ML20138F534

Insp Repts 50-266/85-15 & 50-301/85-15 on 850801-0930. Violation Noted:Three Subcritical Spent Fuel Assemblies Moved to Positions Adjacent to Spent Fuel Pit East Wall

ML20138F534
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	10/10/1985
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138F473	List: IR 05000266/1985015 IR 05000801/2009030 ML20138F470
References
50-266-85-15, 50-301-85-15, NUDOCS 8510250282
Download: ML20138F534 (7)

See also: IR 05000801/2009030

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/85015(DRP);

No. 50-301/85015(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; No. DPR-27

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company

231 West Michigan

Milwaukee, WI 53203

Facility Name: Point Beach Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Two Creeks, WI

Inspection Conducted: August 1, 1985 through September 30, 1985

Inspectors: R. L. Hague

R. J. Leemon

OCT 101985

Approved By: I. N. Jackiw, Chief

Reactor Projects Section 2B Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on August 1 through September 30, 1985, (Reports No. 50-266/85015 (DRP);

No. 50-301/85015 (DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of

operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; receipt of new fuel;

preparation for refueling; spent fuel pit activities; and licensee event

report follow-up. The inspection involved a total of 308 inspector-hours

onsite by two inspectors including 52 inspector-hours on off-shifts.

Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no violations were identified in six

of the areas. One violation was identified in the remaining area (violation

of Technical Specification 15.5.4.4, Paragraph 7).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

• J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP

T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent

G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent - Operation

• J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent - EQR

W. J. Herrman, Superintendent - Maintenance & Construction

R. S. Bredvad, Health Physicist

R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor

• F. A. Flentje, Stafi Services Supervisor

• J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer

The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation,

Maintenance, Health Physics, and Instrument and Control Sections.

• Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.

2. Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System

Walkdown (71709 and 71710)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs

and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months

of August and September 1985. During these discussions and observations,

the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant

conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action

when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected

emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to

service of affected components. Tours of the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings

were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential

fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that

maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.

The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the

physical security plant was being implemented in accordance with the

station security plan.

The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and

verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the

months of August and September 1985, the inspectors walked down the

accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Diesel Generating,

Safety Injection and Containment Spray systems to verify operability.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility

operations were in conformance with the requirements established under

Technical Specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedures.

On August 29, 1985, Unit I nuclear instrumentation (NI) power range

channel 44 began exhibiting erratic downpower spiking. Troubleshooting

of the problem indicated that toa cause was located in containment and

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was related to either the detector itself or the associated connectors.

To prevent an inadvertent runback which would be initiated by an

indicated 5%/5 second decrease in power on any one of the four power

range dectectors, the licensee bypassed the runback function of NI

channel 44. This is allowed because of the back-up protection provided

by the rod position indication system which will also provide a runback

and rod outmotion stop on indication of a dropped rod. On August 31, 1985,

NI channel 44 failed completely and was placed in the tripped condition.

Unit 1 was taken off-line at 6:35 P.M. that day, the failed detector was

replaced, and the unit returned to power at 3:18 A.M. on September 1, 1985.

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On September 3, 1985, a voltage perturbation on the red instrument bus

caused a downspike on Unit 1 NI power range channel 41 causing a runback

to 80% power. The red instrument bus was placed on the spare inverter

and the normal inverter output was monitored by strip chart recorder in

an attempt to monitor any subsequent voltage transients. No further

perturbations were recorded and the cause of the original transient was

not identified.

, On September 11, 1985, a downspike on Unit 1 NI power range channel 44

caused a runback to 80% power. NI power range 44 is powered from the

yellow instrument bus. An investigation into the cause revealed that

contractors installing fire protection foam in conduits had abraded the

insulation on a yellow instrument bus feeder to instrumentation above the

control room. The exposed feeder momentarily arced to ground while the

contractors rearranged the cabling inside the conduit. The licensee

halted all further conduit foaming until the procedure and method could

be evaluated to prevent recurrence.

On September 16, 1985, individual rod position indication for rod F-6

failed low picking up the rod bottom bistable and causing a runback to

80% power on Unit 1. The cause for the failure is believed to be the

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instrumentation connector in containment. During the previous operating

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cycle, a number of individual position indicators either failed or

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exhibited erratic indication. These problems were all traced to the

instrumentation connections. To recover from the runback, the bistable

was jumpered out and actual F-6 rod position is verified every shift per

Technical Specification requirements.

3. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance '

testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels, Nuclear

Instrumentation, and service water pumps and verified that testing was

performed in accordance with adequate procedures, the test instrumentation

was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that

removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that

test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure require-

ments and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing

the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were

properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

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The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test

activities:

3D Diesel Generator Surveillance

40 Diesel Generator Surveillance

Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps

4. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components

listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted

in accordance with approved procedures,> regulatory guides and industry

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codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting

conditions for operation were met while components or systems were

removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the

work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were

inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were

performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality

control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by

qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;

radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were

implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and

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to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment

maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

Auxiliary Building Crane Modification

Repair of Snubber HS-601-R73

Overhaul of Service Water Pump P32A

Overhaul of Service Water Pump P32D

During a check of battery post connecting bolt torque values on

September 3,1985, one of the connector bolts on Battery A, Cell 6,

broke. The bolt was found to be elongated but no corrosion was evident.

The cells are equipped with dual connectors and the inspectors verified

that the remaining connector would have carried sufficient current to

perform its emergency functions had it been required. The licensee was

concerned that the manufacturer's specified torque of 100 inch pounds

may be excessive in that it appears that torquing to this value tends

to decrease the diameter of the battery post. Routinely subsequent

torque checks-yield values of 75-80 inch pounds. Therefore, at each

check-the licensee tightens the bolt to the required 100 inch pounds.

The licensee suggested to the manufacturer's representative that lower

torque values may be sufficient. However, the representative contends

that the 100 inch pound specification is correct. The licensee is

presently performing a test using spare connectors and battery cells

and utilizing various torque values on the connector bolts to determine

if there is a limiting torque above which compression of the post results

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in a relaxing of the applied torque. If the results of the licensee's

tests indicate that the 100 inch pound torque requirement is excessive,

a part El report may be required. This is an open item (266/85015-01;

301/85015-01).

5. Receipt of New Fuel (60705)

The inspector verified prior to receipt of new fuel that technically

adequate, approved procedures were available covering the receipt,

inspection, and storage of new fuel; observed receipt inspections and

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storage of new fuel elements and verified these activities were performed

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in accordance with the licensee's procedures; and, followed up resolution

of deficiencies found during new fuel inspections.

6. Preparation for Refueling (60705)

The inspector verified that technically adequate procedures were approved

for Unit 2, Refueling 11. Unit 2 is scheduled to go off line at 10:00 P.M.

on October 4, 1985. The inspector verified that the licensee had submitted

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a proposed core reload technical specificatior change to NRR (or that the

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licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation of the reload core showed that

prior NRR review is not required). The inspector also reviewed the licensee's

program for overall outage control.

7. ' Spent Fuel Pool Activities (86700)

In the last resident inspector inspection report, 50-266/85010;

50-301/85010, it was reported that during an audit of spent fuel and

their locations, the licensee determined that 3 sperat fuel assemblies

which had been subcritical less than one year were inadvertently stored

adjacent to the spent fuel pit wall. Additional follow-up on this event

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was pursued during this inspection period. In IE inspection report

50-266/82001; 50-301/82001, the licensee was cited for a violation of

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Technical Specification 15.5.4.4 for placing two fuel assemblies which

were subcritical for less than one year adjacent to the spent fuel pit

, divider wall. These assemblies were placed in accordance with a

j requirement to obtain maximum irradiation of the Boraflex I poison

i surveillance specimens. Immediate corrective action as described in the

licensee's response letter dated July 30, 19S2, included moving the fuel

assemblies. Action to prevent recurrence involved educating personnel

responsible for fuel positioning that the divider wall is a structural

wall and shall be treated as such with respect to the Technical

Specification requirements. These corrective actions were considered

adequate at the time.

Subsequently, the licensee provided an analysis of the heating effects of

storing two newly removed spent fuel assemblies next to the divider wall

to NRR as justification for a Technical Specification change to allow

continued maximum irradiation of the poison specimens. This Technical

j Specification change was granted and the licensee's procedure REI 24.0,

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Spent Fuel Pit, was revised on June 17, 1984, to reflect the Technical

Specification change. The purpose of this procedure is to describe or

reference various requirements concerning the spent fuel pit. This

procedure is considered a reference document and is not "in hand" during

spent fuel transfers.

As described in Licensee Event Report 50-266/85005, three spent fuel

assemblies subcritical less than one year were placed adjacent to the

east wall of the spent fuel pit on February 7,1984. This is a violation

of Technical Specification 15.5.4.4 (Violation 266/85015-02;

301/85015-02).

It is apparent that the action taken to prevent recurrence in 1982 was

inadequate in that it addressed specifically the divider wall and that it

was directed at those responsible for fuel positioning at the time. This

gave no assurance that future personnel responsible for fuel positioning

would be cognizant of the Technical Specification requirement. As

further described in Licensee Event Report 50-266/85005, the licensee has

committed to revise the fuel transfer authorization (Form RE-TI) to

explicitly state that fuel movements be checked to ensure that they

comply with the Technical Specification. The revised procedure has been

reviewed by the inspector. An appendix has been added (RE-Tla) which

incorporates the requirements of procedure REI 24.0 and a sign-off has

been added to verify that all of the requirements specified are satisfied

for each spent fuel move. This documentation will be present and

completed by those responsible for fuel positioning during transfers.

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Although the licensee event report committed to having this revision  ;

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completed by January 1,1986, the inspector verified that it is complete l

i and will be available for the next refueling outage. These actions to

i prevent recurrence are considered adequate and no response is required to

this violation.  ;

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8. Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700) L

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4 Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and

review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine '

j that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective

i action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had '

been accomplished in accordance with technical specifications.

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266/85004 Low Voltage Station Transformer IX04 Lockout

266/85005 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage

j 9. Exit Interview (30703)

i The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection

! period.to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activities.

l The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments. The inspectors also

discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with

regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the

j inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes  ;

j as proprietary.

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