Text

Response to Request for Additional Information Related to an Amendment to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-425, Revision 3, to Relocate Specific Surveillance Frequencies to a Licensee Controlled Program
	ML11229A184
Person / Time
Site:	Duane Arnold
Issue date:	08/15/2011
From:	Wells P; Nextera Energy
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	NG-11-0299
	Download: ML11229A184 (86)
	v • d • e

NExTeram EN E RG

ýARNOLD August 15, 2011 NG-1 1-0299 10 CFR 50.90 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 Renewed Op. License No. DPR-49 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to an Amendment to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-425, Revision 3, to Relocate Specific Surveillance Frequencies to a Licensee Controlled Program

References:

1) License Amendment Request (TSCR-120): Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program (TSTF-425, Rev.

3), NG-1 1-0037, dated February 23, 2011

2) Clarification of Information Contained in License Amendment Request (TSCR-120): Application for Technical Specification Change Regarding Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program (TSTF-425, Rev. 3), NG 0135, dated April 20, 2011 In the Reference 1 letter, as clarified by Reference 2, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (hereafter NextEra Energy Duane Arnold) requested a revision to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. Subsequently, the NRC Staff requested, via facsimile and electronic mail, additional information regarding that application. Attachment 1 to this letter contains the requested information.

As a result of discussions with the Staff held on June 28, 2011, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold withdraws that portion of the Reference 1 application dealing with the A00i NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, 3277 DAEC Road, Palo, IA 52324

Document Control Desk NG-1 1-0299 Page 2 of 2 line item consolidation of certain Surveillances in the Instrumentation Chapter of the DAEC TS. Attachments 2 and 3 to this letter contain the revised TS and TS Bases markup pages, respectively, that are intended to supersede those same pages submitted in Reference 1. As a result of the above changes, Attachment 4 is an updated version of the cross-reference table submitted as Attachment 5 in the original application.

This additional information does not impact the 10 CFR 50.92 evaluation of "No Significant Hazards Consideration" previously provided in the referenced application.

This letter makes no new commitments or changes to any existing commitments.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Steve Catron at 319-851-7234.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on August 15, 2011 Peter Wells Vice President, Duane Arnold Energy Center NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC Attachments: 1) Response to Request for Additional Information Related to an Amendment to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-425, Revision 3, to Relocate Specific Surveillance Frequencies to a Licensee Controlled Program

2) Updated Revised TS Markup Pages

3) Updated Revised TS Bases Markup Pages

4) TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) versus DAEC TS Cross-reference (Updated) cc: NRC Regional Administrator NRC Resident Inspector NRC Project Manager M. Rasmusson (State of Iowa)

Attachment I to NG-l 1-0299 Page 1 of 8 RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO AN AMENDMENT TO ADOPT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TASK FORCE TRAVELLER TSTF-425, REVISION 3, TO RELOCATE SPECIFIC SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCIES TO A LICENSEE CONTROLLED PROGRAM DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER DOCKET NO. 50-331

1. The submittal states that technical specifications (TS) have been consolidated for those Surveillances that become duplicative once the specific Frequency has been replaced with the reference to the "Surveillance Frequency Control Program" (SFCP).

In this approach, tests of the same type, e.g., "Perform a Channel Functional Tests,"

are consolidated. For example, TS Section 3.3.1.1 (RPS Instrumentation) currently contains 3 Surveillances to "Perform a Channel Functional Tests," one on a 7 day Frequency (SR 3.3.1.1.5), one on a 92 day Frequency (SR 3.3.1.1.9), and one on a 24 month Frequency (SR 3.3.1.1.13). NextEra Energy Duane Arnold proposes to consolidate these 3 Surveillances into the single Surveillance. SR 3.3.1.1.5, with the specified Frequency of "In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program," and to delete existing SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.13.

The NextEra Energy Duane Arnold submittal indicates that the proposed approach is an administrative deviation from the standard Technical Specification Task Force-425 application submittal. Please address the following for the staff's assessment of the proposed consolidated Surveillance Requirements (SRs) approach.

The SFCP requires a list of frequencies of those SRs for which the frequency is controlled by the program. Given that the different SRs which are consolidated have different SFs (e.g., in the above example the SFs are 7 days, 92 days, and 24 months), it is necessary to maintain these different SFs in the SFCP for evaluating SF changes. Please clarify how NextEra Energy Duane Arnold intends to handle relocation of different SFs for consolidated SRs. In addition, clarify if the existing Bases information describing the basis for SFs will be relocated to the SFCP.

Provide an example of the proposed SFCP illustrating the consolidated SR approach.

Response

As a result of a conference call held with the Staff on June 28, 2011, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold has decided to withdraw this portion of the original application dealing with the Surveillance consolidation. Attachments 2 and 3 of this letter contain the revised marked-up pages of the TS and TS Bases, respectively, that are intended to supercede those same pages provided in the original application.

The current approach is to leave the SF basis informati,on in the TS Bases and not relocate that information into the SFCP. While this could necessitate a TS Bases change, under the TS Bases Control Program, for each future SF change, NextEra Energy Duane

Attachment I to NG- 11-0299 Page 2 of 8 Arnold believes this approach preserves the purpose of the TS Bases to have all the TS supporting information in one location and is a better human-factored presentation.

2. In Table 2-1, "Status of Identified Gaps to Capability Category II of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) probabilistic risk assessment (PRA)

Standard," it is noted that a gap was found for SC-A6. SC-A6 is to confirm that the bases for the success criteria are consistent with the features, procedures and operating philosophy of the plant. The response to this finding states that MAAP runs were updated. Please elaborate on why you believe that updating MAAP runs only, and not considering updates of other supporting engineering analyses or human reliability analysis for success criteria, is sufficient to address this gap finding.

Response

Supporting Requirement IE-A4a was assessed as 'Not Met' in the December 2007 PRA Peer Review, but was re-assessed as 'Met: Capability Category I/II/111' in the subsequent Focused PRA Peer Review of March 2011. Although our discussion in Table 2-1 regarding disposition of the 2007 gap focuses on use of MAAP for evaluating success criteria, other analytical tools were also employed for the Rev 6 PRA update.

3. In Table 2-3, "Disposition of Peer Review "Suggestion F&Os," (sic) the peer review notes in AS-B5a-01 that the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) in suppression pool cooling is not modeled explicitly. The disposition of this comment discusses it for a specific sequence. Please clarify if the peer review comment is related only to the sequence discussed, or if the RHR suppression pool cooling is not modeled explicitly in the PRA model and what is the impact of the condition on the application.

Response

The peer review comment is related only to the sequence discussed. The suppression pool cooling function of RIHR is, and always has been, explicitly considered in the DAEC PRA model as a means of rejecting energy to the ultimate heat sink.

4. In Table 2-3, the peer review also notes for IE-A4a-01, initiating events resulting from multiple failures from common cause and routine system alignments were not included. The disposition addresses this observation by discussing support system initiating event (SSIE) fault trees, concluding that such fault trees can be considered on a case-by-case basis. Provide confirmation that common cause failures and routine system alignments were considered in assessing the possibility of an initiating event for the PRA model, per IE-A4a, or provide technical justification for not meeting IE-A4a Capability Category II for this application.

Attachment 1 to NG-1 1-0299 Page 3 of 8

Response

Supporting Requirement IE-A4a was assessed as 'Not Met' in the December 2007 PRA Peer Review, but was re-assessed as 'Met: Capability Category II' in the subsequent Focused PRA Peer Review of March 2011. The basis for this assessment is that a structured system-by-system accounting of initiating event identification is included in the updated Initiating Event Notebook. It was also noted that a support system initiating event fault tree has been developed for the River Water Supply system and that initiating events resulting from failure of other support systems are appropriately quantified using Bayesian updating of generic data.

As stated in Table 2-3 in the original application, development of fault tree logic for quantification of specific support system initiators can be considered on a case-by-case basis, depending on the system or components being evaluated for the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

5. Supplementary information was provided by memorandum dated April 20, 2011, in response to a staff request, and included a table entitled "ASME Category II SRs Not Met in Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Model, Rev. 6." The peer review had found ASME SR IE-B3-OIA not met for Category I1.Given the grouping of initiators and the potential impacts of the subsumed initiating events, most of the initiating events presented, if modeled separately, may not have a significant impact on the base PRA model for this application. However, the gap description indicates that initiating events involving bus failures (1A1/1A2 and 1A3/1A4) could result in turbine trip (TT) or shutdown with impact on plant systems. Please provide technical justification for grouping these bus failure initiating events into TT for this application.

Response

Failure data associated with I Al, 1A2, I A3 and I A4 were included in the calculation of TT probability. Loss of IAI or IA2 does result in an automatic SCRAM. Loss of IA3 or 1A4 does not result in an automatic SCRAM but the Alarm Response procedures do require operators to SCRAM the plant if loss is a result of a fault. A sensitivity analysis considering the failure of these buses as initiators along with a turbine trip was performed. The impact of the bus failures was found to not be significant. Therefore, grouping these bus failures with the TT initiating event is appropriate.

6. Does the failure probabilities of structures, systems, and components that are in standby for extended periods as modeled in the DAEC PRA include a standby time-related contribution and a cyclic demand-related contribution? Please describe how you address the standby time-related contribution for extended surveillances.

Attachment 1 to NG- 11-0299 Page 4 of 8

Response

No, the SSC standby failure probabilities do not include a separate standby time-related contribution. The standby time-related probability contribution for extended surveillances will be addressed using guidance contained in NEI-04-10 Rev 1 Steps 8, "Associated STI SSC Modeled in PRA?" and 14, "Perform Sensitivity Studies." When the breakdown between time-related and demand-related contributions is unknown, all failures will be assumed to be time-related to obtain the maximum test-limited risk contribution unless supported by an alternate method supported by data.

7. The scope of risk assessments may need to include shutdown, using Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 04-10 guidance for surveillance test interval (STI) changes. What shutdown risk method would be used for the analyses?

Response

Risk associated with the conduct of maintenance during outages is managed based on principles contained in NUMARC 91-06, Guidelines for Industry Actions to Assess Shutdown Management. Since a PRA model has not yet been developed for shutdown conditions, evaluations involving structures, systems, or components required to function while shutdown will include qualitative information consistent with these principles.

8. Please address the following requested clarifications:

a. SR 3.3.1.1.11 is marked up in the submittal, but is not incorporated in the DAEC TS cross-reference, Attachment 5 of the submittal. How does this SR cross-reference to NUREG-1433?

b. SR 3.5.2.6 is marked up for inclusion of the SFCP; however, its corresponding basis was not found in the submittal. Please provide the corresponding basis for SR 3.5.2.6.

c. In the cross-reference table, it is noted that DAEC 3.3.1.1.17 is consolidated with SR 3.3.1.1.14. Is this correct, or should it be noted as renumbered to SR 3.3.1.1.14? If it is consolidated, how can it be when the SRs have different descriptions? (DAEC 3.3.1.1.14 in the table is noted to be consolidated with renumbered SR 3.3.1.1.11.)

d. The cross-reference table shows that DAEC 3.3.1.1.12 is renumbered to SR 3.3.1.1.11; however, the marked-up bases show it renumbered to SR 3.3.1.1.10.

Attachment I to NG-l 1-0299 Page 5 of 8

Response

a. DAEC SR 3.3.1.1.11 does not have a counterpart in NUREG-1433 (TSTF-425). It was inadvertently omitted from the Attachment 5 Table in the original application. A corrected Table is provided as Attachment 4 to this letter.

b. SR 3.5.2.6 does not have a unique write up in the current TS Bases, it is the same as for SR 3.5.1.7. See page B 3.5-25 for this cross-reference information. See markup of TS Bases page B 3.5-17, in the original application, for the pertinent SF basis information.

c. As stated in the Response to Question I above, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold has chosen to withdraw this portion of the original application. A revised cross-reference Table is provided as Attachment 4 to this letter.

d. As stated in the Response to Question 1 above, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold has chosen to withdraw this portion of the original application. A revised cross-reference Table is provided as Attachment 4 to this letter.

9. Please confirm, or clarify, the following summary of the July 7, 2011 conference call. Based on this conference call, the staff understands that:

a. The probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model, Revision 6, proposed for the TSTF-425 application, is complete.

b. The status of the open gap items for Revision 6 is as provided in the supplemental information, dated April 20, 2011.

c. The focused peer review, noted in the supplemental information, utilized appropriate independent peer reviewers consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.200.

d. The focused peer review reviewed the 83 potential gap items from the 2007 full scope peer review, including the 30 provided in the February 23, 2011 submittal.

e. The focused peer review also reviewed new methods and PRA model changes associated with the upgrade to Revision 6.

f. This focused peer review identified 12 items, 5 of which have been incorporated into Revision 6, and 7 open items as provided in the supplemental information.

g. The 7 open gap items supersedes the 30 open gap items provided in TSTF-425 application submittal, dated February 23, 2011, for Revision 6.

Attachment 1 to NG-1 1-0299 Page 6 of 8

h. The 12 items include gap items not previously identified in the February 23, 2011 submittal.

i. In addition to confirming, or clarifying this summary, please describe the 5 gap items noted in the supplemental information and, for each with its own unique identifier, how they were dispositioned via the Revision 6 PRA model.

Response

a. Yes the model is complete. It was validated and issued on June 30, 2011.

b. Yes, the only open items remaining are those listed in the supplemental information dated April 20, 2011.

c. There were 5 independent peer reviewers, consisting of a contractor peer review lead and two PRA contractors, supplemented by 2 NextEra Energy employees - one is a senior PRA engineer from Seabrook Station and the other is an experienced PRA engineer that was newly hired to be on the corporate staff. The contractors on the peer review team were selected through a bidding process of qualified vendors. Neither of the NextEra Energy employees on the team had participated in the creation or update of the DAEC PRA.

d. The scope of the review included the original gaps from the 2007 full scope peer review along with reviews of method changes implemented to close the 2007 peer review gaps.

e. The peer review reexamined methods associated with the previous findings and suggestions and methods coupled to the SRs related to these findings. The new methods reviewed include use of the EPRI HRA calculator and changing the common cause statistic from beta to alpha.

f. Yes, 2 of the 5 were logic changes incorporated into Revision 6 of the model, 2 were additional reviews to validate model logic and data, and I was a procedure change.

g. Yes, the 7 findings supersede the 30 open gap items provided in TSTF-425 application submittal.

h. Yes, the scope of the focused peer review expanded beyond the previously identified gaps in cases where gaps where found in implementing new methods.

i. See the following table.

Attachment 1 to NG-1 1-0299 Page 7 of 8 SR .= =FINDI*NG .Disposition ..

The remarks made by the previous peer review under finding SY-A3-03 are still open and still valid. Failure of This finding was closed either vital 4kV bus Start Up Transformer (SUT) breaker, 1A302 [1A402], to trip on LOSP is not modeled - by adding SUT this failure would prevent associated EDG breaker from closing onto the bus. Omission of this is non- breakers to the PRA conservative. The model should include the necessary dependencies for this event. Specifically, the fault tree model. The change model omits a dependency; the failure of the normal supply breaker to each vital 4kV bus to trip upon a loss of included new random offsite power to allow the associated EDG to close onto the bus. More importantly, a common cause failure and CCF basic events SY-A3-01A between the two breakers for the two busses is omitted. This CCF may contribute significantly to SBO for these breakers. This sequences. Also, not modeling these breakers will have an impact on the fire model, change was documented in RECOMMENDATION: These components should be modeled to remove non-conservatism and to address supplements to the future PRA applications. PRA notebooks.

There are no system level cutsets included in the notebooks and as such no evidence that the system models System cutsets were were evaluated to validate they are complete and accurate [i.e. a description of model results]. Based on prepared and reviewed.

discussions with DAEC, system level cutsets were reviewed to validate the models, however the results of the As a result of this review were not documented and the system level cutsets were not included in the notebooks, review several changes SY-C2-02A were made to the RECOMMENDATON: Include system level cutsets in the system notebooks along with an assessment. Revision 6 model and documented in supplements to the PRA notebooks.

No evidence of failure mode level information is provided. This requires documentation of a review of test Test procedures were procedures to determine that test covers all failure modes of a component. For example a check associated with reviewed against their a pump may or may not be cycled based on the recirculation configuration. related component failure modes. The RECOMMENDATION: Address this issue by component type (e. g. pump test likely covers all pump failure assumed failure modes modes but not failure modes of all downstream valves). for components were DA-CIO-01A found to be covered.

No changes were required to the model.

The evaluation was documented in supplements to the PRA notebooks.

Appendix C. I provides graphs of prior and posterior distributions; however there is no discussion of the The reasonableness of reasonableness of the posterior. For example for TC AS 1K FR has a prior mean of 9 E-5 with evidence of 3 the prior and posterior failures in 544. It appears that the data is inconsistent with the prior. distributions was reviewed and concluded that no model changes DA-D4-01A were required. The evaluation was documented in supplements to the PRA notebooks.

Attachment I to NG- 11-0299 Page 8 of 8 SR FINDING Disposition.

The Duane Arnold PRA Maintenance procedure was updated to meet all MU SRs. Also, a table cross referencing all the MU-FI-01 Update PRA procedures to meet all MU SRs. MU SRs to specific sections in the procedure was added to facilitate maintenance of the procedure and its verification in the future.

Attachment 2 To NG-1 1-0299 UPDATED PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (MARK-UPS) 33 Pages to Follow

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

NOTES ----------------------------

1. Refer to Table 3.3.1.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RPS Function.

2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i

SR 3.3.1.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. i2fottrs~T

+

SR 3.3.1.1.2 ------------ NOTE - ----------------

Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after THERMAL POWER Ž_21.7%

RTP.

Verify the absolute difference between the Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) channels and the calculated power is

< 2% RTP plus any gain adjustment required by LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating," while operating at >

21.7% RTP.

SR 3.3.1.1.3 Perform a functional test of each 7 daysT1 automatic scram contactor.

SR 3.3.1.1.4 --------------------- NOTE--------------

Not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. :das (continued)

DAEC 3.3-3 TC-2 Amendment 24-

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY S R 3.3.1.1.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. q-da~T1=

SR 3.3.1.1.6 Verify the Source Range Monitor (SRM) and Prior to Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) channels withdrawing overlap. SRMs from the fully inserted position SR 3.3.1.1.7 -------------------- NOTE --------------

Only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1.

Verify the IRM and APRM channels overlap. .IaysERTj SR 3.3.1.1.8 Calibrate the local power range monitors.

, IINERT SR 3.3.1.1.9 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

SR 3.3.1.1.10 Calibrate the trip units. Vr- 1*INSERT SR 3.3.1.1.11 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 92 INsRT (continued)

ITSCR-120 DAEC 3.3-4 A"mendlme 223

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.12 -------- NOTES---------------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For Function 2.a, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 84Adays- T 24 mnts 1 1NJ _RT SR 3.3.1.1.13 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.

SR 3.3.1.1.14 -------- ----

NOTES-- ------

1. Neutron detectors are excluded.

2. For Function 1, not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1 until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

SR 3.3.1.1.15 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.

SR 3.3.1.1.16 Verify Turbine Stop Valve-Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions are not bypassed when THERMAL POWER is

> 26% RTP.

(continued)

C-120 DAEC 3.3-5 Amendment 243

RPS Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.1.17 Adjust the channel to conform to a calibrated flow signal.

24_ months. o InST

,INNSERT 1 SR 3.3.1.1.18 Verify the RPS RESPONSE TIME is within limits. STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.1.1.19 Verify the RPS logic system response time is within limits. STAGGERXED TFEST BASIS DAEC 3.3-6 ,3FE 720 u3-6R .

The revisions on this page are being RPS Instrumentation withdrawn from this application. 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 1 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

1. Intermediate Range Monitors

a. Neutron 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 < 125/125 divisions of Flux- High SR 3.3.1.1.4 full scale SR 3.3.1.1.6 SR 3.3.1.1.7 SR 3.3.1.1.X11'1 SR 3.3.1.1.1 121 SR 3.3.1.1. 1 5(a) H SR 3.3.1.1.1 < 125/125 divisions of SR 3.3.1.1.5 full scale SR 3.3. 1.. W11 '

SR 3.3.1.1..W 12I SR 3.3.1.1.1 L

b. Inop 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.4 NA SR 3.3.1. 1. ,5 R12 SR 3.3.1.1.98 116 5 (a) H SR 3.3.1.1.5 NA SR 3.3.1,.1.:] 2 SR 3.3.1.1.ie .J

2. Average Power Range Monitors

a. Neutron 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 < 16.6% RTP Flux - SR 3.3.1.1.4 Upscale, SR 3.3.1.1.7 Startup SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.3.1.1. 11 SR 3.3.1.1.112I SR 3.3.1.1. LE 1<

b. Flow Biased - 2 F SR 3.3.1.1.1 < (0.55W + 67.7) (b)(c)

High SR 3.3.1.1.2 SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.8 5 SR 3.3.1.11 0 I SR 3.3.111,1 1 2 SR 3.3.1.1. 1 -

SR 3.3.1.1,0 14I-SR 3.3.1.1.14 161J (Continued)

(a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.

(b) When reset for single loop operation per LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating," the following Allowable Value applies:

<(0.55W + 61.4) (c)

The trip setpoints may be reset by adjusting APRM gain or by recalibrating the APRMs.

(c) W is equal to the percentage of the drive flow, where 100% drive flow is that required to achieve 100% core flow at 100% RTP.

ITSCR-1 20 DAEC 3.3-7 AIn-endie,,it 243

The revisions on this page are being RPS Instrumentation withdrawn from this application. 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 2 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

2. Average Power Range Monitors (continued)

c. High Value Clamp 1 2 F SR 3.3.1.1.2 < 121.6% RTP SR 3.3.1.1.3 SR 3.3.1.1.8 SR 3.311 ,/1I SR 3 .3 .1.1i'-j I SR 3 . 3 .1.1.j. ,-12I SR 3.3.1.1.196

d. Inop 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.3 NA SR 3.3.1.1"-a 1 I 2

SR 3.3.1.1..5,i SR 3.3.1.1. JS16_

3. Reactor Vessel Steam 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.3 - < 1069.2 psig Dome Pressure - High SR 3.3.1.1.9-II SR 3.3.1.1 J-10I SR 3.3. 1.1. &-112I S R 3.3.1.1.'1 -- 1 I SR 3.3.1.1.5tQ*

4. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.1 > 165.6 inches Level - Low SR 3.3.1.1.3 .5 SR 3.3.1.1. 11 SR 3.3.1.1. W1 1 SR 3.3.1.1. *r- 12 SR 3.3.1.1.49 15 SR 3.3.1.1.1- 16

5. Main Steam Isolation 1 4 F SR 3.3.1.1.3 -- < 10% closed Valve - Closure SR 3.3.1.1.9" 1 SR 3.3.1.1.1*,111 SR 3.3.1.1.1"5- 12 1 SR 3.3.1.1. 19.

6. Drywell Pressure- High 1,2 2 G SR 3.3.1.1.3 <2.2 psig SR 3.3.1.1.9--1 I SR 3.3.1.1.414-Il I SR 3.3.1.1.'1"T- 12I SR 3.3.1.1. 16m1 (continued) 2 0 I SC-DAEC 3.3-8 A mendme'nt 223~

The revisions on this page are being RPS Instrumentation withdrawn from this application. 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3.1.1-1 (page 3 of 3)

Reactor Protection System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION D.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE

7. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level - High

a. Resistance 1,2 G SR 3.3.1.1.3 < 769 ft-Temperature SR 3.3.1.1.*t* 3.0 inches Detector SR 3.3.1.1 .j SR 3.3.1.1.1 SR 3.3.1.11"I.1" SR 3.3.1.1.1'9, 5 (a) H SR 3.3.1.1.3 < 769 ft -

SR 3.3.1.1.4'1 3.0 inches SR 3.3.1.1.A" SR 3.3.1.1."4, SR 3.3.1.1.%,

SR 3.3.1.I .W,

b. Float Switch 1,2 G SR 3.3.1.1.3 < 769 ft -

SR 3.3.1.1.9.'* 2.8 inches SR 3.3.1.1.44-SR 3.3.1.1.IT.-

SR 3.3.1.11...S, 5 (a) H SR 3.3.1.1.3 < 769 ft -

SR 3.3.1.1.V'* 2.8 inches SR 3.3.1.1.14-SR 3.3.1.1.:1 SR 3.3.1.1.1"9-,

8. Turbine Stop Valve - > 26% 4 E SR 3.3.1.1.3 ~~26% 2 E SR 3.3.1.1.3 > 465 psig Fast Closure, Trip Oil RTP SR 3.3.1.1. *"~~

~~Pressure - Low SR 3.3.1.1."4W SR 3.3.1.1.At" SR 3.3.1.1.46-SR 3.3.1.1.+0&.~~
10. Reactor Mode Switch - 1,2 G SR 3.3.1.1.3:3- NA Shutdown Position SR 3.3.1.1.1"-
~~5 (a) H SR 3.3.1. 1. "- NA SR 3.3.1.1.44.~~
11. Manual Scram 1,2 G SR 3.3.1.1:..ý. NA SR 3.3.1.1.V1" 5 (a) H SR 3.3.1.1. , NA SR 3.3.1.1.1.X
=== .J11 (a) With any control rod withdrawn from a core cell containing one or more fuel assemblies.
1 20 E,
DAEC 3.3-9 Amendment 24 SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

~~NOTE-------------------------------~~

Refer to Table 3.3.1.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each applicable MODE or other specified conditions.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.1.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. ,_ ,.,- .
SR 3.3.1.2.2 -------------- NOTES --------------
~~1. Only required to be met during CORE ALTERATIONS.~~
~~2. One SRM may be used to satisfy more than one of the following.~~
~~Verify an OPERABLE SRM detector is 42 houps located in : IN~~
~~a. The fueled region;~~
~~b. The core quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, when the associated SRM is included in the fueled region; and~~
~~c. A core quadrant adjacent to where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, when the associated SRM is included in the fueled region.~~
Perform CHANNEL CHECK. ,u,- 4 SR 3.3.1.2.3 (continued)
TSR120 DAEC 3.3-12 Amem 225
~~ie.ent~~
SRM Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i
SR 3.3.1.2.4 -------- NOTE Not required to be met with less than or equal to four fuel assemblies adjacent to the SRM and no other fuel assemblies in the associated core quadrant.
Verify count rate is > 3.0 cps. 142 heurs during
-GORE-
-ALTERAkTIONe SR 3.3.1.2.5 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
SR 3.3.1.2.6 ---------------- NOTE ------------------
Not required to be performed until INSERT 1 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after IRMs on Range 2 or below.
Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
I SR 3.3.1.2.7 NOTES ------------
~~1. Neutron detectors are excluded.~~
~~2. Not required to be performed until 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after IRMs on Range 2 or below.~~
Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
DAEC 3.3-13 A.. im idert 223
The revisions on this page are being SRM Instrumentation withdrawn from this application. 3.3.1.2 Table 3.3.1.2-1 (page 1 of 1)
Source Range Monitor Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE FUNCTION SPECIFIED CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS
1. Source Range Monitor 2 (a) 3 SR 3.3.1.2.1n SR 3.3.1.121I SR 3.31.2*11:2 SR 3.3.1.2.1w 3,4 2 SR 3.3.1.2.,PI SR 3.3.1 2.2[
SR 3.3.1.2G6-1 SR 3.3.1. 2 5 2(b) (c) SR 3.3.1.2.1 SR 3.3.1.2.2 SR 3.3.1.2-11 SR 3.3.1.21,&
SR 3.3.1.2.--1.6 (a) Wth IRMs on Range 2 or below.
(b) Only one SRM channel is required to be OPERABLE during spiral offload or reload when the fueled region includes only that SRM detector.
(c) Special movable detectors may be used in place of SRMs if connected to normal SRM circuits.
ITCR120 DAEC 3.3-14 Amnzr 223-
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

~~NOTES --------------------------~~

~~1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each ECCS Function.~~
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 1.d, 2.f, 3.c, 3.d, 3.e, and 3.f; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions other than 1.d, 2.f, 3.c, 3.d, 3.e, and 3.f provided the associated Function (or the redundant Function for Functions 4 and 5) maintains ECCS initiation or loop selection capability.
(continued)
TSCR-n120 2
~~'l I1 j 2231ILf--~~
DAEC 3.3-39
ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1.7 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 8 ont^,,,
SR 3.3.5.1.8 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 2~4-mnefths -
ISR SR 3.3.5.1.9 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL -24 months-TEST.
DAEC 3.3-40 Am~enidment 223
The revisions on this page are being ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 withdrawn from this application.
Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 1 of 5)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~1. Core Spray System~~
a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 4 (b) B SR 3.3.5.1.1i _2]38.3 inches Level - Low Low Low (a) (a) SR 3.3.5.1 -3alI 4() 5() SR 3.3.5.1,1-I SR 3.3.5.1t!U4
b. Drywell Pressure - 1,2,3 4 (b) B SR 3.3.5.1,Y2 < 2.19 psig High SR 3.3.5.1..& 3 SR 3.3.5.1. 4
c. Reactor Steam Dome 1,2,3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1,12I >363.3 psig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1-0 3 and <_485.1 psig (Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1. 4 >363.3 psig 4 (a), 5(a) 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.ý 2I SR 3.3.5.1.3 and <_485.1 psig SR 3.3.5.1.3 4
d. Core Spray Pump 1,2,3, 1 per E SR 3.3.5.1.1] > 256.6gpm Discharge Flow - Low 4 (a) 5 (a) pump SR 3.3.5.t1
~~and (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1. 3 -2382.1 gpm~~
~~ý'4~~
e. Core Spray Pump Start 1,2,3, 1 per C SR 3.3.5.1. ] >2.6 seconds Time Delay Relay 4(a) 5 (a) pump SR 3.3.5.1.. and <6.8 seconds
f. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 1,2,3, 1 per F SR 3.3.5.1.- . 2 < 3500V Sequential Loading 4(a) 5 (a) pump SR 3.3.5.1.33 Relay SR 3.3.5.1 J
~~2. Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) System~~
a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 - > 38.3 inches Level- Low Low Low (a) (a) SR 3.3.5.1,,2 4a , 5S R 3.3.5.1 *.&
~~SR 3.3.5.1 4~~
b. Drywell Pressure- 1,2,3 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.,?2 < 2.19 psig High SR 3.3.5.1. _3 -
SR 3. 3. 5. 1.*.
(continued)
(a) When associated ECCS subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2, ECCS-Shutdown.
(b) Also required to initiate the associated Diesel Generator (DG).
DAEC 3.3-41 A mendmenrt23
The revisions on this page are being ECCS Instrumentation withdrawn from this application. 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 2 of 5)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES REQUIRED REFERENCED OR OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~2. LPCI System (continued)~~
c. Reactor Steam Dome 1,2,3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.22 > 363.3 psig and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.03I <485.1 psig (Injection Permissive) SR 3.3.5.1.9S14 3.35.._1'*1 i > >363.3 psig 4 (a), 5(a) 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.&t5I and <485.1 psig SR 3.3.5.1.1*13 SR 3.3.5. 1 .[4]
d. Reactor Vessel Shroud 1,2,3 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 >_40.89 inches Level - Low SR 3.3.5.1.2 SR 3.3.5..,1:I3 SR 3.3.5.1. 4
e. Low Pressure Coolant 1,2,3, 1 per C SR 3.3.5.1. -- In Injection Pump 4(a, (a) pump SR 3.3.5.1.;U4 Start - Time Delay 4 5 Relay Pumps A &B >8.8 seconds and
< 11.2 seconds
> 13.8 seconds Pumps C & D and
< 33.5 seconds
f. Low Pressure 1,2,3, 1 per E SR 3.3.5.1 a_471.8gpm Coolant Injection Pump 4 (a) 5 (a) loop SR 3.3.5.1.'-"1 and Discharge Flow- Low SR 3.3.5.1.9141 < 3676.6 gpm (Bypass) LI
g. LPCI Loop Select- 1,2,3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 > 112.65 inches Reactor Vessel Water SR 3.3.5.1.2 Level - Low-Low SR 3.3.5.1.£r1I SR 3.3.5.1.21.4
~~h. LPCI Loop Select- 1,2,3 4 C SR 3.3.5.12 3 _>~~
887 psig Reactor Steam Dome SR 3.3.5.-1;. I Pressure - Low SR 3.3.5.1.'92o n (continued)
(a) When associated ECCS subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Shutdown.
DAEC 3.3-42 A11 6, dui,ei it 223
The revisions on this page are being ECCS Instrumentation withdrawn from this application. 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 3 of 5)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~2. LPCI System (continued)~~
i. LPCI Loop Select- 1,2,3 4 per C SR 3.3.5.1.1 <7.8 psid Recirculation Pump pump SR 3.3.5.1.2 3 Differential Pressure SR 3.3.5.1..81 i SR 3.3.5.1. 4j
j. LPCI Loop Select- 1,2,3 4 C SR 3.3.5.1.1 >_0.13 psid Recirculation Riser SR 3.3.5.1.2 - and < 2.07 psid Differential Pressure SR 3.3.5.1." 3 SR 3.3.5.1.79 4
k. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.5.1.42 <3500 V Sequential Loading SR 3.3.5.16.- 3 Relay SR 3.3.5.1a 4 4 (a) 5 (a) I F SR 3.3.5.1.5-2 <3500 V SR 3.3.5.1 3 SR 3.3.5.1. 4
~~3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System~~
a. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.1 > 112.65 inches Level - Low Low (C) (c) SR 3.3.5.1.121 2 .c 3 SR 3.3.5.1 SR 3.3.5.1. .I
b. Drywell Pressure- 1, 4 B SR 3.3.5.1.42] < 2.19 psig High 2 (c)' 3 (c) SR 3.3.5.1*31 SR 3.3.5.1.'14
c. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 2 C SR 3.3.5.11 <214.8 inches Level - High (C) (c) SR 3.3.5.1..1*2 2 3 SR 3.3.5.1.&1i SR 3.3.5.1.'Lj
d. Condensate Storage (c) 1, (c) 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.34 3.3.5.1.813 >11.6 1 inches Tank Level - Low 2 3 SR 3.3.5.1.
(continued)
(a) When the associated ECCS subsystem(s) are required to be OPERABLE per LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Shutdown.
(c) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.
FE--12 O DAEC 3.3-43 Ameid1 .lent 223
The revisions on this page are being ECCS Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 withdrawn from this application.
Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 4 of 5)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~3. HPCI System (continued)~~
e. Suppression Pool 1, 2 D SR 3.3.5.1.3'B2 <5.9 inches Water Level - High SR 3.3.5.1.813j 2 (c), 3 (c) SR 3.3.5.1. 44
f. High Pressure Coolant 1, Injection Pump 2 (c), 3 (c) 1 E SR 3.3.5.1. 2- _264.2 gpm Discharge Flow- Low SR 3.3.5.1. 8131 and (Bypass) SR 3.3.5.1._J4 <_2025.1 gpm
~~4. Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) Trip Logic A~~
a. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.1j _>38.3 inches Level - Low Low Low (d) (d) SR 3.3.5.1 2I 2 'd3 SR 3.3.5.1.81*3 3
~~SR 3. .5.14.4J~~
b. Automatic 1, 1 H SR 3.3.5.1..3] <125 seconds Depressurization (d) (d) SR 3.3.5.1.*&3I System Timer 2(d 3 SR 3.3.5.1.S4J
c. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 1 G SR 3.3.5.1.1 > 166.1 inches Level - Low (d) (d) SR 3.3.5.1 LI 3
(Confirmatory) 2 3 SR 3.3.5.1.r1 i 3
SR 3. .5.1.j
d. Core Spray Pump , H SR 3.3.5.1.2 >_114.2 psig Discharge (d) (d) SR 3.3.5.1.1 3 and Pressure- High 2(, 3 SR 3.3.5.1.,14 _S177.0 psig
e. Low Pressure Coolant 1, 4 H SR 3.3.5.1. 21 > 103.8 psig Injection Pump 2 (d) 3 (d) SR 3.3.5.1. .3 and Discharge Pressure - SR 3.3.5.1. .4 < 147.0 psig High [*J (continued)
(c) With reactor steam dome pressure > 150 psig.
(d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 100 psig.
TSCRj120 . 2 DAEC 3.3-44 ,^mcndm^nt ,,,. 245
The revisions on this page are being ECCS Instrumentation withdrawn from this application. 3.3.5.1 Table 3.3.5.1-1 (page 5 of 5)
Emergency Core Cooling System Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~5. ADS Trip Logic B~~
a. Reactor Vessel Water 1, 2 G SR 3.3.5.1.1 2 > 38.3 inches Level - Low Low Low 2 (d) 3 (d) SR 3.3.5.1 3I SR 3.3.5.1 SR 3.3.5.1. ,1 1,
b. Automatic SR 3.3.5.1 .a4 < 125 seconds Depressurization 2 (d) 3 (d) SR 3.3.5.1 System Timer SR 3.3.5.1.1
~~c. Reactor Vessel Water 1, SR 3.3.5.1.1 2 > 166.1 inches 2 (d, 3 (d)~~
Level - Low SR SR 3.3.5.1.-
3.3.5.1. i (Confirmatory) SR 3.3.5.1. 31.
SR 3.3.5.1 &
1,
~~d. Core Spray Pump HSR 3.3.5.1.**3 > 114.2 psig 2 (d) 3 (d)~~
Discharge SR 3.3.5.1 and Pressure - High < 177.0 psig SR 3.3.5.1.1-
~~e. Low Pressure Coolant 1, 4 SR 3.3.5.1 . > 103.8 psig Injection Pump 2 (d), 3 (d)~~
SR 3.3.5. 1 3 and Discharge SR3... :< 147.0 psig 4
Pressure - High (d) With reactor steam dome pressure > 100 psig.
DAEC 3.3-45 AA3,,-endme-nt ,, 245
RCIC System Instrumentation 3.3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

~~NOTES----------------------~~

~~1. Refer to Table 3.3.5.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each RCIC Function.~~
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 2 and 3; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Function 1 provided the associated Function maintains RCIC initiation capability.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.2.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. hours-SR 3.3.5.2.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. days-SR 3.3.5.2.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 2-e- <--INSERT1 SR 3.3.5.2.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. ]24 Fenths SR 3.3.5.2.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL .241-m 10,,tS TEST.
ITSCR-1 20 DAEC 3.3-48 Amendment 2,i"^23
The revisions on this page are being RCIC System Instrumentation withdrawn from this application. 3.3.5.2 Table 3.3.5.2-1 (page 1 of 1)
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Instrumentation CONDITIONS REQUIRED REFERENCED CHANNELS FROM REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION PER FUNCTION ACTION A.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
1. Reactor Vessel Water 4 B SR 3.3.5.2.1 >112.65 inches Level - Low Low SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR SR 3.3.5.2.3
~~3. 3.5. 2 .tE[~~
2. ReactorVessel Water 2 C SR 3.3.5.2.1 < 214.8 inches Level - High SR 3.3.5.2.2 SR 3.3.5.2.3 SR 3.3.5.2.*"
3. Condensate Storage Tank 2 D SR 3.3.5.2.2 Ž 11.6 inches Level - Low SR 3.3.5.2.._413 SR 3.3.5.2. 4 ITCR120O DAEC 3.3-49 Amendmen~t 223
~~Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS~~

~~----------------- NOTES------------------------~~

~~1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Primary Containment Isolation Function.~~
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Function 5.a; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions other than 5.a provided the associated Function maintains isolation capability.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. ---- heufs-SR 3.3.6.1.2 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. heu-s-SR 3.3.6.1.3 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 31-days SR 3.3.6.1.4 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 92-days SR 3.3.6.1.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 92-days-SR 3.3.6.1.6 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. +84-days-SR 3.3.6.1.7 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 12-months (continued)
ITSCR-120O DAEC 3.3-55 Amendment N.231
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY i
SR 3.3.6.1.8 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. -24months INSERT 1 SR 3.3.6.1.9 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL -24.meoth-s TEST.
AeSCR-120 J DAEC 3.3-56 A--me1IImIIIII INI. 231,*
The revisions on this page are being Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 withdrawn from this application.
Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 1 of 5)
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~1. Main Steam Line Isolation~~
a. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.1 ' > 38.3 inches Level - Low Low Low SR 3.3.6.1.II SR 3.3.6.1 -93 SR 3.3.6.1 4]
b. Main Steam Line 1 2 E SR 3 . 3 . 6 .1.4T1 a821 psig Pressure - Low SR 3.3.6.1.53 SR 3.3.6.1.
c. Main Steam Line 1,2,32 per D SR 3.3.6.1.1 <138% rated Flow - High MSL SR 3.3.6.1. steam flow SR 3.3.6.1.1 3 SR 3.3.6.1.9"4
d. Condenser 1,2(a), 2 D SR 3.3.6.1.4-I'] >7.2 inches Backpressure - High (a) SR 3.3.6.1.83 Hg vacuum 3 6 SR 3. . .1.9 C
e. Main Steam Line Tunnel 1,2,3 4 D SR 3.3.6.1.2-T <205.1*F Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.
SR 3.3.6.1.*j 2 SR 3.3.6.1. 3 f.. Turbine Building 1,2,3 4 D SR 3.3.6.1.1t 1 4
<205.1OF x
Temperature- High SR 3.3.6.1.4 2 SR 3.3.6.1.
SR 3.3.6.1. 3 4 (continued)
(a) When any turbine stop valve is greater than 90% open or when the key-locked bypass switch is in the NORM Position.
DAEC 3.3-57 Amnerdmient No. 2G1-
The revisions on this page are being Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation t3.3.6.1 withdrawn from this application.
Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 2 of 5)
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~2. Primary Containment Isolation~~
a. ReactorVessel Water 1.2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.1 J- > 165.6 inches Level- Low SR 3.3.6.1 -
~~SR 3.3.6.1.8" SR 3.3.6.1.8 4~~
~~b. Drywell Pressure - High 1,2,3 2 H SR 3.3.6.1.4 2' < 2.2 psig SR 3.3.6.1.8-13 SR 3.3.6.1~~
~~c. Offgas Vent Stack - 1 (c), 2 (c), 1 L SR 3.3.6.1. 1 (b)~~
~~High Radiation 3(c) SR 3.3.6.1. 2 SR 3361 SR 3.3.6.1. 3 4~~
d. Reactor Building 1,2,3 1 H SR 3.3.6. 1. 12.8 mR/hr Exhaust Shaft - SR 3.3.6.1.- <
~~High Radiation SR 3.3.6.1 .,2I SR 3.3.6. !S<3~~
~~e. Refueling Floor 1,2,3 1 H SR 3.3.6.1.~~
14
" <10.6 mR/hr Exhaust Duct- SR 3.3.6.1.I 2 High Radiation SR 3.3.6.1' J 3
SR 3.3.6.1.
~~3. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System Isolation~~
a. HPCI Steam Line Flow- 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1. 4-f <409 inches High SR 3.3.6.1.8-13l (inboard)
SR 3.3.6.1.'4 _<110 inches (outboard)
(continued)
(b) Allowable value is determined in accordance with the ODAM.
(c) During venting or purging of primary containment.
AA n120 I DAEC 3.3-58 Amendment 223*'
The revisions on this page are being Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 withdrawn from this application.
Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 3 of 5)
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~3. HPCI System Isolation (continued)~~
b. HPCI Steam Supply Line 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1 >50 psig and Pressure - Low SR 3.3.6.1. I <147.1 psig SR 3.3.6.1.C
~~c. HPCI Turbine 1,2,3 2 F SR 3.3.6.1.4-- >_2.5 psig Exhaust Diaphragm SR 3.3.6.1.'--~~
~~Pressure - High SR 3.3.6. 1.-..~~
d. DrywelU Pressure - 1.2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1 :S2.2 psig High SR 3.3.6.1 SR 3.3.6.1.
e. Suppression Pool 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.- < 153.31F Area Ambient SR 3.3.6.1.'4 Temperature - High SR 3.3.6. --1.. _
SR 3.3.6.1.'1-...*
f. HPCI Leak Detection 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1 -] N/A Time Delay S R 3.3.6. 1.-1 SR 3.3.6.1.f..]
~~SR 3361=--~~
g. Suppression Pool 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.2 - < 51.51F Area Ventilation SR 3.3.6.1.-."*
Differential SR 3.3.6.
Temperature - High
h. HPCI Equipment Room 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1.Z < 178.3OF Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1-12 SR 3.3.6.1'3 SR 3.3.6.1.
0
i. HPCI Room Ventilation 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1 lr- < 51.5 F Differential SR 3.3.6.1.',, 2 I Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.M SR 3.3.6.1'9 1:
(continued) f DAEC 3.3-59 Amenid 111 i11 t No.-231t
The revisions on this page are being Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 withdrawn from this application.
Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 4 of 5)
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION C.1 REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~4. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Isolation~~
a. RCIC Steam Line 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1. < 164 inches Flow- High SR 3.3.6.1.8 3 (inboard)
~~SR 3.3.6.1. 4 < 159 inches (outboard)~~
b. RCIC Steam Supply 1,2,3 2 SR 3.3.6.1 3 > 50.3 psig Line Pressure - Low SR 3.3.6.1, SR 3.3.6.1 4
c. RCIC Turbine 1,2,3 2 SR 3.3.6.1A' > 3.3 psig Exhaust Diaphragm SR 3.3.6.1 Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.1.4431
d. Drywell Pressure - 1.2,3 F SR 3.3:6.1 < 2.2 psig High SR 3.3 3 SR 3.3.6.1.'J4
e. RCIC Suppression 1,2,3 1 F SR 3.3.6.1.9-ý < 153.3°F Pool Area Ambient SR 3.3.6 1.#-ý Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1 SR 3.3.6.1. ',4,,.1
~~f. RCIC Leak Detection 1,2,3 N/A Time Delay SR336..~~
~~g. RCIC Suppression 1,2,3 SR 3.3.6.1:4" 2 < 51.5°F Pool Area Ventilation Differential Temperature - High~~
h. RCIC Equipment Room 1,2,3 SR 3361' 3 < 178.31F Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1.4 SR 3.3.6.1 -'I~~
~~SR 3.3.6.1.2~~
~~i. RCIC Room 1,2,31 F < o51.51F Ventilation SR 3.3.6.1.~~
Differential SR 3.3.6.131 Temperature - High (continued)
TSCR-n120 N DAEC 3.3-60 Amcndr{nent Nol^ 231,
The revisions on this page are being' Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 withdrawn from this appli ti" n ,
Table 3.3.6.1-1 (page 5 of 5)
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE CONDITIONS MODES OR REQUIRED REFERENCED OTHER CHANNELS FROM SPECIFIED PER TRIP REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS SYSTEM ACTION CA REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~5. Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation~~
a. Differential Flow- 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1 :S59 gpm High SR 3 .3.6
~~.1 2 SR 3.3.6.1 - 3 SR 3.3.6.1. 4I~~
~~b. Area Temperature - High 1,2,3 1(d) F SR 3.33.6.1 <133.31F 3.3.6.1 .,S.~~
~~SR 3361 SR 3.3.6.1.* 3 q4~~
~~c. Area Ventilation 1,2,3 (d) FSIR 3.3.6. 1.,2-=-.-~~
1 Differential SR 3.3.6.1.*-,, "_22.51F Temperature - High SR 3.3.6.1 SR 3.3.6.
RWCU Pump Room RWCU Pump A Room " 23.51F RWCU Pump B Room _<34.5-F RWCU Heat Exch. Room < 51.51F I SR 3361*
~~d. SLC System Initiation 1,2 NA F SR 3.3.6.1.19E~~
e. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3 2 >112.65 Level - Low Low SR3.3.6.1.4 SR 3361 3 inches SIR 3ý361 SIR 3.3.6.1 .'* 4
f. Area Near TIP Room 1,2,3 F SR 3.3.6.1 1 < 115.7°F Ambient Temperature - SR 3.3.6.1 2 High SR 3.3.6.1 .
~~SR 3361.1~~
~~6. Shutdown Cooling System Isolation~~
~~a. Reactor Steam Dome F SR 3361.f1l Pressure - High 1,2,3 SIR 3.3.6.1.-1* I4 < 152.7 psig SR 3.3.6.179U4I SR 3.3,6.11,~~
b. Reactor Vessel Water 3,4,5 J SR 3.3.6.1.,117 > 165.6 inches Level - Low SR 3.3.6.1. I8 S R 3.3.6.1.,J1*_
~~FS R 3.3.6.1.4~~
~~c. Drywell Pressure - 1,2,3 2 SR 3.3.6.1 . < 2.2 psig High~~
~~7. Containment Cooling System SR S 3.3.6.1 .~~
~~Isolation~~
a. Containment Pressure - 1,2,3 4 SR 3361 > 1.25 psig High SR 3.3.6.1 S R 3.3.6.1.
(d) Each Trip System must have either an OPERABLE Function 5.b or an OPERABLE Function 5.c channel in both the RWCU pump area and in the RWCU heat exchanger area.
(e) SLC System Initiation only inputs into one of the two trip systems.
(f) Only one trip system required in MODES 4 and 5 when RHR Shutdown Cooling System integrity maintained.
ý-12O~
DAEC 3.3-61 Amen 4menit 223
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

~~NOTES --------------- - --------~~

~~1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.2-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Secondary Containment Isolation Function.~~
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains secondary containment isolation capability.
TSR120 DAEC 3.3-64
The revisions on this page are Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation being withdrawn from this 3.3.6.2 application. Table 3.3.6.2-1 (page 1 of 1)
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR REQUIRED OTHER CHANNELS SPECIFIED PER SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS TRIP SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~1. Reactor Vessel Water 1,2,3, SR 3.ý > 165.6 inches Level- Low (a) SR 3.:~~
SR 3.
SR 3.ý
~~2. Drywell Pressure- High 1,2,3 SR 3.ý < 2.2 psig SR 3.~~
~~SR 3.1~~
~~3. Reactor Building Exhaust 1.2,3, SR < 12.8 mR/hr Shaft - High Radiation (a) SR SR SR~~
4. Refueling Floor Exhaust 1,2,3, SR < 10.6 mR/hr Duct- High Radiation (a) SR SR SR (a) During operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel.
DAEC 3.3-65 An iei idi iie, it 237
LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 ACTIONS (continued)
CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1 Declare the Immediately associated Completion associated LLS Time of Condition A, B, valve(s) inoperable.
or C not met.
OR Both LLS valves inoperable due to inoperable channels.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

~~NOTES -----------------------------~~

~~1. Refer to Table 3.3.6.3-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Function.~~
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains LLS initiation capability.
~~SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY~~
~~1-SR 3.3.6.3.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST for portion of the channel outside primary containment.~~
SR 3.3.6.3.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST.
SR 3.3.6.3.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
(continued)
TSCR-120 2 DAEC 3.3-67
~~mcndmz.1 ntL223.r~~
.L-
LLS Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.3.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 1-84 days -
SR 3.3.6.3.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 24. memtths. INSERT 1 w
SR 3.3.6.3.6 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL 24-menth,-
TEST.
DAEC 3.3-68 1 I L40
The revisions on this page are being LLS Instrumentation withdrawn fromthis application. 3.3.6.3 Table 3.3.6.3-1 (page 1 of 1)
Low-Low Set Instrumentation REQUIRED CHANNELS PER SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~1. ReactorVessel Steam Dome 1 per LLS valve SR 3.3.6.3.2 < 1069.21 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.6.3.3J4]~~
~~SR 3.3.6.3.A~~
~~2. Low-Low Set Pressure Setpoints 2 per LLS valve SR 3.3.6.3.2 Low:~~
SR 3.3.6.3.4-] Open > 1014 psig SIR 3.3.6.3. 1 and < 1045 psig Close > 893.4 psig and _<925 psig High:
Open > 1019 psig and < 1050 psig Close > 893.4 psig and < 930 psig
3. Tailpipe High Pressure 3 per SRV SR 3.3.6.3.1 < 99 psig SR 3.3.6.3.1 SR 3.3.6.3,4j ITC-20 DAEC 3.3-69 Ai i i idi ,ietIit 223
~~LOP Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS~~

~~NOTES ------------------------------~~

~~1. Refer to Table 3.3.8.1-1 to determine which SRs apply for each LOP Function.~~
2. When a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided the associated Function maintains DG initiation capability.
SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1.1 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 1-y SR 3.3.8.1.2 Perform CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. 12 nents P
SS.81INSERT SR 3.3.8.1.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 42--xw~i --
SR 3.3.8.1.4 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION.24mnh SR 3.3.8.1.5 Perform LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST.
AmnCR-120 2 DAEC 3.3-74 AmcI I1mIcnt 223*1II
l*
The revisions on this page are being LOP Instrumentation withdrawn from this application. 3.3.8.1 Table 3.3.8.1-1 (page 1 of 1)
Loss of Power Instrumentation REQUIRED CHANNELS SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION PER BUS REQUIREMENTS VALUE
~~1. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Loss of Voltage)~~
~~a. Bus Undervoltage 1 SR 3.3.8.1.] >595 V and SR 3.3.8.1.412 < 2275 V SR 3.3.8.1.Sjj~~
~~2. 4.16 kV Emergency Bus Undervoltage (Degraded Voltage)~~
~~a. Bus Undervoltage 4 SR 3.3.8.1.1 > 3780 V and SR 3.3.8.1.*Z1 <3822 V SR 3.3.8.1.-j3J~~
~~b. Time Delay 4 SR 3.3.8.1.1 2 >7.92 seconds and SR 3.3.8.1.1I <8.5 seconds SR 3.3.8.1 31*J~~
3. 4.16 kV Emergency Transformer 2 SR 3 . 3 .8 .1.21 >2450 V Supply Undervoltage SR 3.3.8.1.121 SR 3.3.8.1.5 TSCR-1 20 DAEC 3.3-75 -Am........I 1 ,, 273
Attachment 3 To NG-11-0299 UPDATED PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGES (MARK-UPS - FOR INFORMATION ONLY) 30 Pages to Follow
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RPS REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.1.1-1.
The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , provided the associated Function maintains RPS trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.
This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 9) assumption of the average time required to perform channel Surveillance.
That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RPS will trip when necessary.
SR 3.3.1.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ence every 12 h.ur.
ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.
A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it The Surveillance Frequency is lmay be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its controlled under the limit.
Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels (continued)
DAEC B 3.3-26 A ITSCB-1203 - 20P
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.1.1.2 To ensure that the APRMs are accurately indicating the true core average power, the APRMs are calibrated to the reactor power calculated from a heat balance. LCO 3.4.1, "Recirculation Loops Operating," allows the APRMs to be reading greater than actual THERMAL POWER to effectively lower the APRM Flow Biased High setpoints by 6.3% for single recirculation loop operation.
When this adjustment is made, the requirement for the APRMs to indicate within 2% RTP of calculated power is modified to require The Surveillance Frequency is the APRMs to indicate within 2% RTP of calculated power plus controlled under the 6.3%.&The Frequency of once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is based on minor Surveillance Frequency changes in LPRM sensitivity, which could affect the APRM Control Program. reading between performances of SR 3.3.1.1.8.
A restriction to satisfying this SR when < 21.7% RTP is provided that requires the SR to be met only at _>21.7% RTP because it is difficult to accurately maintain APRM indication of core THERMA POWER consistent with a heat balance when < 21.7% RTP. At low power levels, a high degree of accuracy is unnecessary because of the large, inherent margin to thermal limits (MCP and APLHGR). At _>21.7% RTP, the Surveillance is required t ave been satisfactorily performed within the previous 2 ,in accordance with SR 3.0.2. A Note is provided which allows an increase in THERMAL POWER above 21.7% if the 24-hour-Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after reaching or exceeding 21.7%
RTP. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete the SR.
SR 3.3.1.1.3 The surveillance frequency extensions for various RPS functions are permitted by Reference 9, provided the automatic scram contactors are functionally tested weekly. There are four pairs of RPS automatic scram contactors (i.e., K14 relay contacts) with each pair associated with an automatic scram logic (Al, A2, 81, and 82). The automatic scram contactors can be functionally tested without the necessity of using an automatic scram (continued)
DAEC B 3.3-27 TSC R-044A-EII
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.3 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS function trip. This functional test can be accomplished by placing the associated RPS Test Switch in the trip position, which will deenergize a pair of the automatic scram contactors and in turn, trip the associated RPS logic. The RPS Test Switches were not specifically credited in the accident analysis and thus, do not have any OPERABILITY requirements of their own. However, because the Manual Scram pushbuttons at the DAEC are not configured the same as the generic model used in Reference 9, (i.e., they are in a separate RPS logic - A3 and 83), the RPS Test Switches have been found to be functionally equivalent to the Manual Scram pushbuttons in the generic model for performing the weekly functional test of the automatic scram contactors required by Reference 9. If an RPS Test Switch(es) is (are) not available for performing this test, it is permissible to take credit for a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of an automatic RPS trip function The Surveillance Frequency is (i.e., SR 3.3.1.1.9), if performed within the required Frequency for controlled under the this Surveillance, as it will also test the K14 relay contacts.
Surveillance Frequency Control Program. The Frequency ef dy is based upon the reliability analysis in Reference 9.
SR 3.3.1.1.4 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is \ /
acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay /
are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.4 is not required to be performed when entering MODE 2 from MODE 1, since testing of the MODE 2 required IRM and APRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links.
(continued)
DAEC B 3.3-28 TSCR-026AJI]
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.4 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS This allows entry into MODE 2 if the 7-day Frequency is not met per SR 3.0.2. In this event, the SR must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Twelve hours is The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience and in consideration of providing a controlled under the reasonable time in which to complete the SR./ Frequency-ef--
Surveillance Frequency :7 days provides an acceptable level of system average Control Program. The unavailability over the Frequency interval and is based on reliability analysis (Ref. 9).
SR 3.3.1.1.5 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is \
acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical The Surveillance Frequency is Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with controlled under the applicable extensions.&'A Frequency .ef 7 -days provides an Surveillance Frequency acceptable level of system average availability over the
,Control Program. The Frequency and is based on the reliability analysis using the concepts developed in Reference 10.
SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 These Surveillances are established to ensure that no gaps in neutron flux indication exist from subcritical to power operation for monitoring core reactivity status.
The overlap between SRMs and IRMs is required to be demonstrated to ensure that reactor power will not be increased into a neutron flux region without adequate indication. This is required prior to withdrawing SRMs from the fully inserted position since indication is being transitioned from the SRMs to the IRMs.
The overlap between IRMs and APRMs is of concern when reducing power into the IRM range. On power increases, the system design will prevent further increases (by initiating a rod block) if adequate overlap is not maintained.
(continued)
DAEC B 3.3-29 TSCR-026A-E
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE £ SR 3.3.1.1.6 and SR 3.3.1.1.7 (continued)
REQUIREMENT Overlap between IRMs and APRMs exists when sufficient IRMs and APRMs concurrently have onscale readings such that the transition between MODE 1 and MODE 2 can be made without either APRM downscale rod block, or IRM upscale rod block (i.e.,
approximately one-half decade of range). Overlap between SRMs and IRMs similarly exists when, prior to withdrawing the SRMs from the fully inserted position, IRMs are indicating at least 5/40 on range 1 before SRMs have reached 106 counts per second.
As noted, SR 3.3.1.1.7 is only required to be met during entry into MODE 2 from MODE 1. That is, after the overlap requirement has been met and indication has transitioned to the IRMs, maintaining overlap is not required (APRMs may be reading downscale once in MODE 2).
The Surveillance.. If overlap for a group of channels is not demonstrated (e.g.,
Frequency is controlled IRM/APRM overlap), the reason for the failure of the Surveillance under the Surveillance should be determined and the appropriate channel(s) declared inoperable. Only those appropriate channels that are required in Frequency Control the current MODE or condition should be declared inoperable.
Pr66oram. The
,KFrequency of-days is reasomable based on engineering judgment and the reliability of the IRMs and APRMs.
SR 3.3.1.1.8 TheSuryeillance'... LPRM gain settings are determined using analytical methods with Frequency is controlled input from the axial flux profiles measured by the Traversing under the Surveillance Incore Probe (TIP) System. This establishes the relative local flux Frequency Control profile for appropriate representative input to the APRM System.
Program., The 1000 MWDT Frequency is based on operating experience with LPRM sensitivity changes.
SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.13 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verificiation of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay (continued)
DAEC B 3.3-30 TSCR-O26A"aJ
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.9 and SR 3.3.1.1.13 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Frequency is controlled Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with under the Surveillance applicable extensions.AThe-92 day Frequency of SR 3.3.1.1.9 is Frequency Control based on the reliability analysisy~i of Reference 9. lof SR 3.3.1.1.13 Program.
The 24-menth Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the-24-metit Frequency.
SR 3.3.1.1.10 Calibration of trip units provides a check of the actual trip setpoints. The channel must be declared inoperable if the trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than the Allowable Value specified in Table 3.3.1.1-1. Ifthe trip setting is discovered to be less conservative than accounted for in the appropriate setpoint methodology, but is not beyond the Allowable Value, the channel performance is still within the requirements of the plant The Surveillance safety analysis. Under these conditions, the setpoint must be Frequency is readjusted to be equal to or more conservative than accounted for controlled under in the appropriate setpoint methodoloqy./)The Frequency of-the Surveillance days is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 9.
Frequency Contro Program. SR 3.3.1.1.11. SR 3.3.1.1.12 and SR 3.3.1.1.14 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies that the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology. The CHANNEL CALIBRATION for Functions 5 and 8 shall consist of the physical inspection and actuation of these position switches.
(continued)
DAEC B 3.3-31 TSCR-,026-A
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.11, SR 3.3.1.1.12 and SR 3.3.1.1.14 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS Note 1 states that neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they are passive devices, with minimal drift, and because of the difficulty of simulating a meaningful signal. Changes in neutron detector sensitivity are compensated for by performing the calorimetric calibration (SR 3.3.1.1.2) evefy-hotrn-and the 1000 MVWD/T LPRM calibration against the TIPs (SR 3.3.1.1.8). A second Note is provided that requires the APRM and IRM SRs to be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 from MODE 1. Testing of the MODE 2 APRM and IRM Functions cannot be performed in MODE 1 without utilizing jumpers, lifted leads, or movable links. This Note allows entry into The Surveillance MODE 2 from MODE 1 if the associated Frequency is not met per Frequency is contirolled SR 3.0.2. Twelve hours is based on operating experience and in under the Surveill ance consideration of providing a reasonable time in which to complete Frequency Contro --- k the SR.
Program.
____H sof The Frequency of.SR 3.3.11 is based upon the assumption of a 92--ýalibration interval in the determination of the magnitude equipment drift in the setpoint analysis. The Frequency Gf ealobratien interval inthe determination ef the magnitude ef equipment drift in the etpaintl analysis. The Fi'-ueciy of SR 3.3.1.1.14 is based upon the assumpticn of a 24 month calibiation inter-vadl in t e dete--i ,-atio of th e ,dyliiude i ti of
. .u. lent drift in the setpeint analysis.
SR 3.3.1.1.15 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the The Surveillance OPERABILITY of the required trip logic for a specific channel.
Frequency is controlled The functional testing of control rods (LCO 3.1.3), and SDV vent under the Surveillance Frequency Control 7', and drain valves (LCO 3.1.8), overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.
Program. The 24-mon'th Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at4 01ency.
(continued)
B 3.3-32 ITSCR-120 I DAEC DAEC B 3.3-32 A 1U111C11t 4223
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.16 REQUIREMENTS (continued) This SR ensures that scrams initiated from the Turbine Stop Valve
- Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure - Low Functions will not be inadvertently bypassed when THERMAL POWER is > 26% RTP. This involves calibration of the bypass channels. Adequate margins for the instrument setpoint methodologies are incorporated into the actual setpoint.
Because main turbine bypass flow, as well as other turbine steam loads, can affect this setpoint nonconservatively (THERMAL POWER is derived from turbine first stage pressure), the main turbine bypass valves must remain closed at THERMAL POWER
> 26% RTP to ensure that the calibration remains valid. If any bypass channel's setpoint is nonconservative (i.e., the Functions are bypassed at _>26% RTP, either due to open main turbine bypass valve(s) (e.g., required testing or upon actual demand) or other reasons, such as changes in turbine steamload to the Main Steam Reheaters), then the affected Turbine Stop Valve -
Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure, Trip Oil Pressure
- Low Functions are considered inoperable. Alternatively, the The Surveillance bypass channel can be placed in the conservative condition Frequency is controlled (nonbypass). If placed in the nonbypass condition, this SR is met under the Surveillance and the channel is considered OPERABLE.
Frequency Control \The Frequency e 24 menth& is based on engineering judgment Program.
and reliability of the components.
SR 3.3.1.1.17 The Average Power Range Monitor Flow Biased - High Function uses the recirculation loop drive flows to vary the trip setpoint.
This SR ensures that the total loop drive flow signals from the flow units used to vary the setpoint is appropriately compared to a calibrated flow signal and, therefore, the APRM Function accurately reflects the required setpoint as a function of flow.
Each flow signal from the respective flow unit must be < 110% of the calibrated flow signal. If the flow unit signal is not within the limit, that flow unit may be bypassed, and its output to the low auction circuit will be maximum, making the low auction circuit select the input from the operating flow unit.
(continued)
DAEC B 3.3-33 TSC R,2-3"
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.17 (continued)
REQUIREMENT, S The Frequency of 24 months is based on engineering judgment, The Surveillance operating experience, the reliability of this instrumentation, the Frequency is controlled other surveillances performed on the components of the flow under the Surveillance biasing network, and the fact that a half scram will be present for Frequency Control an extended period of time during the performance of this Program. surveillance.
SR 3.3.1.1.18 This SR ensures that the individual channel response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analysis. The RPS Response Time test only applies to the Functions of Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low and Reactor Vessel Steam Dome Pressure - High. These RPS Functions are the only ones that were identified, in a program conducted prior to The Surveillance the first refueling outage, that require sensor response time Frequency is testing. This test may be performed in one measurement or in overlapping segments, with verification that all components are controlled under tested. The m
-*included RPS RESPONSE in Reference 13. TIME acceptance criteria are the Surveillance Frequency Control Pro.gra m.
N, I'*1" rI' or-Ol-'UIl.,o' I IIVIE Lt:S:LS dI::l U.UIIUUILLeU UII ,,
'~ A~.. -
£_'-I. IIIUIILII STAGGE,.. T,[-ST BASIS. This Frequency is based on the logic interrelationships of the various channels required to produce an RPS scram signal. The 24-mefthr Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
SR 3.3.1.1.19 This SR ensures that the RPS logic system response times are less than or equal to the maximum value assumed in the accident analysis. The RPS logic system response time test is measured from the opening of the sensor contact up to and including the opening of the trip actuator contacts. As such, this test does not include the sensor response time. All RPS Functions except the RPS Manual Scram and Reactor Mode Switch - Shutdown Position are included in this test.
(continued)
FTsC-R--l 2-0----l DAEC B 3.3-34 A Afflen%31 1 1,51 1 440
RPS Instrumentation B 3.3.1.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.1.19 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance These two RPS Functions are excluded since they directly trip their scram solenoid relays without any intervening devices, thus Frequency is there is nothing to response time test. This test may be controlled under performed in one measurement or in overlapping segments, with the Surveillance verification that all components are tested. The RPS logic system Frequency Control 1response
\*,
timet, acceptance
~~sy , es-o is .~~
criteria time.... LA are.......
tests a included f
in Reference 13.
te e*,*1*
n a 2)4 Program.
m.nth STA-GEREr* TEST BASIS. This Frequency is based on the logic interrelationships of the various channels required to produce an RPS scram signal. The 24 month Frequency is consistent with the typical industry refueling cycle and is based upon plant operating experience, which shows that random failures of instrumentation components causing serious response time degradation, but not channel failure, are infrequent occurrences.
REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Figure 7.2-2.
~~2. UFSAR, Section 15.1.4.2.~~
~~3. NEDO-23842, "Continuous Control Rod Withdrawal in the Startup Range," April 18, 1978.~~
~~4. UFSAR, Section 5.2.2 and Appendix 5B.~~
~~5. UFSAR, Section 15.2.4. //~~
~~6. UFSAR, Section 15.2.1. /~~
~~7. UFSAR, Chapter 15.1.~~
~~8. P. Check (NRC) letter to G. Lainas (NRC), "BWR Scram Discharge System Safety Evaluation," December 1, 1980.~~
~~9. NEDO-30851-P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for BWR Reactor Protection System,"~~
~~March 1988.~~
~~10. Reliability of Engineered Safety Features as a Function of Testing Frequency, Volume 9, No. 4, July-August 1968.~~
(continued)
F12-0 1 DAEC B 3.3-35 TSCR-044A"
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.1 and SR 3.3.1.2.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on another channel. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a The Surveillance combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including Frequency is con trolled indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it m~qx hp nn inrfinftinn fhntf thim incfr,,manf hn:z rlrifforl nltf-irhm it--
under the Survei llnnra Frequency Contr Program. rol[ limit.
The Frequency of anc, vr;', 12 heurs f.. SR 3.3.1.2.1 is based on operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare.
While in MODES 3 and 4, reactivity changes are not expected; frOm MD therefore, the +2-hour Frequency is relaxed to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for nd MODE3S i.2.3. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.1.2.2 To provide adequate coverage of potential reactivity changes in the core when the fueled region encompasses more than one SRM, one SRM is required to be OPERABLE in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIONS are being performed, and the other OPERABLE SRM must be in an adjacent quadrant containing fuel. Note 1 states that the SR is required to be met only during CORE ALTERATIONS. It is not required to be met at other times in MODE 5 since core reactivity changes are not occurring. This Surveillance consists of a review of plant logs to ensure that SRMs required to be OPERABLE for given CORE ALTERATIONS are, in fact, OPERABLE. In the event that only one SRM is required to be OPERABLE, per Table 3.3.1.2-1, footnote (b),
(continued)
B 3.3-42 ITSCR-120 DAEC B 3.3-42 %illullulliclit
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.2 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS The Surveillance only the a. portion of this SR is required. Note 2 clarifies that Frequency is controlled more than one of the three requirements can be met by the same under the Surveillance OPERABLE SRM. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is based upon operating experience and supplements operational controls over Frequency Control refueling activities that include steps to ensure that the SRMs Program. required by the LCO are in the proper quadrant.
SR 3.3.1.2.4 This Surveillance consists of a verification of the SRM instrument readout to ensure that the SRM reading is greater than a specified minimum count rate with the detector fully inserted into the core.
The requirement of at least 3 cps assures that any transient, should it occur, begins at or above the initial value of 10-8 of RTP which is used in the analysis of transients in cold conditions. With few fuel assemblies loaded, the SRMs may not have a high enough count rate to satisfy the SR. Therefore, allowances are made for loading sufficient "source" material, in the form of irradiated fuel assemblies, to establish the minimum count rate.
To accomplish this, the SR is modified by a Note that states that the count rate is not required to be met on an SRM that has less The Surveillance than or equal to four fuel assemblies adjacent to the SRM and no Frequency is controlled other fuel assemblies are in the associated core quadrant. With
" nfiar tha q1 niaillnnra four or less fuel assemblies loaded around each SRM and no other fuel assemblies in the associated core quadrant, even with a Frequenc y Control control rod withdrawn, the configuration will not be critical.
Program.
The Frequency is based upon channel redundancy and other information available in the control room, and ensures that the required channels are frequently monitored while corn .*a*tivity Ichianges ari- ou,,y. When no reactivity changes are in during CORE progress, the Frequency is relaxed fro,,12 hourS t 24 h.urs.
ALTERATIONS that during CORE ALTERATIONS (continued)
ITSCR-120 DAEC B 3.3-43 Amendment 223
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLAIN(CE SR 3.3.1.2.5 and SR 3.3.1.2.6 REQUIREME qITS (continuedJ) Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the associated channel will function properly. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL //
FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at The Surveillancie least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
Frequency is SR 3.3.1.2.5 is required in MODE 5, and the 7-4ay Frequency ensures that the channels are OPERABLE while core reactivity controlled undEer changes could be in progress.- Frequency is rasenable, the SurveillancE based on operating experience and on other Surveillances (such Frequency as a CHANNEL CHECK), that ensure proper functioning between Control Prograr CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS.
The SR 3.3.1.2.6 is required in MODE 2 with IRMs on Range 2 or The Surveillance below, and in MODES 3 and 4. Since core reactivity changes do not normally take place in MODES 3 and 4 and core reactivity hat in Frequency is changes are due solely to control rod movement in MODE 2, the MOtE controlled under Frequency has been extended fror , dy t. Ahe the Surveillance -31 -Frequency is based on operating experience and on other Fre'quency Surveillances (such as CHANNEL CHECK) that ensure proper Control Program. functioning between CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TESTS.
The Note to the Surveillance allows the Surveillance to be delayed until entry into the specified condition of the Applicability (THERMAL POWER decreased to IRM Range 2 or below). The SR must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months after IRMs are on Range 2 uaor below. The allowance to enter the Applicability with the e---day-
'E "Frequency not met is reasonable, based on the limited time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed after entering the Applicability and the inability to perform the Surveillance while at higher power levels. Although the Surveillance could be performed while on IRM Range 3, the plant would not be expected to maintain steady state operation at this power level. In this event, the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is reasonable, based on the SRMs being otherwise verified to be OPERABLE (i.e., satisfactorily performing the CHANNEL CHECK) and the time required to perform the Surveillances.
(continued)
ITSCR-120 I DAEC B 3.3-44
SRM Instrumentation B 3.3.1.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.1.2.7 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION at a F..qucn.y of The Surveillance Frequency 24 menths verifies the performance of the SRM detectors and is controlled under the associated circuitry. The Frequency considers the plant Surveillance Frequency coundiLiuons quiied lb perform the test, the ease of performing the Control Program. test, and the likelihood of a change in the system or component status. Note 1 to the Surveillance allows the neutron detectors to be excluded from the CHANNEL CALIBRATION because they cannot readily be adjusted. The detectors are fission chambers that are designed to have a relatively constant sensitivity over the range and with an accuracy specified for a fixed useful life.
Note 2 to the Surveillance allows the Surveillance to be delayed until entry into the specified condition of the Applicability. The SR must be performed in MODE 2 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months of entering MODE 2 with IRMs on Range 2 or below. The allowance to enter the Applicability with th month-Frequency not met is reasonable, based on the limited lime of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months allowed after entering the Applicability and the inability to perform the Surveillance while at higher power levels. Although the Surveillance could be performed while on IRM Range 3, the plant would not be expected to maintain steady state operation at this power level. In this event, the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Frequency is reasonable, based on the SRMs being otherwise verified to be OPERABLE (i.e., satisfactorily performing the CHANNEL CHECK) and the time required to perform the Surveillances.
REFERENCES None.
ATSCR-1 20 DAEC B 3.3-45 .... en, I 1I, Il t 223
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE Because the Ref. 5 analysis made no assumptions regarding the REQUIREMENTS elapsed time between testing of consecutive channels in the same (continued) logic, it is not necessary to remove jumpers/relays blocks or reconnect lifted leads used to prevent actuation of the trip logic during testing of logic channels with instruments in series solely for the purpose of administering the AOT clocks, provided that the AOT allowance is not exceeded on a per instrument channel basis.
SR 3.3.5.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.
A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected outright channel failure is limited thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff, based on a The Surveillance combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including Frequency is indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it controlled under may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit. qhe Frequency is based upon operating experience that the Surveillance demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK Frequency supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels Control Program. during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.5.1.2, SR 3.3.5.1.3, and SR 3.3.5.1.5 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all (continued)
DAEC B 3.3-137 TSC R--26,'-'
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1.2, SR 3.3.5.1.3, and SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other ,
Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
ISurveillance Th6Frequency of 92 daysfor SR 3.3.5.1.3 is based on the reliability analyses of Reference 5.
Isurveillance I ThFrequencies of 31 days and 12 ,,,nth-(SR 3.3.5.1.2 and SR 3.3.5.1.5,-fespeetiveiy) are based upon engineering judgment and Tl.rk II i C Ul V
. ILC A.Olllal the reliability of the components.
Frequencies are R 3.3.5.1.4, SR 3.3.5.1.6, SR 3.3.5.1.7, and SR 3.3.5.1.8 controlled under the Surveillance A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the Frequency instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel Control Program. responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
The Surveillance The Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.4 is based upon the assumptien ef a Frequencies are 92 day calibr-ation intcrwal in the dctcrmfinaticn ef the magnitude of controlled under equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
the Surveillance Thuency of SR 3.3.5.1.6 is based upon the assum7,ten' Frequency Control Program. 12 mont ibration interval in the determination of magnitude of equipment
~~the o se ntanaly tpin sis.~~
~~The Frequency of SR 3m .i~~
~~upon the assumption of an 18 month calibration inte determination of the magnitude of equpm ft in the se, n nlsis.~~
The Frequ of SR 3.3.5.1.8 is based upon the umption of a 24 m calibration interval in the determination of the nitude quipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
(continued)
TSC B 3.3-138 DAEC B 3.3-138 TSCR-D2&ý'Ln
ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1.9 REQUIREMENI IS (continued) The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.1, LCO 3.5.2, LCO 3.8.1, and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance The Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function.
Frequency is controllediunder J The 24-nont-r Frequency is based on the need to perform this the Surveillance Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage Frequency and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience Control Program.
has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the ---m 'tFrequency.
REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 5.4.7. Hthisj
~~2. UFSAR, Section 6.3.2.~~
~~3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.~~
~~4. NEDC-32980P, "Safety Analysis Report for Duane Arnold Energy Center Extended Power Uprate," Rev. 1, April 2001.~~
~~5. NEDC-30936-P-A, "BWR Owners' Group Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part 2," December 1988.~~
DAEC B 3.3-139 TSCR--O44AL
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES (continued)
SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each RCIC REQUIREMENTS System instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.2-1.
The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed as follows: (a) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Functions 2 and 3; and (b) for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months for Function 1, provided the associated Function maintains trip capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 1) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the RCIC will initiate when necessary. Because the Ref. 1 analysis made no assumptions regarding the elapsed time between testing of consecutive channels in the same logic, it is not necessary to remove jumpers/relay blocks or reconnect lifted leads used to prevent actuation of the trip logic during testing of logic channels with instruments in series solely for the purpose of administering the AOT clocks, provided that the AOT allowance is not exceeded on a per instrument channel basis.
SR 3.3.5.2.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK cncc cvcry 24 hU..
ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred.
A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a parameter on other similar channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
(continued)
DAEC B 3.3-148 AI , endi, ient 223
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2.1 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a The Surveillance combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including Frequency is indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its controlled under limit.
the Surveillance Frequency -\The Frequency is based upon operating experience that Control Program. demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.5.2.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an /1 acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is The Surveillance acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay Frequency is are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with controlled under applicable extenstions.
the Surveillance Frequency The Frequency ef--92-daysis based on the reliability analysis of Control Program. Reference 1.
SR 3.3.5.2.3 and SR 3.3.5.2.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel The Surveillance responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel Frequency is adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive controlled under calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint the Surveillance methodology.
Frequency Control Program. The Frequency ef SR 33.5. is based upon the dsurIIpton, nof a 12 m-nth ealibrtion into'" al in the d'tf""minaton ef the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
(continued) 11-2-01 DAEC B 3.3-149 TSCR-,02CA'
RCIC System Instrumentation B 3.3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.2.3 and SR. 3-3-52.4 (centinuad)
REQUIREMENTS 1(continued)] of SR 3.3.5.2.4 is based -fý p io'nof a 24 month calibrat etermination of the magnitude
-E . ment drift in the setpoint analysis.
SR 3.3.5.2.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the The Surveillance OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific Frequency is channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.3 controlled under overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the safety the Surveillance function.
Frequency Control Program. The 24-menth Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed atthc 24 monlth Frequency.
thi REFERENCES 1. GENE-770-06-2, "Addendum to Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.
DAEC B 3.3-150 Amen1 dmen 5 t 223
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.1.1 and SR 3.3.6.1.2 REQUIREMENTS (continued) Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once everj 12 h..urs or oncc c 24
.; hour-s. ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including The Surveillance indication and readability. Ifa channel is outside the criteria, it Frequency is may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its controlled under limit.
the 5urveiiiance Frequency ,,.-
t ........... based on operating experience that Control Program. demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK The Frequency is supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.
SR 3.3.6.1.3, and SR 3.3.6.1.4 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay V,
are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions.
(continued)
DAEC B 3.3-186 TSCR-_26AP
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANC E SR 3.3.6.1.3, and SR 3.3.6.1.4 (continued)
FS .] Su v i l n e I u v lla n c e REQUIREMEN-I The Surveillance The 9-d Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.4 is based on the reliabiliýj. ,
Frequency is analyses described in References 5 and 6. The 3-1-day-controlled under Frequency of SR 3.3.6.1.3 is based on engineering judgment and the reliability of the components.
the Surveillance Frequency SR 3.3.6.1.5, SR 3.3.6.1.6, SR 3.3.6.1.7 and SR 3.3.6.1.8 Control Program.
A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel The Surveillance adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive Frequency is calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint controlled under methodology.
the Surveillance Frequency The Frequency ef SR 3.3.6.4-5 is based on the assu'mpton-of-a-Control Program. 92 day ealibratien intewal in the d-terminatiOn of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
requency of SR 3.3.6.1 .6 is based on the assump*no 184 da libration interval in the determination ofthermagnitude of equipmen i in the setpoint analsis.
The Frequency of SR 3.3.61.8 is ed on the assumption of a 12 month calibration of equipment drit n interva ehtpoint an determination of the magnitude i.*
The Frequ of SR 3.3618 sbsed on the umption of a 24m caltibrraftion tilnterval in thendetersmination of antd quipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
(continued)
DAEC B 3.3-187 11 TSCBR-.D44-k
Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.1 BASES SURVEILLANC TE SR 3.3.6.1.9 REQUIREMEN ITS (continued) The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the The Surveillance OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific Frequency is channel. The system functional testing performed on PCIVs in LCO 3.6.1.3 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing controlled under of the assumed safety function.KIThe 24-menth Frequency is the Surveillance based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the Frequency conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an Control Program. unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the Frequency.
REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.2. 1
~~2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.~~
~~3. NEDO-31466, "Technical Specification Screening Criteria Application and Risk Assessment," November 1987.~~
~~4. UFSAR, Section 9.3.4.2.~~
~~5. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation,"~~
~~July 1990.~~
~~6. NEDC-30851 P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.~~
~~7. UFSAR, Section 7.3.~~
~~8. UFSAR, Section 15.2.1.5.~~
(continued)
DAEC B 3.3-188 TSCR-Q4*9"
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a REQUIREMENTS channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of (continued) required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months provided the associated Function maintains secondary containment isolation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Refs. 4 and 5) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the SCIV/Ds will isolate the associated penetration flow paths and that the SBGT System will initiate when necessary.
SR 3.3.6.2.1 and SR 3.3.6.2.2 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK either once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months or once eve,-y 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. Agreement criteria are determined by the plant staff based on a combination of the channel instrument The Surveillance uncertainties, including indication and readability. If a channel is Frequency is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has controlled under drifted outside its limit.
the Surveillance Frequency The Froqu--nccs arc based on operating experience that Control Program. demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK The Frequency is supplements less formal, but more frequent, checks of channel status during normal operational use of the displays associated with channels required by the LCO.
(continued) 22d3 DAEC B 3.3-198
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.2.3 REQUIREMENTS (continued) A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state The Surveillance of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an Frequency is controlled under acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay
'I the Surveillance are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Frequency Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with Control Program. applicable extensions.
The Frequemy of 92 days is based on the reliability analysis of References 4 and 5.
SR 3.3.6.2.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range The Surveillance and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel Frequency is adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive controlled under calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.
the Surveillance Frequency The Frequency of SR 3.. 64is based on the as.u.p.ien efa-Control Program. 24 m^-nth calibr-ati-n in the detormination of
.nte '-al magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
SR 3.3.6.2.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required isolation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed on SCIV/Ds and the SBGT System in LCO 3.6.4.2 and LCO 3.6.4.3, respectively, overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.
The Surveillance Frequency is The 24*month Frequency is based on the need to perform this controlled under Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage the Surveillance and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance Frequency were performed with the reactor at power.
Control Program.
(continued)
A911201 DAEC B 3.3-199 TSCR-D026A`-
Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.6.2.5 (continued)
REQUIREMENTS Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month-Frequency. th REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.3.
~~2. UFSAR, Chapter 15.~~
~~3. UFSAR, Section 15.2.1.~~
~~4. NEDC-30851P-A Supplement 2, "Technical Specifications Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Instrumentation Common to RPS and ECCS Instrumentation," March 1989.~~
~~5. NEDC-31677P-A, "Technical Specification Improvement Analysis for BWR Isolation Actuation Instrumentation,"~~
July 1990.
DAEC B 3.3-200 TSCR-D*4]9I
LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE does not significantly reduce the probability that the LLS valves REQUIREMENTS will initiate when necessary.
(continued)
SR 3.3.6.3.1. and SR 3.3.6.3.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an The Surveillance acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is N /
acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay /
Frequency is are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical controlled under Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with the Surveillance applicable extensions.
Frequency Control Program. The 92-day Frequency is based on the reliability analysis of Reference 3.
A portion of the SRV tailpipe pressure switch channels is located inside the primary containment and is not available for testing during reactor operation. Therefore, SR 3.3.6.3.1 is only required on that portion of the channel that is outside primary containment.
SR 3.3.6.3.3, SR 3.3.6.3.4, and SR 3.3.6.3.5 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the The Surveillance measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy.
Frequency is CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account controlled under for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent the Surveillance with the plant specific setpoint methodology..*he Frequency-of-once every 92 days for SR 3.3.6.3.3, 184 days fer GR 3.3.6.3.4, Frequency
,nd 2,4 months-, fr SR 3.3.6.3.5 is based on the assumption of the Control Program. ....... -.. -Q.~1..
.iR-; -- :- ... i. A . r..-... .. A.if th, magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
(continued)
DAEC B 3.3-207 TSCR-026A-1 7 j
LLS Instrumentation B 3.3.6.3 BASES SURVEILLAN4 SR 3.3.6.3.6 REQUIREMEI' 4JTS (continued) The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPFRARIILITY of the. recairiid *c~tiiation Ionic. for * .*n*..ifi*.d The Surveillance channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.4.3, Frequency is "Safety Relief Valves (SRVs)" and LCO 3.6.1.5, "Low-Low Set controlled under (LLS) Safety Relief Valves (SRVs)," for SRVs overlaps this test to the Surveillance provide complete testing of the assumed safety function.
Frequency Control Program. The Frequency of once every 24 months for SR 3.3.6.3.6 is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed att Frequency.
REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Figure 7.6-31.
~~2. NEDE-30021-P, Low-Low Set Relief Logic System and Lower MSIV Water Level Trip for the DAEC, January 1983.~~
~~3. GENE-770-06-1, "Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," February 1991.~~
4 UFSAR, Chapter 15.
DAEC B 3.3-208 TSCR-044AEZ
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 (continued)
If the Required Action and associated Completion Time is not met, the associated Function is not capable of performing the intended function. Therefore, the associated DG(s) is declared inoperable immediately. This requires entry into applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1 and LCO 3.8.2, which provide appropriate actions for the inoperable DG(s).
SURVEILLANCE As noted at the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each LOP REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are located in the SRs column of Table 3.3.8.1-1.
The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months provided the associated Function maintains DG initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 2 hour2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken.
SR 3.3.8.1.1 and SR 3.3.8.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state The Surveillance of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an Frequency is acceptable CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of a relay. This is controlled under acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay /
the Surveillance are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Frequency Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with Control Program. applicable extensions.
The Frequency is
-The Fe !f 31 days an*d 12 montIhs am based on operating experience with regard to channel OPERABILITY and drift, which demonstrates that failure of more than one channel of a given Function in any 3 da, interval Or 12 menth inteal (as
.aP..pFi"ate* is a rare event.
(continued)
DAEC B 3.3-222 TSCR-.267[ 20
LOP Instrumentation B 3.3.8.1 BASES SURVEILLANC E SR 3.3.8.1.3 and SR 3.3.8.1.4 REQUIREMEN TS (continued) A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop and the sensor. This test verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range The Surveillance and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive Frequency is calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint controlled under methodology. Any setpoint adjustment shall be consistent with the Surveillance the assumptions of the current plant specific setpoint Frequency methodology.
Control Program.
The Frequency is The Frgnie r based upon the assumptien of either a 129mnth or 24 month a,,braton interval On the deter iii-atioi of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.
SR 3.3.8.1.5 The Surveillance The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the Frequency is OPERABILITY of the required actuation logic for a specific controlled under channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.8.1 the Surveillance and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to provide complete Frequency testing of the assumed safety functions.
Control Program.
The 24 menth Frequency is based on the need to perform this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed a -th-is e Frequency.
REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 6.2.
~~2. UFSAR, Section 6.3.~~
~~3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.~~
DAEC B 3.3-223 TSCR-O44A[Z
Attachment 4 to NG-11-0299 TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) vs. DAEC Cross-Reference Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF-425 DAEC Notes Description*
Control Rod Operability 3.1.3 3.1.3 Control rod position 3.1.3.1 3.1.3.1 Notch test - fully withdrawn control rod one notch 3.1.3.2 3.1.3.2 DAEC has Notch test - partially withdrawn control rod one notch 3.1.3.3 3.1.3.2 adopted TSTF-475 Control Rod Scram Times 3.1.4 3.1.4 Scram time testing 3.1.4.2 Control Rod Scram Accumulators 3.1.5 3.1.5 Control rod scram accumulator pressure 3.1.5.1 3.1.5.1 Rod Pattern Control 3.1.6 3.1.6 Analyzed rod position sequence 3.1.6.1 3.1.6.1 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System 3.1.7 3.1.7 Volume of sodium pentaborate 3.1.7.1 3.1.7.1 Temperature of sodium pentaborate solution 3.1.7.2 3.1.7.2 Temperature of pump suction piping 3.1.7.3 3.1.7.3 Continuity of explosive charge 3.1.7.4 3.1.7.4 Concentration of boron solution 3.1.7.5 3.1.7.5 Manual/power operated valve position 3.1.7.6 --
DAEC Pump flow rate 3.1.7.7 Frequency is controlled by IST Program Flow through one SLC subsystem 3.1.7.8 3.1.7.7 Heat traced piping is unblocked 3.1.7.9 3.1.7.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent & Drain Valves 3.1.8 3.1.8 Each SDV vent & drain valve open 3.1.8.1 3.1.8.1 DAEC Cycle each SDV vent & drain valve fully closed/fully open 3.1.8.2 Frequency is position controlled by IST Program Each SDV vent & drain valve closes on receipt of scram 3.1.8.3 3.1.8.3 Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR) 3.2.1 3.2.1 APLHGR less than or equal to limits 3.2.1.1 3.2.1.1 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) 3.2.2 3.2.2 MCPR greater than or equal to limits 3.2.2.1 3.2.2.1 Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR) 3.2.3 N/A LHGR less than or equal to limits 3.2.3.1 N/A Average Power Range Monitor (APRM) Gain & Setpoints 3.2.4 N/A MFLPD is within limits 3.2.4.1 N/A APRM setpoints or gain are adjusted for calculated MFLPD 3.2.4.2 N/A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 3.3.1.1 Channel Check 3.3.1.1.1 3.3.1.1.1 Absolute diff. between APRM channels & calculated power 3.3.1.1.2 3.3.1.1.2 Adjust channel to conform to calibrated flow (APRM STP - Hi) 3.3.1.1.3 3.3.1.1.17 Page 1 of 11
Attachment 4 to NG-11-0299 TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) vs. DAEC Cross-Reference Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF-425 DAEC Notes Description*
Functional Test of automatic scram contactors -- 3.3.1.1.3 Channel Functional Test (after entering Mode 2) 3.3.1.1.4 3.3.1.1.4 Channel Functional Test (7 days) 3.3.1.1.5 3.3.1.1.5 IRM/APRM channel overlap -- 3.3.1.1.7 Calibrate local power range monitors 3.3.1.1.6 3.3.1.1.8 Channel Functional Test ([92] days) 3.3.1.1.7 3.3.1.1.9 Calibrate trip units (92 days) 3.3.1.1.8 3.3.1.1.10 Channel Calibration (92 days) -- 3.3.1.1.11 Channel Calibration (184 days) 3.3.1.1.9 3.3.1.1.12 Channel Functional Test ([18] month) 3.3.1.1.10 3.3.1.1.13 Channel Calibration ([18] month) 3.3.1.1.11 3.3.1.1.14 Verify APRM Flow Biased STP - High 3.3.1.1.12 --
Logic System Functional Test 3.3.1.1.13 3.3.1.1.15 Verify TSV/TCV closure/Trip Oil Press-Low Not Bypassed 3.3.1.1.14 3.3.1.1.16 Verify RPS Response Time 3.3.1.1.15 3.3.1.1.18 Verify RPS logic system response time -- 3.3.1.1.19 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation 3.3.1.2 3.3.1.2 Channel Check (12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ) 3.3.1.2.1 3.3.1.2.1 Verify Operable SRM Detector 3.3.1.2.2 3.3.1.2.2 Channel Check (24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ) 3.3.1.2.3 3.3.1.2.3 Verify count rate 3.3.1.2.4 3.3.1.2.4 Channel Functional Test (Mode 5) (7 days) 3.3.1.2.5 3.3.1.2.5 Channel Functional Test (Modes 2, 3, 4) (31 days) 3.3.1.2.6 3.3.1.2.6 Channel Calibration 3.3.1.2.7 3.3.1.2.7 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.2.1 3.3.2.1 Channel Functional Test (quarterly) 3.3.2.1.1 3.3.2.1.1 Channel Functional Test (rod withdrawal MODE 2) 3.3.2.1.2 3.3.2.1.2 Channel Functional Test (thermal power < 10% RTP in MODE 1) 3.3.2.1.3 3.3.2.1.3 Verify RBM not bypassed 3.3.2.1.4 3.3.2.1.4 Verify RWM not bypassed (thermal power < 10%) 3.3.2.1.5 --
Channel Functional Test 3.3.2.1.6 3.3.2.1.6 Channel Calibration 3.3.2.1.7 3.3.2.1.5 Feedwater & Main Turbine High Water Level Trip 3.3.2.2 N/A Instrumentation Channel Check 3.3.2.2.1 N/A Channel Functional Test 3.3.2.2.2 N/A Channel Calibration 3.3.2.2.3 N/A Logic System Functional Test 3.3.2.2.4 N/A Post Accident Monitor (PAM) Instrumentation 3.3.3.1 3.3.3.1 Channel Check 3.3.3.1.1 3.3.3.1.1 Calibration 3.3.3.1.2 3.3.3.1.2 Remote Shutdown System 3.3.3.2 3.3.3.2 Channel Check 3.3.3.2.1 --
Verify control circuit and transfer switch capable of function 3.3.3.2.2 3.3.3.2.1 Page 2 of 11
Attachment 4 to NG-11-0299 TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) vs. DAEC Cross-Reference Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF-425 DAEC Notes Description*
Channel Calibration 3.3.3.2.3 3.3.3.2.2 End-of-Cycle-Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) Instrumentation 3.3.4.1 3.3.4.1 Channel Functional Test 3.3.4.1.1 3.3.4.1.1 Calibrate trip units 3.3.4.1.2 --
Channel Calibration 3.3.4.1.3 3.3.4.1.2 Logic System Functional Test 3.3.4.1.4 3.3.4.1.3 Verify TSV/TCV Closure/Trip Oil Press-Low Not Bypassed 3.3.4.1.5 3.3.4.1.4 Verify EOC-RPT System Response Time 3.3.4.1.6 3.3.4.1.5 Determine RPT breaker interruption time 3.3.4.1.7 --
Anticipated Trip Without Scram-RPT Instrumentation 3.3.4.2 3.3.4.2 Channel Check 3.3.4.2.1 3.3.4.2.1 Channel Functional Test 3.3.4.2.2 3.3.4.2.2 Calibrate trip units 3.3.4.2.3 --
Channel Calibration 3.3.4.2.4 3.3.4.2.3 Logic System Functional Test 3.3.4.2.5 3.3.4.2.4 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation 3.3.5.1 3.3.5.1 Channel Check 3.3.5.1.1 3.3.5.1.1 Channel Functional Test (Monthly) -- 3.3.5.1.2 Channel Functional Test (92 days) 3.3.5.1.2 3.3.5.1.3 Calibrate trip units 3.3.5.1.3 --
Channel Calibration (92 days) 3.3.5.1.4 3.3.5.1.4 Channel Functional Test (Annually) -- 3.3.1.5.5 Channel Calibration (Annually) -- 3.3.5.1.6 Channel Calibration (18 months) -- 3.3.5.1.7 Channel Calibration ([18] months) 3.3.5.1.5 3.3.5.1.8 Logic System Functional Test 3.3.5.1.6 3.3.5.1.9 Verify ECCS Response Time 3.3.5.1.7 N/A Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System 3.3.5.2 3.3.5.2 Instrumentation Channel Check 3.3.5.2.1 3.3.5.2.1 Channel Functional Test 3.3.5.2.2 3.3.5.2.2 Calibrate trip units 3.3.5.2.3 --
Channel Calibration (92 days) 3.3.5.2.4 --
Channel Calibration (Annually) -- 3.3.5.2.3 Channel Calibration ([18] months) 3.3.5.2.5 3.3.5.2.4 Logic System Functional Test 3.3.5.2.6 3.3.5.2.5 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.1 3.3.6.1 Channel Check (12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ) 3.3.6.1.1 3.3.6.1.1 Channel Check (Daily) -- 3.3.6.1.2 Channel Functional Test (Monthly) -- 3.3.6.1.3 Channel Functional Test ([92] days) 3.3.6.1.2 3.3.6.1.4 Calibrate trip units 3.3.6.1.3 --
Channel Calibration (92 days) 3.3.6.1.4 3.3.6.1.5 Channel Functional Test ([184] days) 3.3.6.1.5 --
Page 3 of 11
Attachment 4 to NG-11-0299 TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) vs. DAEC Cross-Reference Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF-425 DAEC Notes Description*
Channel Calibration (Semi-annually) -- 3.3.6.1.6 Channel Calibration (Annually) -- 3.3.6.1.7 Channel Calibration ([18] months) 3.3.6.1.6 3.3.6.1.8 Logic System Functional Test 3.3.6.1.7 3.3.6.1.9 Verify Isolation Response Time 3.3.6.1.8 N/A Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 3.3.6.2 Channel Check (12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months ) 3.3.6.2.1 3.3.6.2.1 Channel Check (Daily) -- 3.3.6.2.2 Channel Functional Test 3.3.6.2.2 3.3.6.2.3 Calibrate trip units 3.3.6.2.3 --
Channel Calibration ([92) days) 3.3.6.2.4 --
Channel Calibration ([18] months) 3.3.6.2.5 3.3.6.2.4 Logic System Functional Test 3.3.6.2.6 3.3.6.2.5 Verify Isolation Response Time 3.3.6.2.7 N/A Low-Low-Set (LLS) Instrumentation 3.3.6.3 3.3.6.3 Channel Check 3.3.6.3.1 --
Channel Functional Test (outside containment) 3.3.6.3.2 3.3.6.3.1 Channel Functional Test (inside containment) 3.3.6.3.3 --
Channel Functional Test ([92] days) 3.3.6.3.4 3.3.6.3.2 Calibrate trip units 3.3.6.3.5 --
Channel Calibration (Quarterly) -- 3.3.6.3.3 Channel Calibration (Semi-annually) -- 3.3.6.3.4 Channel Calibration ([18] months) 3.3.6.3.6 3.3.6.3.5 Logic System Functional Test 3.3.6.3.7 3.3.6.3.6 Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC) 3.3.7.1 3.3.7.1 Instrumentation Channel Check 3.3.7.1.1 3.3.7.1.1 Channel Functional Test 3.3.7.1.2 3.3.7.1.2 Calibrate trip units 3.3.7.1.3 --
Channel Calibration 3.3.7.1.4 3.3.7.1.3 Logic System Functional Test 3.3.7.1.5 3.3.7.1.4 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation 3.3.8.1 3.3.8.1 Channel Check 3.3.8.1.1 --
Channel Functional Test (31 days) 3.3.8.1.2 3.3.8.1.1 Channel Functional Test (Annually) -- 3.3.8.1.2 Channel Calibration (Annually) -- 3.3.8.1.3 Channel Calibration ([18] months) 3.3.8.1.3 3.3.8.1.4 Channel Functional Test (Loss of Voltage) -- 3.3.8.1.3 Logic System Functional Test 3.3.8.1.4 3.3.8.1.5 RPS Electric Power Monitoring 3.3.8.2 3.3.8.2 Channel Functional Test 3.3.8.2.1 3.3.8.2.1 Channel Calibration 3.3.8.2.2 3.3.8.2.2 System functional test 3.3.8.2.3 3.3.8.2.3 Recirculation Loops Operating 3.4.1 3.4.1 Page 4 of 11
Attachment 4 to NG-11-0299 TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) vs. DAEC Cross-Reference Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF-425 DAEC Notes Description*
Recirculation loop jet pump flow mismatch 3.4.1.1 3.4.1.1 Verify operation outside Exclusion Zone -- 3.4.1.2 Jet Pumps 3.4.2 3.4.2 Jet pump parameters match established patterns 3.4.2.1 3.4.2.1 Safety/Relief Valves (SRVs) 3.4.3 3.4.3 DAEC Frequency is 3.4.3.1 -- cr olle d by Safety function lift setpoints controlled by IST Program SRV opens when manually actuated 3.4.3.2 3.4.3.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Operational Leakage 3.4.4 3.4.4 RCS unidentified and total leakage increase within limits 3.4.4.1 3.4.4.1 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage 3.4.5 N/A Equivalent leakage of each PIV 3.4.5.1 N/A RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation 3.4.6 3.4.5 Channel Check 3.4.6.1 3.4.5.1 Channel Functional Test (31 days) 3.4.6.2 3.4.5.2 Channel Functional Test (Quarterly) -- 3.4.5.3 Channel Calibration (Quarterly) -- 3.4.5.4 Channel Calibration ([18] months) 3.4.6.3 3.4.5.5 RCS Specific Activity 3.4.7 3.4.6 Dose Equivalent 1-131 specific activity 3.4.7.1 3.4.6.1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling - Hot 3.4.8 3.4.7 Shutdown One RHR Shutdown cooling subsystem operating 3.4.8.1 3.4.7.1 RHR Shutdown Cooling - Cold Shutdown 3.4.9 3.4.8 One RHR Shutdown cooling subsystem operating 3.4.9.1 3.4.8.1 RCS Pressure/Temperature Limit 3.4.10 3.4.9 RCS pressure, temperature, heatup and cooldown rates 3.4.10.1 3.4.9.1 RPV flange/head flange temperatures (tensioning head bolt stud) 3.4.10.7 3.4.9.5 RPV flange/head flange temperatures (after RCS temp < 80 0 F) 3.4.10.8 3.4.9.6 RPV flange/head flange temperatures (after RCS temp < 100'F) 3.4.10.9 3.4.9.7 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure 3.4.11 3.4.10 Verify reactor steam dome pressure 3.4.11.1 3.4.10.1 ECCS - Operating 3.5.1 3.5.1 Verify injection/spray piping filled with water 3.5.1.1 3.5.1.1 Verify each valve in flow path is in correct position 3.5.1.2 3.5.1.2 Verify ADS header pressure 3.5.1.3 3.5.1.3 Verify RHR (LPCI) cross tie valve is closed and power removed 3.5.1.4 N/A Verify LPCI inverter output voltage 3.5.1.5 N/A DAEC Frequency is Verify ECCS pumps develop specified flow 3.5.1.7 -- cr olle d by controlled by IST Program Page 5 of 1
Attachment 4 to NG-11-0299 TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) vs. DAEC Cross-Reference Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF-425 DAEC Notes Description*
DAEC Verify HPCI flow rate (Rx press < 1020, > 920) 3.5.1.8 -- Frequency is controlled by IST Program Verify HPCI flow rate (Rx press < [165] psig) 3.5.1.9 3.5.1.6 Verify ECCS actuates on initiation signal 3.5.1.10 3.5.1.7 Verify ADS actuates on initiation signal 3.5.1.11 3.5.1.8 Verify each ADS valve opens when manually actuated 3.5.1.12 3.5.1.9 ECCS - Shutdown 3.5.2 3.5.2 Verify, for LPCI, suppression pool water level 3.5.2.1 3.5.2.1 Verify, for CS, suppression pool water level and CST water level 3.5.2.2 3.5.2.2 Verify ECCS piping filled with water 3.5.2.3 3.5.2.3 Verify each valve in flow path is in correct position 3.5.2.4 3.5.2.4 DAEC Frequencyd is by Verify each ECCS pump develops flow 3.5.2.5 -- cr olle controlled by IST Program Verify ECCS actuates on initiation signal 3.5.2.6 3.5.2.6 RCIC System 3.5.3 3.5.3 Verify RCIC piping filled with water 3.5.3.1 3.5.3.1 Verify each valve in flow path is in correct position 3.5.3.2 3.5.3.2 Verify RCIC flow rate (Rx press <1020, >920) 3.5.3.3 DAEC Frequency is controlled by IST Program Verify RCIC flow rate (Rx press < 165) 3.5.3.4 3.5.3.4 Verify RCIC actuates on initiation signal 3.5.3.5 3.5.3.5 Primary Containment 3.6.1.1 3.6.1.1 Verify drywell to suppression chamber differential pressure 3.6.1.1.2 3.6.1.1.2 Primary Containment Air Lock 3.6.1.2 3.6.1.2 Verify only one door can be opened at a time 3.6.1.2.2 3.6.1.2.2 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) 3.6.1.3 3.6.1.3 Verify purge valve is sealed closed 3.6.1.3.1 --
Verify each 18 inch purge valve is closed 3.6.1.3.2 3.6.1.3.1 Verify each manual PCIV outside containment is closed 3.6.1.3.3 Verify continuity of traversing incore probe (TIP) shear valve 3.6.1.3.5 3.6.1.3.2 DAEC Frequency is Verify isolation time of each power operated PCIV 3.6.1.3.6 -- cr olle d by controlled by IST Program Perform leakage rate testing on each PC purge valve 3.6.1.3.7 3.6.1.3.4 DAEC Verify isolation time of MSIVs 3.6.1.3.8 -- Frequency is controlled by Page 6 of 11
Attachment 4 to NG-1 1-0299 TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) vs. DAEC Cross-Reference Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF-425 DAEC Notes Description*
IST Program Verify automatic PCIV actuates to isolation position 3.6.1.3.9 3.6.1.3.6 Verify sample of Excess Flow Check Valves actuate 3.6.1.3.10 3.6.1.3.7 DAEC Test explosive squib from each shear valve 3.6.1.3.11 Frequency is controlled by IST Program Verify each purge valve is blocked 3.6.1.3.15 --
Drywell Pressure 3.6.1.4 N/A Verify drywell pressure is within limit 3.6.1.4.1 N/A Drywell Average Air Temperature 3.6.1.5 3.6.1.4 Verify drywell average air temperature is within limit 3.6.1.5.1 3.6.1.4.1 LLS Valves 3.6.1.6 3.6.1.5 Verify each LLS valve opens when manually actuated 3.6.1.6.1 3.6.1.5.1 Verify LLS system actuates on initiation signal 3.6.1.6.2 3.6.1.5.2 Reactor Building - Suppression Chamber Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.7 3.6.1.6 Verify each vacuum breaker is closed 3.6.1.7.1 3.6.1.6.1 Perform functional test on each vacuum breaker 3.6.1.7.2 3.6.1.6.2 Verify opening setpoint for each vacuum breaker 3.6.1.7.3 3.6.1.6.3 Suppression Chamber - Drywell Vacuum Breakers 3.6.1.8 3.6.1.7 Verify each vacuum breaker is closed 3.6.1.8.1 3.6.1.7.1 Perform functional test on each vacuum breaker 3.6.1.8.2 3.6.1.7.2 Verify opening setpoint for each vacuum breaker 3.6.1.8.3 3.6.1.7.3 Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control System 3.6.1.9 N/A Operate each MSIV LCS blower 3.6.1.9.1 N/A Verify continuity of inboard MSIV LCS heater element 3.6.1.9.2 N/A Perform functional test of each MSIV LCS subsystem 3.6.1.9.3 N/A Suppression Pool Average Temperature 3.6.2.1 3.6.2.1 Verify suppression pool average temperature within limits 3.6.2.1.1 3.6.2.1.1 Suppression Pool Water Level 3.6.2.2 3.6.2.2 Verify suppression pool water level within limits 3.6.2.2.1 3.6.2.2.1 RHR Suppression Pool Cooling 3.6.2.3 3.6.2.3 Verify each valve in flow path is in correct position 3.6.2.3.1 3.6.2.3.1 DAEC Frequency is Verify each RHR pump develops flow rate 3.6.2.3.2 -- crolled by controlled by IST Program RHR Suppression Pool Spray 3.6.2.4 3.6.2.4 Verify each valve in flow path is in correct position 3.6.2.4.1 --
Verify RHR pump develops flow rate 3.6.2.4.2 --
Verify spray nozzle unobstructed 3.6.2.4.1 Drywell - Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure 3.6.2.5 N/A Verify differential pressure is within limit 3.6.2.5.1 N/A Drywell Cooling System Fans 3.6.3.1 N/A Page 7 of 1
Attachment 4 to NG-11-0299 TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) vs. DAEC Cross-Reference Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF-425 DAEC Notes Description*
Operate each fan > 15 minutes 3.6.3.1.1 N/A Verify each fan flow rate 3.6.3.1.2 N/A Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration 3.6.3.2 3.6.3.2 Verify PC oxygen concentration is within limits 3.6.3.2.1 3.6.3.2.1 Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) System 3.6.3.3 N/A Verify CAD liquid nitrogen storage 3.6.3.3.1 N/A Verify each CAD valve in flow path is in correct position 3.6.3.3.2 N/A Secondary Containment 3.6.4.1 3.6.4.1 Verify SC vacuum 3.6.4.1.1 --
Verify all SC equipment hatches closed and sealed 3.6.4.1.2 3.6.4.1.1 Verify one SC access door in each opening is closed 3.6.4.1.3 3.6.4.1.2 Verify SC drawn down using one SGTS 3.6.4.1.4 --
Verify SC can be maintained using one SGTS 3.6.4.1.5 3.6.4.1.3 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves 3.6.4.2 3.6.4.2 Verify each SC isolation manual valve is closed 3.6.4.2.1 --
Verify isolation time of each SCIV 3.6.4.2.2 3.6.4.2.1 Verify each automatic SCIV actuates to isolation position 3.6.4.2.3 3.6.4.2.2 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System 3.6.4.3 3.6.4.3 Operate each SGT subsystem with heaters operating 3.6.4.3.1 3.6.4.3.1 Verify each SGT subsystem actuates on initiation signal 3.6.4.3.3 3.6.4.3.3 Verify each SGT filter cooler bypass damper can be opened 3.6.4.3.4 3.6.4.3.4 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System 3.7.1 3.7.1 Verify each RHRSW valve in flow path in correct position 3.7.1.1 3.7.1.1 Plant Service Water (PSW) System and Ultimate Heat Sink 3.7.2 3.7.2 (UHS)
Verify water level in cooling tower basin 3.7.2.1 3.7.2.1 Verify water level in pump well of pump structure 3.7.2.2 --
Verify average water temperature of heat sink 3.7.2.3 3.7.2.2 Verify river water depth (Daily) -- 3.7.2.3 Operate each cooling tower fan 3.7.2.4 --
Verify each PSW valve in flow path is in correct position 3.7.2.5 3.7.2.4 Verify river water depth (Quarterly) -- 3.7.2.5 Verify PSW actuates on initiation signal 3.7.2.6 3.7.2.6 Diesel Generator (DG) Standby Service Water (SSW) System 3.7.3 3.7.3 Verify each valve in flow path is in correct position 3.7.3.1 3.7.3.1 Verify pump starts automatically 3.7.3.2 3.7.3.2 MCREC System 3.7.4 3.7.4 Operate each MCREC subsystem 3.7.4.1 3.7.4.1 Verify each subsystem actuates on initiation signal 3.7.4.3 3.7.4.3 DAEC has Verify each subsystem can maintain positive pressure 3.7.4.4 implemented TSTF-448 Control Room Air Conditioning System 3.7.5 3.7.5 Verify each subsystem has capability to remove heat load 3.7.5.1 3.7.5.1 Page 8 of 11
Attachment 4 to NG-11-0299 TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) vs. DAEC Cross-Reference Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF-425 DAEC Notes Description*
Main Condenser Offgas 3.7.6 3.7.6 Verify gross gamma activity rate of the noble gases 3.7.6.1 3.7.6.1 Main Turbine Bypass System 3.7.7 3.7.7 Verify one complete cycle of each main turbine bypass valve 3.7.7.1 3.7.7.1 Perform system functional test 3.7.7.2 3.7.7.2 Verify Turbine Bypass System Response Time within limits 3.7.7.3 3.7.7.3 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7.8 3.7.8 Verify spent fuel storage pool water level 3.7.8.1 3.7.8.1 CB/SBGT Instrument Air System -- 3.7.9 Operate each CB/SBGT Instrument Air compressor 3.7.9.1 Verify each CB/SBGT Instrument Air subsystem automatically 3.7.9.2 actuates AC Sources - Operating 3.8.1 3.8.1 Verify correct breaker alignment 3.8.1.1 3.8.1.1 Verify each DG starts from standby conditions/steady state 3.8.1.2 3.8.1.2 Verify each DG is synchronized and loaded 3.8.1.3 3.8.1.3 Verify each day tank level 3.8.1.4 3.8.1.4 Check for and remove accumulated water from day tank 3.8.1.5 3.8.1.5 Verify fuel oil transfer system operates 3.8.1.6 3.8.1.6 Verify each DG starts from standby conditions/quick start 3.8.1.7 3.8.1.7 Verify transfer of power from offsite circuit to alternate circuit 3.8.1.8 3.8.1.8 Verify DG rejects load greater than single largest load 3.8.1.9 3.8.1.9 Verify DG maintains load following load reject 3.8.1.10 --
Verify on loss of offsite power signal 3.8.1.11 Verify DG starts on ECCS initiation signal 3.8.1.12 --
Verify DG automatic trips bypassed on ECCS initiation signal 3.8.1.13 3.8.1.10 Verify each DG operates for > 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 3.8.1.14 --
Verify each DG starts from standby conditions/quick restart 3.8.1.15 --
Verify each DG synchronizes with offsite power 3.8.1.16 3.8.1.11 Verify ECCS initiation signal overrides test mode 3.8.1.17 --
Verify interval between each timed load block 3.8.1.18 3.8.1.12 Verify on LOOP in conjunction with ECCS initiation signal 3.8.1.19 3.8.1.13 Verify simultaneous DG starts 3.8.1.20 --
Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air 3.8.3 3.8.3 Verify fuel oil storage tank volume 3.8.3.1 3.8.3.1 Verify lube oil inventory 3.8.3.2 3.8.3.2 Verify each DG air start receiver pressure 3.8.3.4 3.8.3.4 Check/remove accumulated water from fuel oil storage tank 3.8.3.5 3.8.3.5 DC Sources - Operating 3.8.4 3.8.4 Verify battery terminal voltage 3.8.4.1 3.8.4.1 Verify no visible corrosion -- 3.8.4.2 Verify no physical damage or abnormal deterioration 3.8.4.3 Remove visible corrosion 3.8.4.4 Verify connection resistance 3.8.4.5 Page 9 of 11
Attachment 4 to NG-11-0299 TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) vs. DAEC Cross-Reference Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF-425 DAEC Notes Description*
Verify each battery charger supplies amperage 3.8.4.2 3.8.4.6 Verify battery capacity is adequate (service test) 3.8.4.3 3.8.4.7 Verify battery capacity is adequate (performance discharge test) -- 3.8.4.8 Battery Parameters 3.8.6 3.8.6 Verify battery float current 3.8.6.1 --
Verify battery pilot cell voltage 3.8.6.2 --
Verify battery connected cell electrolyte level 3.8.6.3 --
Verify battery pilot cell temperature 3.8.6.4 --
Verify battery connected cell voltage 3.8.6.5 --
Verify battery cell parameters meet Category A -- 3.8.6.1 Verify battery cell parameters meet Category B -- 3.8.6.2 Verify electrolyte temperature of representative cells -- 3.8.6.3 See 3.8.4.8 3.8.6.6 -- above Verify battery capacity during performance discharge test above Inverters - Operating 3.8.7 N/A Verify correct inverter voltage, frequency and alignment 3.8.7.1 N/A Inverters - Shutdown 3.8.8 N/A Verify correct inverter voltage, frequency and alignment 3.8.8.1 N/A Distribution System - Operating 3.8.9 3.8.7 Verify correct breaker alignment/power to distribution 3.8.9.1 3.8.7.1 subsystems Verify LPCI Swing Bus breaker coordination -- 3.8.7.2 Distribution System - Shutdown 3.8.10 3.8.8 Verify correct breaker alignment/power to distribution 3.8.10.1 3.8.8.1 subsystems Refueling Equipment Interlocks 3.9.1 3.9.1 Channel Functional Test of refueling equip interlock inputs 3.9.1.1 3.9.1.1 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock 3.9.2 3.9.2 Verify reactor mode switch locked in refuel position 3.9.2.1 3.9.2.1 Perform Channel Functional Test 3.9.2.2 3.9.2.2 Control Rod Position 3.9.3 3.9.3 Verify all control rods fully inserted 3.9.3.1 3.9.3.1 Control Rod Operability - Refuel 3.9.5 3.9.5 Insert each withdrawn control rod one notch 3.9.5.1 3.9.5.1 Verify each withdrawn control rod scram accumulator press 3.9.5.2 3.9.5.2 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level - Irradiated Fuel 3.9.6 3.9.6 Verify RPV water level 3.9.6.1 3.9.6.1 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level - New Fuel 3.9.7 N/A Verify RPV water level 3.9.7.1 N/A RHR - High Water Level 3.9.8 3.9.7 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem operating 3.9.8.1 3.9.7.1 RHR - Low Water Level 3.9.9 3.9.8 Verify one RHR shutdown cooling subsystem operating 3.9.9.1 3.9.8.1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing 3.10.2 3.10.2 Page 10 of 1I
Attachment 4 to NG-11-0299 TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433) vs. DAEC Cross-Reference Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance TSTF-425 DAEC Notes Description*
Verify all control rods fully inserted in core cells 3.10.2.1 3.10.2.1 Verify no Core Alterations in progress 3.10.2.2 3.10.2.2 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Hot Shutdown 3.10.3 3.10.3 Verify all control rods in five-by-five array are disarmed 3.10.3.2 3.10.3.2 Verify all control rods other than withdrawn rod are fully inserted 3.10.3.3 3.10.3.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown 3.10.4 3.10.4 Verify all control rods in five-by-five array are disarmed 3.10.4.2 3.10.4.2 Verify all control rods other than withdrawn rod are fully inserted 3.10.4.3 3.10.4.3 Verify a control rod withdrawal block is inserted 3.10.4.4 3.10.4.4 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal - Refuel 3.10.5 3.10.5 Verify all control rods other than withdrawn rod are fully inserted 3.10.5.1 3.10.5.1 Verify all control rods in five-by-five array are disarmed 3.10.5.2 3.10.5.2 Verify a control rod withdrawal block is inserted 3.10.5.3 3.10.5.3 Verify no other Core Alterations in progress 3.10.5.5 3.10.5.5 Multiple CRD Removal-Refuel 3.10.6 3.10.6 Verify four fuel assemblies removed from core cells 3.10.6.1 3.10.6.1 Verify all other rods in core cells inserted 3.10.6.2 3.10.6.2 Verify fuel assemblies being loaded comply with reload 3.10.6.3 3.10.6.3 sequence Shutdown Margin Test - Refueling 3.10.8 3.10.8 Verify no other Core Alterations in progress 3.10.8.4 3.10.8.4 Verify CRD charging water header pressure 3.10.8.6 3.10.8.6 Recirculation Loops - Testing 3.10.9 N/A Verify LCO 3.4.1 requirements suspended for < 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months 3.10.9.1 N/A Verify Thermal power < 5% RTP during Physics Test 3.10.9.2 N/A Training Startups 3.10.10 N/A Verify all operable IRM channels are <25/40 div. of full scale 3.10.10.1 N/A Verify average reactor coolant temperature < 200 F 3.10.10.2 N/A 5.5.15 5.5.14 New Programs (Surveillance Frequency Control Program)
Program The Technical Specification Section Title/Surveillance Description portion of this attachment is a summary description of the referenced TSTF-425 (NUREG-1433)/DAEC TS Surveillances which is provided for information purposes only and is not intended to be a verbatim description of the TS Surveillances.
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v t e Letter Sequence Response to RAI
TAC:ME5744, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - RITSTF Initiative 5B (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request Acceptance Supplement Administration Questions 3 October 2011 4 October 2011 Answers 15 August 2011 Results Approval Other: ML110890824, ML12037A087, ML120740202
MONTHYEAR2011-03-29 [Table View]

NG-11-0299, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to an Amendment to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-425, Revision 3, to Relocate Specific Surveillance Frequencies to a Licensee Controlled Program

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NG-11-0299, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to an Amendment to Adopt Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-425, Revision 3, to Relocate Specific Surveillance Frequencies to a Licensee Controlled Program

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