IR 05000348/2006004

IR 05000348-06-004, 05000364-06-004 and 07200042-06-002; on 07/01/2006 - 09/30/2006; Joseph M. Farley, Units 1 & 2, Routine Integrated Report

ML062980513
Person / Time
Site:	Farley, 07200042
Issue date:	10/25/2006
From:	Scott Shaeffer NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To:	Sumner H Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-06-002, IR-06-004
Download: ML062980513 (17)

Text

ber 25, 2006

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000348/2006004,05000364/2006004, AND 07200042/2006002

Dear Mr. Sumner:

On September 30, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on October 5, 2006, with Mr. Randy Johnson and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified by the NRC.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-348, 50-364, and 72-42 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000348/2006004, 05000364/2006004, and 07200042/2006002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-348, 50-364, 72-42 License Nos.: NPF-2, NPF-8 Report Nos.: 05000348/2006004, 05000364/2006004, and 07200042/2006002 Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Location: Columbia, AL 36319 Dates: July 1- September 30, 2006 Inspectors: C. Patterson, Senior (Sr.) Resident Inspector J. Baptist, Resident Inspector R. Baldwin, Sr. Operations Engineer (Section 1R11)

S. Rose, Sr. Operations Engineer (Section 1R11)

Approved by: Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000348/2006004, 05000364/2006004 and 07200042/2006002; 07/01/2006-09/30/2006;

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2, Routine Integrated Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors and two senior operations inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July, 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 was shut down on June 30, 2006, due to a suspected inoperable main steam isolation valve (MSIV). The unit returned to power operation on July 3 and operated at or near rated thermal power (RTP).

Unit 2 operated at or near RTP.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns. The inspectors performed partial walk-downs of the following three systems to verify they were properly aligned when redundant systems or trains were out of service. The walk-downs were performed using the criteria in licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, and FNP-0-SOP-0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel. The walk-downs included reviewing the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), plant procedures and drawings, checks of control room and plant valves, switches, components, electrical power line-ups, support equipment, and instrumentation. Documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.

C 2B Containment Spray (CS) Pump during 2A CS Pump equipment outage C 1A Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump during 1B RHR Pump equipment outage C 1B, 2B, 1-2A, and 2C Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) during 1C EDG equipment outage

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Area Tours. The inspectors conducted a walk-down of the eight fire areas listed below to verify the licensees control of transient combustibles, the operational readiness of the fire suppression system, and the material condition and status of fire dampers, doors, and barriers. The requirements were described in licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-36, Fire Surveillance and Inspection; FNP-0-AP-38, Use of Open Flame; FNP-0-AP-39, Fire Patrols and Watches; and the associated Fire Zone Data sheets.

C Unit 1 and 2 Service Water (SW) Intake Structure, Zone 72E C Unit 1 and 2 SW Intake Structure, Zone 72D C Unit 1 and 2 SW Intake Structure, Zone 74 C Unit 1 and 2 SW Intake Structure, Zone 72A C Unit 1 and 2 SW Intake Structure, Zone 72B C Unit 1 and 2 SW Intake Structure, Zone 72C C Unit 1 and 2 SW Intake Structure, Zone 73 C Unit 1 and 2 SW Intake Structure, CO2 Bottle Room Fire Drill. On August 24, the inspectors observed a fire drill for a simulated fire in the 2B EDG room of the EDG building. The inspectors observed that the licensee response in the control room and entrance of the EDG building was in accordance with plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed procedures FNP-0-AOP-29.0, Plant Fire; FNP-0-EIP-13.0, Fire Emergencies; and FNP-0-FVP-11.0, Fire Ventilation-EDG Building, to verify they were properly implemented. The inspectors attended the licensees critique of the drill to verify deficiencies were identified. The inspectors discussed inspectors observations with plant management.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

External Flooding Review. The inspectors reviewed plant design features protecting against external flooding and related licensee procedures to verify the licensees flood mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with the design requirements and risk analysis assumptions. The inspectors reviewed flood protection barriers which included plant yard drains and the auxiliary building roof. The inspectors also reviewed condition reports and maintenance work orders to verify the licensee was identifying and resolving problems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Internal Flooding Review. The inspectors walked down the following two areas to verify that plant design features and plant procedures for flood mitigation were consistent with the design requirements and internal flooding analysis assumptions. This included potential sources of internal flooding, the condition of room penetrations, and the condition of the sumps in the rooms. The inspectors also reviewed Condition Reports (CRs) and maintenance work orders to verify the licensee was identifying and resolving problems.

C EDG rooms C Unit 1 Motor-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) pump rooms

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

Quarterly Resident Review. On September 19, the inspectors observed portions of the licensed operator training and testing program to verify implementation of procedures FNP-0-AP-45, Farley Nuclear Plant Training Program; FNP-0-TCP-17.6, Simulator Training Evaluation Documentation; and FNP-0-TCP-17.3, Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program Administration. The inspectors observed scenarios conducted in the licensees simulator for an End of Life reactor plant transient utilizing BEACON reactor physics software to guide Axial Flux Difference control. The inspectors observed high risk operator actions, overall performance, self-critiques, training feedback, and management oversight to verify operator performance was evaluated against the performance standards of the licensees scenario. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Biennial Requalification Program Review. The inspectors reviewed documentation, interviewed licensee personnel, and observed the administration of simulator operating tests associated with the licensees operator requalification program to assess the effectiveness of the licensee in implementing requalification requirements identified in 10 CFR 55, Operators Licenses. The evaluations were also performed to determine if the licensee effectively implemented operator requalification guidelines established in NUREG-1021, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors, and Inspection Procedure 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program. The inspectors also reviewed and evaluated the licensees simulation facility for adequacy for use in operator licensing examinations. The inspectors observed three licensed operator simulator scenarios during the performance of the operating tests.

Documentation reviewed included written examinations, job performance measures, simulator scenarios, licensee procedures, on-shift records, simulator modification request records and performance test records, the feedback process, licensed operator qualification records, remediation plans, watchstanding, and medical records. The records were inspected against the criteria listed in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following two issues to verify implementation of licensee procedures FNP-0-M-87, Maintenance Rule (MR) Scoping Manual; NMP-ES-021, Structural Monitoring Program for the Maintenance Rule; and FNP-0-M-89, FNP Maintenance Rule Site Implementation Manual; and compliance with 10CFR50.65. The inspectors assessed the licensees evaluation of appropriate work practices, common cause failures, functional failures, maintenance preventable functional failures, repetitive failures, availability and reliability monitoring, trending and condition monitoring, and system specialist involvement. The inspectors also interviewed maintenance personnel, system specialists, the MR coordinator, and operations personnel to assess their knowledge of the program.

C CR 2006107396, Component Cooling Water (CCW) Heat Exchange Outlet Valve, FV3009A, placed on manual jack C CR 2006108039, Motor Cooler Leaks

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees planning and control for the following six planned activities to verify the requirements in licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.3, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance; NMP-GM-006, Work Management; and FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group; and the MR risk assessment guidance in 10CFR50.65a(4) were met C CR 2006106689, Fire Main Break C CR 2006106237, MSIV Testing Problems C CR 2006106813, Entered Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) due to Instrument Air Blowdown C CR 2006108151, 1C Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump flow to reactor coolant pump (RCP) thermal barrier C CR 2006107957, Unit 2 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) through-wall leak C CR 2006107942, 2B CS Pump Low Flow

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five operability evaluations to verify they met the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations and FNP-0-ACP-9.2, Operability Determination for technical adequacy, consideration of degraded conditions, and identification of compensatory measures. The inspectors reviewed the evaluations against the design bases, as stated in the UFSAR and Functional System Descriptions (FSDs) to verify system operability was not affected.

C CR 2006106237, Unit 1 MSIVs Partial Stroke Test C CR 2006101959, OD 6-02, Leak at SW makeup to circulating water C CR 2006105954, OD 6-07, SW pipe leak at pressure switch for dilution flow C CR 2006107396, OD 06-08, CCW HX 1A SW Flow Control Valve C CR 2006108465, Unit 2 MS-524 A Main Steam Line Hanger Support Justification for Continued Operation, DOEJ-SC-2062790201-001

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following plant modification to verify the implementation of procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control. This included verification that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability or risk significant systems, structures, and components would not be degraded through the modifications and the modifications would not place the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors also discussed the modifications with engineering and operations personnel, and reviewed the related procedures and drawings.

C DCP 1052277501 Unit 1 R11/R12 modification

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the criteria contained in licensee procedures FNP-0-PMT-0.0, Post Maintenance Test Program, to verify post-maintenance test procedures and test activities for the following five systems/components were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.

C FNP-2-STP-16.1, CS Inservice Test C FNP-1-STP-45.7, MSIV and Bypass Valves Cold Shutdown Inservice Test C FNP-1-STP-227.2, Containment Air Particle monitor N1D11RE0011 Calibration and Channel operational Test C FNP-1-STP-45.1, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Cold Shutdown Valves Inservice Test C FNP-2-STP-4.3, 2C Charging Pump Quarterly Inservice Test

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following six surveillance tests to determine if the tests adequately demonstrated equipment operability and met the TS requirements. The inspectors reviewed the activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-24, Test Control; FNP-0-M-050, Master List of Surveillance Requirements; and FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations; and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met.

Surveillance Tests C FNP-1-STP-23.1, CCW Pump 1A Inservice Test C FNP-2-SOP-17.0, App. 4, Main Steam Line Isolation Valve Functional Test C FNP-2-STP-20.0, Penetration Room Filtration Train B Quarterly Operability and Valve Inservice Test.

C FNP-1-STP-23.3, 1C CCW Pump Quarterly Inservice Test In-Service Tests (ISTs)

C FNP-1-STP-45.7, MSIV and Bypass Valves Cold Shutdown Inservice Test Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Detection C FNP-1-STP-9.0, RCS Leakage

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated emergency plan drills on the following dates to verify the licensee was properly classifying the events, making required notifications, making protective action recommendations, and conducting self-assessments. The inspectors used procedure FNP-0-EIP-15.0, Emergency Drills, as the inspection criteria and observed the drill in the Technical Support Center (TSC). The inspectors reviewed FNP-0-EIP-9.0, Emergency Classification and Actions, and other supporting procedures to validate the classification of the event made by the licensee. The inspectors subsequently observed and reviewed notifications made, communications between emergency response team members, team work of licensee personnel, licensee identification of weaknesses and deficiencies, corrective action documentation, and overall performance.

C August 9, RCS leakage and response in accordance with FNP-1-AOP 1.0, RCS Leakage C September 29, Loss Of Offsite Power with Main Steamline Break and Hostile Actions.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Review

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by reviewing daily hard copy summaries of CRs and by reviewing the licensees electronic CR database.

.2 Annual Sample Review

a. As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, the inspectors performed a detailed review of CR 2006104942, concerning operability of Unit 1 TDAFW. The CR was examined to verify that safety concerns were properly classified and prioritized for resolution; technical issues were evaluated and dispositioned to address operability and reportability; root cause determinations were sufficiently thorough; extent of condition generic implications, common cause, and previous history were implemented or planned in a manner consistent with safety and compliance. The inspectors also evaluated the CR against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as delineated in Procedure NMP-GM-003, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. During a plant startup from a refueling outage and entering Mode 3, the TDAFW flow and speed was not as high as expected.

The pump was declared inoperable until the speed control system was calibrated. The licensees initial review of this issue determined the TDAFW was inoperable. However, an analysis of the pump speed and flow later determined the pump was operable. The licensee implemented a number of corrective actions to address the drift of the speed control circuit. One action was a design change to replace the speed control circuit.

Other actions were to review the TS to clarify the transition from Mode 4 to Mode 3 with the TDAFW. The TDAFW cannot be run with steam until in Mode 3. Based on a review of the CR, discussions with plant management, and other NRC offices, the inspectors concluded the licensees assessment of the identified problem and the subsequent corrective actions were thorough and appropriate.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) (IP60855.1)

a. Inspection Scope

Inspectors reviewed ISFSI operations to verify that the licensee performed ISFSI activities safely and in compliance with approved procedures. The inspectors reviewed records to verify that the licensee had properly identified the parameters of each fuel assembly loaded, that duplicate records were created and sufficiently protected, and that a physical inventory had been performed on all spent fuel in the ISFSI on at least a 12-month frequency. The inspectors also reviewed the TS to verify that the fuel placed in these casks met the requirements. The inspectors walked down the ISFSI pads to assess the material condition of the casks, the installation of security equipment, and the performance of the monitoring systems. The inspectors also reviewed ISFSI document control practices to verify that any changes to the required ISFSI procedures were performed in accordance with guidelines established in local procedures and 10CFR72.48. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Licensing Document Change Request (LDCR) 2006024DC, ISFSI annual offsite dose contribution change and additional use of ratchet straps on HI-TRAC yoke arms.

• LDCR 2006-028DC, Revision to Site Boundary Dose Assessment for Dry Cask Storage based on FNP specific Cobalt impurity levels of fuel assembly hardware.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Licensee Strike Contingency Plans

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed IP 92709, Licensee Strike Contingency Plans, in preparation for a potential strike. The inspectors reviewed the licensees strike contingency plan and supporting information to verify that the plan contained the minimum requirements for operations staffing, fire brigade, and emergency planning.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 5, 2006, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Randy Johnson and the other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

W.L. Bargeron, Assistant General Manager - Operations

W. R. Bayne, Performance Analysis Supervisor

S. H. Chestnut, Engineering Support Manager

P. Harlos, Health Physics Manager

L. Hogg, Security Manager

J. Horn, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

J.R. Johnson, Plant General Manager

T. Livingston, Chemistry Manager

B. L. Moore, Maintenance Manager

W. D. Oldfield, Quality Assurance Supervisor

J. Swartzwelder, Work Control Superintendent

R. J. Vanderbye, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator

R. Wells, Operations Manager

T. L. Youngblood, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support

NRC personnel

S. Shaeffer, Chief, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects

V. McCree, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Division

M. Weber, Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation