ML18018B797

Forwards Addl Info Re Internally Generated Missiles,In Response to SER Open Item 2

ML18018B797
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	10/25/1984
From:	Zimmerman S CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NLS-84-409, NUDOCS 8410300213
Download: ML18018B797 (23)

Text

REGULATOR INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION S fEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR;8410300213, OOCeDATE: 84/10/25 NOTARIZED: NO FACIL:50 400 Shear on Har r is Nucl ear Power Pl ant-< Uni t 1< Carol ina 05000400 AUTH ~ NAME, AUTHOR AFFILIATION ZIMMERMANgS,R~ Carolina Power,8 Light Co.

NOTES'OCKET

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RECIP ~ NAME DENTONgH-,RE

'

SUBJECT:

Forwards addi response DISTRIBUTION CODE: B001D RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationi to info re internally generated missilesgin SER Open Item 2, COPIES RECEIVED:LTR / /'.

ENCL Director.

'SIZE':

TITLE! Licensing Submittal: PSAR/FSAR Amdts 8, Related Correspondence REC IP IENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME~ LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL NRR/DL/ADL 1 0 NRR LB3 BC 1 0 NRR LB3 LA 1 0 BUCKLEYgB Oi 1 1 INTERNAL: ADM/LFMB 1 0 ELD/HDS1 1 0 1 1 IE/DEPER/EPB 36 1 1 IE'ILE'E/DEPER/IRB IE/DQASIP/QAB21 35 1 1 1 1 NRR'OEgM ~ L 1 1 NRR/DE/AEAB 1 0 NRR/DE/CEB il. 1 1 NRR/DE/EHEB 1 1 NRR/DE/EQB 13" 2 2 NRR/DE/GB 28 2 2 NRR/OE/MEB 18 1 1 NRR/OE/MTEB 17 1 1 NRR/DE/SAB 24 1 1 NRR/DE/SGEB 25 1 1-NRR/DHFS/HFEB40 1 NRR/DHFS/LQB 32 1 1 NRR/DHFS/PSRB 1 1 NRR/DL/SSPB 0 NRR/Ds I/AEB 26 1 1 NRR/DSI/ASB 1 1 ~

NRR/DSI'/CPB 10 1 1 NRR/DSI/OSB 09 1 1 NRR/DSI/ICSB 16 1 1 NRR/DSI/METB 12'B 1 1 NRR/OSI/PSB 19 1 1 22 1 1 NRR/DS I/RSB 23 1 04 1 1 RGN2 3 3 RM/DDAMI/MI8 1 0 EXTERNAL: ACRS 41= 6 6 BNL(AMDTS ONLY) 1 OMB/OSS (AMOTS) 1 1 FEMA REP DIV 39 1 1 LPDR 03 1 1 NRC POR 02"'TIS 1 1 ~

NSIC 05 1 1 1

'TOTAL NUMBER'F COPIES REQUIRED! LTTR 53 ENCL 45

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Carolina Power 8 Light Company SERIAL: NLS-84-409 OGT 35 1984, Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NO. j. DOCKET NO. 50-400 INTERNALLY GENERATED MISSILES

Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) hereby submits additional information concerning Internally Generated Missiles at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. This information is in response to Safety Evaluation Report Open Item No. 2 from the Auxiliary Systems Branch.

If you have any questions or require additional information on this subject, please contact me.

Yours very truly, S mmerman Manager Nuclear Licensing Section JHE/cfr (592JHE)

Attachments CC'r. B. C. Buckley (NRC) Mr.

Mr.

Wells Eddleman John D. Runkle Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP)

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII) Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. Norm Wagner (NRC-ASB) Mr. G. 0. Bright (ASLB)

Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU) Dr. J. H. Carpenter (ASLB)

Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP) Mr. J. L. Kelley (ASLB)

Chapel Hill Public Library Wake County Public Library p84i03002i3 DR ADOCK 84i025

'05000400 PDR 411 Fayettevilte Street o P. O. Box 1551 ~ Raleigh, N, C. 27602

glI m i)

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Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant SER Open Item No. 2(a)

Internally Generated Missiles Essential Services Chilled Water S stem

~Oen Item:

The SER noted t".at neither the ESCWS or the WPBCWS appears on the list of structures, systems, and'omponents requiring protection against internally generated missiles (outside containment). In response, the applicant stated that the following had been considered as potential sources of missiles that could damage the ESCWS: high pressure systems, rotating machinery, gravitational missiles, and secondary missiles (resulting from the impact of primary missiles). However, the applicant concluded that these missiles were either not credible or would not affect safety-related equipment in the ESCWS area.

The staff finds this conclusion to be unacceptable. Missiles from these potential sources are considered credible unless some deliberate element in the design or extra precaution is provided to prevent their generation.

Design of equipment to appropriate codes is not a satisfactory means for preventing missile generation. Therefore, to justify the conclusion that such missiles are not credible, the applicant must show, in detail, that the design specifically considered the problem of missile generation from these potential sources, or the applicant must show that the ESCWS is protected against such missiles. Either of these approaches will satisfy the staff's concern regarding protection of the ESCWS against internally generated missiles outside containment.

As for the WPBCWS, the applicant noted that no adverse safety or radiological impact results from failure of the nonnuclear WPBCWS and, therefore, -the WPBCWS need not be protected against missiles. The staff finds this acceptable.

~Res ense:

FSAR Table 3.5.1-1 will be revised in a future amendment to include the Essential Services Chilled Water System as a system required for safe shutdown or whose damage by internally or externally generated missiles could result in significant release of radioactivity.

A missile study was performed to evaluate the effects of internally generated missiles on the ESCWS outside containment. This study identifies the potential sources of missiles that could damage the ESCWS. Justification for the determination of non-credible missiles or recommendations to protect the ESCWS from credible missiles has been provided. The following highlights of the study are summarized below:

a. High Pressure Systems FSAR Section 3.5.1.1 indicates that the only credible potential missiles generated from high energy systems outside of containment would be instrument wells. These potential missiles have been evaluated and the results are documented in FSAR Table 3.5.1-17.

(592JHE/cfr)

Rotating Machinery A pump generated missile study which considered the possibility of rotating machinery as potential missile sources has been performed. This missile study has concluded that the ESCWS is protected from the possible effects of internally generated pump missiles.

Gravitational Missiles SHNPP is designed to ensure that failure of non-safety related, non-seismically designed equipment and/or structures will not adversely affect the operation of safety-related equipment. The ESCWS has been reviewed in its entirety in order to ensure its continued availability. Equipment, systems, components and/or structures in the vicinity of the ESCWS are either seismically designed to ensure, their continued structural integrity post-SSE or the postulated failure of non-seismically designed components has been assumed and it was determined that both trains of ESCWS would not be rendered inoperable.

Secondary Missiles The effects of secondary missiles on safety-related systems including ESCWS, structures, and components is based on fragments generated from primary missiles ~ Our review has identified the existence of potential secondary missiles generated by primary missiles from high pressure systems and rotating machinery. Zn the event that secondary missiles are generated, we have determined that one of the following interactions would occur-'.

1. safety-related equipment would not be within the strike zone of the secondary missiles generated; or

2. the impact energy from secondary missiles on safety-related equipment is negligible and would not cause any significant damage; or

3. barriers and compartmentalization of safety-related equipment would confine secondary missiles to a finite area so that a single missile will be incapable of negating redundant safety trains.

Based on the above analysis, the generation of secondary missiles cannot disable the necessary functioning of the redundant trains of the ESCWS.

(592 JHE/cf r)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant SER Open Item No. 2(b)

Internall Generated Missiles Missiles From Pum s

~Oen Item:

During the staff review, a concern arose regarding the possibility of internally generated missiles resulting from pump failure. The applicant was made aware of this concexn, and, in response, the applicant noted that missiles from pumps within the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) scope that are outside of containment have been designed so that their maximum no-load speed is equivalent to their operating speed. Thus, a sudden loss of load (resulting, for example, from a line break) will not result in the generation of missiles. Further, the FSAR states that the balance-of-plant (BOP) is designed so that missiles from internal sources will not damage engineered safety features in a way that would jeopardize the minimum required safety functions.

The staff finds this unacceptable. Although the pumps in the NSSS scope are prevented from overspeeding, the staff concern relates to the possibility of missile generation from.well-designed pumps operating normally (see Item 3, above). In addition, the applicant must provide detailed information to explain how safety-related structuresR systems, and components are protected against internally generated missiles generated from pumps within the BOP scope.

~Ree once:

General Design Criteria 4, "Environmental and Missile Design Bases of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants", to 10CFR Part 50, Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities", requires, in part, that structures, systems, and components important to safety be appropriately protected against the effects of missiles that might result from pump failures. A missile study was performed to evaluate the effects of internally generated pump missiles at SHNPP. Our assessment of internally generated pump missiles was conducted for high speed, reciprocating pumps.

Small capacity support pumps associated with vendor packages were not evaluated in this study because of their small mass, low inertia, and integral incorporation within skid mounted packages.

The objective of this response is to provide assurance that redundant portions of safety-related structures, systems, and components are adequately protected from the effects of internally generated missiles from pumps.

In many cases, protection against pump generated missiles has been provided by the use of missile barriers. In other cases, protection of essential systems or structures against direct strikes by pump missiles was also provided by appropriate placement and orientation of the pump. The'ingle failure criterion is used in the analysis. Therefore, if a safety related pump fails, the single failure criterion is met. If a non-safety related pump fails, an additional single failure is postulated.

Pumps were evaluated in accordance with the following criteria to ensure that missile damage is not credible:

(592JHE/cfr)

1. Safety-related pumps which, because of their location, cannot affect multiple power or component trains by generating missiles shall not be considered as a potential danger to the safety of the plant.

2. Safety-related pumps which are isolated in cubicles and cannot damage other essential equipment by generating missiles shall not be considered a potential danger to the safety of the plant.

3~ Non-safety related pumps which are located in non-safety related areas or which are isolated in cubicles and cannot damage essential equipment by generating missiles shall not be considered a potential danger to the safety of the plant.

4. Pumps for which vendor calculations or certifications are available stating that the pumps cannot generate missiles that penetrate the pump

~

casing shall not be considered a potential danger to the safety of the plant.

5. Any pumps which are intended for use only during cold shutdown, shall not be considered a potential danger to the safety of the plant.

In order to assess the effects of pump generated missiles, the pumps listed in Table 1 were located and reviewed in terms of the evaluation criteria listed above. Evaluation Criteria 1, 2, and 3 eliminated most of the pumps (safety and non-safety related) from further analysis because of their location and the location of other essential components in the area of the pump.

Pumps which did not fall into categories 1, 2, or 3 were reviewed in terms of Evaluation Criteria 84. The pump vendor was contacted to determine whether the pump could actually generate a missile that could penetrate the pump casing. The vendor'was requested to submit a letter of certification or a calculation showing that the pump could not generate a missile that would penetrate the pump casing. If such information was not available, the vendor was requested to supply pump data necessary to allow appropriate calculations to be performed.

Pumps which did not fall into any aformentioned categories were reviewed'in terms of their mode of operation. If a pump was intended to operate only during cold shutdown conditions, evaluation criteria /I5 was utilized.

Subsequent to the application of Evaluation Criteria 1-5, four types of pumps could not be eliminated from further consideration. For three of these types, the Charging Pumps, the CVCS Chiller Pumps, and the RHR Pumps, the potential for missile generation has been evaluated,.on the basis of the projected missile strike zones. Missiles from these pumps will not result in the impact of redundant essential component trains. The remaining pump type, the Boron Injection Recirculation Pump, is a close-coupled pump whose missile expulsion potential is not considered a potential danger to the safety of the plant.

(592JHE/cfr)

The results of the evaluation are summarized in Table 1 Pump Generated Missile Study. This evaluation supports the conclusion that systems, structures and components whose failure could prevent safe shutdown of the plant or result in significant uncontrolled release of radioactivity have been protected from the possible effects of internally generated missiles.

(592 JHE/c fr)

TABLE I - PNP GENERATEO MISSILES STUOY Eliminated er criteria:

T e of Pu Location 2 3 4 Remarks Charging Pump RAB EL, 236' The potential for mlssl le generation 016 (J 6~ 7p 8) has been Identified. Subsequent evaluation of the proJected missile strike zone has resulted in the conclusion that missile generation from this pump can not result in t Impact of redundant essential component trains.

SW Booster Pump RAB EL, 236'-016 (K-11) (K-16)

Boric Acid Transfer RAB EL, 236)

G-016 (J" 16)

CVCS Chl lier Pump RAB EL, The potential for missile generation (M-'lb) has been identified, Subsequent 236'-016 evaluation of the proJected missile strike zone has resulted In the conclusion that mlsslle generation fran this pump can not result In the impact of redundant essential component trains.

Reactor Makeup Water Pump Tank Area EL. 236~

G-033 (H"8)

(592JHE/cfr)

EI iml nated er cr I ter I a:

T eof Pum Location 2 3 4 Remarks Condensate Transfer Pump Tank Area EL, 236'433 (H-8)

Sec. Waste Sample Tank Pump Tank Area EL. 236~

G"033 (H-7)

Tank Area Drain Pump Tank Area EL 236'-033 (1-4)

Reactor Coolant Orain Tank Pump Cont. Bldg. EL, 221~

G-011 (J-4)

Reactor Coolant Pump Cont. Bldg, EL, 236~

G-Oil (F-13)

Fuel Pool Cooling Pump FHB EL, 236'-023 (H-8)

Containment Spray Pump RAB EL, 190~

G-015 (1-12, 19)

RHR Pump RAB EL, The potential for missile generation (l-13, Identl f led, Subsequent 190'-015

18) has been evaluation of the projected missile strike zone has resulted In the conclusion that missile generation fram this pump can not result in the impact of redundant essential component trains.

El Imlnated er criteria:

T e of Pum Location Remarks Floor Drain Transfer Pump RAB EL, (J-I) 190'&15 Boron InJection Reclr, Pump RAB EL, 216~ Analysis of the potential for G-015 (J-8) miss l le generation has ldentl f led a penetration constraint due to pump design. A potential missile would be required to Impinge upon and penetrate either the casing flange or a portion of the pump driver.

This pump, therefore, is not considered to be a potential danger to the safety of the plant, HVAC Condensate Transfer Pump RAB EL. 216~

G-015 (K-5)

SSE Fire Protection Booster Pump RAB EL.

(J-1) 216'-015 Recycle Monitor Tank Pump RAB EL, 261>

G-017 (L-12, 16)

HVAC Chilled Water Pump RAB EL, 26ls G-017 (L-8)

Steam Generator Wet RAB EL, 261>

Lay&p Reclrc. Pump G-017 (J-5)

(592JHE/cfr)

EI Imi nated er cr I ter la:

T eof Pum Location 2 3 4 Remarks Condenser Water Pump RAB EL, (L-I) (L-8) 261'-017 Component Cooling Water Pump RAB EL, 236~

G-016 (M-3, 9)

Motor Driven Steam Gen. RAB EL, 236'"016 Aux. Fee@rater Pump (M-6)

Turbine Driven Steam Gen, RAB EL, 236>

Aux. Feebrater Pump G-016 (M-9)

Decontamination Wash Pump FHB EL 261 )

G-022 (8-21)

Decontamination Rinse Pump FHB EL, 261>

G-022 (8-21)

Decontamination Transfer Pump FHB EL, 236~

G-023 ( I -18)

HVAC Cond. Receiver Transfer Pump FHB EL, 216'-023 (E-3)

Fuel Pool Skinner Pump FHB EL, 236'-023 (G-13)

(592JHE/cfr)

EI lml nated er cr I ter I a:

T eof Pum Location 2 3 4 Remarks CCW Transfer Pump FIB EL, 216'-023 (D-18)

Spent Fuel Pool Refueling FfS EL, 216<

Water Purl f lcatlon Pump G-023 (C-6)

Equipment Drain Transfer Pump RAB EL, 190~

G-015 (J-16)

Hydrotest Pump RAB EL (I-3) 236'-016 Aux. Bul ldlng Fl lter RAB EL X 236'-016 Backwash Transfer Pump (G-I3)

Recycle Evaporator Feed Pumps RAB EL, X 236'-016 (G-10)

FHB Filter Backwash Transfer Pump FIS EL, 216~

G-023 (C-4)

Diesel Oil Transfer Pump OOSTA G-214 (D-9, 13)

Cooling Tower Makeup Pump ES)f Intake G-202 (E-5, 7)

(592JHE/cfr)

Eliminated er criteria:

T e of Pum Location Remarks Normal Service Water Pump NSW I ntake G-201 (H-10)

Circulating Water Pump CT Intake G-203 (C-12)

WPB Cooling Water Pump WPB CL 261'-912 (1-13)

Waste Monitor Tank Pump Tank Area G-033 (L-4)

Chlorine Booster Pump NSW Intake G-201 (I-12)

Caustic Metering Pump CT Intake G-203 (0-9)

Acid NeterIng Pump CT intake G-203 <E-8)

Fire Service Screen Wash Pump ESW Intake G-209 (F-5, 11)

Fconomizer Reclrc. Pump Aux. Boiler Bldg, G-243(Sl) (G-10)

(592JHE/cfr)

Eliminated er criteria:

T e of Pum Location 2 3 Remarks Rinse Recycle Pumps Turb, El'40

&404 (0-5)

Condensate Pumps Turb, Bldg.

G-004 (J-10)

Steam Generator Feed Pumps Turb." B I dg, G-005 (C" 13)

Heater Orain Pumps Turb. Bldg.

G-004 (E-14)

Condenser Vacuum Pumps Turb. Bldg.

G"005 (G-9)

Aux. Bol ler Fuel Ol I Yards Unloading Pump G-210(SO I ) (E-14)

Screen Wash Pump ESW Intake G-205 (G-4, 6)

Aux. Steam Condensate Pump WPB G-910 (G-11) (J-11)

Main Reservoir Make-Up Pump Deleted (Unit 2 Cancellation)

(592JHE/cfr)

EI lmlnated er criteria:

T eof Pum Location Remarks Fire Water Pump ESW Intake Screen G-209 (E-14)(F-4)

Jockey Pump ESW Intake Screen G-209 (G-14)

Condensate Booster Pump Turb.

G-005 (C-B)

Emergency Service Water Pump ESW Intake G-202 (C-13, 18)

Floor Oraln Tank Pump WPB EL, 2IIs G-910 (K-3)

Floor Drain Tank Mixing Pump WPB EL, (L-3) 211'-910 FO Polyelectrolyte Feed Tank Pump WPB EL, 2l l~

G-910 (L-4)

Waste Evaporator Feed Pump WPB EL 211'"910 (L-7)

Waste Evaporator Conc, Tank Pump WPB EL, X (L-8) 211'-910 (592JHE/cfr)

EI iml nated er cr I ter I a:

T eof Pum Location 2 3 4 Remarks Gas Decay Tank Drain Pump WPB EL, 2iii G-910 (N"7)

,t WPB Flit. Part, Cond. Tank Pump WPB EL.

211'-910 (N-7)

WPB Filter Backwash Storage WPB El.

211'-910 Tank Pump (M-B, 9)

Chemical Drain Tank Pump WPB EL, 211'-910 (J-5)

Waste Evaporator CNDS Pump WPB EL, 21 I>

G-910 (J"7)

RO Feed Pump WPB EL, 21I>

G"910 (H-6)

Spent Resin Transfer Pump WPB EL, 211'-910 (H-10)

Sluice Pumps Turb. EL, 240~

G-004 (E-8)

Lube Ol I Transfer Pump Turb.

G-005 (J-16)

(592JHE/cfr)

Eliminated er criteria:

T e of Pum Location 2 3 4 Remarks Spent Resin Sluice Pump WPB EL, (1-10) 211'-910 Aux. Steam Cond, Tank Pump WPB EL, (J" 11) 211'-910 (G-11)

Sec. Waste Evap.'ond. Tank Pump WPB EL. 2II~

G-910 (G" 13) (1-13)

Sec. Waste Evap. Conc, Pump WPB EL.

211'-910 (H-14)

Sec, Waste Evap. Reclrc. Pump WPB EL, 2II~

G-910 (G-14)

SW Filter Backrash Transfer WPB EL, 211'-910 Tank Pump (H-15)

High Conductlvlty Hold Tank WPB EL 211>

Mixing Pump G-910 (J-14)

High Conductlvlty Hold Tank Pump WPB EL, 211~

G-910 (J-14)

Low Conductivity Hold Tank Pump WFB EL, 2II~ X G"910 (L-13)

(592JHE/cfr)

Eliminated er criteria:

T e of Pum Location Remarks Chiller Pumps WPB EL, 291'-914 (G-10)

Sol ldi f i cation System Pretreat. WPB EL, 291'ank Pump G-914 (L-4)

WPB Feed Pumps WPB Ef, 291~

G-914 (J-9)

RO Conc. Evap. Cond, Pump WPB EL, (M-3) 236'G-911 RO Conc, Evap. Reclrc. Pump WPB EL, 236>

G-911 (K, L-3)

RO Conc. Evap. Distill Pump WPB EL, (L-3) 236'-91'I RO Conc, Evap, Conc. Pump WPS EL, (J-3) 236'-911 LNS Tank Pump WPB EL, 236)

G-911 (H-3)

LQ6 Tank Mixing Pump WPB EL, 236'-911 (H-3)

(592JHE/cfr)

El lmlnated er criteria:

T e of Pum Location 2 3 5 Remarks LATHS Polyelectrolyte Feed Pump WPB EL. 236~

G-9ll (H-3)

Treated Laundry 4 Hot WPB EL, 236>

Shower Tank Pump G-9ll (E-3)

Demineralized Water Storage Pump 'ard G-210 (SO) (L-5)

Skimned Ol I Trans Pump Yard G-210 (S03) (H-5)

Burner Fuel Ol I Pump Yard G-210 (SO I) (E-14)

Effluent Water Transfer Pump Yard G-210 (S03)(H-3)

Neutralization Basin Reclrc. Pump Yard G-201 (S03)(E, H-12)

Flash Mixer Feed Pump Yard G-2'IO (S03) (E, I-16)

(592PIE/c fr)

Eliminated er crlterla:

T e of Pum Location 2 3 Remarks Secondary Waste Evap. WPB EL, Distillate Pump 236'everse Osmosis Concentrate WPB EL 236<

Evaporator Feed Pump

~ I Laundry and Hot Showers Reverse WPB Osmosis Feed Pump EL'36'ettling Tank Drain Transfer Pump Turb. Bldg, EL, 240'mmonia Recycle Pump Turb, Bldg. EL.

240'ube Oil Conditioner Circulation Turb, Bldg, EL, 26i~

Pumps Emergency and Bearing Oll Turb. Bldg. EL, Pumps ln Oil Reservoir 286'mnonla Transfer Pumps Yard Diesel Ol I Unloading Pumps Yard Evaporator Concentrates Pump RAB EL ~ 236<

G-0l6 (592JHE/cfr)

Eliminated er criteria:

T eof Pum Location Remarks Distillate Pump RAB, EL, 236'-016 ESCWS Lubricating System Oil Pump RAB ~ EL. 26I~

G-017 (592JHE/cfr)