012
| ML21340A138 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 12/07/2021 |
| From: | Nestor Feliz-Adorno Reactor Projects Region 3 Branch 4 |
| To: | Peter Dietrich DTE Electric Company |
| References | |
| IR 2021012 | |
| Download: ML21340A138 (19) | |
Text
SUBJECT:
FERMI POWER PLANT, UNIT 2 - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000341/2021012
Dear Mr. Dietrich:
On November 5, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment.
Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified during this inspection.
December 7, 2021 This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 05000341 License No. NPF-43
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000341
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2021-012-0009
Licensee:
DTE Electric Company
Facility:
Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2
Location:
Newport, MI
Inspection Dates:
October 18, 2021 to November 05, 2021
Inspectors:
M. Garza, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
J. Harvey, Project Manager
K. Kolaczyk, Reactor Operations Engineer
R. Ng, Project Engineer
C. Norton, Senior Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Néstor J. Féliz Adorno, Chief
Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations of more than minor significance were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 02.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensees Corrective Action Program, use of operating experience, self-assessments, and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the Corrective Action Programs effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors also conducted a five-year review of the residual heat removal service water and mechanical draft cooling tower systems.
Operating Experience, Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations processes for use of operating experience, audits and self-assessments.
Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment of Corrective Action Program 71152B Based on the samples reviewed, the team concluded that the licensee's implementation of the Corrective Action Program was generally effective with opportunities for improvements and supported nuclear safety.
Effectiveness of Problem Identification:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee continued to identify issues at a low threshold and appropriately entered these issues into the Corrective Action Program. The team also determined that the licensee usually entered problems into the Corrective Action Program completely and accurately.
The team noted that the licensee utilized a number of Corrective Action Program support processes to identify problems, including the self-assessment and audit process and the Operating Experience Program. Some deficiencies were identified by external organizations, including the NRC, that had not been previously identified by licensee staff and were subsequently entered into the Corrective Action Program. For example, the licensee performed department self-assessments and quality assurance audits to identify issues in station processes. These identified deficiencies were entered into the Corrective Action Program for resolution. Similarly, the licensee screened issues from both NRC and industry operating experience and entered them into the Corrective Action Program when they were applicable to the station.
The team determined that the licensee was generally effective at trending low level issues and taking appropriate corrective actions to prevent more significant problems from developing. In addition, the licensee used the Corrective Action Program to document instances in which previous corrective actions were ineffective or were inappropriately closed.
The team performed a 5-year review of the residual heat removal service water and mechanical draft cooling tower systems. Specifically, the team focused on corrosion and performance aspects of the systems. As part of this review, the team interviewed the system engineer, reviewed the plant health reports, and reviewed selected corrective action and condition evaluation documents. In addition, the team performed a partial system walkdown to assess the material condition of the system piping, selected components, and surrounding areas. The team concluded that piping degradation and performance concerns for the systems were identified and entered into the Corrective Action Program at a low threshold and the corrective actions were adequate and timely commensurate with their safety significances. The team did identify a minor procedural violation related to the implementation of the compensatory action related to an operability evaluation. The details of the minor violation are described in the section below. For the areas walked down, the team did not identify any additional issues.
Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee performance was generally effective at prioritizing and evaluating issues commensurate with the safety significance of the identified problem. The Ownership Screening Committee and the Management Review Committee meetings were generally thorough and intrusive in reviewing issues and prioritizing actions. The team observed a productive dialogue between the members of these committees and the members challenged each other when dispositioning issues. In general, once a degraded or non-conforming condition was identified, the Corrective Action Program directed that an equipment operability or functionality review be performed. As a result, the samples reviewed were evaluated in a timely manner.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions:
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in implementing corrective actions. In general, corrective actions for deficiencies that were safety significant were implemented in a timely manner. Problems identified using a root cause or other cause methodologies were resolved in accordance with Corrective Action Program requirements. The corrective actions assignments that were sampled by the team for selected NRC documented violations and for licensee event reports (LERs) were generally effective and timely.
Use of Operating Experience 71152B Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that licensee's performance in the use of operating experience was generally effective. The licensee screened industry and NRC operating experience information for applicability to the station. Based on these initial screenings, the licensee-initiated actions in the Corrective Action Program to fully evaluate the impact, if any, to the station. When applicable, actions were developed and implemented under the Corrective Action Program to prevent similar issues from occurring. Operating experience lessons learned were communicated and incorporated into plant operations. The team observed the information being used in daily activities, such as pre-job briefs, as well as Corrective Action Program issues reviews and investigations.
The team noticed that some of the operating experience processing steps were not formally incorporated into the licensee's operating experience procedures. For example, the licensee's operating experience coordinator has subscribed to a service that retrieves operating experiences from external sources, which was not described in the procedure.
While these actions were beneficial to the licensee, the lack of a formalized process could lead to missed operating experience response when unexpected turnover occurs. The licensee entered this issue into the Correction Action Program as CARD 21-29874 and is reviewing their internal process for potential process changes.
Self-Assessments and Audits 71152B Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensee's performance of self-assessments and audits was generally effective. The licensee performed department self-assessments and quality assurance audits throughout the organization on a periodic basis. These self-assessments and audits were generally effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an appropriate threshold. The self-assessments and audits reviewed by the team identified issues that were not previously known, including issues within the Corrective Action Program itself. Nuclear Quality Assurance (NQA) had identified deficiencies with the licensee's processes and those issues were addressed by the station through the Corrective Action Program.
Safety Conscious Work Environment 71152B During this inspection, the team assessed safety conscious work environment (SCWE) at Fermi. The team conducted individual interviews and facilitated supervisor and worker focus group meetings. The teams reviewed corrective action resolution documents (CARDS),
Nuclear Safety Culture Monitoring Panel reports and the results of the June 2020 and January 2021 Nuclear Safety Culture Pulse Surveys. The team identified no SCWE issues.
An environment exists at Fermi where personnel are free to raise nuclear safety concerns without fear of retaliation.
During interviews and focus group meetings, employees described morale and trust concerns that may warrant plant management assessment and intervention. Morale concerns centered around workload and resources, issues brought on by work at home practices, and treatment of contract employees. Employees also described trust concerns between work groups.
Some described mistrust within work groups, due in part to the newness of supervisors brought in from outside the organization. The licensee is aware of these issues and is developing actions to address these concerns via CARD 21-29964.
Minor Violation 71152B Minor Violation: CARD 21-25216, "Oil Level "C" MDCT [mechanical draft cooling tower] Fan Gear Reducer is Low," documented the licensees discovery of a low oil level on the MDCT fan "C" gear reducer. This component is required to support operability of the Division 1 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The licensee determined the condition did not impact UHS operability and performed engineering functional analysis EFA-E11-21-005, revision 0, to further evaluate the system's ability to perform its safety function. This evaluation specified several compensatory actions to ensure operability. Compensatory Action 2 required, in part, to maintain the oil level at the high-level mark. Per the vendor of the gearbox, oil level indication would drop as oil is redistributed around the inside of gearbox during operation.
Therefore, it would be advantageous to maintain the oil level at the high mark with the fan in standby to account for this drop. However, the inspectors noted Compensatory Action 2 was not included in the Compensatory Monitoring List that the licensee used to implement compensatory actions. Instead, the Compensatory Monitoring List stated, in part, to check that the oil level is in band during standby and during operation only.
Step 3.4.4 of MQA11, "Corrective Action Program," Revision 49, requires that supervisors and managers ensure that immediate or compensatory corrective actions are taken for identified conditions. Thus, the inspectors determined that the failure to follow MQA-11 procedure was a performance deficiency and a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings."
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The performance deficiency was minor because the deficiency did not result in reasonable doubt about the equipments operability. The licensee had actions to monitor the oil leakage during standby and measure the oil level during operation ensuring adequate oil level when the fan is called upon to perform its safety functions.
Enforcement:
The licensee generated CARD 21-30007, "2021 NRC PI&R Inspection EFA Compensatory Measure Documents Don't Match," to restore compliance. This failure to comply with Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
Observation: Work Control and Risk Management Concerns 71152B The team reviewed several CARDs from 2019, 2020 and 2021, documenting issues identified internally and externally related to the station's understanding of risk. For instance, CARD 19-29121, "Trend Identified with Operations Risk Management of Work Items," was generated on November 26, 2019, to capture several instances of work items authorized by Operations that resulted in an adverse impact to the plant. One example identified in this CARD was associated with the licensee's failure to consider mitigating factors defined in a fire protection engineering evaluation (FPEE) for a non-functional alternate diesel fire pump (ADFP). Specifically, the licensee performed work on the combustion turbine generators (CTGs) while the ADFP was non-functional. The CTGs were credited as a mitigating factor in that FPEE. This misunderstanding of risk to the station resulted in the licensee not being able to perform that mitigating action for the ADFP. Another example from this CARD was associated with the station's failure to recognize the risk and complexity associated with installing that ADFP as a temporary modification. The lack of understanding ultimately resulted in the temporary modification not meeting all necessary design requirements and a safety near miss when the ADFP recirculation line became dislodged during testing. NRC inspectors documented a Green finding with an associated violation related to this issue in Inspection Report 2019003 (ADAMS Accession Number ML19310E673). As a result, the licensee implemented actions to address the trend identified in CARD 19-29121. However, on November 12, 2020, CARD 20-32176, "Operations Performance Gap in Risk Management and Identification of Risk," was generated to document risk management problems in Operations. Two additional risk management related CARDs were created in 2021: CARD 21-21524, "NQA Audit 21-0100 Deficiency - Fermi has not Exhibited the Behaviors Necessary to Consistently Identify, Assess, Eliminate or Reduce, and Manage Risks Associated with Station Operations," and CARD 21-26403, "2021 WANO Peer Review
- AFI OF.2." The inspectors did not identify a violation or finding with the issues associated with these CARDs. However, the inspectors noted that this appeared to be a recurring observation and that a lack of understanding of risk identification and mitigation continued to be an apparent challenge for the station.
The inspectors also reviewed numerous CARDs over the last year related to work planning. For instance, CARD 21-29208, "23.307.16 Section 5.1 (EDG [emergency diesel generator] 13 Slow Start Surveillance) not Scheduled Prior to Critical Date," discussed the station's failure to schedule a Technical Specification required surveillance for the EDG 13 prior to the week the surveillance date went critical. The licensee identified this issue before the surveillance was past due and was able to rearrange the work week to perform the surveillance. The team noted that work management gaps can also lead to challenging the station's risk identification and mitigation as required work may not be incorporated into the overall risk profile for the work week.
The licensee generated CARD 21-29873, "2021 PIR - NRC Observation Risk Assessment,"
to capture the inspectors' observations.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On November 5, 2021, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to you and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
09-27876
2009 Configuration Design Basis Inspection (CDBI)
Self-Assessment - Additional Unanalyzed HPCI/RCIC and
Room LOCA Heat Load
10/08/2009
10-24554
HPCI and RCIC Gland Steam Leakage Higher than Expected
06/03/2010
10-30552
Generic Letter 2008-01 UT Examination: PM Event X058
Detected Void in Div. 1 Core Spray
11/12/2010
10-31129
UFSAR 6.2.1.6 Description of Mill Scale/Varnish Overstates
Quantity and is Inconsistent with Design
11/24/2010
11-29284
Legacy Circuit Design Associated with the RHR 4.16KV
Load Shed Scheme
10/12/2011
13-22655
UFSAR Section 15.6.4 Description of Main Steam Line Break
Source Term Concentrations Appears to be Incorrect
04/15/2013
13-28648
2013 NRC UHS Inspection: Potential Unanalyzed Condition
Related to Limiting Post-Tornado Suppression Pool
Temperature
2/06/2013
14-25130
P44F400A Div 1 EECW TCV AOV Abnormalities that were
Identified During WO
06/20/2014
14-25229
Design Discrepancy Related to Assumed High Energy Line
Break Area for 15 Psig Heating Steam
06/25/2014
14-25229
Design Discrepancy Related to Assumed HELB Break Area
for 15 Psig Heating Steam
06/25/2014
15-22830
Legacy Issues with Appendix R/Loop Drywell Temperature
Response
04/20/2015
15-23277
RHRSW Return from RHR HX High Temperature Alarm
Setpoints Above Piping Design
05/07/2015
16-23673
Independent RHRSW Inspection - Piping Calculation is
Inconsistent with Drawing
05/04/2016
17-20462
EDGSW Support Discrepancies
01/16/2017
17-21170
R1700S011A Inverter not Outputting as Expected
2/09/2017
17-28611
E1150F068B Packing Leak Root Cause Evaluation
05/23/2018
Corrective Action
Documents
18-25183
Protected Area Camera CCTV 06 Loss of Video with
Unknown Cause
07/05/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
18-25847
Div 2 MDCT Fan Brake Inverter Found with No Power
08/03/2018
18-26647
Valve External Has Corrosion
09/04/2018
18-26888
Localized Pit Discovered
09/13/2018
18-27268
Noted Flange Corrosion on Stage to Column Flange on 'B'
09/24/2018
18-27271
- 13 EDGSW Pump Min Flow Line Approximately 3" Broke
Off
09/24/2018
18-27477
Indications on Removed Stem
09/28/2018
18-27533
Div 1 RHR Decant Pump Has Through Holes
09/29/2018
18-27571
OSC Cognitive Trend, RHRSW Corrosion
09/30/2018
18-27594
Observed Flange Corrosion on RHRSW A Pump Column
10/01/2018
18-27797
Request Work Orders for RHRSW Valves
10/04/2018
18-29220
Placing T4100D018, Control Room Humidifier in Service
Caused Dripping Water in the Control Room and Computer
Room
11/26/2018
18-29727
The MDCT Brake Inverter Panel, R1700S011B, is Indicating
No AC Volts or AC Amps and the AC Power Light is Off
2/04/2018
18-30069
NRC Identified Potential Trend - Repetitive Failures of
Important Equipment
2/13/2018
18-30289
Damage to S. RHR HX RM Platform Beam B88 at Top of
Steel (TOS) El. 613'-5"
2/20/2018
19-20083
NQA Audit 18-0116 Deficiency - CDA Testing/Evaluations
Not Completed
01/03/2019
19-20762
RHRSW LIR - Recommendation
2/04/2019
19-20772
RHRSW LIR Deficiency - SW Pump Motor Corrosion
2/04/2019
19-21857
Site Excellence Plan Action Tracking
03/10/2019
19-22982
2019 Radiation Protection Excellence Plan
04/18/2019
19-24737
EDG 14 Surging in Idle During Surveillance Run
06/24/2019
19-25280
NRC Identified: Local Lake Level Indication Reads Higher
than UFSAR Assumed Maximum Starting Level for Flood
07/12/2021
19-25762
Lead Shielding in CFT Pump Room
08/02/2019
19-26201
Improper Configuration of Security Equipment - Microwave
Zone 04 Receiver
08/16/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
19-26836
NRC Identified Reactor Feedwater System Bailey DCS
Maintenance Incomplete Information
09/11/2019
19-26837
NRC Identified: CTG Black Start Capability Removed when
Relied Upon for FPEE-19-0003
09/11/2019
19-27064
Review and Address CARD Quality Issued with CARD 20002
09/20/2019
19-27140
NRC Question to Determine if CTG 11.1 has the Correct
09/23/2019
19-27635
Adverse Trend for EQ Program PM Implementation
10/08/2019
19-27709
Reassess DCS S1401 CDA as Direct
10/09/2019
19-28279
NQA Audit 19-0110 Adverse Finding
10/30/2019
19-28748
NQA Audit 19-0111 Deficiency
11/14/2019
19-29121
Trend Identified with Operations Risk Management of Work
Items
11/26/2019
20-20091
Division 1 RHR Pump Room Dampers
01/06/2020
20-20456
Corrosion Identified on Roof Plug Anchor Above RHR
Pump A
01/15/2020
20-20580
CDAs Associated with CTG 11.1 Were Incorrectly Classified
as Indirect
01/17/2020
20-20727
Evaluation MWC10 and the WO Review/ALARA Planning
Process
07/31/2020
20-21776
Radworker Boundary Control Trend Identified
2/18/2020
20-21944
Trend of EDG Equipment Issues in 2019
2/21/2020
20-22759
Procedural CST Minimum Level Requirements Appear to be
Non-Conservative Relative to Limits Established in
DC-5874 Vol I Rev A
03/13/2020
20-23266
Corrosion of RHRSW Pipe at MDCT Penetration MK-151
03/26/2020
20-24300
LHRA Conditions Identified in the Torus Proper
04/11/2020
20-24960
NQA RF20 Adverse Trend in Identification and Control of
04/21/2020
20-25851
Unexpected DR Alarm During Scaffold Modification at
MSIV D
05/17/2020
20-26407
Notification of 10CFR Part 21 for Rosemont Model 1153,
1154, and 3150 Series Transmitters Pressure Transmitters
06/01/2020
20-26719
Stator Water Cooling Conductivity Meter Malfunction
06/09/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
20-28926
Secondary Containment Isolation
08/03/2020
20-29403
Unable to Complete Work Order 53093540 (Trend Only)
08/19/2019
20-29842
NQA Audit 20-0108 Deficiency
09/01/2020
20-29870
RF20 Dose Overage
09/02/2020
20-30213
NQA Audit 20-0111 Deficiency - Outdated Revisions of
Documents Identified at Emergency Response
Facility - Repeat Audit Issue
09/14/2020
20-31803
Operations Missed Risk Assessment for CRD Suction from
10/30/2020
20-32176
Operations Performance Gap in Risk Management and
Identification of Risk
11/12/2020
20-32606
EDP 80072 MDCT Discrepancies Identified During
Installation
2/02/2020
20-32992
NRC IN 2007-12, Supplement 1: Pipe Wear Due to
Interaction of Flow-Induced Vibrations and Reflective Metal
Insulation
2/16/2020
20-33238
EDG 11 Crankcase Oil Exhibits Increased Fuel Oil in the
Crankcase Oil
2/29/2020
21-20377
RP Department Indicator for Level 2/3 PCEs Did Not Meet
YE Goal
01/13/2021
21-21536
CARD Quality Review Team Gap in Corrective Action
Quality - Maintenance Electrical
2/17/2021
21-21704
Apparent Cause Evaluation-Suction Hoses Installed Beyond
Expected Depth
2/23/2021
21-22253
CARD Quality Review Team: Gap in Countermeasure Action
Quality-Training
03/11/2021
21-22547
Apparent Cause Evaluation - Failure to Complete
Compensatory Fire Watch Inspections - NRC Identified
03/22/2021
21-22634
Trend in RP Technician Unplanned SRD Dose Rate Alarms
03/24/2021
21-22813
Torque Wrench with Fixed Contamination Possibly
03/29/2021
21-23492
Trend Noted on Roof Leaks
04/21/2021
21-23702
Watertight Penetration
04/27/2021
21-23855
Potential Unanalyzed Condition Following
05/03/2021
21-23904
Non-Conservative Assumption in MSLB/FWLB Design
05/04/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculation
21-24537
- 2 HPSV [High Pressure Stop Valve] Indicates Closed in the
MCR [Main Control Room]
05/23/2021
21-24629
Review NRC IN 2021-01 for Applicability to MOV Program
05/26/2021
21-25216
Oil Level "C" MDCT Fan Gear Reducer is Low
06/12/2021
21-25224
UNSAT Conditions on MDCT Gear Reducer Oil Level Do Not
Show up RED on Operator Rounds
06/13/2021
21-26030
Investigate Limit Switches on Remote Valves Causing MCRD
07/08/2021
21-27024
NRC Violation 2Q2021 - License Condition 2(C)(9),
"Modifications for Fire Protection"
08/21/2021
21-28309
NRFP Controller Not Indicating Properly
09/21/2021
21-28431
MDCT 'D' Spray Nozzle Inspection
09/23/2021
1-29661
21 NRC PI&R - NRC Identified: CARD 18-25183
"Protected Area Camera CCTV 06 Loss of Video with
Unknown Cause" Rescreened After Closure to Correct
Classification with No CARD Initiated to Document This
10/29/2021
21-09785
21 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Identified) - CA Closed to
AIM
11/03/2021
21-29217
Misalignment Between Hard Copy CARD Form and Web
ARMs CARD Form
10/18/2021
21-29296
Content of IWE Program in IWE Report
10/20/2021
21-29407
21 PI&R - Evaluate the Process for Adding MCRD # to the
WO in Maximo
10/22/2021
21-29479
21 NRC PI&R - Feedback from NRC on Investigation
Details in eCARD for B/F CARDs
10/25/2021
21-29589
21 NRC PI&R Inspection - Enhancement Action to Update
Applicable Design Documentation Associated
to C11F412
10/27/2021
21-29620
21 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Identified Gap in CARD
21-22878
10/28/2021
21-29621
21 NRC PI&R - NRC Identified CARD Quality Issues for
CARD 21-22535 (Evaluate OE 2021-0085 for
Potential Mitigating Actions)
10/28/2021
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
21-29646
21 NRC PI&R - NRC Identified Delay in Initiation of CARD
10/29/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
21-29628: NCAP Actions Closed Inappropriately
21-29673
21 NRC PI&R - NRC Identified: Potential CARD
Re-Classification Miss for CARD 20-31731
10/29/2021
21-29746
21 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Identified Typo in
CARD 13-28648
11/02/2021
21-29785
21 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Identified) - CA Closed to
AIM
11/03/2021
21-29812
21 NRC PI&R (NRC Identified) - RP Org Effectiveness
Review in CARD 20-29870 Found 3 Actions Incorrectly
Categorized as Corrective Actions
11/05/2021
21-29819
21 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Identified) - CARD Tag
Hanging After CARD Closure
11/04/2021
21-29821
21 NRC PI&R CARD (NRC Identified) - DC-6004 VOL I
Packing Friction Revision (Trend Only)
11/04/2021
21-29831
21 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Identified: NCAP CARD
Action Closure Inadequate
11/04/2021
21-29850
21 NRC PI&R Inspection (NRC Question) - Survey the
Industry on Tracking Methods for Comp Actions in CAP
CARDs
11/04/2021
21-29851
21 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Enhancement
Opportunity - Operator Rounds Validation
11/04/2021
21-29855
21 PI&R NRC Identified - Enhancement Action
Categorized as a Corrective Action in CARD 20-26407
11/04/2021
21-29869
21 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation
11/05/2021
21-29871
21 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation Related to CRD System
11/05/2021
21-29872
21 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation Related to the
RP Program
11/05/2021
21-29873
21 PIR - NRC Observation Risk Assessment
11/05/2021
21-29874
21 NRC PI&R - NRC Observation Related to the OE
Program
11/05/2021
21-29881
21 NRC PI&R Inspection - NRC Identified Gap from
RFI-167
11/05/2021
21-29903
QHSA - EFA Compensatory Measures Deficiency,
MES27 5.2.3
11/05/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
21-29946
21 NRC PIR Inspection - Potential Minor Violations
11/08/2021
21-29964
21 NRC PI&R Inspection - Theme of Trust Noted in
Interviews
11/08/2021
21-30007
21 NRC PI&R Inspection EFA Compensatory Measure
Documents Don't Match
11/09/2021
Engineering
Evaluations
EQ1-EF2-063-
G01
Qualification Evaluation Report (QER) Revision 0
2/18/2019
System Health Report for Residual Heat Removal
1Q2021
NQA-19-0110
Station Blackout and Maintenance Rule Programs
11/20/2019
NQA-19-0111
Corrective and Operation Experience Programs
2/20/2019
Miscellaneous
NQA-20-018
Radiation Protection, Radiological Effluent and Radioactive
Material Transfer and Disposal Program
10/16/2020
23.412
Turbine Building Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
System
35.000242
Barrier Identification/Classification
MMR 03
Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual - Scoping
MMR 10
Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual - Monitoring
MMR-14
Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual - Structures
Monitoring
MMR03
Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual
MQA 11-100
Quality Assurance Conduct Manual Implementing
Procedure - Operability Determination Process
MQA11-200
Quality Assurance Conduct Manual Implementing Procedure
1B
MQA11-300
Quality Assurance Conduct Manual Implementing
Procedure - Screening and Assignment
MQA11-400
Corrective Action Program - Condition Disposition
MQA11-500
Non-Corrective Action Program - Condition Disposition
Procedures
ODE-6
Operator Challenges
20 Fermi Mid-Cycle Self-Assessment
11/03/2020
20 FME Formal Self-Assessment
10/16/2020
Quick Hit Self-Assessment of Fluid Leak Management
Program (MDI-59)
10/09/2020
Self-Assessments
21 Latent Issue Review (LIR) for the IWE-Primary
2/26/2021
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Containment Inspection Program
19-0109
Quality Assurance Audit of the Emergency Preparedness
Program
09/17/2019
19-0111
Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Corrective Action and
Operating Experience Programs
11/26/2019
21-0100
Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Operations, Fire
Protection, and Emergency Operating Procedures Programs
2/22/2021
21-0108
Nuclear Quality Assurance Audit of the Emergency
Preparedness Program
09/13/2021
NPRP-19-0087
QHSA: Radiation Protection Performance Improvement
10/16/2019
NPRP-20-0024
QHSA: 71124.01, Radiological Hazard Assessment and
Exposure Controls, 71124.03, In-Plant Airborne Radiation
Control and Mitigation & 71124.04 Occupational Dose
Assessment
03/09/2020
NPRP-21-0040
QHSA: Radiological Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Treatment
06/08/2021