IR 05000266/1985015

Insp Repts 50-266/85-15 & 50-301/85-15 on 850801-0930. Violation Noted:Three Subcritical Spent Fuel Assemblies Moved to Positions Adjacent to Spent Fuel Pit East Wall

ML20138F534
Person / Time
Site:	Point Beach
Issue date:	10/10/1985
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20138F473	List: IR 05000266/1985015 IR 05000801/2009030 ML20138F470
References
50-266-85-15, 50-301-85-15, NUDOCS 8510250282
Download: ML20138F534 (7)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/85015(DRP);

No. 50-301/85015(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; No. DPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53203 Facility Name: Point Beach Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Two Creeks, WI Inspection Conducted: August 1, 1985 through September 30, 1985 Inspectors: R. L. Hague R. J. Leemon OCT 101985 Approved By: I. N. Jackiw, Chief Reactor Projects Section 2B Date Inspection Summary Inspection on August 1 through September 30, 1985, (Reports No. 50-266/85015 (DRP);

No. 50-301/85015 (DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of operational safety; maintenance; surveillance; receipt of new fuel; preparation for refueling; spent fuel pit activities; and licensee event report follow-up. The inspection involved a total of 308 inspector-hours onsite by two inspectors including 52 inspector-hours on off-shift Results: Of the seven areas inspected, no violations were identified in six of the areas. One violation was identified in the remaining area (violation of Technical Specification 15.5.4.4, Paragraph 7).

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DETAILS 1. Persons Contacted

• J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent - Operation

• J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent - EQR W. J. Herrman, Superintendent - Maintenance & Construction R. S. Bredvad, Health Physicist R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor

• F. A. Flentje, Stafi Services Supervisor

• J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer The inspector also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation, Maintenance, Health Physics, and Instrument and Control Section * Denotes personnel attending exit interview . Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71709 and 71710)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the months of August and September 1985. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that the physical security plant was being implemented in accordance with the station security pla The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and verified implementation of radiation protection controls. During the months of August and September 1985, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Diesel Generating, Safety Injection and Containment Spray systems to verify operabilit These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedure On August 29, 1985, Unit I nuclear instrumentation (NI) power range channel 44 began exhibiting erratic downpower spiking. Troubleshooting of the problem indicated that toa cause was located in containment and i

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was related to either the detector itself or the associated connector To prevent an inadvertent runback which would be initiated by an indicated 5%/5 second decrease in power on any one of the four power range dectectors, the licensee bypassed the runback function of NI channel 44. This is allowed because of the back-up protection provided by the rod position indication system which will also provide a runback and rod outmotion stop on indication of a dropped rod. On August 31, 1985, NI channel 44 failed completely and was placed in the tripped conditio Unit 1 was taken off-line at 6:35 P.M. that day, the failed detector was replaced, and the unit returned to power at 3:18 A.M. on September 1, 1985.

f On September 3, 1985, a voltage perturbation on the red instrument bus caused a downspike on Unit 1 NI power range channel 41 causing a runback to 80% power. The red instrument bus was placed on the spare inverter and the normal inverter output was monitored by strip chart recorder in an attempt to monitor any subsequent voltage transients. No further perturbations were recorded and the cause of the original transient was not identified.

, On September 11, 1985, a downspike on Unit 1 NI power range channel 44 caused a runback to 80% power. NI power range 44 is powered from the yellow instrument bus. An investigation into the cause revealed that contractors installing fire protection foam in conduits had abraded the insulation on a yellow instrument bus feeder to instrumentation above the control room. The exposed feeder momentarily arced to ground while the contractors rearranged the cabling inside the conduit. The licensee halted all further conduit foaming until the procedure and method could be evaluated to prevent recurrenc On September 16, 1985, individual rod position indication for rod F-6 failed low picking up the rod bottom bistable and causing a runback to 80% power on Unit 1. The cause for the failure is believed to be the i

instrumentation connector in containment. During the previous operating i

cycle, a number of individual position indicators either failed or

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exhibited erratic indication. These problems were all traced to the instrumentation connections. To recover from the runback, the bistable was jumpered out and actual F-6 rod position is verified every shift per Technical Specification requirement . Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed Technical Specifications required surveillance '

testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels, Nuclear Instrumentation, and service water pumps and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures, the test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished, that

test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure require-ments and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personne i L

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The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities:

3D Diesel Generator Surveillance 40 Diesel Generator Surveillance Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures,> regulatory guides and industry

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codes or standards and in conformance with technical specification The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or systems were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemente Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and

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to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performanc The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:

Auxiliary Building Crane Modification Repair of Snubber HS-601-R73 Overhaul of Service Water Pump P32A Overhaul of Service Water Pump P32D During a check of battery post connecting bolt torque values on September 3,1985, one of the connector bolts on Battery A, Cell 6, broke. The bolt was found to be elongated but no corrosion was eviden The cells are equipped with dual connectors and the inspectors verified that the remaining connector would have carried sufficient current to perform its emergency functions had it been required. The licensee was concerned that the manufacturer's specified torque of 100 inch pounds may be excessive in that it appears that torquing to this value tends to decrease the diameter of the battery post. Routinely subsequent torque checks-yield values of 75-80 inch pounds. Therefore, at each check-the licensee tightens the bolt to the required 100 inch pound The licensee suggested to the manufacturer's representative that lower torque values may be sufficient. However, the representative contends that the 100 inch pound specification is correct. The licensee is presently performing a test using spare connectors and battery cells and utilizing various torque values on the connector bolts to determine if there is a limiting torque above which compression of the post results

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in a relaxing of the applied torqu If the results of the licensee's tests indicate that the 100 inch pound torque requirement is excessive, a part El report may be required. This is an open item (266/85015-01; 301/85015-01). Receipt of New Fuel (60705)

The inspector verified prior to receipt of new fuel that technically adequate, approved procedures were available covering the receipt, inspection, and storage of new fuel; observed receipt inspections and

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storage of new fuel elements and verified these activities were performed

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in accordance with the licensee's procedures; and, followed up resolution of deficiencies found during new fuel inspection . Preparation for Refueling (60705)

The inspector verified that technically adequate procedures were approved for Unit 2, Refueling 11. Unit 2 is scheduled to go off line at 10:00 on October 4, 1985. The inspector verified that the licensee had submitted

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a proposed core reload technical specificatior change to NRR (or that the I

licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation of the reload core showed that

prior NRR review is not required). The inspector also reviewed the licensee's program for overall outage contro . ' Spent Fuel Pool Activities (86700)

In the last resident inspector inspection report, 50-266/85010;

50-301/85010, it was reported that during an audit of spent fuel and their locations, the licensee determined that 3 sperat fuel assemblies which had been subcritical less than one year were inadvertently stored adjacent to the spent fuel pit wall. Additional follow-up on this event i

was pursued during this inspection period. In IE inspection report 50-266/82001; 50-301/82001, the licensee was cited for a violation of

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Technical Specification 15.5.4.4 for placing two fuel assemblies which were subcritical for less than one year adjacent to the spent fuel pit

, divider wall. These assemblies were placed in accordance with a j requirement to obtain maximum irradiation of the Boraflex I poison i surveillance specimens. Immediate corrective action as described in the licensee's response letter dated July 30, 19S2, included moving the fuel assemblies. Action to prevent recurrence involved educating personnel responsible for fuel positioning that the divider wall is a structural wall and shall be treated as such with respect to the Technical Specification requirements. These corrective actions were considered adequate at the tim Subsequently, the licensee provided an analysis of the heating effects of storing two newly removed spent fuel assemblies next to the divider wall to NRR as justification for a Technical Specification change to allow continued maximum irradiation of the poison specimens. This Technical j Specification change was granted and the licensee's procedure REI 24.0,

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Spent Fuel Pit, was revised on June 17, 1984, to reflect the Technical Specification change. The purpose of this procedure is to describe or reference various requirements concerning the spent fuel pit. This procedure is considered a reference document and is not "in hand" during spent fuel transfer As described in Licensee Event Report 50-266/85005, three spent fuel assemblies subcritical less than one year were placed adjacent to the east wall of the spent fuel pit on February 7,198 This is a violation of Technical Specification 15.5.4.4 (Violation 266/85015-02; 301/85015-02).

It is apparent that the action taken to prevent recurrence in 1982 was inadequate in that it addressed specifically the divider wall and that it

was directed at those responsible for fuel positioning at the time. This gave no assurance that future personnel responsible for fuel positioning would be cognizant of the Technical Specification requirement. As further described in Licensee Event Report 50-266/85005, the licensee has committed to revise the fuel transfer authorization (Form RE-TI) to explicitly state that fuel movements be checked to ensure that they comply with the Technical Specification. The revised procedure has been reviewed by the inspector. An appendix has been added (RE-Tla) which incorporates the requirements of procedure REI 24.0 and a sign-off has been added to verify that all of the requirements specified are satisfied for each spent fuel move. This documentation will be present and completed by those responsible for fuel positioning during transfers.

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Although the licensee event report committed to having this revision  ;

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completed by January 1,1986, the inspector verified that it is complete l i and will be available for the next refueling outage. These actions to i prevent recurrence are considered adequate and no response is required to this violatio ;

8. Licensee Event Reports Followup (92700) L

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4 Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event reports were reviewed to determine '

j that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective i action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had '

been accomplished in accordance with technical specification !

266/85004 Low Voltage Station Transformer IX04 Lockout 266/85005 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage j 9. Exit Interview (30703)

i The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1)

throughout the inspection period and at the conclusion of the inspection

! period.to summarize the scope and findings of the inspection activities.

l The licensee acknowledged the inspectors' comments. The inspectors also

discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspectors during the j inspectio The licensee did not identify any such documents / processes  ;

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