ML20151T203

Insp Rept 50-155/88-13 on 880602-0718.Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Surveillance Observation of Pressure Test on NSSS & Reactor Depressurization Sys & Security Observations Re Day to Day Plant Activities

ML20151T203
Person / Time
Site:	Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png
Issue date:	08/05/1988
From:	Jackiw I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151T187	List: ML20151T183 ML20151T196 ML20151T203
References
50-155-88-13, IEB-88-005, IEB-88-007, IEB-88-5, IEB-88-7, NUDOCS 8808160287
Download: ML20151T203 (8)

See also: IR 05000155/1988013

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION III I

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hport No. 50-155/88013(DRP)

Docket No. 50-155 License No. DPR-6

Licensee: Consumers Power Company

212 West Michigan Avenue

Jackson, MI 49201

Facility Name: Big Rock Point Nu ear Plant

Inspection At: Charlevoix, MI 49720

Inspection Conducted: June 2 through July 18, 1988 ,

Inspector: E. Plettner 8'd 7N

Uate

Inspector: N. Williamsen .

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Approved By: 1 N  !

ReactorPyojectsSection28 Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on June 2 through July 18,1988 (Report No. 50-155/88-013(DRP))

Areas Inspected: The inspection was routine, unannounced, and conducted by-

the Senior Resident Inspector and the Resident Inspector. The functional '

areas inspected consisted of the followina areas. Surveillance observation

of the pressure test on the nuclear steam supply system and the reactor

depressurization system. Maintenance observation of work performed on

motor operated isolation valves and the reinstallation of the reactor

depressurization valves. Operational safety verification, radiological

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practices, and security observations involving day to day plant activities.

Startup/ refuel activities associated with the refuel and startup of the

reactor. NRC Bulletins on defective piping material and pover oscillations

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ir, boiling water reactors.

Results: The licensee has demonstrated a desire to respond in a timely

manner to issues and concerns presented to them by the NRC. The surveillance,

maintenanca, operational safety, radiological program, and the security

program appeared to ensure public health and safety. Two violations were

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identified in this report. The violation in the maintenance section

addresses inadequate quality controls and the violation in the operational

safety section addresses the failure to follow procedure when using a copy

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of a controlled document.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

• T. Elward, Plant Superintendent

• A. Pet'tjean, Planni:ig and Administrative Services

Superintendent

G. Withrow, Engineering Maintenance Superintendent

• R. Alexander Technical Engineer

L. Monshor, Quality As:urance Superintendent

• J. Seer, Chemistry / Health Physics Superintendent

• R. Scheels, ' Acting Operations Supervisor

"R. Hill, Sr. QA Consultant

• P. Donnelly, Nuclear Assurance Administrator

• R. Schrader, E & M Superintendent, Acting .

• M. Bielinski, Production and Plant Performance,

Superintendent, Acting

• T. Hagan, Director Nuclear Training

The inspector a'.so contacted other licensee personnel in the Operations,

Maintenance, Radiation Protection, and Technical Departments.

• Denotes those present at exit interview.

2. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The NRC inspectors observed Technical Specification required surveillance

tests. The reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility

surveillance operations were performed in accordance with the requirements

established in the Operating License and Technical Specification.

The Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) observed the licensee's performance

of the following surveillance tests on the indicated dates:

June 20, 1988, TV-10, "Pressure Test of Nuclear Steam Supply System,"

Revision 37, dated June 14, 1988, with approved. temporary changes to

allow the use of a new hydro test pump. A failed relief valve in the

Reactor Water Clean-up System was noted during the test. A maintenance

work order was issued and a new valve installed. The licensee also

replaced two other relief valves in the system since they were the same

age as the failed valve. A second test was performed and observed by

the SRI on June 22, 1988, with satisfactory results.

July 13,1988, T30-30, "RDS Cabinet Test (Sensor Cabinet C/ Actuation

Cabinet 3)," Revision 24, dated January 11, 1988. The procedure was

satisfactorily performed by a licensed operator and an auxiliary

operator.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

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3. Monthly Maintenance Observation ' ?703)

Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components

listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted

in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry

codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting .

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed

from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;

activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected

as applicable; functional testing ond/or calibrations were performed prior

to returning components or systems to service; quality control records

were maintained; activities were accomplished by qual fied personnel;

parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls

were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to

assure that priority is assigned to safety-related equipment maintenance

which may affect system performance.

On June 18, 1988, the SRI observed the performance of maintenance on

motor operated Valve IA-760 under Work Request 88-PCS-0075.

The SRI reviewed the certification test reports of the Reactor

Depressurization System Valves from Wyle Laboratory. The certification

reports identified each main valve and its associated pilot valve, the

full-stroke time, the leak rates, acceptance criteria, and test proceoure

used to perform the test. Pilot valve assembly number one failed the test

on the first attempt. Repairs were made and testing was conducted with

the second test results being satisfactory. The certificate numbers were

49294-1, -2, -3, and -4. The SRI observed the installation of the valves

on June 24 and 25, 1988, under Maintenance Work Orders 88-RDS-065 and 066.

During the refueling / maintenance outage the licensee replaced the

diaphragms in the Control Rod Drive Scram Valves (CRDSV), a safety-related

system. All 64 valve diaphragms were replaced and tested for proper

operation. It was during post maintenance testing that personnel

discovered excessive air leakage from the valves. The licensee

investigated the problem and found that the diaphragms had been installed

upside down and, in addition, four of the 64 diaphragms had been

incorrectly manufactured resulting in failure of the diaphragms.

Subsequently, all 64 diaphragms, manufactured by Hammel-Dahl, were replaced

for a second time. The licensee sent a letter to General Electric and the

Boiling Water Reactor Owner's Group to inform them of the possible

defective diaphragms. Big Rock Point was one of the first plants to

replace these diaphragms because of General Electric's Service Information

Letter No. 457. The SRI inquired into the amount of Quality Control (QC)

provided during the maintenance activity. The results of the inquiry

revealed that QC had reviewed the purchase agreement documents before work

and work completion documents. During the first installation performed in

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April and May.1988, of the 64 diaphragms, no member'of:the plant's QC

organization observed the activity through one complete disassembly,

repai*, and reassembly process. No inspection was performed to include a

dimensional. check of the diaphragms or a comparison between diaphragms fcr

consistency. The failure to inspect installation activities.and perform

measurements or tests of material ~ is an apparent violation of quality .

control requirements of 10 CFR 50, . Appendix B, Criterion X, as implemented

by Big Rock Point's, "Quality Assurance Description for Operational Nuclear

Power Plants," as described in Section 10. (155/88013-01).

Work on the CRDSVs was performed by Consumers Power Company's traveling ,

maintenance crew who had their own supervisor. Training was conducted

for the crew prior to allowing work to commence on the CRDSV. Corrective

actions taken b/ the licensee prior to the second installation in June

1988, were to revise the installation procedure, and have a plant QC

individual observe at least one complete installation, The SRI verified

by record review and interview that the licensee implemented the

corrective actions. Full-stroke testing proved operability of the CRDSV.

This problem resulted in an extended outage, a great deal of rework and

testing, and additional cost to purchase the replacement parts.

One violation was identified in this area.

4. Operational Safety Verification (71707)

The inspector observed control room operations, reviewed applicable

logs, and conducted discussions with control room operators-during the

inspection period. The inspector verified the operability of selected

emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified proper return

to service of affected components. Tours of the containment sphere and

turbine building were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,

including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations

and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment

in need of maintenance. The inspector observed plant housekeeping /

cleanliness conditions and controls. During the. inspection period,

the inspector walked down the accessible portions of the Reactor.

Depressurization Post Incident, Core Spray, and Containment Spray

systems to. verify operability.

During plant tours conducted this period, the SRI noted that. copies of the

controlled documents used to direct safety activities listed below were

found at their associated work site without being marked "Working Copy"

or "Working Controlled Copy," on the date shown:

June 18, 1988: System Operating Procedures (S0P) 19, "Make up

System," Revision 140.

June 21, 1988: S0P 15, "Condensate System," Revision 94.

June 21, 1988: 50P 11, "Radioactive Waste System," Revision 117.

July 6, 1988: Administrative Procedure 4.2.1, "Material

Control," Revision 4.

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10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, as implemented by Big Rock Point's,

"Quality Assurance Program Description for Operational Nucle'ar Power

Plants," as described in Section 5.0, requires that activities affecting

quality shall be prescribed by documented procedures. Administrative

Procedure 4.1.8 "Procedure Assurance," Revision 1, dated February 12, 1988,

Section 12.0 titled "Short Term Controlled Documents," requires that

controlled documents needed as working level procedures shall be clearly

marked "Working Copy" or "Working Controlled Copy." Failure of the three

working SOP's and the working Administrative Procedure to be marked

"Working Cr,sy" or "Working Controlled Copy," is an apparent violation.

(155/88013-02).

One violation was identified in this area.

5. Radiological Protection Observations (71709)

The NRC inspectors verified that-selected activities of the licensee's -

radiological protection program were. implemented in compliance with

the facility policies, procedures, and regulatory requirements. The

activities observed and/or reviewed during this inspection period were

that health physics (HP) supervisory personnel were conducting plant tours

to check on activities in progress. Radiation work permits contained the

appropriate information to ensure work was performed in a safe and

controlled manner. Personnel in radiation controlled areas (RCA) were

wearing the required personnel monitoring equipment and protective

clothing. Radiation and/or contamir.sted areas were properly posted and

controlled based on the activity levels within the area. Personnel

properly frisked prior to exiting an RCA.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

6. Security Observations (71881)

The NRC Inspectors verified by observation or record review that physical

security measures were being implemented as prescribed in the licensee's

approved physical security plan. The elements contained in the inspection ,

were security manning requirements, access control of both personnel and'  !

vehicles, and detection / assessment aids. Throughout the inspection

period, the inspectors observed that personnel within the protected area )

(PA) properly displayed their identification badges. Vehicles were '

properly authorized, searcheu, and escorted or controlled within the PA.

Persons and packages were properly checked and cleared before entry into

the PA. When security equipment failure or impairment occurred the 1

required compensatory measures were empluyed. Security force actions  !

were conducted in a professional manner. '

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

7. Startup Testing - Refueling (72700)

On June 11, 1988, during refueling operations the licensee found that a l

fuel bundle could not be placed into the position required by the fuel  !

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load sequence Procedure TR-46. . Fuel loading activities were stopped until

the problem could be resolved. The reactor had been verified subcritical

throughout the performance of the procedure. Core verification was

performed with a TV camera to ensure all remaining fuel bundles were

correctly loaded. No other bundles were found out of position. The

reactor engineer made the necessary temporary changes, with approval, to

the fuel load sequence procedure to place the misplaced bundle into.its

correct position. The remaining steps of the procedure were completed

without further problems. Final core verification was performed

satisfactorily. The. licensee will be performing an' evaluation to

determine the root cause and recommend actions to prevent reoccurrence.

This apparent violation of the fuel load sequence procedure will not be

issued because it appears to meet the five criteria stated in 10 CFR 2,

Appendix C (V), Section G.1: (a) it was identified by the licensee;

(b) it fits in Severity Level IV or V; (c) it was reported, if required;

(d) It is being corrected including measures to prevent recurrence, within

a reasonable time; and (e) it was not a violation that could reasonably be

expected to have been prevented by the licensee's corrective action for a

previous violation.

On June 27, 1988, at 7:59 p.m., the reactor at Big Rock Point achieved

criticality following an 80 day refueling outage. The NRC inspectors

observed the start-up. Besides the normal on-shift crew, an extra Reactor

Operator and Auxiliary Operator were present. The start-up was performed

in a professional manner with detailed procedures. Procedures used during

the start-up were TV-34, "Reactor Start-up with Low Source Counts,"

Re<1sion 3, dated February 20, 1987; General Operating Procedure (GOP) 1,

"Plant Start-up from Cold Shutdown," Revision 115, dated May 14, 1988; '

and Technical Data Book 15.5.I.2, "Control Rod Withdrawal and Insertion

Sequence Cycle 23," Revision 82.

The plant continued to heat up within required limits and the required

turbine overspeed trip tests were performed. Problems were encountered

when the licensee tried to place the generator on line. When an

electrical problem c: curred in the generator excitation and automatic

voltage control, power ascension was halted to perform repairs. After

rep- were completed and power was raised to approximately 20 megawatts

elt ., control room Operators noted that each one of the three

nei . stalled Wide Range Monitor (WRM) nuclear systems was indicating

lev e than expected. Power ascension was halted until a course of action

could be determined by the Plant Review Committee (PRC). Following

several hours of discussion, the PRC decided to allow Instrument and ,

Control (I&C) technicians to move the detectors to a higher flux position. '

At 4:54 a.m., on June 29, power was raised to 35 megawatts electrical and

a heat balance calculation was performed.

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I&C technicians using the heat balance calculation results attempted to  !

calibrate the WRMi s with no success. The shift supervisor contacted l

appropriate management personnel and a decision was made to shutdown the

reactor. Plant personnel commenced shutdown at 5:25 a.m., per GOP-6, i

"Plant Shutdown to Hot Shutdown," Revision 115. Shutdown was completed '

at 7:47 a.m., when all rods were fully inserted.

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During.the review of this event, the. licensee determined that the' shutdown

met the criteria of Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP-1) and at

8:00 a.m., on June 29, a Notification of-Unusual Event was declared. The

NRC, the State.of Michigan, and the Charlevoix County Sheriff's Department

were notified.within ten minutes. The event was terminated at 2:30 p.m.,

when the reactor achieved cold shutdown and the above agencies.were

notified of the same. The licensee contacted General Electric, the

equipment vendor, for assistance and subsequent repairs were completed by

the morning of July 1. A reactor start-up was commenced per procedure

but was terminated at 6:44 a.m., when the source range nuclear instruments

failed to properly respond. A PRC meeting was conducted, a course of

action was determined, subsequent repairs were.made, and post maintenance

testing was completed. A reactor start-up commenced, with criticality

being achieved at 5:41 p.m. on July 1.

When attempting to place the turbine generator on line early on July 2, a

problem with the hydrogen seal oil system was discovered which resulted in

a plant shutdown. Repairs were made and the reactor was re-started on

July 7. The NRC inspector monitored the WRM's during power ascension.

Following a heat balance calculation, I&C personnel were unable to

calibrate WRM Channel 2. The channel was placed in the inoperable

condition and power ascension was stopped until repairs could be

accomplished. General Electric was contacted, repair parts for each of

the three WRM channels were obtained and installed, and the WRM's were

calibrated satisfactorily on July 10. Power ascension was resumed with

heat balance calculations and calibrations of instruments being performed

as necessary.

The NRC has been conducting a separate follow-up inspection of the

problems encountered during the~ start-up of the WRM's. . Inspection

Report No. 50-155/88017(DRS) will be completed after review of the

Licensee's Event Report dealing with the same subject.

No violations or deviations were identified in this area.

8. Licensee Action on IE Bulletins

The NRC requested that all licensees review NRC Bulletin No. 88-05,

Supplement 1, "Nonconforming Material Supplied By Piping Supplies

Inc. at Folsom, New Jersey and West Jersey Manufacturing Company at

Williamstown, New Jersey." The bulletin included information on

defactive piping materials supplied by Piping Supplies Incorporated

and also by West Jersey Manufacturing Company. The licensee's

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investigation of the problem described in the bulletin revealed that

Big Rock Point had never purchased any material from the above

companies. This item will remain open pending written confirmation

from the licensee.

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NRC Bulletin No. 88-07, "Power Oscillations In Boiling Water Reactors

(BWR)," issued June 15,.1988, required all BWR licensees to thoroughly

brief all licensed reactor operators or shift technical advisors regarding

the March 9, 1988, LaSalle Unit 2 event within 15 days of receipt. The

event involved excessive neutron flux oscillation while the reactor was on

natural circulation. The licensee completed the briefing of required

on-shift individuals within the 15 days. Other' required members of the ~

licensee staff who were on leave reviewed the material upon their return.

The SRI reviewed the attendance sheet to verify licensee's actions.

Item 1 of Requested Actions for NRC Bulletin No. 88-07 is closed.

No violations or deviations were ident).'ied in this area.

9. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

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throughout the month and at the conclusion of the inspection period and

summarized the scope and findings of the inspection activities. The

licensee acknowledged these findings. The inspector also discussed the

likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to

documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the inspection.

The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as

proprietary.

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